Change search
Refine search result
1415161718 801 - 850 of 895
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Rows per page
  • 5
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100
  • 250
Sort
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
Select
The maximal number of hits you can export is 250. When you want to export more records please use the Create feeds function.
  • 801.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Respekt för patientens autonomi - i klinik och i forskning2008In: Gunilla Silferberg (red.) Vårdetisk spegel (Stockholm: Ersta Sköndal Högskola, 2008), 2008Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 802.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Setting Health-Care Priorities: What Ethical Theories Tell Us2019Book (Refereed)
  • 803.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Should Parents of Neonates With Bleak Prognosis Be Encouraged to Opt for Another Child With Better Odds? On the Notion of Moral Replaceability2018In: Pediatrics, ISSN 0031-4005, E-ISSN 1098-4275, Vol. 142, p. S553-S557Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The notion of moral exchangeability is scrutinized and its proper place in neonatal care is examined. On influential moral outlooks, the neonate is morally exchangeable. On these views, if the parents are prepared to let go of the neonate with a poor prognosis and opt instead for another child who is healthy, this may be the morally right thing for them to do, and neonatal care ought to ease their choice.

    The notion of moral exchangeability has a different place in different moral theories. Three theories are examined: deontological ethics (insisting on the sanctity of innocent human life), according to which there is no place for the replacement of 1 child for another. It is different, however, with utilitarianism and in the moral rights theory based on self-ownership. According to utilitarianism, we are all replaceable. According to the moral rights theory, neonates are replaceable to the extent that they have not developed personhood. Even a deontological ethicist of a Kantian bent would concur here with the moral rights theory.

    Because influential moral theories imply that the neonate is morally exchangeable, it is reasonable within neonatal care, as a general rule, to grant the parents a veto against any attempts to save a child with a poor prognosis. In particular, if the parents are prepared instead to have another, healthy child, this is to be recommended. However, this rule cannot be strict. In rare cases, it is necessary to yield to parents who insist that their neonate be saved despite a poor prognosis.

  • 804.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Social Psychologoy and the Paradox of Revolution2007In: South African Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0258-0136, E-ISSN 2073-4867, Vol. 26, no 2, p. 228-238Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [sv]

    According to the gunman theory many revolutions do not take place, in spite of the fact that the majority stands to gain if they can put an end to the oppression exercised over it, since a gunman can see to it that egoistic individuals have no incentive to take part in the revolution. Champions of the idea that there is a paradox of revolution go further: Even if individuals care about the common good, they will not take action. This is wrong. If they care about the common good revolution will take place. This is good news. The bad news is, however, that those conditions, as we find them in social psychological literature, that are helpful to the revolutionary cause tend to get undermined by the oppressive system when it is well functioning.

  • 805.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Sophie's Choice2011In: Ethics at the cinema / [ed] Ward E. Jones and Samantha Vice, New York: Oxford University Press , 2011, p. 232-247Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The film Sophie's Choice has been seen to represent in a vivid manner how a human being in extreme circumstances is faced with a true moral dilemma. This interpretation is questioned in the present paper. It is argued that the best way of making philosophical sense of Sophie's choice is to see it as a case of blameful right-doing, rather than a dilemma. By doing, in her situation, the right thing, or at least not clearly doing anything wrong, Sophie exhibits a trait of character we do not expect to find in a good mother. She was in a situation where a good parent is not supposed to be able to do the right thing, and yet she does this. Even if we cannot fully explain it, her choice to commit suicide, rather than becoming a parent once again, makes sense when viewed from her own subjective perspective and given her personality as we know it.

  • 806.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Stridsmoral. Soldater av Sönke Neitzel och Harald Welzer2014In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 2Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 807.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Taking Life: Three Theories on the Ethics of Killing2015Book (Refereed)
  • 808.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Ethics of Killing2007In: DialogueArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 809.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Ethics of Killing: An Example: Abortion2011In: Neither/Nor: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday / [ed] Rysiek Sliwinski and Frans Svensson, Uppsala: Uppsala University , 2011, p. 325-344Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 810.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Myth of Innocence: On collective Responsibility and Collective Punishment2007In: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 36Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Collectivities, just like individuals, exist, can act, bear responsibility for their acts and omissions, and be guilty. It sometimes makes sense to hold them responsible for what they do, or don't do, and to punish them for their misdeeds. With respect to many collectivities there is no practical purpose in holding them responsible, since there is not way that we can bring them to justice. But there are exceptions from this rule. In particular it is plausible to assume that sanctions against entire nations or peoples or populations living in open and democratic states may be an effective means to setting them straight where, collectively, they act wrongly. The best present example of this seems to be the Israelis.

