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  • 251.
    Furberg, Elisabeth
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ansvar för sin hälsa?: Problem och möjligheter med att tillämpa en ansvarsprincip inom hälso- och sjukvården2007Report (Other academic)
  • 252. Gasquet, Olivier
    et al.
    Goranko, Valentin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Johannesburg, South Africa.
    Schwarzentruber, François
    Big Brother Logic: visual-epistemic reasoning in stationary multi-agent systems2016In: Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, ISSN 1387-2532, E-ISSN 1573-7454, Vol. 30, no 5, p. 793-825Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We consider multi-agent scenarios where each agent controls a surveillance camera in the plane, with fixed position and angle of vision, but rotating freely. The agents can thus observe the surroundings and each other. They can also reason about each other’s observation abilities and knowledge derived from these observations. We introduce suitable logical languages for reasoning about such scenarios which involve atomic formulae stating what agents can see, multi-agent epistemic operators for individual, distributed and common knowledge, as well as dynamic operators reflecting the ability of cameras to turn around in order to reach positions satisfying formulae in the language. We also consider effects of public announcements. We introduce several different but equivalent versions of the semantics for these languages, discuss their expressiveness and provide translations in PDL style. Using these translations we develop algorithms and obtain complexity results for model checking and satisfiability testing for the basic logic BBL that we introduce here and for some of its extensions. Notably, we show that even for the extension with common knowledge, model checking and satisfiability testing remain in PSPACE. We also discuss the sensitivity of the set of validities to the admissible angles of vision of the agents’ cameras. Finally, we discuss some further extensions: adding obstacles, positioning the cameras in 3D or enabling them to change positions. Our work has potential applications to automated reasoning, formal specification and verification of observational abilities and knowledge of multi-robot systems.

  • 253.
    Gluer Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    General Terms and Relational Modality*2012In: Noûs, ISSN 0029-4624, E-ISSN 1468-0068, Vol. 46, no 1, p. 159-199Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 254.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Analyticity and Implicit Definition2003In: Grazer Philosophische Studien, ISSN 0165-9227, E-ISSN 1875-6735, Vol. 66, p. 23-60Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 255.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Brown on the reductio2006In: What Determines Content?: The Internalism/Externalism Dispute, Cambridge Scholars Press, Newcastle , 2006Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 256.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Colors without circles?2007In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 66, no 1-2, p. 107-131Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Realists about color, be they dispositionalists or physicalists, agree on the truth of the following claim: (R) x is red iff x is disposed to look red under standard conditions. The disagreement is only about whether to identify the colors with the relevant dispositions, or with their categorical bases. This is a question about the representational content of color experience: What kind of properties do color experiences ascribe to objects? It has been argued (for instance by Boghossian and Velleman, 1991) that truths like (R) cannot be used in an account of the colors as they would result in ‚circular’, and therefore empty, contents. It has also been argued (for instance by Harman, 1996) that switching to an account of color in terms of a functional account of color sensations would result in a circular, and therefore empty, account. In this paper, I defend a realist account of color in terms of a (non-reductive) functional account of color sensations. Such an account of sensations has been suggested by Pagin (2000), and it can be applied to color sensations without the resulting account of the colors themselves being circular or empty. I argue that the so-called transparency of experience does not provide any argument against such an account. I also argue that on such an account, the issue of physicalism vs. dispositionalism boils down to the question of the modal profile of the color concepts.

  • 257.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Critical Notice: Donald Davidson's Collected Essays2007In: Dialectica, Vol. 61, p. 275-284Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 258.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Defeating looks2018In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 195, no 7, p. 2985-3012Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In previous work, I have suggested a doxastic account of perceptual experience according to which experiences form a (peculiar) kind of belief: Beliefs with what I have called “phenomenal” or “looks-content”. I have argued that this account can not only accommodate the intuitive reason providing role of experience, but also its justificatory role. I have also argued that, in general, construing experience and perceptual beliefs, i.e. the beliefs most directly based on experience, as having different contents best accounts for the defeasibility of experiential reasons. In this paper, I shall have a closer look at the evidential or inferential relation between looks-propositions and the contents of perceptual beliefs and argue for a form of what I shall call “Pollockianism” about experiential reasons: such reasons are good unless defeated. Questions to be investigated include: Does the resulting picture of perceptual justification contain an externalist element? Is it compatible with Bayesianism? And how does it do with respect to problems that have been raised for other forms of Pollockianism such as dogmatism or phenomenal conservatism?

  • 259.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Externalismus und phänomenologische Methode2006In: Phänomenologie und Sprachanalyse, mentis, Paderborn , 2006Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 260.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    In Defence of a Doxastic Account of Experience2009In: Mind and language, ISSN 0268-1064, E-ISSN 1468-0017, Vol. 24, p. 297-327Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Today, many philosophers think that perceptual experiences are conscious mental states with representational content and phenomenal character. Subscribers to this view often go on to construe experience more precisely as a propositional attitude sui generis ascribing sensible properties to ordinary material objects. I argue that experience is better construed as a kind of belief ascribing ‘phenomenal’ properties to such objects. A belief theory of this kind deals as well with the traditional arguments against doxastic accounts as the sui generis view. Moreover, in contrast to sui generis views, it can quite easily account for the rational or reason providing role of experience.

  • 261.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On Perceiving That2004In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 70, no 3-4, p. 197-212Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 262.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Talking about Looks2017In: Review of Philosophy and Psychology, ISSN 1878-5158, E-ISSN 1878-5166, Vol. 8, no 4, p. 781-807Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In natural language, looks-talk is used in a variety of ways. I investigate three uses of 'looks' that have traditionally been distinguished - epistemic, comparative, and phenomenal 'looks' - and endorse and develop considerations in support of the view that these amount to polysemy. Focusing on the phenomenal use of 'looks', I then investigate connections between its semantics, the content of visual experience, and the metaphysics of looks. I argue that phenomenal 'looks' is not a propositional attitude operator: We do not use it to ascribe propositional attitudes to subjects, but to directly ascribe looks to objects, where looks are relational properties. However, I go on to argue that, given the way we use phenomenal 'looks', these relational properties are ultimately best understood as phenomenal relational properties, i.e. in terms of relations involving experiences. Along the way, I endorse Byrne's argument against Jackson's claim that phenomenal 'looks F' only takes predicates for colour, shape, and distance, and raise the issue of compositionality for the resulting view according to which phenomenal 'looks F' is context-dependent in a way that allows it to take a vast range of predicates. I conclude by arguing that these considerations concerning the natural language use of 'looks', and in particular its phenomenal use, are water on the mills of phenomenal intentionalism, a position in the philosophy of perception according to which experiences are propositional attitudes with phenomenal looks-contents.

  • 263.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Status of Charity I: Conceptual Truth or Aposteriori Necessity?2006In: International journal of philosophical studies (Print), ISSN 0967-2559, E-ISSN 1466-4542, Vol. 14, no 3, p. 337-359Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to Donald Davidson, linguistic meaning is determined by the principle of charity. Because of Davidson's semantic behaviourism, charity's significance is both epistemic and metaphysical: charity not only provides the radical interpreter with a method for constructing a semantic theory on the basis of his data, but it does so because it is the principle metaphysically determining meaning. In this paper, I assume that charity does determine meaning. On this assumption, I investigate both its epistemic and metaphysical status: is charity a priori or a posteriori? And what kind of necessity does it have? According to Davidson himself, charity is an a priori truth and its necessity is conceptual: it is essential to, or constitutive of, our common concepts of meaning and belief. Not only does this generate tension within Davidson's own, Quine-inspired epistemology, but there is independent reason to think of charity as an empirical truth. Even so, charity might be essential to belief and meaning in the sense of being an a posteriori necessity. I conclude that our ordinary modal intuitions might well support charity's psychological-nomological necessity, but that they do not reach all the way to metaphysical necessity.

  • 264.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Triangulation2006In: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language, Oxford University Press , 2006Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 265.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Proper Names and Relational Modality2006In: Linguistics and Philosophy, ISSN 0165-0157, E-ISSN 1573-0549, Vol. 29, no 5, p. 507-535Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Saul Kripke’s thesis that ordinary proper names are rigid designators is supported by widely shared intuitions about the occurrence of names in ordinary modal contexts. By those intuitions names are scopeless with respect to the modal expressions. That is, sentences in a pair like (a) Aristotle might have been fond of dogs, (b) Concerning Aristotle, it is true that he might have been fond of dogs will have the same truth value. The same does not in general hold for definite descriptions. If one, like Kripke, accounts for this difference by means of the intensions of the names and the descriptions, the conclusion is that names do not in general have the same intension as any normal, identifying description. However, this difference can be accounted for alternatively by appeal to the semantics of the modal expressions. On the account we suggest, dubbed ‘relational modality’, simple singular terms, like proper names, contribute to modal contexts simply by their actual world reference, not by their descriptive content. That account turns out to be fully equivalent with the rigidity account when it comes to truth of modal and non-modal sentence (with respect to the actual world), and hence supports the same basic intuitions. Here we present the relational modality account and compare it with others, in particular Kripke’s own

  • 266.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Against Belief Normativity2013In: The Aim of Belief / [ed] Timothy Chan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 80-99Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Normativism about belief is a claim about the nature of belief: Belief is essentially norm- or rule-guided. This is standardly interpreted as requiring that belief formation be subject to genuine prescriptions. In this chapter, Glüer and Wikforss argue that belief normativism is very hard to square with some basic intuitions about rule guidance. Any account of rule-guidance needs to support the distinction between being guided by a rule and merely being in accord with it. But belief normativism cannot account for this difference in what the authors take to be the most natural, intuitive terms. If this is correct, any defense of normativism will have to involve a significant departure from intuition or a novel construal of the normativity involved. The challenge is to motivate any of these moves.

  • 267.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Against Content Normativity2009In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 118, p. 31-70Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 268.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Es braucht die Regel nicht: Wittgenstein on Rules and Meaning2010In: The Later Wittgenstein on Language / [ed] Daniel Whiting, Palgrave Macmillan , 2010, p. 148-166Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 269.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Meaning Normativism: Against the Simple Argument2015In: Organon F, ISSN 1335-0668, Vol. 22, p. 63-73Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper examines a central argument in support of the thesis that meaning is essentially normative. The argument tries to derive meaning normativism from the fact that meaningful expressions necessarily have conditions of correct application: Since correctness is a normative notion, it is argued, statements of correctness conditions for an expression have direct normative consequences for the use of that expression. We have labeled this the 'simple argument', and have argued that it fails. In this paper we elaborate on our objections to the argument in response to Daniel Whiting's recent attempt to rescue it. We argue, first, that statements of correctness conditions simply allow us to categorize the applications of an expression into two basic kinds (for instance, the true and the false) without this having any normative implications; and, second, that the normativist has not provided any reasons to think that some further, normative notion of semantic correctness is essential to meaning.

  • 270.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Still No Guidance: Reply to Steglich-Petersen2015In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 81, no 3, p. 272-279Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In a recent article in this journal, AsbjOrn Steglich-Petersen criticizes an argument we have called the no-guidance argument. He claims that our argument fails because it (1) presupposes a much too narrow understanding of what it takes for a norm to influence behaviour and (2) betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the point of the truth norm (Steglich-Petersen, 2013, p. 279). If these claims could be substantiated, the no-guidance argument would lose all interest. But Steglich-Petersen's attempt at substantiating them fails. The suggested sense in which the truth norm can guide behaviour turns out to be too wide to be recognizable as an intuitive notion of norm guidance. Moreover, it remains unclear how the truth norm could possibly provide an answer to the question whether it - rather than some other, possible norm for belief - is valid.

  • 271.
    Glüer, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Normativity of Meaning and Content2009In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy / [ed] Edward N. Zalta, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, Metaphysics Research Lab, Center for the Study of Language and Information , 2009Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 272.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Agreement Maximization2011In: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences / [ed] Patrick Colm Hogan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 93-94Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 273.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Brief aus Schweden2013In: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, ISSN 0012-1045, E-ISSN 2192-1482, Vol. 61, no 5/6, p. 823-826Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    This short text is part of a series of letters from philosophers working abroad. I write about what brought me to Sweden and about what philosophy and academic life are like there, including some reflections on language politics as well as on the situation of women in philosophy and in academia more generally

  • 274.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Charity, Principle of2011In: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences / [ed] Patrick Colm Hogan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 151-152Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 275.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Colors and the Content of Color Experience2012In: Croatian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1333-1108, E-ISSN 1847-6139, Vol. 12, no 36, p. 421-437Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 276.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Constancy in Variation: An Argument for Centering the Contents of Experience?2016In: About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication / [ed] Manuel García-Carpintero, Stephan Torre, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, p. 56-85Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When you look at a circular plate at an angle, it looks circular. But there also is a certain sense in which its look can be described as oval. When you move, the plate’s look changes with your perspective on it—nevertheless, it continues to look circular. This chapter investigates whether these “constancy in variation” phenomena can be explained in terms of the representational content of visual experience, and whether constancy in variation provides special, phenomenological, reasons to construe experience as having centered contents. Concentrating on shape, it argues that due to warring phenomenological demands, all views construing constancy in variation as representation of both objective and perspectival properties or features have limited explanatory powers, and that centering does not provide any advantage. By contrast, adopting the non-standard intentionalism called phenomenal intentionalism, we get rather natural explanations of the phenomenology of constancy in variation.

