A seemingly continuous stream of crises in Europe has turned scholarly agendas towards assessment of the EU's management of crises. Those assessments vary widely, depending on the analytical focus and criteria used. This paper introduces three assessment criteria drawn from crisis research that pertain to the detection of a crisis, the mobilization of necessary resources, and the nature of the public debate about critical choices made in times of crisis. We relate these crisis management insights to long-standing debates in European integration theory to help link traditional crisis management assessments with EU-focused theorizing. The article offers a framework for assessment of the EU's performance as a crisis manager. We illustrate the utility of the framework with a brief application to the EU's response to Covid-19. We assess the EU's performance in positive terms: the Union acted quickly after a somewhat slow start and was very effective in mobilizing a variety of resources. At the same time, we note that major policy choices were made without a significant public debate about potential effects on the future character of the Union.

Despite the cultural and ideological diversity of the member states when it comes to alcohol, several alcohol-related initiatives have been taken recently at the EU level. The purpose of this article is to analyse the development of two of these initiatives: the Council Recommendation of 5 June 2001 on the drinking of alcohol by young people, and the invitation from the Council to the Commission to develop a Community Alcohol Strategy, both adopted during the Swedish Presidency in 2001. Drawing from Hritier's work on escaping deadlock it is argued that EU decisions on alcohol policy were made possible by using four strategies: priority, anchorage, lowest common denominator and baby steps. In cases of weak EU supranational competence the possibilities of escaping deadlock differ somewhat from cases of strong legislative competence and the strategies of priority and anchorage seem to be of particular importance for questions based on soft law decision-making.

Climate change, health pandemics, structural decline, and more - the challenges of solving political problems are daunting, particularly when the political institutions addressing them are not trusted. This article tests the economic theory that residents of high-income regions are more likely to trust political institutions, given their positive experiences with services and opportunities, against the rival argument that predicts a negative effect of regional disadvantage within a country on political trust. Using European Values Study and World Values Survey (2017-2020) data, combined with socioeconomic data for 606 regions in 42 countries, this paper analyses samples of regions both in and outside the EU. The results suggest that people living in wealthy EU regions - both in absolute and relative terms - trust national government more and the EU less. In the global sample, the evidence is more variegated and corroborates economic theory only in democracies. The article sketches implications for regional inequality, political trust, and legitimacy research.

To promote economic and social cohesion, the European Union (EU) structural funds part-finance public investment programmes in European regions with about E30 billion per year. This article develops an explanation for the apportionment of structural funds across EU regions. It is argued that the Commission’s decisions on regional transfer levels reflect its bureaucratic interest and potentially undermine EU goals. Using a new data set on regional transfer payments in the EU-15 from 2000 to 2006, and qualitative interviews with decision-makers, this argument is tested and corroborated. In doing so, it is shown that the recipient regions’ level of economic affluence is necessary, but no sufficient explanatory factor for regional transfer levels. In contrast to previous findings in the literature, the empirical record does not suggest that regional partisan politics has an effect on the size of regional transfer levels.

Legitimacy is central to the functioning of global governance institutions (GGIs) such as the European Union (EU) and the United Nations. There is a vibrant debate about legitimacy in International Relations, and a burgeoning literature in comparative politics on public attitudes towards the EU. Yet, these literatures rarely speak to each other, which has resulted in missed opportunities for theoretical advancements on the sources and consequences of citizens’ legitimacy beliefs vis-à-vis GGIs. To assist researchers in advancing on this state of the art, this research note develops a conceptualization of popular legitimacy as a multidimensional belief system including both moral convictions and self-interest. A statistical analysis of public attitudes towards the EU from 1973 to 2012 suggests that commonly used survey measures capture self-interest rather than moral beliefs. This note concludes by suggesting a research agenda intended to push theory and survey research on legitimacy beliefs towards GGIs forward.

The comparative analysis of welfare states has been greatly advanced by rights-based measurements of social provisions. Social insurance replacement rates have figured prominently here. Apparently, there is considerable confusion about the validity of replacement rates and their comparability across different datasets. The purpose of this study is to outline a refined institutional perspective in the comparative analysis of welfare states focusing on the character of social citizenship rights. We show that social insurance replacement rates from different datasets differ in their underlying theoretical framework for policy analysis and therefore capture different aspects of how welfare states secure the livelihood of citizens in periods of work incapacity. Analysing validity solely on the basis of replacement rate point estimates is therefore misleading. We show that the close focus on social citizenship rights and programmatic design in the Social Citizenship Indicator Programme (SCIP) carries great potential for causal welfare state analysis.

Although many studies compare national integration policies, analyses connecting these policies to integration outcomes are rare. This study combines longitudinal analysis of employment outcomes for Scandinavian refugees, with analyses of integration measures and policies to explain these differences. Can different usages of integration measures explain cross-national differences in employment outcomes between genders and with increased residence time? Moreover, can the countries' integration policies explain such differences? Our analyses show substantial cross-national differences. Danish male refugees are employed faster; however, Sweden catches up, and Norway surpasses Danish employment levels with increased residence time. Additionally, Norway has a substantially smaller gender gap in employment than Sweden and particularly Denmark. We demonstrate that different usages of integration measures may explain differences in outcomes. We conjecture that different policies regulating (1) financial benefits and (2) employment and self-sufficiency requirements for obtaining a secure legal status may reinforce differences in programme participation and employment patterns.

European Union (EU) negotiations take place within the framework of a set of formal and informal institutions. Member states negotiate in the organizational context of the Council and the European Council, take decisions through alternative procedures and decision rules, and sustain a set of norms for the conduct of negotiations. While the effects of these institutions on negotiation behaviour and outcomes have received extensive attention, the question of why these particular institutions have been established or evolved remains underexplored. This contribution makes an argument in favour of systematic attention to the design of negotiation institutions in the EU, and suggests that we should draw on general theoretical approaches to institutional design for these purposes. Moreover, rather than engaging in the exercise of trying to prove or falsify theoretical approaches, we should exploit the potential for explanatory complementarities in concrete empirical domains. To this end, the paper advances a domain-of-application approach to institutional design and illustrates its applicability to EU negotiation institutions through four empirical illustrations.

Many problems confronting today’s societies are transnational in character, leading states to increasingly rely on international organizations (IOs) for policy solutions. Yet the performance of IOs varies extensively. As an initial step toward explaining variation in IO performance, this article discusses how performance may best be conceptualized for empirical analysis. We advance an output-based account of IO performance, privileging the results IOs produce in terms of policy output. This conceptualization is distinct from the main alternative perspectives on IO performance, emphasizing either behavioral change by targets (policy outcome) or problem-solving effectiveness (policy impact). In addition, we introduce a typology of output that captures five generic features of IO policy of theoretical importance: policy volume, orientation, type, instrument, and target. We conclude by highlighting the implications of an output-based account to IO performance for the study of institutional design and effectiveness in global governance.