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  • 201.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    II—Claim Rights, Duties, and Lesser-Evil Justifications2015In: Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society, ISSN 0309-7013, E-ISSN 1467-8349, Vol. 89, no 1, 267-285 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper explores the relationship between a person's claim right not to be harmed and the duties this claim confers on others. I argue that we should reject Jonathan Quong's evidence-based account of this relationship, which holds that an agent A's possession of a claim against B is partly determined by whether it would be reasonable for A to demand B's compliance with a correlative duty. When B's evidence is that demanding compliance would not be reasonable, A cannot have a claim against B. I suggest that some of the putatively problematic cases that Quong identifies can be resolved by plausibly narrowing the scope of the right not to be harmed. I also argue that Quong's view leads to implausible conclusions, and that his account of what happens to A's claim in the face of lesser-evil justifications is inconsistent with his broader view. I then defend the view that agents are required, and not merely permitted, to act on lesser-evil justifications. I further argue that A may not defend herself against the infliction of harms that are justified on lesser-evil grounds. However, she may defend herself in cases where B is only evidentially, and not objectively, justified in harming her.

  • 202.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Jeff McMahan's Killing in War2013In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 203.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Judging Armed Humanitarian Intervention2014In: The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention / [ed] Don E. Scheid, Cambridge University Press, 2014Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 204.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Non-Combatant Liability in War2014In: How We Fight: Ethics in War / [ed] H Frowe and G Lang, Oxford University Press, 2014Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 205.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On the Redundancy of Jus ad VimIn: Ethics and International Affairs, ISSN 0892-6794, E-ISSN 1747-7093Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 206.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction2016 (ed. 2)Book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When is it right to go to war? When is a war illegal? What are the rules of engagement? What should happen when a war is over? How should we view terrorism? The Ethics of War and Peace is a fresh and contemporary introduction to one of the oldest but still most relevant ethical debates. It introduces students to contemporary Just War Theory in a stimulating and engaging way, perfect for those approaching the topic for the first time.

  • 207.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Justified Infliction of Unjust HArm2009In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, ISSN 0066-7374, E-ISSN 1467-9264Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 208.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Role of Necessity in Liability to Defensive Harm2016In: The Ethics of Self-Defence / [ed] Christian Coons, Michel Weber, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, 152-170 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 209.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    War and Intervention2014In: Issues in Political Theory / [ed] Catriona McKinnon, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 210.
    Frowe, Helen
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Lang, Gerald
    How we fight: ethics in war2014Collection (editor) (Refereed)
  • 211.
    Furberg, Elisabeth
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ansvar för sin hälsa?: Problem och möjligheter med att tillämpa en ansvarsprincip inom hälso- och sjukvården2007Report (Other academic)
  • 212.
    Gemzöe, Lena
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Ethnology, History of Religions and Gender Studies.
    En feminist synar Kant2006In: Filosofins värld / [ed] Levander, Martin, Stockholm: Liber, 2006, 216-218 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 213.
    Gluer Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    General Terms and Relational Modality*2012In: Noûs, ISSN 0029-4624, E-ISSN 1468-0068, Vol. 46, no 1, 159-199 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 214.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Analyticity and Implicit Definition2003In: Grazer Philosophische Studien, ISSN 0165-9227, Vol. 66, 23-60 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 215.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Colors without circles?2007In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, Vol. 66, no 1-2, 107-131 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Realists about color, be they dispositionalists or physicalists, agree on the truth of the following claim: (R) x is red iff x is disposed to look red under standard conditions. The disagreement is only about whether to identify the colors with the relevant dispositions, or with their categorical bases. This is a question about the representational content of color experience: What kind of properties do color experiences ascribe to objects? It has been argued (for instance by Boghossian and Velleman, 1991) that truths like (R) cannot be used in an account of the colors as they would result in ‚circular’, and therefore empty, contents. It has also been argued (for instance by Harman, 1996) that switching to an account of color in terms of a functional account of color sensations would result in a circular, and therefore empty, account. In this paper, I defend a realist account of color in terms of a (non-reductive) functional account of color sensations. Such an account of sensations has been suggested by Pagin (2000), and it can be applied to color sensations without the resulting account of the colors themselves being circular or empty. I argue that the so-called transparency of experience does not provide any argument against such an account. I also argue that on such an account, the issue of physicalism vs. dispositionalism boils down to the question of the modal profile of the color concepts.

  • 216.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Critical Notice: Donald Davidson's Collected Essays2007In: Dialectica, Vol. 61, 275-284 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 217.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Defeating looks2016In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In previous work, I have suggested a doxastic account of perceptual experience according to which experiences form a (peculiar) kind of belief: Beliefs with what I have called “phenomenal” or “looks-content”. I have argued that this account can not only accommodate the intuitive reason providing role of experience, but also its justificatory role. I have also argued that, in general, construing experience and perceptual beliefs, i.e. the beliefs most directly based on experience, as having different contents best accounts for the defeasibility of experiential reasons. In this paper, I shall have a closer look at the evidential or inferential relation between looks-propositions and the contents of perceptual beliefs and argue for a form of what I shall call “Pollockianism” about experiential reasons: such reasons are good unless defeated. Questions to be investigated include: Does the resulting picture of perceptual justification contain an externalist element? Is it compatible with Bayesianism? And how does it do with respect to problems that have been raised for other forms of Pollockianism such as dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism?

  • 218.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience2009In: Mind and language, ISSN 0268-1064, E-ISSN 1468-0017, Vol. 24, 297-327 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing ‘phenomenal’ properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. Moreover, in contrast to sui generis views, it can quite easily account for the rational or reason providing role of experience.

  • 219.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On Perceiving That2004In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, Vol. 70, no 3-4, 197-212 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 220.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Status of Charity I: Conceptual Truth or Aposteriori Necessity?2006In: International journal of philosophical studies (Print), ISSN 0967-2559, Vol. 14, no 3, 337-359 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to Donald Davidson, linguistic meaning is determined by the principle of charity. Because of Davidson's semantic behaviourism, charity's significance is both epistemic and metaphysical: charity not only provides the radical interpreter with a method for constructing a semantic theory on the basis of his data, but it does so because it is the principle metaphysically determining meaning. In this paper, I assume that charity does determine meaning. On this assumption, I investigate both its epistemic and metaphysical status: is charity a priori or a posteriori? And what kind of necessity does it have? According to Davidson himself, charity is an a priori truth and its necessity is conceptual: it is essential to, or constitutive of, our common concepts of meaning and belief. Not only does this generate tension within Davidson's own, Quine-inspired epistemology, but there is independent reason to think of charity as an empirical truth. Even so, charity might be essential to belief and meaning in the sense of being an a posteriori necessity. I conclude that our ordinary modal intuitions might well support charity's psychological-nomological necessity, but that they do not reach all the way to metaphysical necessity.

  • 221.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Proper Names and Relational Modality2006In: Linguistics and Philosophy, ISSN 0165-0157, Vol. 29, no 5, 507-535 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Saul Kripke’s thesis that ordinary proper names are rigid designators is supported by widely shared intuitions about the occurrence of names in ordinary modal contexts. By those intuitions names are scopeless with respect to the modal expressions. That is, sentences in a pair like (a) Aristotle might have been fond of dogs, (b) Concerning Aristotle, it is true that he might have been fond of dogs will have the same truth value. The same does not in general hold for definite descriptions. If one, like Kripke, accounts for this difference by means of the intensions of the names and the descriptions, the conclusion is that names do not in general have the same intension as any normal, identifying description. However, this difference can be accounted for alternatively by appeal to the semantics of the modal expressions. On the account we suggest, dubbed ‘relational modality’, simple singular terms, like proper names, contribute to modal contexts simply by their actual world reference, not by their descriptive content. That account turns out to be fully equivalent with the rigidity account when it comes to truth of modal and non-modal sentence (with respect to the actual world), and hence supports the same basic intuitions. Here we present the relational modality account and compare it with others, in particular Kripke’s own

