Change search
Refine search result
6789101112 401 - 450 of 895
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Rows per page
  • 5
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100
  • 250
Sort
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
Select
The maximal number of hits you can export is 250. When you want to export more records please use the Create feeds function.
  • 401.
    Ingelström, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Vetenskaplighet2016In: Kritiskt tänkande: i teori och praktik / [ed] Elin Sporrong, Karin Westin Tikkanen, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2016, p. 111-138Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Vetenskaplig kunskap angår oss alla. Även utanför forskarvärlden använder vi oss dagligen av kunskap om hur världen fungerar. Såväl politiker som resonerar kring samhällsomfattande beslut som föräldrar som funderar hur de bäst ska ta hand om sina barn, förlitar sig på en uppfattning av vad verkligheten består av och hur saker och ting hänger samman. När vi agerar i världen utgår vi från teorier om hur världen fungerar. En teori kan sägas vara en grundläggandeberättelse, en berättelse som ger svar på frågor om varför och hur. Berättelser kommer i många former. Vetenskapen söker de riktiga berättelserna ,de som ger oss korrekta förklaringar. I detta kapitel beskriver vi de vetenskapliga berättelserna och klargör vad de består av. Vetenskaplighet handlar om att förstå vad vetenskaplig kunskap är, förstå nyttan av den och kunna avgöra vilka teorier, rön och forskningsresultat vi ska lita på. Kapitlet beskriver översiktligt vetenskapens roll i strävan efter kunskap, vad kunskap är, vad vetenskapliga teorier består av och hur de används. Avslutningsvis presenteras tre kriterier som kan användas för att identifiera god vetenskap.

  • 402.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Anthony Brueckner Essays on Skepticism2013In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5817, E-ISSN 1558-5816, Vol. 79, no 4, p. 378-382Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 403.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Book Review: The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud, edited by Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny, and Wai-Hung Wong.2014In: international journal for the Study of Skepticism, ISSN 2210-5697, Vol. 4, no 2, p. 145-151Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 404.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Defeater Goes External2017In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 45, no 2, p. 701-715Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper proposes a new externalist account of defeaters, in terms of reliable indicators, as an integral part of a unified externalist account of warrant and defeat. It is argued that posing externalist conditions on warrant, but internalist conditions on defeat lead to undesirable tensions. The proposal is contrasted to some rival accounts and then tested on some widely discussed cases, like the airport case. Misleading defeaters, where Laurence BonJour's reliable clairvoyants serve as examples, also receive treatment, partly because they illustrate how internalist constraints are inserted into the set up of the problem and therefore unduly constrain the domain of satisfactory solutions. Lastly, the proposal is defended against some objections. Firstly, that by posing externalist conditions on defeat, the account becomes too open. Secondly, that an externalist account fails to take into account the epistemic assessments of our fellows in the epistemic practice of forming beliefs and making epistemic claims, which can be based on accessible warrant only.

  • 405.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Defeaters and Rising Standards of Justification2008In: Acta Analytica, ISSN 0353-5150, E-ISSN 1874-6349, Vol. 23, no 1, p. 45-54Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this paper is to refute the widespread view that challenging a knowledge-claim always raises the original standards of justification – a view often associated with contextualism. To that purpose the distinction between undermining and overriding defeaters will be used. Three kinds of challenges will be considered that differ in their degree of specification. In all three kinds of challenges, the rising standards of justification model fails to capture the dialectic of justification in the case of undermining defeaters. At the end, the skeptical challenge will more briefly be given a similar analysis.

  • 406.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Empirical Indefeasibility and Nonfactuality: Assessing Field's Evaluative Approach to the A Priori2010In: Croatian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1333-1108, Vol. 10, no 30, p. 183-197Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Hartry Field has recently presented an original and interesting approach to the a priori. Its main theses are, first, that certain rules are empirically indefeasible and, second, that the reasonableness of these rules are not based on any factual property. After an introduction, Field’s approach is presented in section II. Section III examines his claims concerning empirical indefeasibility. It will be argued that his general argument for empirical indefeasibility fails along with the particular examples of rules he gives. Alternative ways of preserving empirical indefeasibility are suggested that are compatible with overdetermination under certain assumptions. In section IV, Field’s arguments for the nonfactuality of epistemological concepts, such as reasonableness, are found wanting. At the end, an alternative way of understanding the link between the epistemological concept in question and truth-conduciveness is proposed that preserves the factuality of the epistemological concept.