  • 811.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The relevance of metaethics to ethics1976 (ed. [Ny utg.])Book (Other academic)
  • 812.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Tvångsvård av dementa2007In: Läkartidningen, no 14Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 813.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Understanding Ethics2013 (ed. 3 uppl.)Book (Refereed)
  • 814.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Understanding Ethics 2nd revised edition2008Book (Refereed)
    Abstract [sv]

    Introduction to normative ethics

  • 815.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Utilitarianism and informed consent2014In: Journal of Medical Ethics, ISSN 0306-6800, E-ISSN 1473-4257, Vol. 40, no 7, p. 445-445Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 816.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Utilitarianism or prioritarianism?2015In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 27, no 2, p. 240-250Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A simple hedonistic theory allowing for interpersonal comparisons of happiness is taken for granted in this article. The hedonistic theory is used to compare utilitarianism, urging us to maximize the sum total of happiness, with prioritarianism, urging us to maximize a sum total of weighed happiness. It is argued with reference to a few thought experiments that utilitarianism is, intuitively speaking, more plausible than prioritarianism. The problem with prioritarianism surfaces when prudence and morality come apart. 

  • 817.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Varför enfrågepartier ställer till det2014In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 18, no 3, p. 29-32Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 818.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Varken galenskap eller ondska2016In: Kvartal, ISSN 2002-6269, Vol. 3Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [sv]

    Vad får människor att begå så remarkabla illdåd som en Breivik eller en IS-krigare? Våra gängse svar på frågan är psykologiska försvar mot en alltför hårdsmält verklighet snarare än seriösa försök att förstå, skriver Torbjörn Tännsjö. Vi bör betrakta omvärlden utan hänvisning till vare sig ”galenskap” eller ”ondska”.

  • 819.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Visst bör vi få sova in i döden2013In: Läkartidningen, ISSN 0023-7205, E-ISSN 1652-7518, no 45Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 820.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Vänsterdocenten2017Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 821.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Värdegrundens vara eller icke vara2016In: Nordisk tidskrift för allmän didaktik: NoAD, ISSN 2002-2832, Vol. 2, no 1, p. 69-73Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 822.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Why No Compromise Is Possible2007In: Metaphilosophy, Vol. 38Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Adherents of different moral views hold conflicting views on the permissibility of embryonic stem cell research. Pace Ronald Dworkin, no liberal compromise is possible. Whichever way the decision goes, some people will be deeply hurt and feel that basic moral principles are being flouted. And yet, when a majority exists in defence of such research, it should not hesitate to allow it.

  • 823.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Why No Compromise is Possible2007In: Stem Cell Research: The Ethical Issues, Blackwell, Oxford , 2007Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 824.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Why should we respect the privacy of donors of biological material?2011In: Medicine, Health care and Philosophy, ISSN 1386-7423, E-ISSN 1572-8633, Vol. 14, no 1, p. 43-52Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Why should we respect the privacy of donors of biological material? The question is answered in the present article in general philosophical terms from the point of view of an ethics of honour, a libertarian theory of rights, a view of respect for privacy based on the idea that autonomy is of value in itself, and utilitarianism respectively. For different reasons the ethics of honour and the idea of the value of autonomy are set to one side. It surfaces that the moral rights theory and utilitarianism present conflicting answers to the question. The main thrust of the argument is that there is no way of finding an overlapping consensus, so politicians have to take decisions that are bound to be controversial in that they can be questioned on reasonable philosophical grounds.

  • 825.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. praktisk filosofi.
    Liedman, Sven-Eric
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Den svårfångade relativismen2008Book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 826.
    Tännsjö, Torbjörn
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Tamburrini, Claudio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Justitiemord?2018In: Sans, ISSN 2000-9690, no 1, p. 42-47Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [sv]

    På senare tid har en rad så kallade rätts­ skandaler uppdagats i Sverige, exempel­ vis de som rörde de fällande domarna mot Thomas Quick och Kaj Linna. Man har till och med talat om »justitiemord» (trots att dödsstraffet är avskaffat). En outtalad ut­ gångspunkt för diskussionen tycks vara att om människor döms oskyldiga, måste det bero på brister i rättssystemet. Medierna larmar om skandal och övergrepp. Måste det vara så? Vi menar att rättssystemet ska vara så utfor­ mat att oskyldiga ibland döms. Då något så­ dant uppdagas ska det förstås åtgärdas. Den oskyldigt dömde ska bli fri och få skadestånd. Domen som sådan behöver emellertid inte vara oförnuftig. Frågan är inte om oskyldiga ska kunna dömas, utan hur ofta det bör tillå­ tas inträffa.

  • 827.
    Tännsjö, Tännsjö
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Utilitarianism, Disability, and Society2010In: Philosophical Reflections on Disability / [ed] Christopher Ralston and Justin Ho, Dordrecht: Springer , 2010Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    I have tried to find out what the social implications of classical hedonistic utilitarianism are with respect to different kinds of disability: mere disability, simple disability, problematic disability, and tragic disability. The implications seem to be, once we rid ourselves of prejudice with respect to disability, rather commonplace. Very roughly, the implications are as follows.

    First of all, there are reasons, within a publicly-financed health care system, to try to cure disabilities. This is true even of some mere disabilities, where people very much want to get rid of them—in spite of the fact that, as such, they do not mean any threat to their level of felt happiness. Here society must surrender to the perversity/futility-mechanism identified in this paper. People with disabilities have a rather strong claim on scarce medical resources, given utilitarianism. Somewhat unexpectedly, they have, in many cases, an even stronger claim than the one they would have had, if instead some kind of egalitarianism or prioritarianism had been the point of departure of the assessment of their needs.

    Secondly, when people suffering from problematic disabilities cannot be cured, these people have a right to compensation from society, once a publicly financed health care system has been established. The need for compensation, mainly in the form of personal assistance, is no less urgent than the need for a cure, when a cure exists. Somewhat unexpectedly, it has also been concluded that people suffering from intractable pain (but no disability) have a similar right to compensation.

    Finally, even if there are good utilitarian reasons, in the individual case, to avoid the birth of people with costly simple disabilities, as well as people with problematic and tragic disabilities, through the use of prenatal genetic diagnosis and selective abortion, as well as through IVF and PGD, it would not be a good idea to make the use of these techniques obligatory. This would be to give rise to speculation among people living with these disabilities that they should not really be where they are; they pose a burden to society. Hence, it is wise utilitarian policy to avoid any concession to eugenics whatever. We may safely assume that, if society is neutral with respect to the question what sort of people there should be, individual couples are capable, in most cases, to arrive at wise answers to this question.

    Classical hedonistic utilitarianism seems to give the "right" answer to how society should react to disability, then. This does not mean that we have come across any positive evidence in favor of classical hedonistic utilitarianism. Other moral views, when applied to the same problem, may give rise to similar implications. We have evidence for a moral theory only where it gives the best explanation of the data at hand. However, the fact that classical hedonistic utilitarianism gives answers in conformance with our considered moral intuitions does at least show that it has not, in this field, been disconfirmed.

  • 828. van Benthem, Johan
    et al.
    Bezhanishvili, Nick
    Enqvist, Sebastian
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    A New Game Equivalence and its Modal Logic2017In: Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science, ISSN 2075-2180, E-ISSN 2075-2180, no 251, p. 57-74Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We revisit the crucial issue of natural game equivalences, and semantics of game logics based on these. We present reasons for investigating finer concepts of game equivalence than equality of standard powers, though staying short of modal bisimulation. Concretely, we propose a more fine-grained notion of equality of 'basic powers' which record what players can force plus what they leave to others to do, a crucial feature of interaction. This notion is closer to game-theoretic strategic form, as we explain in detail, while remaining amenable to logical analysis. We determine the properties of basic powers via a new representation theorem, find a matching 'instantial neighborhood game logic', and show how our analysis can be extended to a new game algebra and dynamic game logic.

