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  • 801.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Concepts and Communication: Comments on Words and Images. An Essay on the Origin of Ideas2015In: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 75, no 1, p. 110-121Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    At the center of Gauker's book stands two inter-connected theses: First, that concepts are dependent on language; second, that this requires rejecting the traditional idea that linguistic communication involves a transmission of thoughts. I argue that we cannot afford to reject the traditional conception of communication and that Gauker's alternative ‘cooperative' conception is unsatisfactory. However, I also argue that Gauker is wrong to suggest that the language dependency thesis of concepts is incompatible with the traditional view of communication.

  • 802.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Davidson and Wittgenstein: A Homeric Struggle?2017In: Wittgenstein and Davidson on language, thought, and action / [ed] Claudine Verheggen, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 46-68Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    P.F. Strawson famously contrasts two approaches to the question of what it is for words to have meaning: That of communication-intention theorists and that of formal semantics theorists. According to Strawson the later Wittgenstein and Davidson end up on opposite sides in this struggle since Wittgenstein, unlike Davidson, takes conventions to be essential to meaning. Several contemporary Wittgenstein scholars agree, among them Hans-Johann Glock and Meredith Williams. They suggest that Wittgenstein puts forth an essentially social picture of language, with the shared conventions at the center, while Davidson defends an individualistic picture that ultimately fails to account for the public nature of language. I shall argue that this description is importantly mistaken: Davidson and Wittgenstein both subscribe to the idea that meaning is determined by use, rather than by conventions, and they both take meaning to be essentially public and tied to its role in communication.

  • 803.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    EXTENDED BELIEF AND EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE2014In: Philosophical Issues, ISSN 1533-6077, E-ISSN 1758-2237, Vol. 24, no 1, p. 460-481Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 804.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Incomplete Understanding of Concepts2017In: Oxford Handbooks Online, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article discusses the thesis that a subject can have a concept, think thoughts containing it, that she incompletely understands. The central question concerns how to construe the distinction between having a concept and understanding it. Two important versions of the thesis are distinguished: a metasemantic version and an epistemic version. According to the first, the subject may have concept C without being a fully competent user, in virtue of deference to other speakers or to the world. According to the second, the subject may have a concept without being able to provide a proper explication of it. It is argued that whereas the epistemic version is plausible, the metasemantic version faces some challenges. First, it needs to be explained precisely how deference enables a speaker to have C. Second, metasemantic incomplete understanding is in tension with the idea that concepts serve to capture the subject’s cognitive perspective.

  • 805.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Our Own Minds. Socio-Cultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness . By Radu J. Bogdan. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 20102013In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 63, no 253, p. 814-816Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 806.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Review of 'Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction', by Gillian Russell2008In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, Vol. 12, no 10Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 807.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rädslan för kunskap2014In: SANS, ISSN 2000-9690, Vol. 3, p. 26-27Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 808.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Content2008In: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 38, no 3, p. 399-424Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 809.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism2007In: PHilosophy Compass, Vol. 2Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Externalism is widely endorsed within contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Despite this, it is far from clear how the externalist thesis should be construed and, indeed, why we should accept it. In this entry I distinguish and examine three central types of externalism: what I call foundational externalism, externalist semantics, and psychological externalism. I suggest that the most plausible version of externalism is not in fact a very radical thesis and does not have any terribly interesting implications for philosophy of mind, whereas the more radical and interesting versions of externalism are quite difficult to support.

  • 810.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Självkännedom - på egen risk.2011In: Forskning & Framsteg, ISSN 0015-7937, no 6, p. 44-47Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 811.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The insiginificance of transparency2015In: Externalism, self-knowledge, and skepticism / [ed] Sandford C. Goldberg, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 142-164Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 812. Zeiler, K
    et al.
    Furberg, E
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Tufveson, G
    Welin, S
    The ethics of non-heartbeating donation;: how new technology can change the ethical landscape2008In: Journal of medical ethics, Vol. 34, p. 526-529Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 813. Zeiler, K.
    et al.
    Furberg, E.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Tufveson, G.
    Welin, S.
    The ethics of non-heart-beating donation: how new technology can change the ethical landscape2008In: Journal of Medical Ethics, ISSN 0306-6800, E-ISSN 1473-4257, Vol. 34, no 7, p. 526-Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The global shortage of organs for transplantation and the development of new and better medical technologies for organ preservation have resulted in a renewed interest in non-heart-beating donation (NHBD). This article discusses ethical questions related to controlled and uncontrolled NHBD. It argues that certain preparative measures, such as giving anticoagulants, should be acceptable before patients are dead, but when they have passed a point where further curative treatment is futile, they are in the process of dying and they are unconscious. Furthermore, the article discusses consequences of technological developments based on improvement of a chest compression apparatus used today to make mechanical heart resuscitation. Such technological development can be used to transform cases of non-controlled NHBD to controlled NHBD. In our view, this is a step forward since the ethical difficulties related to controlled NHBD are easier to solve than those related to non-controlled NHBD. However, such technological developments also evoke other ethical questions.

  • 814. Ågotnes, Thomas
    et al.
    Goranko, Valentin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Jamroga, Wojciech
    Wooldridge, Michael
    Knowledge and Ability2015In: Handbook of Epistemic Logic / [ed] Hans van Ditmarsch. Joseph Halpern, Wiebe van der Hoek and Barteld Kooi, College Publications, 2015, 1, p. 543-589Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this chapter we relate epistemic logics with logics for strategic ability developed and studied in computer science, artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. We discuss approaches from philosophy and artificial intelligence to modelling the interaction of agents’ knowledge and abilities and then focus on concurrent game models and the alternating-time temporal logic ATL. We show how ATL enables reasoning about agents’ coalitional abilities to achieve qualitative objectives in concurrent game models, first assuming complete information and then under incomplete information and uncertainty about the structureof the game model. We then discuss epistemic extensions of ATL enabling explicit reasoning about the interaction of knowledge and strategic abilities on different epistemic levels, leading inter alia to the notion of constructive knowledge.

  • 815.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    A plea for pragmatics2009In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 170, no 1, p. 155-167Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Let intentionalism be the view that what proposition is expressed in context by a sentence containing indexicals depends on the speaker’s intentions. It has recently been argued that intentionalism makes communicative success mysterious and that there are counterexamples to the intentionalist view in the form of cases of mismatch between the intended interpretation and the intuitively correct interpretation. In this paper, I argue that these objections can be met, once we acknowledge that we may distinguish what determines the correct interpretation from the evidence that is available to the audience, as well as from the standards by which we judge whether or not a given interpretation is reasonable. With these distinctions in place, we see that intentionalism does not render communicative success mysterious, and that cases of mismatch between the intended interpretation and the intuitively correct one can easily be accommodated. The distinction is also useful in treating the Humpty Dumpty problem for intentionalism, since it turns out that this can be treated as an extreme special case of mismatch.

  • 816.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Communication and indexical reference2010In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 149, no 3, p. 355-366Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the debate over what determines the reference of an indexical expression on a given occasion of use, we can distinguish between two generic positions. According to the first, the reference is determined by internal factors, such as the speaker’s intentions. According to the second, the reference is determined by external factors, like conventions or what a competent and attentive audience would take the reference to be. It has recently been argued that the first position is untenable, since there are cases of mismatch where the intuitively correct reference differs from the one that would be determined by the relevant internal factors. The aim of this paper is to show that, contrary to this line of argument, it is the proponent of the second position that should be worried, since this position yields counterintuitive consequences regarding communicative success in cases of mismatch.

  • 817.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Contextualist theories of vagueness2012In: Philosophy Compass, ISSN 1747-9991, E-ISSN 1747-9991, Vol. 7, no 7, p. 470-480Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    During the last couple of decades, several attempts have been made to come up with a theory that can handle the various semantic, logical and philosophical problems raised by the vagueness of natural languages. One of the most influential ideas that have come into fashion in recent years is the idea that vagueness should be analysed as a form of context sensitivity. Such contextualist theories of vagueness have gained some popularity, but many philosophers have remained sceptical of the prospects of finding a tenable contextualist solution to the problems of vagueness. This paper provides an introduction to the most popular contextualist accounts, and a discussion of some of the most important arguments for and against them.

  • 818.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Extensions in Flux: An Essay on Vagueness and Context Sensitivity2009Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The extensions of vague predicates like ‘is bald’, ‘is tall’, and ‘is a heap’ apparently lack sharp boundaries, and this makes such predicates susceptible to soritical reasoning, i.e. reasoning that leads to some version of the notorious sorites paradox. This essay is concerned with a certain kind of theory of vagueness, according to which the symptoms and puzzles of vagueness should be accounted for in terms of a particular species of context sensitivity exhibited by vague expressions. The basic idea is that the extensions of vague predicates vary with certain contextual factors, and that this fact can explain why they appear to lack sharp boundaries. This kind of view is referred to as contextualism about vagueness. A detailed characterisation of contextualism about vagueness is given in chapter two and three. In chapter two, a generic version of contextualism about vagueness is developed, and some alternative forms of context sensitivity are introduced. In chapter three, the specific contextual factors appealed to by different contextualists are discussed. In chapter four, different contextualist diagnoses of the sorites paradox are considered, and found to be problematic in various ways. It is argued that contrary to what some of its proponents have claimed, contextualism about vagueness is not superior to other comparable theories of vagueness when it comes to explaining the appeal of soritical reasoning. In chapter five, a certain version of the sorites paradox, known as the forced march sorites, is discussed. It is argued that “data” about how speakers would behave in the forced march cannot lend any firm support to contextualism about vagueness. In chapter six, some problems concerning the instability of the contextual factors are considered. One problem is that contextualist diagnoses of the sorites which locate a fallacy of equivocation in the reasoning seem to render non-soritical reasoning fallacious as well. A model for treating this problem is suggested, but on closer consideration, it turns out to be problematic. Moreover, this model is of no help in solving the more general problem that even if classical logic remains valid for vague language on some contextualist views, the instability of the extensions of vague predicates makes it difficult to know when a certain piece of reasoning instantiates a valid argument form. Other difficulties arise with respect to speech reports and belief contents. Chapter seven concludes with a summary and some methodological remarks.

  • 819.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Forced-March Sorites Arguments and Linguistic Competence2013In: Dialectica, ISSN 0012-2017, E-ISSN 1746-8361, Vol. 67, no 4, p. 403-426Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Agent relativists about vagueness (henceforth ‘agent relativists’) hold that whether or not an object x falls in the extension of a vague predicate ‘P’ at a time t depends on the judgemental dispositions of a particular competent agent at t. My aim in this paper is to critically examine arguments that purport to support agent relativism by appealing to data from forced-march Sorites experiments. The most simple and direct versions of such forced-march Sorites argu- ments rest on the following (implicit) premise: If competent speakers’ judgements vary in a certain way, then the extensions of ‘P’ as used by these speakers must vary in the same way. This premise is in need of independent support, since otherwise opponents of agent relativism can simply reject it. In this paper, I focus on the idea that one cannot plausibly reject this premise, as that would commit one to implausible claims about linguistic competence. Against this, I argue that one can accommodate the data from forced-march Sorites experiments in a way that is compatible with a plausible picture of linguistic competence, without going agent relativist. Thus, there is reason to be sceptical of the idea that such data paired with considerations about linguistic competence can be invoked in order to lend any solid support to agent relativism. Forced-march Sorites arguments of this kind can, and should be, resisted.

  • 820.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Indexicals and Reference-Shifting: Towards a Pragmatic Approach2017In: Philosophy and phenomenological research, ISSN 0031-8205, E-ISSN 1933-1592, Vol. 95, no 1, p. 117-152Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I propose a pragmatic approach to the kind of reference-shifting occurring in indexicals as used in e. g. written notes and answering machine messages. I proceed in two steps. First, I prepare the ground by showing that the arguments against such a pragmatic approach raised in the recent literature fail. Second, I take a first few steps towards implementing this approach, by sketching a pragmatic theory of reference-shifting, and showing how it can handle cases of the relevant kind. While the immediate scope of the paper is restricted to indexicals and reference-shifting, and the discussion is confined to a specific range of theories and cases, the approach proposed is compatible with a fairly broad range of more or less semantically conservative theories, and many of the conclusions drawn are significant for the evaluation of pragmatic explanations in philosophy more generally. The overall goal is to offer a new perspective on the issues under discussion, and to prompt philosophers to reconsider some of the established methods by which pragmatic explanations are evaluated.

  • 821.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Infelicitous cancellation: The explicit cancellability test for conversational implicature revisited2015In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 93, no 3, p. 465-474Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper questions the adequacy of the explicit cancellability test for conversational implicature as it is commonly understood. The standard way of understanding this test relies on two assumptions: first, that that one can test whether a certain content is (merely) conversationally implicated, by checking whether that content is cancellable, and second, that a cancellation is successful only if it results in a felicitous utterance. While I accept the first of these assumptions, I reject the second one. I argue that a cancellation can succeed even if it results in an infelicitous utterance, and that unless we take this possibility into account we run the risk of misdiagnosing philosophically significant cases.

  • 822.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Raffman, Diana. Unruly Words. A Study of Vague Language2014In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 823.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Recanati, François. Perspectival Thought: A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism2009In: Review of Metaphysics, ISSN 0034-6632, E-ISSN 2154-1302, Vol. 62, no 4Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 824.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Communication Desideratum and Theories of Indexical Reference2015In: Mind and language, ISSN 0268-1064, E-ISSN 1468-0017, Vol. 30, no 4, p. 474-499Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to the communication desideratum (CD), a notion of semantic content must be adequately related to communication. In the recent debate on indexical reference, (CD) has been invoked in arguments against the view that intentions determine the semantic content of indexicals and demonstratives (intentionalism). In this article, I argue that the interpretations of (CD) that these arguments rely on are questionable, and suggest an alternative interpretation, which is compatible with (strong) intentionalism. Moreover, I suggest an approach that combines elements of intentionalism with other subjectivist approaches, and discuss the role of intuitions in developing and evaluating theories of indexical reference.

  • 825.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Vagueness, semantics and psychology2011In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 61, no 242, p. 1-5Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to extension-shifting theories of vagueness, the extensions of vague predicates have sharp boundaries, which shift as a function of certain psychological factors. Such theories have been claimed to provide an attractive explanation of the appeal of soritical reasoning. I challenge this claim: the demand for such an explanation need not constrain the semantics of vague predicates at all.

  • 826.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Greenough, Patrick
    University of St Andrews and Arché, University of Sydney.
    Hold the context fixed—vagueness still remains2010In: Cuts and Clouds: Vagueness, Its Nature, and Its Logic / [ed] Richard Dietz and Sebastiano Moruzzi, Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2010, p. 275-288Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Contextualism about vagueness is the view that vagueness consists in a particular species of context-sensitivity, and that accommodating this fact will yield a plausible solution to the sorites paradox. As many commentators have noted, this view faces the following objection: if the context is held fixed, vagueness still remains, therefore vagueness is not a species of context-sensitivity. In this paper, two replies to this objection are sketched, which result in two very different kinds of contextualism.

  • 827.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Greenough, Patrick
    Department of Philosophy/Arché, University of St Andrews.
    Vagueness and Non-Indexical Contextualism2010In: New Waves in Philosophy of Language / [ed] Sarah Sawyer, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan , 2010, 1, p. 8-23Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 828.
    Århem, Peter
    et al.
    Karolinska Institutet.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    On Consciousness and Spontaneous Brain Activity1997In: Matter matters?: on the material basis of the cognitive activity of mind / [ed] Peter Århem, Hans Liljenström, Uno Svedin, Berlin: Springer, 1997, p. 235-253Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 829.
    Århem, Peter
    et al.
    Karolinska Institutet.
    Lindahl, B. I. B.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Manger, Paul R.
    University of the Witwatersrand.
    Butler, Ann B.
    The Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study.
    On the Origin of Consciousness: Some Amniote Scenarios2008In: Consciousness Transitions: Phylogenetic, Ontogenetic, and Physiological Aspects / [ed] Hans Liljenström, Peter Århem, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008, p. 77-96Chapter in book (Other academic)
14151617 801 - 829 of 829
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