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  • 301.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Looks, Reasons, and Experiences2014In: Does Perception Have Content? / [ed] Berit Brogaard, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 76-102Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to the phenomenal belief account of perceptual experience I have suggested elsewhere, experience is a kind of belief. These beliefs have contents of a special form or type: While their objects are ordinary material objects, the properties they ascribe to these objects are 'phenomenal' properties, properties such as looking red or looking round. In this paper, I shall further develop this account by defending it against two objections: a) the objection that ultimately, no plausible epistemology can be built upon experiences with phenomenal contents. And b) the objection that phenomenal ‘looks’ is a propositional attitude operator and therefore cannot be used in specifying the content of experience. First, however, I shall argue that the intuitive inferential integration of experience into our system of beliefs provides one of the strongest motivations for construing experiences as having propositional content in the first place. The phenomenal belief account provides one good way of accommodating this inferential integration. Defending it thus is one way of defending the claim that experience indeed has propositional content.

  • 302.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Martin on the Semantics of 'Looks'2013In: Thought, ISSN 2161-2234, Vol. 1, no 4, p. 292-300Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A natural way of understanding (non-epistemic) looks talk in natural language is phenomenalist: to ascribe looks to objects is to say something about the way they strike us when we look at them. This explains why the truth values of looks-sentences intuitively vary with the circumstances with respect to which they are evaluated. But Mike Martin (2010) argues that there is no semantic reason to prefer a phenomenalist understanding of looks to “Parsimony”, the position according to which looks are basic visible properties. He suggests a semantics for looks-sentences that explains their intuitive truth values and is compatible with Parsimony. I argue that there is semantic reason to prefer a phenomenalist understanding of looks to a parsimonious one since there is a simpler semantics compatible with a phenomenalist understanding of looks, but not with Parsimony. This semantics provides a better explanation of the relevant truth value distribution

  • 303.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Passing Theories2011In: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences / [ed] Patrick Colm Hogan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 588-589Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 304.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Perception and Intermediaries2012In: Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental / [ed] Gerhard Preyer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 192-213Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 305.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Radical Interpretation2011In: The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences / [ed] Patrick Colm Hogan, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 697-699Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 306.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rule-Following and Charity: Wittgenstein and Davidson on Meaning Determination2017In: Wittgenstein and Davidson on Thought, Language, and Action / [ed] Claudine Verheggen, Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 69-96Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The project of this chapter is to explore some relations between the rule-following considerations and radical interpretation. I spell out the sense in which the rule-following considerations are about meaning determination, and investigate whether the principle of meaning determination used in the early Davidson's account of meaning determination - the principle of charity - provides an answer to what I shall call "Wittgenstein's paradox". More precisely, I am interested in one aspect of the paradox: the "problem of objectivity". My question then is whether meaning, as determined by charity, is such that the correctness of the applications of meaningful expressions is an objective matter. After running us through the basics of the radical interpretation account of meaning determination I argue that the principle of charity does seem to fall prey to the problem of objectivity. After unsuccessfully trying to rescue objectivity by means of Lewisian natural properties, this is the verdict I in the end endorse.

  • 307.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Theories of Meaning and Truth Conditions2012In: The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language / [ed] Manuel García-Carpintero; Max Kölbel, London/New York: Continuum, 2012, p. 84-105Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 308.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pagin, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Reply to Forbes2012In: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 72, no 2, p. 298-303Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In earlier work (Glüer, K. and P. Pagin. 2006. Proper names and relational modality. Linguistics & Philosophy 29: 507–35; Glüer, K. and P. Pagin. 2008. Relational modality. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 17: 307–22), we developed a semantics for (metaphysical) modal operators that accommodates Kripkean intuitions about proper names in modal contexts even if names are not rigid designators. Graeme Forbes (2011. The problem of factives for sense theories. Analysis 71: 654–62.) criticizes our proposal. He argues that our semantics predicts readings for certain natural language sentences which these simply do not have. These sentences contain mixed contexts involving factive attitude verbs. We argue that the readings our semantics predicts do indeed exist, even if it might take a little work to bring them out. Moreover, denying their existence would have some rather unattractive consequences.