  • 829.
    Wallenstein, Sven-Olov
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Nihilism, Art, and Technology2010Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The thesis investigates the role of technology in the formation of the artistic avant-garde, along with various forms of philosophical reflection on this development, with a particular emphasis on Heidegger.

    Setting out from an analysis of three paradigmatic cases in the interplay between art and technology—the invention of photography, the shift from Futurism to Constructivism, and the interpretation of technology in debates on architectural theory in the 1920s and ’30s—it proceeds to a discussion of three philosophical responses to this development, those found in Walter Benjamin, Martin Heidegger, and Ernst Jünger, all of which share a certain avant-garde sensibility and a notion of art as a response to nihilism.

    In Heidegger’s postwar writings we see a retreat from the positions of the mid 1930s, and in his reflections on technology a different answer emerges to the question of whether “great art” is still possible: great art is an art that exists precisely by making the founding of a world into something problematic.

    The fourth part confronts Heidegger’s analysis of technology with the work of an individual artist, the architect Mies van der Rohe, and asks how the “silence”—the withdrawal of language, sense, aesthetic perception, etc.—that is often understood as a precondition for the critical potential of his work should in fact be understood. By examining interpretations that draw on Heidegger via comparisons with other types of critical theory, a different understanding emerges of the relation among nihilism, art, and technology. They form a field of constant modulation, which implies that the concepts that have been the foundation of critical theory, nature, subjectivity, experience, even “being” in Heidegger’s sense, must be subjected to a historical analysis that acknowledges them as ongoing processes of construction, and that also accounts for the capacity of technologies and artistic practices to intervene in the formation of philosophical concepts.

  • 830.
    Warnling Conradson, Wiweka
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Sandström, Lena
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Law, Department of Law.
    Ahlenius, Henrik
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Lärare & elev: rättsliga aspekter och etiska dilemman2018 (ed. 2)Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Denna bok inom det skoljuridiska området fokuserar på mötet mellan lärare och elev och vilka rättsliga aspekter, ofta förknippade med etiska dilemman, som detta kan aktualisera. Tanken är att lära sig se dessa aspekter och dilemman i vardagliga situationer för att på så sätt kunna parera ett antal s.k. blindskär i yrkesrollen som lärare.

  • 831.
    Weigelt, Charlotta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Ett möjligt ursprung?: Aristoteles om naturens grunder och vetbarhet i Fysiken2011In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 32, no 3, p. 3-19Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 832.
    Weigelt, Charlotta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Teoretisk filosofi.
    Logos as Kinesis: Heidegger's Interpretation of the Physics in Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie2004In: Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, Vol. 9, no 1, p. 101-116Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 833.
    Weigelt, Charlotta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Teoretisk filosofi.
    Martin Heidegger om individualitet och det egna: Bli den du är2001In: Glänta, no 1-2, p. 61-68Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 834.
    Weigelt, Charlotta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy. Teoretisk filosofi.
    Om Aristoteles nytta och skada för filosofin: Heidegger och fenomenologins början2006In: Filosofisk tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 27, no 2, p. 3-18Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 835.
    Weigelt, Charlotta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Only Science Can Save Us: Phenomenology with a Cartesian Face2010In: Heidegger und Husserl im Vergleich / [ed] Friederike Rese, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann , 2010, p. 287-304Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 836.
    Weigelt, Charlotta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The logic of life: Heidegger's retrieval of Aristotle's concept of Logos2002Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
  • 837.
    Weigelt, Charlotta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Relation between Logic and Ontology in the Metaphysics2007In: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 60, no 3, p. 507-541Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 838.
    Weigelt, Charlotta
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Two Sorts of Dualism: McDowell's Oscillation Between a Transcendental and a Metaphysical Conception of Reason and Nature2009In: Sats: Nordic Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 1600-1974, E-ISSN 1869-7577, Vol. 10, no 1, p. 53-77Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In Mind and World, John McDowell tries to achieve a reconciliation between reason and nature. In his view, this pursuit derives its motivation from the modern conception of nature as the space of law, which seems to relegate human rationality to a state of utter isolation from man's nature as an animal. Accordingly, we need to rethink the modern understanding of nature in such a way as to make room for a notion of “second nature”, in which human reason may properly be situated. In this article I argue, from a phenomenological point of view, that McDowell's proposed solution to the problem of dualism is unsatisfactory, basically because it seeks to combine two radically different perspectives on experience: as a vehicle of reasons and meaning and as a transaction in nature respectively. But, it is suggested, that kind of reconciliation is neither possible, nor even desirable. At bottom, it rests on a confusion of transcendental with metaphysical issues.

  • 839.
    Weigelt, Karl
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Husserl och betydelsefenomenet2011In: Edmund Husserl / [ed] Sven-Olov Wallenstein, Stockholm: Axl Books, 2011, p. 61-73Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 840.
    Weigelt, Karl
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    The Signified World: The Problem of Occasionality in Husserl's Phenomenology of Meaning2008Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This study offers the first comprehensive account of the problem of situation-dependence and facticity in Husserl's phenomenology of meaning. On the basis of a reconsideration of the central ideas of Husserl's phenomenological approach to meaning and intentionality, it presents a reconstruction and assessment of Husserl's revised conception of empirical meaning.

    Taking its lead from Husserl's self-critical remark on the analysis of "occasional expressions" in the Logical Investigations, the study uncovers the underlying problem with Husserl's initial conception of the relation between subjectivity and objectivity. It is shown that the problem of occasionality does not relate to indexicality in a standard sense, but to the essential facticity and subject-relativity of the intentional individuation of real being in general and to the contingency and inexhaustible transcendence of the world.

    The reconstruction of Husserl's solution is carefully related to an interpretation of central ideas of Husserl's developed philosophy. Critically reviewing influential interpretations of Husserl, the study elaborates on the question of internalism and externalism, the question of representationalism, the question of ideal contents, the notion of noema and the issues of direct reference and de re meaning.

    It is shown how Husserl's revised conception of empirical meaning is related to the analysis of horizon-intentionality, to the constitution of the transcendent real world and to the constitution of the lived body as a centre of situated orientation. It is argued that Husserl succeeds in maintaining phenomenological internalism with regard to intentionality in concreto, while accepting a form of externalism with regard to meaning, according to which the possibility of true identity of meaning is bound to the presumptive existence of the experienced world.

  • 841.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Classical vs. modern Squares of Opposition, and beyond2012In: The Square of Opposition: A General Framework for Cognition / [ed] Jean-Yves Beziau, Gillman Payette, Peter Lang Publishing Group, 2012, p. 195-229Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The main difference between the classical Aristotelian square of oppo- sition and the modern one is not, as many seem to think, that the classical square has or presupposes existential import. The difference lies in the relations holding along the sides of the square: (sub)contrariety and sub- alternation in the classical case, inner negation and dual in the modern case. This is why the modern square, but not the classical one, applies to any (generalized) quantifier of the right type: all, no, more than three, all but five, most, at least two-thirds of the,... After stating these and other logical facts about quantified squares of opposition, we present a number of examples of such squares spanned by familiar quantifiers. Spe- cial attention is paid to possessive quantifiers, such Mary’s, at least two students’, etc., whose behavior under negation is more complex and in fact can be captured in a cube of opposition.

  • 842.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Compositionality in Kaplan style semantics2012In: The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality / [ed] M. Werning, W Hinzen, E. Machery, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 192-219Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I investigate how the notion of compisitionality can be adapted to various kinds of semantics that take context dependence seriously.

  • 843.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Constant Operators: Partial Quantifiers2012In: From Quantification to Conversation / [ed] Lars Borin and Staffan Larsson, London: College Publications, 2012Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper begins to explore what it means for an operator to be *constant*, roughly in the sense of meaning the same on every universe. We consider total as well as partial operators of various types, with special focus on generalized quantifiers.

  • 844.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Explaining quantifier restriction: Reply to Ben-Yami2012In: Logique et Analyse, ISSN 0024-5836, E-ISSN 2295-5836, no 217, p. 109-120Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This is a reply to H. Ben-Yami, 'Generalized quantifiers, and beyond' (this journal,2009), where he argues that standard GQ theory does not explain why natural language quantifiers have a restricted domain of quantification. I argue, on the other hand, that although GQ theory gives no deep explanation of this fact, it does give a sort of explanation, whereas Ben-Yami's suggested alternative is no improvement.

  • 845.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    From constants to consequence, and back2011In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 187, no 3, p. 957-971Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Bolzano’s definition of consequence in effect associates with each set X of symbols (in a given interpreted language) a consequence relation =>_X. We present this in a precise and abstract form, in particular studying minimal sets of symbols generating =>_X. Then we present a method for going in the other direction: extracting from an arbitrary consequence relation => its associated set C_=> of constants. We show that this returns the expected logical constants from familiar consequence relations, and that, restricting attention to sets of symbols satisfying a strong minimality condition, there is an isomorphism between the set of strongly minimal sets of symbols and the set of corresponding consequence relations (both ordered under inclusion).

  • 846.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Generalized quantifiers2011In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ISSN 1095-5054, E-ISSN 1095-5054Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 847.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Generalized quantifiers2016In: Cambridge Handbook of Formal Semantics / [ed] Maria Aloni, Paul Dekker, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 206-237Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Thirty years of generalized quantifiers

    It is now more than thirty years since the first serious applications of Generalized Quantifier (GQ) theory to natural language semantics were made: Barwise and Cooper (1981); Higginbotham and May (1981); Keenan and Stavi (1986). Richard Montague had in effect interpreted English NPs as (type 〈1〉) generalized quantifiers (see Montague, 1974), but without referring to GQs in logic, where they had been introduced by Mostowski (1957) and, in final form, Lindström (1966). Logicians were interested in the properties of logics obtained by piecemeal additions to first-order logic (FO) by adding quantifiers like ‘there exist uncountably many’, but they made no connection to natural language. Montague Grammar and related approaches had made clear the need for higher-type objects in natural language semantics. What Barwise, Cooper, and the others noticed was that generalized quantifiers are the natural interpretations not only of noun phrases but also in particular of determiners (henceforth Dets). This was no small insight, even if it may now seem obvious. Logicians had, without intending to, made available model-theoretic objects suitable for interpreting English definite and indefinite articles, the Aristotelian all, no, some, proportional Dets like most, at least half, 10 percent of the, less than two-thirds of the, numerical Dets such as at least five, no more than ten, between six and nine, finitely many, an odd number of, definite Dets like the, the twelve, possessives like Mary's, few students’, two of every professor's, exception Dets like no … but John, every … except Mary, and Boolean combinations of all of the above. All of these can – if one wants! – be interpreted extensionally as the same type of second-order objects, namely (on each universe of discourse) binary relations between sets. Given the richness of this productive but seemingly heterogeneous class of expressions, a uniform interpretation scheme was a huge step. Further, the tools of logical GQ theory could be brought to bear on putative Det interpretations, which turned out to be a subclass of the class of all type 〈1, 1〉 quantifiers with special traits. The three pioneer papers mentioned above offered numerous cases of novel description, and sometimes explanation, of characteristic features of language in terms of model-theoretic properties of the quantifiers involved.

  • 848.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Generalized quantifiers in natural language semantics2015In: The handbook of contemporary semantic theory / [ed] Shalom Lappin, Chris Fox, John Wiley & Sons, 2015, 2 uppl., p. 11-46Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 849.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Midpoints2012In: Theories of Everything: In Honor of Ed Keenan / [ed] T. Graf, D. Paperno, A. Szabolcsi, J. Tellings, Los Angeles: UCLA Working Papers in Linguistics 17 , 2012, p. 427-438Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    I generalize Keenan's study of midpoints, generalized quantifiers equivalent to their own postcomplements (inner negations), focusing on the difference between a global and a local perspective of quantifiers.

  • 850.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Humanities, Department of Philosophy.
    Negation and quantification: a new look at the square of opposition: With comments by Fengkui Ju and Larry Moss, and a response by Dag Westerståhl.2013In: Logic across the University: Foundations and Applications: Proceedings of the Tsinghua Logic Conference, Beijing, 2013 / [ed] Johan van Benthem and Fenrong Liu, London: College Publications, 2013, 47, p. 301-317Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We study the Aristotelian square of opposition from the modern perspective of generalized quantifiers. With a subtle but important change in the relations holding along the sides of the square, we show that it applies to all kinds of quantifiers, not just the four Aristotelian ones. We establish some of its logical properties, and give numerous examples of squares spanned by various quantifiers, in particular those expressed by possessive constructions.

1415161718 801 - 850 of 895
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf