In the nonprofit debate, there is an assumption that market means lead to market ends, oftentimes with grim consequences for nonprofit organizations. By drawing on a theoretical framework related to the social meaning of money in hybrid organizations, and by applying the framework to a longitudinal mixedmethod single case study ofmoneymanagement in the Swedish Federation for Sexual Education (RFSU), we argue in this paper instead that management of market means may also promote political mission ends. Empirical findings suggest that there are different social currencies at play that help explain why some money (income of a lower perceived social status) may be used by the organization simply as a means to get access to higher status money (and the legitimacy that comes with it). Hence, contrary to common assumptions of mission-drift as a consequence of market means, in this case study, business dividends and royalties commercially generated in fully owned subsidiaries have been informally and formally earmarked as lower status money and then used as means to secure higher status political mission ends.

In this paper, we aim for a better understanding of the roles of intermediaries in complex anduncertain contexts. The quest for faith and certainty is constantly pressing the actors in thepoliticized global field of development aid. Operating on the taxpayers’ money and faced withconditions which render knowledge of previous results and prediction of future results a realchallenge, what do they do? To what extent and how are results extrapolated from the use oforganizational structures and management technologies? To what extent and how are resultsrather extrapolated from interpersonal and interorganizational trust? How are the two related?We explore these research questions empirically in a comparative study of two “aid chains”consisting of numerous organizations interlinked in the coordination and operations of aidprojects (in this case aimed for capacity building in unions and universities in the globalsouth). Intermediaries are often criticized for adding “unnecessary” transaction costs to aidprojects. Based on our preliminary findings, we suggest that the understanding of theintermediary and its roles should be reconsidered. Analyzing the messiness and dynamics ofhow intermediaries handle trust and control opens up for a more nuanced understanding, notonly of the roles played by intermediaries but also of how complex systems are coordinated.

In this paper, we aim for a better understanding of the roles of intermediaries in complex and uncertain contexts. The quest for faith and certainty is constantly pressing the actors in the politicized global field of development aid. Operating on the taxpayers’ money and faced with conditions which render knowledge of previous results and prediction of future results a real challenge, what do they do? To what extent and how are results extrapolated from the use of organizational structures and management technologies? To what extent and how are results rather extrapolated from interpersonal and interorganizational trust? How are the two related? We explore these research questions empirically in a comparative study of two “aid chains” consisting of numerous organizations interlinked in the coordination and operations of aid projects (in this case aimed for capacity building in unions and universities in the global south). Intermediaries are often criticized for adding “unnecessary” transaction costs to aid projects. Based on our preliminary findings, we suggest that the understanding of the intermediary and its roles should be reconsidered. Analyzing the messiness and dynamics of how intermediaries handle trust and control opens up for a more nuanced understanding, not only of the roles played by intermediaries but also of how complex systems are coordinated.

The contemporary discourse about the sharing economy is both hyped and full of hope for a more sustainable future, but what is it that actually is shared? How much sharing is actually taking place, and in what dimensions and how can systems for sharing be governed? These questions are discussed in this paper and we compare the contemporary sharing economy discourse with old and since long established organized systems for sharing, here exemplified by constitutional hybrid organizations, thus organizations established with a purpose of mutual sharing in dimensions such as responsibility, power, surplus and risk. It is discussed that the contemporary sharing economy discourse mainly focus on collaborative consumption while constitutional hybridity is a more genuine form of organized mutuality. It is concluded that in both systems for sharing there seem to be empty governance structures. In the sharing economy it is mainly a market logic that dominates, where others than the consumers own what is shared. In constitutional hybridity the consumers are also owners, but it seems as they are either not aware of their ownership responsibilities and formal governance duties, or they are not really interested in taking such responsibilities. So, although there are existing and technically functioning systems for governance of systems for sharing, the practice of governance follows other logics, which calls for more research on governance in systems for sharing.

Instead of communicating via traditional media channels, which have their own agenda and are difficult to control, public organisations are increasingly producing and spreading their own messages through their own channels. One recent phenomenon is public organisations taking on roles as news producers. In this paper, we set the focus on the content published in the intersection of journalism and strategic communication. Through a qualitative study of the content of the digital news channel VGRfokus, launched and produced by the Swedish county council Västra Götalandsregionen (VGR), we examine how an organisational image of VGRs created in and through this content. Our analysis shows that a specific organisational image is constructed through the promotion of main actors from within VGR with a preference for managers, through a numerous and explicit mentioning of VGR or any of its subunits, through a bias towards positive news, and through a frequent use of words that relate to responsibility, innovation and modernity.

In recent years, the criticism of New Public Management (NPM) and its modes of management and governance has increased. As always when a ‘management fashion’ (Røvik, 2008) has been put to the test for some time in actual complex organizational practices, its’ downsides and problems appear. As demonstrated by reform scholars (Brunsson and Olsen, 1993; Røvik, 2008) fundamental ‘wicked problems’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973) such as that of the balance between centralization and decentralization and the question of how to prioritize and evaluate complex missions in the public administration, are always sensitive to new solutions. This is because they are, in a sense, unsolvable by nature (Brunsson, 2006). From this perspective, the current times may be seen as a formative ‘critical juncture’ (Djélic and Quack, 2007), in which it is expected that many will express the desire to leave the old (and now disappointing) management fashion (i.e. NPM) behind and open up for new and promising modes of public management and governance (Ivarsson Westerberg, 2017).

This paper draws on an in-depth case study (Alexius and Sardiello, 2018) of attempts by a Swedish municipality to explore post-NPM modes of ‘trust-based management’ in its Social Services operations (e.g. Bouckaert, 2012; Bentzen and Jagd, 2014; Curry, 2014; Bringselius ed, 2018). 

A first central conclusion of our paper is that it takes time to develop trust-based relationships. Building and maintaining trustful relationships require time both in the sense of endurance – to acquire the appropriate knowledge, such as for example coaching skills (Sardiello 2018) - and in the sense of accessibility in everyday work life - to make oneself psychologically and physically available for informal coordination with others (Alexius and Sardiello 2018).

Regarding governance and culture, we found that the municipality of Borlänge has made a parallel governance and culture change in the last decade from distrust to increased trust. First and foremost, in the early days of the reform, politicians and senior managers were engaged in closer collaboration than ever before, which fostered trust. In recent years, relationships within the administration, among managers as well as between managers and co-workers have been in focus for the reform. Organizational core-values have also been successfully internalized and are extensively used in everyday interactions by co-workers at all levels.

Regarding organization and working methods, we found interesting differences in how different staff groups perceive the ongoing reform towards more trustful relationships. These differences may be understood with reference to the degree of professional self-confidence and experience, and with reference to whether the individual has managerial responsibility or not. Time for dialogue and ability to improvise with judgement in light of given roles were two highlighted key conditions to develop and cherish trust-based relationships. In this sense we found Borlänge municipality has succeeded in relieving their first level social workers but a remaining challenge is staff turnover that often does not leave these officers enough time for supervision or coaching.

Empirical evidence from our studies also shows that the unit managers have to bear a heavy administrative burden of sediments from previous reforms, and that this burden reduces their time for a more coaching leadership. A future challenge for the municipality will be to motivate and relieve the unit managers. A solution that has been tried so far, but has been insufficient, has been to create assistant roles and various staff functions. However this has been insufficient mainly because of the unclear division of labor and responsibility among these different positions, implying a waste of time in terms of coordination (Alexius and Sardiello, 2018).

Despite the fact that the municipality's trust reform emphasizes decentralization, it requires the recruitment and formation of competent and responsible street-level bureaucrats who are willing and are put in the conditions to stay and take part in the committed interplay (Velten et al 2017). Clarifying the division of labor and responsibility between them and their managers and informing them (not only their managers) about the new coaching philosophy would save time in the already time-consuming work of building and maintaining more trustful relationships in the public administration.

In the organization, the modern, utopian project of development and improvement into perfection is in good shape, not least as demonstrated by the success of management models. Management models are visionary. They are about the future creating hope for a better, more efficient workplace and better functioning work processes. One such model is the Lean management model with its focus on efficiency and waste elimination. The model, originally from the automotive industry, has moved into all sorts of organizations including, as discussed in this paper, public preschools. The model’s power of fast, immutable mobility aligned with the perceived utopian ideal of efficiency and modernity rushed the Lean management model into preschools as a force promising solutions to perceived policy problems. In this way, Lean was initiated in order to create a future – to create an imagined future of a Lean, perfectly ordered organization, working efficiently without waste. Even though the Lean model luckily failed to turn preschools into the well-oiled Lean machines, it did manage to create new environments of power and new patterns of governance in preschools. Management models are promoted as models for all organizations, but Lean’s dispositional difference from the policy words and tools that govern preschools and the lack of similarity between the preschool context and the context of the automobile factory rendered the model inept for preschools. Still, the model made itself felt in the preschools by turning resources and focus from pedagogy and care towards efficiency and waste elimination to save time.