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  • 251.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Jeff McMahan, Killing In War, New York: Oxford University Press, 20092013In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 10, no 1, p. 112-115Article, book review (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Killing in War is based upon McMahan’s 2007 Uehiro Lectures, but draws on the substantial body of work on the ethics of war that McMahan has produced over the last decade or so. In this sense, it was a classic before it was written, representing as it does the most sustained, persuasive, and influential attack to date on the ‘ortho-dox’ Walzerian view of just war. It is, undoubtedly, compulsory reading for anyone working in this field, and consolidates McMahan’s position as the most important just war theorist of the last forty years.

  • 252.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Judging Armed Humanitarian Intervention2014In: The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention / [ed] Don E. Scheid, Cambridge University Press, 2014Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 253.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Lesser-Evil Justifications for Harming: Why We're Required to Turn the Trolley2018In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 68, no 272, p. 460-480Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Much philosophical attention has been paid to the question of whether, and why, one may divert a runaway trolley away from where it will kill five people to where it will kill one. But little attention has been paid to whether the reasons that ground a permission to divert thereby ground a duty to divert. This paper defends the Requirement Thesis, which holds that one is, ordinarily, required to act on lesser-evil justifications for harming for the sake of others. Cases in which we have lesser-evil justifications of harming for the sake of others are rescue cases. Ordinarily, an agent is under a duty to rescue unless doing so imposes too great a cost on her, or violates someone else's rights. When neither of these defeating conditions obtain, one is required to rescue even if this involves causing harm to innocent people.

  • 254.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Non-Combatant Liability in War2014In: How We Fight: Ethics in War / [ed] H Frowe and G Lang, Oxford University Press, 2014Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 255.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On the Redundancy of Jus ad VimIn: Ethics and International Affairs, ISSN 0892-6794, E-ISSN 1747-7093Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 256.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On the Redundancy of Jus ad Vim: A Response to Daniel Brunstetter and Megan Braun2016In: Ethics and International Affairs, ISSN 0892-6794, E-ISSN 1747-7093, Vol. 30, no 1, p. 117-129Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 257.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Ethics of War and Peace: An Introduction2016 (ed. 2)Book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When is it right to go to war? When is a war illegal? What are the rules of engagement? What should happen when a war is over? How should we view terrorism? The Ethics of War and Peace is a fresh and contemporary introduction to one of the oldest but still most relevant ethical debates. It introduces students to contemporary Just War Theory in a stimulating and engaging way, perfect for those approaching the topic for the first time.

  • 258.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Just War Framework2018In: Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War / [ed] Seth Lazar, Helen Frowe, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 259.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Justified Infliction of Unjust HArm2009In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, ISSN 0066-7374, E-ISSN 1467-9264Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 260.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Role of Necessity in Liability to Defensive Harm2016In: The Ethics of Self-Defence / [ed] Christian Coons, Michel Weber, New York: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 152-170Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 261.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    War and Intervention2014In: Issues in Political Theory / [ed] Catriona McKinnon, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 262.
    Frowe, Helen
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    War in Political Philosophy2017In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, Oxford University Press, 2017Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We can distinguish between three moral approaches to war: pacifism, realism, and just war theory. There are various theoretical approaches to war within the just war tradition. One of the central disputes between these approaches concerns whether war is morally exceptional (as held by exceptionalists), or morally continuous with ordinary life (as held by reductive individualists). There are also significant debates concerning key substantive issues in the ethics of war, such as reductivist challenges to the thesis that combatants fighting an unjust war are the moral equals of those fighting a just war, and the challenge to reductivism that it undermines the principle of noncombatant immunity. There are also changing attitudes to wars of humanitarian intervention. One under-explored challenge to the permissibility of such wars lies in the better outcomes of alternative ways of alleviating suffering. The notion of unconventional warfare has also come to recent prominence, not least with respect to the moral status of human shields.

  • 263.
    Frowe, Helen
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Lang, Gerald
    How we fight: ethics in war2014Collection (editor) (Refereed)
  • 264.
    Frowe, Helen
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Lazar, Seth
    The Ethics of War2018In: The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War / [ed] Seth Lazar, Helen Frowe, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 265.
    Furberg, Elisabeth
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Advance Directives and Personal Identity2012Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Advance directives are instructions given by patients – or potential patients – specifying what actions ought to be taken for their health in the event that they are no longer capable to make decisions due to illness or incapacity. Over the last decades, there has been a rising tide in favour of advance directives: not only is the use of such directives recommended by most medical and advisory bodies, they are also gaining increasing legal recognition in many parts of the world.

    This book, however, takes as its point of departure one of the most commonly discussed medical-ethical arguments against granting advance directives moral force: the Objection from Personal Identity. The adherers of this objection basically asserts that when there is lacking psychological continuity between the person who formulated the advance directive and the later patient to whom it supposedly applies, this seriously threatens the directive’s moral authority. And, further, that this is so because lacking sufficient psychological continuity implies that the author of the advance directive is numerically distinct from the later patient.

    Although this argument has some initial appeal, most philosophers in the advance directives debate maintain that the Objection from Personal Identity fails, but suggest different reasons as to why. Whereas some argue that the objection has no force because it rests on faulty beliefs about personal identity, others argue that we ought to grant advance directives moral authority even if the author and the later patient are numerically distinct beings. This book investigates some of the most influential of these arguments and reaches the conclusion that the Objection from Personal Identity has more to it than is usually recognized in the medical-ethical debate. Lacking sufficient psychological continuity between author and later patient, it is concluded, does threaten the moral authority of the advance directive.

  • 266.
    Furberg, Elisabeth
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Advance Directives and Personal Identity: What’s the Problem?2012In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, ISSN 0360-5310, E-ISSN 1744-5019, Vol. 37, no 1, p. 60-73Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The personal identity problem expresses the worry that due to disrupted psychological continuity, one person’s advance directive could be used to determine the care of a different person. Even ethicists, who strongly question the possibility of the scenario depicted by the proponents of the personal identity problem, often consider it to be a very potent objection to the use of advance directives. Aiming to question this assumption, I, in this paper, discuss the personal identity problem’s relevance to the moral force of advance directives. By putting the personal identity argument in relation to two different normative frameworks, I aim to show that whether or not the personal identity problem is relevant to the moral force of advance directives, and further, in what way it is relevant, depends entirely on what normative reasons we have for respecting advance directives in the first place.

  • 267.
    Furberg, Elisabeth
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ansvar för sin hälsa?: Problem och möjligheter med att tillämpa en ansvarsprincip inom hälso- och sjukvården2007Report (Other academic)
  • 268. Gasquet, Olivier
    et al.
    Goranko, Valentin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Johannesburg, South Africa.
    Schwarzentruber, François
    Big Brother Logic: visual-epistemic reasoning in stationary multi-agent systems2016In: Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, ISSN 1387-2532, E-ISSN 1573-7454, Vol. 30, no 5, p. 793-825Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We consider multi-agent scenarios where each agent controls a surveillance camera in the plane, with fixed position and angle of vision, but rotating freely. The agents can thus observe the surroundings and each other. They can also reason about each other’s observation abilities and knowledge derived from these observations. We introduce suitable logical languages for reasoning about such scenarios which involve atomic formulae stating what agents can see, multi-agent epistemic operators for individual, distributed and common knowledge, as well as dynamic operators reflecting the ability of cameras to turn around in order to reach positions satisfying formulae in the language. We also consider effects of public announcements. We introduce several different but equivalent versions of the semantics for these languages, discuss their expressiveness and provide translations in PDL style. Using these translations we develop algorithms and obtain complexity results for model checking and satisfiability testing for the basic logic BBL that we introduce here and for some of its extensions. Notably, we show that even for the extension with common knowledge, model checking and satisfiability testing remain in PSPACE. We also discuss the sensitivity of the set of validities to the admissible angles of vision of the agents’ cameras. Finally, we discuss some further extensions: adding obstacles, positioning the cameras in 3D or enabling them to change positions. Our work has potential applications to automated reasoning, formal specification and verification of observational abilities and knowledge of multi-robot systems.

  • 269.
    Gluer Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    General Terms and Relational Modality*2012In: Noûs, ISSN 0029-4624, E-ISSN 1468-0068, Vol. 46, no 1, p. 159-199Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 270.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Analyticity and Implicit Definition2003In: Grazer Philosophische Studien, ISSN 0165-9227, E-ISSN 1875-6735, Vol. 66, p. 23-60Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 271.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Brown on the reductio2006In: What Determines Content?: The Internalism/Externalism Dispute, Cambridge Scholars Press, Newcastle , 2006Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 272.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Colors without circles?2007In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 66, no 1-2, p. 107-131Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Realists about color, be they dispositionalists or physicalists, agree on the truth of the following claim: (R) x is red iff x is disposed to look red under standard conditions. The disagreement is only about whether to identify the colors with the relevant dispositions, or with their categorical bases. This is a question about the representational content of color experience: What kind of properties do color experiences ascribe to objects? It has been argued (for instance by Boghossian and Velleman, 1991) that truths like (R) cannot be used in an account of the colors as they would result in ‚circular’, and therefore empty, contents. It has also been argued (for instance by Harman, 1996) that switching to an account of color in terms of a functional account of color sensations would result in a circular, and therefore empty, account. In this paper, I defend a realist account of color in terms of a (non-reductive) functional account of color sensations. Such an account of sensations has been suggested by Pagin (2000), and it can be applied to color sensations without the resulting account of the colors themselves being circular or empty. I argue that the so-called transparency of experience does not provide any argument against such an account. I also argue that on such an account, the issue of physicalism vs. dispositionalism boils down to the question of the modal profile of the color concepts.

  • 273.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Critical Notice: Donald Davidson's Collected Essays2007In: Dialectica, Vol. 61, p. 275-284Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 274.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Defeating looks2018In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 195, no 7, p. 2985-3012Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In previous work, I have suggested a doxastic account of perceptual experience according to which experiences form a (peculiar) kind of belief: Beliefs with what I have called “phenomenal” or “looks-content”. I have argued that this account can not only accommodate the intuitive reason providing role of experience, but also its justificatory role. I have also argued that, in general, construing experience and perceptual beliefs, i.e. the beliefs most directly based on experience, as having different contents best accounts for the defeasibility of experiential reasons. In this paper, I shall have a closer look at the evidential or inferential relation between looks-propositions and the contents of perceptual beliefs and argue for a form of what I shall call “Pollockianism” about experiential reasons: such reasons are good unless defeated. Questions to be investigated include: Does the resulting picture of perceptual justification contain an externalist element? Is it compatible with Bayesianism? And how does it do with respect to problems that have been raised for other forms of Pollockianism such as dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism?

  • 275.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Externalismus und phänomenologische Methode2006In: Phänomenologie und Sprachanalyse, mentis, Paderborn , 2006Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 276.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience2009In: Mind and language, ISSN 0268-1064, E-ISSN 1468-0017, Vol. 24, p. 297-327Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing ‘phenomenal’ properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. Moreover, in contrast to sui generis views, it can quite easily account for the rational or reason providing role of experience.

  • 277.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On Perceiving That2004In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 70, no 3-4, p. 197-212Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 278.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Talking about Looks2017In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology, ISSN 1878-5158, E-ISSN 1878-5166, Vol. 8, no 4, p. 781-807Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In natural language, looks-talk is used in a variety of ways. I investigate three uses of 'looks' that have traditionally been distinguished - epistemic, comparative, and phenomenal 'looks' - and endorse and develop considerations in support of the view that these amount to polysemy. Focusing on the phenomenal use of 'looks', I then investigate connections between its semantics, the content of visual experience, and the metaphysics of looks. I argue that phenomenal 'looks' is not a propositional attitude operator: We do not use it to ascribe propositional attitudes to subjects, but to directly ascribe looks to objects, where looks are relational properties. However, I go on to argue that, given the way we use phenomenal 'looks', these relational properties are ultimately best understood as phenomenal relational properties, i.e. in terms of relations involving experiences. Along the way, I endorse Byrne's argument against Jackson's claim that phenomenal 'looks F' only takes predicates for colour, shape, and distance, and raise the issue of compositionality for the resulting view according to which phenomenal 'looks F' is context-dependent in a way that allows it to take a vast range of predicates. I conclude by arguing that these considerations concerning the natural language use of 'looks', and in particular its phenomenal use, are water on the mills of phenomenal intentionalism, a position in the philosophy of perception according to which experiences are propositional attitudes with phenomenal looks-contents.

  • 279.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Status of Charity I: Conceptual Truth or Aposteriori Necessity?2006In: International journal of philosophical studies (Print), ISSN 0967-2559, E-ISSN 1466-4542, Vol. 14, no 3, p. 337-359Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to Donald Davidson, linguistic meaning is determined by the principle of charity. Because of Davidson's semantic behaviourism, charity's significance is both epistemic and metaphysical: charity not only provides the radical interpreter with a method for constructing a semantic theory on the basis of his data, but it does so because it is the principle metaphysically determining meaning. In this paper, I assume that charity does determine meaning. On this assumption, I investigate both its epistemic and metaphysical status: is charity a priori or a posteriori? And what kind of necessity does it have? According to Davidson himself, charity is an a priori truth and its necessity is conceptual: it is essential to, or constitutive of, our common concepts of meaning and belief. Not only does this generate tension within Davidson's own, Quine-inspired epistemology, but there is independent reason to think of charity as an empirical truth. Even so, charity might be essential to belief and meaning in the sense of being an a posteriori necessity. I conclude that our ordinary modal intuitions might well support charity's psychological-nomological necessity, but that they do not reach all the way to metaphysical necessity.

  • 280.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Triangulation2006In: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press , 2006Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 281.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Proper Names and Relational Modality2006In: Linguistics and Philosophy, ISSN 0165-0157, E-ISSN 1573-0549, Vol. 29, no 5, p. 507-535Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Saul Kripke’s thesis that ordinary proper names are rigid designators is supported by widely shared intuitions about the occurrence of names in ordinary modal contexts. By those intuitions names are scopeless with respect to the modal expressions. That is, sentences in a pair like (a) Aristotle might have been fond of dogs, (b) Concerning Aristotle, it is true that he might have been fond of dogs will have the same truth value. The same does not in general hold for definite descriptions. If one, like Kripke, accounts for this difference by means of the intensions of the names and the descriptions, the conclusion is that names do not in general have the same intension as any normal, identifying description. However, this difference can be accounted for alternatively by appeal to the semantics of the modal expressions. On the account we suggest, dubbed ‘relational modality’, simple singular terms, like proper names, contribute to modal contexts simply by their actual world reference, not by their descriptive content. That account turns out to be fully equivalent with the rigidity account when it comes to truth of modal and non-modal sentence (with respect to the actual world), and hence supports the same basic intuitions. Here we present the relational modality account and compare it with others, in particular Kripke’s own

  • 282.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Växelsemantik (Switcher Semantics)2018In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 39, no 3, p. 36-51Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 283.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Against Belief Normativity2013In: The Aim of Belief / [ed] Timothy Chan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 80-99Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Normativism about belief is a claim about the nature of belief: Belief is essentially norm- or rule-guided. This is standardly interpreted as requiring that belief formation be subject to genuine prescriptions. In this chapter, Glüer and Wikforss argue that belief normativism is very hard to square with some basic intuitions about rule guidance. Any account of rule-guidance needs to support the distinction between being guided by a rule and merely being in accord with it. But belief normativism cannot account for this difference in what the authors take to be the most natural, intuitive terms. If this is correct, any defense of normativism will have to involve a significant departure from intuition or a novel construal of the normativity involved. The challenge is to motivate any of these moves.

  • 284.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Against Content Normativity2009In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 118, p. 31-70Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 285.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Es braucht die Regel nicht: Wittgenstein on Rules and Meaning2010In: The Later Wittgenstein on Language / [ed] Daniel Whiting, Palgrave Macmillan , 2010, p. 148-166Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 286.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Meaning Normativism: Against the Simple Argument2015In: Organon F, ISSN 1335-0668, Vol. 22, p. 63-73Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper examines a central argument in support of the thesis that meaning is essentially normative. The argument tries to derive meaning normativism from the fact that meaningful expressions necessarily have conditions of correct application: Since correctness is a normative notion, it is argued, statements of correctness conditions for an expression have direct normative consequences for the use of that expression. We have labeled this the 'simple argument', and have argued that it fails. In this paper we elaborate on our objections to the argument in response to Daniel Whiting's recent attempt to rescue it. We argue, first, that statements of correctness conditions simply allow us to categorize the applications of an expression into two basic kinds (for instance, the true and the false) without this having any normative implications; and, second, that the normativist has not provided any reasons to think that some further, normative notion of semantic correctness is essential to meaning.

  • 287.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Still No Guidance: Reply to Steglich-Petersen2015In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 81, no 3, p. 272-279Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In a recent article in this journal, AsbjOrn Steglich-Petersen criticizes an argument we have called the no-guidance argument. He claims that our argument fails because it (1) presupposes a much too narrow understanding of what it takes for a norm to influence behaviour and (2) betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the point of the truth norm (Steglich-Petersen, 2013, p. 279). If these claims could be substantiated, the no-guidance argument would lose all interest. But Steglich-Petersen's attempt at substantiating them fails. The suggested sense in which the truth norm can guide behaviour turns out to be too wide to be recognizable as an intuitive notion of norm guidance. Moreover, it remains unclear how the truth norm could possibly provide an answer to the question whether it - rather than some other, possible norm for belief - is valid.

  • 288.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Normativity of Meaning and Content2009In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy / [ed] Edward N. Zalta, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information , 2009Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 289.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Agreement Maximization2011In: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences / [ed] Patrick Colm Hogan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 93-94Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 290.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Brief aus Schweden2013In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, ISSN 0012-1045, E-ISSN 2192-1482, Vol. 61, no 5/6, p. 823-826Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    This short text is part of a series of letters from philosophers working abroad. I write about what brought me to Sweden and about what philosophy and academic life are like there, including some reflections on language politics as well as on the situation of women in philosophy and in academia more generally

  • 291.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Charity, Principle of2011In: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences / [ed] Patrick Colm Hogan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 151-152Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 292.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Colors and the Content of Color Experience2012In: Croatian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1333-1108, E-ISSN 1847-6139, Vol. 12, no 36, p. 421-437Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 293.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Constancy in Variation: An Argument for Centering the Contents of Experience?2016In: About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication / [ed] Manuel García-Carpintero, Stephan Torre, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 56-85Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When you look at a circular plate at an angle, it looks circular. But there also is a certain sense in which its look can be described as oval. When you move, the plate’s look changes with your perspective on it—nevertheless, it continues to look circular. This chapter investigates whether these “constancy in variation” phenomena can be explained in terms of the representational content of visual experience, and whether constancy in variation provides special, phenomenological, reasons to construe experience as having centered contents. Concentrating on shape, it argues that due to warring phenomenological demands, all views construing constancy in variation as representation of both objective and perspectival properties or features have limited explanatory powers, and that centering does not provide any advantage. By contrast, adopting the non-standard intentionalism called phenomenal intentionalism, we get rather natural explanations of the phenomenology of constancy in variation.

  • 294.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Convention and Meaning2013In: A Companion to Donald Davidson / [ed] Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, p. 339-360Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 295.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Dana Riesenfeld: the Rei(g)n of 'Rule'2011In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Vol. Oct, no 11/10Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 296.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Does perceptual experience have propositional content?2011Other (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 297.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Donald Davidson: A Short Introduction2011Book (Refereed)
  • 298.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Donald Davidson: Bedeutung und Interpretation2010In: Klassiker der Philosophie heute / [ed] Ansgar Beckermann, Dominique Perler, Stuttgart: Reclam , 2010, 2., durchges. und erw. Aufl., p. 831-853Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 299.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Intentionalism, Defeasibility, and Justification2016In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 173, no 4, p. 1007-1030Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a mental state with representational content. When it comes to the epistemology of perception, it is only natural for the intentionalist to hold that the justificatory role of experience is at least in part a function of its content. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of intentionalism trying to hold on to this natural principle face what I call the “defeasibility problem”. This problem arises from the combination of standard intentionalism with further plausible principles governing the epistemology of perception: that experience provides defeasible justification for empirical belief, and that such justification is best construed as probabilification. After exploring some ways in which the standard intentionalist could deal with the defeasibility problem, I argue that the best option is to replace standard intentionalism by what I call “phenomenal intentionalism”. Where standard intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having the content p, phenomenal intentionalism construes (visual) experiences as of p as having “phenomenal” or “looks contents”: contents of the form Lp (it looks as if p).

  • 300.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Interpretation and the Interpreter: On the Role of the Interpreter in Davidsonian Foundational Semantics2018In: The Science of Meaning: Essays on the Metatheory of Natural Language Semantics / [ed] Brian Rabern; Derek Ball, Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 226-252Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to Donald Davidson, “what a fully informed interpreter could learn about what a speaker means is all there is to learn; the same goes for what the speaker believes” (Davidson 1983, 148). This is a foundational claim about the nature of se- mantic properties: these are evidence-constituted properties. They are determined by the principle of charity on the basis of data about the behaviour of the speaker(s). But what exactly is the role of the interpreter in the Davidsonian account of meaning determination? Is she merely a dramatic device or an essential element of the metaphysical picture? In this paper, I investigate whether we can get help in an- swering these questions from David Lewis’s (1983) distinction between natural and unnatural properties.

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