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  • 1.
    Acemoglu, Daron
    et al.
    MIT Department of Economics.
    Aghion, Philippe
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Griffith, Rachel
    UCL.
    Zilibotti, Fabrizio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence2010In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 8, no 5, p. 989-1033Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 2.
    Aghion, Philippe
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Algan, Yann
    Sciences Po.
    Cahuc, Pierre
    Ecole Polytechnique.
    Civil Society and the State: The Interplay between Cooperation and Minimum Wage Regulation2011In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 9, no 1, p. 3-42Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 3. Aghion, Philippe
    et al.
    Bergeaud, Antonin
    Boppart, Timo
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Bunel, Simon
    Firm Dynamics and Growth Measurement in France2018In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 16, no 4, p. 933-956Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we use the same methodology as Aghion et al. (2017a) to compute missing growth estimates from creative destruction in France. We find that from 2004 to 2015, about 0.5 percentage point of real output growth per year is missed by the statistical office, which is about the same as what was found in the United States. We look at how missing growth varies across French sectors and regions, and we look at the underlying establishment and firm dynamics. In particular we show that the similar missing growth estimates between France and the United States hide noticeable differences in plant dynamics between the two countries.

  • 4. Aghion, Philippe
    et al.
    Jaravel, Xavier
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies. CIFAR, Canada.
    Rouzet, Dorothée
    Education and Military Rivalry2019In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 17, no 2, p. 376-412Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    What makes countries engage in reforms of mass education? Motivated by historical evidence on the relation between military threats and expansions of primary education, we assemble a panel dataset from the last 150 years in European countries and from the postwar period in a large set of countries. We uncover three stylized facts: (i) investments in education are associated with military threats, (ii) democratic institutions are negatively correlated with education investments, and (iii) education investments respond more strongly to military threats in democracies. These patterns continue to hold when we exploit rivalries in a country's neighborhood as an alternative source of variation. We develop a theoretical model that rationalizes the three empirical findings. The model has an additional prediction about investments in physical infrastructures, which finds support in the data.

  • 5.
    Arai, Mahmood
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Karlsson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI).
    Lundholm, Michael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    On Fragile Grounds: A Replication of 'Are Muslim Immigrants Different in Terms of Cultural Integration?'2011In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 9, no 5, p. 1002-1011Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This study is a replication of "Are Muslim Immigrants Different in terms of Cultural Integration?" by Alberto Bisin, Eleonora Patacchini, Thierry Verdier and Yves Zenou, published in the Journal of the European Economic Association, 6, 445-456, 2008. Bisin et al. (2008) report that they have 5,963 observations in their study. Using their empirical setup, we can only identify 1,901 relevant observations in the original data. After removing missing values we are left with 818 observations. We cannot replicate any of their results and our estimations yield no support for their claims. (JEL: A14, C21, C87, J15)

  • 6. Ballester, Coralio
    et al.
    Calvo-Armengol, Antoni
    Zenou, Yves
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    DELINQUENT NETWORKS2010In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 8, no 1, p. 34-61Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Each delinquent decides in a noncooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal to optimal group removal, the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex because it depends on wages and on the structure of the network. (JEL: A14, C72, K42, L14)

  • 7.
    Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    London School of Economics and CIFAR.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    FRAGILE STATES AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY2011In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 9, no 3, p. 371-398Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is widely recognized that fragile states are key symptoms of under-development in many parts of the world. Such states are incapable of delivering basic services to their citizens and political violence is commonplace. As of yet, mainstream development economics has not dealt in any systematic way with such concerns and the implications for development assistance. This paper puts forward a framework for analyzing fragile states and applies it to a variety development policies in different types of states.

  • 8. Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies. CIFAR, Canada.
    JEEA-FBBVA LECTURE 2017: The Dynamics of Environmental Politics and Values2019In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 17, no 4, p. 993-1024Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper develops a framework to study environmentalism as a cultural phenomenon, namely as reflecting a process of social identification with certain values. The model is used to explain how the shares of environmentalists and materialists in society can coevolve with taxes on emissions to protect society against damages caused by environmental degradation. These policies are determined by electoral competition. However, even though politicians internalize the welfare of those currently alive and pick utilitarian optimal policies, the dynamic equilibrium paths of policies and evolving values may not converge to the steady state with the highest level of long-run welfare.

  • 9.
    Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    London School of Economics.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Wars and State Capacity2008In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 6, no 2-3, p. 522-530Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The article builds a simple model to investigate how different types of armed conflict shape fiscal capacity: the state's ability to raise revenue from taxes. It starts from the simple observation that external war tends to generate common interests across groups in society, whereas internal, civil war entails deep conflicting interests across groups. Our model predicts that-compared to a society without conflict-civil wars lead to smaller investments in fiscal capacity, whereas prospects of external war generally lead to larger investments. Correlations in international data on conflicts and taxation are, by and large, consistent with these predictions.

  • 10. Bisin, Alberto
    et al.
    Patacchini, Eleonora
    Verdier, Thierry
    Zenou, Yves
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Errata Corrige: are Muslim Immigrants Different in Terms of Cultural Integration?2011In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 9, no 5, p. 1012-1019Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 11.
    Björkman, Martina
    et al.
    Bocconi University.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    When is Community-Based Monitoring Effective?: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Primary Health in Uganda2010In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 8, no 2-3Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 12.
    de Quidt, Jonathan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Your Loss Is My Gain: A Recruitment Experiment with Framed Incentives2018In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 16, no 2, p. 522-559Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    As predicted by loss aversion, numerous studies find that penalties elicit greater effort than bonuses, even when the underlying payoffs are identical. However, loss aversion also predicts that workers will demand higher wages to accept penalty contracts. In six experiments I recruited workers online under framed incentive contracts to test the second prediction. None find evidence for the predicted distaste for penalty contracts. In four experiments penalty framing actually increased the job offer acceptance rate relative to bonus framing. I rule out a number of explanations, most notably self-commitment motives do not seem to explain the finding. Two experiments that manipulate salience are successful at eliminating the effect, but do not significantly reverse it. Overall, loss aversion seems to play surprisingly little role in this setting. The results also highlight the importance of behavioral biases for infrequent, binding decisions such as contract take-up. (JEL: D03, J41, D86)

  • 13.
    Duernecker, Georg
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Technology and Adoption, Turbulence and the Dynamics of Unemployment2014In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 12, no 3, p. 724-754Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 14.
    Hassler, John
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Krusell, Per
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    ECONOMICS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT IN A MULTI-REGION WORLD2012In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 10, no 5, p. 974-1000Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper develops a model that integrates the climate and the global economyan integrated assessment modelwith which different policy scenarios can be analyzed and compared. The model is a dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium setup with a continuum of regions. Thus, it is a full stochastic general-equilibrium version of RICE, Nordhauss pioneering multi-region integrated assessment model. Like RICE, our model features traded fossil fuel but otherwise has no markets across regionsthere is no insurance nor any intertemporal trade across them. The extreme form of market incompleteness is not fully realistic but arguably not a bad approximation of reality. Its major advantage is that, along with a set of reasonable assumptions on preferences, technology, and nature, it allows a closed-form model solution. We use the model to assess the welfare consequences of carbon taxes that differ across as well as within oil-consuming and -producing regions. We show that, surprisingly, only taxes on oil producers can improve the climate: taxes on oil consumers have no effect at all. The calibrated model suggests large differences in views on climate policy across regions.

  • 15. Holden, Steinar
    et al.
    Rosén, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI).
    Discrimination and Employment Protection2014In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 12, no 6, p. 1676-1699Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We study a search model with employment protection legislation. We show that if the output from the match is uncertain at the hiring stage, a discriminatory equilibrium may exist in which workers with the same productive characteristics are subject to different hiring standards. If a bad match takes place, discriminated workers will take longer to find another job, prolonging the costly period for the firm. This makes it less profitable for firms to hire discriminated workers, thus sustaining the discrimination. In contrast to Becker's model, the existence of employers with a taste for discrimination may make it more profitable to discriminate, even for firms without discriminatory preferences.

  • 16. Jia, Ruixue
    et al.
    Kudamatsu, Masayuki
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Seim, David
    POLITICAL SELECTION IN CHINA: THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF CONNECTIONS AND PERFORMANCE2015In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 13, no 4, p. 631-668Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Who becomes a top politician in China? We focus on provincial leadersa pool of candidates for top political officeand examine how their chances of promotion depend on their performance in office and connections with top politicians. Our empirical analysis, based on the curriculum vitae of Chinese politicians, shows that connections and performance are complements in the Chinese political selection process. This complementarity is stronger the younger provincial leaders are relative to their connected top leaders. To provide one plausible interpretation of these empirical findings, we propose a simple theory in which the complementarity arises because connections foster loyalty of junior officials to senior ones, thereby allowing incumbent top politicians to select competent provincial leaders without risking being ousted. Our findings shed some light on why a political system known for patronage can still select competent leaders.

