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  • 201.
    Erman, Eva
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Political Science.
    Niklas, Möller
    Practice-Dependence and Epistemic Uncertainty2017In: Journal of Global Ethics, ISSN 1744-9626, E-ISSN 1744-9634, Vol. 13, no 2, p. 187-205Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A shared presumption among practice-dependent theorists is that aprinciple of justice is dependent on the function or aim of thepractice to which it is supposed to be applied. In recentcontributions to this debate, the condition of epistemicuncertainty plays a significant role for motivating and justifying apractice-dependent view. This paper analyses the role ofepistemic uncertainty in justifying a practice-dependent approach.We see two kinds of epistemic uncertainty allegedly playing thisjustificatory role. What we call‘normative epistemic uncertainty’emerges from dealing with the problem of value uncertainty injustifying applied principles when our higher-level principles areopen-textured, that is, when their content is too vague or unclearto generate determinate prescriptions. What we call‘descriptiveepistemic uncertainty’emerges from dealing with uncertaintyabout empirical facts, such as the problem of moral assurance,that is, the problem that the requirements of justice cannot gobeyond arrangements that we can know with reasonableconfidence that we can jointly establish and maintain. In bothcases, practice-dependent theorists conclude that the condition ofepistemic uncertainty justifies a practice-dependent approach,which puts certain restrictions on theorizing regulative principlesand has wide-ranging practical implications for the scope ofjustice. Our claim in this paper is that neither kind of epistemicuncertainty justifies a practice-dependent approach.

  • 202. Espinoza, Nicolas
    Incommensurability: The Failure to Compare Risks2009In: The Ethics of Technological Risk / [ed] Sabine Roeser, Lotte Asveld, Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2009, p. 128-143Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 203.
    Espinoza, Nicolas
    Luleå Univ Technol, Luleå, Sweden.
    Some New Monadic Value Predicates2009In: American Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0003-0481, E-ISSN 2152-1123, Vol. 46, no 1, p. 31-38Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 204.
    Espinoza, Nicolas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Small Improvement Argument2008In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 165, no 1, p. 127-139Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 205.
    Espinoza, Nicolas
    et al.
    Ctr Healthcare Eth, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Peterson, Martin
    How to depolarise the ethical debate over human embryonic stem cell research (and other ethical debates too!)2012In: Journal of Medical Ethics, ISSN 0306-6800, E-ISSN 1473-4257, Vol. 38, p. 496-500Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 206.
    Espinoza, Nicolas
    et al.
    Lulea University of Technology.
    Peterson, Martin
    Incomplete Preferences in Disaster Risk Management2008In: International Journal of Technology Policy and Management, ISSN 1741-5292, Vol. 8, no 4, p. 341-358Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 207. Espinoza, Nicolas
    et al.
    Peterson, Martin
    Ojämförbara risker?2008In: Risk & Risici / [ed] Johannes Persson, Nils Erik Sahlin, Bokförlaget Nya Doxa, 2008Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 208.
    Espinoza, Nicolas
    et al.
    Swedish Def Res Agcy, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Peterson, Martin
    Risk and Mid-level Moral Principles2012In: Bioethics, ISSN 0269-9702, E-ISSN 1467-8519, Vol. 26, no 1, p. 8-14Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 209.
    Folkmarson Käll, Lisa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Ethnology, History of Religions and Gender Studies, Gender Studies.
    Ellen Feder's Making Sense of Intersex and the Issue of Sexual Difference2016In: Philosophy today (Celina), ISSN 0031-8256, E-ISSN 2329-8596, Vol. 60, no 3, p. 799-807Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 210.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Beata Stawarska, Saussure’s Philosophy of Language as Phenomenology: Undoing the Doctrine of the Course2015In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617, no 21 JulyArticle, book review (Other academic)
  • 211.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Incarnated Meaning and the Notion of Gestalt in Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology2015In: Chiasmi International, ISSN 1637-6757, E-ISSN 2155-6415, Vol. 17, p. 53-75Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Although it is well known that Gestalt theory had an important impact on Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy throughout his career, there is still no detailed study either of its influence on his ideas or of his own understanding of the notoriously polysemic notion of Gestalt. Yet, this notion is a key to Merleau-Ponty’s fundamental project of overcoming “objective thought” and its inherent dichotomies. By indicating how signification or ideality can be immanent in, rather than opposed to, matter, it compels us to redefine both consciousness and the world it is bound up with. The aim of this article is to clarify Merleau-Ponty’s notion of Gestalt against the historical background that he refers to, including Kurt Goldstein’s theory of the organism that was crucial for his interpretation of it.

  • 212.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. School of Dance and Circus, Sweden.
    Language and the Gendered Body: Butler's Early Reading of Merleau-Ponty2013In: Hypatia, ISSN 0887-5367, E-ISSN 1527-2001, Vol. 28, no 4, p. 767-783Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Through a close reading of Judith Butler's 1989 essay on Merleau-Ponty's theory of sexuality as well as the texts her argument hinges on, this paper addresses the debate about the relation between language and the living, gendered body as it is understood by defenders of poststructural theory on the one hand, and different interpretations of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology on the other. I claim that Butler, in her criticism of the French philosopher's analysis of the famous Schneider case, does not take its wider context into account: either the case study that Merleau-Ponty's discussion is based upon, or its role in his phenomenology of perception. Yet, although Butler does point out certain blind spots in his descriptions regarding the gendered body, it is in the light of her questioning that the true radicality of Merleau-Ponty's ideas can be revealed. A further task for feminist phenomenology should be a thorough assessment of his philosophy from this angle, once the most obvious misunderstandings have been put to the side.

  • 213.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Merleau-Ponty's Encounter with Saussure's Linguistics: Misreading, Reinterpretation or Prolongation?2013In: Chiasmi International, ISSN 1637-6757, E-ISSN 2155-6415, Vol. 15, p. 123-142Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The prevailing judgement of Merleau-Ponty’s encounter with Saussure’s linguistics is that, although important for the evolution of his philosophy of language, it was based on a mistaken or at least highly idiosyncratic interpretation of Saussure’s ideas. Significantly, the rendering of Saussure that has been common both in Merleau-Ponty scholarship and in linguistics has been based on the structuralist development of the Genevan linguist’s ideas. This article argues that a reading of Saussure in light of certain passages of the Course of General Linguistics forgotten by the structuralists, and of the manuscripts related to the published works, can show to the contrary that Merleau-Ponty’s account was sustainable. An understanding of Saussure’s ideas that does not flinch from their paradoxical features can throw light upon the French phenomenologist’s views on language and expression. Moreover, the “linguistic turn” in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical development, identified by James Edie for example, does not seem to have been so clear-cut as have previously been believed; the influence of Saussure’s thought had certainly begun before he wrote the Phenomenology of Perception.

  • 214.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Recasting Objective Thought: The Venture of Expression in Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy2015Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This thesis is about meaning, expression and language in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, and their role in the phenomenological project as a whole. For Merleau-Ponty, expression is the taking up of a meaning given either in perception or in already acquired forms of expression, thereby repeating, transforming or congealing meaning into gestures, utterances, artworks, ideas or theories. Contrary to the predominant view in the literature, the relation of expression to meaning, and in particular the problem of expressing new meanings, was of fundamental importance to Merleau-Ponty from the very beginning, in that it was intrinsically related to the overcoming of what he termed “objective thought”. Admittedly, there is an evolution of his philosophy in this respect: from the early stance where the recasting of certain basic categories is taken as pivotal for the development of a new form of thinking, with arguments drawn also from various empirical and social sciences, to what appears to be an effort at an all-pervading reformulation of philosophical language during his last years. But the remoulding of categories was never for Merleau-Ponty a matter simply of finding a few, better adapted concepts, but from the outset an endeavour to think philosophical arguments through to a point where they reveal their inherent inconsistencies. Recasting philosophical expression is thus a risky enterprise, and this is a point I explore further in Essay 1, that focuses especially upon creative expression in painting and to some extent in literature. In Essay 2 I discuss the notion of Gestalt and how it serves this general project, whereas Essay 3 deals with verbal language, on the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Saussure’s linguistics. Essay 4 examines bodily expression from the point of view of feminist phenomenology and in particular Judith Butler’s early reading of Merleau-Ponty, and finally Essay 5 discusses expression in the art of dance.

  • 215.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Dancing Body and Creative Expression: Reflections Based on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology2014In: Senses of Embodiment: Art, Technics, Media / [ed] Mika Elo, Miika Luoto, Bern: Peter Lang Publishing Group, 2014, p. 103-112Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 216.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The First Man Speaking: Merleau-Ponty on Expression as the Task of Phenomenology2015In: Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, ISSN 0007-1773, E-ISSN 2332-0486, Vol. 46, no 3, p. 195-212Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article aims to establish an understanding of Merleau-Ponty's view of creative expression, and of its phenomenological function, setting out from the intriguing statement in his essay Cezanne's Doubt that the painter (or writer or philosopher) finds himself in the situation of the first human being trying to express herself. Although the importance of primary or creative expression in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is well known, there is no consensus among commentators with respect to how this notion is to be understood, and of its apparently paradoxical relation to experience in his philosophy. On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty seems to presuppose that there is an original meaning pre-given in experience; on the other hand, expression is described as a hazardous enterprise, because the meaning to be expressed does not exist before expression has succeeded. In order to resolve this tension, I explore the significance of the precariousness of creative expression, arguing that it must be related to its other side: the constituted, all too often petrified meaning that we must start out from.

  • 217.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Towards a Phenomenological Account of the Dancing Body: Merleau-Ponty and the Corporeal Schema2013In: Material of Movement and Thought: Reflections on the Dancer's Practice and Corporeality / [ed] Anna Petronella Foultier, Cecilia Roos, Stockholm: Dans och Cirkushögskolan , 2013Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The essay discusses the dancing body from a phenomenological perspective, against the background of the philosophical conception of the lived body in tradition. In the very young discipline of dance theory, there is a shortage of philosophical concepts and analyses that I believe phenomenology can partly remedy. Although Merleau-Ponty has not written on dance other than in passing, I argue that his thoughts on the body-proper are useful in order to elucidate bodily expression in general and the significations that the dancer’s body manifests in performing a choreographic work in particular. The dynamic notion of the corporeal schema that he appeals to can make us understand how significations are inscribed in the body, and thus how something such as an expression or a choreographic language can exist in dance. Further, the specific forms of spatiality that Merleau-Ponty considers are opened up by artworks, within and beyond the concrete space of the physical body, gives us a clue to the elaboration of a phenomenology of dance.

  • 218.
    Foultier, Anna Petronella
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Roos, Cecilia
    Material of Movement and Thought: Reflections on the Dancer’s Practice and Corporeality2013Collection (editor) (Other academic)
  • 219.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Can Reductive Individualists Allow Defence Against Political Aggression?2015In: Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy. Volume 1 / [ed] David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne and Steven Wall, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 1Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter defends reductive individualism against the claim that it is unable to sanction wars of national defense that seek to protect non-vital interests, such as political goods. It does so by rebutting the two arguments: the Conditional Force Argument and the Proliferation Problem. The Conditional Force Argument holds that, by the reductivist’s own lights, wars that seek to defend only political goods are necessarily disproportionate and therefore always unjust. The Proliferation Problem holds that there is no morally significant difference between states and some other collectives. So, even if it can showed that it is proportionate for states to wage defensive wars against threats to non-vital interests, the grounds are lacking for restricting this permission to states.

  • 220.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Chatterjee, Deen K., ed. The Ethics of Preventive War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20132015In: Ethics, ISSN 0014-1704, E-ISSN 1539-297X, Vol. 126, no 1, p. 215-220Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 221.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Collectivism and Reductivism in the Ethics of War2016In: A Companion to Applied Philosophy / [ed] Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Kimberley Brownlee, David Coady, Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2016, p. 342-355Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 222.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Defensive killing2014Book (Refereed)
  • 223.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    II—Claim Rights, Duties, and Lesser-Evil Justifications2015In: Supplementary volume - Aristotelian Society, ISSN 0309-7013, E-ISSN 1467-8349, Vol. 89, no 1, p. 267-285Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper explores the relationship between a person's claim right not to be harmed and the duties this claim confers on others. I argue that we should reject Jonathan Quong's evidence-based account of this relationship, which holds that an agent A's possession of a claim against B is partly determined by whether it would be reasonable for A to demand B's compliance with a correlative duty. When B's evidence is that demanding compliance would not be reasonable, A cannot have a claim against B. I suggest that some of the putatively problematic cases that Quong identifies can be resolved by plausibly narrowing the scope of the right not to be harmed. I also argue that Quong's view leads to implausible conclusions, and that his account of what happens to A's claim in the face of lesser-evil justifications is inconsistent with his broader view. I then defend the view that agents are required, and not merely permitted, to act on lesser-evil justifications. I further argue that A may not defend herself against the infliction of harms that are justified on lesser-evil grounds. However, she may defend herself in cases where B is only evidentially, and not objectively, justified in harming her.

  • 224.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Jeff McMahan, Killing In War, New York: Oxford University Press, 20092013In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 10, no 1, p. 112-115Article, book review (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Killing in War is based upon McMahan’s 2007 Uehiro Lectures, but draws on the substantial body of work on the ethics of war that McMahan has produced over the last decade or so. In this sense, it was a classic before it was written, representing as it does the most sustained, persuasive, and influential attack to date on the ‘ortho-dox’ Walzerian view of just war. It is, undoubtedly, compulsory reading for anyone working in this field, and consolidates McMahan’s position as the most important just war theorist of the last forty years.

  • 225.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Judging Armed Humanitarian Intervention2014In: The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention / [ed] Don E. Scheid, Cambridge University Press, 2014Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 226.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Non-Combatant Liability in War2014In: How We Fight: Ethics in War / [ed] H Frowe and G Lang, Oxford University Press, 2014Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 227.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On the Redundancy of Jus ad VimIn: Ethics and International Affairs, ISSN 0892-6794, E-ISSN 1747-7093Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 228.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction2016 (ed. 2)Book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When is it right to go to war? When is a war illegal? What are the rules of engagement? What should happen when a war is over? How should we view terrorism? The Ethics of War and Peace is a fresh and contemporary introduction to one of the oldest but still most relevant ethical debates. It introduces students to contemporary Just War Theory in a stimulating and engaging way, perfect for those approaching the topic for the first time.

  • 229.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Justified Infliction of Unjust HArm2009In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, ISSN 0066-7374, E-ISSN 1467-9264Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 230.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Role of Necessity in Liability to Defensive Harm2016In: The Ethics of Self-Defence / [ed] Christian Coons, Michel Weber, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 152-170Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 231.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    War and Intervention2014In: Issues in Political Theory / [ed] Catriona McKinnon, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 232.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    War in Political Philosophy2017In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, 2017Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We can distinguish between three moral approaches to war: pacifism, realism, and just war theory. There are various theoretical approaches to war within the just war tradition. One of the central disputes between these approaches concerns whether war is morally exceptional (as held by exceptionalists), or morally continuous with ordinary life (as held by reductive individualists). There are also significant debates concerning key substantive issues in the ethics of war, such as reductivist challenges to the thesis that combatants fighting an unjust war are the moral equals of those fighting a just war, and the challenge to reductivism that it undermines the principle of noncombatant immunity. There are also changing attitudes to wars of humanitarian intervention. One under-explored challenge to the permissibility of such wars lies in the better outcomes of alternative ways of alleviating suffering. The notion of unconventional warfare has also come to recent prominence, not least with respect to the moral status of human shields.

  • 233.
    Frowe, Helen
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Lang, Gerald
    How we fight: ethics in war2014Collection (editor) (Refereed)
  • 234.
    Furberg, Elisabeth
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ansvar för sin hälsa?: Problem och möjligheter med att tillämpa en ansvarsprincip inom hälso- och sjukvården2007Report (Other academic)
  • 235.
    Gemzöe, Lena
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Ethnology, History of Religions and Gender Studies.
    En feminist synar Kant2006In: Filosofins värld / [ed] Levander, Martin, Stockholm: Liber, 2006, p. 216-218Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 236.
    Gluer Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    General Terms and Relational Modality*2012In: Noûs, ISSN 0029-4624, E-ISSN 1468-0068, Vol. 46, no 1, p. 159-199Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 237.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Analyticity and Implicit Definition2003In: Grazer Philosophische Studien, ISSN 0165-9227, E-ISSN 1875-6735, Vol. 66, p. 23-60Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 238.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Colors without circles?2007In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 66, no 1-2, p. 107-131Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Realists about color, be they dispositionalists or physicalists, agree on the truth of the following claim: (R) x is red iff x is disposed to look red under standard conditions. The disagreement is only about whether to identify the colors with the relevant dispositions, or with their categorical bases. This is a question about the representational content of color experience: What kind of properties do color experiences ascribe to objects? It has been argued (for instance by Boghossian and Velleman, 1991) that truths like (R) cannot be used in an account of the colors as they would result in ‚circular’, and therefore empty, contents. It has also been argued (for instance by Harman, 1996) that switching to an account of color in terms of a functional account of color sensations would result in a circular, and therefore empty, account. In this paper, I defend a realist account of color in terms of a (non-reductive) functional account of color sensations. Such an account of sensations has been suggested by Pagin (2000), and it can be applied to color sensations without the resulting account of the colors themselves being circular or empty. I argue that the so-called transparency of experience does not provide any argument against such an account. I also argue that on such an account, the issue of physicalism vs. dispositionalism boils down to the question of the modal profile of the color concepts.

  • 239.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Critical Notice: Donald Davidson's Collected Essays2007In: Dialectica, Vol. 61, p. 275-284Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 240.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Defeating looks2016In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In previous work, I have suggested a doxastic account of perceptual experience according to which experiences form a (peculiar) kind of belief: Beliefs with what I have called “phenomenal” or “looks-content”. I have argued that this account can not only accommodate the intuitive reason providing role of experience, but also its justificatory role. I have also argued that, in general, construing experience and perceptual beliefs, i.e. the beliefs most directly based on experience, as having different contents best accounts for the defeasibility of experiential reasons. In this paper, I shall have a closer look at the evidential or inferential relation between looks-propositions and the contents of perceptual beliefs and argue for a form of what I shall call “Pollockianism” about experiential reasons: such reasons are good unless defeated. Questions to be investigated include: Does the resulting picture of perceptual justification contain an externalist element? Is it compatible with Bayesianism? And how does it do with respect to problems that have been raised for other forms of Pollockianism such as dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism?

  • 241.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience2009In: Mind and language, ISSN 0268-1064, E-ISSN 1468-0017, Vol. 24, p. 297-327Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing ‘phenomenal’ properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. Moreover, in contrast to sui generis views, it can quite easily account for the rational or reason providing role of experience.

  • 242.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On Perceiving That2004In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 70, no 3-4, p. 197-212Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 243.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Talking about Looks2017In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology, ISSN 1878-5158, E-ISSN 1878-5166, Vol. 8, no 4, p. 781-807Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In natural language, looks-talk is used in a variety of ways. I investigate three uses of 'looks' that have traditionally been distinguished - epistemic, comparative, and phenomenal 'looks' - and endorse and develop considerations in support of the view that these amount to polysemy. Focusing on the phenomenal use of 'looks', I then investigate connections between its semantics, the content of visual experience, and the metaphysics of looks. I argue that phenomenal 'looks' is not a propositional attitude operator: We do not use it to ascribe propositional attitudes to subjects, but to directly ascribe looks to objects, where looks are relational properties. However, I go on to argue that, given the way we use phenomenal 'looks', these relational properties are ultimately best understood as phenomenal relational properties, i.e. in terms of relations involving experiences. Along the way, I endorse Byrne's argument against Jackson's claim that phenomenal 'looks F' only takes predicates for colour, shape, and distance, and raise the issue of compositionality for the resulting view according to which phenomenal 'looks F' is context-dependent in a way that allows it to take a vast range of predicates. I conclude by arguing that these considerations concerning the natural language use of 'looks', and in particular its phenomenal use, are water on the mills of phenomenal intentionalism, a position in the philosophy of perception according to which experiences are propositional attitudes with phenomenal looks-contents.

  • 244.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Status of Charity I: Conceptual Truth or Aposteriori Necessity?2006In: International journal of philosophical studies (Print), ISSN 0967-2559, E-ISSN 1466-4542, Vol. 14, no 3, p. 337-359Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to Donald Davidson, linguistic meaning is determined by the principle of charity. Because of Davidson's semantic behaviourism, charity's significance is both epistemic and metaphysical: charity not only provides the radical interpreter with a method for constructing a semantic theory on the basis of his data, but it does so because it is the principle metaphysically determining meaning. In this paper, I assume that charity does determine meaning. On this assumption, I investigate both its epistemic and metaphysical status: is charity a priori or a posteriori? And what kind of necessity does it have? According to Davidson himself, charity is an a priori truth and its necessity is conceptual: it is essential to, or constitutive of, our common concepts of meaning and belief. Not only does this generate tension within Davidson's own, Quine-inspired epistemology, but there is independent reason to think of charity as an empirical truth. Even so, charity might be essential to belief and meaning in the sense of being an a posteriori necessity. I conclude that our ordinary modal intuitions might well support charity's psychological-nomological necessity, but that they do not reach all the way to metaphysical necessity.

  • 245.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Proper Names and Relational Modality2006In: Linguistics and Philosophy, ISSN 0165-0157, E-ISSN 1573-0549, Vol. 29, no 5, p. 507-535Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Saul Kripke’s thesis that ordinary proper names are rigid designators is supported by widely shared intuitions about the occurrence of names in ordinary modal contexts. By those intuitions names are scopeless with respect to the modal expressions. That is, sentences in a pair like (a) Aristotle might have been fond of dogs, (b) Concerning Aristotle, it is true that he might have been fond of dogs will have the same truth value. The same does not in general hold for definite descriptions. If one, like Kripke, accounts for this difference by means of the intensions of the names and the descriptions, the conclusion is that names do not in general have the same intension as any normal, identifying description. However, this difference can be accounted for alternatively by appeal to the semantics of the modal expressions. On the account we suggest, dubbed ‘relational modality’, simple singular terms, like proper names, contribute to modal contexts simply by their actual world reference, not by their descriptive content. That account turns out to be fully equivalent with the rigidity account when it comes to truth of modal and non-modal sentence (with respect to the actual world), and hence supports the same basic intuitions. Here we present the relational modality account and compare it with others, in particular Kripke’s own

  • 246.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Against Belief Normativity2013In: The Aim of Belief / [ed] Timothy Chan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 80-99Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Normativism about belief is a claim about the nature of belief: Belief is essentially norm- or rule-guided. This is standardly interpreted as requiring that belief formation be subject to genuine prescriptions. In this chapter, Glüer and Wikforss argue that belief normativism is very hard to square with some basic intuitions about rule guidance. Any account of rule-guidance needs to support the distinction between being guided by a rule and merely being in accord with it. But belief normativism cannot account for this difference in what the authors take to be the most natural, intuitive terms. If this is correct, any defense of normativism will have to involve a significant departure from intuition or a novel construal of the normativity involved. The challenge is to motivate any of these moves.

  • 247.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Against Content Normativity2009In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 118, p. 31-70Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 248.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Es braucht die Regel nicht: Wittgenstein on Rules and Meaning2010In: The Later Wittgenstein on Language / [ed] Daniel Whiting, Palgrave Macmillan , 2010, p. 148-166Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 249.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Meaning Normativism: Against the Simple Argument2015In: Organon F, ISSN 1335-0668, Vol. 22, p. 63-73Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper examines a central argument in support of the thesis that meaning is essentially normative. The argument tries to derive meaning normativism from the fact that meaningful expressions necessarily have conditions of correct application: Since correctness is a normative notion, it is argued, statements of correctness conditions for an expression have direct normative consequences for the use of that expression. We have labeled this the 'simple argument', and have argued that it fails. In this paper we elaborate on our objections to the argument in response to Daniel Whiting's recent attempt to rescue it. We argue, first, that statements of correctness conditions simply allow us to categorize the applications of an expression into two basic kinds (for instance, the true and the false) without this having any normative implications; and, second, that the normativist has not provided any reasons to think that some further, normative notion of semantic correctness is essential to meaning.

  • 250.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Normativity of Meaning and Content2009In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy / [ed] Edward N. Zalta, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information , 2009Chapter in book (Refereed)
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