  • 222.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Against Belief Normativity2013In: The Aim of Belief / [ed] Timothy Chan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 80-99 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Normativism about belief is a claim about the nature of belief: Belief is essentially norm- or rule-guided. This is standardly interpreted as requiring that belief formation be subject to genuine prescriptions. In this chapter, Glüer and Wikforss argue that belief normativism is very hard to square with some basic intuitions about rule guidance. Any account of rule-guidance needs to support the distinction between being guided by a rule and merely being in accord with it. But belief normativism cannot account for this difference in what the authors take to be the most natural, intuitive terms. If this is correct, any defense of normativism will have to involve a significant departure from intuition or a novel construal of the normativity involved. The challenge is to motivate any of these moves.

  • 223.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Against Content Normativity2009In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, Vol. 118, 31-70 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 224.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Es braucht die Regel nicht: Wittgenstein on Rules and Meaning2010In: The Later Wittgenstein on Language / [ed] Daniel Whiting, Palgrave Macmillan , 2010, 148-166 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 225.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Meaning Normativism: Against the Simple Argument2015In: Organon F, ISSN 1335-0668, Vol. 22, 63-73 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper examines a central argument in support of the thesis that meaning is essentially normative. The argument tries to derive meaning normativism from the fact that meaningful expressions necessarily have conditions of correct application: Since correctness is a normative notion, it is argued, statements of correctness conditions for an expression have direct normative consequences for the use of that expression. We have labeled this the 'simple argument', and have argued that it fails. In this paper we elaborate on our objections to the argument in response to Daniel Whiting's recent attempt to rescue it. We argue, first, that statements of correctness conditions simply allow us to categorize the applications of an expression into two basic kinds (for instance, the true and the false) without this having any normative implications; and, second, that the normativist has not provided any reasons to think that some further, normative notion of semantic correctness is essential to meaning.

  • 226.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Normativity of Meaning and Content2009In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy / [ed] Edward N. Zalta, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information , 2009Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 227.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Agreement Maximization2011In: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences / [ed] Patrick Colm Hogan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 93-94 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 228.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Brief aus Schweden2013In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, ISSN 0012-1045, Vol. 61, no 5/6, 823-826 p.Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    This short text is part of a series of letters from philosophers working abroad. I write about what brought me to Sweden and about what philosophy and academic life are like there, including some reflections on language politics as well as on the situation of women in philosophy and in academia more generally

  • 229.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Charity, Principle of2011In: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences / [ed] Patrick Colm Hogan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 151-152 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 230.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Colors and the Content of Color Experience2012In: Croatian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1333-1108, Vol. 12, no 36, 421-437 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 231.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Constancy in Variation: An Argument for Centering the Contents of Experience?2016In: About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication / [ed] Manuel García-Carpintero, Stephan Torre, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, 56-85 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When you look at a circular plate at an angle, it looks circular. But there also is a certain sense in which its look can be described as oval. When you move, the plate’s look changes with your perspective on it—nevertheless, it continues to look circular. This chapter investigates whether these “constancy in variation” phenomena can be explained in terms of the representational content of visual experience, and whether constancy in variation provides special, phenomenological, reasons to construe experience as having centered contents. Concentrating on shape, it argues that due to warring phenomenological demands, all views construing constancy in variation as representation of both objective and perspectival properties or features have limited explanatory powers, and that centering does not provide any advantage. By contrast, adopting the non-standard intentionalism called phenomenal intentionalism, we get rather natural explanations of the phenomenology of constancy in variation.

  • 232.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Convention and Meaning2013In: A Companion to Donald Davidson / [ed] Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, 339-360 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 233.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Dana Riesenfeld: the Rei(g)n of 'Rule'2011In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Vol. Oct, no 11/10Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 234.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Does perceptual experience have propositional content?2011Other (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 235.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Donald Davidson: A Short Introduction2011Book (Refereed)
  • 236.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Donald Davidson: Bedeutung und Interpretation2010In: Klassiker der Philosophie heute / [ed] Ansgar Beckermann, Dominique Perler, Stuttgart: Reclam , 2010, 2., durchges. und erw. Aufl., 831-853 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 237.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Intentionalism, Defeasibility, and Justification2016In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 173, no 4, 1007-1030 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a mental state with representational content. When it comes to the epistemology of perception, it is only natural for the intentionalist to hold that the justificatory role of experience is at least in part a function of its content. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of intentionalism trying to hold on to this natural principle face what I call the “defeasibility problem”. This problem arises from the combination of standard intentionalism with further plausible principles governing the epistemology of perception: that experience provides defeasible justification for empirical belief, and that such justification is best construed as probabilification. After exploring some ways in which the standard intentionalist could deal with the defeasibility problem, I argue that the best option is to replace standard intentionalism by what I call “phenomenal intentionalism”. Where standard intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having the content p, phenomenal intentionalism construes (visual) experiences as of p as having “phenomenal” or “looks contents”: contents of the form Lp (it looks as if p).

  • 238.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Looks, Reasons, and Experiences2014In: Does Perception Have Content? / [ed] Berit Brogaard, Oxford University Press, 2014, 76-102 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to the phenomenal belief account of perceptual experience I have suggested elsewhere, experience is a kind of belief. These beliefs have contents of a special form or type: While their objects are ordinary material objects, the properties they ascribe to these objects are 'phenomenal' properties, properties such as looking red or looking round. In this paper, I shall further develop this account by defending it against two objections: a) the objection that ultimately, no plausible epistemology can be built upon experiences with phenomenal contents. And b) the objection that phenomenal ‘looks’ is a propositional attitude operator and therefore cannot be used in specifying the content of experience. First, however, I shall argue that the intuitive inferential integration of experience into our system of beliefs provides one of the strongest motivations for construing experiences as having propositional content in the first place. The phenomenal belief account provides one good way of accommodating this inferential integration. Defending it thus is one way of defending the claim that experience indeed has propositional content.

  • 239.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Martin on the Semantics of 'Looks'2013In: Thought, ISSN 2161-2234, Vol. 1, no 4, 292-300 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A natural way of understanding (non-epistemic) looks talk in natural language is phenomenalist: to ascribe looks to objects is to say something about the way they strike us when we look at them. This explains why the truth values of looks-sentences intuitively vary with the circumstances with respect to which they are evaluated. But Mike Martin (2010) argues that there is no semantic reason to prefer a phenomenalist understanding of looks to “Parsimony”, the position according to which looks are basic visible properties. He suggests a semantics for looks-sentences that explains their intuitive truth values and is compatible with Parsimony. I argue that there is semantic reason to prefer a phenomenalist understanding of looks to a parsimonious one since there is a simpler semantics compatible with a phenomenalist understanding of looks, but not with Parsimony. This semantics provides a better explanation of the relevant truth value distribution

  • 240.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Passing Theories2011In: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences / [ed] Patrick Colm Hogan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 588-589 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 241.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Perception and Intermediaries2012In: Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental / [ed] Gerhard Preyer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 192-213 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 242.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Radical Interpretation2011In: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences / [ed] Patrick Colm Hogan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 697-699 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 243.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Theories of Meaning and Truth Conditions2012In: The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language / [ed] Manuel García-Carpintero; Max Kölbel, London/New York: Continuum, 2012, 84-105 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 244.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Reply to Forbes2012In: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 72, no 2, 298-303 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In earlier work (Glüer, K. and P. Pagin. 2006. Proper names and relational modality. Linguistics & Philosophy 29: 507–35; Glüer, K. and P. Pagin. 2008. Relational modality. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17: 307–22), we developed a semantics for (metaphysical) modal operators that accommodates Kripkean intuitions about proper names in modal contexts even if names are not rigid designators. Graeme Forbes (2011. The problem of factives for sense theories. Analysis 71: 654–62.) criticizes our proposal. He argues that our semantics predicts readings for certain natural language sentences which these simply do not have. These sentences contain mixed contexts involving factive attitude verbs. We argue that the readings our semantics predicts do indeed exist, even if it might take a little work to bring them out. Moreover, denying their existence would have some rather unattractive consequences.

  • 245.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Aiming at Truth: On the Role of Belief2013In: Teorema, ISSN 0210-1602, Vol. 32, no 3, 137-162 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We explore the possibility of characterizing belief wholly in terms of its first-order functional role, its input (evidence) and output (further beliefs and actions), by addressing some common challenges to the view. One challenge concerns the fact that not all belief is evidence-sensitive. In response to this, normativists and teleo-functionalists have concluded that something over and above functional role is needed, a norm or a telos. We argue that both allow for implausibly much divergence between belief and evidence. Others have suggested that belief should be saved as the evidence-sensitive attitude, by making it share its motivational role with an hitherto unrecognized state: alief. We argue that the appeal to alief faces a dilemma: Either explanation of intentional action by means of alief is a species of intentional explanation, in which case it becomes hard to distinguish alief from (irrational) belief, or alief is sufficiently different from belief, but then neither the explanation nor the explanandum (action) are recognizably intentional any longer. We conclude that the most promising way forward is an account of belief that makes use of the full functional role of belief, including its role in theoretical reasoning.

  • 246.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Reasons for Belief and Normativity2017In: Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity / [ed] Daniel Star, Oxford University Press, 2017Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 247.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Truth Norm and Guidance: a Reply to Steglich-Petersen2010In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 119, no 475, 757-761 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We have claimed that truth norms cannot provide genuine guidance for belief formation (Glüer and Wikforss 2009, pp. 43–4). Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen argues that our ‘no guidance argument’ fails because it conflates certain psychological states an agent must have in order to apply the truth norm with the condition under which the norm prescribes forming certain beliefs. We spell out the no guidance argument in more detail and show that there is no such conflation.

  • 248.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Anmärkningar kring den omänskliga lyckan hos Aristoteles2006In: Aigis, ISSN 1901-6859, E-ISSN 1901-6859, Vol. 6, no 2 Supplement, 1-11 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 249.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Listening to Reason in Aristotle's Moral Psychology2007In: Oxford studies in ancient philosophy, ISSN 0265-7651, Vol. 32, 251-271 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 250.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Notes on Nicomachean ethics 1173a2–52016In: Classical Quarterly, ISSN 0009-8388, E-ISSN 1471-6844, Vol. 66, no 2, 484-490 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Nicomachean Ethics (= Eth. Nic.) 10.2, Aristotle addresses Eudoxus' argument that pleasure is the chief good in his characteristically dialectical manner. The argument is that pleasure is the chief good, since all creatures, rational (ἔλλογα) and non-rational (ἄλογα) alike, are perceived to aim at pleasure (1172b9–11). At 1172b35–1173a5, Aristotle turns to an objection against Eudoxus' argument. For some object (οἱ δ’ἐνιστάμενοι) to the argument by questioning one of its premisses, namely that what all creatures aim at is the good (1172b12–15). Instead, they claim that what all creatures aim at is not good (ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ’ ἐφίεται, 1172b36). This claim is reasonably taken to mean that not everything that all creatures aim at is good. But, as we shall shortly see, Aristotle dismisses it in a way suggesting a less charitable interpretation. At any rate, the significance of this objection is that it challenges the strong claim that what all creatures aim at is the good with an argument against the weaker claim that what all creatures aim at is good (or a good). For if the weaker claim is refuted, then the strong claim is refuted as well. Aristotle takes issue with the argument against the weaker claim, but without committing himself to the strong claim.

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