  • 277.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Convention and Meaning2013In: A Companion to Donald Davidson / [ed] Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013, p. 339-360Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 278.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Dana Riesenfeld: the Rei(g)n of 'Rule'2011In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Vol. Oct, no 11/10Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 279.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Does perceptual experience have propositional content?2011Other (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 280.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Donald Davidson: A Short Introduction2011Book (Refereed)
  • 281.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Donald Davidson: Bedeutung und Interpretation2010In: Klassiker der Philosophie heute / [ed] Ansgar Beckermann, Dominique Perler, Stuttgart: Reclam , 2010, 2., durchges. und erw. Aufl., p. 831-853Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 282.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Intentionalism, Defeasibility, and Justification2016In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 173, no 4, p. 1007-1030Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a mental state with representational content. When it comes to the epistemology of perception, it is only natural for the intentionalist to hold that the justificatory role of experience is at least in part a function of its content. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of intentionalism trying to hold on to this natural principle face what I call the “defeasibility problem”. This problem arises from the combination of standard intentionalism with further plausible principles governing the epistemology of perception: that experience provides defeasible justification for empirical belief, and that such justification is best construed as probabilification. After exploring some ways in which the standard intentionalist could deal with the defeasibility problem, I argue that the best option is to replace standard intentionalism by what I call “phenomenal intentionalism”. Where standard intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having the content p, phenomenal intentionalism construes (visual) experiences as of p as having “phenomenal” or “looks contents”: contents of the form Lp (it looks as if p).

  • 283.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Looks, Reasons, and Experiences2014In: Does Perception Have Content? / [ed] Berit Brogaard, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 76-102Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to the phenomenal belief account of perceptual experience I have suggested elsewhere, experience is a kind of belief. These beliefs have contents of a special form or type: While their objects are ordinary material objects, the properties they ascribe to these objects are 'phenomenal' properties, properties such as looking red or looking round. In this paper, I shall further develop this account by defending it against two objections: a) the objection that ultimately, no plausible epistemology can be built upon experiences with phenomenal contents. And b) the objection that phenomenal ‘looks’ is a propositional attitude operator and therefore cannot be used in specifying the content of experience. First, however, I shall argue that the intuitive inferential integration of experience into our system of beliefs provides one of the strongest motivations for construing experiences as having propositional content in the first place. The phenomenal belief account provides one good way of accommodating this inferential integration. Defending it thus is one way of defending the claim that experience indeed has propositional content.

  • 284.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Martin on the Semantics of 'Looks'2013In: Thought, ISSN 2161-2234, Vol. 1, no 4, p. 292-300Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A natural way of understanding (non-epistemic) looks talk in natural language is phenomenalist: to ascribe looks to objects is to say something about the way they strike us when we look at them. This explains why the truth values of looks-sentences intuitively vary with the circumstances with respect to which they are evaluated. But Mike Martin (2010) argues that there is no semantic reason to prefer a phenomenalist understanding of looks to “Parsimony”, the position according to which looks are basic visible properties. He suggests a semantics for looks-sentences that explains their intuitive truth values and is compatible with Parsimony. I argue that there is semantic reason to prefer a phenomenalist understanding of looks to a parsimonious one since there is a simpler semantics compatible with a phenomenalist understanding of looks, but not with Parsimony. This semantics provides a better explanation of the relevant truth value distribution

  • 285.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Passing Theories2011In: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences / [ed] Patrick Colm Hogan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 588-589Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 286.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Perception and Intermediaries2012In: Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental / [ed] Gerhard Preyer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 192-213Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 287.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Radical Interpretation2011In: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences / [ed] Patrick Colm Hogan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 697-699Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 288.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rule-Following and Charity: Wittgenstein and Davidson on Meaning Determination2017In: Wittgenstein and Davidson on Thought, Language, and Action / [ed] Claudine Verheggen, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 69-96Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The project of this chapter is to explore some relations between the rule-following considerations and radical interpretation. I spell out the sense in which the rule-following considerations are about meaning determination, and investigate whether the principle of meaning determination used in the early Davidson's account of meaning determination - the principle of charity - provides an answer to what I shall call "Wittgenstein's paradox". More precisely, I am interested in one aspect of the paradox: the "problem of objectivity". My question then is whether meaning, as determined by charity, is such that the correctness of the applications of meaningful expressions is an objective matter. After running us through the basics of the radical interpretation account of meaning determination I argue that the principle of charity does seem to fall prey to the problem of objectivity. After unsuccessfully trying to rescue objectivity by means of Lewisian natural properties, this is the verdict I in the end endorse.

  • 289.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Theories of Meaning and Truth Conditions2012In: The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language / [ed] Manuel García-Carpintero; Max Kölbel, London/New York: Continuum, 2012, p. 84-105Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 290.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Reply to Forbes2012In: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 72, no 2, p. 298-303Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In earlier work (Glüer, K. and P. Pagin. 2006. Proper names and relational modality. Linguistics & Philosophy 29: 507–35; Glüer, K. and P. Pagin. 2008. Relational modality. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17: 307–22), we developed a semantics for (metaphysical) modal operators that accommodates Kripkean intuitions about proper names in modal contexts even if names are not rigid designators. Graeme Forbes (2011. The problem of factives for sense theories. Analysis 71: 654–62.) criticizes our proposal. He argues that our semantics predicts readings for certain natural language sentences which these simply do not have. These sentences contain mixed contexts involving factive attitude verbs. We argue that the readings our semantics predicts do indeed exist, even if it might take a little work to bring them out. Moreover, denying their existence would have some rather unattractive consequences.

  • 291.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Aiming at Truth: On the Role of Belief2013In: Teorema, ISSN 0210-1602, Vol. 32, no 3, p. 137-162Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We explore the possibility of characterizing belief wholly in terms of its first-order functional role, its input (evidence) and output (further beliefs and actions), by addressing some common challenges to the view. One challenge concerns the fact that not all belief is evidence-sensitive. In response to this, normativists and teleo-functionalists have concluded that something over and above functional role is needed, a norm or a telos. We argue that both allow for implausibly much divergence between belief and evidence. Others have suggested that belief should be saved as the evidence-sensitive attitude, by making it share its motivational role with an hitherto unrecognized state: alief. We argue that the appeal to alief faces a dilemma: Either explanation of intentional action by means of alief is a species of intentional explanation, in which case it becomes hard to distinguish alief from (irrational) belief, or alief is sufficiently different from belief, but then neither the explanation nor the explanandum (action) are recognizably intentional any longer. We conclude that the most promising way forward is an account of belief that makes use of the full functional role of belief, including its role in theoretical reasoning.

  • 292.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Reasons for Belief and Normativity2017In: Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity / [ed] Daniel Star, Oxford University Press, 2017Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 293.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Truth Norm and Guidance: a Reply to Steglich-Petersen2010In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 119, no 475, p. 757-761Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We have claimed that truth norms cannot provide genuine guidance for belief formation (Glüer and Wikforss 2009, pp. 43–4). Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen argues that our ‘no guidance argument’ fails because it conflates certain psychological states an agent must have in order to apply the truth norm with the condition under which the norm prescribes forming certain beliefs. We spell out the no guidance argument in more detail and show that there is no such conflation.

  • 294.
    Goranko, Valentin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Logic as a Tool: A Guide to Formal Logical Reasoning2016Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The book explains the grammar, semantics and use of classical logical languages and teaches the reader how grasp the meaning and translate them to and from natural language.  It illustrates with extensive examples the use of the most popular deductive systems -- axiomatic systems, semantic tableaux, natural deduction, and resolution -- for formalising and automating logical reasoning both on propositional and on first-order level,  and provides the reader with technical skills needed for practical derivations in them.  Systematic guidelines are offered on how to perform logically correct and well-structured reasoning using these deductive systems and the reasoning techniques that they employ. 

  • 295.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Dam, Mads
    Computer Science Logic 20172017Conference proceedings (editor) (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Computer Science Logic (CSL) is the annual conference of the European Association for Computer Science Logic (EACSL). It is an interdisciplinary conference, spanning across both basic and application oriented research in mathematical logic and computer science. CSL started as a series of international workshops on Computer Science Logic, and became at its sixth meeting the Annual Conference of the EACSL.

    The 26th annual EACSL conference Computer Science Logic (CSL 2017) was held in Stockholm from August 20 to August 24, 2017. CSL 2017 was organised jointly by members of the Departments of Philosophy and of Mathematics and Stockholm University, and of the Department of Theoretical Computer Science at KTH Royal Institute of Technology.

  • 296.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Galton, Antony
    Temporal Logic2015In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 1095-5054, E-ISSN 1095-5054Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 297.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Johannesburg, South Africa.
    Jamroga, Wojciech
    State and Path Coalition Effectivity Models for Logics of Multi-Player Games2016In: Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, ISSN 1387-2532, E-ISSN 1573-7454, Vol. 30, no 3, p. 446-485Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We consider models of multi-player games where abilities of players and coalitions are defined in terms of sets of outcomes which they can effectively enforce. We extend the well-studied state effectivity models of one-step games in two different ways. On the one hand, we develop multiple state effectivity functions associated with different long-term temporal operators. On the other hand, we define and study coalitional path effectivity models where the outcomes of strategic plays are infinite paths. For both extensions we obtain representation results with respect to concrete models arising from concurrent game structures. We also apply state and path coalitional effectivity models to provide alternative, arguably more natural and elegant semantics to the alternating-time temporal logic ATL*, and discuss their technical and conceptual advantages.

  • 298.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Johannesburg, South Africa.
    Kuijer, Louwe B.
    On the Length and Depth of Temporal Formulae Distinguishing Non-bisimilar Transition Systems2016In: 23rd International Symposium on Temporal Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings / [ed] Curtis Dyreson, Michael R. Hansen, Luke Hunsberger, IEEE Computer Society, 2016, p. 177-185Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We investigate the minimal length and nesting depth of temporal formulae that distinguish two given non-bisimilar finite pointed transition systems. We show that such formula can always be constructed in length at most exponential in the combined number of states of both transition systems, and give an example with exponential lower bound, for several common temporal languages. We then show that by using renamings of subformulae or explicit assignments the length of the distinguishing formula can always be reduced to one that is bounded above by a cubic polynomial on the combined size of both transition systems. This is also a bound for the size obtained by using DAG representation of formulae. We also prove that the minimal nesting depth for such formula is less than the combined size of the two state spaces and obtain some tight upper bounds.

  • 299.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Johannesburg, South Africa.
    Kuusisto, Antti
    University of Bremen, Germany.
    LOGICS FOR PROPOSITIONAL DETERMINACY AND INDEPENDENCE2018In: The Review of Symbolic Logic, ISSN 1755-0203, E-ISSN 1755-0211Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We introduce and study formal logics for reasoning about propositional determinacy and independence. These relate naturally with the philosophical concept of supervenience, which can also be regarded as a generalisation of logical consequence. Propositional Dependence Logic D, and Propositional Independence Logic I are recently developed logical systems, based on team semantics, that provide a framework for such reasoning tasks. We introduce two new logics L_D and L_I, based on Kripke semantics, and propose them as alternatives for D and I, respectively. We analyse and compare the relative expressive powers of these four logics and also discuss how they relate to the natural language use and meaning of the concepts of determinacy and independence. We argue that L_D and L_I naturally resolve a range of interpretational problems that arise in D and I. We also obtain sound and complete axiomatizations for L_D and L_I and relate them with the recently studied inquisitive logics and their semantics.

  • 300.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kuusisto, Antti
    University of Bremen, Germany.
    Rönnholm, Raine
    University of Tampere, Finland.
    CTL with finitely bounded semantics2017In: Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Temporal Representation and Reasoning (TIME'2017) / [ed] Sven Schewe, Thomas Schneider, Jef Wijsen, Schloss Dagstuhl: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik , 2017, p. 14:1-14:19Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We consider a variation of the branching time logic CTL with non-standard, “finitely bounded”semantics (FBS). FBS is naturally defined as game-theoretic semantics where the proponent oftruth of an eventuality must commit to a time limit (number of transition steps) within which theformula should become true on all (resp. some) paths starting from the state where the formulais evaluated. The resulting version CTL_FB of CTL differs essentially from the standard one asit no longer has the finite model property.We develop two tableaux systems for CTL_FB. The first one deals with infinite sets of formulae,whereas the second one deals with finite sets of formulae in a slightly extended language allowingexplicit indication of time limits in formulae. We prove soundness and completeness of bothsystems and also show that the latter tableaux system provides an EXPTIME decision procedurefor it and thus prove EXPTIME-completeness of the satisfiability problem.

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