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  • 251.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Agreement Maximization2011In: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences / [ed] Patrick Colm Hogan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 93-94Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 252.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Brief aus Schweden2013In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, ISSN 0012-1045, E-ISSN 2192-1482, Vol. 61, no 5/6, p. 823-826Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    This short text is part of a series of letters from philosophers working abroad. I write about what brought me to Sweden and about what philosophy and academic life are like there, including some reflections on language politics as well as on the situation of women in philosophy and in academia more generally

  • 253.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Charity, Principle of2011In: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences / [ed] Patrick Colm Hogan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 151-152Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 254.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Colors and the Content of Color Experience2012In: Croatian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1333-1108, E-ISSN 1847-6139, Vol. 12, no 36, p. 421-437Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 255.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Constancy in Variation: An Argument for Centering the Contents of Experience?2016In: About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication / [ed] Manuel García-Carpintero, Stephan Torre, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 56-85Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When you look at a circular plate at an angle, it looks circular. But there also is a certain sense in which its look can be described as oval. When you move, the plate’s look changes with your perspective on it—nevertheless, it continues to look circular. This chapter investigates whether these “constancy in variation” phenomena can be explained in terms of the representational content of visual experience, and whether constancy in variation provides special, phenomenological, reasons to construe experience as having centered contents. Concentrating on shape, it argues that due to warring phenomenological demands, all views construing constancy in variation as representation of both objective and perspectival properties or features have limited explanatory powers, and that centering does not provide any advantage. By contrast, adopting the non-standard intentionalism called phenomenal intentionalism, we get rather natural explanations of the phenomenology of constancy in variation.

  • 256.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Convention and Meaning2013In: A Companion to Donald Davidson / [ed] Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, p. 339-360Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 257.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Dana Riesenfeld: the Rei(g)n of 'Rule'2011In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Vol. Oct, no 11/10Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 258.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Does perceptual experience have propositional content?2011Other (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 259.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Donald Davidson: A Short Introduction2011Book (Refereed)
  • 260.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Donald Davidson: Bedeutung und Interpretation2010In: Klassiker der Philosophie heute / [ed] Ansgar Beckermann, Dominique Perler, Stuttgart: Reclam , 2010, 2., durchges. und erw. Aufl., p. 831-853Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 261.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Intentionalism, Defeasibility, and Justification2016In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 173, no 4, p. 1007-1030Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a mental state with representational content. When it comes to the epistemology of perception, it is only natural for the intentionalist to hold that the justificatory role of experience is at least in part a function of its content. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of intentionalism trying to hold on to this natural principle face what I call the “defeasibility problem”. This problem arises from the combination of standard intentionalism with further plausible principles governing the epistemology of perception: that experience provides defeasible justification for empirical belief, and that such justification is best construed as probabilification. After exploring some ways in which the standard intentionalist could deal with the defeasibility problem, I argue that the best option is to replace standard intentionalism by what I call “phenomenal intentionalism”. Where standard intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having the content p, phenomenal intentionalism construes (visual) experiences as of p as having “phenomenal” or “looks contents”: contents of the form Lp (it looks as if p).

  • 262.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Looks, Reasons, and Experiences2014In: Does Perception Have Content? / [ed] Berit Brogaard, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 76-102Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to the phenomenal belief account of perceptual experience I have suggested elsewhere, experience is a kind of belief. These beliefs have contents of a special form or type: While their objects are ordinary material objects, the properties they ascribe to these objects are 'phenomenal' properties, properties such as looking red or looking round. In this paper, I shall further develop this account by defending it against two objections: a) the objection that ultimately, no plausible epistemology can be built upon experiences with phenomenal contents. And b) the objection that phenomenal ‘looks’ is a propositional attitude operator and therefore cannot be used in specifying the content of experience. First, however, I shall argue that the intuitive inferential integration of experience into our system of beliefs provides one of the strongest motivations for construing experiences as having propositional content in the first place. The phenomenal belief account provides one good way of accommodating this inferential integration. Defending it thus is one way of defending the claim that experience indeed has propositional content.

