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  • 401.
    Jeppsson, Sofia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Practical Perspective Compatibilism2012Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this dissertation, I argue for what I call “practical perspective compatibilism”. According to this thesis, an agent with practical freedom is sufficiently free to be a moral agent and morally responsible for his or her actions.

    The concept of practical freedom is originally found in the writings of Kant. Kant argued that we can view the world from either a theoretical or a practical perspective. The theoretical perspective is that of causal explanation and prediction, whereas the practical perspective is that of choosing what to do and how to act. We see that we are free when we view things from a practical perspective. Determinism cannot threaten our practical freedom, since from a practical perspective we must choose what to do even if everything ultimately is determined. I argue that practical freedom is sufficient freedom-wise for moral agency and moral responsibility because morality is action-guiding. Right and wrong are concepts to be employed in deliberation and advice. This is a strong reason to regard factors irrelevant to deliberators and advisers as irrelevant when making judgements of right and wrong, and whether somebody had some other kind of freedom than practical freedom is irrelevant to deliberators and advisers. There are also prima facie reasons to regard moral responsibility as tied to rightness and wrongness, so that agents are blameworthy when they did wrong (or subjectively wrong, or what would have been wrong given their state of information and so on) and praiseworthy when they did right (subjectively right and so on). I also show that no classic arguments for incompatibilism about determinism and moral responsibility work when directed against practical perspective compatibilism.

    Finally, this thesis discusses metaethics in relation to compatibilism. Since competing theories imply the falsity of some respected metaethical positions, metaethical considerations lend further support to practical perspective compatibilism.

  • 402.
    Jeppsson, Sofia
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences.
    Purebred Dogs and Canine Wellbeing2013In: Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, ISSN 1187-7863, E-ISSN 1573-322X, Vol. 27, no 3, p. 417-430Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Breeders of purebred dogs usually have several goals they want to accomplish, of which canine wellbeing is one. The purpose of this article is to investigate what we ought to do given this goal. Breeders typically think that they fulfil their wellbeing-related duties by doing the best they can within their breed of choice. However, it is true of most breeders that they could produce physically and mentally healthier dogs if they switched to a healthier breed. There are a few breeds that are healthier than other breeds as well as mutts; we could maximize wellbeing for the next generations by focusing all our breeding resources on those. However, in the long run such a strategy would severely deplete the canine gene pool. If we are to breed for wellbeing in the long run, we must thus weigh the benefits of selection against physical and mental problems against the benefits of genetic diversity. The optimal breeding strategy for canine wellbeing is to preserve many breeds, though not all of them. Furthermore, we ought to combine strict health programs with looser barriers between breeds. Such a policy conflicts with the goal of breed preservation, at least if we think of breeds as populations registered within kennel clubs rather than types of dogs, but not with the goal of producing good working dogs capable of performing various tasks.

  • 403.
    Jeppsson, Sofia M. I.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Responsibility problems for criminal justice2014In: Frontiers in Psychology, ISSN 1664-1078, E-ISSN 1664-1078, Vol. 5, article id 821Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 404.
    Johannesson, Eric
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Analyticity, Necessity and Belief: Aspects of two-dimensional semantics2017Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A glass couldn't contain water unless it contained H2O-molecules. Likewise, a man couldn't be a bachelor unless he was unmarried. Now, the latter is what we would call a conceptual or analytical truth. It's also what we would call a priori. But it's hardly a conceptual or analytical truth that if a glass contains water, then it contains H2O-molecules. Neither is it a priori. The fact that water is composed of H2O-molecules was an empirical discovery made in the eighteenth century. The fact that all bachelors are unmarried was not. But neither is a logical truth, so how do we explain the difference? Two-dimensional semantics is a framework that promises to shed light on these issues. The main purpose of this thesis is to understand and evaluate this framework in relation to various alternatives, to see whether some version of it can be defended. I argue that it fares better than the alternatives. However, much criticism of two-dimensionalism has focused on its alleged inability to provide a proper semantics for certain epistemic operators, in particular the belief operator and the a priori operator. In response to this criticism, a two-dimensional semantics for belief ascriptions is developed using structured propositions. In connection with this, a number of other issues in the semantics of belief ascriptions are addressed, concerning indexicals, beliefs de se, beliefs de re, and the problem of logical omniscience.

  • 405.
    Johannesson, Eric
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Finns det objektiva sannolikheter?2015In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 2Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 406.
    Johannesson, Eric
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Goodmans induktionsproblem2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 4Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 407.
    Johannesson, Eric
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Monty-Hall problemet2017In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 2Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 408.
    Johannesson, Eric
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Partial Semantics for Quantified Modal Logic2018In: Journal of Philosophical Logic, ISSN 0022-3611, E-ISSN 1573-0433Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When it comes to Kripke-style semantics for quantified modal logic, there’s a choice to be made concerning the interpretation of the quantifiers. The simple approach is to let quantifiers range over all possible objects, not just objects existing in the world of evaluation, and use a special predicate to make claims about existence (an existence predicate). This is the constant domain approach. The more complicated approach is to assign a domain of objects to each world. This is the varying domain approach. Assuming that all terms denote, the semantics of predication on the constant domain approach is obvious: either the denoted object has the denoted property in the world of evaluation, or it hasn’t. On the varying domain approach, there’s a third possibility: the object in question doesn’t exist. Terms may denote objects not included in the domain of the world of evaluation. The question is whether an atomic formula then should be evaluated as true or false, or if its truth value should be undefined. This question, however, cannot be answered in isolation. The consequences of one’s choice depends on the interpretation of molecular formulas. Should the negation of a formula whose truth value is undefined also be undefined? What about conjunction, universal quantification and necessitation? The main contribution of this paper is to identify two partial semantics for logical operators, a weak and a strong one, which uniquely satisfy a list of reasonable constraints (Theorem 2.1). I also show that, provided that the point of using varying domains is to be able to make certain true claims about existence without using any existence predicate, this result yields two possible partial semantics for quantified modal logic with varying domains.

  • 409.
    Johannesson, Eric
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Packalén, Sara
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The A Priori-Operator and the Nesting Problem2016In: Thought: a journal of philosophy, ISSN 0340-6245, E-ISSN 2161-2234, Vol. 5, no 3, p. 169-176Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Many expressions intuitively have different epistemic and modal profiles. For example, co-referring proper names are substitutable salva veritate in modal contexts but not in belief-contexts. Two-dimensional semantics, according to which terms have both a so-called primary and a secondary intension, is a framework that promises to accommodate and explain these diverging intuitions. The framework can be applied to indexicals, proper names or predicates. Graeme Forbes (2011) argues that the two-dimensional semantics of David Chalmers (2011) fails to account for so-called nested contexts. These are linguistic contexts where a sentence is embedded under both epistemic and modal operators. Chalmers and Rabern (2014) suggest a two-dimensional solution to the problem. Their semantics solves the nesting-problem, but at the cost of invalidating certain plausible principles. We suggest a solution that is both simpler and avoids this cost.

  • 410.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Am I a Series?2009In: TheoriaArticle in journal (Refereed)
  • 411.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Being and Betterness2010In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 22, no 3, p. 285-302Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article I discuss the question of whether a person's existence can be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence. Recently, Nils Holtug and Melinda A. Roberts have defended an affirmative answer. These defenses, I shall argue, do not succeed. In different ways, Holtug and Roberts have got the metaphysics and axiology wrong. However, I also argue that a person's existence can after all be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence, though for reasons other than those provided by Holtug and Roberts

  • 412.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Constituted Simples?2009In: PhilosophiaArticle in journal (Refereed)
  • 413.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time2009In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 12, no 3, p. 247-256Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare — intrinsic value for a person—can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that so long as we keep the tenses and the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction right, the fitting-attitudes analysis of welfare can be shown to survive Heathwood’s criticism.

  • 414.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Francescotti on Fission2009In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0279-0750, E-ISSN 1468-0114, Vol. 90, no 4, p. 476-481Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Most versions of the psychological-continuity approach to personal identity (PCA) contain a ‘non-branching’ requirement. Recently, Robert Francescotti has argued that while such versions of PCA handle Parfit's standard fission case well, they deliver the wrong result in the case of an intact human brain. To solve this problem, he says, PCA-adherents need to add a clause that runs contrary to the spirit of their theory. In this response, I argue that Francescotti's counterexample fails. As a result, the revision he suggests is not needed.

  • 415.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kaufman's Response to Lucretius2008In: Pacific Philosophical QuarterlyArticle in journal (Refereed)
  • 416.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Mortal Beings: On the Metaphysics and Value of Death2005Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This book is a contribution to the debate of the metaphysics and value of death.

    The metaphysical problems of death are closely connected with the debate of personal identity. In Chapter Two, I defend the view that human persons are human organisms. This view, often called "Animalism," is apparently incompatible with a standard account of personal identity over time, "the Psychological View." I try to show how the Animalist can accommodate the intuitions that seem to support the Psychological View.

    In Chapter Three, I discuss the thesis that human persons cease to exist when they die, a thesis that has bearing on several metaphysical and ethical questions. Recently, many materialists have attacked the thesis, arguing that human persons continue to exist after death as corpses. In opposition to this popular view, I argue that human animals, and hence human persons, do go out of existence at death.

    Epicureans deny that death is an evil for the one who dies. Their arguments are based on what will be called "the missing subject problem." In Chapter Four, I aim to show that Epicureanism survives the objections that have been put forward in current literature. But I also argue that a more convincing case can be made against the Epicurean view.

    Anti-Epicureans typically base the view that death is sometimes bad for the deceased on the "deprivation approach." This approach seems to have the unsavory consequence that prenatal non-existence, too, is a great evil. Recently, proponents of the deprivation approach have suggested a number of ways of avoiding this implication. In Chapter Five, I argue that all these attempts fail, and that it is preferable to accept the consequence.

    In Chapter Six I turn to the question of the reasonableness of the special concern that most people have for their own deaths. I claim that this issue should be treated in the light of the more general question of the justifiability of special concern about one's own future. It is often held that such concern is justified if and only if "Non-Reductionism" about personal identity is correct. I argue, on the contrary, that it is unjustified whether or not Non-Reductionism is true.

  • 417.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Non-Reductionism and Special Concern2007In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 85Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 418.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Parfit on Fission2009In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 150, no 1, p. 21-35Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Derek Parfit famously defends a number of surprising views about “fission.” One is that, in such a scenario, it is indeterminate whether I have survived or not. Another is that the fission case shows that it does not matter, in itself, whether I survive or not. Most critics of the first view contend that fission makes me cease to exist. Most opponents of the second view contend that fission does not preserve everything that matters in ordinary survival. In this paper I shall provide a critique that does not rely on either of these contentions. There are other, interrelated reasons to reject Parfit’s defense of the two theses. In particular, the availability of the following view creates trouble for Parfit: I determinately survive fission, but it is indeterminate which fission product I am.

  • 419.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Recension av D. Munter & K. Löfgren, 8 filosofiska texter2008In: Filosofisk tidskriftArticle, book review (Other academic)
  • 420.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Review of L. R. Baker, The Metaphysics of Everyday Life2009In: Philosophical QuarterlyArticle, book review (Other academic)
  • 421.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Roache's Argument against the Cohabitation View2011In: Philosophia (Ramat Gan), ISSN 0048-3893, E-ISSN 1574-9274, Vol. 39, no 2, p. 309-310Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Rebecca Roache's recent critique of David Lewis's cohabitation view assumes that a person cannot be properly concerned about something that rules out that she ever exists. In this brief response, I argue against this assumption.

  • 422.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Time of Death's Badness2011In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, ISSN 0360-5310, E-ISSN 1744-5019Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 423.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Timing Problem2011In: Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Death, Oxford University Press , 2011Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 424.
    Johansson, Jens
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    What is Animalism?2007In: Ratio: An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol. 20, no 2Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 425. Johansson, Jens
    et al.
    Olson, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Against pluralism in metaethics2015In: The Palgrave handbook of philosophical methods / [ed] Christopher Daly, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 593-609Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Disagreement in ethics abounds. This has led some philosophers to argue that there is an irreducible plurality of moral values, duties, obligations, rights, etc., and that there is no universally valid way of balancing them. This kind of moral pluralism in combination with the absence of determinate rankings of values, duties, obligations, rights, etc., has been thought by some to imply that some cases of disagreement in ethics are rationally irresolvable, which in its turn, explains why disagreement in ethics abounds and remains pervasive.

  • 426.
    Johansson, Lars-Göran
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Understanding quantum mechanics: a realist interpretation without hidden variables1992Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 427. Juth, Niklas
    et al.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    Lynöe, Niels
    Honour-related threats and human rights: A qualitative study of Swedish healthcare providers’ attitudes towards young women requesting a virginity certificate or hymen reconstruction2013In: European journal of contraception & reproductive health care, ISSN 1362-5187, E-ISSN 1473-0782, Vol. 18, no 6, p. 451-459Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Objectives To investigate the preferred actions of healthcare staff, as well as their reasoning and attitudes about young females’ requests for a virginity certificate or hymen restoration.

    Method A qualitative study, consisting of semi-structured interviews of healthcare providers from different parts of Sweden and from different medical specialties and professions, who had experience of women who asked for a virginity certificate or a hymen repair.

    Results Using content analysis, ten themes emerged regarding healthcare personnel's attitudes and reasoning about young female patients and their requests for demonstration of virginity. The themes logically were categorised as values, beliefs, and cultural affiliation.

    Conclusions Responders had a more pragmatic and permissive view than the restrictive, official Swedish policy opposing hymenoplasties within the public healthcare system. There were degrees of willingness to accommodate such requests, due, for example, to different moral beliefs and medical concerns. Responders expressed frustration over the difficulty of following up patients, a situation likely due to the restrictive policy. The patient-centred approach adopted by a Dutch team of health professionals would probably better enable quality assurance.

  • 428.
    Karlander, Karl
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Normativity of Thought and Meaning2008Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In recent years the normativity of thought and meaning has been the subject of an extensive debate. What is at issue is whether intentionality has normative features, and if so, whether that constitutes a problem for naturalistic attempts to account for intentional phenomena. The origin of the debate is Saul Kripke’s interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, published in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke claimed, on behalf of Wittgenstein, that dispositional accounts of linguistic meaning - accounts, i.e., which attempt to reduce semantic phenomena to facts about how speakers are disposed to employ words - fail to ground the factuality of semantic statements. From this, and other arguments, the far reaching conclusion was drawn by Kripke’s Wittgenstein that there are no semantic facts, that every application of a word is “a leap in the dark”. This position has become known as meaning scepticism.

    In the present essay, it will be argued that meaning scepticism is incoherent, but that the normativity argument is interesting in its own right. The development of the debate will be traced, primarily through detailed consideration of the writings of Paul Boghossian, who has shifted the focus from the normativity of linguistic meaning to that of belief. It will be contended that even though Boghossian’s attempt to locate a normativity of belief fails, there is a related form of normativity that has to do with the intrinsic badness of false beliefs. Also, suggestions made by Kripke regarding the normativity of intentions will be investigated, and related to contemporary arguments in the philosophy of rationality. The tentative conclusion is that there are some interesting kinds of normativity associated with the intentional, but of a somewhat different variety than those usually discussed.

  • 429.
    Kihlbom, Ulrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ethical particularism: an essay on moral reasons2002Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 430.
    Klamm-Doneen, Kristin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Norm-Expressivism: Requirements & Possibilities for Moral Emotions: Narrow Moral Emotions and Broad Capacities2012Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The contemporary metaethical theory, norm-expressivism, maintains that a moral judgment expresses one’s acceptance of norms governing guilt and anger. The theory’s founder, Allan Gibbard, argues that this understanding of the moral claim is supported through both the realization of weaknesses in other accounts and a naturalistic consideration of the way in which moral judgments function in our moral lives. Thus, a moral judgment is the acceptance of norms that permit (or require, in this case) anger at those who engage in wrongdoing and feelings of guilt by those who do wrong. Because Gibbard arrives at this analysis, in part, through an understanding of the natural psychic mechanisms that determine our moral lives, norm-expressivism is then (largely) grounded upon the cogency of certain empirical claims. Should norm-expressivism be a cogent theory, then this would have implications upon the nature of guilt and anger. Guilt and anger would need to, in fact, be stronger motivators than are other moral emotions, moral judgments must be capable of influencing these moral emotions and yet anger and guilt could not entail (nor necessarily be caused by) moral judgments. Should guilt and anger turn out to be (or be necessarily caused by) moral judgments, then norm-expressivism would offer a circular account of the moral judgment. This project will survey diverse theories of emotion in order to assess the compatibility of these theories with norm-expressivism. After introducing norm-expressivism, I will propose seven conditions for a compatible theory of emotion. I will argue that norm-expressivists can find theories of emotion that frame the nature of guilt and anger in ways consistent with the truth of their metaethical theory. While many facts about the nature of guilt and anger remain unanswered by the scope of this project, I will argue that there are theories of emotion (and more than Gibbard supposed) that provide frameworks to explain both the nature of emotion and emotion typology in a way consistent with norm-expressivism.

  • 431.
    Kuusisto, Antti
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Wrocław, Poland.
    A Double Team Semantics for Generalized Quantifiers2015In: Journal of Logic, Language and Information, ISSN 0925-8531, E-ISSN 1572-9583, Vol. 24, no 2, p. 149-191Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We investigate extensions of dependence logic with generalized quantifiers. We also introduce and investigate the notion of a generalized atom. We define a system of semantics that can accommodate variants of dependence logic, possibly extended with generalized quantifiers and generalized atoms, under the same umbrella framework. The semantics is based on pairs of teams, or double teams. We also devise a game-theoretic semantics equivalent to the double team semantics. We make use of the double team semantics by defining a logic DC2 which canonically fuses together two-variable dependence logic D-2 and two-variable logic with counting quantifiers FOC2. We establish that the satisfiability and finite satisfiability problems of DC2 are complete for NEXPTIME.

  • 432.
    Lagerlund, Henrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Awareness and Unity of Conscious Experience: Buridan and the Common Sense2017In: Questions on the soul by John Buridan and others: a companion to John Buridan's philosophy of mind / [ed] Gyula Klima, Cham: Springer, 2017Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 433.
    Lagerlund, Henrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Divine Deception2018In: Skepticism from Antiquity to the Present / [ed] Diego E. Machuca, Baron Reed, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018, p. 222-231Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 434.
    Lagerlund, Henrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Food Ethics in the Middle Ages2018In: The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics / [ed] Anne Barnhill, Tyler Doggett, Mark Budolfson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 759-772Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter looks at what kind of foods medieval people ate and what impact on their habits religion had. It then looks closer at what they said about animals as food, but also looks at perhaps the most important aspect of medieval food ethics, namely, the moral aspect of eating itself. This is foremost governed by the virtue of fasting and the vice, or even deadly sin, of gluttony.

  • 435.
    Lagerlund, Henrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Francisco Suarez2018In: Great Christian Jurists in Spanish History / [ed] Rafael Domingo, Javier Martínez-Torrón, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 436.
    Lagerlund, Henrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. The University of Western Ontario, Canada.
    Knowledge and Scientia in Two Posterior Analytics Commentaries after Buridan: Alber of Saxony and John Mair2018In: Knowledge in Medieval Philosophy / [ed] Henrik Lagerlund, Bloomsbury Academic, 2018Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 437.
    Lagerlund, Henrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Knowledge in Medieval Philosophy2018Collection (editor) (Refereed)
  • 438.
    Lagerlund, Henrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Logic in the Latin Thirteenth Century2016In: The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic / [ed] Caterina Duthil-Novaes, Stephen Read, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 119-141Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 439.
    Lagerlund, Henrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Medieval Theories of the Syllogism2016In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 440.
    Lagerlund, Henrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy2017In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 441.
    Lagerlund, Henrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Systematization of the Passions in the Thirteenth Century2017In: Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middle Ages / [ed] Margaret Cameron, Routledge, 2017, p. 157-177Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 442.
    Lappalainen, Jonna Hjertström
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Den enskilde: En studie av trons profana möjlighet i Sören Kierkegaards tidiga författarskap2009Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In his attempt to explore philosophically human existence, Kierkegaard frequently refers to the term "the single individual" (den Enkelte), and he explicitly states that this notion plays a prominent part in his authorship. Even if he ascribes such a significant role to the single individual he never gives a comprehensive account of how to understand this notion. The thesis is an attempt to describe the difficulties inherent in this very notion and at the same time to provide an interpretation of how one could understand it as fundamental to Kierkegaard's philosophical and theological work.

    The study starts by determining and interpreting Kierkegaard's own remarks about the single individual and how he himself presents it as essential to his philosophy. These remarks constitute the point of departure for the interpretation of some of his books from the years 1843-1846. The mainly biblical characters that constitute the subject matter of these books are interpreted as philosophical examples of single individuals. This procedure shows that Kierkegaard's struggle with the notion of the single individual was an underlying and homogenous theme throughout his early authorship, and further that Kierkegaard understands this notion as a complex existential category: both as a way to exist and a way to perceive. It also shows that he regarded the single individual as a prerequisite for reaching genuine faith, and yet not as an essentially religious category. It is a general human existential category, the individual's capacity to experience the unknown as absolutely unknown and the new as absolutely new.

  • 443. Lazar, Seth
    et al.
    Frowe, HelenStockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War2015Collection (editor) (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This handbook is currently in development, with individual articles publishing online in advance of print publication. At this time, we cannot add information about unpublished articles in this handbook, however the table of contents will continue to grow as additional articles pass through the review process and are added to the site. Please note that the online publication date for this handbook is the date that the first article in the title was published online. For more information, please read the site FAQs.

  • 444. Lazar, Seth
    et al.
    Frowe, HelenStockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of War2018Collection (editor) (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Recent years have seen a resurgence of interest - among philosophers, legal scholars, and military experts - in the ethics of war. This resurgence of interest has multiple causes: escalating and persistent conflicts around the globe over the last 20 years, the growth of new forms of unconventional and asymmetrical warfare, and the appearance of new issues like targeted killings and drone strikes. Much of the most innovative theoretical and applied research over this time has radically called into question traditional modes of just war theory. This Oxford Handbook offers a guide to thinking through the ethics of war. It has two aims: to present chapters that introduce the reader to a broad range of the central topics in just war theory, and to make significant advances in each of those debates. The first section focuses on methodology, and the second section on historical just war theory in the Western tradition. The remaining sections align with the traditional categories of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum - Resort, Conduct, and Aftermath.

  • 445.
    Leppäkoski, Markku
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The transcendental how: Kant's transcendental deduction of objective cognition1993Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 446.
    Leth, Palle
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institut Jean-Nicod, Paris, France.
    Intentions in Utterance Interpretation2015In: Modeling and Using Context: 9th International and Interdisciplinary Conference, CONTEXT 2015 Lanarca, Cyprus, November 2–6, 2015. Proceedings / [ed] Henning Christiansen, Isidora Stojanovic, George A. Papadopoulos, 2015, p. 501-505Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Which is the role of intentions in utterance interpretation? I sketch an argument to the effect that the role of intentions is indirect; the interpreter’s assignment of meaning rather depends on considerations of what meaning is most reasonably assigned and her interest. This approach often results in the assignment of intended meaning, but might also result in the assignment of non intended meaning. I consider the three basic options offered to the interpreter when, in the course of the conversation, she is confronted with further evidence about the speaker’s intention.

  • 447.
    Leth, Palle
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Institut Jean Nicod, Paris, France.
    Utterance Interpretation without Utterance Meaning2017In: Contexts in Philosophy: Proceedings of the Workshop on Contexts in Philosophy / [ed] Carlo Penco, Massimiliano Vignolo, CEUR-WS.org , 2017, p. 95-107Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is commonly taken for granted that an important task of a theory of meaning is to tell what determines the meaning of an utterance. The two basic positions are intentionalism and anti-intentionalism, the former situating the instance of determinacy in the speaker S’s intention and the latter in features accessible to the hearer H. In this paper I argue that the interpretive practice of S and H lends support to neither intentionalism nor anti-intentionalism, but rather suggests that the notion of utterance meaning is dispensable. I outline what I take to be the three options at stake in utterance interpretation and show that none of them presupposes recourse to the objectively correct interpretation of the utterance.

  • 448.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Consciousness and Biological Evolution1997In: Journal of Theoretical Biology, ISSN 0022-5193, E-ISSN 1095-8541, Vol. 187, p. 613-629Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It has been suggested that if the preservation and development of consciousness in the biological evolution is a result of natural selection, it is plausible that consciousness not only has been influenced by neural processes, but has had a survival value itself; and it could only have had this, if it had also been efficacious. This argument for mind–brain interaction is examined, both as the argument has been developed by William James and Karl Popper and as it has been discussed by C. D. Broad. The problem of identifying mental phenomena with certain neural phenomena is also addressed. The main conclusion of the analysis is that an explanation of the evolution of consciousness in Darwinian terms of natural selection does not rule out that consciousness may have evolved as a mere causally inert effect of the evolution of the nervous system, or that mental phenomena are identical with certain neural phenomena. However, the interactionistic theory still seems, more plausible and more fruitful for other reasons brought up in the discussion.

  • 449.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Consciousness, Behavioural Patterns and the Direction of Biological Evolution: Implications for the Mind-Brain Problem2001In: Dimensions of Conscious Experience / [ed] Paavo Pylkkänen, Tere Vadén, Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2001, p. 73-99Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 450.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Health and Evolution2000In: Scandinavian Journal of Public Health, ISSN 1403-4948, E-ISSN 1651-1905, Vol. 28, p. 309-311Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Darwinian medicine may shed new light on the notion of health and many current health problems. In this paper, health, as an ability to realize one’s own welfare, is compared with health as an ability — either being developed or actually present — to perform a reproductive function of one’s species. It is argued that knowledge about the conditions for health in the latter sense may enhance our efforts to promote health in the former sense.

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