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  • 2051.
    Olsson, Susanne
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Ethnology, History of Religions and Gender Studies, History of Religions.
    Svensson, Jonas
    ‘One of the most important questions that human beings have to understand’: Salafism as Islamic deferentialist fundamentalism2022In: Approaching Religion, E-ISSN 1799-3121, Vol. 12, no 2, p. 59-76Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the present article, the authors argue that the study of Salafism as a contemporary Islamic new religious movement could benefit from an analytical perspective separating fundamentalism into the modes of inferentialism and deferentialism. The basics of these concepts are outlined and discussed in relation to different aspects of contemporary Salafism as well as in relation to previous tendencies in Islamic history. As a case study, the authors employ the concept in an analysis of a contemporary Swedish Salafi discourse on the ‘wiping of the (leather) socks’ in the context of ritual purity. The authors argue that the concept of ‘deferential fundamentalism’ has a potential in the study of Salafism in that it allows for comparative analysis, both cross-religiously and diachronically, in contextualising Salafism historically. It also allows for an analysis of Salafi thought and practice in relation to theories of how human beings in general process social information.

  • 2052.
    Olsson, Ulf
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Science, Department of Education in Arts and Professions. Yrkeskunnande och lärande.
    DRÖMMEN OM DEN HÄLSOSAMMA MEDBORGAREN.1999Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [sv]

    Folkuppfostran och hälsoupplysning har en lång tradiion i det svenska samhället. Myndigheterna har sedan mitten av 1700-talet intresserat sig för i vilken utsträckning som den svenska befolkningen har levt ett sa hälsosamt liv som möjligt, till gagn för de samhällsprojekt som formulerats under olika tider. Intresset har varit särskilt starkt under de perioder då samhället anses ha varit i kris. Här diskuteras de drömmar om den upplysta och hälsosamma medborgaren som har följt folkhemmets framväxt, utveckling och omstrukturering. Boken börjar i 1930-talets oro att det låga födelsetalet skulle hota landets framtida utveckling. Den slutar i 1990-talets diskussioner om I enskildes rätt att fa del av samhällets krympande sjukvårdsresurser.

    Det material som analyseras är statliga utredningar som legat till grund for hälso- och sjukvårdens framväxt och övergripande inriktning. Ett genomgående tema är välfärdsstatens manipulerande och frigörande mekanismer. En central fråga är om nutidens framställning av de som röker kan sägas fylla samma funktion som föreställningarna om rasbiologiskt undermåliga individer gjorde i 1930-talets framtidsvisioner.

  • 2053.
    Olsson Yaouzis, Nicolas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    An evolutionary dynamic of revolutions2012In: Public Choice, ISSN 0048-5829, E-ISSN 1573-7101, Vol. 151, no 3-4, p. 497-515Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It has been argued that rational choice theory is unable to explain the occurrence of social revolutions. This paper argues that if social revolutions are modeled in an evolutionary setting it is possible to predict when revolutions occur. It is shown that revolutions are expected to occur when regimes lose their determination to punish revolutionary activity early and severely. In the process of constructing the model some results about public good provision are generalized.

  • 2054.
    Olsson Yaouzis, Nicolas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    "That is just what they want you to believe": A modest defence of Marxist paranoia2018In: European Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0966-8373, E-ISSN 1468-0378, Vol. 26, no 2, p. 827-839Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This essay defends a rational reconstruction of a genealogical debunking argument that begins with the premise that's just what the economic elite want you to believe and ends in the conclusion you should lower your confidence in your belief. The argument is genealogical because it includes a causal explanation of your beliefs; it is debunking because it claims that the contingencies uncovered by the genealogy undermine your beliefs. The essay begins by defending a plausible causal explanation of your belief in terms of the wants of the elite. Then a number of recent objections to genealogical debunking arguments are considered. It is argued that the genealogy offered in the first part constitutes evidence that a testimony-based belief is not safe and therefore does not constitute knowledge if the economic elite wants you to believe it.

  • 2055.
    Olsson-Yaouzis, Nicolas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ideology, Rationality, and Revolution: An Essay on the Persistence of Oppression2012Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This essay is concerned with two explanations of why oppressive social orders persist. According to the first, the so-called gunman theory of oppression (GT), these social orders persist because the oppressed are afraid being punished if they participated in a revolt. According to the second, the so-called ideology theory of oppression (IT), oppression persists because the oppressed are subject to ideology. Traditionally, the former has been associated with rational choice theory, and the latter with Marxism and critical theory. Analytical philosophers have been suspicious of IT since it involves functional claims. This essay shows that it is possible to make sense of both IT and its associated functional claim within the framework of rational choice theory. Chapter one provides an overview of the discussion and a presentation of the general argument against IT. Chapter two specifies the explanandum for the two theories in more detail. The chapter concludes with a description of three real-life persistent oppressive social orders. In chapter three, the basics of rational choice theory are introduced and GT spelled out. Some problems for the theory are identified and then dealt with. It is concluded that GT does a good job at explaining the persistence of tyrannies. Chapter four argues that ideology is necessary to provide satisfactory explanations of the other two cases of oppression described in chapter two. The chapter concludes with a specification of IT where the functional claim is made explicit. Chapter five defends Gerald Cohen's account of functional explanations against a dilemma formulated by Ann Cudd. In chapter six, three mechanisms are provided that indicate how the functional claim of IT can be demystified. Chapter seven concludes by indicating a statistical method for testing IT and describing some policy implications.

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  • 2056.
    Olsson-Yaouzis, Nicolas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Revolutionaries, despots, and rationality2010In: Rationality and Society, ISSN 1043-4631, E-ISSN 1461-7358, Vol. 22, no 3, p. 283-299Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The role of groups has often been invoked as an explanation of how successful revolutions can be the outcome of rational action. This paper attempts to show that the focus on groups fails to incorporate an important aspect of oppression, namely the oppressive regime itself. If rational choice theory is to be taken seriously and if it is assumed that the potential revolutionaries are rational, then similar assumptions should be made about the despot. If this is done, then it is far from obvious that groups help to solve the free-rider problem. Rather it is shown that in this case the revolutionaries become subject to a higher order free-rider problem.

  • 2057.
    Ooi, Kee Beng
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Oriental Languages.
    The state and its changdao: sufficient discursive commonality in nation renewal, with Malaysia as case study2001Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 2058.
    Orrje, Jacob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Culture and Aesthetics.
    L’espace scandinave2016In: L’Europe des sciences et des techniques: Un dialogue des savoirs, XVe-XVIIIe / [ed] Liliane Hilaire-Pérez, Fabien Simon, Marie Thébaud-Sorger, Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2016, p. 501-506Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 2059.
    Orrje, Jacob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Culture and Aesthetics.
    Mechanics of patronage: Christopher Polhem and the changing regimes of the Swedish state (1680–1750)2016In: Artefact: techniques, histoire et sciences humaines, ISSN 2273-0753, no 4, p. 135-146Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This essay approaches the politics of early modern technology through the Swedish mechanical practitioner Christopher Polhem. During the absolute monarchy of early 18th century Sweden, Polhem successfully attained royal patronage. But under the constitutional monarchy of the 1720s, his royal connections became a problem. Through Polhem, this essay aims to show the irony of how mechanical practitioners, who presented themselves as faithful subjects of an early modern order, retrospectively have been interpreted as agents of change.

  • 2060.
    Orup, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Ethnology, History of Religions and Gender Studies.
    Tre svenska judars upplevelser av antisemitism i Sverige2014Independent thesis Basic level (professional degree), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
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  • 2061. Osbeck, Christina
    et al.
    Skeie, Geir
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Centre for Teaching and Learning in the Humanities (CeHum).
    Religious Education at Schools in Sweden2014In: Religious Education at Schools in Europe: Part 3,  Northern Europe / [ed] Martin Jaggle, Martin Rothgangel, Geir Skeie, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014, p. 237-266Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 2062. Osbeck, Christina
    et al.
    Sporre, Karin
    Skeie, Geir
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Education. University of Stavanger, Norway.
    The RE classroom as a safe public space: Critical perspectives on dialogue, demands for respect, and nuanced religious education2017In: Location, Space and Place in Religious Education / [ed] Martin Rothgangel, Kerstin von Brömssen, Hans-Günter Heimbrock, Geir Skeie, Münster: Waxmann Verlag, 2017, p. 49-66Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 2063.
    Packalén, Sara
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Content and Composition: An essay on tense, content, and semantic value2016Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A remarkable thing about natural language is that we can use it to share our beliefs and thoughts about the world with other speakers of our language. In cases of successful communication, beliefs seem to be transferred from speakers to hearers by means of the hearer recovering the contents of the speaker’s utterances. This is so natural to us that we take it for granted in our everyday life, and rarely stop to think about how it's is possible. Nevertheless, it's a phenomenon that calls for explanation. It is natural to expect that natural language semantics has a key explanatory role to play here. In order to understand this role, we must relate the semantic values assigned to sentences by semantic theories with the contents of our speech acts. The simplest possible relation would be identity; the meaning of a sentence is simply the belief expressed by an assertion of the sentence in a given context of utterance. However, a number of problem cases in the literature suggest that this cannot be the case. This dissertation offers a critical assessment of the arguments for distinguishing the semantic value of a sentence from its so-called assertoric content, focusing on problems arising from the analysis of tense and temporal expressions. I conclude that they are indeed distinct, and offer a constructive account of how they must be related in order to allow for an explanation of communicative success.​

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  • 2064.
    Packalén, Sara
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kan vi veta att vi inte är hjärnor i näringslösning?2012In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 33, no 2, p. 3-13Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 2065.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    A general argument against structured propositions2019In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 196, no 4, p. 1501-1528Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The standard argument against ordered tuples as propositions is that it is arbitrary what truth-conditions they should have. In this paper we generalize that argument. Firstly, we require that propositions have truth-conditions intrinsically. Secondly, we require strongly equivalent truth-conditions to be identical. Thirdly, we provide a formal framework, taken from Graph Theory, to characterize structure and structured objects in general. The argument in a nutshell is this: structured objects are too fine-grained to be identical to truth-conditions. Without identity, there is no privileged mapping from structured objects to truth-conditions, and hence structured objects do not have truth-conditions intrinsically. Therefore, propositions are not structured objects.

  • 2066.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    A Note on the Phenomenal Sorites2012In: Croatian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1333-1108, E-ISSN 1847-6139, Vol. 12, no 3, p. 519-524Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Is observational indiscriminability non-transitive? This was once an accepted truth, and it was used by philosophers like Armstrong and Dummett to argue against the existence of appearances (sense data, sensory items). It was objected, however, early on by Jackson and Pinkerton, and more recently by vagueness contextualists like Raffman and Fara, that the case for non-transitivity is flawed. The reason is the context dependence of appearance. I argue here that if we take context dependence properly into account, we still have (a modified version of) non-transitivity, and that therefore we still face the problem of appearances.

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  • 2067.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Assertion2016In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E-ISSN 1095-5054Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    An assertion is a speech act in which something is claimed to hold, for instance that there are infinitely many prime numbers, or, with respect to some time t, that there is a traffic congestion on Brooklyn Bridge at t, or, of some person x with respect to some time t, that x has a tooth ache at t. The concept of assertion has occupied a central place in the philosophy of language, since it is often thought that making assertions is the use of language most crucial to linguistic meaning. In recent years, by contrast, most of the interest in assertion has come from epistemology.

    The nature of assertion and its relation to other categories and phenomena have been subject to much controversy. Some of the ideas of assertion will be presented below. The article will situate assertion within speech act theory and pragmatics more generally, and then go on to present the current main accounts of assertion.[1]

    By an account of assertion is here meant a theory of what it consists in to make an assertion. According to such accounts, there are deep properties of assertion: specifying those properties is specifying what a speaker essentially does in making an assertion (e.g., express a belief). There must also be surface properties, which are the properties by which we can tell whether an utterance is an assertion, for instance that it is made by means of uttering a sentence in the indicative mood. Some accounts specify deep properties only, while others relate deep properties to surface properties, as we shall see.

  • 2068.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Assertion, inference, and consequence2012In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 187, no 3, p. 869-885Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper the informativeness account of assertion (Pagin in Assertion. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) is extended to account for inference. I characterize the conclusion of an inference as asserted conditionally on the assertion of the premises. This gives a notion of conditional assertion (distinct from the standard notion related to the affirmation of conditionals). Validity and logical validity of an inference is characterized in terms of the application of method that preserves informativeness, and contrasted with consequence and logical consequence, that is defined in terms of truth preservation. The proposed account is compared with that of Prawitz (Logica yearbook 2008. pp. 175-192. College Publications, London, 2009).

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  • 2069.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Assertion Not Possibly Social2009In: Journal of Pragmatics, ISSN 0378-2166, E-ISSN 1879-1387, Vol. 41, p. 2563-2567Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In his paper ‘Why assertion may yet be social’ (Pegan, this issue), Philip Pegan directs two main criticisms against my earlier paper ‘Is assertion social?’ (Pagin, 2004). I argued that what I called ‘‘social theories’’, are inadequate, and I suggested a method for generating counterexamples to them: types of utterance which are not assertions by intuitive standards, but which are assertion by the standards of those theories. Pegan’s first criticism is that I haven’t given an acceptable characterization of the class of social theories. His second criticism is that I have overlooked some alternatives, and that there are social theories that are not affected by my argument. In Section 1 I discuss the first, and in Section 2 the second.

  • 2070.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Belief Sentences and Compositionality. Notional Part2019In: Journal of Semantics, ISSN 0167-5133, E-ISSN 1477-4593, Vol. 36, no 2, p. 241-284Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper presents an account of notional belief attributions, that is, belief attributions where the belief content is fully specified. The proposal combines a Hintikka style possible-worlds semantics for the belief operator and a structured meanings approach for giving a structured mode of presentation of the belief content. The semantics is not standard compositional, but it satisfies a more general notion of compositionality, explained in the paper. This notion, general compositionality, allows semantic switching: the semantic function relevant for an embedded term is distinct from that which applies to the term in which it is embedded. The general relation between compositionality and hyperintensional contexts is discussed in detail. In the first section, it is argued that we need to combine structured and unstructured meanings.

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  • 2071.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Communication and the Complexity of Semantics2012In: Oxford Handbook of Compositionality / [ed] Wolfram Hinzen, Eduoard Machery, and Marcus Werning, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 1, p. 510-529Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I first argue that we have reason to look to the computational needs of communication for justifying the claim that natural language semantics is compositional. I then turn to discussing appropriate measures of computa- tional complexity. For the measure chosen I present arguments that maxi- mally efficient computational systems have a certain form. I argue that se- mantic functions of a certain more specific compositional kind can be com- puted by systems of that form. In this sense, they have minimal complexity. I finally discuss the converse question about the extent to which maximal efficiency mandates compositionality, and conclude that although it is not strictly required, there is reason to think that natural language semantics at least approximates a kind of semantics that is in one respect more specific than, and in another respect a generalization of, standard compositionality.

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  • 2072.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    COMPOSITIONALITY, COMPUTABILITY, AND COMPLEXITY2021In: The Review of Symbolic Logic, ISSN 1755-0203, E-ISSN 1755-0211, Vol. 14, no 3, p. 551-591Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper starts from the observation that the standard arguments for compositionality are really arguments for the computability of semantics. Since computability does not entail compositionality, the question of what justifies compositionality recurs. The paper then elaborates on the idea of recursive semantics as corresponding to computable semantics. It is then shown by means of time complexity theory and with the use of term rewriting as systems of semantic computation, that syntactically unrestricted, noncompositional recursive semantics leads to computational explosion (factorial complexity). Hence, with combinatorially unrestricted syntax, semantics with tractable time complexity is compositional.

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  • 2073.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Compositionality in Davidson's Early Work2019In: Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy, E-ISSN 2159-0303, Vol. 7, no 2, p. 76-89Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Davidson’s 1965 paper, “Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages”, has (at least almost) invariably been interpreted, by others and by myself, as arguing that natural languages must have a compositional semantics, or at least a systematic semantics, that can be finitely specified. However, in his reply to me in the Żegleń volume, Davidson denies that compositionality is in any need of an argument. How does this add up?