  • 263.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Martin on the Semantics of 'Looks'2013In: Thought, ISSN 2161-2234, Vol. 1, no 4, p. 292-300Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A natural way of understanding (non-epistemic) looks talk in natural language is phenomenalist: to ascribe looks to objects is to say something about the way they strike us when we look at them. This explains why the truth values of looks-sentences intuitively vary with the circumstances with respect to which they are evaluated. But Mike Martin (2010) argues that there is no semantic reason to prefer a phenomenalist understanding of looks to “Parsimony”, the position according to which looks are basic visible properties. He suggests a semantics for looks-sentences that explains their intuitive truth values and is compatible with Parsimony. I argue that there is semantic reason to prefer a phenomenalist understanding of looks to a parsimonious one since there is a simpler semantics compatible with a phenomenalist understanding of looks, but not with Parsimony. This semantics provides a better explanation of the relevant truth value distribution

  • 264.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Passing Theories2011In: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences / [ed] Patrick Colm Hogan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 588-589Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 265.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Perception and Intermediaries2012In: Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental / [ed] Gerhard Preyer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 192-213Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 266.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Radical Interpretation2011In: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences / [ed] Patrick Colm Hogan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 697-699Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 267.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rule-Following and Charity: Wittgenstein and Davidson on Meaning Determination2017In: Wittgenstein and Davidson on Thought, Language, and Action / [ed] Claudine Verheggen, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 69-96Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The project of this chapter is to explore some relations between the rule-following considerations and radical interpretation. I spell out the sense in which the rule-following considerations are about meaning determination, and investigate whether the principle of meaning determination used in the early Davidson's account of meaning determination - the principle of charity - provides an answer to what I shall call "Wittgenstein's paradox". More precisely, I am interested in one aspect of the paradox: the "problem of objectivity". My question then is whether meaning, as determined by charity, is such that the correctness of the applications of meaningful expressions is an objective matter. After running us through the basics of the radical interpretation account of meaning determination I argue that the principle of charity does seem to fall prey to the problem of objectivity. After unsuccessfully trying to rescue objectivity by means of Lewisian natural properties, this is the verdict I in the end endorse.

  • 268.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Theories of Meaning and Truth Conditions2012In: The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language / [ed] Manuel García-Carpintero; Max Kölbel, London/New York: Continuum, 2012, p. 84-105Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 269.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Reply to Forbes2012In: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 72, no 2, p. 298-303Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In earlier work (Glüer, K. and P. Pagin. 2006. Proper names and relational modality. Linguistics & Philosophy 29: 507–35; Glüer, K. and P. Pagin. 2008. Relational modality. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17: 307–22), we developed a semantics for (metaphysical) modal operators that accommodates Kripkean intuitions about proper names in modal contexts even if names are not rigid designators. Graeme Forbes (2011. The problem of factives for sense theories. Analysis 71: 654–62.) criticizes our proposal. He argues that our semantics predicts readings for certain natural language sentences which these simply do not have. These sentences contain mixed contexts involving factive attitude verbs. We argue that the readings our semantics predicts do indeed exist, even if it might take a little work to bring them out. Moreover, denying their existence would have some rather unattractive consequences.

  • 270.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Aiming at Truth: On the Role of Belief2013In: Teorema, ISSN 0210-1602, Vol. 32, no 3, p. 137-162Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We explore the possibility of characterizing belief wholly in terms of its first-order functional role, its input (evidence) and output (further beliefs and actions), by addressing some common challenges to the view. One challenge concerns the fact that not all belief is evidence-sensitive. In response to this, normativists and teleo-functionalists have concluded that something over and above functional role is needed, a norm or a telos. We argue that both allow for implausibly much divergence between belief and evidence. Others have suggested that belief should be saved as the evidence-sensitive attitude, by making it share its motivational role with an hitherto unrecognized state: alief. We argue that the appeal to alief faces a dilemma: Either explanation of intentional action by means of alief is a species of intentional explanation, in which case it becomes hard to distinguish alief from (irrational) belief, or alief is sufficiently different from belief, but then neither the explanation nor the explanandum (action) are recognizably intentional any longer. We conclude that the most promising way forward is an account of belief that makes use of the full functional role of belief, including its role in theoretical reasoning.

  • 271.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Reasons for Belief and Normativity2017In: Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity / [ed] Daniel Star, Oxford University Press, 2017Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 272.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Truth Norm and Guidance: a Reply to Steglich-Petersen2010In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 119, no 475, p. 757-761Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We have claimed that truth norms cannot provide genuine guidance for belief formation (Glüer and Wikforss 2009, pp. 43–4). Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen argues that our ‘no guidance argument’ fails because it conflates certain psychological states an agent must have in order to apply the truth norm with the condition under which the norm prescribes forming certain beliefs. We spell out the no guidance argument in more detail and show that there is no such conflation.

  • 273.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Anmärkningar kring den omänskliga lyckan hos Aristoteles2006In: Aigis, ISSN 1901-6859, E-ISSN 1901-6859, Vol. 6, no 2 Supplement, p. 1-11Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 274.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Listening to Reason in Aristotle's Moral Psychology2007In: Oxford studies in ancient philosophy, ISSN 0265-7651, Vol. 32, p. 251-271Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 275.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Notes on Nicomachean ethics 1173a2–52016In: Classical Quarterly, ISSN 0009-8388, E-ISSN 1471-6844, Vol. 66, no 2, p. 484-490Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Nicomachean Ethics (= Eth. Nic.) 10.2, Aristotle addresses Eudoxus' argument that pleasure is the chief good in his characteristically dialectical manner. The argument is that pleasure is the chief good, since all creatures, rational (ἔλλογα) and non-rational (ἄλογα) alike, are perceived to aim at pleasure (1172b9–11). At 1172b35–1173a5, Aristotle turns to an objection against Eudoxus' argument. For some object (οἱ δ’ἐνιστάμενοι) to the argument by questioning one of its premisses, namely that what all creatures aim at is the good (1172b12–15). Instead, they claim that what all creatures aim at is not good (ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ’ ἐφίεται, 1172b36). This claim is reasonably taken to mean that not everything that all creatures aim at is good. But, as we shall shortly see, Aristotle dismisses it in a way suggesting a less charitable interpretation. At any rate, the significance of this objection is that it challenges the strong claim that what all creatures aim at is the good with an argument against the weaker claim that what all creatures aim at is good (or a good). For if the weaker claim is refuted, then the strong claim is refuted as well. Aristotle takes issue with the argument against the weaker claim, but without committing himself to the strong claim.

  • 276.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Paula Gottlieb: The Virtue of Aristotle’s Etics2009In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, Vol. 09, no 37, p. 1-6Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 277.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Plato on perceptual cognition2001Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of the study is to spell out and consider Plato' s views on perceptual cog­nition. It is argued that Plato is cornrnitted to the view that perceptual cognition can be rational, and that beliefs about the sensible world need not be confused or ill-founded. Plato' s interest in the matter arises from worries over the way in which his fore­runners and contemporaries conceived of perceptual cognition. They conceived of cognitive processes in terms of corporeal changes and attempted to explain perceptual cognition in causal terms. The problem with such accounts, according to Plato, is that they make perceptual cognition an entirely passive process, and seem incapable of accommodating the freedom of reason. Plato's main target is Protagoras' view on cognition and he accuses him of con­flating different cognitive phenomena that ought to be kept apart. More particularly, he suggests that Protagoras' 'man the measure' thesis is based on the conflation of sen se perception (aisthesis), belief (doxa) and appearing (phantasia), and that Protagoras is cornmitted to the view that beliefs are arrived at in a non-rational way. It is shown how Plato takes issue with Protagoras by disentangling these three cognitive phenomena. It is argued that Plato' s way of understanding these notions leaves room for the possibility that reason plays apart in perceptual cognition and that we arrive at beliefs in a rational way. In the course of spelling out the argument, Plato' s views on a number of topics are scrutinised: the perceptual mechanism; the objects of sense perception; perceptual content; the nature of belief; the eon trast between belief and appearing; the nation of reason.

  • 278.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Two kinds of belief in Plato2013In: Journal of the history of philosophy, ISSN 0022-5053, E-ISSN 1538-4586, Vol. 51, no 1, p. 1-19Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this paper is to clarify a distinction between two kinds of belief in Plato’s Theaetetus and the Sophist. In the Sophist, Plato distinguishes between phantasia, which occurs “through sense perception,” and doxa, which occurs “according to thinking.” What distinguishes these two kinds of belief is the believer’s understanding of the thing the belief is about, as a result of the way in which each kind of belief is formed. A doxa is formed through a particular kind of thinking, and the person having it grasps the nature of the thing. A phantasia, by contrast, is formed through sense perception, and the person having it grasps the mere appearance of the thing. 

  • 279.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Why is Aristotle’s vicious person miserable?2015In: The Quest for the Good Life: Ancient Philosophers on Happiness / [ed] Øyvind Rabbås, Eyjólfur K. Emilsson, Hallvard Fossheim, Miira Tuominen, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 146-163Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The question raised in this chapter is why Aristotle portrays the bad person as being in a miserable state. It is argued that the bad person suffers from a mental conflict, which consists of a clash between two different kinds of desire, and that fulfilling one of the desires violates values that she also desires. But in contrast to the akratic person, the bad person has no proper conception of the good. Nevertheless, although the bad person may succeed in achieving what she thinks is good, she feels miserable not only on account of failing to fulfil her desire for the truly good life, but also on account of doing things that she finds degrading for her.

  • 280.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wish, Motivation and the Human Good in Aristotle2015In: Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy, ISSN 0031-8868, E-ISSN 1568-5284, Vol. 60, no 1, p. 60-87Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Aristotle invokes a specifically human desire, namely wish (boulesis), to provide a teleological explanation of the pursuit of the specifically human good in terms of virtuous activity. Wish is a basic, unreasoned desire which, independently of other desires, or evaluative attitudes, motivates the pursuit of the human good. Even a person who pursues what she mistakenly believes to be good is motivated by wish for what in fact is good, although she is oblivious of it.

  • 281.
    Gunnarsson, Karin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Centre for Teaching and Learning in the Humanities (CeHum).
    ‘Becoming healthy’: An intra-active investigation of a program in the apparatus of health promotion in Swedish schools.2012Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper takes its point of departure in the work on my PhD thesis. The topic for the thesis is the apparatus of health promotion in Swedish schools, and more specific one manual-based program within this framework. The program is based on cognitive behavioral therapy and directed to girls in eighth grade. The aim of my thesis is to investigate what phenomena are produced in the intra-action of discursive, material and technological processes within the practice of the program and entangled components.

     

    The theoretical point of departure will be located in the conversation between Barad and Haraway. Providing an onto-epistemological framework to investigate how the iterative intra-action of agential components produces specific becomings. This also includes a notion of performativity where complex interweaving of power-relations stabilizes and destabilizes differential boundaries.

     

    The intra-active investigation will be conducted through an analysis of diffraction focusing on how different bodies are enacting ‘becomings with’ in the intra-action of human and non-human, constantly relational, constantly transforming. Trying to transgress the borders of self, other, bodies, health and pedagogical work in the constant reconfigure of the spacetimemattering.

  • 282.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Bemerkninger om Cavell og Austin2008In: Agora: Journal for metafysisk spekulation, ISSN 0800-7136, Vol. 26, no 1-2, p. 49-65Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 283.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Filosofin genom tiderna: 1900-talet. Före 19502010Collection (editor) (Other academic)
  • 284.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kan man låtsas vara vaken?2008In: Tankar tillägnade Sören Stenlund, 2008, p. 251-260Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 285.
    Hallengren, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Literature and History of Ideas.
    A hermeneutic key to the title Leaves of Grass2013In: Philosophy, Literature, Mysticism: An Anthology of essays on the thought and influence of Emanuel Swedenborg / [ed] Stephen McNeilly, London: The Swedenborg Society , 2013, 1, p. 233-250Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Examines the Swedenborg-Emerson-Whitman connection and especially the more direct Swedenborg-Whitman relation, tracking Whitman's striking comments on Swedenborg and suggesting that the poetic language of Leaves of Grass may partly reflect the doctrine of correspondences. Read in terms of current contemporary hermeneutics the title means "Truths of what is alive in man". 

  • 286.
    Hallengren, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Literature and History of Ideas.
    Dynamics of Absolute Value2002In: Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Studies Association: The Bahamas 27th, May 27–June 1st, 2002. CSA CD. ASOCIACIÓN DE ESTUDIOS DEL CARIBE, San Germán, Puerto Rico: CSA/Asociación de estudios del Caribe , 2002Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 287.
    Hallengren, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Literature and History of Ideas.
    Law, Liberation, and Human Rights: Emerson and the Radical Yankee Debt to English Lawyers2006Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    After the Civil War, in 1866, Ralph Waldo Emerson received the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws from Harvard. Nearly thirty years after his address on the American Scholar, he appeared for the second time as the orator at Phi Beta Kappa, once again preaching his liberal ideals, praising and presenting the correspondence between the material and the spiritual, and the common centrality of the physical and the ethical worlds. But Emerson's philosophy of law had become intermingled with a jurisprudential idea of natural law and natural rights in his later conception of the “higher law”. Emerson could never forgive the diplomatic Unionist Daniel Webster, for having helped to pass the Fugitive Slave Law. The main fault with Senator Webster was, according to both Emerson and Theodore Parker, that he lacked faith in the “higher law”. Webster refuted that notion, which was reckoned as a good joke at some courts. In his argument against the Fugitive Slave Law in 1851, Emerson referred to the Higher Law and to the Bible, when he stated that immoral laws are void. His approach was explicitly juridical, however. The “great jurists, Cicero, Grotius, Coke, Blackstone, Burlamaqui, Vattel, Burke, Mackintosh, Jefferson, do all affirm this”, namely, that no human laws are of any validity, if they violate the law of Nature, among whose principles are, according to Blackstone, “that we should live on, should hurt nobody, and should render unto every one his due”. We are “bound to transgress” such a human law; or else we must offend “both the natural and the divine.” It is not only contrary to “the laws of God”. Natural laws of the human mind, and of human existence — laws of our existential and social nature — are violated.

    Hugo Grotius, and after him Samuel Pufendorf, developed a theory of international legislation based upon “natural law”. The rules of the human reason are, according to Grotius and Pufendorf, as immutable as the laws of the universe: they are but expressions of the same force. Their ideas paved the way for clearing the law concept from theology in an age when higher mathematics was developed and cosmic laws were discovered by Kepler and Newton. Not even to God it is granted to upset infinitesimal calculus. The new idea of “natural rights”, but also Deism and Determinism, would accordingly follow. Grotius, however, did not think that an equal certainty can be found in ethics and in mathematics. His successor Pufendorf did, and John Locke, the foremost spokesman of natural rights, preferred the latter. Emerson does not refer to Pufendorf or to Locke in his argument. But he does refer to Grotius. He is cited in the early lectures, even in the sermons. He hardly ever read him, however.

    From the good authority of his extant notebooks, Emerson's most important sources can be determined with certainty. From excerpts written late in 1850, we can see that he drew heavily for his statement from William Blackstone's influential Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765). Emerson used a New York edition, printed in 1843. He also used John Lord Campbell's recent The Lives of the Chief Justices of England (1849). Emerson's quotations from Blackstone in the Fugitive Slave Law Address, are from the Commentaries. In both works Emerson met with the standpoint taken by Edward Coke (1552-1634), who attracted Emerson as much as the views of Blackstone did. Of special importance to Emerson, was the event of November 10, 1608, when the judges and the Exchequer Barons in England accused — and tried — James I at Hampton Court. Emerson copies the King's words from Baron Campbell: “King James said to Coke C[hief] J[ustice:] ‘My lord, I always thought, & by my soul I have often heard the boast that your English law was founded upon reason. If that be so, why have not I & others reason, as well as judges?’” The King maintained his sovereignty. Why should he be under the law? Coke answered that God and Law are sovereign, that the law does command the King. Emerson knew Coke's reply to His Majesty, in Archbishop Bracton's words, by heart. It is still visible in the golden motto above the portal at Harvard Law School, marking the ideological abode of the doctor of laws. Coke replied: Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege. Indeed, the divine right of kings died when Charles I was beheaded in 1649. The English jurists also inspired the revolt of the colonies against British rule, the reign of George III. In America, Law became King.

  • 288.
    Hallengren, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Literature and History of Ideas.
    Optimism & Pessimism: Föredrag inför Stockholms Humanistiska Förbund 13 maj 19921992 (ed. 1)Book (Other academic)
  • 289.
    Hallengren, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Literature and History of Ideas.
    Race and Caste: Subjugation, Serfdom, Slavery1998Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 290.
    Hallengren, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Literature and History of Ideas.
    Towards an Interpretation of Reality: Laws of Life and the Language of Nature2009In: Things Heard and Seen, no 28 (Spring), p. 10-13Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 291.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Metasemantics out of Economics?2015In: Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome / [ed] Andrew Reisner and Iwao Hirose, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 52-60Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 292.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. The Swedish Collegium for Advanced Studies, Sweden.
    Moral Supervenience2018In: Canadian journal of philosophy, ISSN 0045-5091, E-ISSN 1911-0820, Vol. 48, no 3-4, p. 592-615Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is widely held, even among nonnaturalists, that the moral supervenes on the natural. This is to say that for any two metaphysically possible worlds w and w′, and for any entities x in w and y in w′, any isomorphism between x and y that preserves the natural properties preserves the moral properties. In this paper, I put forward a conceivability argument against moral supervenience, assuming non-naturalism. First, I argue that though utilitarianism may be true, and the trolley driver is permitted to kill the one to save the five, there is a conceivable scenario that is just like our world in all natural respects, yet at which deontology is true, and the trolly driver is not permitted to kill the one to save the five. I then argue that in the special case of morality, it is possible to infer from the conceivability of such a scenario to its possibility. It follows that supervenience is false.

  • 293.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. SCAS.
    The limits of expressivism2015In: Meaning without representation: essays on truth, expression, normativity, and naturalism / [ed] Stephen Gross, Nicholas Tebben, Michael Williams, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 224-244Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In his recent book, Meaning and Normativity, Allan Gibbard argues at length that the concept of meaning is normative, and that his own brand of expressivism can be applied in the semantic and intentional domain. In this paper, I  argue that the extension of expressivism to semantic discourse is unprofitable and—worse still—in a certain sense self-undermining. It is unprofitable because it sheds no light on the problem of intentionality; undermines itself because many of the sentences that make up the expressivist’s theory are semantic sentences, and if these are understood to express non-cognitive attitudes of some kind, the expressivist’s explanations are spurious.

  • 294.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Normativity of Meaning2017In: A Companion to the Philosophy of Language / [ed] Bob Hale, Crispin Wright, Alexander Miller, Wiley-Blackwell, 2017, 2, p. 649-669Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 295.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Rules of Thought By Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis2016In: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 76, no 3, p. 393-397Article, book review (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The Rules of Thought , by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin Jarvis (henceforth IJ), is a dense and ambitious book whose principal aim is to defend the view that philosophical inquiry is a priori inquiry into essential natures. The book covers a broad range of philosophical issues spanning the philosophy of mind and language, the epistemology of metaphysical modality and the philosophy of philosophy. It will be of considerable interest to many, since there is something in it for just about everyone. That said, the authors do not do as much as one might like to make their views accessible to the uninitiated or convincing to the unconverted.

  • 296.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Bayne, Tim
    Manchester University.
    Belief and Its Bedfellows2013In: New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure / [ed] Nikolaj Nottelmann, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 124-144Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 297. Helms McCarty, Sara
    et al.
    Angner, Erik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Scott, Brian
    Culver, Sarah
    Mandated volunteering: an experimental approach2018In: Applied Economics, ISSN 0003-6846, E-ISSN 1466-4283, Vol. 50, no 27, p. 2992-3006Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This study employs a novel experimental paradigm to examine crowdout effects in volunteering. Using a framework modelled upon money donation experiments, we examine the impact of ‘forced’ volunteering on the amount of time volunteered. We find that subjects exposed to forced volunteering on the mean voluntarily donate less time than subjects in the control condition. Among religious subjects, the crowdout is 52.8%, suggesting warm-glow giving. Among non-religious subjects, the crowdout is 138%, implying altruistic giving. Thus, policies mandating volunteer activity may be associated with sizeable crowdout effects and might have heterogeneous effects across subpopulations.

  • 298.
    Hendry, Robin Findlay
    et al.
    Univ Durham, Durham , England.
    Needham, Paul
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Woody, Andrea I.
    Univ Washington, Seattle, USA.
    Handbook of the Philosophy of Science Volume 6 Philosophy of Chemistry INTRODUCTION2012In: Philosophy of Chemistry, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2012, p. 3-18Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 299. Hirose, Iwao
    et al.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Introduction to Value Theory2015In: The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory / [ed] Iwao Hirose, Jonas Olson, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 1-9Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 300. Hirose, Iwao
    et al.
    Olson, JonasStockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory2015Collection (editor) (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Value theory, or axiology, looks at what things are good or bad, how good or bad they are, and, most fundamentally, what it is for a thing to be good or bad. Questions about value and about what is valuable are important to moral philosophers, since most moral theories hold that we ought to promote the good (even if this is not the only thing we ought to do). This Handbook focuses on value theory as it pertains to ethics, broadly construed, and provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary debates pertaining not only to philosophy but also to other disciplines-most notably, political theory and economics.

    The Handbook's twenty-two newly commissioned chapters are divided into three parts. Part I: Foundations concerns fundamental and interrelated issues about the nature of value and distinctions between kinds of value. Part II: Structure concerns formal properties of value that bear on the possibilities of measuring and comparing value. Part III: Extensions, finally, considers specific topics, ranging from health to freedom, where questions of value figure prominently.

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