  • 407.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Förståelse ur ett kunskapsteoretiskt perspektiv2018In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 39, no 3, p. 63-71Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 408.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Getting a Grasp of the Grasping Involved in Understanding2018In: Acta Analytica, ISSN 0353-5150, E-ISSN 1874-6349, Vol. 33, no 3, p. 371-383Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper investigates some epistemic properties that distinguish understanding from knowledge. In particular, the focus is on how to spell out the notion of grasping the relationships between propositions that constitute objectual understanding: what kind of epistemic access is required for grasping to occur and to what extent is the act of grasping voluntary? A modest form of access is suggested as an answer to the first question and a largely negative answer to the second. The worry that my suggestion is too permissive in crediting subjects with understanding is addressed. The results are then finally briefly contrasted to Ernest Sosa's notion of knowing full well where one contrast precisely concerns the voluntary character of the respective epistemic states.

  • 409.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Knowledge versus Understanding: The Cost of Avoiding Gettier2012In: Acta Analytica, ISSN 0353-5150, E-ISSN 1874-6349, Vol. 27, no 2, p. 183-197Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the current discussion on epistemic value, several philosophers argue that understanding enjoys higher epistemological significance and epistemic value than knowledge-the epistemic state the epistemological tradition has been preoccupied with. By noting a tension between the necessary conditions for understanding in the perhaps most prominent of these philosophers, Jonathan Kvanvig, this paper disputes the higher epistemological relevance of understanding. At the end, on the basis of the results of the previous sections, some alternative comparative contrasts between knowledge and understanding are briefly explored, including one in which an analogue to the KK-principle for knowledge, the "UU-principle", does not hold for a different reason than that for which the former principle fails.

  • 410.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Naturalism and the status of epistemology2001Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 411.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Challenges of Traveling without Itinerary: The Overrding Case2013In: Defeasibility in Philosophy: Knowledge, Agency, Responsibility, and the Law / [ed] Claudia Blöser, Mikael Janvid, Hannes Ole Matthiessen, Marcus Willaschek, Rodopi, 2013, p. 59-73Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    As an important step towards a comprehensive model of challenges and defeaters, it is here argued that securing a previously held epistemic status for a belief in the face of an overriding challenge does not require us to reach a higher epistemic standard than the one the belief originally reached. In the course of the investigation, criteria for when the epistemic status of beliefs are challenged and defeated are suggested. At the end of the paper, these results are then more briefly applied to shed some light on the problem of misleading evidence.

  • 412.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Experiential Defeasibility and Overdetermination of A Priori Justification2008In: Journal of Philosophical Research, ISSN 1053-8364, Vol. 33Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The question whether a belief justified a priori is indefeasible in general and experientially indefeasible in particular has received different answers. In a recent and interesting paper “Experientially Defeasible A Priori Justification”, Joshua Thurow argues that many a priori justified beliefs are defeasible by experience. The argument takes the form of an objection against Albert Casullo’s recent book A Priori Justification where Casullo, according to Thurow, denies that if a justified belief is non-experientially defeasible, then that belief is also experientially defeasible.

    This paper examines Thurow’s two arguments in the first two sections I-II. In the last section, III, an alternative line of argument for Thurow’s thesis is suggested that employs other parts of the framework that Casullo provides – especially the thesis of the overdetermination of justification. It will be argued that the prospects for this suggestion are brighter than for both of Thurow’s arguments.

  • 413.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Value of Lesser Goods: The Epistemic Value of Entitlement2009In: Acta Analytica, ISSN 0353-5150, Vol. 24, no 4, p. 263-274Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Abstract  The notion of entitlement plays an important role in some influential epistemologies. Often the epistemological motive for introducing the concept is to accommodate certain externalist intuitions within an internalist framework or, conversely, to incorporate internalist traits into an otherwise externalist position. In this paper two prominent philosophers will be used as examples: Tyler Burge as a representative of the first option and Fred Dretske as one of the second. However, even on the assumption that the concept of entitlement is sufficiently clarified, accomplishing these results is easier said than done – especially if we also want to ascribe positive epistemic value to entitlement. It will be shown that the epistemic value of entitlement is either granted at the expense of the epistemic value of justification or the value ends up below the level of value at which the epistemologists employing the concept of entitlement are aiming.