  • 309.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Aiming at Truth: On the Role of Belief2013In: Teorema, ISSN 0210-1602, Vol. 32, no 3, p. 137-162Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We explore the possibility of characterizing belief wholly in terms of its first-order functional role, its input (evidence) and output (further beliefs and actions), by addressing some common challenges to the view. One challenge concerns the fact that not all belief is evidence-sensitive. In response to this, normativists and teleo-functionalists have concluded that something over and above functional role is needed, a norm or a telos. We argue that both allow for implausibly much divergence between belief and evidence. Others have suggested that belief should be saved as the evidence-sensitive attitude, by making it share its motivational role with an hitherto unrecognized state: alief. We argue that the appeal to alief faces a dilemma: Either explanation of intentional action by means of alief is a species of intentional explanation, in which case it becomes hard to distinguish alief from (irrational) belief, or alief is sufficiently different from belief, but then neither the explanation nor the explanandum (action) are recognizably intentional any longer. We conclude that the most promising way forward is an account of belief that makes use of the full functional role of belief, including its role in theoretical reasoning.

  • 310.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Reasons for Belief and Normativity2017In: Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity / [ed] Daniel Star, Oxford University Press, 2017Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 311.
    Glüer-Pagin, Kathrin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Truth Norm and Guidance: a Reply to Steglich-Petersen2010In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 119, no 475, p. 757-761Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We have claimed that truth norms cannot provide genuine guidance for belief formation (Glüer and Wikforss 2009, pp. 43–4). Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen argues that our ‘no guidance argument’ fails because it conflates certain psychological states an agent must have in order to apply the truth norm with the condition under which the norm prescribes forming certain beliefs. We spell out the no guidance argument in more detail and show that there is no such conflation.

  • 312.
    Goranko, Valentin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Logic as a Tool: A Guide to Formal Logical Reasoning2016Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The book explains the grammar, semantics and use of classical logical languages and teaches the reader how grasp the meaning and translate them to and from natural language.  It illustrates with extensive examples the use of the most popular deductive systems -- axiomatic systems, semantic tableaux, natural deduction, and resolution -- for formalising and automating logical reasoning both on propositional and on first-order level,  and provides the reader with technical skills needed for practical derivations in them.  Systematic guidelines are offered on how to perform logically correct and well-structured reasoning using these deductive systems and the reasoning techniques that they employ. 

  • 313.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Dam, Mads
    Computer Science Logic 20172017Conference proceedings (editor) (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Computer Science Logic (CSL) is the annual conference of the European Association for Computer Science Logic (EACSL). It is an interdisciplinary conference, spanning across both basic and application oriented research in mathematical logic and computer science. CSL started as a series of international workshops on Computer Science Logic, and became at its sixth meeting the Annual Conference of the EACSL.

    The 26th annual EACSL conference Computer Science Logic (CSL 2017) was held in Stockholm from August 20 to August 24, 2017. CSL 2017 was organised jointly by members of the Departments of Philosophy and of Mathematics and Stockholm University, and of the Department of Theoretical Computer Science at KTH Royal Institute of Technology.

  • 314.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Enqvist, Sebastian
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Socially Friendly and Group Protecting Coalition Logics2018In: Proc. of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2018) / [ed] M. Dastani, G. Sukthankar, E. André, S. Koenig, The International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2018, p. 372-380Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We consider extensions of Coalition Logic (CL) which can express statements about inter-related powers of coalitions to achieve their respective goals. In particular, we introduce and study two new extensions of CL. One of them is the “Socially Friendly Coalition Logic” SFCL, which is also a multi-agent extension of the recently introduced “Instantial Neighborhood Logic” INL. SFCL can express the claim that a coalition has a collective strategy to guarantee achieving its explicitly stated goal while acting in a ‘socially friendly way’, by enabling the remaining agents to achieve other (again, explicitly stated) goals of their choice. The other new extension is the “Group Protecting Coalition Logic” GPCL which enables reasoning about entire coalitional goal assignments, in which every group of agents has its own specified goal. GPCL can express claims to the effect that there is an action profile of the grand coalition such that, by playing it, every sub-coalition of agents can guarantee satisfaction of its own private goal (and thus, protect its own interests) while acting towards achievement of the common goal of the grand coalition. For each of these logics, we discuss its expressiveness, introduce the respective notion of bisimulation and prove bisimulation invariance and Hennessy-Milner property. We then also present sound and complete axiomatic systems and prove decidability for both logics.

  • 315.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Galton, Antony
    Temporal Logic2015In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 1095-5054, E-ISSN 1095-5054Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 316.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Johannesburg, South Africa.
    Jamroga, Wojciech
    State and Path Coalition Effectivity Models for Logics of Multi-Player Games2016In: Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, ISSN 1387-2532, E-ISSN 1573-7454, Vol. 30, no 3, p. 446-485Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We consider models of multi-player games where abilities of players and coalitions are defined in terms of sets of outcomes which they can effectively enforce. We extend the well-studied state effectivity models of one-step games in two different ways. On the one hand, we develop multiple state effectivity functions associated with different long-term temporal operators. On the other hand, we define and study coalitional path effectivity models where the outcomes of strategic plays are infinite paths. For both extensions we obtain representation results with respect to concrete models arising from concurrent game structures. We also apply state and path coalitional effectivity models to provide alternative, arguably more natural and elegant semantics to the alternating-time temporal logic ATL*, and discuss their technical and conceptual advantages.

  • 317.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Johannesburg, South Africa.
    Kuijer, Louwe B.
    On the Length and Depth of Temporal Formulae Distinguishing Non-bisimilar Transition Systems2016In: 23rd International Symposium on Temporal Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings / [ed] Curtis Dyreson, Michael R. Hansen, Luke Hunsberger, IEEE Computer Society, 2016, p. 177-185Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We investigate the minimal length and nesting depth of temporal formulae that distinguish two given non-bisimilar finite pointed transition systems. We show that such formula can always be constructed in length at most exponential in the combined number of states of both transition systems, and give an example with exponential lower bound, for several common temporal languages. We then show that by using renamings of subformulae or explicit assignments the length of the distinguishing formula can always be reduced to one that is bounded above by a cubic polynomial on the combined size of both transition systems. This is also a bound for the size obtained by using DAG representation of formulae. We also prove that the minimal nesting depth for such formula is less than the combined size of the two state spaces and obtain some tight upper bounds.

  • 318.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Johannesburg, South Africa.
    Kuusisto, Antti
    LOGICS FOR PROPOSITIONAL DETERMINACY AND INDEPENDENCE2018In: The Review of Symbolic Logic, ISSN 1755-0203, E-ISSN 1755-0211, Vol. 11, no 3, p. 470-506Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We introduce and study formal logics for reasoning about propositional determinacy and independence. These relate naturally with the philosophical concept of supervenience, which can also be regarded as a generalisation of logical consequence. Propositional Dependence Logic D, and Propositional Independence Logic I are recently developed logical systems, based on team semantics, that provide a framework for such reasoning tasks. We introduce two new logics L_D and L_I, based on Kripke semantics, and propose them as alternatives for D and I, respectively. We analyse and compare the relative expressive powers of these four logics and also discuss how they relate to the natural language use and meaning of the concepts of determinacy and independence. We argue that L_D and L_I naturally resolve a range of interpretational problems that arise in D and I. We also obtain sound and complete axiomatizations for L_D and L_I and relate them with the recently studied inquisitive logics and their semantics.

  • 319.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kuusisto, Antti
    University of Bremen, Germany.
    Rönnholm, Raine
    University of Tampere, Finland.
    CTL with finitely bounded semantics2017In: Proceedings of the 24th International Symposium on Temporal Representation and Reasoning (TIME'2017) / [ed] Sven Schewe, Thomas Schneider, Jef Wijsen, Schloss Dagstuhl: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik , 2017, p. 14:1-14:19Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We consider a variation of the branching time logic CTL with non-standard, “finitely bounded”semantics (FBS). FBS is naturally defined as game-theoretic semantics where the proponent oftruth of an eventuality must commit to a time limit (number of transition steps) within which theformula should become true on all (resp. some) paths starting from the state where the formulais evaluated. The resulting version CTL_FB of CTL differs essentially from the standard one asit no longer has the finite model property.We develop two tableaux systems for CTL_FB. The first one deals with infinite sets of formulae,whereas the second one deals with finite sets of formulae in a slightly extended language allowingexplicit indication of time limits in formulae. We prove soundness and completeness of bothsystems and also show that the latter tableaux system provides an EXPTIME decision procedurefor it and thus prove EXPTIME-completeness of the satisfiability problem.

