While there is ample evidence of a society-wide cooperation norm, it is not as clear who upholds this norm. In the present paper, we investigate whether there are gender differences with respect to norm enforcement. We let 1403 subjects play games of punishment and reward, individually or in groups with varying gender composition. Broadly, the results indicate that there are no clear gender differences: men are about as inclined as women to punish norm-breakers. However, behavior is context-dependent: men acting among other men are less inclined to uphold a cooperation norm than are women, or men in gender-mixed groups.

The issue of low-wage competition in services trade involving posted workers is controversial in the EU. Using Swedish survey data, people's attitudes are found to be more negative to such trade than to goods trade. The differences depend on both a preference for favouring social groups to which individuals belong (the domestic population) and altruistic justice concerns for foreign workers. In small-group experiments, we find a tendency for people to adjust their evaluations of various aspects of trade to their general attitude. This tendency is stronger for those opposed to than those in favour of low-wage trade competition. This may indicate that the former group forms its attitudes in a less rational way than the latter group.

This paper introduces the negative feelings associated with the perception of being unfairly treated into a tournament model and examines the impact of these perceptions on workers’ efforts and their willingness to work overtime. The effect of unfair treatment on workers’ behavior is ambiguous in the model in that two countervailing effects arise: a negative impulsive effect and a positive strategic effect. The impulsive effect implies that workers react to the perception of being unfairly treated by reducing their level of effort. The strategic effect implies that workers raise this level in order to improve their career opportunities and thereby avoid feeling even more unfairly treated in the future. An empirical test of the model using survey data from a Swedish municipal utility shows that the overall effect is negative. This suggests that employers should consider the negative impulsive effect of unfair treatment on effort and overtime when designing contracts and determining promotions.

The article argues for the use of a narrow stakeholder definition. It also adds one group - managers - that generally is not considered as being a stakeholder group. Here it is suggested that control of this stakeholder group holding the executive power should be a central topic for stakeholder theory. The article supports the common idea that the business discourse and the moral discourse should be integrated in stakeholder theory, not treated as separate tracks. The issue is then how to mold the substance for such integration. This article argues that the priority of stakeholders implies a distancing from general altruistic philosophy that argues against - not for - giving special consideration to the company's stakeholders. Both the moral substance and the business potential lie in the special and close relationship with these partners. Stakeholder theory needs a more compatible ethical theory.