  • 414.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Towards a Default and Challenge Model of A Priori Warrant2012In: Journal of Philosophical Research (JPR), ISSN 1053-8364, E-ISSN 2153-7984, Vol. 37, p. 135-154Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper outlines a default and challenge account of a priori warrant by unfolding the three stages of the epistemic dialectic in which such warrant comes to the fore. Among the virtues of this account is that it does not rely on controversial assumptions regarding non-experiential sources of warrant, like intellectual intuition, but instead relies on features of our epistemic practice, more precisely, its default and challenge structure. What distinguishes beliefs to which you are warranted a priori is not that their source of warrant resides in some intellectual faculty, but rather the characteristic ways in which these beliefs can be successfully defended against challenges. The paper ends in a discussion of whether a priori warranted beliefs are empirically indefeasible, arguing that it is misguided to demand such indefeasibility of a priori warranted beliefs since that demand is not made for other sources of warrant. The question that rather should be posed is whether beliefs for which a priori warrant is provided qualify as knowledge on a consistent basis, and this question can be given an affirmative answer even in the face of empirical defeasibility.

  • 415.
    Janvid, Mikael
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Understanding Understanding: An Epistemological Investigation2014In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 42, no 4, p. 971-985Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Understanding has received growing interest from epistemologists in recent years, but no consensus regarding its epistemic properties has yet been reached. This paper extracts, but also rejects, candidates of epistemic properties for construing an epistemological model of understanding from the writings of epistemologists participating in the current discussion surrounding that state. On the basis of these results, a suggestion is put forward according to which understanding is a non-basic epistemic state of warrant rather than knowledge. It is argued that this move provides a satisfactory conciliatory answer to the central question whether understanding is a factive epistemic state. Some differ- ences between understanding and knowledge are recorded along the way: for instance, that in contrast to knowledge, understanding does not require belief and that, even though neither knowledge nor understanding iterates, so that a subject can both know without knowing that she knows, as well as understanding without understanding that she understands, the reasons for the failure is different. 

  • 416. Jebari, Karim
    et al.
    Olsson-Yaouzis, Niklas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    A Game of Stars: Active SETI, radical translation and the Hobbesian trap2018In: Futures: The journal of policy, planning and futures studies, ISSN 0016-3287, E-ISSN 1873-6378, Vol. 101, p. 46-54Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Among scholars dedicated to Search for Extra-terrestrial Intelligence (SETI), the risks and possibilities of actively contacting extra-terrestrials (Active SETI) have been widely discussed. Yet, some fundamental philosophical problems concerning the possibility of translating an alien language have hardly been raised in this context. The proponents of Active SETI assume that, abswould an extra-terrestrial intelligent (ETI) entity choose to contact us, they would use radio signals to convey a coded message that would be possible for us to decode and translate. Furthermore, they argue, were we to transmit a message, then this message would also be possible to translate. However, any interstellar message would, for obvious reasons, be conveyed without context and without the possibility of meaningful interaction over timescales relevant to us. According to the most influential research program in the philosophy of language, the meaning of an utterance is derived from its use in a context and is not intrinsic to the utterance by which it was conveyed. Therefore, while radical translation, i.e. learning an unknown language, is possible, it requires contextualized interaction. Only then can semantic behavior be observed, and utterances linked to meaning. Thus, merely an exchange of signals cannot produce meaningful communication. If this claim is true, there are important game-theoretical consequences of interstellar contact. An informal game theoretical analysis of this scenario, A Game of Stars, is described. This analysis suggests that the lack of communication may lead players into a Hobbesian Trap, where fear impels the players to a risk dominant strategy, potentially resulting in mutual destruction. Our conclusion is that interstellar contact is an underestimated existential risk. If true and given the relative ease of contacting an ETI given the knowledge of its location, information about the existence and location of an ETI would be very dangerous to spread. Thus, knowledge of an ETI and its location would constitute an information hazard.

