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  • 201.
    Erman, Eva
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Political Legitimacy and the Unreliability of LanguageIn: Public Reason, ISSN 2065-7285, E-ISSN 2065-8958Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 202.
    Erman, Eva
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Pragmatism and Epistemic Democracy2018In: The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology / [ed] Miranda Fricker, David Henderson, Jeremy Wyatt, London: Routledge, 2018Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 203.
    Erman, Eva
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science. Uppsala universitet, Sverige.
    Review Essay: On Forst's the Right to Justification2012In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 204.
    Erman, Eva
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    What is 'critical' of critical theory?2017In: Philosophy & Social Criticism, ISSN 0191-4537, E-ISSN 1461-734X, Vol. 43, no 3, p. 300-301Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 205.
    Erman, Eva
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Möller, Niklas
    How practices do not matter2017In: Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, ISSN 1369-8230, E-ISSN 1743-8772Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In his most recent work, Sangiovanni has retreated from his stronger claims about practice-dependence. Instead of claiming that principles of justice must be practice-dependent, he now expresses his claim in a modal form, arguing that there are several ways in which practices may matter. While merely mapping out the logical space of possibilities seems to look like a modest ambition, the conditions for when practices do matter according to Sangiovanni’s analysis are easily met in actuality. Consequently, if he is right, the practice-dependent approach covers a significant number of political theories. Sangiovanni’s main claim is that higher-level principles with an open texture, which include most higher-level principles in political philosophy, justify a practice-dependent method in the form of a mode of application called ‘mediated deduction,’ according to which a thoroughgoing investigation is made of the nature of the target practice. Our task in this paper is to reject this claim. This is done in two steps. First, we question Sangiovanni’s distinction between instrumental application and mediated deduction, arguing that it remains unclear whether it marks out two sufficiently distinct ‘modes’ to do any theoretical work. Second, we argue that the practice-dependent method is not required even if two such modes are established.

  • 206.
    Erman, Eva
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Möller, Niklas
    Political Legitimacy and the Unreliability of Language2016In: Public Reason, ISSN 2065-7285, E-ISSN 2065-8958, Vol. 8, no 1-2, p. 81-89Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Many political theorists in current debates have argued that pragmatist theories of mind and language place certain constraints on our normative political theories. In a couple of papers, we have accused these pragmatically influenced political theorists of misapplication of otherwise perfectly valid ideas. In a recent paper, one of the targets of our critique, Thomas Fossen, has retorted that we have misrepresented the role that a pragmatist theory of language plays in these accounts. In this paper, we claim that Fossen’s attempt to chisel out a role for his account in normative political theory rehearses the same problematic view of the utility of theories of language as his previous iterations. We argue that Fossen’s account is still guilty of the fallacious claim that a pragmatist theory of language (in his case Robert Brandom’s account) has implications for the form and justification of theories of political legitimacy. We specifically focus on three flaws with his current reply: the idea that criteria and conditions are problematic on a pragmatist outlook, the idea that a pragmatist linguistic account applied to a particular political context will have a distinct political-theoretical payoff, and the idea that a fundamental linguistic level of analysis supplies normative guidance for theorizing political legitimacy.

  • 207.
    Erman, Eva
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Möller, Niklas
    Political Legitimacy for Our World: Where is Political Realism Going?2018In: Journal of Politics, ISSN 0022-3816, E-ISSN 1468-2508, Vol. 80, no 2, p. 525-538Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A common denominator of recent proposals suggested by political realists has been a rather pessimistic view of what we may rightfully demand of political authorities in terms of legitimacy. In our analysis, three main justificatory strategies are utilized by realists, each supposedly generating normative premises for this “low bar conclusion.” These strategies make use of the concept of politics, the constitutive features of politics, and feasibility constraints, respectively. In this article, we make three claims: first, that the two justificatory strategies of utilizing the concept of politics and the constitutive features of politics fail, since they rely on implausible normative premises; second, that while the feasibility strategy relies on reasonable premises, the low bar conclusion does not follow from them; third, that relativist premises fit better with the low bar conclusion, but that this also makes the realist position less attractive and casts doubt on several of its basic assumptions.

  • 208.
    Erman, Eva
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Möller, Niklas
    Practice-Dependence and Epistemic Uncertainty2017In: Journal of Global Ethics, ISSN 1744-9626, E-ISSN 1744-9634, Vol. 13, no 2, p. 187-205Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A shared presumption among practice-dependent theorists is that a principle of justice is dependent on the function or aim of the practice to which it is supposed to be applied. In recent contributions to this debate, the condition of epistemic uncertainty plays a significant role for motivating and justifying a practice-dependent view. This paper analyses the role of epistemic uncertainty in justifying a practice-dependent approach. We see two kinds of epistemic uncertainty allegedly playing this justificatory role. What we call ‘normative epistemic uncertainty’ emerges from dealing with the problem of value uncertainty in justifying applied principles when our higher-level principles are open-textured, that is, when their content is too vague or unclear to generate determinate prescriptions. What we call ‘descriptive epistemic uncertainty’ emerges from dealing with uncertainty about empirical facts, such as the problem of moral assurance, that is, the problem that the requirements of justice cannot go beyond arrangements that we can know with reasonable confidence that we can jointly establish and maintain. In both cases, practice-dependent theorists conclude that the condition of epistemic uncertainty justifies a practice-dependent approach, which puts certain restrictions on theorizing regulative principles and has wide-ranging practical implications for the scope of justice. Our claim in this paper is that neither kind of epistemic uncertainty justifies a practice-dependent approach.

  • 209.
    Erman, Eva
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Möller, Niklas
    Practices and Principles: On the Methodological Turn in Political Theory2015In: Philosophy Compass, ISSN 1747-9991, E-ISSN 1747-9991, Vol. 10, no 8, p. 533-546Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The question of what role social and political practices should play in the justification of normative principles has received renewed attention in post-millennium political philosophy. Several current debates express dissatisfaction with the methodology adopted in mainstream political theory, taking the form of a criticism of so-called ‘ideal theory’ from ‘non-ideal’ theory, of ‘practice-independent’ theory from ‘practice-dependent’ theory, and of ‘political moralism’ from ‘political realism’. While the problem of action-guidance lies at the heart of these concerns, the critics also share a number of methodological assumptions. Above all, their methodology is practice-dependent in the sense that an existing (social, political, or institutional) practice is assumed to put substantial limitations on the appropriate normative principles for regulating it. In other words, we cannot formulate and justify an appropriate principle without first understanding the practice (or its point and purpose) this principle is supposed to govern. The aim of this paper is to map out and analyze the common denominators of these debates with regard to methodological commitments. We will investigate how this practice-dependent method may be understood and motivated. In particular, we point to challenges that must be met in order for the position to remain both distinct and attractive.

  • 210.
    Erman, Eva
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Möller, NiklasStockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Risk and Moral Theory: Volume 21, Issue 2, April 20182018Collection (editor) (Refereed)
  • 211.
    Erman, Eva
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Möller, Niklas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    The Interdependence of Risk and Moral Theory2018In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 21, no 2, p. 207-216Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 212.
    Erman, Eva
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Möller, Niklas
    The Practical Turn in Political Theory2018Book (Refereed)
  • 213.
    Erman, Eva
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Möller, Niklas
    What distinguishes the practice - dependent approach to justice?2016In: Philosophy & Social Criticism, ISSN 0191-4537, E-ISSN 1461-734X, Vol. 42, no 1, p. 3-23Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The practice-dependent approach to justice has received a lot of attention in post-millennium political philosophy. It has been developed in different directions and its normative implications have been criticized, but little attention has been directed to the very distinction between practice-dependence and practice-independence and the question of what theoretically differentiates a practice-dependent account from mainstream practice-independent accounts. The core premises of the practice-dependent approach, proponents argue, are meta-normative and methodological. A key feature is the presumption that a concept of justice is dependent on the function or aim of the social practices to which it is supposed to be applied. Closely related to this meta-normative thesis is an interpretive methodology for deriving principles of justice from facts about existing practices, in particular regarding their point and purpose. These two premises, practice-dependent theorists claim, differentiate their account since (1) they are not accepted by practice-independent accounts and (2) they justify different principles of justice than practice-independent accounts. Our aim in this article is to refute both (1) and (2), demonstrating that practice-independent accounts may indeed accept the meta-normative and methodological premises of the practice-dependent accounts, and that we are given no theoretical reason to think that practice-dependent accounts justify other principles of justice for a practice than do practice-independent accounts. In other words, practice-dependent theorists have not substantiated their claim that practice-dependence is theoretically differentiated from mainstream accounts. When practice-dependent proponents argue for other principles of justice than mainstream theorists, it will be for the usual reason in normative theory: their first-order normative arguments differ.