  • 320.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kuusisto, Antti
    University of Bremen, Germany.
    Rönnholm, Raine
    University of Tampere, Finland.
    Game-Theoretic Semantics for Alternating-Time Temporal Logic2016In: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems / [ed] J. Thangarajah, K. Tuyls, C. M. Jonker, S. Marsella, The International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2016, p. 671-679Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We introduce versions of game-theoretic semantics (GTS) for Alternating-Time Temporal Logic (ATL). In GTS, truth is defined in terms of existence of a winning strategy in a semantic evaluation game, and thus the game-theoretic perspective appears in the framework of ATL on two semantic levels: on the object level, in the standard semantics of the strategic operators, and on the meta-level, where game-theoretic logical semantics can be applied to ATL. We unify these two perspectives into semantic evaluation games specially designed for ATL. The novel game-theoretic perspective enables us to identify new variants of the semantics of ATL, based on limiting the time resources available to the verifier and falsifier in the semantic evaluation game; we introduce and analyse an unbounded and bounded GTS and prove these to be equivalent to the standard (Tarski-style) compositional semantics. We also introduce a non-equivalent finitely bounded semantics and argue that it is natural from both logical and game-theoretic perspectives.

  • 321.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Johannesburg, South Africa.
    Kuusisto, Antti
    Rönnholm, Raine
    Game-Theoretic Semantics for Alternating-Time Temporal Logic2018In: ACM Transactions on Computational Logic, ISSN 1529-3785, E-ISSN 1557-945X, Vol. 19, no 3, article id 17Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We introduce several versions of game-theoretic semantics (GTS) for Alternating-Time Temporal Logic (ATL). In GTS, truth is defined in terms of existence of a winning strategy in a semantic evaluation game. Thus, the game-theoretic perspective appears in the framework of ATL on two semantic levels: on the object level in the standard semantics of the strategic operators and on the meta-level, where game-theoretic logical semantics is applied to ATL. We unify these two perspectives into semantic evaluation games specially designed for ATL. The game-theoretic perspective enables us to identify new variants of the semantics of ATL based on limiting the time resources available to the verifier and falsifier in the semantic evaluation game. We introduce and analyze an unbounded and (ordinal) bounded GTS and prove these to be equivalent to the standard (Tarski-style) compositional semantics. We show that, in bounded GTS, truth of ATL formulae can always be determined in finite time, that is, without constructing infinite paths. We also introduce a nonequivalent finitely bounded semantics and argue that it is natural from both logical and game-theoretic perspectives.

  • 322.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Johannesburg, South Africa.
    Kuusisto, Antti
    Rönnholm, Raine
    Game-Theoretic Semantics for ATL+ with Applications to Model Checking2017In: Proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'2017) / [ed] S. Das, E. Durfee, K. Larson, M. Winikoff, The International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS), 2017, p. 1277-1285Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We develop a game-theoretic semantics (GTS) for the fragment ATL+ of the Alternating-time Temporal Logic ATL∗, essentially extending a recently introduced GTS for ATL. We show that the new game-theoretic semantics is equivalent to the standard compositional semantics of ATL+ (with perfect-recall strategies). Based on the new semantics, we providean analysis of the memory and time resources needed formodel checking ATL+ and show that strategies of the verifier that use only a very limited amount of memory suffice. Furthermore, using the GTS we provide a new algorithm for model checking ATL+ and identify a natural hierarchy of tractable fragments of ATL+ that extend ATL.

  • 323.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kuusisto, Antti
    University of Bremen, Germany.
    Rönnholm, Raine
    University of Tampere, Finland.
    Rational coordination in games with enriched representations2018In: Multi-Agent Systems and Agreement Technologies: 15th European Conference EUMAS 2017 / [ed] Francesco Belardinelli and Estefanía Argente, Berlin: Springer, 2018, Vol. 10676, p. 323-338Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We consider pure win-lose coordination games where the representation of the game structure has additional features that are commonly known to the players, such as colouring, naming, or ordering of the available choices or of the players. We study how the information provided by such enriched representations affects the solvability of these games by means of principles of rational reasoning in coordination scenarios with no prior communication or conventions.

  • 324.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kuusisto, Antti
    University of Bremen, Germany.
    Rönnholm, Raine
    University of Tampere, Finland.
    Rational coordination with no communication or conventions2017In: Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Logic, Rationality and Interaction (LORI VI) / [ed] Alexandru Baltag, Jeremy Seligman, Tomoyuki Yamada, Springer, 2017, p. 33-48Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, ‘win’ or ‘lose’. We identify and discuss a range of ‘purely rational principles’ guiding the reasoning of rational players in such games and analyse which classes of coordination games can be solved by such players with no preplay communication or conventions. We observe that it is highly nontrivial to delineate a boundary between purely rational principles and other decision methods, such as conventions, for solving such coordination games.

  • 325.
    Goranko, Valentin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Johannesburg, South Africa.
    Turrini, Paolo
    Two-player preplay negotiation games with conditional offers2016In: International Game Theory Review, ISSN 0219-1989, Vol. 18, no 1, article id 1550017Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, contingent on the recipient playing the strategy indicated in the offer. Such offers transform the payoff matrix of the original game but preserve its non-cooperative nature. The type of offers we focus on here are conditional on a suggested matching offer of the same kind made in return by the receiver. Players can exchange a series of such offers, thus engaging in a bargaining process before a strategic normal form game is played. In this paper we study and analyse solution concepts for two-player normal form games with such preplay negotiation phase, under several assumptions for the bargaining power of the players, as well as the value of time for the players in such negotiations. We obtain results describing the possible solutions of such bargaining games and analyse the degrees of efficiency and fairness that can be achieved in such negotiation process. We show the similarities and the differences with a variety of frameworks in the literature of bargaining games and games with a preplay phase. 

  • 326.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Anmärkningar kring den omänskliga lyckan hos Aristoteles2006In: Aigis, ISSN 1901-6859, E-ISSN 1901-6859, Vol. 6, no 2 Supplement, p. 1-11Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 327.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Listening to Reason in Aristotle's Moral Psychology2007In: Oxford studies in ancient philosophy, ISSN 0265-7651, Vol. 32, p. 251-271Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 328.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Notes on Nicomachean ethics 1173a2–52016In: Classical Quarterly, ISSN 0009-8388, E-ISSN 1471-6844, Vol. 66, no 2, p. 484-490Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Nicomachean Ethics (= Eth. Nic.) 10.2, Aristotle addresses Eudoxus' argument that pleasure is the chief good in his characteristically dialectical manner. The argument is that pleasure is the chief good, since all creatures, rational (ἔλλογα) and non-rational (ἄλογα) alike, are perceived to aim at pleasure (1172b9–11). At 1172b35–1173a5, Aristotle turns to an objection against Eudoxus' argument. For some object (οἱ δ’ἐνιστάμενοι) to the argument by questioning one of its premisses, namely that what all creatures aim at is the good (1172b12–15). Instead, they claim that what all creatures aim at is not good (ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οὗ πάντ’ ἐφίεται, 1172b36). This claim is reasonably taken to mean that not everything that all creatures aim at is good. But, as we shall shortly see, Aristotle dismisses it in a way suggesting a less charitable interpretation. At any rate, the significance of this objection is that it challenges the strong claim that what all creatures aim at is the good with an argument against the weaker claim that what all creatures aim at is good (or a good). For if the weaker claim is refuted, then the strong claim is refuted as well. Aristotle takes issue with the argument against the weaker claim, but without committing himself to the strong claim.

  • 329.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Paula Gottlieb, The Virtue of Aristotle's Ethics, Cambridge UP, 20092009In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617, Vol. 9, no 37Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 330.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Plato on perceptual cognition2001Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of the study is to spell out and consider Plato' s views on perceptual cog­nition. It is argued that Plato is cornrnitted to the view that perceptual cognition can be rational, and that beliefs about the sensible world need not be confused or ill-founded. Plato' s interest in the matter arises from worries over the way in which his fore­runners and contemporaries conceived of perceptual cognition. They conceived of cognitive processes in terms of corporeal changes and attempted to explain perceptual cognition in causal terms. The problem with such accounts, according to Plato, is that they make perceptual cognition an entirely passive process, and seem incapable of accommodating the freedom of reason. Plato's main target is Protagoras' view on cognition and he accuses him of con­flating different cognitive phenomena that ought to be kept apart. More particularly, he suggests that Protagoras' 'man the measure' thesis is based on the conflation of sen se perception (aisthesis), belief (doxa) and appearing (phantasia), and that Protagoras is cornmitted to the view that beliefs are arrived at in a non-rational way. It is shown how Plato takes issue with Protagoras by disentangling these three cognitive phenomena. It is argued that Plato' s way of understanding these notions leaves room for the possibility that reason plays apart in perceptual cognition and that we arrive at beliefs in a rational way. In the course of spelling out the argument, Plato' s views on a number of topics are scrutinised: the perceptual mechanism; the objects of sense perception; perceptual content; the nature of belief; the eon trast between belief and appearing; the nation of reason.

  • 331.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Two kinds of belief in Plato2013In: Journal of the history of philosophy, ISSN 0022-5053, E-ISSN 1538-4586, Vol. 51, no 1, p. 1-19Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this paper is to clarify a distinction between two kinds of belief in Plato’s Theaetetus and the Sophist. In the Sophist, Plato distinguishes between phantasia, which occurs “through sense perception,” and doxa, which occurs “according to thinking.” What distinguishes these two kinds of belief is the believer’s understanding of the thing the belief is about, as a result of the way in which each kind of belief is formed. A doxa is formed through a particular kind of thinking, and the person having it grasps the nature of the thing. A phantasia, by contrast, is formed through sense perception, and the person having it grasps the mere appearance of the thing. 

  • 332.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Why is Aristotle’s vicious person miserable?2015In: The Quest for the Good Life: Ancient Philosophers on Happiness / [ed] Øyvind Rabbås, Eyjólfur K. Emilsson, Hallvard Fossheim, Miira Tuominen, Oxford University Press, 2015, p. 146-163Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The question raised in this chapter is why Aristotle portrays the bad person as being in a miserable state. It is argued that the bad person suffers from a mental conflict, which consists of a clash between two different kinds of desire, and that fulfilling one of the desires violates values that she also desires. But in contrast to the akratic person, the bad person has no proper conception of the good. Nevertheless, although the bad person may succeed in achieving what she thinks is good, she feels miserable not only on account of failing to fulfil her desire for the truly good life, but also on account of doing things that she finds degrading for her.

  • 333.
    Grönroos, Gösta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Wish, Motivation and the Human Good in Aristotle2015In: Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy, ISSN 0031-8868, E-ISSN 1568-5284, Vol. 60, no 1, p. 60-87Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Aristotle invokes a specifically human desire, namely wish (boulesis), to provide a teleological explanation of the pursuit of the specifically human good in terms of virtuous activity. Wish is a basic, unreasoned desire which, independently of other desires, or evaluative attitudes, motivates the pursuit of the human good. Even a person who pursues what she mistakenly believes to be good is motivated by wish for what in fact is good, although she is oblivious of it.

  • 334.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Bemerkninger om Cavell og Austin2008In: Agora: Journal for metafysisk spekulation, ISSN 0800-7136, Vol. 26, no 1-2, p. 49-65Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 335.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Berkeley och det sunda förnuftet1997In: Vidgade perspektiv, Uppsala universitet, Uppsala , 1997, p. 109-119Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 336.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Custom and Origin: The Place of Ordinary Language in Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's Thinking2000In: Herder and Humboldt: Language and Culture, Höyskoleforlaget, Kristiansand , 2000, p. 169-180Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 337.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Entangled Sense: An Inquiry into the Philosophical Significance of Meaning and Rules2000Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 338.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Filosoferna och ensamheten2006In: Den moderna ensamheten, Symposion, Stockholm , 2006, p. 173-186Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 339.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Filosofin genom tiderna: 1900-talet. Före 19502010Collection (editor) (Other academic)
  • 340.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    How Do I Know that the Colour that I am Now Seeing Is Called 'Green'?2001In: Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy: A Reassessment after 50 Years: Papers of the 24th International Wittgenstein Symposium, 2001, p. 288-294Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 341.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kan man låtsas vara vaken?2008In: Tankar tillägnade Sören Stenlund, 2008, p. 251-260Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 342.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Meaning, Saying, Truth2002In: The Practice of Language / [ed] Martin Gustafsson and Lars Hertzberg, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, p. 177-197Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 343.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Nonsense and Philosophical Method2006In: Wittgenstein and the Method of Philosophy, Societas Philosophica Fennica, Helsingfors , 2006, p. 11-34Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 344.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Några kommentarer till Wittgensteins Om Visshet1995In: Filosofisk tidskrift, Vol. 16, p. 41-48Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 345.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On Rawls's Distinction between Perfect and Imperfect Procedural Justice2004In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 34, p. 300-305Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 346.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Perfect Pitch and Austinian Examples: Cavell, McDowell, Wittgenstein, and the Philosophical Significance of Ordinary Language2005In: Inquiry, Vol. 48, p. 356-389Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 347.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Quine on Explication and Elimination2006In: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 36, p. 57-70Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 348.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Regelföljande och moralfilosofins uppgift1996In: Filosofisk tidskrift, Vol. 17, p. 3-21Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 349.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Review of R. Brandom (ed.), Rorty and His Critics2001In: Philosophical Review, Vol. 110, p. 645-650Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 350.
    Gustafsson, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Review of S. Mulhall, Inheritance and Originality. Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard2002In: European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 10, p. 255-260Article, book review (Refereed)
45678910 301 - 350 of 895
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