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  • 1. Acemoglu, Daron
    et al.
    Aghion, Philippe
    Lelarge, Claire
    Van Reenen, John
    Zilibotti, Fabrizio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Technology, Information, and the Decentralization of the Firm2007In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 122, no 4, p. 1759-1799Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyzes the relationship between the diffusion of new technologies and the decentralization of firms. Centralized control relies on the information of the principal, which we equate with publicly available information. Decentralized control, on the other hand, delegates authority to a manager with superior information. However, the manager can use his informational advantage to make choices that are not in the best interest of the principal. As the available public information about the specific technology increases, the tradeoff shifts in favor of centralization. We show that firms closer to the technological frontier, firms in more heterogeneous environments, and younger firms are more likely to choose decentralization. Using three data sets on French and British firms in the 1990s, we report robust correlations consistent with these predictions.

  • 2.
    Alonso, Irasema
    et al.
    Yale University.
    Prado, Jr., Jose Mauricio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Ambiguity Aversion, the Equity Premium, and the Welfare Costs of Business Cycles2007Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We examine the potential importance of consumer ambiguity aversion for asset prices and how consumption fluctuations influence consumer welfare. First, considering a simple Mehra-Prescott-style endowment economy with a representative agent facing consumption fluctuations calibrated to match U.S. data, we study to what extent ambiguity aversion can deliver asset prices that are consistent with data: a high return on equity and a low return on riskfree bonds. For some configurations of preference parameters – a discount factor, a degree of relative risk aversion, and a measure of ambiguity aversion – we find that it can. Then, we use these parameter configurations to investigate how much consumers would be willing to pay to reduce endowment fluctuations to zero, thus delivering a Lucas-style welfare cost of fluctuations. These costs turn out to be very large: consumers are willing to pay over 10% of consumption in permanent terms.

  • 3.
    Calmfors, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Finanspolitiken i EU-länderna och stabilitetspakten2007In: Tillämpad makroekonomi, 2007Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 4.
    Calmfors, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Flexicurity: An Answer or a Question2007In: European Policy Analysis, Vol. 6Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 5.
    Calmfors, Lars
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Leijonborg, Lars
    Alsér, Kristina
    Bergström, Hans
    Bildt, Carl
    Bäckström, Urban
    Carstedt, Per
    Demirbag-Sten, Dilsa
    Ekström, Anna
    Littorin, Sven Otto
    Lundby-Wedin, Wanja
    Markides, Karin
    Nilsson, Elisabeth
    Nilsson Ström, Aina
    Nordh, Sture
    Odell, Mats
    Olofsson, Maud
    Svanberg, Carl-Henric
    Treschow Torell, Lena
    Wallberg-Henriksson, Harriet
    Wallenberg, Marcus
    Wästberg, Olle
    Knowledge-driven Growth: An Initial Report by the Swedish Fiscal Policy Council2007Report (Other academic)
  • 6. Corsetti, Giancarlo
    et al.
    Devereux, Michael
    Honkapohja, Seppo
    Saint-Paul, Gilles
    Sinn, Hans-Werner
    Sturm, Jan-Egbert
    Vives, Xavier
    Calmfors, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The EEAG Report on the European Economy 20072007Report (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 7. DellaVigna, Stefano
    et al.
    Kaplan, Ethan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting2007In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 122, p. 1187-1234Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 8.
    Eisensee, Thomas
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Strömberg, David
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    News Floods, News Droughts, and U.S. Disaster Relief2007In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 122, no 2Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 9.
    Flam, Harry
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Euron och utrikeshandeln: Hur mycket handel förlorar Sverige årligen?2007In: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 35, no 5, p. 16-30Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 10.
    Flam, Harry
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svar till Hagerud2007In: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 35, no 6, p. 78-80Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 11.
    Flam, Harry
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Nordström, Håkan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Reformera AP-fondsystemet2007In: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 35, no 4, p. 6-22Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 12.
    Gennaioli, Nicola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Rainer, Ilia
    Precolonial Centralization and Institutional Quality in Africa2007In: Institutions and Norms in Economic Development, MIT Press, Cambridge , 2007Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 13.
    Gennaioli, Nicola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Rainer, Ilia
    The Modern Impact of Precolonial Centralization in Africa2007In: Journal of Economic GrowthArticle in journal (Refereed)
  • 14.
    Gennaioli, Nicola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Shleifer, Andrei
    Overruling and the Instability of Law2007In: Journal of Comparative EconomicsArticle in journal (Refereed)
  • 15.
    Gennaioli, Nicola
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Shleifer, Andrei
    The Evolution of Common Law2007In: Journal of Political Economy, ISSN 0022-3808, Vol. 115, no 1Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 16.
    Gonzales-Eiras, Martin
    et al.
    Universidad de San Andrés.
    Prado, Jr., Jose Mauricio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Determinants of Capital Intensive and R&D Intensive Foreign Direct Investment2007Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We study the determinants of capital intensity and technology content of foreign direct investment, an important economic driving force for developing countries. For this purpose, we use sectoral industry data on U.S. foreign investment abroad, and data on host countries’ institutional characteristics, like investment climate, protection of property rights, labor standards and constitutional arrangements. Our regressions show that better protection of property rights has a significant positive effect on R&D but not on capital intensive capital flows. There is evidence that an increase in workers’ bargaining power results in a reduction of capital and technologically intensive foreign investment. And although the evidence with respect to constitutional arrangements is not very strong, presidential regimes appear to be less able than parliamentary ones to deliver policies attracting R&D intensive capital flows. This is consistent with recent research on the effects of constitutional arrangements on economic growth.

  • 17.
    Hassler, John
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Democratic Public Good Provision2007In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 133, no 1, p. 127-151Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 18.
    Hassler, John
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Mora, Jose V. Rodriguez
    Zeira, Joseph
    Inequality and mobility2007In: Journal of economic growth (Boston), ISSN 1381-4338, E-ISSN 1573-7020, Vol. 12, no 3, p. 235-259Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Acknowledging that wage inequality and intergenerational mobility are strongly interrelated, this paper presents a model in which both are jointly determined. The model enables us to study how inequality and mobility are affected by exogenous changes and what determines their correlation. A main implication of the model is that differences in the amount of public subsidies to education and educational quality produce cross-country patterns with a negative correlation between inequality and mobility. Differences in the labor market, like differences in skill-biased technology or wage compression instead produce a positive correlation. The predictions of the model are found to be consistent with various empirical observations on mobility and inequality.

  • 19.
    Hassler, John
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Storesletten, Kjetil
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Zilibotti, Fabrizio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Democratic Public Good Provision2007In: Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 133, no 1, p. 127-151Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 20.
    Krusell, Per
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Greenwood, Jeremy
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Growth Accounting with Investment-Specific Technological Progress2007In: Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 54, no 4, p. 1300-1310Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 21.
    Krusell, Per
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Hornstein, Andreas
    Violante, Giovanni
    Technology-Policy Interaction in Frictional Labor markets2007In: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 74, no 4Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 22.
    Krusell, Per
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Hornstein, Andreas
    Violante, Giovanni
    Vintage Capital in Frictional labor Markets2007In: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 74, no 4, p. 1089-1124Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 23.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    China's Reformed Economy2007In: CESifo Forum, Vol. 1Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 24.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Economic-Social Interaction during China’s Transition2007In: Journal of Comparative Studies, Vol. 33Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 25.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Stabiliseringspolitiken i teori och praktik2007In: Tillämpad makroekonomi, 2007Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 26. Matthiessen, Lars
    et al.
    Siven, Claes-Henric
    Svedberg, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies. Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Bent Hansen2007In: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 4, p. 51-63Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 27.
    Niepelt, Dirk
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Starving the Beast? Intra-Generational Conflict and Balanced Budget Rules2007In: European Economic Review, Vol. 51, no 1, p. 145-159Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A balanced budget requirement does not only prevent fiscal policy makers from smoothing tax distortions but also affects their preferred choice of government spending. The paper analyzes the conditions under which groups opposed to government spending might want to implement a balanced budget requirement in order to induce the government to spend less. It shows that relaxing a balanced budget requirement need not be associated with higher government spending.

  • 28.
    Persson, Mats
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Siven, Claes-Henric
    Department of Economics.
    The Becker Paradox and Type I vs. Type II Errors in the Economics of Crime2007In: International Economic Review, no 48, p. 211-33Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 29.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Roland, Gerard
    Tabellini, Guido
    Electoral rules and government spending in parliamentary democracies2007In: Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, no 2, p. 155-188Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy where electoral competition inside coalition governments induces higher spending than under single party governments. Policy preferences of parties are endogenous and derived from opportunistic reelection motives. The electoral rule affects government spending, but only indirectly: proportional elections induce a more fragmented party system and a larger incidence of coalition governments than do majoritarian elections. Empirical evidence from post-war parliamentary democracies strongly supports these predictions.

  • 30.
    Prado, Jr., Jose Mauricio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Government Policy in the Formal and Informal Sectors2007Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper quantitatively investigates, in general equilibrium, the interaction between the firms’ choice to operate in the formal or the informal sector and government policy on taxation and enforcement, given a level of regulation. A static version of Ghironi and Melitz’s (2005) industry model is used to show that firms with lower productivity endogenously choose to operate in the informal sector. I use cross-country data on taxes, measures of informality, and measures of regulation (entry and compliance costs, red tape, etc) to back out how high the enforcement levels must be country by country to make the theory match the data. Welfare gains from policy reforms can be fairly large. I find also that welfare gains from reducing regulation are almost twice those computed for the policy reform. Finally, distortions associated with informality account for a factor of 1.5 of the output per capita difference between the richest and the poorest countries.

  • 31.
    Reinikka, Ritva
    et al.
    World Bank.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Working for God?: Evidence from a Change in Financing of Not-for-Profit Health Care Providers in Uganda2007Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    What motivates religious not-for-profit health care providers? This paper uses a change in financing of not-for-profit health care providers in Uganda to test two theories of organizational behavior. We show that financial aid leads to more laboratory testing, lower user charges, and increased utilization. These findings are consistent with the view that religious not-for-profit providers are intrinsically motivated to serve (poor) people and that these preferences matter quantitatively.

  • 32.
    Storesletten, Kjetil
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Comments on Hong and Rios-Rull's "Social Security, Life Insurance and Annuities for Families"2007In: Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 54, no 1, p. 141-143Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 33.
    Storesletten, Kjetil
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Discussion of Heaton and Lucas "Can Heterogeneity, Undiversified Risk and Trading Fricitions Solve the Equity Puzzle"2007In: Handbook of the Equity Risk Premium, 2007Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 34.
    Storesletten, Kjetil
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Telmer, Chris
    Yaron, Amir
    Asset Prices and Intergenerational Risk Sharing: The Role of Idiosyncratic Earnings Shocks2007In: Handbook of the Equity Risk Premium, North-Holland , 2007Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 35.
    Storesletten, Kjetil
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Telmer, Chris
    Yaron, Amir
    Asset Pricing with Idiosyncratic Risk and Overlapping Generations2007In: Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 10, no 4, p. 519-548Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 36.
    Strömberg, David
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Natural Disasters, Economic Development, and Humanitarian Aid2007In: Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 21, no 3Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 37.
    Svensson, Jakob
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Fisman, Raymon
    Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence2007In: Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 83, no 1, p. 63-75Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Exploiting a unique data set containing information on the estimated bribe payments of Ugandan firms, we study the relationship between bribery payments, taxes and firm growth. Using industry-location averages to circumvent potential problems of endogeneity and measurement errors, we find that both the rate of taxation and bribery are negatively correlated with firm growth. A one-percentage point increase in the bribery rate is associated with a reduction in firm growth of three percentage points, an effect that is about three times greater than that of taxation. This provides some validation for firm-level theories of corruption which posit that corruption retards the development process to an even greater extent than taxation.

  • 38.
    Tonin, Mirco
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The wage dimension of flexibility and security in selected Central and South-Eastern European countries2007In: Flexicurity: A relevant approach for Central and Eastern Europe, International Labour office, Geneva , 2007Chapter in book (Other academic)
1 - 38 of 38
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