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  • 1.
    Häckner, Jonas
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Nyberg, Sten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Advertising and Media Market Concentration2008In: Journal of Media EconomicsArticle in journal (Refereed)
  • 2. Häckner, Jonas
    et al.
    Nyberg, Sten
    Deregulating Taxi Services; a word of Caution1995In: Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, ISSN 0022-5258, E-ISSN 1754-5951Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 3.
    Häckner, Jonas
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Nyberg, Sten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Every Viewer Has a Price : on the Differentiation of TV Channels2012In: Journal of Media Economics, ISSN 0899-7764, E-ISSN 1532-7736, Vol. 25, no 4, p. 220-243Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The authors analyzed the implications of targeted advertising on the equilibrium level of channel profile differentiation (e.g., in terms of political positioning), in free-to-air broadcasting industries. When consumers have no preferences over program content (e.g., entertainment vs. news) standard Hotelling type results apply. Market forces minimize differentiation while the optimal degree is at an intermediate level. As preferences over program content get somewhat stronger, the difference between optimal and market outcomes is initially reduced. However, when preferences over program content get more pronounced, minimal differentiation suddenly becomes optimal while market forces lead to excessive differentiation. Hence, policies aimed at increasing diversity are beneficial only when viewers care little about differences in program content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] Copyright of Journal of Media Economics is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract.

  • 4. Häckner, Jonas
    et al.
    Nyberg, Sten
    Rent-Control and Prices of Owner Occupied Housing2000In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, ISSN 0347-0520, E-ISSN 1467-9442Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 5. Häckner, Jonas
    et al.
    Nyberg, Sten
    Vanity and Congestion A Study of Reciprocal Externalities1996In: Economica, ISSN 0013-0427, E-ISSN 1468-0335Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 6.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Nyberg, Sten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance2001Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Children who can count on support from altruistic parents may not try hard to succeed in the labor market. Moreover, parental altruism makes withdrawal of such support non-credible. To promote work effort, parents may want to instill norms which later cause their children to experience guilt or shame associated with failure to support themselves. While social insurance pools risk across families, we show that it also creates a free-rider problem among parents in terms of norm formation. We also examine the formation of norms requiring children to support their parents financially in old age.

  • 7.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Nyberg, Sten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Weibull, Jörgen W.
    Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics2003In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 1, no 2-3, p. 533-542Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance. If the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher, then voters will choose less generous benefits than otherwise. We also discuss welfare‐state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share, and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of beneficiaries.

  • 8.
    Nyberg, Sten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Konkurrens och innovationsklimat2011In: Ett innovationspolitiskt ramverk – ett steg vidare / [ed] Pontus Braunerhjelm, Stockholm: Entreprenörsskapsforum , 2011Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 9.
    Nyberg, Sten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Price Squeeze Absent a Duty to Deal - What is the Relevant Counterfactual?2013In: Nordic perspectives on Competition in Innovation Markets / [ed] Hans Henrik Lidgard, Lund: Lund Univ., Faculty of Law , 2013, p. 77-88Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 10.
    Nyberg, Sten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Reciprocal shareholding and takeover deterrence1995In: International Journal of Industrial Organization, ISSN 0167-7187, E-ISSN 1873-7986, Vol. 13, no 3, p. 355-372Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Reciprocal shareholding has been argued to increase managerial power and facilitate takeover resistance. The latter may translate into higher premiums in the event of an actual takeover, thus benefiting shareholders, whereas increased influence over board decisions induces too high managerial compensation. The net effect is determined by the efficiency of the incumbent management relative to outside entrepreneurs. If the probability of receiving a tender offer is high, shareholders are likely to benefit from crosswise shareholdings. While symmetric increases in crosswise shareholdings unambiguously make takeovers more difficult, it is not true' that the effect on managerial compensation is always positive. The remuneration can be shown to be initially increasing but eventually it will decrease, approaching a lower bound.

  • 11.
    Nyberg, Sten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    The honest society: Stability and policy considerations1997In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 64, no 1, p. 83-99Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The social level of honesty is a public good that determines the feasibility of ventures subject to opportunism and the amount of resources devoted to safeguarding such activities. This paper examines equilibrium honesty in an evolutionary model where safeguards exhibit diminishing returns. The analysis shows that honesty-promoting policies, such as public provision and subsidization of safeguards, financed by uniform taxes, increase social welfare. By contrast, sharply increased safeguard costs, e.g. soaring litigation costs, may initiate a process of disintegration of honesty in society. Furthermore, hysteresis makes re-establishing honesty likely to be very costly.

  • 12.
    Nyberg, Sten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Häckner, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Vanity and Congestion: A Study of Reciprocal Externalities1996In: Economica, ISSN 0013-0427, E-ISSN 1468-0335, Vol. 63, no 249, p. 97-111Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper models a private goods oligopoly market characterized by negative and reciprocal externalities. Although firms compete in prices, and products are undifferentiated in equilibrium, the price-cost margin turns out to be positive. From a social perspective, the equilibrium price is higher than what is motivated by the negative externality. Hence welfare can be improved by means of a price ceiling. Finally, industries with high fixed costs would be expected to exhibit a high degree of concentration on the supply side and considerable price-cost margins.

  • 13.
    Nyberg, Sten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance2006In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 121, p. 1473-1503Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 14.
    Nyberg, Sten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Weibull, Jörgen
    Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State1999In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, ISSN 0033-5533, E-ISSN 1531-4650, Vol. 114, no 1, p. 1-35Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyzes the interplay between social norms and economic incentives in the context of work decisions in the modern welfare state. We assume that to live off one's own work is a social norm, and that the larger the population share adhering to this norm, the more intensely it is felt by the individual. Individuals face two choices: one economic, whether to work or live off public transfers; and one political, how large the transfer should be. The size of the transfer and the intensity of the social norm are determined endogenously in equilibrium.

  • 15.
    Nyberg, Sten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Priks, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Public order and private payments: Evidence from the Swedish soccer leauge2017In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 153, p. 1-8Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Should organizers of events share the associated costs of maintaining public order? We address this question by using unique data from the Swedish soccer league where co-payment for police were introduced for some clubs only. The difference-in-differences analysis shows that co-payments increased private guards by 40% and suggests a reduction of unruly behavior by 20%. The results are consistent with our model, where co-payments alleviate under-provision in efforts by organizers to combat problems such as hooliganism due to externalities and free-riding on police services. The model also sheds light on the critique that co-payments could lead financially constrained organizers to provide less security.

1 - 15 of 15
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