  • 417.
    Jeppsson, Sofia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Flourishing Dogs: The Case for an Individualized Conception of Welfare and Its Implications2016In: Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, ISSN 1187-7863, E-ISSN 1573-322X, Vol. 29, no 3, p. 425-438Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Martha Nussbaum argues that animals (including ourselves) are entitled to a flourishing life according to the norm for their species. Nussbaum furthermore suggests that in the case of dogs, breed norms as well as species norms are relevant. Her theses capture both common intuitions among laypeople according to which there is something wrong with the breeding of unnatural animals, or animals that are too different from their wild ancestors, and the dog enthusiast's belief that dogs departing from the norms for their breed are tragic. I argue that the high diversity of the dog species and the ultimate arbitrariness of breed norms support the thesis that a conception of welfare must be tied to what the individual requires in order to flourish. In the second part of the paper, I discuss the implications that an individualized (but sufficiently sophisticated) welfare conception has for the breeding of dogs for conformation shows, for the pet market and for the performance of various tasks for which we need working dogs.

  • 418.
    Jeppsson, Sofia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Non-Elusive Freedom Contextualism2016In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 44, no 3, p. 793-808Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    There are powerful arguments for free will scepticism. However, it seems obvious that some of our actions are done of our own free will. It has been argued that we can solve this puzzle by giving 'free' a contextualist analysis. In everyday contexts we are often allowed to ignore sceptical arguments, and can truly say that we acted freely. In the more demanding context of philosophy, it is true that we never do anything freely. Our freedom is elusive; it escapes us as soon as sceptical arguments are brought up. This kind of freedom contextualism has been criticized for conceding too much to the sceptic. Furthermore, it has problematic implications for moral responsibility. I develop an alternative contextualist analysis of 'free', according to which it is proper in certain contexts to ignore sceptical arguments even if they are brought up. Ignoring them is proper when doing so is necessary for engaging in an activity that is obviously justified. I argue that engaging in deliberation and inter-agential interaction with other people are obviously justified activities that require ignoring sceptical arguments. In these contexts, we do have a non-elusive kind of freedom.

  • 419.
    Jeppsson, Sofia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Gothenburg, Sweden; Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Sweden.
    Obesity and Obligation2015In: Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal (Print), ISSN 1054-6863, E-ISSN 1086-3249, Vol. 25, no 1, p. 89-110Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The belief that obese people ought to lose weight and keep it off is widespread, and has a profound negative impact on the lives of the obese. I argue in this paper that most obese people have no such obligation, even if obesity is bad, and caused by calorie input exceeding output. Obese people do not have an obligation to achieve long-term weight loss if this is impossible for them, is worse than the alternative, or requires such an enormous effort in relation to what stands to be gained that this option is supererogatory rather than obligatory. It is highly plausible that most obese people fall into one of these three groups. Politicians may still have obligations to fight obesity, but they ought to do so through progressive politics rather than blaming and shaming.

  • 420.
    Jeppsson, Sofia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Practical Perspective Compatibilism2012Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this dissertation, I argue for what I call “practical perspective compatibilism”. According to this thesis, an agent with practical freedom is sufficiently free to be a moral agent and morally responsible for his or her actions.

    The concept of practical freedom is originally found in the writings of Kant. Kant argued that we can view the world from either a theoretical or a practical perspective. The theoretical perspective is that of causal explanation and prediction, whereas the practical perspective is that of choosing what to do and how to act. We see that we are free when we view things from a practical perspective. Determinism cannot threaten our practical freedom, since from a practical perspective we must choose what to do even if everything ultimately is determined. I argue that practical freedom is sufficient freedom-wise for moral agency and moral responsibility because morality is action-guiding. Right and wrong are concepts to be employed in deliberation and advice. This is a strong reason to regard factors irrelevant to deliberators and advisers as irrelevant when making judgements of right and wrong, and whether somebody had some other kind of freedom than practical freedom is irrelevant to deliberators and advisers. There are also prima facie reasons to regard moral responsibility as tied to rightness and wrongness, so that agents are blameworthy when they did wrong (or subjectively wrong, or what would have been wrong given their state of information and so on) and praiseworthy when they did right (subjectively right and so on). I also show that no classic arguments for incompatibilism about determinism and moral responsibility work when directed against practical perspective compatibilism.

