Change search
Refine search result
1234567 51 - 100 of 773
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Rows per page
  • 5
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100
  • 250
Sort
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
Select
The maximal number of hits you can export is 250. When you want to export more records please use the 'Create feeds' function.
  • 51.
    Beckman, Frida
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Culture and Aesthetics.
    Posthumanism and narrativity: Beginning again with Arendt, Derrida, and Deleuze2017In: Posthumous life: theorizing beyond the posthuman / [ed] Jami Weinstein, Claire Colebrook, New York: Columbia University Press, 2017, p. 43-64Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 52.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    A Defense of Quinean Naturalism2008In: Naturalism, Reference, and Ontology: Essays in Honor of Roger F. Gibson, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., New York , 2008Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper argues that a naturalized epistemology of the kind presented by W.V. Quine preserves everything worthwhile in traditional epistemology. Arguments against Quinean naturalism by such writers as Laurence BonJour, Jaegwon Kim, Richard Rorty, Barry Stroud, and Donald Davidson are criticized. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, Quinean naturalism does not reject a priori justification. The important point is that epistemology is contained in science. There is no ‘first philosophy’, and, in particular, epistemology is not a normative discipline. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which Quinean naturalism provides an answer to Cartesian scepticism.

  • 53.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    A priori kunskap2012In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 3Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 54.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Analytiska satser2012In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 4Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 55.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Artiklar om empirism, epistemisk relativism,Goodman, objektivitet, Quine, semantisk relativism, underbestämning2008In: Den svårfångade relativismen: En uppslagsbok, Thales, Stockholm , 2008Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 56.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Att handla i eget intresse2006In: Tvärsnitt, no 2Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 57.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Cirkulär tid - ännu en gång2006In: Filosofisk tidskrift, no 3Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 58.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Death and eternal recurrence2013In: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death / [ed] Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman, Jens Johansson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 167-185Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 59.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Döden och tiden2013In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 34, no 1, p. 23-29Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 60.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Döden som förlust2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 35, no 1, p. 18-29Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 61.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Epikuros och döden2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 35, no 2, p. 17-21Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 62.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ett universum ur ingenting av Lawrence M. Krauss2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 35, no 4, p. 38-41Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 63.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Goda grunder och berättigad tro2007In: Filosofisk tidskrift, no 2Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 64.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Hur man besvarar eviga frågor2005In: Tvärsnitt, no 4Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 65.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kants maxim2010In: Filosofisk tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 4, p. 38-45Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 66.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kompatibilism på villovägar2010In: Filosofisk tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 3, p. 10-20Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 67.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kort om spelteori av Ken Binmore2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 35, no 1, p. 52-58Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 68.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kritisk rationalism?2010In: Filosofisk tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 1, p. 29-34Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 69.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ojämlikhetens anatomi av Per Molander2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 35, no 4, p. 57-60Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 70.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Om slutledningar2008In: Filosofisk tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 2Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 71.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Paul A. Gregory: Quine's Naturalism: Language, Theory, and the Knowing Subject2009In: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ISSN 0269-8595, E-ISSN 1469-9281, Vol. 23, no 1, p. 109-112Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 72.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Quine and the a priori2014In: A Companion to W. V. O. Quine / [ed] Gilbert Harman & Ernst LePore, Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014, p. 38-53Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 73.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Quine och sanningen2013In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 34, no 2, p. 22-32Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 74.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Quine versus Davidson : Truth, Reference and Meaning by Gary Kemp2014In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5817, E-ISSN 1558-5816, Vol. 80, no 3, p. 283-287Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 75.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Quine's relativism2006In: Theoria, Vol. 72, no 4Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It has been claimed that “the central problem of relativism is one of giving it a coherent formulation, making the doctrine more than the platitude that differently situated people may judge differently, and less than the falsehood that contradictory views may each be true”. W.V. Quine has claimed that relativism is paradoxical and unacceptable; nevertheless, his own views concerning truth and the underdetermination of theories by data amount to an interesting and plausible form of relativism.

  • 76.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Recension av Från ett öppet universum: studier i Karl Poppers filosofi2013In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 34, no 1, p. 53-56Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 77.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Tankar om skepticismen2012In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 2Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 78.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Teismen som förklaring2013In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 34, no 4, p. 57-61Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 79.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Tidens verkliga gång2010In: Filosofisk tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 1, p. 1-12Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 80.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Tänka, snabbt och långsamt av Daniel Kahneman2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 35, no 2, p. 54-59Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 81.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Varats gåta2012In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 33, no 1Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 82.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    W. V. Quine Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist and Other Essays, ed. Dagfinn Føllesdal and Douglas B. Quine, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 20082013In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 79, no 2, p. 172-179Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 83.
    Berndt Rasmussen, Katharina
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Democracy and the Common Good: A Study of the Weighted Majority Rule2013Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority rule. It assigns to each voter a number of votes that is proportional to her stakes in the decision. It has been shown that, for collective decisions with two options, the weighted majority rule in combination with self-interested voters maximises the common good when the latter is understood in terms of either the sum-total or prioritarian sum of the voters’ well-being.

    The main result of my study is that this argument for the weighted majority rule — that it maximises the common good — can be improved along the following three main lines. (1) The argument can be adapted to other criteria of the common good, such as sufficientarian, maximin, leximin or non-welfarist criteria. I propose a generic argument for the collective optimality of the weighted majority rule that works for all of these criteria. (2) The assumption of self-interested voters can be relaxed. First, common-interest voters can be accommodated. Second, even if voters are less than fully competent in judging their self-interest or the common interest, the weighted majority rule is weakly collectively optimal, that is, it almost certainly maximises the common good given a large numbers of voters. Third, even for smaller groups of voters, the weighted majority rule still has some attractive features. (3) The scope of the argument can be extended to decisions with more than two options. I state the conditions under which the weighted majority rule maximises the common good even in multi-option contexts. I also analyse the possibility and the detrimental effects of strategic voting. Furthermore, I argue that self-interested voters have reason to accept the weighted majority rule.

  • 84.
    Berndt Rasmussen, Katharina
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Recension: G. A. Cohen "Rescuing Justice and Equality"2011In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 15, no 2, p. 40-55Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 85.
    Berndt Rasmussen, Katharina
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Should the probabilities count?2012In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 159, no 2, p. 205-218Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When facing a choice between saving one person and saving many, some people have argued that fairness requires us to decide without aggregating numbers; rather we should decide by coin toss or some form of lottery, or alternatively we should straightforwardly save the greater number but justify this in a non-aggregating contractualist way. This paper expands the debate beyond well-known number cases to previously under-considered probability cases, in which not (only) the numbers of people, but (also) the probabilities of success for saving people vary. It is shown that, in these latter cases, both the coin toss and the lottery lead to what is called an awkward conclusion, which makes probabilities count in a problematic way. Attempts to avoid this conclusion are shown to lead into difficulties as well. Finally, it is shown that while the greater number method cannot be justified on contractualist grounds for probability cases, it may be replaced by another decision method which is so justified. This decision method is extensionally equivalent to maximising expected value and seems to be the least problematic way of dealing with probability cases in a non-aggregating manner.

  • 86.
    Berndt Rasmussen, Katharina
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Är sannolikheter moraliskt relevanta?2011In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 32, no 4, p. 27-40Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 87.
    Besson, Corine
    et al.
    University of London, UK.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    University of Oxford, UK; St Hilda’s College, Oxford, UK.
    The open future, bivalence and assertion2014In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 167, no 2, p. 251--271Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is highly now intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed now—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence of future contingents is at odds with our pre-theoretic intuitions about the openness of the future. These intuitions are revealed by our pragmatic judgments concerning the correctness and incorrectness of assertions of future contingents. We argue that the pragmatic data together with a plausible account of assertion shows that in many cases we take future contingents to be true (or to be false), though we take the future to be open in relevant respects. It follows that appeals to intuition to support the non-bivalence of future contingents are untenable. Intuition favours bivalence.

  • 88.
    Birnbaum, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Hospitality of Presence: Problems of Otherness in Husserl´s Phenomenology1998Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 89.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Explaining Away Epistemic Skepticism about Culpability2017In: Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Volume 4 / [ed] David Shoemaker, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 141-164Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Recently, a number of authors have suggested that the epistemic condition on moral responsibility makes blameworthiness much less common than we ordinarily suppose, and much harder to identify. This paper argues that such epistemically based responsibility skepticism is mistaken. Section 2 sketches a general account of moral responsibility, building on the Strawsonian idea that blame and credit relates to the agent’s quality of will. Section 3 explains how this account deals with central cases that motivate epistemic skepticism and how it avoids some objections to quality of will accounts recently raised by Gideon Rosen. But an intuitive worry brought out by these objections remains. Section 4 spells out this remaining worry and argues that, like traditional metaphysical responsibility skepticism, it has its source in a non-standard explanatory perspective on action, suggesting that strategies for explaining away the intuitive pull of traditional skepticism are applicable in this case too.

  • 90.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility2017In: Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition / [ed] Philip Robichaud, Jan Willem Wieland, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 146-162Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter combines the familiar Strawsonian idea that moral blame and credit depend on the agent’s quality of will with an independently motivated account of responsibility as grounded in a normal explanatory relation between agential qualities and objects of responsibility. The resulting “explanatory quality of will condition” on moral responsibility is then further motivated by being shown to account for the effects on moral blame and credit of justifications, excuses, and undermined control in cases where agents are fully aware of what they are doing. Having been independently motivated, the explanatory quality of will condition is then applied to cases involving lack of awareness. Though this condition involves no explicit epistemic condition on responsibility, it is shown how it accounts for the degrees to which lack of awareness can excuse.

  • 91.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    How Effects Depend on Their Causes, Why Causal Transitivity Fails, and Why We Care about Causation2007In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, Vol. 133, no 3, p. 349-390Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Despite recent efforts to improve on counterfactual theories of causation, failures to explain how effects depend on their causes are still manifest in a variety of cases. In particular, theories that do a decent job explaining cases of causal preemption have problems accounting for cases of causal intransitivity. Moreover, the increasing complexity of the counterfactual accounts makes it difficult to see why the concept of causation would be such a central part of our cognition. In this paper, I propose an account of our causal thinking that not only explains the hitherto puzzling variety of causal judgments, but also makes it intelligible why we would employ such an elusive concept.

  • 92.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Moral internalism: An Essay in Moral Psychology1998Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    An ancient but central divide in moral philosophy concerns the nature of opinions about what is morally wrong or what our moral duties are. Some philosophers argue that moral motivation is internal to moral opinions: that moral opinions consist of motivational states such as desires or emotions. This has often been seen as a threat to the possibility of rational argument and justification in morals. Other philosophers argue that moral motivation is external to moral opinion: moral opinions should be seen as beliefs about moral reality, beliefs which may or may not motivate depending on whether the person holding them cares about moral matters.

    In this essay it is argued that although the traditional case for the internalist position fails, the total available evidence and methodological considerations support an internalist theory formulated in terms of a relatively rich psychological model. It is shown how such a theory can explain not only the practical character of moral opinions and their connection to moral emotions but also phenomena that have been taken to suggest an externalist picture, such as the role of inference, inconsistency, argument and explanations in moral discussion, as well as cases of amoralism and psychological disturbance. In the end, it is concluded that externalist explanations of the same phenomena are methodologically inferior for postulating a more complicated psychology.

  • 93.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rik Peels, Responsible Belief: A Theory in Ethics and Epistemology, Oxford University Press, 20172017In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617, article id 10.17Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 94.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Significance of Ethical Disagreement for Theories of Ethical Thought and Talk2017In: Routledge Handbook of Metaethics / [ed] Tristram McPherson, David Plunkett, New York: Routledge, 2017, p. 275-291Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter has two sections, each focusing on a distinct way in which ethical disagreement and variations in ethical judgment matter for theories of ethical thought and talk. In the first section, we look at how the variation poses problems for both cognitivist and non-cognitivist ways of specifying the nature of ethical judgments. In the second, we look at how disagreement phenomena have been taken to undermine cognitivist accounts, but also at how the seeming variation in cognitive and non-cognitive contents between parties of deep ethical disagreement challenges both cognitivist and non-cognitivist accounts of disagreement itself.

  • 95.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Båve, Arvid
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Teoretisk filosofi.
    Meaning as a Normative Concept: An Interview with Allan Gibbard2007In: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0040-5825, Vol. 78, no 3, p. 190-205Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    This interview was conducted following Allan Gibbard's Hägerström Lectures, titled "Meaning as a Normative Concept".

  • 96.
    Bohlin, Henrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Groundless knowledge: a Humean solution to the problem of skepticism1997Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of the present study is to develop a solution to the problem of skepticism about the external world ("skepticism", for short), inspired primarily by Hume's "skeptical solution" to the problem of skepticism about induction, but also by epistemological externalism and Wittgenstein's discussion of skeptical doubts in On Certainty. The author accepts certain elements in P. F. Strawson's interpretation of Hume and Wittgenstein, but rejects the "psychological" argument against skepticism which Strawson ascribes to the two philosophers.

    The problem of skepticism is understood as that of showing that we can know what we in common sense claim to know about external objects, despite skeptical arguments to the contrary. A "moderate" skepticism is accepted, according to which it is possible that we are globally mistaken in our beliefs about external objects, and it is argued that there is in fact no conflict between this moderate skepticism and common sense. A distinc-tion is drawn between two types of "strong" skepticism, which does conflict with common sense: prescriptive skepti-cism, the recommendation to abandon our common sense ways of forming beliefs, by suspend-ing judgement or in other ways; and theoretical skepti-cism, the thesis that we can have no rational grounds for our beliefs about external objects. An argument against prescriptive skepticism is devel-oped, according to which each of three possible forms of prescriptive skepticism is unacceptable. An externalist argument against theoreti-cal skepticism is developed, according to which it is suffi-cient for knowledge that one is in fact not globally mis-taken, whether or not one has grounds for believing this to be the case. It is argued that this variant of externalism constitutes a form of natu-ralistic epistemology, and that it as such fills a gap in Quine's argument for the natu-ralization of epistemology. An interpretation of On Certainty is defended, according to which Wittgen-stein accepts a form of moderate skepticism and presents an argu-ment against strong skep-ticism similar to Hume's.

  • 97. Bonnay, Denis
    et al.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Compositionality Solves Carnap's Problem2016In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 81, no 4, p. 721-739Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The standard relation of logical consequence allows for non-standard interpretations of logical constants, as was shown early on by Carnap. But then how can we learn the interpretations of logical constants, if not from the rules which govern their use? Answers in the literature have mostly consisted in devising clever rule formats going beyond the familiar what follows from what. A more conservative answer is possible. We may be able to learn the correct interpretations from the standard rules, because the space of possible interpretations is a priori restricted by universal semantic principles. We show that this is indeed the case. The principles are familiar from modern formal semantics: compositionality, supplemented, for quantifiers, with topic-neutrality.

  • 98. Bonnay, Denis
    et al.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Consequence Mining Constants Versus Consequence Relations2012In: Journal of Philosophical Logic, ISSN 0022-3611, E-ISSN 1573-0433, Vol. 41, no 4, p. 671-709Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The standard semantic definition of consequence with respect to a selected set X of symbols, in terms of truth preservation under replacement (Bolzano) or reinterpretation (Tarski) of symbols outside X, yields a function mapping X to a consequence relation . We investigate a function going in the other direction, thus extracting the constants of a given consequence relation, and we show that this function (a) retrieves the usual logical constants from the usual logical consequence relations, and (b) is an inverse to-more precisely, forms a Galois connection with-the Bolzano-Tarski function.

  • 99. Bonnay, Denis
    et al.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Dynamic Versus Classical Consequence2014In: Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics / [ed] Baltag, A.; Smets, S., Dordrecht: Springer, 2014, Vol. 5, p. 837-854Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The shift of interest in logic from just reasoning to all forms of information flow has considerably widened the scope of the discipline, as amply illustrated in Johan van Benthem's recent book Logical Dynamics of Information and Interaction. But how much does this change when it comes to the study of traditional logical notions such as logical consequence? We propose a systematic comparison between classical consequence, explicated in terms of truth preservation, and a dynamic notion of consequence, explicated in terms of information flow. After a brief overview of logical consequence relations and the distinctive features of classical consequence, we define classical and dynamic consequence over abstract information frames. We study the properties of information under which the two notions prove to be equivalent, both in the abstract setting of information frames and in the concrete setting of Public Announcement Logic. The main lesson is that dynamic consequence diverges from classical consequence when information is not persistent, which is in particular the case of epistemic information about what we do not yet know. We end by comparing our results with recent work by Rothschild and Yalcin on the conditions under which the dynamics of information updates can be classically represented. We show that classicality for consequence is strictly less demanding than classicality for updates. Johan van Benthem's recent book Logical Dynamics of Information and Interaction [8] can be seen as a passionate plea for a radically new view of logic. To be sure, the book is not a philosophical discussion of what logic is but rather an impressive series of illustrations of what logic can be, with presentations of numerous logical languages and a wealth of meta-logical results about them. The view is called simply Logical Dynamics, and contrasted with more traditional views of logic, and also with the earlier view from e.g. [5], now called Pluralism, in which logic was seen as the study of consequence relations. According to Logical Dynamics, logic is not only about reasoning, about what follows from what, but about all aspects of information flow among rational agents. Not just proof and inference, but observations, questions, announcements, communication, plans, strategies, etc. are first-class citizens in the land of Logic. And not only the output of these activities belong to logic, but also the processes leading up to it. This is a fascinating and inspiring view of logic. But how different is it from a more standard view? In particular, what does it change for the analysis of logical consequence, which had been the focus of traditional logical enquiry? This paper attempts some answers to the latter question, with a view to get clearer about the former.

  • 100. Bradley, Richard
    et al.
    Stefánsson, H. Orri
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Counterfactual Desirability2017In: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, ISSN 0007-0882, E-ISSN 1464-3537, Vol. 68, no 2, p. 485-533Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Preferences based on such value dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes generate a class of problems for orthodox decision theory, the best-known perhaps being the so-called Allais paradox. In this article we solve these problems by extending Richard Jeffrey’s decision theory to counterfactual prospects, using a multidimensional possible-world semantics for conditionals, and showing that preferences that are sensitive to counterfactual considerations can still be desirability-maximizing. We end the article by investigating the conditions necessary and sufficient for a desirability function to be a standard expected-utility function. It turns out that the additional conditions imply highly implausible epistemic principles.

1234567 51 - 100 of 773
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf