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  • 1.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Against Belief Normativity2013In: The Aim of Belief / [ed] Timothy Chan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 80-99Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Normativism about belief is a claim about the nature of belief: Belief is essentially norm- or rule-guided. This is standardly interpreted as requiring that belief formation be subject to genuine prescriptions. In this chapter, Glüer and Wikforss argue that belief normativism is very hard to square with some basic intuitions about rule guidance. Any account of rule-guidance needs to support the distinction between being guided by a rule and merely being in accord with it. But belief normativism cannot account for this difference in what the authors take to be the most natural, intuitive terms. If this is correct, any defense of normativism will have to involve a significant departure from intuition or a novel construal of the normativity involved. The challenge is to motivate any of these moves.

  • 2.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Against Content Normativity2009In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 118, p. 31-70Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 3.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Es braucht die Regel nicht: Wittgenstein on Rules and Meaning2010In: The Later Wittgenstein on Language / [ed] Daniel Whiting, Palgrave Macmillan , 2010, p. 148-166Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 4.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Meaning Normativism: Against the Simple Argument2015In: Organon F, ISSN 1335-0668, Vol. 22, p. 63-73Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper examines a central argument in support of the thesis that meaning is essentially normative. The argument tries to derive meaning normativism from the fact that meaningful expressions necessarily have conditions of correct application: Since correctness is a normative notion, it is argued, statements of correctness conditions for an expression have direct normative consequences for the use of that expression. We have labeled this the 'simple argument', and have argued that it fails. In this paper we elaborate on our objections to the argument in response to Daniel Whiting's recent attempt to rescue it. We argue, first, that statements of correctness conditions simply allow us to categorize the applications of an expression into two basic kinds (for instance, the true and the false) without this having any normative implications; and, second, that the normativist has not provided any reasons to think that some further, normative notion of semantic correctness is essential to meaning.

  • 5.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Reasons for Belief and Normativity2018In: Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity / [ed] Daniel Star, Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 575-599Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 6.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Still No Guidance: Reply to Steglich-Petersen2015In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 81, no 3, p. 272-279Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In a recent article in this journal, AsbjOrn Steglich-Petersen criticizes an argument we have called the no-guidance argument. He claims that our argument fails because it (1) presupposes a much too narrow understanding of what it takes for a norm to influence behaviour and (2) betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the point of the truth norm (Steglich-Petersen, 2013, p. 279). If these claims could be substantiated, the no-guidance argument would lose all interest. But Steglich-Petersen's attempt at substantiating them fails. The suggested sense in which the truth norm can guide behaviour turns out to be too wide to be recognizable as an intuitive notion of norm guidance. Moreover, it remains unclear how the truth norm could possibly provide an answer to the question whether it - rather than some other, possible norm for belief - is valid.

  • 7.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Normativity of Meaning and Content2009In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy / [ed] Edward N. Zalta, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information , 2009Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 8.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Aiming at Truth: On the Role of Belief2013In: Teorema, ISSN 0210-1602, Vol. 32, no 3, p. 137-162Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We explore the possibility of characterizing belief wholly in terms of its first-order functional role, its input (evidence) and output (further beliefs and actions), by addressing some common challenges to the view. One challenge concerns the fact that not all belief is evidence-sensitive. In response to this, normativists and teleo-functionalists have concluded that something over and above functional role is needed, a norm or a telos. We argue that both allow for implausibly much divergence between belief and evidence. Others have suggested that belief should be saved as the evidence-sensitive attitude, by making it share its motivational role with an hitherto unrecognized state: alief. We argue that the appeal to alief faces a dilemma: Either explanation of intentional action by means of alief is a species of intentional explanation, in which case it becomes hard to distinguish alief from (irrational) belief, or alief is sufficiently different from belief, but then neither the explanation nor the explanandum (action) are recognizably intentional any longer. We conclude that the most promising way forward is an account of belief that makes use of the full functional role of belief, including its role in theoretical reasoning.

  • 9.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Truth Norm and Guidance: a Reply to Steglich-Petersen2010In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 119, no 475, p. 757-761Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We have claimed that truth norms cannot provide genuine guidance for belief formation (Glüer and Wikforss 2009, pp. 43–4). Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen argues that our ‘no guidance argument’ fails because it conflates certain psychological states an agent must have in order to apply the truth norm with the condition under which the norm prescribes forming certain beliefs. We spell out the no guidance argument in more detail and show that there is no such conflation.

  • 10.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Experimental Semantics: The Case of Natural Kind Terms2015In: Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Language / [ed] Jussi Haukioja, Bloomsbury Academic, 2015, p. 109-138Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 11.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Externalism and a posteriori semantics2007In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 67, no 3, p. 373-386Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is widely held that the meaning of certain types of terms, such as natural kind terms, is individuated externalistically, in terms of the individual’s external environment. Recently a more radical thesis has emerged, a thesis we dub ‘a posteriori semantics.’ The suggestion is that not only does a term’s meaning depend on the external environment, but so does its semantics. One motivation for this is the aim to account for cases where a putative natural kind term fails to pick out a natural kind: The term may have a standard externalist semantics (if it picks out a natural kind) or a more descriptivist one (if it does not). Knowing which semantics applies will therefore require detailed empirical knowledge. This move has also been employed in cases where a singular term, such as a name, fails to have a reference. We argue that a posteriori semantics is inherently implausible, since the type of semantics common terms should be given ought not to be conditional on details of chemistry or physics. A number of difficulties for the position—‘metaphysical,’ epistemological, and methodological—are articulated. Finally, we suggest that a posteriori semantics misconstrues the way in which semantics is empirical.

  • 12.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Terms: Myth and Reality2018In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, ISSN 0007-0882, E-ISSN 1464-3537, Vol. 69, no 4, p. 911-933Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The article examines the role of natural kinds in semantic theorizing, which has largely been conducted in isolation from relevant work in science, metaphysics, and philosophy of science. We argue that the Kripke–Putnam account of natural kind terms, despite recent claims to the contrary, depends on a certain metaphysics of natural kinds; that the metaphysics usually assumed—micro-essentialism—is untenable even in a ‘placeholder’ version; and that the currently popular homeostatic property cluster theory of natural kinds is correct only to an extent that fails to vindicate the Kripke–Putnam account. This undermines the metasemantics required for anti-descriptivist semantics.

  • 13. Rattan, Gurpreet
    et al.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Is Understanding Epistemic in Nature?2017In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0279-0750, E-ISSN 1468-0114, Vol. 98, no 2, p. 271-294Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Is understanding epistemic in nature? Does a correct account of what constitutes understanding of a concept mention epistemological notions such as knowledge, justification or epistemic rationality? We defend the view that understanding is epistemic in nature – we defend epistemological conceptions of understanding. We focus our discussion with a critical evaluation of Tim Williamson’s challenges to epistemological conceptions of understanding in The Philosophy of Philosophy. Against Williamson, we distinguish three kinds of epistemological conceptions and argue that Williamson’s arguments succeed against only the most heavily committed kind, and leave the less heavily committed kinds untouched. Further, we argue that Williamson’s elaboration of lessons from his arguments point in a direction opposite of his own conclusions and give vivid articulation and support to epistemological conceptions. We suggest also that skepticism about Williamson’s larger metaphilosophical conclusions – according to which understanding plays no special role in the epistemology of philosophy – may be in order.

  • 14.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Alternativa fakta: Om kunskapen och dess fiender2017Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 15.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Are Natural Kind Terms Special?2010In: The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds / [ed] Helen Beebee and Nigel Sabbarton-Leary, New York: Routledge , 2010, p. 64-84Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    It is commonly assumed that natural kind terms constitute a distinct semantic category. This idea emerged during the 1970's following Kripke's and Putnam's well-known remarks on natural kind terms. The idea has stayed with us, although it is now recognized that the issues are considerably more complex than initially thought. Thus, it has become clear that much of Kripke's and Putnam's discussions were based on rather simplified views of natural kinds. It also turns out that the semantic issues are less straightforward than assumed - in particular, it is far from clear what it might mean to say that a kind term is rigid. Strikingly, however, these worries have not done much to undermine the confident assumption that natural kind terms form a special semantic category. In the paper I try to shake that confidence.  I argue that although natural kind terms are no doubt important (for instance, from an explanatory point of view), we are certainly not warranted in concluding that they form a separate, semantic category among the kind terms.

  • 16.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University. Stockholm University.
    Are there understanding-assent links?2010In: The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, ISSN 1944-3676, Vol. 5, p. 1-17Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 17.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Bachelors, Energy, Cats and Water: Putnam on Kinds and Kind Terms2013In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 79, no 3, p. 242-261Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Since Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke's first attacks on traditional, descriptivist theories of natural kind terms, it has become customary to speak of the ` Putnam-Kripke' view of meaning and reference. This article argues that this is a mistake, and that Putnam's account of natural kind terms is importantly different from that of Kripke. In particular, Putnam has from the very start been sceptical of Kripke's modal claims, and in later papers he explicitly rejects the proposal that theoretical identity statements are metaphysically necessary (if true). I suggest that this is wholly in line with Putnam's earlier, Quine-inspired writings on general terms, and his preoccupation with the philosophy of science. Moreover, I argue that the picture of general terms that emerges from Putnam's writings is more plausible than that suggested by Kripke. However, contrary to Putnam, I also suggest that Putnam's later views on natural kinds and natural kind terms do not support standard Twin Earth externalism.

  • 18.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Color Terms and Semantic Externalism2012In: Croatian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1333-1108, E-ISSN 1847-6139, Vol. 12, no 36, p. 399-419Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper discusses whether the color terms should be given an externalist semantics. In the literature on the semantics of color terms externalism is standardly taken for granted, and Twin Earth style arguments play a central role. This is notable given that few people would claim that semantic externalism applies across the board, to all types of terms.  Why, then, should the color terms belong with this group of terms? I argue that the standard externalist strategies, introduced by Tyler Burge and Hilary Putnam, do not apply to these terms: The color terms do not function like natural kind terms, and the idea of semantic reliance on others does not apply to them. I conclude that the externalist arguments fail and that a version of internalism, more properly called ‘individualism’, applies to the color terms. 

  • 19.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Concepts and Communication: Comments on Words and Images. An Essay on the Origin of Ideas2015In: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 75, no 1, p. 110-121Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    At the center of Gauker's book stands two inter-connected theses: First, that concepts are dependent on language; second, that this requires rejecting the traditional idea that linguistic communication involves a transmission of thoughts. I argue that we cannot afford to reject the traditional conception of communication and that Gauker's alternative ‘cooperative' conception is unsatisfactory. However, I also argue that Gauker is wrong to suggest that the language dependency thesis of concepts is incompatible with the traditional view of communication.

  • 20.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Davidson and Wittgenstein: A Homeric Struggle?2017In: Wittgenstein and Davidson on language, thought, and action / [ed] Claudine Verheggen, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 46-68Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    P.F. Strawson famously contrasts two approaches to the question of what it is for words to have meaning: That of communication-intention theorists and that of formal semantics theorists. According to Strawson the later Wittgenstein and Davidson end up on opposite sides in this struggle since Wittgenstein, unlike Davidson, takes conventions to be essential to meaning. Several contemporary Wittgenstein scholars agree, among them Hans-Johann Glock and Meredith Williams. They suggest that Wittgenstein puts forth an essentially social picture of language, with the shared conventions at the center, while Davidson defends an individualistic picture that ultimately fails to account for the public nature of language. I shall argue that this description is importantly mistaken: Davidson and Wittgenstein both subscribe to the idea that meaning is determined by use, rather than by conventions, and they both take meaning to be essentially public and tied to its role in communication.

  • 21.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Does Semantics Need Normativity? Comments on Allan Gibbard, Meaning and Normativity2018In: Inquiry, ISSN 0020-174X, E-ISSN 1502-3923, Vol. 61, no 7, p. 755-766Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the book Gibbard proposes, first, that statements about meaning are normative statements and, second, that they can be given an expressivist treatment, along the lines of Gibbard's preferred metaethics. In my paper, I examine the first step: The claim that meaning statements are to be construed as being normative, as involving oughts'. Gibbard distinguishes two versions of the normativity of meaning thesis - a weak version, according to which every means implies an ought, and a strong version, according to which for every means, there is an ought that implies it. I argue that neither thesis withstands scrutiny. The weak thesis depends on assumptions about the notion of semantic correctness that the anti-normativist rejects, and the strong thesis does not solve the problems Gibbard wants it to solve: the problems of indeterminacy and meaning skepticism. I conclude that semantics does not need normativity.

  • 22.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    EXTENDED BELIEF AND EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE2014In: Philosophical Issues, ISSN 1533-6077, E-ISSN 1758-2237, Vol. 24, no 1, p. 460-481Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 23.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Faktaresistensen – en farsot2017In: Kristianstadsbladet, ISSN 1103-9523, no 25 novemberArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 24.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Incomplete Understanding of Concepts2017In: Oxford handbooks onlineArticle in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article discusses the thesis that a subject can have a concept, think thoughts containing it, that she incompletely understands. The central question concerns how to construe the distinction between having a concept and understanding it. Two important versions of the thesis are distinguished: a metasemantic version and an epistemic version. According to the first, the subject may have concept C without being a fully competent user, in virtue of deference to other speakers or to the world. According to the second, the subject may have a concept without being able to provide a proper explication of it. It is argued that whereas the epistemic version is plausible, the metasemantic version faces some challenges. First, it needs to be explained precisely how deference enables a speaker to have C. Second, metasemantic incomplete understanding is in tension with the idea that concepts serve to capture the subject’s cognitive perspective.

  • 25.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rose, Nick (Creator)
    Introduktion2018In: Klassrumspsykologi: från teori till praktik, Stockholm: Natur och kultur, 2018Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 26.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    När den falska berättelsen (nästan) tog över2018In: Snabbtänkt: Reflektioner från valet 2018 av ledande forskare / [ed] Lars Nord, Marie Grusell, Niklas Bolin, Kajsa Falasca, Sundsvall: Mid Sweden University, DEMICOM , 2018, p. 14-14Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 27.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Our Own Minds. Socio-Cultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness . By Radu J. Bogdan. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 20102013In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 63, no 253, p. 814-816Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 28.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Review of 'Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction', by Gillian Russell2008In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, Vol. 12, no 10Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 29.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rädslan för kunskap2014In: SANS, ISSN 2000-9690, Vol. 3, p. 26-27Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 30.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Content2008In: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 38, no 3, p. 399-424Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 31.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism2007In: PHilosophy Compass, Vol. 2Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Externalism is widely endorsed within contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Despite this, it is far from clear how the externalist thesis should be construed and, indeed, why we should accept it. In this entry I distinguish and examine three central types of externalism: what I call foundational externalism, externalist semantics, and psychological externalism. I suggest that the most plausible version of externalism is not in fact a very radical thesis and does not have any terribly interesting implications for philosophy of mind, whereas the more radical and interesting versions of externalism are quite difficult to support.

  • 32.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Semantic Intuitions and the Theory of Reference2017In: Teorema, ISSN 0210-1602, Vol. 36, no 3, p. 95-116Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Experiments on the semantic intuitions of lay speakers concerning proper names have suggested that there is great variation in these intuitions, across individuals and across cultures. How should the semanticist respond to these results? Machery et. al. (2011) suggest three ways of accommodating the variation in intuitions: Deny that intuitions are reliable guides to reference; adopt referential pluralism and grant that names refer differently; or deny the value of non-expert intuitions. Philosophers of language have tended to endorse either the first option, arguing that the type of intuitions tested by Machery et. al. (2004) do not provide real evidence for the theory of reference, or the third option, arguing that lay speaker intuitions are not sufficiently reliable when it comes to semantics. I argue, instead, that the intuitions tested do have evidential value and that the third option need be taken more seriously: referential pluralism. In particular, I address Marti's criticisms of Machery et. al. and her claim that the intuitions tested lack evidential value since they are meta-linguistic [Marti (2009), (2013)]. I argue that the intuitions tested are not meta-linguistic in a problematic way and that they do provide reasons to accept referential pluralism.

  • 33.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Självkännedom - på egen risk.2011In: Forskning & Framsteg, ISSN 0015-7937, no 6, p. 44-47Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 34.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Svenska elever är för dåligt ­­rustade mot falska nyheter2017In: Dagens nyheter, ISSN 1101-2447, no 9 decemberArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 35.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The insiginificance of transparency2015In: Externalism, self-knowledge, and skepticism / [ed] Sandford C. Goldberg, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 142-164Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 36.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Vad är egentligen fake news? Ett missbrukat begrepp och en oroande verklighet2018In: Fejk, filter och faktaresistens – hotar sociala medier demokratin? / [ed] Lars Truedson, Stockholm: Institutet för mediestudier , 2018, p. 15-30Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 37.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Vem bryr sig om fakta?2017In: Modern psykologi, ISSN 2000-4087, no 8, p. 30-33Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
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