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  • 801.
    Weigelt, Charlotta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The logic of life: Heidegger's retrieval of Aristotle's concept of Logos2002Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 802.
    Weigelt, Charlotta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Relation between Logic and Ontology in the Metaphysics2007In: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 60, no 3, p. 507-541Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 803.
    Weigelt, Charlotta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Two Sorts of Dualism: McDowell's Oscillation Between a Transcendental and a Metaphysical Conception of Reason and Nature2009In: Sats: Nordic Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1600-1974, E-ISSN 1869-7577, Vol. 10, no 1, p. 53-77Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Mind and World, John McDowell tries to achieve a reconciliation between reason and nature. In his view, this pursuit derives its motivation from the modern conception of nature as the space of law, which seems to relegate human rationality to a state of utter isolation from man's nature as an animal. Accordingly, we need to rethink the modern understanding of nature in such a way as to make room for a notion of “second nature”, in which human reason may properly be situated. In this article I argue, from a phenomenological point of view, that McDowell's proposed solution to the problem of dualism is unsatisfactory, basically because it seeks to combine two radically different perspectives on experience: as a vehicle of reasons and meaning and as a transaction in nature respectively. But, it is suggested, that kind of reconciliation is neither possible, nor even desirable. At bottom, it rests on a confusion of transcendental with metaphysical issues.

  • 804.
    Weigelt, Karl
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Husserl och betydelsefenomenet2011In: Edmund Husserl / [ed] Sven-Olov Wallenstein, Stockholm: Axl Books, 2011, p. 61-73Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 805.
    Weigelt, Karl
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Signified World: The Problem of Occasionality in Husserl's Phenomenology of Meaning2008Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This study offers the first comprehensive account of the problem of situation-dependence and facticity in Husserl's phenomenology of meaning. On the basis of a reconsideration of the central ideas of Husserl's phenomenological approach to meaning and intentionality, it presents a reconstruction and assessment of Husserl's revised conception of empirical meaning.

    Taking its lead from Husserl's self-critical remark on the analysis of "occasional expressions" in the Logical Investigations, the study uncovers the underlying problem with Husserl's initial conception of the relation between subjectivity and objectivity. It is shown that the problem of occasionality does not relate to indexicality in a standard sense, but to the essential facticity and subject-relativity of the intentional individuation of real being in general and to the contingency and inexhaustible transcendence of the world.

    The reconstruction of Husserl's solution is carefully related to an interpretation of central ideas of Husserl's developed philosophy. Critically reviewing influential interpretations of Husserl, the study elaborates on the question of internalism and externalism, the question of representationalism, the question of ideal contents, the notion of noema and the issues of direct reference and de re meaning.

    It is shown how Husserl's revised conception of empirical meaning is related to the analysis of horizon-intentionality, to the constitution of the transcendent real world and to the constitution of the lived body as a centre of situated orientation. It is argued that Husserl succeeds in maintaining phenomenological internalism with regard to intentionality in concreto, while accepting a form of externalism with regard to meaning, according to which the possibility of true identity of meaning is bound to the presumptive existence of the experienced world.

  • 806.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Classical vs. modern Squares of Opposition, and beyond2012In: The Square of Opposition: A General Framework for Cognition / [ed] Jean-Yves Beziau, Gillman Payette, Peter Lang Publishing Group, 2012, p. 195-229Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The main difference between the classical Aristotelian square of oppo- sition and the modern one is not, as many seem to think, that the classical square has or presupposes existential import. The difference lies in the relations holding along the sides of the square: (sub)contrariety and sub- alternation in the classical case, inner negation and dual in the modern case. This is why the modern square, but not the classical one, applies to any (generalized) quantifier of the right type: all, no, more than three, all but five, most, at least two-thirds of the,... After stating these and other logical facts about quantified squares of opposition, we present a number of examples of such squares spanned by familiar quantifiers. Spe- cial attention is paid to possessive quantifiers, such Mary’s, at least two students’, etc., whose behavior under negation is more complex and in fact can be captured in a cube of opposition.

