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  • 1. Aghion, Philippe
    et al.
    Jaravel, Xavier
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi. CIFAR, Canada.
    Rouzet, Dorothée
    Education and Military Rivalry2019Inngår i: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 17, nr 2, s. 376-412Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    What makes countries engage in reforms of mass education? Motivated by historical evidence on the relation between military threats and expansions of primary education, we assemble a panel dataset from the last 150 years in European countries and from the postwar period in a large set of countries. We uncover three stylized facts: (i) investments in education are associated with military threats, (ii) democratic institutions are negatively correlated with education investments, and (iii) education investments respond more strongly to military threats in democracies. These patterns continue to hold when we exploit rivalries in a country's neighborhood as an alternative source of variation. We develop a theoretical model that rationalizes the three empirical findings. The model has an additional prediction about investments in physical infrastructures, which finds support in the data.

  • 2.
    Besley, Tim
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little?2014Inngår i: Journal of Economic Perspectives, ISSN 0895-3309, E-ISSN 1944-7965, Vol. 28, nr 4, s. 99-120Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 3. Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    Folke, Olle
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi. Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Canada.
    Rickne, Johanna
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för social forskning (SOFI). Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Sweden; Uppsala Center for Labor Studies (UCLS), Sweden.
    Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden2017Inngår i: The American Economic Review, ISSN 0002-8282, E-ISSN 1944-7981, Vol. 107, nr 8, s. 2204-2242Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    We develop a model where party leaders choose the competence of politicians on the ballot to trade off electoral success against their own survival. The predicted correlation between the competence of party leaders and followers is strongly supported in Swedish data. We use a novel approach, based on register data for the earnings of the whole population, to measure the competence of all politicians in 7 parties, 290 municipalities, and 10 elections (for the period 1982-2014). We ask how competence was affected by a zipper quota, requiring local parties to alternate men and women on the ballot, implemented by the Social Democratic Party in 1993. Far from being at odds with meritocracy, this quota raised the competence of male politicians where it raised female representation the most. We argue that resignation of mediocre male leaders was a key driver of this effect.

  • 4. Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    Ilzetzki, Ethan
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Weak States and Steady States: The Dynamics of Fiscal Capacity2013Inngår i: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, ISSN 1945-7707, E-ISSN 1945-7715, Vol. 5, nr 4, s. 205-235Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Investments in fiscal capacity-economic institutions for tax compliance-are an important feature of economic development. This paper develops a dynamic model to study the evolution of fiscal capacity over time. We contrast a social planner's investment path with politically feasible paths. Three types of states emerge in the long run: a common-interest state where public resources are devoted to public goods, a redistributive state where additional fiscal capacity is used for transfers, and a weak state with no transfers and a low level of public goods provision. We also present some preliminary evidence consistent with the theory.

  • 5.
    Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Economic Approaches to Political Institutions2008Inngår i: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics / [ed] Steven N. Durlauf, Lawrence E. Blume, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 2. edKapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    Political institutions affect the rules of the game in which politics is played. Economists now have theoretical approaches to explain the impact of institutions on policy, and empirical evidence to support the relevance of the theory. This article sketches a framework to inform discussions about how political institutions shape policy outcomes. It does so using four examples: majoritarian versus proportional elections; parliamentary versus presidential government; whether to impose term-limits on office holders; and the choice between direct and representative democracy. Each example illustrates how theory and data can be brought together to investigate a specific issue.

  • 6.
    Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    London School of Economics and CIFAR.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    FRAGILE STATES AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY2011Inngår i: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 9, nr 3, s. 371-398Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    It is widely recognized that fragile states are key symptoms of under-development in many parts of the world. Such states are incapable of delivering basic services to their citizens and political violence is commonplace. As of yet, mainstream development economics has not dealt in any systematic way with such concerns and the implications for development assistance. This paper puts forward a framework for analyzing fragile states and applies it to a variety development policies in different types of states.

  • 7. Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi. CIFAR, Canada.
    JEEA-FBBVA LECTURE 2017: The Dynamics of Environmental Politics and Values2019Inngår i: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 17, nr 4, s. 993-1024Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper develops a framework to study environmentalism as a cultural phenomenon, namely as reflecting a process of social identification with certain values. The model is used to explain how the shares of environmentalists and materialists in society can coevolve with taxes on emissions to protect society against damages caused by environmental degradation. These policies are determined by electoral competition. However, even though politicians internalize the welfare of those currently alive and pick utilitarian optimal policies, the dynamic equilibrium paths of policies and evolving values may not converge to the steady state with the highest level of long-run welfare.

  • 8.
    Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    London School of Economics and Political Science.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Pillars of prosperity: the political economics of development clusters2011Bok (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 9.
    Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    London School of Economics, CIFAR.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Repression or Civil War?2009Inngår i: The American Economic Review, ISSN 0002-8282, E-ISSN 1944-7981, Vol. 99, nr 2, s. 292-297Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Perhaps the crowning achievement of mature democracies is the peaceful acceptance of the ballot box as the primary instrument for deciding who should hold power in society. We do not have to go far back in the history of most democratic states, however, to find a distinct role for political violence. Moreover, many inhabitants of the globe still remain at risk of falling prey to widespread violence in the struggle for political office. Forms of political violence differ a great deal. We focus on two important manifestations: repression and civil war distinguished by whether violence is one-sided or two-sided. We present a unified approach to studying these forms of political violence with common roots in poverty, natural resource rents, and weak political institutions. First, we lay out  rudimentary model to analyze whether violence will occur and, if so, manifest itself as repression or civil war. Three regimes — peace, repression and civil war — emerge as alternative equilibrium outcomes in the interaction between an incumbent government and an opposition group. Moreover, the theory suggests a natural ordering of these regimes. We then construct empirical measures of repression and civil war, which we map into ordered variables as suggested by the theory. We investigate how the regime depends on economic and political variables, using an ordered logit model defined over the three regimes. Our estimation results indicate a strong correlation between low incomes, weak political institutions and both forms of political violence.

  • 10.
    Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    London School of Economics.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    State Capacity, Conflict, and Development2010Inngår i: Econometrica, ISSN 0012-9682, E-ISSN 1468-0262, Vol. 78, nr 1, s. 1-34Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    The absence of state capacities to raise revenue and to support markets is a key factor in explaining the persistence of weak states. This paper reports on an ongoing project to investigate the incentive to invest in such capacities. The paper sets out a simple analytical structure in which state capacities are modeled as forward looking investments by government. The approach highlights some determinants of state building including the risk of external or internal conflict, the degree of political instability, and dependence on natural resources. Throughout, we link these state capacity investments to patterns of development and growth.

  • 11. Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi. Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR), Canada.
    Taxation and Development2013Inngår i: Handbook of public economics / [ed] Alan J. Auerbach, Raj Chetty, Martin Feldstein, Emmanuel Saez, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2013, s. 51-110Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    The central question in taxation and development is: “how does a government go from raising around 10% of GDP in taxes to raising around 40%?” This paper looks at the economic and political forces that shape the way that fiscal capacity is created and sustained. As well as reviewing the literature and evidence, it builds an overarching framework to help structure thinking on the topic.

  • 12.
    Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    London School of Economics, United Kingdom; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Canada.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi. Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Canada.
    The Causes and Consequences of Development Clusters: State Capacity, Peace and Income2014Inngår i: Annual Review of Economics, ISSN 1941-1383, E-ISSN 1941-1391, Vol. 6, s. 927-949Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Three important aspects of development-per capita income, state capabilities, and (the absence of) political violence-are correlated with each other at the country level. This article discusses the causes of such development clusters and highlights two explanations: common economic, political, and social drivers and complementarities (two-way positive feedbacks). It also draws out preliminary policy implications of these patterns of development and proposes topics for further research.

  • 13.
    Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    London School of Economics.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    The Logic of Political Violence2011Inngår i: Quarterly Journal of Economics, ISSN 0033-5533, E-ISSN 1531-4650, Vol. 126, nr 3, s. 1411-1445Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This article offers a unified approach for studying political violence whether it emerges as repression or civil war. We formulate a model where an incumbent or opposition can use violence to maintain or acquire power to study which political and economic factors drive one-sided or two-sided violence (repression or civil war). The model predicts a hierarchy of violence states from peace via repression to civil war; and suggests a natural empirical approach. Exploiting only within-country variation in the data, we show that violence is associated with shocks that can affect wages and aid. As in the theory, these effects are only present where political institutions are noncohesive.

  • 14.
    Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    London School of Economics.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Wars and State Capacity2008Inngår i: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 6, nr 2-3, s. 522-530Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    The article builds a simple model to investigate how different types of armed conflict shape fiscal capacity: the state's ability to raise revenue from taxes. It starts from the simple observation that external war tends to generate common interests across groups in society, whereas internal, civil war entails deep conflicting interests across groups. Our model predicts that-compared to a society without conflict-civil wars lead to smaller investments in fiscal capacity, whereas prospects of external war generally lead to larger investments. Correlations in international data on conflicts and taxation are, by and large, consistent with these predictions.

  • 15. Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi. CIFAR, Canada.
    Reynal-Querol, Marta
    Resilient Leaders and Institutional Reform: Theory and Evidence2016Inngår i: Economica, ISSN 0013-0427, E-ISSN 1468-0335, Vol. 83, nr 332, s. 584-623Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Strengthening executive constraints is one of the key means of improving political governance. This paper argues that resilient leaders who face a lower probability of being replaced are less likely to reform institutions in the direction of constraining executive power. We test this idea empirically using data on leaders since 1875 using two proxies of resilience: whether a leader survives long enough to die in office, and whether recent natural disasters occur during the leader's tenure. We show that both are associated with lower rates of leader turnover and a lower probability of a transition to strong executive constraints. This effect is robust across a wide range of specifications. Moreover, in line with the theory, it is specific to strengthening executive constraints rather than generalized political reform.

  • 16.
    Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    London School of Economics.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Sturm, Daniel M.
    London School of Economics.
    Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the US2010Inngår i: The Review of Economic Studies, ISSN 0034-6527, E-ISSN 1467-937X, Vol. 77, nr 4, s. 1329-1352Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper develops a simple model to analyse how a lack of political competition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth. We test the predictions of the model on panel data for the US states. In these data, we find robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state is associated with anti-growth policies: higher taxes, lower capital spending, and a reduced likelihood of using right-to-work laws. We also document a strong link between low political competition and low income growth.

  • 17. Dal Bó, Ernesto
    et al.
    Finan, Frederico
    Folke, Olle
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Rickne, Johanna
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för social forskning (SOFI). Uppsala University, Sweden; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Sweden.
    Who Becomes A Politician?2017Inngår i: Quarterly Journal of Economics, ISSN 0033-5533, E-ISSN 1531-4650, Vol. 132, nr 4, s. 1877-1914Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Can a democracy attract competent leaders, while attaining broad representation? Economicmodels suggest that free-riding incentives and lower opportunity costs give the less competent a comparative advantage at entering political life. Moreover, if elites have more human capital, selecting on competence may lead to uneven representation. This article examines patterns of political selection among the universe of municipal politicians and national legislators in Sweden, using extraordinarily rich data on competence traits and social background for the entire population. We document four new facts that together characterize an inclusive meritocracy. First, politicians are on average significantly smarter and better leaders than the population they represent. Second, this positive selection is present even when conditioning on family (and hence social) background, suggesting that individual competence is key for selection. Third, the representation of social background, whether measured by parental earnings or occupational social class, is remarkably even. Fourth, there is at best a weak trade-off in selection between competence and social representation, mainly due to strong positive selection of politicians of low (parental) socioeconomic status. A broad implication of these facts is that it is possible for democracy to generate competent and socially representative leadership.

  • 18.
    Englund, Peter
    et al.
    Handelshögskolan i Stockholm.
    Krusell, Per
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Strömberg, Per
    Handelshögskolan i Stockholm.
    2013 års Ekonomipris till Eugene Farma, Robert Schiller och Lars Peter Hansen2013Inngår i: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 2013, nr 8, s. 26-36Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 19.
    Englund, Peter
    et al.
    Department of Economics, Uppsala University.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Swedish Business Cycles: 1861-19881990Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 20.
    Flam, Harry
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Optimal Subsidies to Declining Industries: Efficiency and Equity Considerations1982Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper consider equity vs. efficiency in a small economy that subsidizes an industry facing falling world market prices. Subsidies keep up output in the short run when wages and factors are rigid. But once introduced subsidies become permanent, because of pressures from vested interests. This creates misallocation of resources in the long run. An optimal efficiency subsidy balances the short-run gains and long-run losses. It should be raised when prices fall if there is full employment initially and lowered if there is unemployment. An optimal distribution subsidy, which aims at maintaining the sxisting income distribution, should always be raised.

  • 21. Folke, Olle
    et al.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi. London School of Economics, UK.
    Rickne, Johanna
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för social forskning (SOFI). Yale University, USA.
    Arbetslinjen och finanskris förklarar SD:s framgångar2018Inngår i: Dagens nyheter, ISSN 1101-2447, nr 5 septemberArtikkel i tidsskrift (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 22. Folke, Olle
    et al.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi. CIFAR, Canada.
    Rickne, Johanna
    Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Sweden.
    Dynastic Political Rents? Economic Rents to Relatives of Top Politicians2017Inngår i: Economic Journal, ISSN 0013-0133, E-ISSN 1468-0297, Vol. 127, s. F495-F517Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    We exploit close elections in Swedish municipalities to test whether relatives of politicians who become mayors obtain economic benefits. We find no benefits for the siblings of new mayors, but the average earnings of children of newly appointed mayors rise by about 15%. Administrative information on occupational and residence status show that the higher earnings are unlikely reflect an illegitimate allocation of jobs. But the evidence suggests that children of election-winning mayors are more likely to postpone tertiary education and remain in their parents' municipality to work.

  • 23. Folke, Olle
    et al.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Rickne, Johanna
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för social forskning (SOFI). Institutet för Näringslivsforskning, Sverige.
    Könskvotering, kompetens och karriär2017Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 24. Folke, Olle
    et al.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi. London School of Economics, UK.
    Rickne, Johanna
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för social forskning (SOFI). Yale University, USA.
    Ojämlikhet kan förstärka synen att invandring belastar statsfinanserna. Slutreplik2018Inngår i: Dagens nyheter, ISSN 1101-2447, nr 10 septemberArtikkel i tidsskrift (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 25. Folke, Olle
    et al.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi. Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Canada.
    Rickne, Johanna
    The Primary Effect: Preference Votes and Political Promotions2016Inngår i: American Political Science Review, ISSN 0003-0554, E-ISSN 1537-5943, Vol. 110, nr 3, s. 559-578Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    In this analysis of how electoral rules and outcomes shape the internal organization of political parties, we make an analogy to primary elections to argue that parties use preference-vote tallies to identify popular politicians and promote them to positions of power. We document this behavior among parties in Sweden's semi-open-list system and in Brazil's open-list system. To identify a causal impact of preference votes, we exploit a regression discontinuity design around the threshold of winning the most preference votes on a party list. In our main case, Sweden, these narrow primary winners are at least 50% more likely to become local party leaders than their runners-up. Across individual politicians, the primary effect is present only for politicians who hold the first few positions on the list and when the preference-vote winner and runner-up have similar competence levels. Across party groups, the primary effect is the strongest in unthreatened governing parties.

  • 26.
    Frey, Bruno S.
    et al.
    University of Zurich .
    Schneider, Friedrich
    University of Zurich.
    Horn, Henrik
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    A Formulation and Test of a Simple Model of World Bank Behavior1983Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    There exists a large literature describing the behavior of international institutions. This literature is however, with few exceptions, purely descriptive, i.e. it lacks an analysis based on clearly stated behavioral assumptions leading to falsifiable and hence empirically testable hypotheses. A positive theory of the behavior of international organizations is thus lacking.

    This paper endeavours to provide a simple theoretical model of the behavior of such an international organization - The World Bank - using the traditional approach of maximizing a utility function subject to constraints (Sections 2 and 3). The theoretically derived hypotheses are empirically applied to the World Bank's granting of loans to developing countries during recent years (Section 4). A final part summarizes the main findings (Section 5).

  • 27.
    Gottfries, Nils
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Palmer, Edward
    National Board of Insurance.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Regulation, Financial Buffer Stocks, and Short-Run Adjustment: An Economic Case-Study of Sweden, 1970-821987Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 28.
    Gottfries, Nils
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Empirical Examinations of the Information Sets of Economic Agents1986Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 29.
    Horn, Henrik
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Exchange Rate Policy, Wage Formation, and Credibility1985Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 30.
    Kotlikoff, Laurence J.
    et al.
    Boston University.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Social Contracts as Assets: A Possible Solution to the Time-Consistency Problem1987Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper presents a new solution to the time-consistency problem that appears capable of enforcing ex ante policy in a variety of settings in which other enforcement mechanisms do not work. The solution involves formulating a social contract, institution, or agreement that specifies the optimal ex ante policy. The social contract is effectively sold by succesive old generations to successive young generations, who pay for the social contract through the payment of taxes. Both old and young generations have an economic incentive to fulfill the social contract. For the old generation, breaking the social contract makes the social contract valueless, and the generation suffers a capital loss by not being able to sell it. For the young generation the economic advantage of purchasing the existing social contract exceeds its price as well as the economic gain from setting up the a new social contract.

  • 31.
    Krugman, Paul R.
    et al.
    Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Inflation, Monetary Velocity and Welfare1982Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 32.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Molander, Per
    ESO, Stockholm.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Petersen, Olof
    Uppsala University.
    Sandmo, Agnar
    Norwegian School of Business Administration.
    Swedenborg, Birgitta
    SNS, Stockholm.
    Thygesen, Niels
    University of Copenhagen.
    Options for Economic and Political Reform in Sweden1993Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper summarises an official report to the Swedish government (and general public). The economic crisis in Sweden is explained by both system failures and specific policy mistakes. The system failures include distorted incentives and markets, and inappropriate and outdated institutions. The deep recession and extraordinary rise in unemployment started as a collision between inflationary wage development and attempts to pursue a hard-currency policy. The resulting loss of international competitiveness in the tradable sector was accompanied by increased real interest rates, collapsing real estate prices and a related financial crisis.

    Following the floating of the Swedish krona in November 1992, the main problem became a domestic demand collapse, which has been accentuated by a spectacular rise in the household saving rate. The report emphasizes that good policy advice is not enough; it is also necessary to analyse and reform not only to macroeconomic stability but also economic efficiency and growth. The proposed institutional reforms are designed to restore a highly competitive market system and to facilitate a responsible fiscal stabilisation programme. This would also enahnce the medium-run credibility for government policies and provide scope for a more expansionary policy in the short run.

  • 33.
    Persson, Mats
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Ellingsen, Tore
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Sjöström, Thomas
    2014 års Ekonomipris till Jean Tirole2014Inngår i: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, nr 8, s. 5-14Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 34.
    Persson, Mats
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Hassler, John
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    2015 års Ekonomipris till Angus Deaton2015Inngår i: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 8, s. 6-16Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 35.
    Persson, Mats
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Debt, Cash Flow and Inflation Incentives: A Swedish Example1996Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 36.
    Persson, Mats
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy1985Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 37.
    Persson, Mats
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy: A Solution2005Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper demonstrates how time consistency of the Ramsey policy – the optimal fiscal and monetary policy under commitment – can be achieved. Each government should leave its successor with a unique maturity structure for the nominal and indexed debt, such that the marginal benefit of a surprise inflation exactly balances the marginal cost. Unlike in earlier papers on the topic, the result holds for quite a general Ramsey policy, including timevarying policies with positive inflation and positive nominal interest rates. We compare our resuklts with those in Persson, Persson, and Svensson (1987), Calvo and Obstfeld (1990), and Alvarez, Kehoe, and Neumeyer (2004).

  • 38.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Alternative Transactions Variables in Money Demand Equations: A Note on the Baumol-Tobin Theory1979Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 39.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Credibility of Macroeconomic Policy: An Introduction and a Broad Survey1987Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This is a broad survey of the work on credibility of macroeconomic policy since the early 80's. I critically evaluate a first generation of work dealing with the basic credibility problem that arises when policy cannot be precommited and when a desireable policy fails to be ex post optimal. Then, the desireable policy is not credible to the private sector. The work I discuss, deals with credibility problems in three different areas of macroeconomics (i) "anti-inflationary monetary policy", (ii) "macroeconomic public finance", and (iii) "policy coordination". The first generation of work leaves several issues unresolved, however, and a second generation of work dealing with these unresolved issues is currently developing. I also discuss this very recent work and make some suggestions for future research.

  • 40.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Deficits and Intergenerational Welfare in Open Economies1984Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper deals with public debt in open economies, extending Diamond's overlapping generations model to a small open economy as well as an international equilibrium of two large economies. It focuses on the intergenerational welfare redistributions caused by an increase in public debt triggered by a temporary government budget deficit, and shows how these redistributions differ in open and closed economies. The interplay between the deficits in the government budget and the current account is also analyzed. It is shown how a single period with a government deficit can be followed by a sequence of periods with a deficit in the current account.

  • 41.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Politics and Economic Policy1992Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 42.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Real Transfers in Fixed Exchange Rate Systems and the International Adjustment Mechanism1983Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 43.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Besley, Timothy
    London School of Economics.
    The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation and policy2009Inngår i: The American Economic Review, ISSN 0002-8282, E-ISSN 1944-7981, Vol. 99, nr 4, s. 1218-1244Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes. This paper develops a framework where "policy choices" in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past investments in legal and fiscal capacity. It studies the economic and political determinants of such investments, demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity are typically complements. The results show that, among other things, common interest public goods, such as fighting external wars, as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions, are conducive to building state capacity. Some correlations in cross-country data are consistent with the theory.

  • 44.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Roland, Gerard
    ECARE, University of Brussels (Belgium).
    Tabellini, Guido
    IGIER, Bocconi University (Milan, Italy).
    Comparative Politics and Public Finance1997Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 45.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Roland, Gerard
    Tabellini, Guido
    Electoral rules and government spending in parliamentary democracies2007Inngår i: Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, nr 2, s. 155-188Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy where electoral competition inside coalition governments induces higher spending than under single party governments. Policy preferences of parties are endogenous and derived from opportunistic reelection motives. The electoral rule affects government spending, but only indirectly: proportional elections induce a more fragmented party system and a larger incidence of coalition governments than do majoritarian elections. Empirical evidence from post-war parliamentary democracies strongly supports these predictions.

  • 46.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Roland, Gerard
    Université Libre de Bruxelles.
    Tabellini, Guido
    Bocconi University.
    Separation of Powers and Accountability: Towards a Formal Approach to Comparative Politics1996Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    A political constitution is like an incomplete contract: it spells out a procedure for making decisions and for delegating power, without specifying the contents of those decisions. This creates a problem: the apponted policymaker could use this power for his own benefit against the interests of the citizens. In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for disciplining public officials. But elections are not sufficient. Separation of powers between executive and legislative bodies also helps the voters, in two distinct ways. First, it can elicit information held by the appointed officials and not otherwise available to the voters. Second, by playing one body against the other and by aligning the interest of the weaker body with their own, the voters can induce the two bodies to discipline each other. Separation of power only works to the voters' advantage if it is appropriately designed, however, and it can be detrimental if it creates a "common pool" problem. These advantages of separation of powers are present both in Presidential and in Parliamentary democracies. Government appointed rules in Parliamentary democracies must be appropriately designed, however, to prevent collisuon.

  • 47.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Checks and Balances on the Government Budget1987Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 48.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Current Account Dynamics and the Terms of Trade: Harberger-Laursen-Metzler Two Generations Later1984Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This is a study of the current account dynamics resulting from the savings and investment dynamics in a small open economy which is subject to exogenous changes in its terms of trade and in world interest rates.

    Anticipated and unanticipated, as well as temporary and permanent, terms of trade changes have very different effects. There is, however, a general tendency towards cycles in both savings and investment, which gives rise to cycles in the current account.

    It is shown that the classic Harberger-Laursen-Metzler effect on saving of a terms of trade deterioration can have any sign for plausible parameter values, both for temporary and permanent disturbances.

  • 49.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Exchange Rate Variability and Asset Trade1987Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    In popular discussion about the merits of different international monetary arrangements it is often maintained that increased exchange rate variability has a negative influence on international trade and foreign investment. This paper addresses a specific, but also a very basic, aspect of this general issue, namely the effect of exchange rate variability on capital flows and international portfolio diversification. More precisely, we examine how different monetary policies - and among those, policies that aim at stabilizing exchange rate - determine the risk characteristics of nominal assets, and how these risk characteristics in turn affect international portfolio composition and trade in assets, when international asset markets are incomplete.

  • 50.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholms universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutet för internationell ekonomi.
    International Borrowing and Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy1984Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    We discuss optimal fiscal policy in open economies, using an open-economy version of a model used in the recent work by Lucas and Stokey. An optimal allocation  smooths out the tax distortions associated with financing a given sequence of government consumption, and it also smooths out private consumption of goods and leisure by borrowing (lending) on the international capital market in periods with high (low) government consumption. The main question we ask is how the optimal policy can be made time-consistent, when usccessive governments reoptimize with respect to current and future tax rates, but most honor the government debt obligations. We show that this requires government debt of sufficiently rich maturity to be issued.

    First we treat a case with capital controls, where only the government can borrow and lend abroad. The there is a unique restructuring scheme for the domestic debt that is necessary to give succeeding governments incentives to continue following the optimal policy (here we interpret and extend Lucas and Stokey's results). For a small economy, this scheme is also sufficient for time-consistency, but in an economy large enough to affect its terms of trade, it is also necessary to follow a unique restructuring scheme for the government's (and the country's) foreign debt.

    When there are no capital controls, time-consistency is no longer a problem in a small economy. In a large economy, what matters is total government debt and total foreign debt (but not their composition), and again there are unique maturity structures necessary and sufficient for time-consistency. An interesting observation is that in the distorted world we consider, relaxing the capital controls actually deteriorates welfare.

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