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  • 251.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Paula Gottlieb: The Virtue of Aristotle’s Etics2009In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, Vol. 09, no 37, 1-6 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 252.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Plato on perceptual cognition2001Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of the study is to spell out and consider Plato' s views on perceptual cog­nition. It is argued that Plato is cornrnitted to the view that perceptual cognition can be rational, and that beliefs about the sensible world need not be confused or ill-founded. Plato' s interest in the matter arises from worries over the way in which his fore­runners and contemporaries conceived of perceptual cognition. They conceived of cognitive processes in terms of corporeal changes and attempted to explain perceptual cognition in causal terms. The problem with such accounts, according to Plato, is that they make perceptual cognition an entirely passive process, and seem incapable of accommodating the freedom of reason. Plato's main target is Protagoras' view on cognition and he accuses him of con­flating different cognitive phenomena that ought to be kept apart. More particularly, he suggests that Protagoras' 'man the measure' thesis is based on the conflation of sen se perception (aisthesis), belief (doxa) and appearing (phantasia), and that Protagoras is cornmitted to the view that beliefs are arrived at in a non-rational way. It is shown how Plato takes issue with Protagoras by disentangling these three cognitive phenomena. It is argued that Plato' s way of understanding these notions leaves room for the possibility that reason plays apart in perceptual cognition and that we arrive at beliefs in a rational way. In the course of spelling out the argument, Plato' s views on a number of topics are scrutinised: the perceptual mechanism; the objects of sense perception; perceptual content; the nature of belief; the eon trast between belief and appearing; the nation of reason.

  • 253.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Two kinds of belief in Plato2013In: Journal of the history of philosophy, ISSN 0022-5053, E-ISSN 1538-4586, Vol. 51, no 1, 1-19 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this paper is to clarify a distinction between two kinds of belief in Plato’s Theaetetus and the Sophist. In the Sophist, Plato distinguishes between phantasia, which occurs “through sense perception,” and doxa, which occurs “according to thinking.” What distinguishes these two kinds of belief is the believer’s understanding of the thing the belief is about, as a result of the way in which each kind of belief is formed. A doxa is formed through a particular kind of thinking, and the person having it grasps the nature of the thing. A phantasia, by contrast, is formed through sense perception, and the person having it grasps the mere appearance of the thing. 

  • 254.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Why is Aristotle’s vicious person miserable?2015In: The Quest for the Good Life: Ancient Philosophers on Happiness / [ed] Øyvind Rabbås, Eyjólfur K. Emilsson, Hallvard Fossheim, Miira Tuominen, Oxford University Press, 2015, 146-163 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The question raised in this chapter is why Aristotle portrays the bad person as being in a miserable state. It is argued that the bad person suffers from a mental conflict, which consists of a clash between two different kinds of desire, and that fulfilling one of the desires violates values that she also desires. But in contrast to the akratic person, the bad person has no proper conception of the good. Nevertheless, although the bad person may succeed in achieving what she thinks is good, she feels miserable not only on account of failing to fulfil her desire for the truly good life, but also on account of doing things that she finds degrading for her.

  • 255.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wish, Motivation and the Human Good in Aristotle2015In: Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy, ISSN 0031-8868, E-ISSN 1568-5284, Vol. 60, no 1, 60-87 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Aristotle invokes a specifically human desire, namely wish (boulesis), to provide a teleological explanation of the pursuit of the specifically human good in terms of virtuous activity. Wish is a basic, unreasoned desire which, independently of other desires, or evaluative attitudes, motivates the pursuit of the human good. Even a person who pursues what she mistakenly believes to be good is motivated by wish for what in fact is good, although she is oblivious of it.

  • 256.
    Gunnarsson, Karin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Centre for Teaching and Learning in the Humanities (CeHum).
    ‘Becoming healthy’: An intra-active investigation of a program in the apparatus of health promotion in Swedish schools.2012Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper takes its point of departure in the work on my PhD thesis. The topic for the thesis is the apparatus of health promotion in Swedish schools, and more specific one manual-based program within this framework. The program is based on cognitive behavioral therapy and directed to girls in eighth grade. The aim of my thesis is to investigate what phenomena are produced in the intra-action of discursive, material and technological processes within the practice of the program and entangled components.

     

    The theoretical point of departure will be located in the conversation between Barad and Haraway. Providing an onto-epistemological framework to investigate how the iterative intra-action of agential components produces specific becomings. This also includes a notion of performativity where complex interweaving of power-relations stabilizes and destabilizes differential boundaries.

     

    The intra-active investigation will be conducted through an analysis of diffraction focusing on how different bodies are enacting ‘becomings with’ in the intra-action of human and non-human, constantly relational, constantly transforming. Trying to transgress the borders of self, other, bodies, health and pedagogical work in the constant reconfigure of the spacetimemattering.

  • 257.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Bemerkninger om Cavell og Austin2008In: Agora: Journal for metafysisk spekulation, ISSN 0800-7136, Vol. 26, no 1-2, 49-65 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 258.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Filosofin genom tiderna: 1900-talet. Före 19502010Collection (editor) (Other academic)
  • 259.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kan man låtsas vara vaken?2008In: Tankar tillägnade Sören Stenlund, 2008, 251-260 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 260.
    Hallengren, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Literature and History of Ideas.
    A hermeneutic key to the title Leaves of Grass2013In: Philosophy, Literature, Mysticism: An Anthology of essays on the thought and influence of Emanuel Swedenborg / [ed] Stephen McNeilly, London: The Swedenborg Society , 2013, 1, 233-250 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Examines the Swedenborg-Emerson-Whitman connection and especially the more direct Swedenborg-Whitman relation, tracking Whitman's striking comments on Swedenborg and suggesting that the poetic language of Leaves of Grass may partly reflect the doctrine of correspondences. Read in terms of current contemporary hermeneutics the title means "Truths of what is alive in man". 

  • 261.
    Hallengren, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Literature and History of Ideas.
    Dynamics of Absolute Value2002In: Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Studies Association: The Bahamas 27th, May 27–June 1st, 2002. CSA CD. ASOCIACIÓN DE ESTUDIOS DEL CARIBE, San Germán, Puerto Rico: CSA/Asociación de estudios del Caribe , 2002Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 262.
    Hallengren, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Literature and History of Ideas.
    Law, Liberation, and Human Rights: Emerson and the Radical Yankee Debt to English Lawyers2006Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    After the Civil War, in 1866, Ralph Waldo Emerson received the honorary degree of Doctor of Laws from Harvard. Nearly thirty years after his address on the American Scholar, he appeared for the second time as the orator at Phi Beta Kappa, once again preaching his liberal ideals, praising and presenting the correspondence between the material and the spiritual, and the common centrality of the physical and the ethical worlds. But Emerson's philosophy of law had become intermingled with a jurisprudential idea of natural law and natural rights in his later conception of the “higher law”. Emerson could never forgive the diplomatic Unionist Daniel Webster, for having helped to pass the Fugitive Slave Law. The main fault with Senator Webster was, according to both Emerson and Theodore Parker, that he lacked faith in the “higher law”. Webster refuted that notion, which was reckoned as a good joke at some courts. In his argument against the Fugitive Slave Law in 1851, Emerson referred to the Higher Law and to the Bible, when he stated that immoral laws are void. His approach was explicitly juridical, however. The “great jurists, Cicero, Grotius, Coke, Blackstone, Burlamaqui, Vattel, Burke, Mackintosh, Jefferson, do all affirm this”, namely, that no human laws are of any validity, if they violate the law of Nature, among whose principles are, according to Blackstone, “that we should live on, should hurt nobody, and should render unto every one his due”. We are “bound to transgress” such a human law; or else we must offend “both the natural and the divine.” It is not only contrary to “the laws of God”. Natural laws of the human mind, and of human existence — laws of our existential and social nature — are violated.

    Hugo Grotius, and after him Samuel Pufendorf, developed a theory of international legislation based upon “natural law”. The rules of the human reason are, according to Grotius and Pufendorf, as immutable as the laws of the universe: they are but expressions of the same force. Their ideas paved the way for clearing the law concept from theology in an age when higher mathematics was developed and cosmic laws were discovered by Kepler and Newton. Not even to God it is granted to upset infinitesimal calculus. The new idea of “natural rights”, but also Deism and Determinism, would accordingly follow. Grotius, however, did not think that an equal certainty can be found in ethics and in mathematics. His successor Pufendorf did, and John Locke, the foremost spokesman of natural rights, preferred the latter. Emerson does not refer to Pufendorf or to Locke in his argument. But he does refer to Grotius. He is cited in the early lectures, even in the sermons. He hardly ever read him, however.

    From the good authority of his extant notebooks, Emerson's most important sources can be determined with certainty. From excerpts written late in 1850, we can see that he drew heavily for his statement from William Blackstone's influential Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765). Emerson used a New York edition, printed in 1843. He also used John Lord Campbell's recent The Lives of the Chief Justices of England (1849). Emerson's quotations from Blackstone in the Fugitive Slave Law Address, are from the Commentaries. In both works Emerson met with the standpoint taken by Edward Coke (1552-1634), who attracted Emerson as much as the views of Blackstone did. Of special importance to Emerson, was the event of November 10, 1608, when the judges and the Exchequer Barons in England accused — and tried — James I at Hampton Court. Emerson copies the King's words from Baron Campbell: “King James said to Coke C[hief] J[ustice:] ‘My lord, I always thought, & by my soul I have often heard the boast that your English law was founded upon reason. If that be so, why have not I & others reason, as well as judges?’” The King maintained his sovereignty. Why should he be under the law? Coke answered that God and Law are sovereign, that the law does command the King. Emerson knew Coke's reply to His Majesty, in Archbishop Bracton's words, by heart. It is still visible in the golden motto above the portal at Harvard Law School, marking the ideological abode of the doctor of laws. Coke replied: Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege. Indeed, the divine right of kings died when Charles I was beheaded in 1649. The English jurists also inspired the revolt of the colonies against British rule, the reign of George III. In America, Law became King.

  • 263.
    Hallengren, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Literature and History of Ideas.
    Optimism & Pessimism: Föredrag inför Stockholms Humanistiska Förbund 13 maj 19921992 (ed. 1)Book (Other academic)
  • 264.
    Hallengren, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Literature and History of Ideas.
    Race and Caste: Subjugation, Serfdom, Slavery1998Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 265.
    Hallengren, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Literature and History of Ideas.
    Towards an Interpretation of Reality: Laws of Life and the Language of Nature2009In: Things Heard and Seen, no 28 (Spring), 10-13 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 266.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Metasemantics out of Economics?2015In: Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome / [ed] Andrew Reisner and Iwao Hirose, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 52-60 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 267.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. SCAS.
    The limits of expressivism2015In: Meaning without representation: essays on truth, expression, normativity, and naturalism / [ed] Stephen Gross, Nicholas Tebben, Michael Williams, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, 224-244 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In his recent book, Meaning and Normativity, Allan Gibbard argues at length that the concept of meaning is normative, and that his own brand of expressivism can be applied in the semantic and intentional domain. In this paper, I  argue that the extension of expressivism to semantic discourse is unprofitable and—worse still—in a certain sense self-undermining. It is unprofitable because it sheds no light on the problem of intentionality; undermines itself because many of the sentences that make up the expressivist’s theory are semantic sentences, and if these are understood to express non-cognitive attitudes of some kind, the expressivist’s explanations are spurious.

  • 268.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Rules of Thought By Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin W. Jarvis2016In: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 76, no 3, 393-397 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The Rules of Thought , by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Benjamin Jarvis (henceforth IJ), is a dense and ambitious book whose principal aim is to defend the view that philosophical inquiry is a priori inquiry into essential natures. The book covers a broad range of philosophical issues spanning the philosophy of mind and language, the epistemology of metaphysical modality and the philosophy of philosophy. It will be of considerable interest to many, since there is something in it for just about everyone. That said, the authors do not do as much as one might like to make their views accessible to the uninitiated or convincing to the unconverted.

  • 269.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Bayne, Tim
    Manchester University.
    Belief and Its Bedfellows2013In: New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure / [ed] Nikolaj Nottelmann, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, 124-144 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 270.
    Hendry, Robin Findlay
    et al.
    Univ Durham, Durham , England.
    Needham, Paul
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Woody, Andrea I.
    Univ Washington, Seattle, USA.
    Handbook of the Philosophy of Science Volume 6 Philosophy of Chemistry INTRODUCTION2012In: Philosophy of Chemistry, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2012, 3-18 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 271. Hirose, Iwao
    et al.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Introduction to Value Theory2015In: The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory / [ed] Iwao Hirose, Jonas Olson, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, 1-9 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 272. Hirose, Iwao
    et al.
    Olson, JonasStockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory2015Collection (editor) (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Value theory, or axiology, looks at what things are good or bad, how good or bad they are, and, most fundamentally, what it is for a thing to be good or bad. Questions about value and about what is valuable are important to moral philosophers, since most moral theories hold that we ought to promote the good (even if this is not the only thing we ought to do). This Handbook focuses on value theory as it pertains to ethics, broadly construed, and provides a comprehensive overview of contemporary debates pertaining not only to philosophy but also to other disciplines-most notably, political theory and economics.

    The Handbook's twenty-two newly commissioned chapters are divided into three parts. Part I: Foundations concerns fundamental and interrelated issues about the nature of value and distinctions between kinds of value. Part II: Structure concerns formal properties of value that bear on the possibilities of measuring and comparing value. Part III: Extensions, finally, considers specific topics, ranging from health to freedom, where questions of value figure prominently.

  • 273.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    A Model for Thought Experiments2009In: Canadian journal of philosophy, ISSN 0045-5091, E-ISSN 1911-0820, Vol. 39, no 1, 55-76 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 274.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Modal Knowledge and the Form of Thought Experiments2009In: The A Priori and Its Role in Philosophy / [ed] Nikola Kompa, Christian Nimtz, Christian Suhm, Paderborn: Mentis Verlag GmbH, 2009, 53-68 p.Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 275.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Recension av S. Holst, Tankar som ändrar allt2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 1Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 276.
    Häggqvist, Sören
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Cohnitz, Daniel
    Department of Philosophy, University of Tartu.
    The Role of Intuitions in Philosophy2009In: Studia Philosophica (Tartu), ISSN 1406-0000, Vol. 2, no 2, 1-14 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 277.
    Hållsten, Henrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Explanation and deduction: a defence of deductive chauvinism2001Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this essay I defend the notion of deductive explanation mainly against two types of putative counterexamples: those found in genuinely indeterministic systems and those found in complex dynamic systems. Using Railton's notions of explanatory information and ideal explanatory text, deductivism is defended in an indeterministic setting. Furthermore, an argument against non-deductivism that hinges on peculiarities of probabilistic causality is presented. The use of the notion of an ideal explanatory text gives rise to problems in accounting for explanations in complex dynamic systems, regardless of whether they are deterministic or not. These problems are considered in the essay and a solution is suggested. This solution forces the deductivist to abandon the requirement that an explanation consists of a deductive argument, but it is argued that the core of deductivism is saved in so far as we, for full explanations, can still adhere to the fundamental requirement:

    If A explains B, then A is inconsistent with anything inconsistent with B.

  • 278.
    Ingelström, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Nytta och fallgropar med statistik2016In: Kritiskt tänkande: i teori och praktik / [ed] Elin Sporrong, Karin Westin Tikkanen, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2016, 139-154 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Statistik beskriver världen med siffror. I vår digitaliserade tid produceras mer sifferbaserad information än någonsin, och med hjälp av statistik kan vi beskriva och förenkla komplexiteten i den informationen. Men statistik kan också användas vilseledande, och förenklingarna kan bli alltför grova. Utmaningen är att undvika fallgroparna. I det här kapitlet beskrivs vad statistik är och hur statistiska påståenden ska förstås. Kapitlet ger en kortfattad och lättsam introduktion till statistika metoder och begrepp. Grundläggande förståelse av statistik behövs för att kunna förhålla sig sunt kritisk gentemot den omfattande mängd statistisk information som når oss i samhället. Fokus ligger på de övergripande granskande frågornas om vi alla behöver kunna ställa, inte på tekniska detaljer och metoder för statistikproduktion.

  • 279.
    Ingelström, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Recension av Kort om yttrandefrihet av Nigel Warburton: Ett alltför förenklat försvar av yttrandefriheten2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 4Article, book review (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Som introduktion till faktiska debatter om politisk yttrandefriheten är det här en bra bok. Som introduktion till värdet av yttrandefrihet lämnar den en hel del att önska.

  • 280.
    Ingelström, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Vetenskaplighet2016In: Kritiskt tänkande: i teori och praktik / [ed] Elin Sporrong, Karin Westin Tikkanen, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2016, 111-138 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Vetenskaplig kunskap angår oss alla. Även utanför forskarvärlden använder vi oss dagligen av kunskap om hur världen fungerar. Såväl politiker som resonerar kring samhällsomfattande beslut som föräldrar som funderar hur de bäst ska ta hand om sina barn, förlitar sig på en uppfattning av vad verkligheten består av och hur saker och ting hänger samman. När vi agerar i världen utgår vi från teorier om hur världen fungerar. En teori kan sägas vara en grundläggandeberättelse, en berättelse som ger svar på frågor om varför och hur. Berättelser kommer i många former. Vetenskapen söker de riktiga berättelserna ,de som ger oss korrekta förklaringar. I detta kapitel beskriver vi de vetenskapliga berättelserna och klargör vad de består av. Vetenskaplighet handlar om att förstå vad vetenskaplig kunskap är, förstå nyttan av den och kunna avgöra vilka teorier, rön och forskningsresultat vi ska lita på. Kapitlet beskriver översiktligt vetenskapens roll i strävan efter kunskap, vad kunskap är, vad vetenskapliga teorier består av och hur de används. Avslutningsvis presenteras tre kriterier som kan användas för att identifiera god vetenskap.

  • 281.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Anthony Brueckner Essays on Skepticism2013In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5817, E-ISSN 1558-5816, Vol. 79, no 4, 378-382 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 282.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Book Review: The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud, edited by Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny, and Wai-Hung Wong.2014In: international journal for the Study of Skepticism, ISSN 2210-5697, Vol. 4, no 2, 145-151 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 283.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Defeater Goes External2017In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 45, no 2, 701-715 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper proposes a new externalist account of defeaters, in terms of reliable indicators, as an integral part of a unified externalist account of warrant and defeat. It is argued that posing externalist conditions on warrant, but internalist conditions on defeat lead to undesirable tensions. The proposal is contrasted to some rival accounts and then tested on some widely discussed cases, like the airport case. Misleading defeaters, where Laurence BonJour's reliable clairvoyants serve as examples, also receive treatment, partly because they illustrate how internalist constraints are inserted into the set up of the problem and therefore unduly constrain the domain of satisfactory solutions. Lastly, the proposal is defended against some objections. Firstly, that by posing externalist conditions on defeat, the account becomes too open. Secondly, that an externalist account fails to take into account the epistemic assessments of our fellows in the epistemic practice of forming beliefs and making epistemic claims, which can be based on accessible warrant only.

  • 284.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Teoretisk.
    Defeaters and Rising Standards of Justification2008In: Acta Analytica, Vol. 23, no 1, 45-54 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this paper is to refute the widespread view that challenging a knowledge-claim always raises the original standards of justification – a view often associated with contextualism. To that purpose the distinction between undermining and overriding defeaters will be used. Three kinds of challenges will be considered that differ in their degree of specification. In all three kinds of challenges, the rising standards of justification model fails to capture the dialectic of justification in the case of undermining defeaters. At the end, the skeptical challenge will more briefly be given a similar analysis.

  • 285.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Empirical Indefeasibility and Nonfactuality: Assessing Field's Evaluative Approach to the A Priori2010In: Croatian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1333-1108, Vol. 10, no 30, 183-197 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Hartry Field has recently presented an original and interesting approach to the a priori. Its main theses are, first, that certain rules are empirically indefeasible and, second, that the reasonableness of these rules are not based on any factual property. After an introduction, Field’s approach is presented in section II. Section III examines his claims concerning empirical indefeasibility. It will be argued that his general argument for empirical indefeasibility fails along with the particular examples of rules he gives. Alternative ways of preserving empirical indefeasibility are suggested that are compatible with overdetermination under certain assumptions. In section IV, Field’s arguments for the nonfactuality of epistemological concepts, such as reasonableness, are found wanting. At the end, an alternative way of understanding the link between the epistemological concept in question and truth-conduciveness is proposed that preserves the factuality of the epistemological concept.

  • 286.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Knowledge versus Understanding: The Cost of Avoiding Gettier2012In: Acta Analytica, ISSN 0353-5150, Vol. 27, no 2, 183-197 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the current discussion on epistemic value, several philosophers argue that understanding enjoys higher epistemological significance and epistemic value than knowledge-the epistemic state the epistemological tradition has been preoccupied with. By noting a tension between the necessary conditions for understanding in the perhaps most prominent of these philosophers, Jonathan Kvanvig, this paper disputes the higher epistemological relevance of understanding. At the end, on the basis of the results of the previous sections, some alternative comparative contrasts between knowledge and understanding are briefly explored, including one in which an analogue to the KK-principle for knowledge, the "UU-principle", does not hold for a different reason than that for which the former principle fails.

  • 287.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Naturalism and the status of epistemology2001Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 288.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Challenges of Traveling without Itinerary: The Overrding Case2013In: Defeasibility in Philosophy: Knowledge, Agency, Responsibility, and the Law / [ed] Claudia Blöser, Mikael Janvid, Hannes Ole Matthiessen, Marcus Willaschek, Rodopi, 2013, 59-73 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    As an important step towards a comprehensive model of challenges and defeaters, it is here argued that securing a previously held epistemic status for a belief in the face of an overriding challenge does not require us to reach a higher epistemic standard than the one the belief originally reached. In the course of the investigation, criteria for when the epistemic status of beliefs are challenged and defeated are suggested. At the end of the paper, these results are then more briefly applied to shed some light on the problem of misleading evidence.

  • 289.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Experiential Defeasibility and Overdetermination of A Priori Justification2008In: Journal of Philosophical Research, ISSN 1053-8364, Vol. 33Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The question whether a belief justified a priori is indefeasible in general and experientially indefeasible in particular has received different answers. In a recent and interesting paper “Experientially Defeasible A Priori Justification”, Joshua Thurow argues that many a priori justified beliefs are defeasible by experience. The argument takes the form of an objection against Albert Casullo’s recent book A Priori Justification where Casullo, according to Thurow, denies that if a justified belief is non-experientially defeasible, then that belief is also experientially defeasible.

    This paper examines Thurow’s two arguments in the first two sections I-II. In the last section, III, an alternative line of argument for Thurow’s thesis is suggested that employs other parts of the framework that Casullo provides – especially the thesis of the overdetermination of justification. It will be argued that the prospects for this suggestion are brighter than for both of Thurow’s arguments.

  • 290.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Value of Lesser Goods: The Epistemic Value of Entitlement2009In: Acta Analytica, ISSN 0353-5150, Vol. 24, no 4, 263-274 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Abstract  The notion of entitlement plays an important role in some influential epistemologies. Often the epistemological motive for introducing the concept is to accommodate certain externalist intuitions within an internalist framework or, conversely, to incorporate internalist traits into an otherwise externalist position. In this paper two prominent philosophers will be used as examples: Tyler Burge as a representative of the first option and Fred Dretske as one of the second. However, even on the assumption that the concept of entitlement is sufficiently clarified, accomplishing these results is easier said than done – especially if we also want to ascribe positive epistemic value to entitlement. It will be shown that the epistemic value of entitlement is either granted at the expense of the epistemic value of justification or the value ends up below the level of value at which the epistemologists employing the concept of entitlement are aiming.

  • 291.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Towards a Default and Challenge Model of A Priori Warrant2012In: Journal of Philosophical Research (JPR), ISSN 1053-8364, Vol. 37, 135-154 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper outlines a default and challenge account of a priori warrant by unfolding the three stages of the epistemic dialectic in which such warrant comes to the fore. Among the virtues of this account is that it does not rely on controversial assumptions regarding non-experiential sources of warrant, like intellectual intuition, but instead relies on features of our epistemic practice, more precisely, its default and challenge structure. What distinguishes beliefs to which you are warranted a priori is not that their source of warrant resides in some intellectual faculty, but rather the characteristic ways in which these beliefs can be successfully defended against challenges. The paper ends in a discussion of whether a priori warranted beliefs are empirically indefeasible, arguing that it is misguided to demand such indefeasibility of a priori warranted beliefs since that demand is not made for other sources of warrant. The question that rather should be posed is whether beliefs for which a priori warrant is provided qualify as knowledge on a consistent basis, and this question can be given an affirmative answer even in the face of empirical defeasibility.

  • 292.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Understanding Understanding: An Epistemological Investigation2014In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 42, no 4, 971-985 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Understanding has received growing interest from epistemologists in recent years, but no consensus regarding its epistemic properties has yet been reached. This paper extracts, but also rejects, candidates of epistemic properties for construing an epistemological model of understanding from the writings of epistemologists participating in the current discussion surrounding that state. On the basis of these results, a suggestion is put forward according to which understanding is a non-basic epistemic state of warrant rather than knowledge. It is argued that this move provides a satisfactory conciliatory answer to the central question whether understanding is a factive epistemic state. Some differ- ences between understanding and knowledge are recorded along the way: for instance, that in contrast to knowledge, understanding does not require belief and that, even though neither knowledge nor understanding iterates, so that a subject can both know without knowing that she knows, as well as understanding without understanding that she understands, the reasons for the failure is different. 

  • 293.
    Jarrick, Arne
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Archaeology and Classical Studies, Centre for the Study of Cultural Evolution.
    Skarpa argument mot konstruktivismen: Paul Boghossian, Rädslan för kunskap (Fear of Knowledge – Against Relativism and Constructivism)2016In: Respons : recensionstidskrift för humaniora & samhällsvetenskap, ISSN 2001-2292, no 3Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 294.
    Jeppsson, Sofia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Practical Perspective Compatibilism2012Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this dissertation, I argue for what I call “practical perspective compatibilism”. According to this thesis, an agent with practical freedom is sufficiently free to be a moral agent and morally responsible for his or her actions.

    The concept of practical freedom is originally found in the writings of Kant. Kant argued that we can view the world from either a theoretical or a practical perspective. The theoretical perspective is that of causal explanation and prediction, whereas the practical perspective is that of choosing what to do and how to act. We see that we are free when we view things from a practical perspective. Determinism cannot threaten our practical freedom, since from a practical perspective we must choose what to do even if everything ultimately is determined. I argue that practical freedom is sufficient freedom-wise for moral agency and moral responsibility because morality is action-guiding. Right and wrong are concepts to be employed in deliberation and advice. This is a strong reason to regard factors irrelevant to deliberators and advisers as irrelevant when making judgements of right and wrong, and whether somebody had some other kind of freedom than practical freedom is irrelevant to deliberators and advisers. There are also prima facie reasons to regard moral responsibility as tied to rightness and wrongness, so that agents are blameworthy when they did wrong (or subjectively wrong, or what would have been wrong given their state of information and so on) and praiseworthy when they did right (subjectively right and so on). I also show that no classic arguments for incompatibilism about determinism and moral responsibility work when directed against practical perspective compatibilism.

    Finally, this thesis discusses metaethics in relation to compatibilism. Since competing theories imply the falsity of some respected metaethical positions, metaethical considerations lend further support to practical perspective compatibilism.

  • 295.
    Jeppsson, Sofia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences.
    Purebred Dogs and Canine Wellbeing2013In: Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, ISSN 1187-7863, E-ISSN 1573-322X, Vol. 27, no 3, 417-430 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Breeders of purebred dogs usually have several goals they want to accomplish, of which canine wellbeing is one. The purpose of this article is to investigate what we ought to do given this goal. Breeders typically think that they fulfil their wellbeing-related duties by doing the best they can within their breed of choice. However, it is true of most breeders that they could produce physically and mentally healthier dogs if they switched to a healthier breed. There are a few breeds that are healthier than other breeds as well as mutts; we could maximize wellbeing for the next generations by focusing all our breeding resources on those. However, in the long run such a strategy would severely deplete the canine gene pool. If we are to breed for wellbeing in the long run, we must thus weigh the benefits of selection against physical and mental problems against the benefits of genetic diversity. The optimal breeding strategy for canine wellbeing is to preserve many breeds, though not all of them. Furthermore, we ought to combine strict health programs with looser barriers between breeds. Such a policy conflicts with the goal of breed preservation, at least if we think of breeds as populations registered within kennel clubs rather than types of dogs, but not with the goal of producing good working dogs capable of performing various tasks.

  • 296.
    Jeppsson, Sofia M. I.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Responsibility problems for criminal justice2014In: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 5, 821Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 297. Johan, Gustafsson
    et al.
    Espinoza, Nicolas
    Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, & Swedish Defence Research Agency.
    Conflicting Reasons in the Small-Improvement Argument2010In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 60, no 214, 754-763 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 298.
    Johannesson, Eric
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Analyticity, Necessity and Belief: Aspects of two-dimensional semantics2017Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A glass couldn't contain water unless it contained H2O-molecules. Likewise, a man couldn't be a bachelor unless he was unmarried. Now, the latter is what we would call a conceptual or analytical truth. It's also what we would call a priori. But it's hardly a conceptual or analytical truth that if a glass contains water, then it contains H2O-molecules. Neither is it a priori. The fact that water is composed of H2O-molecules was an empirical discovery made in the eighteenth century. The fact that all bachelors are unmarried was not. But neither is a logical truth, so how do we explain the difference? Two-dimensional semantics is a framework that promises to shed light on these issues. The main purpose of this thesis is to understand and evaluate this framework in relation to various alternatives, to see whether some version of it can be defended. I argue that it fares better than the alternatives. However, much criticism of two-dimensionalism has focused on its alleged inability to provide a proper semantics for certain epistemic operators, in particular the belief operator and the a priori operator. In response to this criticism, a two-dimensional semantics for belief ascriptions is developed using structured propositions. In connection with this, a number of other issues in the semantics of belief ascriptions are addressed, concerning indexicals, beliefs de se, beliefs de re, and the problem of logical omniscience.

  • 299.
    Johannesson, Eric
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Finns det objektiva sannolikheter?2015In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 2Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 300.
    Johannesson, Eric
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Goodmans induktionsproblem2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 4Article in journal (Other academic)
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