    Finally, this thesis discusses metaethics in relation to compatibilism. Since competing theories imply the falsity of some respected metaethical positions, metaethical considerations lend further support to practical perspective compatibilism.

  • 421.
    Jeppsson, Sofia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences.
    Purebred Dogs and Canine Wellbeing2013In: Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, ISSN 1187-7863, E-ISSN 1573-322X, Vol. 27, no 3, p. 417-430Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Breeders of purebred dogs usually have several goals they want to accomplish, of which canine wellbeing is one. The purpose of this article is to investigate what we ought to do given this goal. Breeders typically think that they fulfil their wellbeing-related duties by doing the best they can within their breed of choice. However, it is true of most breeders that they could produce physically and mentally healthier dogs if they switched to a healthier breed. There are a few breeds that are healthier than other breeds as well as mutts; we could maximize wellbeing for the next generations by focusing all our breeding resources on those. However, in the long run such a strategy would severely deplete the canine gene pool. If we are to breed for wellbeing in the long run, we must thus weigh the benefits of selection against physical and mental problems against the benefits of genetic diversity. The optimal breeding strategy for canine wellbeing is to preserve many breeds, though not all of them. Furthermore, we ought to combine strict health programs with looser barriers between breeds. Such a policy conflicts with the goal of breed preservation, at least if we think of breeds as populations registered within kennel clubs rather than types of dogs, but not with the goal of producing good working dogs capable of performing various tasks.

  • 422.
    Jeppsson, Sofia M. I.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Responsibility problems for criminal justice2014In: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 5, article id 821Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 423.
    Johannesson, Eric
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Analyticity, Necessity and Belief: Aspects of two-dimensional semantics2017Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A glass couldn't contain water unless it contained H2O-molecules. Likewise, a man couldn't be a bachelor unless he was unmarried. Now, the latter is what we would call a conceptual or analytical truth. It's also what we would call a priori. But it's hardly a conceptual or analytical truth that if a glass contains water, then it contains H2O-molecules. Neither is it a priori. The fact that water is composed of H2O-molecules was an empirical discovery made in the eighteenth century. The fact that all bachelors are unmarried was not. But neither is a logical truth, so how do we explain the difference? Two-dimensional semantics is a framework that promises to shed light on these issues. The main purpose of this thesis is to understand and evaluate this framework in relation to various alternatives, to see whether some version of it can be defended. I argue that it fares better than the alternatives. However, much criticism of two-dimensionalism has focused on its alleged inability to provide a proper semantics for certain epistemic operators, in particular the belief operator and the a priori operator. In response to this criticism, a two-dimensional semantics for belief ascriptions is developed using structured propositions. In connection with this, a number of other issues in the semantics of belief ascriptions are addressed, concerning indexicals, beliefs de se, beliefs de re, and the problem of logical omniscience.

  • 424.
    Johannesson, Eric
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Finns det objektiva sannolikheter?2015In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 2Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 425.
    Johannesson, Eric
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Goodmans induktionsproblem2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 4Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 426.
    Johannesson, Eric
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Monty-Hall problemet2017In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 2Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 427.
    Johannesson, Eric
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Partial Semantics for Quantified Modal Logic2018In: Journal of Philosophical Logic, ISSN 0022-3611, E-ISSN 1573-0433, Vol. 47, no 6, p. 1049-1060Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When it comes to Kripke-style semantics for quantified modal logic, there’s a choice to be made concerning the interpretation of the quantifiers. The simple approach is to let quantifiers range over all possible objects, not just objects existing in the world of evaluation, and use a special predicate to make claims about existence (an existence predicate). This is the constant domain approach. The more complicated approach is to assign a domain of objects to each world. This is the varying domain approach. Assuming that all terms denote, the semantics of predication on the constant domain approach is obvious: either the denoted object has the denoted property in the world of evaluation, or it hasn’t. On the varying domain approach, there’s a third possibility: the object in question doesn’t exist. Terms may denote objects not included in the domain of the world of evaluation. The question is whether an atomic formula then should be evaluated as true or false, or if its truth value should be undefined. This question, however, cannot be answered in isolation. The consequences of one’s choice depends on the interpretation of molecular formulas. Should the negation of a formula whose truth value is undefined also be undefined? What about conjunction, universal quantification and necessitation? The main contribution of this paper is to identify two partial semantics for logical operators, a weak and a strong one, which uniquely satisfy a list of reasonable constraints (Theorem 2.1). I also show that, provided that the point of using varying domains is to be able to make certain true claims about existence without using any existence predicate, this result yields two possible partial semantics for quantified modal logic with varying domains.

  • 428.
    Johannesson, Eric
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Packalén, Sara
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The A Priori-Operator and the Nesting Problem2016In: Thought: a journal of philosophy, ISSN 0340-6245, E-ISSN 2161-2234, Vol. 5, no 3, p. 169-176Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Many expressions intuitively have different epistemic and modal profiles. For example, co-referring proper names are substitutable salva veritate in modal contexts but not in belief-contexts. Two-dimensional semantics, according to which terms have both a so-called primary and a secondary intension, is a framework that promises to accommodate and explain these diverging intuitions. The framework can be applied to indexicals, proper names or predicates. Graeme Forbes (2011) argues that the two-dimensional semantics of David Chalmers (2011) fails to account for so-called nested contexts. These are linguistic contexts where a sentence is embedded under both epistemic and modal operators. Chalmers and Rabern (2014) suggest a two-dimensional solution to the problem. Their semantics solves the nesting-problem, but at the cost of invalidating certain plausible principles. We suggest a solution that is both simpler and avoids this cost.

  • 429.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Am I a Series?2009In: TheoriaArticle in journal (Refereed)
  • 430.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Being and Betterness2010In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 22, no 3, p. 285-302Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article I discuss the question of whether a person's existence can be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence. Recently, Nils Holtug and Melinda A. Roberts have defended an affirmative answer. These defenses, I shall argue, do not succeed. In different ways, Holtug and Roberts have got the metaphysics and axiology wrong. However, I also argue that a person's existence can after all be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence, though for reasons other than those provided by Holtug and Roberts

  • 431.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Constituted Simples?2009In: PhilosophiaArticle in journal (Refereed)
  • 432.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time2009In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 12, no 3, p. 247-256Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare — intrinsic value for a person—can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that so long as we keep the tenses and the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction right, the fitting-attitudes analysis of welfare can be shown to survive Heathwood’s criticism.

  • 433.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Francescotti on Fission2009In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0279-0750, E-ISSN 1468-0114, Vol. 90, no 4, p. 476-481Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Most versions of the psychological-continuity approach to personal identity (PCA) contain a ‘non-branching’ requirement. Recently, Robert Francescotti has argued that while such versions of PCA handle Parfit's standard fission case well, they deliver the wrong result in the case of an intact human brain. To solve this problem, he says, PCA-adherents need to add a clause that runs contrary to the spirit of their theory. In this response, I argue that Francescotti's counterexample fails. As a result, the revision he suggests is not needed.

  • 434.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kaufman's Response to Lucretius2008In: Pacific Philosophical QuarterlyArticle in journal (Refereed)
  • 435.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Mortal Beings: On the Metaphysics and Value of Death2005Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This book is a contribution to the debate of the metaphysics and value of death.

    The metaphysical problems of death are closely connected with the debate of personal identity. In Chapter Two, I defend the view that human persons are human organisms. This view, often called "Animalism," is apparently incompatible with a standard account of personal identity over time, "the Psychological View." I try to show how the Animalist can accommodate the intuitions that seem to support the Psychological View.

    In Chapter Three, I discuss the thesis that human persons cease to exist when they die, a thesis that has bearing on several metaphysical and ethical questions. Recently, many materialists have attacked the thesis, arguing that human persons continue to exist after death as corpses. In opposition to this popular view, I argue that human animals, and hence human persons, do go out of existence at death.

    Epicureans deny that death is an evil for the one who dies. Their arguments are based on what will be called "the missing subject problem." In Chapter Four, I aim to show that Epicureanism survives the objections that have been put forward in current literature. But I also argue that a more convincing case can be made against the Epicurean view.

    Anti-Epicureans typically base the view that death is sometimes bad for the deceased on the "deprivation approach." This approach seems to have the unsavory consequence that prenatal non-existence, too, is a great evil. Recently, proponents of the deprivation approach have suggested a number of ways of avoiding this implication. In Chapter Five, I argue that all these attempts fail, and that it is preferable to accept the consequence.

    In Chapter Six I turn to the question of the reasonableness of the special concern that most people have for their own deaths. I claim that this issue should be treated in the light of the more general question of the justifiability of special concern about one's own future. It is often held that such concern is justified if and only if "Non-Reductionism" about personal identity is correct. I argue, on the contrary, that it is unjustified whether or not Non-Reductionism is true.

  • 436.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Non-Reductionism and Special Concern2007In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 85Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 437.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Parfit on Fission2009In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 150, no 1, p. 21-35Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Derek Parfit famously defends a number of surprising views about “fission.” One is that, in such a scenario, it is indeterminate whether I have survived or not. Another is that the fission case shows that it does not matter, in itself, whether I survive or not. Most critics of the first view contend that fission makes me cease to exist. Most opponents of the second view contend that fission does not preserve everything that matters in ordinary survival. In this paper I shall provide a critique that does not rely on either of these contentions. There are other, interrelated reasons to reject Parfit’s defense of the two theses. In particular, the availability of the following view creates trouble for Parfit: I determinately survive fission, but it is indeterminate which fission product I am.

  • 438.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Recension av D. Munter & K. Löfgren, 8 filosofiska texter2008In: Filosofisk tidskriftArticle, book review (Other academic)
  • 439.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Review of L. R. Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life2009In: Philosophical QuarterlyArticle, book review (Other academic)
  • 440.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Roache's Argument against the Cohabitation View2011In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 39, no 2, p. 309-310Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Rebecca Roache's recent critique of David Lewis's cohabitation view assumes that a person cannot be properly concerned about something that rules out that she ever exists. In this brief response, I argue against this assumption.

  • 441.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Time of Death's Badness2011In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, ISSN 0360-5310, E-ISSN 1744-5019Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 442.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Timing Problem2011In: Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Death, Oxford University Press , 2011Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 443.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    What is Animalism?2007In: Ratio: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol. 20, no 2Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 444. Johansson, Jens
    et al.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Against pluralism in metaethics2015In: The Palgrave handbook of philosophical methods / [ed] Christopher Daly, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 593-609Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Disagreement in ethics abounds. This has led some philosophers to argue that there is an irreducible plurality of moral values, duties, obligations, rights, etc., and that there is no universally valid way of balancing them. This kind of moral pluralism in combination with the absence of determinate rankings of values, duties, obligations, rights, etc., has been thought by some to imply that some cases of disagreement in ethics are rationally irresolvable, which in its turn, explains why disagreement in ethics abounds and remains pervasive.

  • 445.
    Johansson, Lars-Göran
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Understanding quantum mechanics: a realist interpretation without hidden variables1992Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 446. Ju, Fengkui
    et al.
    Grilletti, Gianluca
    Goranko, Valentin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Johannesburg, South Africa.
    A logic for temporal conditionals and a solution to the Sea Battle Puzzle2018In: Advances in Modal Logic / [ed] Guram Bezhanishvili, Giovanna D'Agostino, George Metcalfe, Thomas Studer, London: College Publications, 2018, p. 379-398Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Temporal reasoning with conditionals is more complex than both classical temporal reasoning and reasoning with timeless conditionals, and can lead to some rather counter-intuitive conclusions. For instance, Aristotle’s famous “Sea Battle Tomorrow” puzzle leads to a fatalistic conclusion: whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow or not, but that is necessarily the case now. We propose a branching-time logic LTC to formalise reasoning about temporal conditionals and provide that logic with adequate formal semantics. The logic LTC extends the Nexttime fragment of CTL∗ , with operators for model updates, restricting the domain to only future moments where antecedent is still possible to satisfy. We provide formal semantics for these operators that implements the restrictor interpretation of antecedents of temporalized conditionals, by suitably restricting the domain of discourse. As a motivating example, we demonstrate that a naturally formalised in our logic version of the ‘Sea Battle’ argument renders it unsound, thereby providing a solution to the problem with fatalist conclusion that it entails, because its underlying reasoning per cases argument no longer applies when these cases are treated not as material implications but as temporal conditionals. On the technical side, we analyze the semantics of LTC and provide a series of reductions of LTC-formulae, first recursively eliminating the dynamic update operators and then the path quantifiers in such formulae. Using these reductions we obtain a sound and complete axiomatization for LTC, and reduce its decision problem to that of the modal logic KD.

  • 447. Juth, Niklas
    et al.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    Lynöe, Niels
    Honour-related threats and human rights: A qualitative study of Swedish healthcare providers’ attitudes towards young women requesting a virginity certificate or hymen reconstruction2013In: European journal of contraception & reproductive health care, ISSN 1362-5187, E-ISSN 1473-0782, Vol. 18, no 6, p. 451-459Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Objectives To investigate the preferred actions of healthcare staff, as well as their reasoning and attitudes about young females’ requests for a virginity certificate or hymen restoration.

    Method A qualitative study, consisting of semi-structured interviews of healthcare providers from different parts of Sweden and from different medical specialties and professions, who had experience of women who asked for a virginity certificate or a hymen repair.

    Results Using content analysis, ten themes emerged regarding healthcare personnel's attitudes and reasoning about young female patients and their requests for demonstration of virginity. The themes logically were categorised as values, beliefs, and cultural affiliation.

    Conclusions Responders had a more pragmatic and permissive view than the restrictive, official Swedish policy opposing hymenoplasties within the public healthcare system. There were degrees of willingness to accommodate such requests, due, for example, to different moral beliefs and medical concerns. Responders expressed frustration over the difficulty of following up patients, a situation likely due to the restrictive policy. The patient-centred approach adopted by a Dutch team of health professionals would probably better enable quality assurance.

  • 448.
    Karlander, Karl
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Normativity of Thought and Meaning2008Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In recent years the normativity of thought and meaning has been the subject of an extensive debate. What is at issue is whether intentionality has normative features, and if so, whether that constitutes a problem for naturalistic attempts to account for intentional phenomena. The origin of the debate is Saul Kripke’s interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, published in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke claimed, on behalf of Wittgenstein, that dispositional accounts of linguistic meaning - accounts, i.e., which attempt to reduce semantic phenomena to facts about how speakers are disposed to employ words - fail to ground the factuality of semantic statements. From this, and other arguments, the far reaching conclusion was drawn by Kripke’s Wittgenstein that there are no semantic facts, that every application of a word is “a leap in the dark”. This position has become known as meaning scepticism.

    In the present essay, it will be argued that meaning scepticism is incoherent, but that the normativity argument is interesting in its own right. The development of the debate will be traced, primarily through detailed consideration of the writings of Paul Boghossian, who has shifted the focus from the normativity of linguistic meaning to that of belief. It will be contended that even though Boghossian’s attempt to locate a normativity of belief fails, there is a related form of normativity that has to do with the intrinsic badness of false beliefs. Also, suggestions made by Kripke regarding the normativity of intentions will be investigated, and related to contemporary arguments in the philosophy of rationality. The tentative conclusion is that there are some interesting kinds of normativity associated with the intentional, but of a somewhat different variety than those usually discussed.

  • 449. Khoury, Andrew C.
    et al.
    Matheson, Benjamin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Is Blameworthiness Forever?2018In: Journal of the American Philosophical Association, ISSN 2053-4477, Vol. 4, no 2, p. 204-224Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Many of those working on moral responsibility assume that once blameworthy, always blameworthy. They believe that blameworthiness, like diamonds, is forever. In this article, we argue that blameworthiness is not forever; rather, it can diminish through time. We begin by showing that the view that blameworthiness is forever is best understood as the claim that personal identity is sufficient for diachronic blameworthiness. We argue that this view should be rejected because it entails that blameworthiness for past action is completely divorced from the distinctive psychological features of the person at the later time. This is because on none of the leading accounts of personal identity does identity require the preservation of any distinctive psychological features, but merely requires some form of continuity. The claim that blameworthiness is forever should therefore be rejected. We then sketch an account of blameworthiness over time, and consider two objections.

  • 450.
    Kihlbom, Ulrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ethical particularism: an essay on moral reasons2002Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
6789101112 401 - 450 of 895
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf