Change search
Refine search result
1234567 101 - 150 of 829
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Rows per page
  • 5
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100
  • 250
Sort
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
Select
The maximal number of hits you can export is 250. When you want to export more records please use the 'Create feeds' function.
  • 101.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Moral internalism: An Essay in Moral Psychology1998Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    An ancient but central divide in moral philosophy concerns the nature of opinions about what is morally wrong or what our moral duties are. Some philosophers argue that moral motivation is internal to moral opinions: that moral opinions consist of motivational states such as desires or emotions. This has often been seen as a threat to the possibility of rational argument and justification in morals. Other philosophers argue that moral motivation is external to moral opinion: moral opinions should be seen as beliefs about moral reality, beliefs which may or may not motivate depending on whether the person holding them cares about moral matters.

    In this essay it is argued that although the traditional case for the internalist position fails, the total available evidence and methodological considerations support an internalist theory formulated in terms of a relatively rich psychological model. It is shown how such a theory can explain not only the practical character of moral opinions and their connection to moral emotions but also phenomena that have been taken to suggest an externalist picture, such as the role of inference, inconsistency, argument and explanations in moral discussion, as well as cases of amoralism and psychological disturbance. In the end, it is concluded that externalist explanations of the same phenomena are methodologically inferior for postulating a more complicated psychology.

  • 102.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rik Peels, Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology, Oxford University Press, 20172017In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617, article id 10.17Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 103.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Significance of Ethical Disagreement for Theories of Ethical Thought and Talk2017In: Routledge Handbook of Metaethics / [ed] Tristram McPherson, David Plunkett, New York: Routledge, 2017, p. 275-291Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter has two sections, each focusing on a distinct way in which ethical disagreement and variations in ethical judgment matter for theories of ethical thought and talk. In the first section, we look at how the variation poses problems for both cognitivist and non-cognitivist ways of specifying the nature of ethical judgments. In the second, we look at how disagreement phenomena have been taken to undermine cognitivist accounts, but also at how the seeming variation in cognitive and non-cognitive contents between parties of deep ethical disagreement challenges both cognitivist and non-cognitivist accounts of disagreement itself.

  • 104.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Båve, Arvid
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Teoretisk filosofi.
    Meaning as a Normative Concept: An Interview with Allan Gibbard2007In: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0040-5825, Vol. 78, no 3, p. 190-205Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    This interview was conducted following Allan Gibbard's Hägerström Lectures, titled "Meaning as a Normative Concept".

  • 105.
    Blomberg, C.
    et al.
    Kungl. Tekniska högskolan.
    Liljenström, H.
    Kungl. Tekniska högskolan.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Århem, P.
    Karolinska Institutet.
    Mind and Matter: Essays from Biology, Physics and Philosophy: An Introduction1994In: Journal of Theoretical Biology, ISSN 0022-5193, E-ISSN 1095-8541, Vol. 171, p. 1-5Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 106.
    Bognar, Greg
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. La Trobe University, Australia.
    Is disability mere difference?2016In: Journal of Medical Ethics, ISSN 0306-6800, E-ISSN 1473-4257, Vol. 42, no 1, p. 46-49Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 107.
    Bognar, Greg
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Priority Setting and Age2016In: Prioritization in Medicine: An International Dialogue / [ed] Eckhard Nagel, Michael Lauerer, Springer, 2016, p. 163-177Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The role of age in priority setting is one of the most controversial issues in health policy. It has also been a contentious topic for many years in medical ethics and philosophy, and any discussion of age as a criterion for setting priorities in health care is likely to stir up intense public debate. Age is an easily observable characteristic; hence it is tempting to use it when priorities must be set between different resource uses or patient groups. Indeed, age considerations pervade health systems worldwide. Consequently, there is an urgent need to clarify the role that age can play in health care resource allocation.

  • 108.
    Bognar, Greg
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    QALYs, DALYs, and Their Critics2015In: The Routledge Companion to Bioethics / [ed] John D. Arras, Elizabeth Fenton, Rebecca Kukla, Routledge, 2015, p. 44-55Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 109.
    Bohlin, Henrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Groundless knowledge: a Humean solution to the problem of skepticism1997Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of the present study is to develop a solution to the problem of skepticism about the external world ("skepticism", for short), inspired primarily by Hume's "skeptical solution" to the problem of skepticism about induction, but also by epistemological externalism and Wittgenstein's discussion of skeptical doubts in On Certainty. The author accepts certain elements in P. F. Strawson's interpretation of Hume and Wittgenstein, but rejects the "psychological" argument against skepticism which Strawson ascribes to the two philosophers.

    The problem of skepticism is understood as that of showing that we can know what we in common sense claim to know about external objects, despite skeptical arguments to the contrary. A "moderate" skepticism is accepted, according to which it is possible that we are globally mistaken in our beliefs about external objects, and it is argued that there is in fact no conflict between this moderate skepticism and common sense. A distinc-tion is drawn between two types of "strong" skepticism, which does conflict with common sense: prescriptive skepti-cism, the recommendation to abandon our common sense ways of forming beliefs, by suspend-ing judgement or in other ways; and theoretical skepti-cism, the thesis that we can have no rational grounds for our beliefs about external objects. An argument against prescriptive skepticism is devel-oped, according to which each of three possible forms of prescriptive skepticism is unacceptable. An externalist argument against theoreti-cal skepticism is developed, according to which it is suffi-cient for knowledge that one is in fact not globally mis-taken, whether or not one has grounds for believing this to be the case. It is argued that this variant of externalism constitutes a form of natu-ralistic epistemology, and that it as such fills a gap in Quine's argument for the natu-ralization of epistemology. An interpretation of On Certainty is defended, according to which Wittgen-stein accepts a form of moderate skepticism and presents an argu-ment against strong skep-ticism similar to Hume's.

  • 110. Bonnay, Denis
    et al.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Compositionality Solves Carnap's Problem2016In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 81, no 4, p. 721-739Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The standard relation of logical consequence allows for non-standard interpretations of logical constants, as was shown early on by Carnap. But then how can we learn the interpretations of logical constants, if not from the rules which govern their use? Answers in the literature have mostly consisted in devising clever rule formats going beyond the familiar what follows from what. A more conservative answer is possible. We may be able to learn the correct interpretations from the standard rules, because the space of possible interpretations is a priori restricted by universal semantic principles. We show that this is indeed the case. The principles are familiar from modern formal semantics: compositionality, supplemented, for quantifiers, with topic-neutrality.

  • 111. Bonnay, Denis
    et al.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Consequence Mining Constants Versus Consequence Relations2012In: Journal of Philosophical Logic, ISSN 0022-3611, E-ISSN 1573-0433, Vol. 41, no 4, p. 671-709Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The standard semantic definition of consequence with respect to a selected set X of symbols, in terms of truth preservation under replacement (Bolzano) or reinterpretation (Tarski) of symbols outside X, yields a function mapping X to a consequence relation . We investigate a function going in the other direction, thus extracting the constants of a given consequence relation, and we show that this function (a) retrieves the usual logical constants from the usual logical consequence relations, and (b) is an inverse to-more precisely, forms a Galois connection with-the Bolzano-Tarski function.

  • 112. Bonnay, Denis
    et al.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Dynamic Versus Classical Consequence2014In: Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics / [ed] Baltag, A.; Smets, S., Dordrecht: Springer, 2014, Vol. 5, p. 837-854Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The shift of interest in logic from just reasoning to all forms of information flow has considerably widened the scope of the discipline, as amply illustrated in Johan van Benthem's recent book Logical Dynamics of Information and Interaction. But how much does this change when it comes to the study of traditional logical notions such as logical consequence? We propose a systematic comparison between classical consequence, explicated in terms of truth preservation, and a dynamic notion of consequence, explicated in terms of information flow. After a brief overview of logical consequence relations and the distinctive features of classical consequence, we define classical and dynamic consequence over abstract information frames. We study the properties of information under which the two notions prove to be equivalent, both in the abstract setting of information frames and in the concrete setting of Public Announcement Logic. The main lesson is that dynamic consequence diverges from classical consequence when information is not persistent, which is in particular the case of epistemic information about what we do not yet know. We end by comparing our results with recent work by Rothschild and Yalcin on the conditions under which the dynamics of information updates can be classically represented. We show that classicality for consequence is strictly less demanding than classicality for updates. Johan van Benthem's recent book Logical Dynamics of Information and Interaction [8] can be seen as a passionate plea for a radically new view of logic. To be sure, the book is not a philosophical discussion of what logic is but rather an impressive series of illustrations of what logic can be, with presentations of numerous logical languages and a wealth of meta-logical results about them. The view is called simply Logical Dynamics, and contrasted with more traditional views of logic, and also with the earlier view from e.g. [5], now called Pluralism, in which logic was seen as the study of consequence relations. According to Logical Dynamics, logic is not only about reasoning, about what follows from what, but about all aspects of information flow among rational agents. Not just proof and inference, but observations, questions, announcements, communication, plans, strategies, etc. are first-class citizens in the land of Logic. And not only the output of these activities belong to logic, but also the processes leading up to it. This is a fascinating and inspiring view of logic. But how different is it from a more standard view? In particular, what does it change for the analysis of logical consequence, which had been the focus of traditional logical enquiry? This paper attempts some answers to the latter question, with a view to get clearer about the former.

  • 113. Bradley, Richard
    et al.
    Stefánsson, H. Orri
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Counterfactual Desirability2017In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, ISSN 0007-0882, E-ISSN 1464-3537, Vol. 68, no 2, p. 485-533Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Preferences based on such value dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes generate a class of problems for orthodox decision theory, the best-known perhaps being the so-called Allais paradox. In this article we solve these problems by extending Richard Jeffrey’s decision theory to counterfactual prospects, using a multidimensional possible-world semantics for conditionals, and showing that preferences that are sensitive to counterfactual considerations can still be desirability-maximizing. We end the article by investigating the conditions necessary and sufficient for a desirability function to be a standard expected-utility function. It turns out that the additional conditions imply highly implausible epistemic principles.

  • 114.
    Brunnander, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Deflating selection: On the interpretation and application of evolutionary theory2011Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Although the theory of evolution is well-established it nevertheless presents us with a few unresolved matters of interpretation. One key task is to get clear about what exactly one should take the term 'natural selection' to denote. Is natural selection a causal factor that causes evolutionary change and that has driven the process of evolution from relatively simple beginnings to the current state of biological complexity, or is it a "mere" consequence of the appearance of novel forms in relatively stable environments? Does evolutionary theory present us with a set of specifically evolutionary causes, natural selection being the most important? The answers to these questions have repercussions for what we may rightly take appeals to natural selection to explain, and how we are to relate evolutionary theory to neighbouring sciences. The first paper of this compilation thesis, as well as the appendix, deals with these questions at length, and come out supporting a non-causal interpretation. It is argued that it is redundant to posit natural selection as a cause of evolutionary change, and that the idea promotes misunderstanding of the evolutionary process. The second paper criticises the attempt to invoke natural selection in accounting for the heterogeneity of realisation within functionally defined biological categories. It is argued that the purported explanation is mistaken in a way that reflects the misconception of selection that is inherent in the causal interpretation. The paper furthermore presents a hypothesis that constitutes an additional theme in the thesis; that evolutionary discourse is influenced by pre-theoretical "leakage" due to the terms used and their entrenched meanings. The third paper argues that we have no reason to adopt an essentially etiological conception of biological functions. It is argued that the seeming reasonableness of essentially etiological functions stems from a pre-theoretical mindset that lacks theoretical justification. Standard etiological accounts unpack the notion of function in terms of selection, and so this discussion is related to the question of interpreting the inventory of evolutionary theory. The fourth paper discusses the relation between evolutionary discourse and intentional psychology. The background is that evolutionary considerations are quite commonly presented in terms connoting intent and motivation, and that the evolutionary and psychological perspectives are not always kept apart. The last paper is a metaphilosophical contribution that emanated from my engagement with the debate about biological functions.

  • 115.
    Brunnander, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Discussion note: Did Darwin really answer Paley's question?2013In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, ISSN 1369-8486, E-ISSN 1879-2499, Vol. 44, no 3, p. 309-311Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is commonly thought that natural selection explains the rise of adaptive complexity. Razeto-Barry and Frick (2011) have recently argued in favour of this view, dubbing it the Creative View. I argue that the Creative View is mistaken if it claims that natural selection serves to answer Paley’s question. This is shown by a case that brings out the contrastive structure inherent in this demand for explanation. There is, however, a rather trivial sense in which specific environmental conditions are crucial for the rise of specific adaptations, but this is hardly what opponents of the Creative View are denying.

  • 116.
    Brunnander, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Is the language of intentional psychology an efficient tool for evolutionists?2008In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, ISSN 1369-8486, E-ISSN 1879-2499, Vol. 39, no 1, p. 147-152Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The language of intentional psychology is commonly used as a means of addressing issues concerning selection. This habit is generally considered an efficient shorthand, but oft-reported misunderstandings leave room for doubt. I stress the general point that efficiency of a mode of expression is an empirical matter, deserving the same treatment, theoretically and methodologically, as other such matters. Mistaken assumptions regarding the relevant cognitive capacities may make for inefficient communication, and discourse about human evolution is a plausible case in point.

  • 117.
    Brunnander, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Natural selection and multiple realisation: A closer look2013In: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ISSN 0269-8595, E-ISSN 1469-9281, I, Vol. 27, no 1, p. 73-83Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The target of this paper is the claim that natural selection accounts for the multiple realisation of biological and psychological kinds. I argue that the explanation actually offered doesn’t provide any insight about the phenomenon since it presupposes multiple realisation as an unexplained premise, and this is what does all the work. The purported explanation mistakenly invokes the “indifference” of selection to structure as an additional explanatorily relevant factor. While such indifference can be explanatory in intentional contexts it isn’t a causal factor at all in non-intentional nature. The upshot is that once the necessary initial assumption about heterogeneity is accepted there is no further explanation to do.

  • 118.
    Brunnander, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On the theoretical motivation for positing etiological functions2011In: Canadian journal of philosophy, ISSN 0045-5091, E-ISSN 1911-0820, Vol. 41, no 3, p. 371-390Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper argues that the widely accepted etiological notion of function finds no solid support in biological theory. While the notion may seem to be called for by entrenched linguistic practice, I claim that the arguments that have been raised in its favour do not succeed in providing a theoretical motivation for it. This verdict is bound to transfer to philosophical contexts where the notion is put to use, teleosemantics being the perhaps most debated application.

  • 119.
    Brunnander, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Philosophy and default descriptivism: The functions debate2011In: Metaphilosophy, ISSN 0026-1068, E-ISSN 1467-9973, Vol. 42, no 4, p. 417-430Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    By focusing on contributions to the literature on function ascription, this article seeks to illustrate two problems with philosophical accounts that are presented as having descriptive aims. There is a motivational problem in that there is frequently no good reason why descriptive aims should be important, and there is a methodological problem in that the methods employed frequently fail to match the task description. This suggests that the task description as such may be the result of “default descriptivism,” a tendency to take considerations that make sense of a practice to be the very considerations that generate it. Although such hypotheses are frequently quite plausible, the fact of the matter may not be very important for the pursuits of philosophers.

  • 120.
    Brunnander, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    What is natural selection?2007In: Biology & Philosophy, ISSN 0169-3867, E-ISSN 1572-8404, Vol. 22, no 2, p. 231-246Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    ‘Natural selection’ is, it seems, an ambiguous term. It is sometimes held to denote a consequence of variation, heredity, and environment, while at other times as denoting a force that creates adaptations. I argue that the latter, the force interpretation, is a redundant notion of natural selection. I will point to difficulties in making sense of this linguistic practice, and argue that it is frequently at odds with standard interpretations of evolutionary theory. I provide examples to show this; one example involving the relation between adaptations and other traits, and a second involving the relation between selection and drift.

  • 121.
    Buijsman, Stefan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Accessibility of reformulated mathematical content2017In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 194, no 6, p. 2233-2250Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I challenge a claim that seems to be made when nominalists offer reformulations of the content of mathematical beliefs, namely that these reformulations are accessible to everyone. By doing so, I argue that these theories cannot account for the mathematical knowledge that ordinary people have. In the first part of the paper I look at reformulations that employ the concept of proof, such as those of Mary Leng and Ottavio Bueno. I argue that ordinary people don’t have many beliefs about proofs, and that they are not in a position to acquire knowledge about proofs autonomously. The second part of the paper is concerned with other reformulations of content, such as those of Hartry Field and Stephen Yablo. There too, the problem is that people are not able to acquire knowledge of the reformulated propositions autonomously. Ordinary people simply do not have beliefs with the kind of content that the nominalists need, for their theory to account for the mathematical knowledge of ordinary people. All in all then, the conclusion is that a large number of theories that suggest reformulations of mathematical content yield contents that are inaccessible for most people. Thus, these theories are limited, in that they cannot account for the mathematical knowledge of ordinary people.

  • 122.
    Buijsman, Stefan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Are The Natural Numbers Fundamentally Ordinals?2018In: Philosophy and phenomenological research, ISSN 0031-8205, E-ISSN 1933-1592Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    There are two ways of thinking about the natural numbers: as ordinal numbers or as cardinal numbers. It is, moreover, well‐known that the cardinal numbers can be defined in terms of the ordinal numbers. Some philosophies of mathematics have taken this as a reason to hold the ordinal numbers as (metaphysically) fundamental. By discussing structuralism and neo‐logicism we argue that one can empirically distinguish between accounts that endorse this fundamentality claim and those that do not. In particular, we argue that if the ordinal numbers are metaphysically fundamental then it follows that one cannot acquire cardinal number concepts without appeal to ordinal notions. On the other hand, without this fundamentality thesis that would be possible. This allows for an empirical test to see which account best describes our actual mathematical practices. We then, finally, discuss some empirical data that suggests that we can acquire cardinal number concepts without using ordinal notions. However, there are some important gaps left open by this data that we point to as areas for future empirical research.

  • 123.
    Buijsman, Stefan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Philosophy of Mathematics for the Masses: Extending the scope of the philosophy of mathematics2016Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    One of the important discussions in the philosophy of mathematics, is that centered on Benacerraf’s Dilemma. Benacerraf’s dilemma challenges theorists to provide an epistemology and semantics for mathematics, based on their favourite ontology. This challenge is the point on which all philosophies of mathematics are judged, and clarifying how we might acquire mathematical knowledge is one of the main occupations of philosophers of mathematics. In this thesis I argue that this discussion has overlooked an important part of mathematics, namely mathematics as it is exercised by ordinary people (almost everyone without a mathematics degree). I do so by looking at the different theories that have been put forward in the recent debate, and showing for each of these that they are unable to account for the mathematical practices of ordinary people. In order to show that these practices do need to be accounted for, I also argue that ordinary people are (sometimes) doing mathematics, i.e. that they engage in properly mathematical practices. Because these practices are properly mathematical, they should be accounted for by any philosophy of mathematics. The conclusion of my thesis, then, is that current theories fail to do something that they should do, while remaining neutral on how well they perform when it comes to accounting for the practices of professional mathematicians.

  • 124.
    Buijsman, Stefan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Referring to Mathematical Objects via Definite Descriptions2017In: Philosophia mathematica, ISSN 0031-8019, E-ISSN 1744-6406, Vol. 25, no 1, p. 128-138Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Linsky and Zalta try to explain how we can refer to mathematical objects by saying that this happens through definite descriptions which may appeal to mathematical theories. I present two issues for their account. First, there is a problem of finding appropriate pre-conditions to reference, which are currently difficult to satisfy. Second, there is a problem of ensuring the stability of the resulting reference. Slight changes in the properties ascribed to a mathematical object can result in a shift of reference and this leads to various problems, e.g., it makes inferring knowledge much harder than it is.

  • 125.
    Buijsman, Stefan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The role of mathematics in scienceArticle, book review (Other academic)
  • 126.
    Buijsman, Stefan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Two roads to the successor axiom2018In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Most accounts of our knowledge of the successor axiom claim that this is based on the procedure of adding one. While they usually don’t claim to provide an account of how children actually acquire this knowledge, one may well think that this is how they get that knowledge. I argue that when we look at children’s responses in interviews, the time when they learn the successor axiom and the intermediate learning stages they find themselves in, that there is an empirically viable alternative. I argue that they could also learn it on the basis of a method that has to do with the structure of the numeral system. Specifically, that they (1) use the syntactic structure of the numeral system and (2) attend to the leftmost digits, the one with the highest place-value. Children can learn that this is a reliable method of forming larger numbers by combining two elements. First, a grasp of the syntactic structure of the numeral system. That way they know that the leftmost digit receives the highest value. Second, an interpretation of numerals as designating cardinal values, so that they also realise that increasing or adding digits on the lefthand side of a numeral produces a larger number. There are thus two, currently equally well-supported, ways in which children might learn that there are infinitely many natural numbers.

  • 127. Bulling, Nils
    et al.
    Goranko, Valentin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Jamroga, Wojciech
    Logics for reasoning about strategic abilities in multi-player games2015In: Models of strategic reasoning: logics, games and communities / [ed] Johan van Benthem, Sujata Ghosh, Rineke Verbrugge, Berlin: Springer, 2015, p. 93-136Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We introduce and discuss basic concepts, ideas, and logical formalisms used for reasoning about strategic abilities in multi-player games. In particular, we present concurrent game models and the alternating time temporal logic ATL∗ and its fragment ATL. We discuss variations of the language and semantics of ATL∗ that take into account the limitations and complications arising from incomplete information, perfect or imperfect memory of players, reasoning within dynamically changing strategy contexts, or using stronger, constructive concepts of strategy. Finally, we briefly summarize some technical results regarding decision problems for some variants of ATL.

  • 128.
    Burman, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Social ontologi: Från sedlar och cocktailpartyn till företag och mänskliga rättigheter2018In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 1Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 129.
    Butler, Ann B.
    et al.
    Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study.
    Manger, Paul R.
    University of the Witwatersrand.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Århem, Peter
    Karolinska Institutet.
    Evolution of the Neural Basis of Consciousness: A Bird–Mammal Comparison2005In: Bioessays, ISSN 0265-9247, E-ISSN 1521-1878, Vol. 27, p. 923-936Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The main objective of this essay is to validate some of the principal, currently competing, mammalian consciousness–brain theories by comparing these theories with data on both cognitive abilities and brain organization in birds. Our argument is that, given that multiple complex cognitive functions are correlated with presumed consciousness in mammals, this correlation holds for birds as well. Thus, the neuroanatomical features of the forebrain common to both birds and mammals may be those that are crucial to the generation of both complex cognition and consciousness. The general conclusion is that most of the consciousness–brain theories appear to be valid for the avian brain. Even though some specific homologies are unresolved, most of the critical structures presumed necessary for consciousness in mammalian brains have clear homologues in avian brains. Furthermore, considering the fact that the reptile–bird brain transition shows more structural continuity than the stem amniote–mammalian transition, the line drawn at the origin of mammals for consciousness by several of the theorists seems questionable. An equally important point is that consciousness cannot be ruled out in the absence of complex cognition; it may in fact be the case that consciousness is a necessary prerequisite for complex cognition.

  • 130.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons2018In: The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity / [ed] Daniel Star, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 131.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Being and well-being2015In: Weighing and reasoning: themes from the philosophy of John Broome / [ed] Iwao Hirose, Andrew Reisner, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter discusses the question of whether we can make it better for a person by creating her. It argues that John Broome’s argument for a negative answer to this question can be improved upon to avoid some recent criticisms. Instead of being concerned with whether a state of affairs that is better for you would be better for you if it obtained, we should ask whether it could make things better for you. It is also shown that these criticisms assume a mistaken idea about what it means to say that abstract states of affairs have value. The correct idea is that valuable states of affairs are possible value-makers of the world.

  • 132.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Can unstable preferences provide a stable standard of well-being?2010In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 26, no 1Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 133.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Derek Parfit, On What Matters, New York: Oxford University Press, 20112013In: Ethical Perspectives, ISSN 1370-0049, E-ISSN 1783-1431, no 2Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 134.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Happiness in a flux.: The instability problem.2010In: Journal of Happiness Studies, ISSN 1389-4978, E-ISSN 1573-7780, Vol. 11, no 5Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 135.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Killing and extinction2014In: The Cambridge companion to Life and Death / [ed] Steven Luper, Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. 316-329Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 136.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Mill2012In: Ethics: the key thinkers / [ed] Tom Angier, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012, 1, p. 197-216Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 137.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    Moral uncertainty2017In: Philosophy Compass, ISSN 1747-9991, E-ISSN 1747-9991, Vol. 12, no 3, article id UNSP e12408Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    What should we do when we are not certain about what we morally should do? There is a long history of theorizing about decision-making under empirical uncertainty, but surprisingly little has been written about the moral uncertainty expressed by this question. Only very recently have philosophers started to systematically address the nature of such uncertainty and its impacts on decision-making. This paper addresses the main problems raised by moral uncertainty and critically examines some proposed solutions.

  • 138.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Preference-based views of well-being2016In: The Oxford handbook of well-being and public policy / [ed] Matthew D. Adler, Marc Fleurbaey, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 321-346Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 139.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Preferences (Preferentialism)2013In: The Bloomsbury encyclopedia of utilitarianism / [ed] Crimmons, James, New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 140.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Prudence2013In: International Encyclopedia of Ethics / [ed] Hugh LaFollette, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    To be prudent, in a general sense of the term, is to show foresight in your deliberations and take into account the effects your actions will have on the future. In this general sense, you can be prudent about the future finances of your business, or your children's future well-being. However, to be prudent is often understood, more narrowly, as being concerned with one's own future well-being. Indeed, in the philosophical discussion it is often understood, more demandingly, as being concerned with one's own well-being while attaching no intrinsic significance to the timing of a certain benefit or harm in one's life, whether it is in the past, present, or the future. But do we really have reason to be prudent in this more demanding sense?

  • 141.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Reply to Orsi2015In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 124, no 496, p. 1201-1205Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 142.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Review of Dennis McKerlie's Justice Between the Young and The Old (Oxford University Press, 2013)2015In: Ethics, ISSN 0014-1704, E-ISSN 1539-297X, Vol. 125, no 3, p. 895-900Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 143.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Review of Jussi Suikkanen and John Cottingham's Essays on Derek Parfit's 'On What Matters', 2009, Wiley-Blackwell2013In: Philosophical Perspectives, ISSN 1520-8583, E-ISSN 1758-2245Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 144.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Time and morality2013In: A companion to the philosophy of time / [ed] Heather Dyke and Adrian Bardon., Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 145.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Utilitarianism in the twentieth century2013In: Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism / [ed] Eggleston, Ben; Miller, Dave, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 103-124Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 146.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Value and time2015In: The Oxford handbook of value theory / [ed] Iwao Hirose, Jonas Olson, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter discusses time and value. The two main questions are: What is the time of value? and What is the value of time? The first main question splits into two: Does what has value always have a temporal location? and Does value itself have temporal location? The second main question asks whether temporal features are evaluatively relevant. The features discussed are duration, temporal order (being before, simultaneous, after), life-periods (childhood, adulthood, old age), and tense (past, present, future). The kinds of value in focus are well-being (good for, bad for, better for), intrinsic value (i.e., value in virtue of intrinsic features), final value (which some think is different form intrinsic value), virtues, and moral value of persons.

  • 147.
    Bykvist, Krister
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Weighing Reasons By Errol Lord and Barry Maguire Oxford University Press, 20162017In: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 78, no 1, p. 180-183Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 148.
    Bykvist, Krister
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Brulde, Bengt
    Happiness, Ethics, and Politics: Introduction, History, and Conceptual Framework2010In: Journal of Happiness Studies, ISSN 1389-4978, E-ISSN 1573-7780, Vol. 11, no 5Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 149.
    Bykvist, Krister
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Belief, Truth and Blindspots2013In: The Aim of Belief / [ed] Timothy Chan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 100-122Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 150.
    Bykvist, Krister
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Non-Cognitivism and Fundamental Moral Certitude: Reply to Eriksson and Francén Olinder2017In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 95, no 4, p. 794-799Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Accommodating degrees of moral certitude is a serious problem for non-cognitivism about ethics. In particular, non-cognitivism has trouble accommodating fundamental moral certitude. John Eriksson and Ragnar Francén Olinder [2016] have recently proposed a solution. In fact, Eriksson and Francén Olinder offer two different proposals—one ‘classification’ account and one ‘projectivist’ account. We argue that the classification account faces the same problem as previous accounts do, while the projectivist account has unacceptable implications. Non-cognitivists will have to look elsewhere for a plausible solution to the problem of accommodating fundamental moral certitude.

1234567 101 - 150 of 829
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf