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  • 1.
    Boschini, Anne
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Sjögren, Anna
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI).
    Håkanson, Christina
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Rosen, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI).
    Trading Off or Having It All? Completed Fertility and Mid-career Earnings of Swedish Men and Women2010Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 2. Holden, Steinar
    et al.
    Rosén, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI).
    Discrimination and Employment Protection2014In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 12, no 6, p. 1676-1699Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We study a search model with employment protection legislation. We show that if the output from the match is uncertain at the hiring stage, a discriminatory equilibrium may exist in which workers with the same productive characteristics are subject to different hiring standards. If a bad match takes place, discriminated workers will take longer to find another job, prolonging the costly period for the firm. This makes it less profitable for firms to hire discriminated workers, thus sustaining the discrimination. In contrast to Becker's model, the existence of employers with a taste for discrimination may make it more profitable to discriminate, even for firms without discriminatory preferences.

  • 3. Holden, Steinar
    et al.
    Rosén, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI).
    Diskriminering og selvoppfyllende forventninger2014In: Samfunnsøkonomen, ISSN 1890-5250, Vol. 128, no 9, p. 60-61Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 4. Moen, Espen R.
    et al.
    Rosén, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI).
    Incentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium2011In: The Review of Economic Studies, ISSN 0034-6527, E-ISSN 1467-937X, Vol. 78, no 2, p. 733-761Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper proposes a labour market model with job search frictions where workers have private information on match quality and effort. Firms use wage contracts to motivate workers. In addition, wages are also used to attract employees. We define and characterize competitive search equilibrium in this context, and show that it satisfies a simple modified Hosios rule. We also analyse the interplay between macroeconomic variables and optimal wage contracts. Finally, we show that private information may increase the responsiveness of the unemployment rate to changes in the aggregate productivity level and, in particular, to changes in the information structure.

  • 5. Moen, Espen R.
    et al.
    Rosén, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI).
    On-the-job Search and Moral Hazard2013In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 11, no 6, p. 1404-1431Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on-the-job search. In our model, agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation. At the same time workers do on-the-job search. Deferred compensation improves workers' incentives to exert effort but distorts their on-the-job search decisions. We show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker–firm pair of on-the-job search is high. Moreover, the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback effects. If firms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation, fewer firms with vacancies enter the on-the-job search market, and this in turn reduces the distortions created by deferred compensation. These feedback effects between the incentive contracts used and the activity level in the search markets can lead to multiple equilibria: a low-turnover equilibrium where firms use deferred compensation, and a high-turnover equilibrium where they do not. Furthermore, the model predicts that firms are more likely to use deferred compensation when search frictions are high and when the gains from on-the-job search are small.

  • 6.
    Rosén, Åsa
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI).
    Moen, Espen R.
    Norwegian School of Management, Oslo.
    Does Poaching Distort Training?2002Report (Other academic)
  • 7.
    Rosén, Åsa
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI).
    Moen, Espen R.
    Norwegian School of Management, Oslo.
    Equilibrium Incentive Contracts2003Report (Other academic)
  • 8.
    Rosén, Åsa
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI).
    Moen, Espen R.
    Norwegian School of Management.
    Performance pay and adverse selection2001Report (Other academic)
  • 9.
    Rosén, Åsa
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI).
    Wasmer, Etienne
    ECARES, Université Libre de Bruxelles.
    Higher Education Levels, Firms' Outside Options and the Wage Structure2001Report (Other academic)
1 - 9 of 9
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