Change search
Refine search result
1 - 17 of 17
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Rows per page
  • 5
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100
  • 250
Sort
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
Select
The maximal number of hits you can export is 250. When you want to export more records please use the Create feeds function.
  • 1.
    Spaak, Torben
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    A challenge to Bix's interpretation of Kelsen and Hart's views on the normativity of law2018In: Revus. Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law, ISSN 1855-7112Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Brian Bix discusses questions of legal normativity, arguing (1) that Hans Kelsen’s theory of the basic norm is best understood as saying that a person may choose to presuppose the basic norm in order to interpret the actions of legal officials normatively; (2) that H. L. A. Hart is best understood as espousing a sui generis view of legal normativity; and (3) that Hart’s view is preferable to the rather popular view that law makes some sort of moral claim. I accept (1) but think it is rather trivial. I find (2) plausible but the view itself problematic, and am therefore skeptical of (3).

  • 2.
    Spaak, Torben
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    A critical appraisal of Karl Olivecrona's legal philosophy2014Book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This book offers a critical appraisal of Karl Olivecrona’s legal philosophy. Based on Olivecrona’s critique of the view that law has binding force, the analysis of the concept and function of a legal rule, and the idea that law is a matter of organized force, the book argues that Olivecrona’s legal philosophy is a unique contribution to twentieth century legal philosophy. It shows how Olivecrona’s philosophy can be used in the assessment of contemporary theories of law, such as those put forward by Hart, Raz, Dworkin, and Alexy. In addition, the book argues that Olivecrona’s various discussions of theories defended by key people in the history of legal and political philosophy are highly interesting contributions. They not only increase our understanding of the legal and political philosophy of previous generations, but also enhances our insight into legal-philosophical questions that remain with us today. ​

  • 3.
    Spaak, Torben
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Alf Ross on the Concept of a Legal Right2014In: Ratio Juris, ISSN 0952-1917, E-ISSN 1467-9337, Vol. 27, no 4, p. 461-476Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article, I discuss Alf Ross's claim that the concept of a legal right is best understood as a technical tool of presentation, which ties together a disjunction of operative facts and a conjunction of legal consequences, and that rights statements render the content of a number of legal norms in a convenient manner. I argue that while Ross's analysis is appealing, it is problematic in at least three respects. I also argue, however, that despite these difficulties Ross's analysis deserves our continued attention, because the fundamental idea—that the concept of a legal right must be understood functionally—is sound.

  • 4.
    Spaak, Torben
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Fahlbeck om de lege ferenda-forskning2016In: Juridisk Tidskrift, ISSN 1100-7761, E-ISSN 2002-3545, no 2, p. 533-541Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Reinhold Fahlbeck diskuterar i ett kort och kärnfullt inlägg i Juridisk tidskrift frågan huruvida det är möjligt att forska – att bedriva vetenskap – de lege ferenda, till skillnad från de lege lata, d.v.s. att forska om hur gällande rätt bör se ut, inte om hur den faktiskt ser ut. Han menar själv (med vissa reservationer) att de lege ferenda-undersökningar inte kan betraktas som forskning men förklarar inte riktigt varför. Mitt intryck av hans argumentation är dock att han helt enkelt anser att värdeomdömen i allmänhet och moraliska omdömen i synnerhet är subjektiva till sin natur och att det är detta som gör att de lege ferenda-forskning inte kan betraktas som forskning. Han säger t.ex. i slutet av artikeln (s. 6) att de lege ferenda-förslagen endast kan värderas utifrån överväganden om hur effektivt de kan tillgodose det förändringsbehov som utgör avhandlingens (av Fahlbeck förutsatta) utgångspunkt, d.v.s. endast såvitt gäller frågan om relationen mellan mål och medel (se avsnitt 3 nedan.).

    Jag kommer att hävda dels (1A) att Fahlbecks krav att forskningsresultatet skall nödvändiggöra de lege ferenda-förslaget, för att det skall vara fråga omforskning, är allt för starkt, något som enligt min mening vinner stöd av den omständigheten att detta krav också skulle utesluta de lege lata-forskning från forskningens område, dels (1B) att Fahlbecks egna krav på de lege ferenda-forskning, vilka såvitt jag kan förstå är normativa, verkar förutsätta just det som Fahlbeck tycks anse vara falskt, nämligen att värdeomdömen, inklusive moraliska omdömen, kan vara objektiva. Jag kommer också att hävda (2) att den yttersta anledningen till att de lege ferenda-forskning inte är möjlig är att den innefattar värdeomdömen, typiskt sett moraliska omdömen, att sådana omdömen ärsubjektiva (=inte objektiva) och att man bör skilja mellan olika sätt på vilka värdeomdömen kan vara subjektiva, eftersom dessa skillnader kan ha en viss betydelse för den juridiska analysen.

  • 5.
    Spaak, Torben
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Ingvill Helland and Sören Koch, eds., Nordic and Germanic Legal Methods, 461 pp. (Mohr-Siebeck, 2014)2016In: Nordicum-Mediterraneum, ISSN 1670-6242, E-ISSN 1670-6242, Vol. 11, no 1Article, book review (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This book on Nordic and Germanic legal methods includes contributions from a number of German, Swiss, and Nordic legal scholars and is a welcome contribution both to the national and the international debate on legal reasoning. Clearly, we have reason to compare not only solutions to substantive legal problems, as comparative legal scholars usually do, but also the methods for the interpretation and application of the law used in different legal orders. Reading through these essays, then, the reader is likely to acquire some interesting information about the similarities and differences between the so-called legal methods used in the relevant legal orders and about the reasons why there are certain similarities and differences between those methods. What the reader will not get, however, is (i) a systematic discussion of whether there is anything specific enough to deserve the name of ‘legal method’ and, if so, what, exactly, this might be, or (ii) any general conclusions about the similarities and differences between the legal methods used in the various legal orders or about the reasons for the relevant similarities and differences. Moreover, the reader will not get (iii) a systematic discussion of the relation between the two aims of the collection, that is, (a) to describe and compare the legal methods in the different legal orders and (b) to explain any similarities and differences regarding the methods that may turn up in the comparison. For these reasons, although I do welcome the book, I am not entirely satisfied with it.

  • 6.
    Spaak, Torben
    Uppsala University, Sweden.
    Karl Olivecrona on Legislation2013In: The Theory and Practice of Legislation, ISSN 2050-8840, Vol. 1, no 1, p. 59-76Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The multidisciplinary study of legislation, or Gesetzgebungslehre, as the Germans call it, has yet to fully penetrate the defense wall of legal philosophers, who have so far focused mainly on the more or less finished product of legislation, namely the legal system (in their inquiries into the nature of law), or on the activities of judges and other law-appliers (in their study of legal reasoning), or, in some cases, on normative or evaluative questions, such as whether there is an obligation to obey the law. But the interest among legal philosophers in questions concerning legislation seems to be on the increase. Against this background, it is of some interest to note that the Scandinavian realist, Karl Olivecrona, touches on questions concerning legislation in his otherwise traditionally oriented writings on jurisprudence. As one might expect, his account of legislation follows a reliably realist pattern in that it is concerned not with the capacity of legislative products to establish legal relations, but with their capacity to cause people to behave in one way or another. More specifically, Olivecrona rejects the view that legal rules have binding force and can confer rights and impose duties, arguing instead that they are independent imperatives possessing (what he calls) a suggestive character by virtue of which they influence the citizens (and the legal officials) on the psychological level. This suggestive character depends in turn ultimately on the reverence (or respect) for the constitution on the part of the citizens (and the legal officials): They are disposed to obey the independent imperatives because they revere the constitution. On the basis of this account of legislation, Olivecrona identifies important similarities (and some differences) between ordinary and revolutionary legislation. Olivecrona's account is not without its problems, however. One may, for example, wonder precisely what it means to say that independent imperatives have a suggestive character, and that the citizens (and the legal officials) revere the constitution. These questions will be addressed in the lecture.

  • 7.
    Spaak, Torben
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Karl Olivecrona's Legal Philosophy2016In: A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence: Volume 12: Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Civil Law World, Tome 1: Language Areas, Tome 2: Main Orientations and Topics / [ed] Enrico Pattaro, Corrado Roversi, Springer, 2016, p. 365-378Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Karl Olivecrona (1897–1980) and Alf Ross (1899–1979) were the most prominent of the Scandinavian realists, who were active from the late 1920s into the 1970s.

  • 8.
    Spaak, Torben
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Kelsen on Monism and Dualism2013In: Basic Concepts of Public International Law: Monism and Dualism / [ed] Marko Novakovic, Belgrade: Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade , 2013, p. 322-341Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Kelsen defends (a) monism, that is, the view that international law and the various state legal systems taken together constitute a unified normative system, and (b) the primacy of international law over state law within the monistic framework. He argues in support of the (a)-claim (i) that only monism is compatible with the epistemological postulate, according to which cognition requires the unity of the object of cognition, (ii) that the norm conflicts that are said by the critics of monism to undermine monism are harmless because they are not norm contradictions, but only norm contrarieties, and (iii) that the doctrine of dualism collapses into solipsism due to its dependence on the doctrine of recognition. And he argues in support of the (b)-claim (iv) that the idea of the primacy of international law within the monistic framework is necessary to account for the existence of states that are legally coordinated and separated from one another in their spheres of validity.

    In this article, I discuss critically claims (a) and (b) and the arguments (i)-(iv) that Kelsen adduces in support of these claims. I argue, more specifically, (I) that while Kelsen is right that only monism is compatible with the epistemological postulate, the claim is unpersuasive that norm contrarieties, as distinguished from norm contradictions, are harmless from the point of view of this postulate, and (II) that in any case not all the norm conflicts identified by the critics of monism are norm contrarieties. I also argue (III) that if the above-mentioned claim (ii) had been persuasive, the dualists, too, might have invoked it and avoided Kelsen’s criticism of dualism via the criticism of the doctrine of recognition, and (IV) that Kelsen’s claim is well founded that dualism collapses into solipsism because of the collapse of the doctrine of recognition. Finally, I suggest (V) that contrary to what Kelsen appears to think, the epistemological postulate rules out locating law in a higher realm of norms and values that is sharply separated from the world of time and space.

  • 9.
    Spaak, Torben
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Legal positivism, conventionalism, and the normativity of law2018In: Jurisprudence, ISSN 2040-3313, E-ISSN 2040-3321, Vol. 9, no 2, p. 319-344Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of this article is to see whether we can account for the normativity of law within the framework of legal positivism and whether the idea of a social convention could be of help in this endeavour. I argue, inter alia, that we should distinguish between (alpha) the problem of accounting for the normativity of law, conceived as a necessary property of law, and (beta) the problem of accounting for the use of normative legal language on the part of legal actors; that the debate about the normativity of law, which mainly concerns (alpha), is more or less identical to the debate between legal positivists and non-positivists; that one cannot account for the normativity of law, conceived along the lines of (alpha), within the framework of legal positivism, and that the question of the normativity of law considered within the framework of legal positivism is not an open question.

  • 10.
    Spaak, Torben
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Naturalism and Non-Naturalism in Legal Philosophy: Hägerström vs. Kelsen2013In: Axel Hägerström and Modern Social Thought / [ed] Sven Eliaeson, Patricia Mindus, Stephen P. Turner, Oxford: Bardwell Press, 2013, p. 231-255Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The spiritual father of Scandinavian realism, Axel Hägerström, erected his theory of law on, and formulated his critical remarks on other theories of law from, a philosophical foundation consisting of ontological naturalism and ethical non-cognitivism. The author of the Pure Theory of Law, Hans Kelsen, on the other hand, rejected ontological naturalism out of hand, arguing that law belongs in the ‘world of the ought’, a realm of norms and values beyond the world of time and space, and that any theory of law that locates law in the world of time and space cannot but fail to grasp the specific meaning of law. His meta-ethical position, as we shall see, is not crystal clear, though he appears to have been a meta-ethical relativist. Unfortunately, there was not much intellectual interaction between these two important legal philosophers. While Hägerström occasionally turned his attention to Kelsen’s writings, Kelsen does not appear to have directly addressed Hägerström’s theory or criticism of Kelsen’s theory, though he (Kelsen) did engage with Alf Ross’s realist jurisprudence, especially with the critical remarks made by Ross on Kelsen’s theory (see especially Kelsen 1959/60).

    In this article, I intend to take a closer look at Hägerström’s criticism of Kelsen’s theory as it was put forward in the above-mentioned review essay, especially the claim that Kelsen’s theory should be rejected on the grounds that it cannot be squared with Hägerström’s naturalistic theory of reality. I am going to argue, more specifically, (i) that while Hägerström’s objection to Kelsen’s non-naturalism is plausible, Hägerström’s theory of reality is not without its problems, and (ii) that Kelsen could in any case meet Hägerström’s criticism by abandoning his non-naturalism and adopting instead a naturalist, and more specifically, a conventionalist analysis of the existence of legal norms. I am also going to argue (iii) that Hägerström’s claim that Kelsen’s theory shows a strong affinity to primitive positivism, in assuming that the act of legislation necessarily and immediately gives rise to the existence of valid (in the sense of binding) legal norms, is undermined by Hägerström’s failure to appreciate that Kelsen saw the presupposition of the basic norm as being conditional upon a wish on the part of the person who makes the presupposition to conceive of the legal raw-material as a system of valid norms.

  • 11.
    Spaak, Torben
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Realism about the Nature of Law2017In: Ratio Juris, ISSN 0952-1917, E-ISSN 1467-9337, Vol. 30, no 1, p. 75-104Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Legal realism comes in two main versions, namely American legal realism and Scandinavian legal realism. In this article, I shall be concerned with the Scandinavian realists, who were naturalists and non‐cognitivists, and who maintained that conceptual analysis (in a fairly broad sense) is a central task of legal philosophers, and that such analysis must proceed in a naturalist, anti‐metaphysical spirit. Specifically, I want to consider the commitment to ontological naturalism and non‐cognitivism on the part of the Scandinavians and its implications for their view of the nature of law. I argue (i) that the Scandinavians differ from legal positivists in that they reject the idea that there are legal relations, that is, legal entities and properties, and to varying degrees defend the view that law is a matter of human behavior rather than legal norms, and (ii) that they do not and cannot accept the idea that there is a ‘world of the ought’ in Kelsen's sense. I also argue, more specifically, (iii) that the objection to non‐naturalist theories raised by the Scandinavians—that there is and can be no connection between the higher realm of norms and values (the ‘world of the ought’) and the world of time and space—is convincing, and (iv) that Kelsen's introduction of a so‐called modally indifferent substrate does nothing to undermine this objection. In addition, I argue (v) that the Scandinavians can account for the existence of legal relations that do not presuppose the existence of morally binding legal norms by embracing conventionalism about the existence of the sources of law, while pointing out that in doing so they would also be abandoning their legal realism for legal positivism. Finally, I argue (vi) that the implications for legal scholarship of the realist emphasis on human behavior instead of legal norms is not well explained by the realists and appear to amount to little more than a preference for teleological interpretation of legal norms.

  • 12.
    Spaak, Torben
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Ross on the Dualism of Reality and Validity2015In: Utopia y Praxis Latinoamericana, ISSN 1316-5216, Vol. 20, no 71, p. 41-66Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article, I want to consider Alf Ross’s intriguing 1946 critique of the dualism of reality and validity and the implications of this critique for so-called dual-nature theories of law, such as the theory defended by Robert Alexy. The meaning of this dualism, which Ross considers to be at the foundation of traditional legal thinking, is that both the very concept of law and certain other fundamental legal concepts – such as the concept of the sources of law and the concept of subjective law (which encompasses the concept of a legal right and the concept of a legal duty) – consist of two parts, one factual and empirical and one normative and metaphysical. Ross objects, however, that this dualism gives rise to certain very troublesome antinomies both in the concept of law and in the other fundamental legal concepts, and that dualists cannot avoid these antinomies by eliminating the concept of validity from their theories, since doing so would leave the resulting (monist) theory unable to even ¿nd its study object, but must instead substitute a non-cognitivist account of claims of legal validity for the non-naturalist (intuitionist) account characteristic of such dualism. I am, however, going to argue that Ross’s discussion of the dualism of reality and validity and the ensuing antinomies, although very interesting, is ultimately not persuasive, that the solution proposed by Ross to the problem of the antinomies would likely have been successful if there really had been a problem that needed a solution, and that in any case Ross’s critique of the dualism of reality and validity does not apply to Robert Alexy’s dual-nature theory of law.

  • 13.
    Spaak, Torben
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Rättspositivism och juridisk metod2013In: Juridisk metodlära / [ed] Fredric Korling, Mauro Zamboni, Lund: Studentlitteratur AB, 2013, p. 47-77Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Jag kommer i den här artikeln att koncentrera mig på relationen mellan rättspositivism och normativa teorier om juridisk argumentation, dvs. teorier som säger något om hur rättstillämparen bör resonera och hur han bör avgöra målen. Vad följer av ett rättspositivistiskt synsätt för normativa teorier om juridisk argumentation? Går det överhuvud taget att formulera en normativ teori om juridisk argumentation inom ramen för rättspositivismen? Om inte, betyder det att rättspositivismen bör förkastas? Det ligger i vad som sagts att de rättspositivistiska teserna inte gör det omöjligtatt formulera en normativ teori om juridisk argumentation, men att de i vissaavseenden begränsar vår frihet att formulera en sådan teori. Svårigheten ligger i att klargöra precis hur dessa begränsningar ser ut. Jag skall i det följande försöka säga något om detta. Jag kommer närmare bestämt att hävda (1) att den så kallade starka sociala tesen – som säger att gällande rätt bestäms med hjälp av uteslutande faktuella kriterier – gör det svårt att förklara hur rättsprinciper (rikt-linjer, grundsatser) till skillnad från rättsregler kan ingå i gällande rätt, något som i sin tur kan leda till att rättspositivister tänker sig att utrymmet för judiciellt skön är större än det faktiskt är. Jag kommer också att hävda (2) att den rättspositivismen underliggande empirismen leder till att rättspositivister typiskt sett accepterar någon version av semantisk antirealism, vilket påverkar deras förståelse av de olika tolkningsprinciperna och de så kallade tolkningsresultaten (som reduktionsslut, analogislut och e contrarioslut). Slutligen kommer jag att hävda (3) att en persons uppfattning om rättsbegreppet har en indirekt betydelse för hans approach till juridisk argumentation.

  • 14.
    Spaak, Torben
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Schauer's Anti-Essentialism2016In: Ratio Juris, ISSN 0952-1917, E-ISSN 1467-9337, Vol. 29, no 2, p. 182-214Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In his new book, The Force of Law, Frederick Schauer maintains that law has no necessary properties (a position he calls legal anti‐essentialism), and that therefore jurisprudents should not assume that an inquiry into the nature of law has to be a search for such properties. I argue, however, that Schauer's attempt to show that legal anti‐essentialism is a defensible position fails, because his one main argument (the cognitive science argument) is either irrelevant or else incomplete, depending on how one understands it, and because the other main argument (the family resemblance argument) is false.

  • 15.
    Spaak, Torben
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    The Canberra Plan and the Nature of Law2016In: Metaphilosophy of Law / [ed] Pawel Banas, Adam Dyrda, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki, Oxford, UK: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016, p. 81-119Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article, I shall consider a method for conceptual analysis which has been called the Canberra Plan and which might perhaps be conceived as an alternative approach to conceptual analysis in the classical sense. The Canberra Plan is not, however, aimed primarily at the elucidation of the relevant concept, but at the metaphysical question of identifying the descriptive (or natural or physical) property that corresponds to the concept.[1] The idea of the Canberra Plan is, more specifically, (a) to clarify the import of the concept by reference to the role the concept plays in a network of concepts, principles, and claims, and (b) to investigate and see what, if any, descriptive property corresponds to the concept thus analyzed. What I want to do in this article, then, is first to introduce the Canberra Plan and give some consideration to its advantages and disadvantages and, secondly, to apply it to the concept of law, in order not only to clarify the import of this concept, but also to find out what, if any, descriptive property corresponds to the concept.

    The question of what descriptive property, if any, corresponds to the concept of law should be of considerable interest to jurisprudents, not only because the meta-ethical question of whether legal properties are descriptive, or even natural or physical, is generally interesting, but also because the existence of such descriptive (or natural or physical) legal properties is precisely what is asserted by legal positivists through the so-called social thesis, which has it that we determine what the law is using factual criteria. That is to say, if the analyst succeeds in establishing that the property of being law is a descriptive property, he would seem to have offered at least some support for the social thesis of legal positivism and, therefore, for legal positivism.

    In order to investigate this interesting question, I shall carry out a Canberra-style analysis of the concept of law, and I shall argue, tentatively, (1) that X is law if, and only if, (i) X is a relation between (a) a system of norms all of which can be traced back to one of several recognized sources of law that can be handled on the basis of exclusively factual considerations, and (b) an organization that is constituted and regulated by the norms of the system and whose task it is to interpret and apply these norms, (ii) X aspires to regulate social life in general, (iii) X is non-optional, and (iv) X claims to trump competing normative systems. In addition, I shall argue, equally tentatively, (2a) that the property of being law is precisely the descriptive property that satisfies the conditions (i)-(iv), (2b) that this property is a role property, not a realizer property, and (2c) that there is very little to be said about the legal realizer property on a general level and that the legal realizer property differs in this regard from moral and mental realizer properties.

    I shall, however, also argue (3a) that the analyst who applies the Canberra Plan to the concept of law will almost certainly find it very difficult to come up with a collection of sufficiently rich analytic platitudes, especially what Frank Jackson calls input and output clauses, (3b) that he is not likely to get much help from the idea of mature legal thinking (introduced here as an analog to Jackson’s idea of mature folk morality), and (3c) that the so-called permutation problem, which is very problematic, will arise as a result of the above-mentioned lack of input and output clauses. And I shall therefore argue (4) that, as things stand, the Canberra Plan will not help us clarify the nature of law or lend support to the strong social thesis of legal positivism.

  • 16.
    Spaak, Torben
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    The Legal Philosophy of Ingemar Hedenius2016In: A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence: Volume 12: Legal Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: The Civil Law World, Tome 1: Language Areas, Tome 2: Main Orientations and Topics / [ed] Enrico Pattaro, Corrado Roversi, Springer, 2016, p. 435-442Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Ingemar Hedenius (1908-1982) was professor of practical philosophy at Uppsala University 1947-1973 as well as a prolific and controversial contributor to the public debate in the 1940’s through the 1960’s. His critique of Christianity, in particular (e.g., 1949, 1951, 1964), caused quite a stir (on this, see Nordin 1984, 177-84). Although Hedenius was primarily a moral philosopher, he also treated legal-philosophical questions now and then, and it is these contributions that have earned him a place among the Scandinavian realists. But unlike better known realists like Alf Ross (1946, 1959) and Karl Olivecrona (1939, 1971), Hedenius, who wrote almost exclusively in Swedish, did not put forward a comprehensive legal philosophy. He did, however, introduce into legal thinking a distinction between internal and external legal statements (Section 2), and put forward a “realistic” (or sociological) analysis of the concept of a valid legal rule (Section 3) and an ideal-type analysis of the concept of ownership (Section 4). He also analyzed the concept of a performative and discussed its relevance to legal thinking (Section 5).

  • 17.
    Spaak, Torben
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    The Philosophy of Law of Karl Olivecrona2017In: Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy / [ed] Mortimer Sellers, Stephan Kirste, Springer, 2017Chapter in book (Refereed)
1 - 17 of 17
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf