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  • 1.
    Balleer, Almut
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Gómez-Salvador, Ramón
    Universität Bonn.
    Turunen, Jarkko
    European Central Bank.
    Labour Force Participation in the Euro Area: A Cohort Based Analysis2009Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We use a cohort based model to analyse determinants of labour force participation for disaggregated groups of workers in the euro area and the five largest euro area countries. The model captures age and cohort effects as indicators of (unobserved) determinatns of participation behaviour. We use these effects and observed determinants to construct trends and projections of labour supply. Our results suggest that age and cohort effects can account for a substantial part of the recent increase in participation. Cohort effects are particularly relevant for women with those born in the late 1960s and early 1970s more likely to participate over the life-cycle. There is substantial variation in the estimated age and cohort effects across countries. Looking forward, positive cohort effects for women are not large enough to compensate for the downward impact of population ageing on participation rates in the euro area.

  • 2.
    Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    London School of Economics, CIFAR.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Repression or Civil War?2009In: The American Economic Review, ISSN 0002-8282, E-ISSN 1944-7981, Vol. 99, no 2, p. 292-297Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Perhaps the crowning achievement of mature democracies is the peaceful acceptance of the ballot box as the primary instrument for deciding who should hold power in society. We do not have to go far back in the history of most democratic states, however, to find a distinct role for political violence. Moreover, many inhabitants of the globe still remain at risk of falling prey to widespread violence in the struggle for political office. Forms of political violence differ a great deal. We focus on two important manifestations: repression and civil war distinguished by whether violence is one-sided or two-sided. We present a unified approach to studying these forms of political violence with common roots in poverty, natural resource rents, and weak political institutions. First, we lay out  rudimentary model to analyze whether violence will occur and, if so, manifest itself as repression or civil war. Three regimes — peace, repression and civil war — emerge as alternative equilibrium outcomes in the interaction between an incumbent government and an opposition group. Moreover, the theory suggests a natural ordering of these regimes. We then construct empirical measures of repression and civil war, which we map into ordered variables as suggested by the theory. We investigate how the regime depends on economic and political variables, using an ordered logit model defined over the three regimes. Our estimation results indicate a strong correlation between low incomes, weak political institutions and both forms of political violence.

  • 3.
    Calmfors, Lars
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Dimdins, Girts
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Gustafsson, Marie
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Montgomery, Henry
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Stavlöt, Ulrika
    SIEPS.
    Trade in services and in goods with low-wage countries: how do attitudes differ and how are they formed?2009Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Frågan om låglönekonkurrens med utstationerad arbetskraft ska tillåtas inom EU eller om denna arbetskraft ska betalas samma löner som i värdlandet har de senaste åren varit flitigt omdebatterad i många EU-länder. I Sverige symboliseras denna debatt av Vaxholmskonflikten.

    I rapporten Trade in Services and in Goods with Low-Wage Countries - How Do Attitudes Differ and How Are They Formed? analyserar ekonomer och psykologer attityderna till olika typer av låglönekonkurrens. Resultaten bekräftar att attityderna är mer negativa till låglönekonkurrens i tjänstehandel som innefattar utstationerad arbetskraft än till "vanlig" import av varor från låglöneländer. Attitydbildningen verkar ha såväl "rationella" som "irrationella" komponenter. Detta gäller både de som förespråkar fri lönekonkurrens och de som är emot, även om analysen visar att det rationella inslaget tycks vara större för den förra gruppen.

  • 4.
    Calmfors, Lars
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Larsson, Anna
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Pattern Bargaining and Wage Leadership in a Small Open Economy2009Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Pattern bargaining where the tradables (manufacturing) sector acts as wage leader is a common form of wage bargaining in Europe. Our results question the conventional wisdom that such a bargaining set-up produces wage restraint. We find that all forms of pattern bargaining give the same macroeconomic outcomes as uncoordinated bargaining under inflation targeting and a flexible exchange rate. Under monetary union (a fixed exchange rate) wage leadership for the non-tradables sector is conducive to wage restraint and high employment, whereas wage leadership for the tradables sector is not. Loss aversion and comparison thinking in wage setting, where unions evaluate the utility of the wages of their members relative to a wage norm, may lead the follower to set the same wage as the leader. Such equilibria can arise when the leader sector is the smaller sector and promote high employment.

  • 5.
    Flodén, Martin
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Andersen, Torben
    Calmfors, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Hartman, Laura
    Kolm, Ann-Sofie
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Tobisson, Lars
    Åsbrink, Erik
    Svensk Finanspolitik: Finanspolitiska rådets rapport 20092009Report (Other academic)
  • 6.
    Fredriksson, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Dispatchers2009Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    It is a well-established fact that the government bureaucracy in many developing countries is large, difficult to understand, non-transparent and time-consuming. However, “de jure” bureaucratic procedures sometimes have little to do with how firms or individuals actually go about when dealing with the government bureaucracy. One institution that has emerged in many countries is a specialized intermediary, henceforth called dispatcher, that assists individuals and firms in their contracts with the public sector. It is often the workings of this “de facto” institution, rather than the de jure procedure, that determines outcomes. A model where firms demand a license from the government bureaucracy is developed in order to address two sets of questions related to the use of dispatchers. First, what is the impact of dispatchers on time and resources that firms spend in obtaining licenses and what is the impact on the degree of informality, i.e. on the fraction of firms that choose to not get the license? How do these results depend on the organization of bureaucrats and dispatchers, the regulatory framework and the extent of corruption in the bureaucracy? Second, what are the incentives of corrupt bureaucrats and dispatchers to try to make regulation more/less complicated? When are the incentives of bureaucrats and dispatchers to create “red tape” aligned? Ultimately and ideally, the answers to these questions can help explain why reforms of the public sector have been so difficult.

  • 7.
    Fredriksson, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Informal Firms, Investment Incentives and Formalization2009Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In a typical developing country, the majority of small firms are informal and entry costs into formality are high. This paper is motivated by these two observations. It asks the question of what can be expected in terms of firm investment, growth and formalization in such a setting. It also studies the effects of policies towards the informal sector on formalization decisions. I show that the investment paths and growth trajectories differ substantially between firms that choose to formalize and those (ex-ante almost identical firms) that do not. Second, the formalization decision depends non-trivially on the productivity of the informal firm, due to the balancing of an accumulation effect and a threshold effect. This, in turn, has an effect on how policies towards the informal sector should be designed. Third, when aggregating over firms and a range of larger firms, but also a “missing middle”, much in line with actual firm size distributions observed in developing countries. Fourth, the long-run form-size distribution turns out to depend on the initial firm-level stock of capital, a result that can be interpreted as a poverty/informality trap.

  • 8.
    Klein, Paul
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Ventura, Gustavo
    Productivity differences and the dynamic effects of labor movements2009In: Journal of Monetary Economics, ISSN 0304-3932, E-ISSN 1873-1295, Vol. 56, no 8, p. 1059-1073Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Barriers to labor mobility across countries coexist with substantial differences in living standards largely attributable to productivity differences. A growth model with endogenous labor movements is used to assess the effects on output, capital accumulation and welfare of removing barriers to labor mobility. The model is parameterized so that it is consistent with evidence on historical labor movements, and is applied to two cases: the enlargement of the European Union and the (hypothetical) creation of a common labor market in the North America. The main finding is that there are large resulting gains in terms Of Output and welfare. 

  • 9.
    Krusell, Per
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Mukoyama, Toshihiko
    Sahin, Aysegul
    Smith, Anthony
    Revisiting the Welfare Effects of Eliminating Business Cycles2009In: Review of economic dynamics (Print), ISSN 1094-2025, E-ISSN 1096-6099, Vol. 12, no 3, p. 393-404Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We investigate the welfare effects of eliminating business cycles in a model with substantial consumer heterogeneity. The heterogeneity arises from uninsurable and idiosyncratic uncertainty in preferences and employment status. We calibrate the model to match the distribution of wealth in U.S. data and features of transitions between employment and unemployment. In comparison with much of the literature, we find rather large effects. For our benchmark model, we find welfare effects that, on average across all consumers, are of a bit more than one order of magnitude larger than those computed by Lucas [Lucas Jr., R.E., 1987. Models of Business Cycles. Basil Blackwell, New York]. When we distinguish long- from short-term unemployment, long-term unemployment being distinguished by poor (and highly procyclical) employment prospects and low unemployment compensation, the average gain from eliminating cycles is as much as 1% in consumption equivalents. In addition, in both models, there are large differences across groups: very poor consumers gain a lot when cycles are removed (the long-term unemployed as much as around 30%), as do very rich consumers, whereas the majority of consumers—the “middle class”—sees much smaller gains from removing cycles. Inequality also rises substantially upon removing cycles.

  • 10.
    Nordvall Lagerås, Andreas
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Science, Department of Mathematics.
    Seim, David
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    How do Interactions Influence Formation of Social Networks?: A General Microfounded Explanation2009Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper investigates the strategic interaction effects that precede network formation. We find that for a general class of payoff functions which, among other things, feature strict supermodularity, the degree of a node is a sufficient statistic for the action it undertakes. Dynamically, we construct a general model where each period consists of two stages: first, a game on the given network is played and second, a link is either created or severed. It turns out that the payoff functions we consider give absolute convergence to the absorbing class of networks called nested split graphs. These networks do not only possess mathematically tractable characteristics, but we can also interpret real-world networks as perturbed nested split graphs. The general framework provided here can be applied to more or less complex models of network formation.

  • 11.
    Olovsson, Conny
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Why do Europeans Work so Little?2009In: International Economic Review, ISSN 0020-6598, E-ISSN 1468-2354, Vol. 50, no 1, p. 39-61Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Market work per person is roughly 10% higher in the United States than in Sweden. However, if we include the work carried out in home production, the total amount of work only differs by 1%. I set up a model and show that differences in policy—mainly taxes—can account for the discrepancy in both labor supply and home production between Sweden and the United States. These results are independent of the elasticity of labor supply.

  • 12.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Besley, Timothy
    London School of Economics.
    The origins of state capacity: Property rights, taxation and policy2009In: The American Economic Review, ISSN 0002-8282, E-ISSN 1944-7981, Vol. 99, no 4, p. 1218-1244Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes. This paper develops a framework where "policy choices" in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past investments in legal and fiscal capacity. It studies the economic and political determinants of such investments, demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity are typically complements. The results show that, among other things, common interest public goods, such as fighting external wars, as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions, are conducive to building state capacity. Some correlations in cross-country data are consistent with the theory.

  • 13.
    Persson, Torsten
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Tabellini, Guido
    Bocconi University.
    Democratic Capital: The nexus of political and economic change2009In: American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, ISSN 1945-7707, Vol. 1, p. 88-126Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We study the dynamics of economic and political change, theoretically and empirically. Democratic capital measured by a nation's historical experience with democracy, and the incidence of democracy in its neighborhood, appears to reduce exit rates from democracy and raise exit rates from autocracy. Higher democratic capital stimulates growth by increasing the stability of democracies. Heterogeneous effects of democracy induce sorting of countries into political regimes, which helps explain systematic differences between democracies and autocracies. Our results suggest the possibility of a virtuous circle, where accumulation of physical and democratic capital reinforce each other, promoting economic development and consolidation of democracy.

  • 14.
    Siven, Claes-Henric
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Ingvar Svennilson 1908-19722009In: IUI/IFN 1939-2009: sju decennier av forskning om ett näringsliv i utveckling / [ed] Magnus Henrekson, Stockholm: Ekerlid , 2009Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 15.
    Svensson, Jakob
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Björkman, Martina
    Bocconi University.
    Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment of a Community-Based Monitoring Project in Uganda2009In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, ISSN 0033-5533, E-ISSN 1531-4650, Vol. 124, no 2, p. 735-769Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper presents a randomized field experiment on community-based monitoring of public primary health care providers in Uganda. Through two rounds of village meetings, localized nongovernmental organizations encouraged communities to be more involved with the state of health service provision and strengthened their capacity to hold their local health providers to account for performance. A year after the intervention, treatment communities are more involved in monitoring the provider, and the health workers appear to exert higher effort to serve the community. We document large increases in utilization and improved health outcomes—reduced child mortality and increased child weight—that compare favorably to some of the more successful community-based intervention trials reported in the medical literature.                 

  • 16.
    Yanagizawa, David
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Ahlerup, Pelle
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Olsson, Ola
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Social Capital vs Institutions in the Growth Process2009In: European Journal of Political Economy, ISSN 0176-2680, E-ISSN 1873-5703, Vol. 25, no 1, p. 1-14Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Is social capital a substitute or a complement to formal institutions for achieving economic growth? A number of recent micro studies suggest that interpersonal trust has its greatest impact on economic performance when court institutions are relatively weak. The onventional wisdom from most macro studies, however, is that social capital is unconditionally good for growth. On the basis of the micro evidence, we outline an investment game between a producer and a lender in an incomplete-contracts setting. A key insight is that social capital will have the greatest effect on the total surplus from the game at lower levels of institutional strength and that the effect of social capital vanishes when institutions are very strong. When we bring this prediction to an empirical cross-country growth regression, it is shown that the marginal effect of social capital (in the form of interpersonal trust) decreases with institutional strength. Our results imply that a one standard deviation rise in social capital in weakly institutionalized Nigeria should increase economic growth by 1.8 percentage points, whereas the same increase in social capital only increases growth by 0.3 percentage points in strongly institutionalized Canada.

  • 17.
    Yanagizawa, David
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Nancy, Qian
    Yale University.
    The Strategic Determinants of U.S. Human Rights Reporting: Evidence from the Cold War2009In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 8, no 2-3, p. 446-457Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper uses a country-level panel data set to test the hypothesis that the United States biases its human rights reports of countries based on the latters' strategic value. We use the difference between the U.S. State Department's and Amnesty International's reports as a measure of U.S. “bias.” For plausibly exogenous variation in strategic value to the U.S., we compare this bias between U.S. Cold War (CW) allies to non-CW allies, before and after the CW ended. The results show that allying with the U.S. during the CW significantly improved reports on a country's human rights situation from the U.S. State Department relative to Amnesty International.

  • 18.
    Yanagizawa, David
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Getting Prices Right: The Impact of the Market Information System in Uganda2009In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 8, no 2-3, p. 434-445Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The Market Information Service project in Uganda collected data on prices for the main agricultural commodities in major market centers and disseminated the information through local FMradio stations in various districts. Exploiting the variation across space between households with and without access to a radio, we find evidence suggesting that better-informed farmers managed to bargain for higher farm-gate prices on their surplus production.

  • 19.
    Östling, Robert
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Economic Influences on Moral Values2009In: The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, ISSN 1935-1682, Vol. 9, no 1Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper extends standard consumer theory to account for endogenous moral motivation. Building on cognitive dissonance theory, I show how moral values are affected by changes in prices and income. The key insight is that changes in prices and income that lead to higher consumption of an immoral good also affect the moral values held by the consumer so that the good is considered less immoral. A preliminary empirical analysis based on the World Values Survey is consistent with the model's predictions with respect to income.

  • 20.
    Östling, Robert
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Martin, Flodén
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Från nationalekonomi till ekonomik?2009In: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 37, no 3, p. 3-4Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
1 - 20 of 20
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