    In this paper I consider Davidson’s first three meaning theoretic papers from this perspective. I conclude that Davidson was right in his reply to me that he never took compositionality, or systematic semantics, to be in need of justification. What Davidson had been concerned with, clearly in the 1965 paper and in “Truth and Meaning” from 1967, and to some extent in his Carnap critique from 1963, is (i) that we need a general theory of natural language meaning, (ii) that such a theory should not be in conflict with the learnability of a language, and (iii) that such a theory bring out should how knowledge of a finite number of features of a language suffices for the understanding of all the sentences of that language.

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  • 2074.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Compositionality, Understanding, and Proofs2009In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 118, no 471, p. 713-737Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The principle of semantic compositionality, as Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore have emphasized, imposes constraints on theories of meaning that it is hard to meet with psychological or epistemic accounts. Here, I argue that this general tendency is exemplified in Michael Dummett’s account of meaning. On that account, the so-called manifestability requirement has the effect that the speaker who under- stands a sentence s must be able to tell whether or not s satisfies central semantic conditions. This requirement is not met by truth-conditional accounts of meaning. On Dummett’s view, it is met by a proof conditional account: understanding amounts to knowledge of what counts as a proof of a sentence. A speaker is supposed always to be capable of deciding whether or not a given object is a proof of a given sentence she understands. This requirement comes into conflict with composition- ality. If meaning is compositionally determined, then all you need for understand- ing a sentence is what you get from combining your understanding of the parts according to the mode of composition. But that knowledge is not always sufficient for recognizing any proof at all of a given sentence. Dummett’s proof-theoretic argument to the contrary is mistaken.

  • 2075.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Compositionality, Complexity, and Evolution2013In: Proceedings: Symposium on Language Acquisition and Language Evolution / [ed] Francisco Lacerda, Stockholm: Department of Linguistics, Stockholm University , 2013, 1, p. 51-62Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Is there a reason to believe that the evolution of language leads to compositional semantics? A proposal from Henry Brighton is presented and criticized. As an alternative, the role of compositionality for the complexity of semantic interpretation is emphasized.

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  • 2076.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Constructing the World and Locating Oneself2017In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology, ISSN 1878-5158, E-ISSN 1878-5166, Vol. 8, no 4, p. 827-852Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Our Knowledge of the Internal World, Robert Stalnaker describes two opposed perspectives on the relation between the internal and the external. According to one, the internal world is taken as given and the external world as problematic, and according to the other, the external world is taken as given and the internal world as problematic. Analytic philosophy moved from the former to the latter, from problems of world-construction to problems of self-locating beliefs. I argue in this paper that these problems are equivalent: both arise because experience and objective, external facts jointly underdetermine their relation. Both can be seen as a problem of expressive completeness; of the internal language in the former case, and of the non-indexical language in the second.

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  • 2077.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    De Se Communication: Centered or Uncentered?2016In: About oneself: De Se Thought and Communication / [ed] Manuel García-Carpintero, Stephan Torre, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 272-306Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It was pointed out, first by Robert Stalnaker, then also by Andy Egan, that David Lewis’s model of centered-worlds contents has undesired consequences for communication of de se contents. The recent years have seen a number of attempts to save the model by amending it to handle de se communication. Proposals include the appeal to sequences of individuals in the centers, to ersatz classical propositions, and to operations of “re-centering”. The authors are Dilip Ninan and Stephan Torre (sequences), Sarah Moss and Max Kölbel (ersatz), and Alan Gibbard and Clas Weber (re-centering). The present paper discusses these attempts. The conclusion is that they fail.

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  • 2078.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Enrichment, coherence, and quantifier properties2019In: Journal of Pragmatics, ISSN 0378-2166, E-ISSN 1879-1387, Vol. 154, p. 92-102Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Pagin 2014 I provided a new account of pragmatic enrichment. Building on the theory of coherence relations defended by Andrew Kehler, I proposed a four step scale of coherence strength. According to the account, free enrichment takes place, subject to constraints, when it raises the degree of coherence. It turned out that there is an intriguing interaction between coherence raising and determiner semantics: certain determiners license coherence raising while others tend to block them. In this paper I investigate the phenomenon. I try to identify the determiner properties that license coherence raising, and provide an explanation of why they do. 

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  • 2079.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Fusing Quantifiers and Connectives: is Intuitionistic Logic Different?2015In: Dag Prawitz on Proofs and Meaning / [ed] Heinrich Wansing, Cham: Springer, 2015, p. 259-280Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A paper by Dag Westerstahl and myself twenty years ago introduced operators that are both connectives and quantifiers. We introduced two binary operators that are classically interdefinable: one that fuses conjunction and existential quantification and one that fuses implication and universal quantification. We called the system PFO. A complete Gentzen-Prawitz style Natural Deduction axiomatization of classical PL was provided. For intuitionistic PL, however, it seemed that existential quantification should be fused with disjunction rather than with conjunction. Whether this was true, and if so why, were questions not answered at the time. Also, it seemed that there is no uniform definition of such a disjunctive-existential operator in classical PFO. This, too, remained a conjecture. In this paper, I return to these previously unresolved questions, and resolve them.

  • 2080.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University.
    Ideas for a theory of rules1987Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 2081.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Indeterminacy and the analytic/synthetic distinctions: a survey2008In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 164, p. 1-18Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is often assumed that there is a close connection between Quine’s criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction, in ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’ and onwards, and his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, in Word and Object and onwards. Often, the claim that the distinction is unsound (in some way or other) is taken to follow from the indeterminacy thesis, and sometimes the indeterminacy thesis is supported by such a claim. However, a careful scrutiny of the indeterminacy thesis as stated by Quine, and the varieties of the analytic/synthetic distinction, reveals that the two claims are mutually independent. Neither does the claim that the distinction is unsound follow from the indeterminacy thesis, nor that thesis from unsoundness claim, under any of the common interpretations of the analytic/synthetic distinction.

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  • 2082.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Indeterminacy of Translation2014In: A Companion to W.V.O. Quine / [ed] Gilbert Harman and Ernest Lepore, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014, 1, p. 236-262Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 2083.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Informativeness and Moore's Paradox2008In: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 68, no 1, p. 46-57Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is argued that a) non-intentional systems can exhibit what is intuitively reconizable as Moorean absurdity; b) that main-stream accounts of Moore's paradox cannot explain this; c) that an alternative account focused on informativeness (or information-giving) can explain it; d) that an account of assertoric force as prima facie informativeness is plausible; e) that the informativeness account of Moorean absurdity can explain standard examples of Moore's paradox in virtue of this theory of assertion.

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  • 2084.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Intending to be misinterpreted2015In: Organon F, ISSN 1335-0668, Vol. 22, p. 5-18Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In his paper 'Two Notions of Utterance Meaning', Petr Kot'atko criticises Davidson's conception of the relation between meaning and intention. He ascribes the following view (D) to Davidson: If S makes an utterance in order to perform a certain speech act, he intends and expects that act to be assigned to the utterance in A's interpretation. Kot'atko's objection to (D) is that a speaker can intend to be misinterpreted. The present paper discusses this objection. It is argued that Kot'atko's main example of such an intention fails. It is also argued that although there can be cases that would be adequately described as examples of intending to be misinterpreted, they are not of the kind needed for an objection against (D).

  • 2085.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Intersubjective intentional identity2014In: Empty representations: reference and non-existence / [ed] Manuel García-Carpintero, Genoveva Martí, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 1, p. 91-113Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Geach’s basic idea of intentional identity is reconsidered and the idea of a common focus is elaborated in possible-worlds terms. A distinction betweeen internalism and externalism about common focus is made; internalism is characterized by the idea that mental anaphora always succeeds in establishing common focus. It is then argued that internalism makes intersubjective intentional identity, as expressed in Geach sentences, impossible. Finally, a semantic account of Geach sentences is proposed, which can make them true on certain realist assumptions about possible worlds and possible objects.

  • 2086.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Intuitionism and the anti-justification of bivalence2008In: Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism — What has Become of Them?, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands , 2008, p. 221-236Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Dag Prawitz has argued (Prawitz 1998) that it is possible intuitionist- ically to prove the validity of ‘A → there is a proof of [A]’ by induction over formula complexity, provided we observe an ob ject language/meta- language distinction. In the present paper I mainly argue that if the ob ject language with its axioms and rules can be represented as a formal system, then the proof fails. I also argue that if this restriction is lifted, at each level of the language hierarchy, then the proof can go through, but at the expense of virtually reducing the concept of a proof to that of truth in a non-constructive sense.

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  • 2087.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Korta, Kepa; Perry, John, Critical Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 20112014In: Philosophical Review, ISSN 0031-8108, E-ISSN 1558-1470, Vol. 123, no 3, p. 371-374Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 2088.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Philosophy of Language, by Scott Soames. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 20102013In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 122, no 486, p. 589-593Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 2089.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Teoretisk filosofi.
    Pragmatic Composition?2007In: The World of Language and the World beyond Language: A Festschrift for Pavel Cmorej, Slovak Academy of Science , 2007, p. 11-26Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 2090.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pragmatic enrichment as coherence raising2014In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 168, no 1, p. 59-100Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns the phenomenon of pragmatic enrichment, and has a proposal for predicting the occurrence of such enrichments. The idea is that an enrichment of an expressed content c occurs as a means of strengthening the coherence between c and a salient given content c’ of the context, whether c’ is given in discourse, as sentence parts, or through perception. After enrichment, a stronger coherence relation is instantiated than before enrichment. An idea of a strength scale of types of coherence relations is proposed and applied.

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  • 2091.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Problems with norms of assertion2016In: Philosophy and phenomenological research, ISSN 0031-8205, E-ISSN 1933-1592, Vol. 93, no 1, p. 178-207Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper I draw attention to a number of problems that afflict norm accounts of assertion, i.e. accounts that explain what assertion is, and typically how speakers understand what assertion is, by appeal to a norm of assertion. I argue that the disagreements in the literature over norm selection undermines such an account of understanding. I also argue that the treatment of intuitions as evidence in the literature undermines much of the connection to empirical evidence. I further argue that appeals made to conversational patterns do not require the existence of any norms at all.

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  • 2092.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Propositional Content by Peter Hansk (Review)2019In: Language, ISSN 0097-8507, Vol. 95, no 2, p. 377-380Article, book review (Other academic)
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  • 2093.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Radical Interpretation and Pragmatic Enrichment2017In: Argumenta, ISSN 2465-2334, Vol. 3, no 1, p. 87-107Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I consider a problem from pragmatics for the radical interpretation project, relying on the principle of charity. If a speaker X in a context c manifests the attitude of holding a sentence s true, this might be because of believing, not the content of s in c, but what results from a pragmatic enrichment of that content. In this case, the connection between the holding-true attitude and the meaning of s might be too loose for charity to confirm the correct interpretation hypothesis. To solve this problem, I apply the coherence raising account of pragmatic enrichment developed in Pagin 2014. The result is that in upward entailing linguistic contexts, the enriched content entails the prior content, and so charity prevails: the speaker also believes the prior content. In downward entailing contexts this would not hold, but I argue that enrichments tend not to occur in downward entailing contexts.

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  • 2094.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Radical Interpretation and the Principle of Charity2013In: A Companion to Donald Davidson / [ed] Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, 1, p. 225-246Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Handbook article about Radical interpretation and the principle of charity in Donald Davidson's philosophy.

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  • 2095.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Cognitive Significance of Mental Files2013In: Disputatio, ISSN 0873-626X, E-ISSN 2182-2875, Vol. 5, no 36, p. 133-145Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper concerns Francois Recanatis Book Mental Files. It presents the main features of the mental files theory, and draws attention to some problematic features of the account of cognitive significance within the theory.

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  • 2096.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Tolerance and higher-order vagueness2017In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 194, no 10, p. 3727-3760Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The idea of higher-order vagueness is usually associated with conceptions of vagueness that focus on the existence of borderline cases. What sense can be made of it within a conception of vagueness that focuses on tolerance instead? A proposal is offered here. It involves understanding 'definitely' not as a sentence operator but as a predicate modifier, and more precisely as an intensifier, that is, an operator that shifts the predicate extension along a scale. This idea is combined with the author's earlier approach to the semantics of vague expressions, which builds on the idea of a central gap associated with a predicate. The central gap approach is generalized to handle arbitrarily many iterations of 'definitely'.

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  • 2097.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Truth Theories, Competence, and Semantic Computation2012In: Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental / [ed] Gerhard Preyer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 1, p. 49-75Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper discusses the question whether T-theories explain how it is possible to understand new sentences, or learn an infinite language, as Davidson claimed. I argue against some commentators that for explanatory power we need not require that T-theories are implicitly known or mirror cognitive structures. I note contra Davidson that the recursive nature of T-theories is not sufficient for explanatory power, since humans can work out only what is computationally tractable, and recursiveness by itself allows for intractable computational complexity. I finally consider the complexity of T-theories, transformed into term rewriting systems, and find that the complexity of such systems is indeed tractable. Therefore Davidson's claim stands, even though a further condition had to be met.

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  • 2098.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Vad är filosofi?2022In: Människan i Centrum: Nio Röster om Humaniora / [ed] Arne Jarrick, Görel Cavalli-Björkman och Kerstin Lidén, Karlstad, Sweden: Votum förlag , 2022, 1, p. 95-113Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    När jag ska säga något om vad filosofi är ser jag mig i första hand som en representant för akademiska filosofer. Men filosofi är inte bara teoretiskt sett en mycket bred disciplin, det är också ett ämne med olika teoretiska traditioner, vilka inte alltid dragit helt jämnt inbördes. Detta skapar vissa problem.

    Jag tillhör själv den analytiska traditionen, vilken är starkt förknippad med framväxten av den moderna logiken och det tillhörande intresset för semantiska och språkfilosofiska frågor. Den traditionen är ganska ung och räknar sin början till slutet av 1800-talet, även om den, precis som de flesta andra nutida alternativ, bygger vidare på en äldre tradition som går tillbaka till det antika Grekland. Bland alternativen kan i första hand nämnas den s k  kontinentala traditionen. Den analytiska och den kontinentala traditionen har en gemensam historia fram till och med Kant, men skiljer sig sedan åt. Förenklat kan sägas att den kontinentala traditionen, med Hegel, Fichte, Schelling och senare med Nietzsche, Husserl och Heidegger, samt Frankfurtskolan, gick i en antropologisk/socialfilosofisk/metafysisk riktning, medan den analytiska, med Bolzano som föregångare och senare Mill, Frege, Russell, Moore och Wienerkretsen, gick i en vetenskapsteoretisk/logisk/språkfilosofisk riktning.

    Det jag säger här nedan är avsett att gälla filosofi i största allmänhet, snarare än bara analytisk filosofi, men en del av det, särskilt när det gäller frågan om metoder, kommer att vara träffande i högre grad för den analytiska filosofin än för andra inriktningar. Man kan säga att det jag presenterar är filosofi, sett från ett analytisk-filosofiskt perspektiv.

    Denna text, liksom föredraget från hösten 2019 som det bygger på, är strukturerad efter de fyra frågor Arne Jarrick hade bett föredragshållarna svara på. 

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  • 2099.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Vagueness and central gaps2010In: Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, Its Nature and Its Logic / [ed] Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2010, p. 254-272Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Ordinary intuitions that vague predicates are tolerant, or cannot have sharp boundaries, can be formalized in first-order logic in at least two non-equivalent ways, a stronger and a weaker. The stronger turns out to be false in domains that have a significant central gap for the predicate in question, i.e. where a sufficiently large middle segment of the ordering relation (such as taller for ‘tall’) is uninstantiated. The weaker principle is true in such domains, but does not in those domains induce the sorites conclusion.

    This fact can be used for interpreting ordinary uses of vague expres- sions by means of a new kind of contextual quantifier domain restriction. A central segment is cut from the domain, if consistent with speaker in- tentions. As long as this is possible, tolerance, bivalence and consistency can all be retained.

    This paper focuses on the basic semantic properties in a model- theoretic setting. The natural language application is sketched and the nature of the approach briefly discussed.

  • 2100.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Vagueness and Domain Restriction2011In: Vagueness and Language Use / [ed] Paul Egré and Nathan Klinedinst, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 283-307Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper develops an idea of saving ordinary uses of vague predicates from the Sorites by means of domain restriction. A tolerance level for a pred- icate, along a dimension, is a difference with respect to which the predicate is semantically insensitive. A central gap for the predicate+dimension in a domain is a segment of an associated scale, larger than this difference, where no object in the domain has a measure, and such that the extension of the predicate has measures on one side of the gap and the anti-extension on the other. The domain restriction imposes a central gap.

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