In this paper I discuss a Kantian conception of cosmopolitan education. It suggests that we pursue the highest good - an object of morality - in the world together, and requires that we acknowledge the value of freedom, render ourselves both efficacious and autonomous in practice, cultivate our judgment, and unselfishly co-operate in the co-ordination and fulfilment of our morally permissible ends. Now, such an accomplishment is one of the most difficult challenges, and may not be achieved in our time, if ever. In the first part of the paper I show that we, according to Kant, have to interact with each other, and comply with the moral law in the quest of general happiness, not merely personal happiness. In the second part, I argue that a cosmopolitan design of teacher education in Kantian terms can establish moral character, even though good moral character is ultimately the outcome of free choice. Such a design can do so by optimizing the freedom of those concerned to set and pursue their morally permissible ends, and to cultivate their judgment through the use of examples. This requires, inter alia, that they be enabled, and take responsibility, to think for themselves, in the position of everyone else, and consistently; and to strengthen their virtue or self-mastery to comply, in practice, with the moral law.

In this paper I show how Article 26 of the Declaration of Human Rights developed from its earlier versions, including basic ideas for education, to aims and purposes, and its final adaptation incorporating further democratic ideals. I also show that the Declaration ""as a common standard of achievement"" heralded by the General Assembly of the United Nations is a principled statement of restriction on government intervention in education, on the one hand, and a principled positive statement that those affected by state-governed education should be able to choose education for their children on the other.

Why should we deliberate? I discuss a Kantian response to this query and argue that we cannot as rational beings avoid deliberation in principle; and that we have good reasons to consider the value and strength of Kant's philosophical investigations concerning fundamental moral issues and their relevance for the question of why we ought to deliberate. I also argue that deliberation is a wide duty. This means that it has to be set as an end, that it is meritorious, and that we cannot specify exactly what acts can be identified with it or are required for its realization. I begin by discussing why we cannot avoid deliberation in principle, that deliberation is a wide duty and why we ought to set it as an end. In the second part I argue how deliberation can be acknowledged in cosmopolitan education, and how we can inquire into the quality of communication in terms of deliberation in such an education or elsewhere.

Kant argues that we have a duty to perfect ourselves morally and promote the happiness of others. He also argues that we have an innate propensity to evil. Our duty to perfect ourselves suggests that we struggle with our innate propensity to wilfully deviate from doing our duty. And we do this when we struggle against the depravation of our heart, namely our propensity to reverse the ethical order as regards the incentives of a free power of choice', namely, our propensity to wilfully comply with the principle of self-love and override the moral law. It seems, however, that education does not enable those concerned to fulfil their duties. It seems, instead, that education basically makes them efficacious with regard to desired ends and with the devised means. It seems, too, that education does not necessarily make it possible for those concerned with duty to perfect themselves morally and help others to do the same, which in turn suggests that those concerned are not being enabled to make themselves as conscientious as possible in [their] moral self-examination'. I argue that education ought to enable those concerned to cultivate their moral strength to do so and enable others to do the same.

Do we need principles of the unification of our agency, our mode of acting? Immanuel Kant and Christine Korsgaard argue that the reflective structure of our mind forces us to have some conception of ourselves, others and the world-including our agency-and that it is through will and reason, and in particular principles of our agency, that we take upon ourselves to unify and test the way(s) in which we make our lives consistent. I argue that the principles suggested-the hypothetical imperative and the categorical imperative-function to unify our understanding of ourselves and others as agents as efficacious and autonomous and that the extent to which those concerned render themselves efficacious and autonomous in cosmopolitan education or elsewhere is due to the extent to which they act in accordance with and are motivated by the suggested principles and in particular the categorical one. I first discuss how the principles function to unify our agency and how the categorical imperative functions as a test of maxims for our actions, how the will is the source of our morality, and how we are forced to have practical identities. I end with some remarks on what it means to acknowledge the mentioned principles in cosmopolitan education.

The notion of 'truth' is one of the most important concepts within critical thinking and critical pedagogy as well as in other traditions or theories, and truth is seen by many as the outcome of inquiry. In this article I will argue for an alternative notion of truth to those that will be discussed in it and that such a view has to be included in a new critical language in education. I discuss a realist notion, a postmodernist social constructivist notion, a relativist notion, a deflationist and a cautionary discursive conception of truth put forward by Habermas, and contend that they are problematic in the light of my interpretation of Donald Davidson's philosophy of language. I also argue that truth cannot be a goal of inquiry, but that understanding and justification are legitimate goals. Finally, I contend that it is reasonable to include notions such as understanding, justification and deliberation in Davidson's terminology in a new critical language of education.

This paper discusses the value and importance of examples in Kantian terms, and how students can cultivate their moral disposition through the use of examples in education. It is argued that students should not just copy or imitate examples automatically, nor appraise them unreflectively and uncritically. They should instead be enabled to think for themselves in the position of the other and consistently, through the use of examples. This paper also discusses the extent to which students in teacher education programmes in Sweden were enabled to cultivate a moral disposition through the use of literature which unveils a design of education in national, European and cosmopolitan terms. However, since it seems that they lacked such opportunities it is argued that they were not enabled to cultivate their moral disposition through the use of the above-mentioned literature.

How can we understand human agency, and what does it mean to educate character? Inthis essay Klas Roth develops a Kantian notion, one that suggests we render ourselves efficacious andautonomous in education and elsewhere. This requires, among other things, that we are successfulin bringing about the intended result through our actions and the means used, and that we act inaccordance with and are motivated by the Categorical Imperative. It also requires that we are or striveto become virtuous and that we engage in moral reflection, and, furthermore, that actions are done forthe sake of duty, that is, out of respect for the moral law. We accomplish such aims by developing ourpredispositions, namely the technical, the pragmatic, and the moral predisposition in a society. Theextent towhichwe achieve this, Roth contends, demonstrates whatwe are prepared tomake of ourselves.