  • 807.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Compositionality in Kaplan style semantics2012In: The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality / [ed] M. Werning, W Hinzen, E. Machery, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 192-219Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I investigate how the notion of compisitionality can be adapted to various kinds of semantics that take context dependence seriously.

  • 808.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Constant Operators: Partial Quantifiers2012In: From Quantification to Conversation / [ed] Lars Borin and Staffan Larsson, London: College Publications, 2012Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper begins to explore what it means for an operator to be *constant*, roughly in the sense of meaning the same on every universe. We consider total as well as partial operators of various types, with special focus on generalized quantifiers.

  • 809.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Explaining quantifier restriction: Reply to Ben-Yami2012In: Logique et Analyse, ISSN 0024-5836, E-ISSN 2295-5836, no 217, p. 109-120Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This is a reply to H. Ben-Yami, 'Generalized quantifiers, and beyond' (this journal,2009), where he argues that standard GQ theory does not explain why natural language quantifiers have a restricted domain of quantification. I argue, on the other hand, that although GQ theory gives no deep explanation of this fact, it does give a sort of explanation, whereas Ben-Yami's suggested alternative is no improvement.

  • 810.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    From constants to consequence, and back2011In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 187, no 3, p. 957-971Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Bolzano’s definition of consequence in effect associates with each set X of symbols (in a given interpreted language) a consequence relation =>_X. We present this in a precise and abstract form, in particular studying minimal sets of symbols generating =>_X. Then we present a method for going in the other direction: extracting from an arbitrary consequence relation => its associated set C_=> of constants. We show that this returns the expected logical constants from familiar consequence relations, and that, restricting attention to sets of symbols satisfying a strong minimality condition, there is an isomorphism between the set of strongly minimal sets of symbols and the set of corresponding consequence relations (both ordered under inclusion).

  • 811.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Generalized quantifiers2011In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 1095-5054, E-ISSN 1095-5054Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 812.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Generalized quantifiers2016In: Cambridge Handbook of Formal Semantics / [ed] Maria Aloni, Paul Dekker, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 206-237Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Thirty years of generalized quantifiers

    It is now more than thirty years since the first serious applications of Generalized Quantifier (GQ) theory to natural language semantics were made: Barwise and Cooper (1981); Higginbotham and May (1981); Keenan and Stavi (1986). Richard Montague had in effect interpreted English NPs as (type 〈1〉) generalized quantifiers (see Montague, 1974), but without referring to GQs in logic, where they had been introduced by Mostowski (1957) and, in final form, Lindström (1966). Logicians were interested in the properties of logics obtained by piecemeal additions to first-order logic (FO) by adding quantifiers like ‘there exist uncountably many’, but they made no connection to natural language. Montague Grammar and related approaches had made clear the need for higher-type objects in natural language semantics. What Barwise, Cooper, and the others noticed was that generalized quantifiers are the natural interpretations not only of noun phrases but also in particular of determiners (henceforth Dets). This was no small insight, even if it may now seem obvious. Logicians had, without intending to, made available model-theoretic objects suitable for interpreting English definite and indefinite articles, the Aristotelian all, no, some, proportional Dets like most, at least half, 10 percent of the, less than two-thirds of the, numerical Dets such as at least five, no more than ten, between six and nine, finitely many, an odd number of, definite Dets like the, the twelve, possessives like Mary's, few students’, two of every professor's, exception Dets like no … but John, every … except Mary, and Boolean combinations of all of the above. All of these can – if one wants! – be interpreted extensionally as the same type of second-order objects, namely (on each universe of discourse) binary relations between sets. Given the richness of this productive but seemingly heterogeneous class of expressions, a uniform interpretation scheme was a huge step. Further, the tools of logical GQ theory could be brought to bear on putative Det interpretations, which turned out to be a subclass of the class of all type 〈1, 1〉 quantifiers with special traits. The three pioneer papers mentioned above offered numerous cases of novel description, and sometimes explanation, of characteristic features of language in terms of model-theoretic properties of the quantifiers involved.

  • 813.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Generalized quantifiers in natural language semantics2015In: The handbook of contemporary semantic theory / [ed] Shalom Lappin, Chris Fox, John Wiley & Sons, 2015, 2 uppl., p. 11-46Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 814.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Midpoints2012In: Theories of Everything: In Honor of Ed Keenan / [ed] T. Graf, D. Paperno, A. Szabolcsi, J. Tellings, Los Angeles: UCLA Working Papers in Linguistics 17 , 2012, p. 427-438Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    I generalize Keenan's study of midpoints, generalized quantifiers equivalent to their own postcomplements (inner negations), focusing on the difference between a global and a local perspective of quantifiers.

  • 815.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Negation and quantification: a new look at the square of opposition: With comments by Fengkui Ju and Larry Moss, and a response by Dag Westerståhl.2013In: Logic across the University: Foundations and Applications: Proceedings of the Tsinghua Logic Conference, Beijing, 2013 / [ed] Johan van Benthem and Fenrong Liu, London: College Publications, 2013, 47, p. 301-317Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We study the Aristotelian square of opposition from the modern perspective of generalized quantifiers. With a subtle but important change in the relations holding along the sides of the square, we show that it applies to all kinds of quantifiers, not just the four Aristotelian ones. We establish some of its logical properties, and give numerous examples of squares spanned by various quantifiers, in particular those expressed by possessive constructions.

  • 816.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Pair grammars and compositionality2014In: Idées Fixes: A Festschrift dedicated to Christian Bennet on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday / [ed] Martin Kaså, Göteborg: University of Gothenburg; Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science , 2014, p. 121-137Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 817.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Questions about compositionality2015In: Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science: Logic and science facing the new technologies: Proceedings of the 14th International Congress (Nancy) / [ed] Peter Schroeder-Heister, Gerhard Heinzmann, Wilfrid Hodges, Pierre Edouard Bour, London: College Publications, 2015, p. 123-147Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Compositionality is currently discussed mainly in computer science, linguistics, and the philosophy of language. In computer science, it is seen as a desirable design principle. But in linguistics and especially in philosophy it is an "issue". Most theorists have strong opinions about it. Opinions, however, vary drastically: from the view that compositionality is trivial or empty, or that it is simply false for natural languages, to the idea that it plays an important role in explaining human linguistic competence. This situation is unsatisfactory, and may lead an outside observer to conclude that the debate is hopelessly confused.

    I believe there is something in the charge of confusion, but that compositionality is nevertheless an idea that deserves serious consideration, for logical as well as natural languages. In this paper I try to illustrate why, without presupposing extensive background knowledge about the issue.

  • 818.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Kontinen, Juha
    University of Helsinki.
    Väänänen, Jouko
    University of Helsinki.
    Editorial introduction: Special issue: Dependence and Independence in Logic2013In: Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, ISSN 0039-3215, E-ISSN 1572-8730, Vol. 101, no 1, p. 233-236Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The goal of the study of dependence and independence in logic is to establish a basic theory of dependence and independence phenomena underlying seemingly unrelated subjects such as game theory, random variables, database theory, scientific experiments, and probably many others. The monograph Dependence Logic (J. Väänänen, Cambridge UP, 2007) stimulated an avalanche of new results which have demonstrated remarkable convergence in this area. The concepts of (in)dependence in the different fields of science have surprising similarity and a common logic is starting to emerge. This special issue will give an overview of the state of the art of this new field.

  • 819.
    Widebäck, Filip
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Identity of proofs2001Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In the early seventies it was conjectured that a certain mathematically well-defined equivalence relation (bh-equivalence) on proofs in natural deduction captures the informal notion of identity of proofs. The conjecture can be divided into two parts, a soundness part and a completeness part. The soundness part is that bh-equivalent proofs are identical. The completeness part is that identical proofs are bh-equivalent. It is argued that soundness can not be mathematically proved. It must be taken for granted or rejected. Completeness, on the other hand, can not be taken for granted. It must be proved or disproved, although the question is not a mathematically precise question.

    The main result of this thesis is that the completeness part of the conjecture is true for the system of minimal implicational logic, provided that soundness can be taken for granted. The result is obtained by first proving that the notion of bh-equivalence is Post-complete. Roughly, if bh-equivalence is extended by a new schematic rule for identifying proofs, then all proofs of the same theorem are identical. In other words, there is only one schematic extension of bh-equivalence, the trivial equivalence relation that identifies all proofs of a theorem. It is then argued that the identity relation on proofs is non-trivial, i.e. that there are non-identical proofs. This proves the completeness part of the conjecture.

    The thesis also contains a new proof (for the above system) of so-called confluence and a conjecture characterizing bh-equivalence in a new way.

  • 820.
    Wikforss, Asa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Semantic Intuitions and the Theory of Reference2017In: Teorema, ISSN 0210-1602, Vol. 36, no 3, p. 95-116Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Experiments on the semantic intuitions of lay speakers concerning proper names have suggested that there is great variation in these intuitions, across individuals and across cultures. How should the semanticist respond to these results? Machery et. al. (2011) suggest three ways of accommodating the variation in intuitions: Deny that intuitions are reliable guides to reference; adopt referential pluralism and grant that names refer differently; or deny the value of non-expert intuitions. Philosophers of language have tended to endorse either the first option, arguing that the type of intuitions tested by Machery et. al. (2004) do not provide real evidence for the theory of reference, or the third option, arguing that lay speaker intuitions are not sufficiently reliable when it comes to semantics. I argue, instead, that the intuitions tested do have evidential value and that the third option need be taken more seriously: referential pluralism. In particular, I address Marti's criticisms of Machery et. al. and her claim that the intuitions tested lack evidential value since they are meta-linguistic [Marti (2009), (2013)]. I argue that the intuitions tested are not meta-linguistic in a problematic way and that they do provide reasons to accept referential pluralism.

  • 821.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Are Natural Kind Terms Special?2010In: The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds / [ed] Helen Beebee and Nigel Sabbarton-Leary, New York: Routledge , 2010, p. 64-84Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    It is commonly assumed that natural kind terms constitute a distinct semantic category. This idea emerged during the 1970's following Kripke's and Putnam's well-known remarks on natural kind terms. The idea has stayed with us, although it is now recognized that the issues are considerably more complex than initially thought. Thus, it has become clear that much of Kripke's and Putnam's discussions were based on rather simplified views of natural kinds. It also turns out that the semantic issues are less straightforward than assumed - in particular, it is far from clear what it might mean to say that a kind term is rigid. Strikingly, however, these worries have not done much to undermine the confident assumption that natural kind terms form a special semantic category. In the paper I try to shake that confidence.  I argue that although natural kind terms are no doubt important (for instance, from an explanatory point of view), we are certainly not warranted in concluding that they form a separate, semantic category among the kind terms.

  • 822.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Bachelors, Energy, Cats and Water: Putnam on Kinds and Kind Terms2013In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 79, no 3, p. 242-261Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Since Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke's first attacks on traditional, descriptivist theories of natural kind terms, it has become customary to speak of the ` Putnam-Kripke' view of meaning and reference. This article argues that this is a mistake, and that Putnam's account of natural kind terms is importantly different from that of Kripke. In particular, Putnam has from the very start been sceptical of Kripke's modal claims, and in later papers he explicitly rejects the proposal that theoretical identity statements are metaphysically necessary (if true). I suggest that this is wholly in line with Putnam's earlier, Quine-inspired writings on general terms, and his preoccupation with the philosophy of science. Moreover, I argue that the picture of general terms that emerges from Putnam's writings is more plausible than that suggested by Kripke. However, contrary to Putnam, I also suggest that Putnam's later views on natural kinds and natural kind terms do not support standard Twin Earth externalism.

  • 823.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Color Terms and Semantic Externalism2012In: Croatian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1333-1108, E-ISSN 1847-6139, Vol. 12, no 36, p. 399-419Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper discusses whether the color terms should be given an externalist semantics. In the literature on the semantics of color terms externalism is standardly taken for granted, and Twin Earth style arguments play a central role. This is notable given that few people would claim that semantic externalism applies across the board, to all types of terms.  Why, then, should the color terms belong with this group of terms? I argue that the standard externalist strategies, introduced by Tyler Burge and Hilary Putnam, do not apply to these terms: The color terms do not function like natural kind terms, and the idea of semantic reliance on others does not apply to them. I conclude that the externalist arguments fail and that a version of internalism, more properly called ‘individualism’, applies to the color terms. 

  • 824.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Concepts and Communication: Comments on Words and Images. An Essay on the Origin of Ideas2015In: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 75, no 1, p. 110-121Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    At the center of Gauker's book stands two inter-connected theses: First, that concepts are dependent on language; second, that this requires rejecting the traditional idea that linguistic communication involves a transmission of thoughts. I argue that we cannot afford to reject the traditional conception of communication and that Gauker's alternative ‘cooperative' conception is unsatisfactory. However, I also argue that Gauker is wrong to suggest that the language dependency thesis of concepts is incompatible with the traditional view of communication.

  • 825.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Davidson and Wittgenstein: A Homeric Struggle?2017In: Wittgenstein and Davidson on language, thought, and action / [ed] Claudine Verheggen, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017, p. 46-68Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    P.F. Strawson famously contrasts two approaches to the question of what it is for words to have meaning: That of communication-intention theorists and that of formal semantics theorists. According to Strawson the later Wittgenstein and Davidson end up on opposite sides in this struggle since Wittgenstein, unlike Davidson, takes conventions to be essential to meaning. Several contemporary Wittgenstein scholars agree, among them Hans-Johann Glock and Meredith Williams. They suggest that Wittgenstein puts forth an essentially social picture of language, with the shared conventions at the center, while Davidson defends an individualistic picture that ultimately fails to account for the public nature of language. I shall argue that this description is importantly mistaken: Davidson and Wittgenstein both subscribe to the idea that meaning is determined by use, rather than by conventions, and they both take meaning to be essentially public and tied to its role in communication.

  • 826.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Does Semantics Need Normativity? Comments on Allan Gibbard, Meaning and Normativity2018In: Inquiry, ISSN 0020-174X, E-ISSN 1502-3923, Vol. 61, no 7, p. 755-766Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the book Gibbard proposes, first, that statements about meaning are normative statements and, second, that they can be given an expressivist treatment, along the lines of Gibbard's preferred metaethics. In my paper, I examine the first step: The claim that meaning statements are to be construed as being normative, as involving oughts'. Gibbard distinguishes two versions of the normativity of meaning thesis - a weak version, according to which every means implies an ought, and a strong version, according to which for every means, there is an ought that implies it. I argue that neither thesis withstands scrutiny. The weak thesis depends on assumptions about the notion of semantic correctness that the anti-normativist rejects, and the strong thesis does not solve the problems Gibbard wants it to solve: the problems of indeterminacy and meaning skepticism. I conclude that semantics does not need normativity.

  • 827.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    EXTENDED BELIEF AND EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE2014In: Philosophical Issues, ISSN 1533-6077, E-ISSN 1758-2237, Vol. 24, no 1, p. 460-481Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 828.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Faktaresistensen – en farsot2017In: Kristianstadsbladet, ISSN 1103-9523, no 25 novemberArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 829.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Incomplete Understanding of Concepts2017In: Oxford handbooks onlineArticle in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article discusses the thesis that a subject can have a concept, think thoughts containing it, that she incompletely understands. The central question concerns how to construe the distinction between having a concept and understanding it. Two important versions of the thesis are distinguished: a metasemantic version and an epistemic version. According to the first, the subject may have concept C without being a fully competent user, in virtue of deference to other speakers or to the world. According to the second, the subject may have a concept without being able to provide a proper explication of it. It is argued that whereas the epistemic version is plausible, the metasemantic version faces some challenges. First, it needs to be explained precisely how deference enables a speaker to have C. Second, metasemantic incomplete understanding is in tension with the idea that concepts serve to capture the subject’s cognitive perspective.

  • 830.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Our Own Minds. Socio-Cultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness . By Radu J. Bogdan. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 20102013In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 63, no 253, p. 814-816Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 831.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Review of 'Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction', by Gillian Russell2008In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, Vol. 12, no 10Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 832.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Rädslan för kunskap2014In: SANS, ISSN 2000-9690, Vol. 3, p. 26-27Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 833.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Content2008In: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 38, no 3, p. 399-424Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 834.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Semantic Externalism and Psychological Externalism2007In: PHilosophy Compass, Vol. 2Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Externalism is widely endorsed within contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Despite this, it is far from clear how the externalist thesis should be construed and, indeed, why we should accept it. In this entry I distinguish and examine three central types of externalism: what I call foundational externalism, externalist semantics, and psychological externalism. I suggest that the most plausible version of externalism is not in fact a very radical thesis and does not have any terribly interesting implications for philosophy of mind, whereas the more radical and interesting versions of externalism are quite difficult to support.

  • 835.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Självkännedom - på egen risk.2011In: Forskning & Framsteg, ISSN 0015-7937, no 6, p. 44-47Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 836.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Svenska elever är för dåligt ­­rustade mot falska nyheter2017In: Dagens nyheter, ISSN 1101-2447, no 9 decemberArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 837.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The insiginificance of transparency2015In: Externalism, self-knowledge, and skepticism / [ed] Sandford C. Goldberg, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 142-164Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 838.
    Wikforss, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Vem bryr sig om fakta?2017In: Modern psykologi, ISSN 2000-4087, no 8, p. 30-33Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 839. Zeiler, K
    et al.
    Furberg, E
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Tufveson, G
    Welin, S
    The ethics of non-heartbeating donation;: how new technology can change the ethical landscape2008In: Journal of medical ethics, Vol. 34, p. 526-529Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 840. Zeiler, K.
    et al.
    Furberg, E.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Tufveson, G.
    Welin, S.
    The ethics of non-heart-beating donation: how new technology can change the ethical landscape2008In: Journal of Medical Ethics, ISSN 0306-6800, E-ISSN 1473-4257, Vol. 34, no 7, p. 526-Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The global shortage of organs for transplantation and the development of new and better medical technologies for organ preservation have resulted in a renewed interest in non-heart-beating donation (NHBD). This article discusses ethical questions related to controlled and uncontrolled NHBD. It argues that certain preparative measures, such as giving anticoagulants, should be acceptable before patients are dead, but when they have passed a point where further curative treatment is futile, they are in the process of dying and they are unconscious. Furthermore, the article discusses consequences of technological developments based on improvement of a chest compression apparatus used today to make mechanical heart resuscitation. Such technological development can be used to transform cases of non-controlled NHBD to controlled NHBD. In our view, this is a step forward since the ethical difficulties related to controlled NHBD are easier to solve than those related to non-controlled NHBD. However, such technological developments also evoke other ethical questions.

  • 841. Ågotnes, Thomas
    et al.
    Goranko, Valentin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Jamroga, Wojciech
    Wooldridge, Michael
    Knowledge and Ability2015In: Handbook of Epistemic Logic / [ed] Hans van Ditmarsch. Joseph Halpern, Wiebe van der Hoek and Barteld Kooi, College Publications, 2015, 1, p. 543-589Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this chapter we relate epistemic logics with logics for strategic ability developed and studied in computer science, artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. We discuss approaches from philosophy and artificial intelligence to modelling the interaction of agents’ knowledge and abilities and then focus on concurrent game models and the alternating-time temporal logic ATL. We show how ATL enables reasoning about agents’ coalitional abilities to achieve qualitative objectives in concurrent game models, first assuming complete information and then under incomplete information and uncertainty about the structureof the game model. We then discuss epistemic extensions of ATL enabling explicit reasoning about the interaction of knowledge and strategic abilities on different epistemic levels, leading inter alia to the notion of constructive knowledge.

  • 842.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    A plea for pragmatics2009In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 170, no 1, p. 155-167Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Let intentionalism be the view that what proposition is expressed in context by a sentence containing indexicals depends on the speaker’s intentions. It has recently been argued that intentionalism makes communicative success mysterious and that there are counterexamples to the intentionalist view in the form of cases of mismatch between the intended interpretation and the intuitively correct interpretation. In this paper, I argue that these objections can be met, once we acknowledge that we may distinguish what determines the correct interpretation from the evidence that is available to the audience, as well as from the standards by which we judge whether or not a given interpretation is reasonable. With these distinctions in place, we see that intentionalism does not render communicative success mysterious, and that cases of mismatch between the intended interpretation and the intuitively correct one can easily be accommodated. The distinction is also useful in treating the Humpty Dumpty problem for intentionalism, since it turns out that this can be treated as an extreme special case of mismatch.

  • 843.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Communication and indexical reference2010In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 149, no 3, p. 355-366Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the debate over what determines the reference of an indexical expression on a given occasion of use, we can distinguish between two generic positions. According to the first, the reference is determined by internal factors, such as the speaker’s intentions. According to the second, the reference is determined by external factors, like conventions or what a competent and attentive audience would take the reference to be. It has recently been argued that the first position is untenable, since there are cases of mismatch where the intuitively correct reference differs from the one that would be determined by the relevant internal factors. The aim of this paper is to show that, contrary to this line of argument, it is the proponent of the second position that should be worried, since this position yields counterintuitive consequences regarding communicative success in cases of mismatch.

  • 844.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Contextualist theories of vagueness2012In: Philosophy Compass, ISSN 1747-9991, E-ISSN 1747-9991, Vol. 7, no 7, p. 470-480Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    During the last couple of decades, several attempts have been made to come up with a theory that can handle the various semantic, logical and philosophical problems raised by the vagueness of natural languages. One of the most influential ideas that have come into fashion in recent years is the idea that vagueness should be analysed as a form of context sensitivity. Such contextualist theories of vagueness have gained some popularity, but many philosophers have remained sceptical of the prospects of finding a tenable contextualist solution to the problems of vagueness. This paper provides an introduction to the most popular contextualist accounts, and a discussion of some of the most important arguments for and against them.

  • 845.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Extensions in Flux: An Essay on Vagueness and Context Sensitivity2009Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The extensions of vague predicates like ‘is bald’, ‘is tall’, and ‘is a heap’ apparently lack sharp boundaries, and this makes such predicates susceptible to soritical reasoning, i.e. reasoning that leads to some version of the notorious sorites paradox. This essay is concerned with a certain kind of theory of vagueness, according to which the symptoms and puzzles of vagueness should be accounted for in terms of a particular species of context sensitivity exhibited by vague expressions. The basic idea is that the extensions of vague predicates vary with certain contextual factors, and that this fact can explain why they appear to lack sharp boundaries. This kind of view is referred to as contextualism about vagueness. A detailed characterisation of contextualism about vagueness is given in chapter two and three. In chapter two, a generic version of contextualism about vagueness is developed, and some alternative forms of context sensitivity are introduced. In chapter three, the specific contextual factors appealed to by different contextualists are discussed. In chapter four, different contextualist diagnoses of the sorites paradox are considered, and found to be problematic in various ways. It is argued that contrary to what some of its proponents have claimed, contextualism about vagueness is not superior to other comparable theories of vagueness when it comes to explaining the appeal of soritical reasoning. In chapter five, a certain version of the sorites paradox, known as the forced march sorites, is discussed. It is argued that “data” about how speakers would behave in the forced march cannot lend any firm support to contextualism about vagueness. In chapter six, some problems concerning the instability of the contextual factors are considered. One problem is that contextualist diagnoses of the sorites which locate a fallacy of equivocation in the reasoning seem to render non-soritical reasoning fallacious as well. A model for treating this problem is suggested, but on closer consideration, it turns out to be problematic. Moreover, this model is of no help in solving the more general problem that even if classical logic remains valid for vague language on some contextualist views, the instability of the extensions of vague predicates makes it difficult to know when a certain piece of reasoning instantiates a valid argument form. Other difficulties arise with respect to speech reports and belief contents. Chapter seven concludes with a summary and some methodological remarks.

  • 846.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Forced-March Sorites Arguments and Linguistic Competence2013In: Dialectica, ISSN 0012-2017, E-ISSN 1746-8361, Vol. 67, no 4, p. 403-426Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Agent relativists about vagueness (henceforth ‘agent relativists’) hold that whether or not an object x falls in the extension of a vague predicate ‘P’ at a time t depends on the judgemental dispositions of a particular competent agent at t. My aim in this paper is to critically examine arguments that purport to support agent relativism by appealing to data from forced-march Sorites experiments. The most simple and direct versions of such forced-march Sorites argu- ments rest on the following (implicit) premise: If competent speakers’ judgements vary in a certain way, then the extensions of ‘P’ as used by these speakers must vary in the same way. This premise is in need of independent support, since otherwise opponents of agent relativism can simply reject it. In this paper, I focus on the idea that one cannot plausibly reject this premise, as that would commit one to implausible claims about linguistic competence. Against this, I argue that one can accommodate the data from forced-march Sorites experiments in a way that is compatible with a plausible picture of linguistic competence, without going agent relativist. Thus, there is reason to be sceptical of the idea that such data paired with considerations about linguistic competence can be invoked in order to lend any solid support to agent relativism. Forced-march Sorites arguments of this kind can, and should be, resisted.

  • 847.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Indexicals and Reference-Shifting: Towards a Pragmatic Approach2017In: Philosophy and phenomenological research, ISSN 0031-8205, E-ISSN 1933-1592, Vol. 95, no 1, p. 117-152Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I propose a pragmatic approach to the kind of reference-shifting occurring in indexicals as used in e. g. written notes and answering machine messages. I proceed in two steps. First, I prepare the ground by showing that the arguments against such a pragmatic approach raised in the recent literature fail. Second, I take a first few steps towards implementing this approach, by sketching a pragmatic theory of reference-shifting, and showing how it can handle cases of the relevant kind. While the immediate scope of the paper is restricted to indexicals and reference-shifting, and the discussion is confined to a specific range of theories and cases, the approach proposed is compatible with a fairly broad range of more or less semantically conservative theories, and many of the conclusions drawn are significant for the evaluation of pragmatic explanations in philosophy more generally. The overall goal is to offer a new perspective on the issues under discussion, and to prompt philosophers to reconsider some of the established methods by which pragmatic explanations are evaluated.

  • 848.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Infelicitous cancellation: The explicit cancellability test for conversational implicature revisited2015In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 93, no 3, p. 465-474Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper questions the adequacy of the explicit cancellability test for conversational implicature as it is commonly understood. The standard way of understanding this test relies on two assumptions: first, that that one can test whether a certain content is (merely) conversationally implicated, by checking whether that content is cancellable, and second, that a cancellation is successful only if it results in a felicitous utterance. While I accept the first of these assumptions, I reject the second one. I argue that a cancellation can succeed even if it results in an infelicitous utterance, and that unless we take this possibility into account we run the risk of misdiagnosing philosophically significant cases.

  • 849.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Raffman, Diana. Unruly Words. A Study of Vague Language2014In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 850.
    Åkerman, Jonas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Recanati, François. Perspectival Thought: A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism2009In: Review of Metaphysics, ISSN 0034-6632, E-ISSN 2154-1302, Vol. 62, no 4Article, book review (Other academic)
1415161718 801 - 850 of 856
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