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  • 51.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Cirkulär tid - ännu en gång2006In: Filosofisk tidskrift, no 3Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 52.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Death and eternal recurrence2013In: The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death / [ed] Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman, Jens Johansson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 167-185 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 53.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Döden och tiden2013In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 34, no 1, 23-29 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 54.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Döden som förlust2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 35, no 1, 18-29 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 55.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Epikuros och döden2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 35, no 2, 17-21 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 56.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ett universum ur ingenting av Lawrence M. Krauss2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 35, no 4, 38-41 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 57.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Goda grunder och berättigad tro2007In: Filosofisk tidskrift, no 2Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 58.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Hur man besvarar eviga frågor2005In: Tvärsnitt, no 4Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 59.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kants maxim2010In: Filosofisk tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 4, 38-45 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 60.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kompatibilism på villovägar2010In: Filosofisk tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 3, 10-20 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 61.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kort om spelteori av Ken Binmore2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 35, no 1, 52-58 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 62.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kritisk rationalism?2010In: Filosofisk tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 1, 29-34 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 63.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ojämlikhetens anatomi av Per Molander2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 35, no 4, 57-60 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 64.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Om slutledningar2008In: Filosofisk tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 2Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 65.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Paul A. Gregory: Quine's Naturalism: Language, Theory, and the Knowing Subject2009In: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ISSN 0269-8595, E-ISSN 1469-9281, Vol. 23, no 1, 109-112 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 66.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Quine and the a priori2014In: A Companion to W. V. O. Quine / [ed] Gilbert Harman & Ernst LePore, Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014, 38-53 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 67.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Quine versus Davidson : Truth, Reference and Meaning by Gary Kemp2014In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5817, E-ISSN 1558-5816, Vol. 80, no 3, 283-287 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 68.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Quine's relativism2006In: Theoria, Vol. 72, no 4Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It has been claimed that “the central problem of relativism is one of giving it a coherent formulation, making the doctrine more than the platitude that differently situated people may judge differently, and less than the falsehood that contradictory views may each be true”. W.V. Quine has claimed that relativism is paradoxical and unacceptable; nevertheless, his own views concerning truth and the underdetermination of theories by data amount to an interesting and plausible form of relativism.

  • 69.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Tankar om skepticismen2012In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 2Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 70.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Teismen som förklaring2013In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 34, no 4, 57-61 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 71.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Tidens verkliga gång2010In: Filosofisk tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 1, 1-12 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 72.
    Bergström, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Tänka, snabbt och långsamt av Daniel Kahneman2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 35, no 2, 54-59 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 73.
    Berndt Rasmussen, Katharina
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Democracy and the Common Good: A Study of the Weighted Majority Rule2013Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this study I analyse the performance of a democratic decision-making rule: the weighted majority rule. It assigns to each voter a number of votes that is proportional to her stakes in the decision. It has been shown that, for collective decisions with two options, the weighted majority rule in combination with self-interested voters maximises the common good when the latter is understood in terms of either the sum-total or prioritarian sum of the voters’ well-being.

    The main result of my study is that this argument for the weighted majority rule — that it maximises the common good — can be improved along the following three main lines. (1) The argument can be adapted to other criteria of the common good, such as sufficientarian, maximin, leximin or non-welfarist criteria. I propose a generic argument for the collective optimality of the weighted majority rule that works for all of these criteria. (2) The assumption of self-interested voters can be relaxed. First, common-interest voters can be accommodated. Second, even if voters are less than fully competent in judging their self-interest or the common interest, the weighted majority rule is weakly collectively optimal, that is, it almost certainly maximises the common good given a large numbers of voters. Third, even for smaller groups of voters, the weighted majority rule still has some attractive features. (3) The scope of the argument can be extended to decisions with more than two options. I state the conditions under which the weighted majority rule maximises the common good even in multi-option contexts. I also analyse the possibility and the detrimental effects of strategic voting. Furthermore, I argue that self-interested voters have reason to accept the weighted majority rule.

  • 74.
    Berndt Rasmussen, Katharina
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Recension: G. A. Cohen "Rescuing Justice and Equality"2011In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 15, no 2, 40-55 p.Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 75.
    Berndt Rasmussen, Katharina
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Should the probabilities count?2012In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 159, no 2, 205-218 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When facing a choice between saving one person and saving many, some people have argued that fairness requires us to decide without aggregating numbers; rather we should decide by coin toss or some form of lottery, or alternatively we should straightforwardly save the greater number but justify this in a non-aggregating contractualist way. This paper expands the debate beyond well-known number cases to previously under-considered probability cases, in which not (only) the numbers of people, but (also) the probabilities of success for saving people vary. It is shown that, in these latter cases, both the coin toss and the lottery lead to what is called an awkward conclusion, which makes probabilities count in a problematic way. Attempts to avoid this conclusion are shown to lead into difficulties as well. Finally, it is shown that while the greater number method cannot be justified on contractualist grounds for probability cases, it may be replaced by another decision method which is so justified. This decision method is extensionally equivalent to maximising expected value and seems to be the least problematic way of dealing with probability cases in a non-aggregating manner.

  • 76.
    Berndt Rasmussen, Katharina
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Är sannolikheter moraliskt relevanta?2011In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 32, no 4, 27-40 p.Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 77.
    Besson, Corine
    et al.
    University of Sussex.
    Hattiangadi, Anandi
    University of Oxford, UK.
    The Open Future, Bivalence and Assertion2014In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 167, no 2, 251--271 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is highly now intuitive that the future is open and the past is closed now—whereas it is unsettled whether there will be a fourth world war, it is settled that there was a first. Recently, it has become increasingly popular to claim that the intuitive openness of the future implies that contingent statements about the future, such as ‘There will be a sea battle tomorrow,’ are non-bivalent (neither true nor false). In this paper, we argue that the non-bivalence of future contingents is at odds with our pre-theoretic intuitions about the openness of the future. These intuitions are revealed by our pragmatic judgments concerning the correctness and incorrectness of assertions of future contingents. We argue that the pragmatic data together with a plausible account of assertion shows that in many cases we take future contingents to be true (or to be false), though we take the future to be open in relevant respects. It follows that appeals to intuition to support the non-bivalence of future contingents are untenable. Intuition favours bivalence.

  • 78.
    Birnbaum, Daniel
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Hospitality of Presence: Problems of Otherness in Husserl´s Phenomenology1998Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 79.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    How Effects Depend on Their Causes, Why Causal Transitivity Fails, and Why We Care about Causation2007In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, Vol. 133, no 3, 349-390 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Despite recent efforts to improve on counterfactual theories of causation, failures to explain how effects depend on their causes are still manifest in a variety of cases. In particular, theories that do a decent job explaining cases of causal preemption have problems accounting for cases of causal intransitivity. Moreover, the increasing complexity of the counterfactual accounts makes it difficult to see why the concept of causation would be such a central part of our cognition. In this paper, I propose an account of our causal thinking that not only explains the hitherto puzzling variety of causal judgments, but also makes it intelligible why we would employ such an elusive concept.

  • 80.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Moral internalism: An Essay in Moral Psychology1998Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    An ancient but central divide in moral philosophy concerns the nature of opinions about what is morally wrong or what our moral duties are. Some philosophers argue that moral motivation is internal to moral opinions: that moral opinions consist of motivational states such as desires or emotions. This has often been seen as a threat to the possibility of rational argument and justification in morals. Other philosophers argue that moral motivation is external to moral opinion: moral opinions should be seen as beliefs about moral reality, beliefs which may or may not motivate depending on whether the person holding them cares about moral matters.

    In this essay it is argued that although the traditional case for the internalist position fails, the total available evidence and methodological considerations support an internalist theory formulated in terms of a relatively rich psychological model. It is shown how such a theory can explain not only the practical character of moral opinions and their connection to moral emotions but also phenomena that have been taken to suggest an externalist picture, such as the role of inference, inconsistency, argument and explanations in moral discussion, as well as cases of amoralism and psychological disturbance. In the end, it is concluded that externalist explanations of the same phenomena are methodologically inferior for postulating a more complicated psychology.

  • 81.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Båve, Arvid
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Teoretisk filosofi.
    Meaning as a Normative Concept: An Interview with Allan Gibbard2007In: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0040-5825, Vol. 78, no 3, 190-205 p.Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    This interview was conducted following Allan Gibbard's Hägerström Lectures, titled "Meaning as a Normative Concept".

  • 82.
    Blumi, Isa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Asian, Middle Eastern and Turkish Studies.
    Battles of Nostalgic Proportion: The Transformation of Islam-as-Historical-Force in the Ideological Matrix of a Self-Affirming 'West'2016In: Althusser and Theology: Religion, Politics, and Philosophy / [ed] Agon Hamza, Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2016, 182-197 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 83.
    Bohlin, Henrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Groundless knowledge: a Humean solution to the problem of skepticism1997Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of the present study is to develop a solution to the problem of skepticism about the external world ("skepticism", for short), inspired primarily by Hume's "skeptical solution" to the problem of skepticism about induction, but also by epistemological externalism and Wittgenstein's discussion of skeptical doubts in On Certainty. The author accepts certain elements in P. F. Strawson's interpretation of Hume and Wittgenstein, but rejects the "psychological" argument against skepticism which Strawson ascribes to the two philosophers.

    The problem of skepticism is understood as that of showing that we can know what we in common sense claim to know about external objects, despite skeptical arguments to the contrary. A "moderate" skepticism is accepted, according to which it is possible that we are globally mistaken in our beliefs about external objects, and it is argued that there is in fact no conflict between this moderate skepticism and common sense. A distinc-tion is drawn between two types of "strong" skepticism, which does conflict with common sense: prescriptive skepti-cism, the recommendation to abandon our common sense ways of forming beliefs, by suspend-ing judgement or in other ways; and theoretical skepti-cism, the thesis that we can have no rational grounds for our beliefs about external objects. An argument against prescriptive skepticism is devel-oped, according to which each of three possible forms of prescriptive skepticism is unacceptable. An externalist argument against theoreti-cal skepticism is developed, according to which it is suffi-cient for knowledge that one is in fact not globally mis-taken, whether or not one has grounds for believing this to be the case. It is argued that this variant of externalism constitutes a form of natu-ralistic epistemology, and that it as such fills a gap in Quine's argument for the natu-ralization of epistemology. An interpretation of On Certainty is defended, according to which Wittgen-stein accepts a form of moderate skepticism and presents an argu-ment against strong skep-ticism similar to Hume's.

  • 84. Bonnay, Denis
    et al.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Compositionality Solves Carnap's Problem2016In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 81, no 4, 721-739 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The standard relation of logical consequence allows for non-standard interpretations of logical constants, as was shown early on by Carnap. But then how can we learn the interpretations of logical constants, if not from the rules which govern their use? Answers in the literature have mostly consisted in devising clever rule formats going beyond the familiar what follows from what. A more conservative answer is possible. We may be able to learn the correct interpretations from the standard rules, because the space of possible interpretations is a priori restricted by universal semantic principles. We show that this is indeed the case. The principles are familiar from modern formal semantics: compositionality, supplemented, for quantifiers, with topic-neutrality.

  • 85. Bonnay, Denis
    et al.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Consequence Mining Constants Versus Consequence Relations2012In: Journal of Philosophical Logic, ISSN 0022-3611, E-ISSN 1573-0433, Vol. 41, no 4, 671-709 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The standard semantic definition of consequence with respect to a selected set X of symbols, in terms of truth preservation under replacement (Bolzano) or reinterpretation (Tarski) of symbols outside X, yields a function mapping X to a consequence relation . We investigate a function going in the other direction, thus extracting the constants of a given consequence relation, and we show that this function (a) retrieves the usual logical constants from the usual logical consequence relations, and (b) is an inverse to-more precisely, forms a Galois connection with-the Bolzano-Tarski function.

  • 86. Bonnay, Denis
    et al.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Dynamic Versus Classical Consequence2014In: Johan van Benthem on Logic and Information Dynamics / [ed] Baltag, A.; Smets, S., Dordrecht: Springer, 2014, Vol. 5, 837-854 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The shift of interest in logic from just reasoning to all forms of information flow has considerably widened the scope of the discipline, as amply illustrated in Johan van Benthem's recent book Logical Dynamics of Information and Interaction. But how much does this change when it comes to the study of traditional logical notions such as logical consequence? We propose a systematic comparison between classical consequence, explicated in terms of truth preservation, and a dynamic notion of consequence, explicated in terms of information flow. After a brief overview of logical consequence relations and the distinctive features of classical consequence, we define classical and dynamic consequence over abstract information frames. We study the properties of information under which the two notions prove to be equivalent, both in the abstract setting of information frames and in the concrete setting of Public Announcement Logic. The main lesson is that dynamic consequence diverges from classical consequence when information is not persistent, which is in particular the case of epistemic information about what we do not yet know. We end by comparing our results with recent work by Rothschild and Yalcin on the conditions under which the dynamics of information updates can be classically represented. We show that classicality for consequence is strictly less demanding than classicality for updates. Johan van Benthem's recent book Logical Dynamics of Information and Interaction [8] can be seen as a passionate plea for a radically new view of logic. To be sure, the book is not a philosophical discussion of what logic is but rather an impressive series of illustrations of what logic can be, with presentations of numerous logical languages and a wealth of meta-logical results about them. The view is called simply Logical Dynamics, and contrasted with more traditional views of logic, and also with the earlier view from e.g. [5], now called Pluralism, in which logic was seen as the study of consequence relations. According to Logical Dynamics, logic is not only about reasoning, about what follows from what, but about all aspects of information flow among rational agents. Not just proof and inference, but observations, questions, announcements, communication, plans, strategies, etc. are first-class citizens in the land of Logic. And not only the output of these activities belong to logic, but also the processes leading up to it. This is a fascinating and inspiring view of logic. But how different is it from a more standard view? In particular, what does it change for the analysis of logical consequence, which had been the focus of traditional logical enquiry? This paper attempts some answers to the latter question, with a view to get clearer about the former.

  • 87. Bradley, Richard
    et al.
    Stefánsson, H. Orri
    Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden.
    Desire, Expectation and Invariance2016In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 125, no 499, 691-725 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The Desire-as-Belief thesis (DAB) states that any rational person desires a proposition exactly to the degree that she believes or expects the proposition to be good. Many people take David Lewis to have shown the thesis to be inconsistent with Bayesian decision theory. However, as we show, Lewis's argument was based on an Invariance condition that itself is inconsistent with the (standard formulation of the) version of Bayesian decision theory that he assumed in his arguments against DAB. The aim of this paper is to explore what impact the rejection of Invariance has on the DAB thesis. Without assuming Invariance, we first refute all versions of DAB that entail that there are only two levels of goodness. We next consider two theses according to which rational desires are intimately connected to expectations of (multi-levelled) goodness, and show that these are consistent with Bayesian decision theory as long as we assume that the contents of 'value propositions' are not fixed. We explain why this conclusion is independently plausible, and show how to construct such propositions.

  • 88. Bridges, Douglas S.
    et al.
    Palmgren, Erik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Science, Department of Mathematics.
    Constructive Mathematics2013In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 1095-5054, E-ISSN 1095-5054Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 89.
    Brodin, Jane
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Child and Youth Studies.
    Stancheva-Popkostadinova, Vaska
    Social medical dept. South West University.
    Ethical considerations in child research in light of the convention on the rights of the child2009In: Journal of Global Change and Governance, ISSN 1941-8760, Vol. II, no 2, 1-16 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of the article is to discuss the needs and priorities for ethical considerations in research on children. The focus is on methodological  issues and  on ethical conserations in research in relation to the CRC.

  • 90.
    Brunnander, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Deflating selection: On the interpretation and application of evolutionary theory2011Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Although the theory of evolution is well-established it nevertheless presents us with a few unresolved matters of interpretation. One key task is to get clear about what exactly one should take the term 'natural selection' to denote. Is natural selection a causal factor that causes evolutionary change and that has driven the process of evolution from relatively simple beginnings to the current state of biological complexity, or is it a "mere" consequence of the appearance of novel forms in relatively stable environments? Does evolutionary theory present us with a set of specifically evolutionary causes, natural selection being the most important? The answers to these questions have repercussions for what we may rightly take appeals to natural selection to explain, and how we are to relate evolutionary theory to neighbouring sciences. The first paper of this compilation thesis, as well as the appendix, deals with these questions at length, and come out supporting a non-causal interpretation. It is argued that it is redundant to posit natural selection as a cause of evolutionary change, and that the idea promotes misunderstanding of the evolutionary process. The second paper criticises the attempt to invoke natural selection in accounting for the heterogeneity of realisation within functionally defined biological categories. It is argued that the purported explanation is mistaken in a way that reflects the misconception of selection that is inherent in the causal interpretation. The paper furthermore presents a hypothesis that constitutes an additional theme in the thesis; that evolutionary discourse is influenced by pre-theoretical "leakage" due to the terms used and their entrenched meanings. The third paper argues that we have no reason to adopt an essentially etiological conception of biological functions. It is argued that the seeming reasonableness of essentially etiological functions stems from a pre-theoretical mindset that lacks theoretical justification. Standard etiological accounts unpack the notion of function in terms of selection, and so this discussion is related to the question of interpreting the inventory of evolutionary theory. The fourth paper discusses the relation between evolutionary discourse and intentional psychology. The background is that evolutionary considerations are quite commonly presented in terms connoting intent and motivation, and that the evolutionary and psychological perspectives are not always kept apart. The last paper is a metaphilosophical contribution that emanated from my engagement with the debate about biological functions.

  • 91.
    Brunnander, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Discussion note: Did Darwin really answer Paley's question?2013In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, ISSN 1369-8486, E-ISSN 1879-2499, Vol. 44, no 3, 309-311 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is commonly thought that natural selection explains the rise of adaptive complexity. Razeto-Barry and Frick (2011) have recently argued in favour of this view, dubbing it the Creative View. I argue that the Creative View is mistaken if it claims that natural selection serves to answer Paley’s question. This is shown by a case that brings out the contrastive structure inherent in this demand for explanation. There is, however, a rather trivial sense in which specific environmental conditions are crucial for the rise of specific adaptations, but this is hardly what opponents of the Creative View are denying.

  • 92.
    Brunnander, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Is the language of intentional psychology an efficient tool for evolutionists?2008In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, ISSN 1369-8486, E-ISSN 1879-2499, Vol. 39, no 1, 147-152 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The language of intentional psychology is commonly used as a means of addressing issues concerning selection. This habit is generally considered an efficient shorthand, but oft-reported misunderstandings leave room for doubt. I stress the general point that efficiency of a mode of expression is an empirical matter, deserving the same treatment, theoretically and methodologically, as other such matters. Mistaken assumptions regarding the relevant cognitive capacities may make for inefficient communication, and discourse about human evolution is a plausible case in point.

  • 93.
    Brunnander, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Natural selection and multiple realisation: A closer look2013In: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, ISSN 0269-8595, E-ISSN 1469-9281, I, Vol. 27, no 1, 73-83 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The target of this paper is the claim that natural selection accounts for the multiple realisation of biological and psychological kinds. I argue that the explanation actually offered doesn’t provide any insight about the phenomenon since it presupposes multiple realisation as an unexplained premise, and this is what does all the work. The purported explanation mistakenly invokes the “indifference” of selection to structure as an additional explanatorily relevant factor. While such indifference can be explanatory in intentional contexts it isn’t a causal factor at all in non-intentional nature. The upshot is that once the necessary initial assumption about heterogeneity is accepted there is no further explanation to do.

  • 94.
    Brunnander, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On the theoretical motivation for positing etiological functions2011In: Canadian journal of philosophy, ISSN 0045-5091, E-ISSN 1911-0820, Vol. 41, no 3, 371-390 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper argues that the widely accepted etiological notion of function finds no solid support in biological theory. While the notion may seem to be called for by entrenched linguistic practice, I claim that the arguments that have been raised in its favour do not succeed in providing a theoretical motivation for it. This verdict is bound to transfer to philosophical contexts where the notion is put to use, teleosemantics being the perhaps most debated application.

  • 95.
    Brunnander, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Philosophy and default descriptivism: The functions debate2011In: Metaphilosophy, ISSN 0026-1068, E-ISSN 1467-9973, Vol. 42, no 4, 417-430 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    By focusing on contributions to the literature on function ascription, this article seeks to illustrate two problems with philosophical accounts that are presented as having descriptive aims. There is a motivational problem in that there is frequently no good reason why descriptive aims should be important, and there is a methodological problem in that the methods employed frequently fail to match the task description. This suggests that the task description as such may be the result of “default descriptivism,” a tendency to take considerations that make sense of a practice to be the very considerations that generate it. Although such hypotheses are frequently quite plausible, the fact of the matter may not be very important for the pursuits of philosophers.

  • 96.
    Brunnander, Björn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    What is natural selection?2007In: Biology & Philosophy, ISSN 0169-3867, E-ISSN 1572-8404, Vol. 22, no 2, 231-246 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    ‘Natural selection’ is, it seems, an ambiguous term. It is sometimes held to denote a consequence of variation, heredity, and environment, while at other times as denoting a force that creates adaptations. I argue that the latter, the force interpretation, is a redundant notion of natural selection. I will point to difficulties in making sense of this linguistic practice, and argue that it is frequently at odds with standard interpretations of evolutionary theory. I provide examples to show this; one example involving the relation between adaptations and other traits, and a second involving the relation between selection and drift.

  • 97.
    Buijsman, Stefan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Accessibility of reformulated mathematical content2017In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 194, no 6, 2233-2250 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I challenge a claim that seems to be made when nominalists offer reformulations of the content of mathematical beliefs, namely that these reformulations are accessible to everyone. By doing so, I argue that these theories cannot account for the mathematical knowledge that ordinary people have. In the first part of the paper I look at reformulations that employ the concept of proof, such as those of Mary Leng and Ottavio Bueno. I argue that ordinary people don’t have many beliefs about proofs, and that they are not in a position to acquire knowledge about proofs autonomously. The second part of the paper is concerned with other reformulations of content, such as those of Hartry Field and Stephen Yablo. There too, the problem is that people are not able to acquire knowledge of the reformulated propositions autonomously. Ordinary people simply do not have beliefs with the kind of content that the nominalists need, for their theory to account for the mathematical knowledge of ordinary people. All in all then, the conclusion is that a large number of theories that suggest reformulations of mathematical content yield contents that are inaccessible for most people. Thus, these theories are limited, in that they cannot account for the mathematical knowledge of ordinary people.

  • 98.
    Buijsman, Stefan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Philosophy of Mathematics for the Masses: Extending the scope of the philosophy of mathematics2016Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    One of the important discussions in the philosophy of mathematics, is that centered on Benacerraf’s Dilemma. Benacerraf’s dilemma challenges theorists to provide an epistemology and semantics for mathematics, based on their favourite ontology. This challenge is the point on which all philosophies of mathematics are judged, and clarifying how we might acquire mathematical knowledge is one of the main occupations of philosophers of mathematics. In this thesis I argue that this discussion has overlooked an important part of mathematics, namely mathematics as it is exercised by ordinary people (almost everyone without a mathematics degree). I do so by looking at the different theories that have been put forward in the recent debate, and showing for each of these that they are unable to account for the mathematical practices of ordinary people. In order to show that these practices do need to be accounted for, I also argue that ordinary people are (sometimes) doing mathematics, i.e. that they engage in properly mathematical practices. Because these practices are properly mathematical, they should be accounted for by any philosophy of mathematics. The conclusion of my thesis, then, is that current theories fail to do something that they should do, while remaining neutral on how well they perform when it comes to accounting for the practices of professional mathematicians.

  • 99.
    Buijsman, Stefan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Referring to Mathematical Objects via Definite Descriptions2017In: Philosophia mathematica, ISSN 0031-8019, E-ISSN 1744-6406, Vol. 25, no 1, 128-138 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Linsky and Zalta try to explain how we can refer to mathematical objects by saying that this happens through definite descriptions which may appeal to mathematical theories. I present two issues for their account. First, there is a problem of finding appropriate pre-conditions to reference, which are currently difficult to satisfy. Second, there is a problem of ensuring the stability of the resulting reference. Slight changes in the properties ascribed to a mathematical object can result in a shift of reference and this leads to various problems, e.g., it makes inferring knowledge much harder than it is.

  • 100.
    Buijsman, Stefan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The role of mathematics in scienceArticle, book review (Other academic)
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