  • 214.
    Erman, Eva
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Möller, Niklas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    What Not to Expect from the Pragmatic Turn in Political Theory2015In: European Journal of Political Theory, ISSN 1474-8851, E-ISSN 1741-2730, Vol. 14, no 2, p. 121-140Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The central ideas coming out of the so-called pragmatic turn in philosophy have set in motion what may be described as a pragmatic turn in normative political theory. It has become commonplace among political theorists to draw on theories of language and meaning in theorising democracy, pluralism, justice, etc. The aim of this paper is to explore attempts by political theorists to use theories of language and meaning for such normative purposes. Focusing on Wittgenstein's account, it is argued that these attempts are unsuccessful. It is shown that pragmatically influenced political theorists draw faulty epistemological, ontological and semantic conclusions from Wittgenstein's view in their normative theorising, and it is argued that pragmatically influenced theories of language and meaning, however full of insight, cannot be put to substantial normative use in political theory. The general scope of the thesis is motivated by pointing to the general form of the argument and by moving beyond Wittgenstein to other philosophers of mind and language, illustrating how similar overextensions are made with regard to Robert Brandom's theory of language and meaning.

  • 215.
    Erman, Eva
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Möller, Niklas
    Why Democracy Cannot be Grounded in Epistemic Principles2016In: Social Theory and Practice, ISSN 0037-802X, E-ISSN 2154-123X, Vol. 42, no 3, p. 449-473Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In recent years, philosophers influenced by Peirce's pragmatism have contributed to the democracy debate by offering not simply a justification of democracy that relies on epistemic as well as moral presumptions, but a justification on purely epistemic grounds, that is, without recourse to any moral values or principles. In a nutshell, this pragmatist epistemic argument takes as its starting-point (1) a few fundamental epistemic principles we cannot reasonably deny, and goes on to claim that (2) a number of interpersonal epistemic commitments follow, which in turn (3) justify democracy in a fullfledged, deliberative sense. In light of the fact of reasonable pluralism, this freestanding (nonmoral) epistemic justification of democracy is allegedly superior to the mainstream, morally anchored liberal alternatives, because epistemic principles are universally shared despite moral disagreement. The pragmatist epistemic approach has been praised for being a valuable contribution to democratic theory, but few attempts have so far been made to systematically scrutinize the argument as a whole. The present paper sets out to do that. In particular, our investigation focuses on the underappreciated but central coherence form of the pragmatist epistemic argument: the central claim that in order to be an internally coherent believer, one must accept democracy. While we endorse the fundamental premise (1) for the sake of argument, our analysis shows that the argument fails in both of the two further steps, (2) and (3). More specifically, the epistemic principles are too weak to entail the suggested interpersonal epistemic commitments; and even if these epistemic commitments are granted, they are insufficient to ground democracy.

  • 216.
    Erman, Eva
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Möller, Niklas
    Why Political Realists Should Not Be Afraid of Moral Values2015In: Journal of Philosophical Research (JPR), ISSN 1053-8364, E-ISSN 2153-7984, Vol. 40, p. 459-464Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In a previous article, we unpacked the so-called "ethics first premise"-the idea that ethics is "prior" to politics when theorizing political legitimacy-that is denied by political realists. We defended a "justificatory" reading of this premise, according to which political justification is irreducibly moral in the sense that moral values are among the values that ground political legitimacy. We called this the "necessity thesis." In this paper we respond to two challenges that Robert Jubb and Enzo Rossi raise against our proposal. Their first claim is that our argument for the necessity thesis is question begging, since we assume rather than show that freedom and equality are moral values. The second claim is that Bernard Williams's Basic Legitimacy Demand demonstrates the possibility of giving political legitimacy a non-moral foundation, since it allows for a distinction to be made between politics and sheer domination. We refute both claims.

  • 217. Espinoza, Nicolas
    Incommensurability: The Failure to Compare Risks2009In: The Ethics of Technological Risk / [ed] Sabine Roeser, Lotte Asveld, Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2009, p. 128-143Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 218.
    Espinoza, Nicolas
    Luleå Univ Technol, Luleå, Sweden.
    Some New Monadic Value Predicates2009In: American Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0003-0481, E-ISSN 2152-1123, Vol. 46, no 1, p. 31-38Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 219.
    Espinoza, Nicolas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Small Improvement Argument2008In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 165, no 1, p. 127-139Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 220.
    Espinoza, Nicolas
    et al.
    Ctr Healthcare Eth, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Peterson, Martin
    How to depolarise the ethical debate over human embryonic stem cell research (and other ethical debates too!)2012In: Journal of Medical Ethics, ISSN 0306-6800, E-ISSN 1473-4257, Vol. 38, p. 496-500Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 221.
    Espinoza, Nicolas
    et al.
    Lulea University of Technology.
    Peterson, Martin
    Incomplete Preferences in Disaster Risk Management2008In: International Journal of Technology Policy and Management, ISSN 1741-5292, Vol. 8, no 4, p. 341-358Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 222. Espinoza, Nicolas
    et al.
    Peterson, Martin
    Ojämförbara risker?2008In: Risk & Risici / [ed] Johannes Persson, Nils Erik Sahlin, Bokförlaget Nya Doxa, 2008Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 223.
    Espinoza, Nicolas
    et al.
    Swedish Def Res Agcy, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Peterson, Martin
    Risk and Mid-level Moral Principles2012In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 26, no 1, p. 8-14Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 224.
    Folkmarson Käll, Lisa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Ethnology, History of Religions and Gender Studies, Gender Studies.
    Ellen Feder's Making Sense of Intersex and the Issue of Sexual Difference2016In: Philosophy today (Celina), ISSN 0031-8256, E-ISSN 2329-8596, Vol. 60, no 3, p. 799-807Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 225.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Beata Stawarska, Saussure’s Philosophy of Language as Phenomenology: Undoing the Doctrine of the Course2015In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617, no 21 JulyArticle, book review (Other academic)
  • 226.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Incarnated Meaning and the Notion of Gestalt in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology2015In: Chiasmi International, ISSN 1637-6757, E-ISSN 2155-6415, Vol. 17, p. 53-75Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Although it is well known that Gestalt theory had an important impact on Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy throughout his career, there is still no detailed study either of its influence on his ideas or of his own understanding of the notoriously polysemic notion of Gestalt. Yet, this notion is a key to Merleau-Ponty’s fundamental project of overcoming “objective thought” and its inherent dichotomies. By indicating how signification or ideality can be immanent in, rather than opposed to, matter, it compels us to redefine both consciousness and the world it is bound up with. The aim of this article is to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s notion of Gestalt against the historical background that he refers to, including Kurt Goldstein’s theory of the organism that was crucial for his interpretation of it.

  • 227.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. School of Dance and Circus, Sweden.
    Language and the Gendered Body: Butler's Early Reading of Merleau-Ponty2013In: Hypatia, ISSN 0887-5367, E-ISSN 1527-2001, Vol. 28, no 4, p. 767-783Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Through a close reading of Judith Butler's 1989 essay on Merleau-Ponty's theory of sexuality as well as the texts her argument hinges on, this paper addresses the debate about the relation between language and the living, gendered body as it is understood by defenders of poststructural theory on the one hand, and different interpretations of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology on the other. I claim that Butler, in her criticism of the French philosopher's analysis of the famous Schneider case, does not take its wider context into account: either the case study that Merleau-Ponty's discussion is based upon, or its role in his phenomenology of perception. Yet, although Butler does point out certain blind spots in his descriptions regarding the gendered body, it is in the light of her questioning that the true radicality of Merleau-Ponty's ideas can be revealed. A further task for feminist phenomenology should be a thorough assessment of his philosophy from this angle, once the most obvious misunderstandings have been put to the side.

  • 228.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Merleau-Ponty's Encounter with Saussure's Linguistics: Misreading, Reinterpretation or Prolongation?2013In: Chiasmi International, ISSN 1637-6757, E-ISSN 2155-6415, Vol. 15, p. 123-142Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The prevailing judgement of Merleau-Ponty’s encounter with Saussure’s linguistics is that, although important for the evolution of his philosophy of language, it was based on a mistaken or at least highly idiosyncratic interpretation of Saussure’s ideas. Significantly, the rendering of Saussure that has been common both in Merleau-Ponty scholarship and in linguistics has been based on the structuralist development of the Genevan linguist’s ideas. This article argues that a reading of Saussure in light of certain passages of the Course of General Linguistics forgotten by the structuralists, and of the manuscripts related to the published works, can show to the contrary that Merleau-Ponty’s account was sustainable. An understanding of Saussure’s ideas that does not flinch from their paradoxical features can throw light upon the French phenomenologist’s views on language and expression. Moreover, the “linguistic turn” in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical development, identified by James Edie for example, does not seem to have been so clear-cut as have previously been believed; the influence of Saussure’s thought had certainly begun before he wrote the Phenomenology of Perception.

  • 229.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Recasting Objective Thought: The Venture of Expression in Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy2015Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This thesis is about meaning, expression and language in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, and their role in the phenomenological project as a whole. For Merleau-Ponty, expression is the taking up of a meaning given either in perception or in already acquired forms of expression, thereby repeating, transforming or congealing meaning into gestures, utterances, artworks, ideas or theories. Contrary to the predominant view in the literature, the relation of expression to meaning, and in particular the problem of expressing new meanings, was of fundamental importance to Merleau-Ponty from the very beginning, in that it was intrinsically related to the overcoming of what he termed “objective thought”. Admittedly, there is an evolution of his philosophy in this respect: from the early stance where the recasting of certain basic categories is taken as pivotal for the development of a new form of thinking, with arguments drawn also from various empirical and social sciences, to what appears to be an effort at an all-pervading reformulation of philosophical language during his last years. But the remoulding of categories was never for Merleau-Ponty a matter simply of finding a few, better adapted concepts, but from the outset an endeavour to think philosophical arguments through to a point where they reveal their inherent inconsistencies. Recasting philosophical expression is thus a risky enterprise, and this is a point I explore further in Essay 1, that focuses especially upon creative expression in painting and to some extent in literature. In Essay 2 I discuss the notion of Gestalt and how it serves this general project, whereas Essay 3 deals with verbal language, on the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Saussure’s linguistics. Essay 4 examines bodily expression from the point of view of feminist phenomenology and in particular Judith Butler’s early reading of Merleau-Ponty, and finally Essay 5 discusses expression in the art of dance.

  • 230.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Dancing Body and Creative Expression: Reflections Based on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology2014In: Senses of Embodiment: Art, Technics, Media / [ed] Mika Elo, Miika Luoto, Bern: Peter Lang Publishing Group, 2014, p. 103-112Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 231.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The First Man Speaking: Merleau-Ponty on Expression as the Task of Phenomenology2015In: Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, ISSN 0007-1773, E-ISSN 2332-0486, Vol. 46, no 3, p. 195-212Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article aims to establish an understanding of Merleau-Ponty's view of creative expression, and of its phenomenological function, setting out from the intriguing statement in his essay Cezanne's Doubt that the painter (or writer or philosopher) finds himself in the situation of the first human being trying to express herself. Although the importance of primary or creative expression in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is well known, there is no consensus among commentators with respect to how this notion is to be understood, and of its apparently paradoxical relation to experience in his philosophy. On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty seems to presuppose that there is an original meaning pre-given in experience; on the other hand, expression is described as a hazardous enterprise, because the meaning to be expressed does not exist before expression has succeeded. In order to resolve this tension, I explore the significance of the precariousness of creative expression, arguing that it must be related to its other side: the constituted, all too often petrified meaning that we must start out from.

  • 232.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Towards a Phenomenological Account of the Dancing Body: Merleau-Ponty and the Corporeal Schema2013In: Material of Movement and Thought: Reflections on the Dancer's Practice and Corporeality / [ed] Anna Petronella Foultier, Cecilia Roos, Stockholm: Dans och Cirkushögskolan , 2013Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The essay discusses the dancing body from a phenomenological perspective, against the background of the philosophical conception of the lived body in tradition. In the very young discipline of dance theory, there is a shortage of philosophical concepts and analyses that I believe phenomenology can partly remedy. Although Merleau-Ponty has not written on dance other than in passing, I argue that his thoughts on the body-proper are useful in order to elucidate bodily expression in general and the significations that the dancer’s body manifests in performing a choreographic work in particular. The dynamic notion of the corporeal schema that he appeals to can make us understand how significations are inscribed in the body, and thus how something such as an expression or a choreographic language can exist in dance. Further, the specific forms of spatiality that Merleau-Ponty considers are opened up by artworks, within and beyond the concrete space of the physical body, gives us a clue to the elaboration of a phenomenology of dance.

  • 233.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Roos, Cecilia
    Material of Movement and Thought: Reflections on the Dancer’s Practice and Corporeality2013Collection (editor) (Other academic)
  • 234.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Can Reductive Individualists Allow Defence Against Political Aggression?2015In: Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. Volume 1 / [ed] David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne and Steven Wall, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 1Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter defends reductive individualism against the claim that it is unable to sanction wars of national defense that seek to protect non-vital interests, such as political goods. It does so by rebutting the two arguments: the Conditional Force Argument and the Proliferation Problem. The Conditional Force Argument holds that, by the reductivist’s own lights, wars that seek to defend only political goods are necessarily disproportionate and therefore always unjust. The Proliferation Problem holds that there is no morally significant difference between states and some other collectives. So, even if it can showed that it is proportionate for states to wage defensive wars against threats to non-vital interests, the grounds are lacking for restricting this permission to states.

  • 235.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Chatterjee, Deen K., ed. The Ethics of Preventive War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20132015In: Ethics, ISSN 0014-1704, E-ISSN 1539-297X, Vol. 126, no 1, p. 215-220Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 236.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Collectivism and Reductivism in the Ethics of War2016In: A Companion to Applied Philosophy / [ed] Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Kimberley Brownlee, David Coady, Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2016, p. 342-355Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 237.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Defensive killing2014Book (Refereed)
  • 238.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    II—Claim Rights, Duties, and Lesser-Evil Justifications2015In: Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society, ISSN 0309-7013, E-ISSN 1467-8349, Vol. 89, no 1, p. 267-285Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper explores the relationship between a person's claim right not to be harmed and the duties this claim confers on others. I argue that we should reject Jonathan Quong's evidence-based account of this relationship, which holds that an agent A's possession of a claim against B is partly determined by whether it would be reasonable for A to demand B's compliance with a correlative duty. When B's evidence is that demanding compliance would not be reasonable, A cannot have a claim against B. I suggest that some of the putatively problematic cases that Quong identifies can be resolved by plausibly narrowing the scope of the right not to be harmed. I also argue that Quong's view leads to implausible conclusions, and that his account of what happens to A's claim in the face of lesser-evil justifications is inconsistent with his broader view. I then defend the view that agents are required, and not merely permitted, to act on lesser-evil justifications. I further argue that A may not defend herself against the infliction of harms that are justified on lesser-evil grounds. However, she may defend herself in cases where B is only evidentially, and not objectively, justified in harming her.

