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  • 1. Ahlenius, Henrik
    et al.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Chinese and Westerners Respond Differently to the Trolley Dilemmas2012In: Journal of Cognition and Culture, ISSN 1567-7095, E-ISSN 1568-5373, Vol. 12, no 3-4, p. 195-201Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A set of moral problems known as The Trolley Dilemmas was presented to 3000 randomly selected inhabitants of the USA, Russia and China. It is shown that Chinese are significantly less prone to support utility-maximizing alternatives, as compared to the US and Russian respondents.

    A number of possible explanations, as well as methodological issues pertaining to the field of surveying moral judgment and moral disagreement, are discussed.

  • 2.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    Ryberg, Jesper
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Repugnant Conclusion2016In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 1095-5054, E-ISSN 1095-5054Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Derek Parfit's original formulation the Repugnant Conclusion is characterized as follows: “For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living” (Parfit 1984). The Repugnant Conclusion highlights a problem in an area of ethics which has become known as population ethics. The last three decades have witnessed an increasing philosophical interest in questions such as “Is it possible to make the world a better place by creating additional happy people?” and “Is there a moral obligation to have children?” The main problem has been to find an adequate theory about the moral value of states of affairs where the number of people, the quality of their lives, and their identities may vary. Since, arguably, any reasonable moral theory has to take these aspects of possible states of affairs into account when determining the normative status of actions, the study of population ethics is of general import for moral theory. As the name indicates, Parfit finds the Repugnant Conclusion unacceptable and many philosophers agree. However, it has been surprisingly difficult to find a theory that avoids the Repugnant Conclusion without implying other equally counterintuitive conclusions. Thus, the question as to how the Repugnant Conclusion should be dealt with and, more generally, what it shows about the nature of ethics has turned the conclusion into one of the cardinal challenges of modern ethics.

  • 3.
    Arrhenius, Gustaf
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ryberg, Jesper
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Repugnant Conclusion2010In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 1095-5054, E-ISSN 1095-5054Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 4. Juth, Niklas
    et al.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    Lynöe, Niels
    Honour-related threats and human rights: A qualitative study of Swedish healthcare providers’ attitudes towards young women requesting a virginity certificate or hymen reconstruction2013In: European journal of contraception & reproductive health care, ISSN 1362-5187, E-ISSN 1473-0782, Vol. 18, no 6, p. 451-459Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Objectives To investigate the preferred actions of healthcare staff, as well as their reasoning and attitudes about young females’ requests for a virginity certificate or hymen restoration.

    Method A qualitative study, consisting of semi-structured interviews of healthcare providers from different parts of Sweden and from different medical specialties and professions, who had experience of women who asked for a virginity certificate or a hymen repair.

    Results Using content analysis, ten themes emerged regarding healthcare personnel's attitudes and reasoning about young female patients and their requests for demonstration of virginity. The themes logically were categorised as values, beliefs, and cultural affiliation.

    Conclusions Responders had a more pragmatic and permissive view than the restrictive, official Swedish policy opposing hymenoplasties within the public healthcare system. There were degrees of willingness to accommodate such requests, due, for example, to different moral beliefs and medical concerns. Responders expressed frustration over the difficulty of following up patients, a situation likely due to the restrictive policy. The patient-centred approach adopted by a Dutch team of health professionals would probably better enable quality assurance.

  • 5. Lynöe, Niels
    et al.
    Wessel, Maja
    Olsson, Daniel
    Alexanderson, Kristina
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Juth, Niklas
    Duelling with doctors, restoring honour and avoiding shame?: A cross-sectional study of sick-listed patients' experiences of negative healthcare encounters with special reference to feeling wronged and shame2013In: Journal of Medical Ethics, ISSN 0306-6800, E-ISSN 1473-4257, Vol. 39, no 10, p. 654-657Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Aims: The aim of this study was to examine if it is plausible to interpret the appearance of shame in a Swedish healthcare setting as a reaction to having one's honour wronged.

    Methods: Using a questionnaire, we studied answers from a sample of long-term sick-listed patients who had experienced negative encounters (n=1628) and of these 64% also felt wronged. We used feeling wronged to examine emotional reactions such as feeling ashamed and made the assumption that feeling shame could be associated with having one's honour wronged. In statistical analyses relative risks (RRs) were computed, adjusting for age, sex, disease-labelling, educational levels, as well as their 95% CI.

    Results: Approximately half of those who had been wronged stated that they also felt shame and of those who felt shame, 93% (CI 91 to 95) felt that they had been wronged. The RR was 4.5 (CI 3.0 to 6.8) for shame when wronged. This can be compared with the other emotional reactions where the RRs were between 1.1 (CI 0.9 to 1.3)-1.4 (CI 1.2 to 1.7). We found no association between country of birth and feeling shame after having experienced negative encounters.

    Conclusions: We found that the RR of feeling shame when wronged was significantly higher compared with other feelings. Along with theoretical considerations, and the specific types of negative encounters associated with shame, the results indicate that our research hypothesis might be plausible. We think that the results deserve to be used as point of departure for future research.

  • 6. Sandor, Judit
    et al.
    Bárd, Petra
    Tamburrini, Claudio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The case of biobank with the law: between a legal and scientific fiction2012In: Journal of Medical Ethics, ISSN 0306-6800, E-ISSN 1473-4257, Vol. 38, no 6, p. 347-350Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to estimates more than 400 biobanks currently operate across Europe. The term 'biobank' indicates a specific field of genetic study that has quietly developed without any significant critical reflection across European societies. Although scientists now routinely use this phrase, the wider public is still confused when the word 'bank' is being connected with the collection of their biological samples. There is a striking lack of knowledge of this field. In the recent Eurobarometer survey it was demonstrated that even in 2010 two-thirds of the respondents had never even heard about biobanks. The term gives the impression that a systematic collection of biological samples can constitute a 'bank' of considerable financial worth, where the biological samples, which are insignificant in isolation but are valuable as a collection, can be preserved, analysed and put to 'profitable use'. By studying the practices of the numerous already existing biobanks, the authors address the following questions: to what extent does the term ` biobank' reflect the normative concept of using biological samples for the purposes of biomedical research? Furthermore, is it in harmony with the so far agreed legal-ethical consensus in Europe or does it deliberately pull science to the territory of a new, ambiguous commercial field? In other words, do biobanks constitute a medico-legal fiction or are they substantively different from other biomedical research protocols on human tissues?

  • 7.
    Svedberg, Maria
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Consequentialism and Free Will: The Conditional Analysis Resuscitated2017In: Harvard Review of Philosophy, ISSN 1062-6239, E-ISSN 2153-9154, Vol. 24, p. 23-41Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Many moral theories incorporate the idea that when an action is wrong, it is wrong because that there was something else that the agent could and should have done instead. Most notable among these are consequentialist theories. According to consequentialism an action A is wrong if and only if there was another action B that the agent could have performed such that, if the agent had performed B instead of A, the consequences would have been better. Relatively little attention has been given to the question of how to understand the meaning of ‘could have’ in this specific context. However, without an answer to this question, consequentialist theories fail to yield determinate verdicts about the deontic status of actions in real scenarios. It is here argued that the following conditional analysis provides the required answer and gives us the most plausible version of consequentialism: the agent could have done B instead of A if and only if, there is a decision such that had the agent made this decision, then she would have done B, and not A. Such a conditional analysis has been universally rejected as an analysis of the general meaning of ‘could have’, but we show that in the specific context of specifying the meaning of ‘could have’ in a consequentialist criterion of right and wrong action, all the standard objections to it fail.

  • 8.
    Tamburrini, Claudio
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Stockholm Bioethics Centre.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Stockholm Bioethics Centre.
    Sport, Ethics and Society: Special issue - The Ethics of Sports Medicine2007Other (Other academic)
  • 9.
    Tamburrini, Claudio
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy, Stockholm Bioethics Centre.
    Tännsjö, TorbjörnStockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy, Stockholm Bioethics Centre.
    The ethics of sports medicine2009Collection (editor) (Other academic)
  • 10.
    Tamburrini, Claudio
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Stockholm Bioethics Centre.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Stockholm Bioethics Centre.
    Transcending human limitations2007In: Sport, Ethics and Philosopy: Special Issue - The ethics of Sports Medicine, ISSN 1751-1321, Vol. 1, no 2, p. 113-118Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 11.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    A realist and internalist response to one of Mackie’s arguments from queerness2015In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 172, no 2, p. 347-357Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    If there is such a thing as objectively existing prescriptivity, as the moral realist claims, then we can also explain why — and we need not deny that — strong (conceptual) internalism is true. Strong conceptual internalism is true, not because of any belief in any magnetic force thought to be inherent in moral properties themselves, as Mackie argued, but because we do not allow that anyone has (in the practical sense) ‘accepted’ a normative claim, unless she is prepared to some extent to act on it (to see to it that it is satisfied).

  • 12.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Animal ethics: a crach course2010Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A short introduction to animal ethics.

  • 13.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Applied Ethics: A Defence2011In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 14, no 4, p. 397-406Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Given a reasonable coherentist view of justification in ethics, applied ethics, as here conceived of, can not only guide us, in our practical decisions, but also provide moral understanding through explanation of our moral obligations. Furthermore, applied ethics can contribute to the growth of knowledge in ethics as such. We put moral hypotheses to crucial test in individual cases. This claim is defended against the challenges from moral intuitionism and particularism.

  • 14.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Biological Egalitarianism: A Defence2012In: The Posthuman Condition: Ethics, Aesthetics and Politics of Biotechnological Challenges / [ed] Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Mads Rosendahl Thomsen, Jacob Wamberg, Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2012, p. 170-183Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 15.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Bör vi moraliskt förbättra människan?2013In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 17, no 2, p. 27-31Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 16.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities.
    Capital Punishment2011In: Handbook of Philosophy and Death, Oxford University Press, 2011Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 17.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Context-Dependent Preferences and the Right fo Forgo Life-Saving Treatment2015In: Social Theory and Practice, ISSN 0037-802X, E-ISSN 2154-123X, Vol. 41, no 4, p. 716-733Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A member of Jehovah’s Witnesses agreed to receive blood when alone, but rejected it once the elders were present. She insisted that the elders should stay, they were allowed to do so, and she bled to death. Was it all right to allow her to have the elders present when she made her final decision? Was it all right to allow her to bleed to death? It was, according to an anti-paternalist principle, which I have earlier defended on purely utilitarian grounds. The thrust of the present argument is that the principle stands even in cases with context-sensitive preferences. However, my utilitarian argument to this effect must now rely on something other than J.S. Mill’s standard presumption that in most cases the individual makes the right choices for herself. A reference to the general trust in the system of healthcare is essential to the utilitarian defense of the anti-paternalistic principle.

  • 18.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Döden är förhandlingsbar2009Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    Resonerar kring det "förhandlingsutrymme" som finns då människor dör inom sjukvården. De kan erbjudas smärtlindring som på skyndar döden, de kan få livsuppehållande behandling avbruten, de kan få sova in i döden, för att nämna tre omdiskuterade möjligheter. Det är emellertid inte reglerat när man få denna typ av hjälp att dö och det är också oklart vem som bestämmer. I boken argumenterar författaren för tydligare riktlinjer.

  • 19.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Egalitarianism and the putative paradoxes of population ethics2007In: Utilitas, Vol. 20Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 20.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ethical aspects of triage in mass casualty2007In: Current Opinion in Anaesthesiology, Vol. 20Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    There is a growing awareness that, not only in war, but also in relation to natural disasters, we may have to face situations of mass casualty. Little has been said about the philosophical aspects of the triage problem arising in anaesthesiology in these circumstances, however. But there are a few articles, where these problems are addressed in a fruitful manner. These articles are here reviewed. Even though important triage problems have been identified in the recent literature, they have not been solved in the discussion. Furthermore, there is no unanimity about how they should be solved in principle or in practice. The implications of the discussions here reviewed are mainly for policy making, and only indirectly for the clinic. However, when the problems have been sorted out in the political process, one would hope that a result should surface in the form of clear guidelines for clinical application. One of the reviewed articles put forward suggestions to this effect. But this could only be the beginning of an important discussion to come.

  • 21.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Etikprofessorn2018Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [sv]

    Etikprofessornär den andra delen av Torbjörn Tännsjös memoarer. Boken tar avstamp i hans arbete som professor i praktisk filosofi och Tännsjö guidar oss genom de ofta kontroversiella debatter han deltagit i. Hans breda engagemang och orädda åsikter har gjort honom till en välkänd, men ibland omstridd, röst i den svenska debatten. Här fördjupar och nyanserar Tännsjö sina resonemang i flera känsliga frågor som abort, dödshjälp och idrott.

  • 22.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Extremt underburna barn2009In: Läkartidningen, Vol. 106, no 28-29, p. 1796-1797Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 23.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Fatta!: en upplysningsskrift2014Book (Other academic)
  • 24.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Filosofisk tröst: en bok om döden2015Book (Other academic)
  • 25.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    From reasons to norms: on the basic question in ethics2010Book (Other academic)
  • 26.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Glasnostalgi. Som jag minns det av Michail Gorbatjov2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 4Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 27.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. praktisk filosofi.
    Global Democracy: The Case for a World Government2008Book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Global democracy is not only necessary, if we want to obviate wars, establish global justice and a sustainable environment, it is also, pace Kant and Rawls and others, desirable in its own sake.

  • 28.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities.
    Hedersmoral — ett problem i västerländsk sjukvård?2011In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 15, no 1, p. 6-26Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [sv]

    I artikeln drivs tesen att också i sina mest tillspetsade form kan en sexualiserad hedersmoral, som vållar bekymmer för västerländsk sjukvård, ses som en förnuftig social konstruktion, förnuftig och nyttig i åtminstone vissa sammanhang, både för en grupp och för individer som ingår i gruppen.

  • 29.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ideologiernas plats i politiken2016In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 20, no 2, p. 17-31Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Bör partierna bli »tydligare» och renodla en ideologi var? Eller bör ideologierna snarare få uppträda inom partierna, flera inom varje parti, varvid de fråntas huvudrollen?

    Jag ska här argumentera för det senare synsättet. Ideologierna är viktiga, de bör spela en framträdande roll i politiken, men de bör inte vara grunden för de olika partier, som konkurrerar om väljarnas röster. Grunden för partierna ska i stället vara det ekonomiska intresset. Huvudfokus på plånboksfrågorna. Men med den restriktionen finns ändå ett betydande utrymme för ideologierna i politiken.

  • 30.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Is Truth in Ethics Different from Truth in Science?2007In: Asian Hospital & Healthcare ManagementArticle in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The notion of truth (just as the notion of knowledge and justification) is the same in ethics and science. We gain moral knowledge in a way similar to how we gain scientific knowledge: we have evidence for ethical theories when they can best explain our data. However, the data in science and ethics are different. In science we rely on observation, in ethics we rely on considered moral intuitions. There is little agreement about when we should trust our ethical intuitions. It is remarkable, however, that neuroscience and psychology has recently shed new light on how our moral intuitions arise. We should ponder these data and submit our intuitions to cognitive psychotherapy. When they resist this kind of therapy, when they do not go away once we know how we have come to hold them, we are justified in relying on them — they have become considered moral intuitions. We are then justified in our moral beliefs. This means that theoretical moral knowledge is possible, at least in principle.

  • 31.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Lennart Berntson och Svante Nordin: Efter revolutionen. Vänstern i svensk kulturdebatt sedan 1968 (Natur och kultur, 2017)2017In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 21, no 3, p. 46-56Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 32.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Medical Enhancement and the Ethos of Elite Sport2009In: Human Enhancement / [ed] Julian Savulescu and Nick Bostrom, Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2009Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 33.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Mein Kampf2016In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 34.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University.
    Moral relativism2007In: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 135Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Abstract: Moral relativism comes in many varieties. One is a moral doctrine, according to which we ought to respect other cultures, and allow them to solve moral problems as they see fit. I will say nothing about this kind of moral relativism in the present context. Another kind of moral relativism is semantic moral relativism, according to which, when we pass moral judgements, we make an implicit reference to some system of morality (our own). According to this kind of moral relativism, when I say that a certain action is right, my statement is elliptic. What I am really saying is that, according to the system of morality in my culture, this action is right. I will reject this kind of relativism. According to yet another kind of moral relativism, which we may call epistemic, it is possible that, when one person (belonging to one culture) makes a certain moral judgement, such as that this action is right, and another person (belong to another culture) makes the judgement that the very same action is wrong, they may have just as good reasons for their respective judgements; it is even possible that, were they fully informed about all the facts, equally imaginative, and so forth, they would still hold on to their respective (conflicting) judgements. They are each fully justified in their belief in conflicting judgements. I will comment on this form of moral relativism in passing. Finally, however, there is a kind of moral relativism we could call ontological, according to which, when two persons pass conflicting moral verdicts on a certain action, they may both be right. The explanation is that they make their judgements from the perspective of different, socially constructed, moral universes. So while it is true in the first person’s moral universe that a certain action is right, it is true in the second person’s moral universe that the very same action is wrong. I explain and defend this version of ontological moral relativism.

  • 35.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. praktisk filosofi.
    Narrow Hedonism2007In: Journal of Happiness Studies, Vol. 8Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Abstract: Narrow hedonism is defined and defended, as a view according to which pleasurable states are individuated as concrete and total experiential situations of a sentient being at a time. Typical of such situations is that, when we are in them, we are at a certain hedonic level. They feel in a certain way for the creature in them. On this understanding of narrow hedonism, which is the only one making good sense of the theory and which was probably also intended by classical hedonists such as Bentham and Edgeworth, standard objections to hedonism, based on the claim that different pleasures have nothing in common, can be set to one side as misplaced and irrelevant. It is also hard to see how this kind of hedonism can be refined, or revised, in the direction indicated by J.S. Mill, when he wants to distinguish “higher” pleasures from “lower” ones. On this understanding of hedonism, we must claim that, those who want to follow Mill will have to rely on non-hedonistic intuitions and thus desert the hedonist camp altogether.