  • 17.
    Kudamatsu, Masayuki
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    HAS DEMOCRATIZATION REDUCED INFANT MORTALITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA?: EVIDENCE FROM MICRO DATA2012In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 10, no 6, p. 1294-1317Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Does democracy help babies survive in sub-Saharan Africa? By using retrospective fertility surveys conducted in 28 African countries, I compare the survival of infants born to the same mother before and after democratization to disentangle the effect of democracy from that of changes in population characteristics, which is infeasible with country-level statistics on infant mortality. I find that infant mortality falls by 1.2 percentage points, 12% of the sample mean, after democratization in the post-Cold War period. Relevant aspects of democracy appear to be the combination of multiparty elections and leadership change.

  • 18.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Nyberg, Sten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Weibull, Jörgen W.
    Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics2003In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 1, no 2-3, p. 533-542Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance. If the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher, then voters will choose less generous benefits than otherwise. We also discuss welfare‐state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share, and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of beneficiaries.

  • 19. Mengel, Friederike
    et al.
    Sauermann, Jan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI).
    Zölitz, Ulf
    Gender Bias in Teaching Evaluations2019In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 17, no 2, p. 535-566Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper provides new evidence on gender bias in teaching evaluations. We exploit a quasi-experimental dataset of 19,952 student evaluations of university faculty in a context where students are randomly allocated to female or male instructors. Despite the fact that neither students’ grades nor self-study hours are affected by the instructor’s gender, we find that women receive systematically lower teaching evaluations than their male colleagues. This bias is driven by male students’ evaluations, is larger for mathematical courses, and particularly pronounced for junior women. The gender bias in teaching evaluations we document may have direct as well as indirect effects on the career progression of women by affecting junior women’s confidence and through the reallocation of instructor resources away from research and toward teaching. (JEL: J16, J71, I23, J45)

  • 20. Moen, Espen R.
    et al.
    Rosén, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI).
    On-the-job Search and Moral Hazard2013In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 11, no 6, p. 1404-1431Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on-the-job search. In our model, agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation. At the same time workers do on-the-job search. Deferred compensation improves workers' incentives to exert effort but distorts their on-the-job search decisions. We show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker–firm pair of on-the-job search is high. Moreover, the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback effects. If firms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation, fewer firms with vacancies enter the on-the-job search market, and this in turn reduces the distortions created by deferred compensation. These feedback effects between the incentive contracts used and the activity level in the search markets can lead to multiple equilibria: a low-turnover equilibrium where firms use deferred compensation, and a high-turnover equilibrium where they do not. Furthermore, the model predicts that firms are more likely to use deferred compensation when search frictions are high and when the gains from on-the-job search are small.

  • 21. Reinikka, Ritva
    et al.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    WORKING FOR GOD?: EVIDENCE FROM A CHANGE IN FINANCING OF NONPROFIT HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS IN UGANDA2010In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 8, no 6, p. 1159-1178Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    What motivates religious nonprofit health care providers? This paper uses a change in financing of nonprofit health care providers in Uganda to test two theories of organizational behavior. We show that financial aid leads to more laboratory testing, lower user charges, and increased utilization. These findings are consistent with the view that religious nonprofit providers are intrinsically motivated to serve (poor) people and that these preferences matter quantitatively. (JEL: L31, I11, O15)

  • 22.
    Yanagizawa, David
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Nancy, Qian
    Yale University.
    The Strategic Determinants of U.S. Human Rights Reporting: Evidence from the Cold War2009In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 8, no 2-3, p. 446-457Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper uses a country-level panel data set to test the hypothesis that the United States biases its human rights reports of countries based on the latters' strategic value. We use the difference between the U.S. State Department's and Amnesty International's reports as a measure of U.S. “bias.” For plausibly exogenous variation in strategic value to the U.S., we compare this bias between U.S. Cold War (CW) allies to non-CW allies, before and after the CW ended. The results show that allying with the U.S. during the CW significantly improved reports on a country's human rights situation from the U.S. State Department relative to Amnesty International.

  • 23.
    Yanagizawa, David
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Getting Prices Right: The Impact of the Market Information System in Uganda2009In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 8, no 2-3, p. 434-445Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The Market Information Service project in Uganda collected data on prices for the main agricultural commodities in major market centers and disseminated the information through local FMradio stations in various districts. Exploiting the variation across space between households with and without access to a radio, we find evidence suggesting that better-informed farmers managed to bargain for higher farm-gate prices on their surplus production.

1 - 23 of 23
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