  • 239.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Jeff McMahan, Killing In War, New York: Oxford University Press, 20092013In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 10, no 1, p. 112-115Article, book review (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Killing in War is based upon McMahan’s 2007 Uehiro Lectures, but draws on the substantial body of work on the ethics of war that McMahan has produced over the last decade or so. In this sense, it was a classic before it was written, representing as it does the most sustained, persuasive, and influential attack to date on the ‘ortho-dox’ Walzerian view of just war. It is, undoubtedly, compulsory reading for anyone working in this field, and consolidates McMahan’s position as the most important just war theorist of the last forty years.

  • 240.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Judging Armed Humanitarian Intervention2014In: The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention / [ed] Don E. Scheid, Cambridge University Press, 2014Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 241.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Non-Combatant Liability in War2014In: How We Fight: Ethics in War / [ed] H Frowe and G Lang, Oxford University Press, 2014Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 242.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On the Redundancy of Jus ad VimIn: Ethics and International Affairs, ISSN 0892-6794, E-ISSN 1747-7093Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 243.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction2016 (ed. 2)Book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When is it right to go to war? When is a war illegal? What are the rules of engagement? What should happen when a war is over? How should we view terrorism? The Ethics of War and Peace is a fresh and contemporary introduction to one of the oldest but still most relevant ethical debates. It introduces students to contemporary Just War Theory in a stimulating and engaging way, perfect for those approaching the topic for the first time.

  • 244.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Justified Infliction of Unjust HArm2009In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, ISSN 0066-7374, E-ISSN 1467-9264Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 245.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Role of Necessity in Liability to Defensive Harm2016In: The Ethics of Self-Defence / [ed] Christian Coons, Michel Weber, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 152-170Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 246.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    War and Intervention2014In: Issues in Political Theory / [ed] Catriona McKinnon, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 247.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    War in Political Philosophy2017In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, 2017Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We can distinguish between three moral approaches to war: pacifism, realism, and just war theory. There are various theoretical approaches to war within the just war tradition. One of the central disputes between these approaches concerns whether war is morally exceptional (as held by exceptionalists), or morally continuous with ordinary life (as held by reductive individualists). There are also significant debates concerning key substantive issues in the ethics of war, such as reductivist challenges to the thesis that combatants fighting an unjust war are the moral equals of those fighting a just war, and the challenge to reductivism that it undermines the principle of noncombatant immunity. There are also changing attitudes to wars of humanitarian intervention. One under-explored challenge to the permissibility of such wars lies in the better outcomes of alternative ways of alleviating suffering. The notion of unconventional warfare has also come to recent prominence, not least with respect to the moral status of human shields.

  • 248.
    Frowe, Helen
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Lang, Gerald
    How we fight: ethics in war2014Collection (editor) (Refereed)
  • 249.
    Furberg, Elisabeth
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ansvar för sin hälsa?: Problem och möjligheter med att tillämpa en ansvarsprincip inom hälso- och sjukvården2007Report (Other academic)
  • 250.
    Gemzöe, Lena
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Ethnology, History of Religions and Gender Studies.
    En feminist synar Kant2006In: Filosofins värld / [ed] Levander, Martin, Stockholm: Liber, 2006, p. 216-218Chapter in book (Other academic)
2345678 201 - 250 of 817
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