  • 36.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Nazismens ideologi och judeutrotningen2012In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 33, no 4, p. 21-28Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 37.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Noen ganger skal man drepe2007Book (Refereed)
  • 38.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ny grund behövs för tvångsvård2013In: Läkartidningen, ISSN 0023-7205, E-ISSN 1652-7518, Vol. 110, no 11, p. 536-537Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 39.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Om den motbjudande slutsatsen - ett svar till Olle Risberg2014In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 18, no 1, p. 12-15Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 40.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Om nödvändigt tvång i demensvården2012In: Dröm och mardröm: En antologi om friska seniorer och beroende gamlingar / [ed] Lars Jederlund, Stockholm: Vårdförbundet , 2012, p. 120-126Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 41.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On deviant causal chains — no need for a general criterion2009In: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 69, no 3, p. 466-473Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 42.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University.
    On Normative Ethics2007In: Normative Ethics 5 Questions, Automatic Press/VIP , 2007Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 43.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ought We to Enhance Our Cognitive Capacities?2009In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 23, no 7, p. 421-432Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Ought we to enhance our cognitive capacities beyond the normal human range? There is no denying that it might be a good idea to level out differences between people with respect to cognitive capacities, and there is no denying that some persons' reaching beyond normal capacities may have some good side-effects on society at large (but also bad side-effects, of course). But is there any direct gain to be made by having ones cognitive capacities enhanced? Will this as such make our lives go better? No, I argue, or, at least, there doesn't seem to exist any evidence suggesting that it would. And it doesn't matter whether we consider the question from a narrow hedonistic perspective, from a more refined hedonistic perspective, from a desire-satisfaction view, or if we adopt some reasonable objective list view of what makes a life go well. Only on an extremely perfectionist — and implausible —view of what makes our lives go well could any direct value in cognitive enhancement find support. Finally, there are no good reasons to do with our sense of identity to enhance even our capacity to remember. So, cognitive enhancement as such would not make our lives go any better.

  • 44.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Palliativ patientmakt2013In: Läkartidningen, ISSN 0023-7205, E-ISSN 1652-7518, no 38Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 45.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Paris — Gaza: Två brott mot krigets lagar2016In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 20, no 1, p. 23-31Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Torbjörn Tännsjö skriver om brott mot krigets lagar. Artikeln skrevs i anslutning till ett seminarium om Operation Protective Edge, arrangerat av Institutet för framtidsstudier i samarbete med Stockholm Centre for the Ethics of War and Peace, och under dagarna efter attentatet i Paris (den 13 november 2015).

  • 46.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Philosophical aspects of body transplantation2016In: Acta Neurochirurgica, ISSN 0001-6268, E-ISSN 0942-0940, Vol. 158, no 12, p. 2249-2250Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 47.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Populism Is Not The Problem: It’s Part Of The Solution2017In: The CritiqueArticle in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The words ‘populist’ and ‘populism’ have in many contexts turned into slurs. They appear in these contexts heavily loaded with negative emotive meaning, but with either little or no descriptive sense. However, within democratic theory they have a well-recognised and clear descriptive meaning. In a populist democracy the people rules itself. The will of the majority is decisive for the political decisions. A way of approaching the populist ideal is through a political system where the parties are represented in the parliament in proportion to the support they gain and where the parliament is sovereign to legislate and to elect a government. Populism can be contrasted with elitism, where the role of the people is restricted to the choice of its it’s rulers. I argue that populism provides us with the best means if we want to contain current aggressive right-wing nationalism. Part of my argument is my presentation of what I call the paradox of elitism:  if the people is not considered good enough when it comes to political decision-making, and therefore not trained in political thinking, then it is highly likely that it will choose the wrong person as it’s leader.

  • 48.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Privatliv2010Book (Other academic)
  • 49.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Privatliv2015 (ed. 2 uppl.)Book (Other academic)
  • 50.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Respekt för patientens autonomi - i klinik och i forskning2008In: Gunilla Silferberg (red.) Vårdetisk spegel (Stockholm: Ersta Sköndal Högskola, 2008), 2008Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
12 1 - 50 of 74
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