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  • 1.
    Acemoglu, Daron
    et al.
    MIT.
    Aghion, Philippe
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Bursztyn, Leonardo
    Harvard.
    Hemous, David
    Harvard.
    The Environment and Directed Technical Change2010Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper introduces endogenous and directed technical change in a growth model with environmental constraints. A unique final good is produced by combining inputs from two sectors. One of these sectors uses “dirty” machines and thus creates environmental degradation. Research can be directed to improving the technology of machines in either sector. We characterize dynamic tax policies that achieve sustainable growth or maximize intertemporal welfare. We show that: (i) in the case where the inputs are sufficiently substitutable, sustainable long-run growth can be achieved with temporary taxation of dirty innovation and production; (ii) optimal policy involves both “carbon taxes” and research subsidies, so that excessive use of carbon taxes is avoided; (iii) delay in intervention is costly: the sooner and the stronger is the policy response, the shorter is the growth transition phase; (iv) the use of an exhaustible resource in dirty input production helps the switch to clean innovation under laissez-faire when the two inputs are substitutes. Under reasonable parameter values and with sufficient substitutability between inputs, it is optimal to redirect technical change towards clean technologies immediately and optimal environmental regulation need not reduce long-run growth.

  • 2.
    Acemoglu, Daron
    et al.
    MIT Department of Economics.
    Aghion, Philippe
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Griffith, Rachel
    UCL.
    Zilibotti, Fabrizio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence2010In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 8, no 5, p. 989-1033Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 3.
    Aghion, Philippe
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Algan, Yann
    Department of Economics, Sciences Po.
    Cahuc, Pierre
    Ecole Polytechnique.
    Schleifer, Andrei
    Harvard Economics Department.
    Regulation and Distrust2010In: Quarterly Journal of Economics, ISSN 0033-5533, E-ISSN 1531-4650, Vol. 125, no 3, p. 1015-1049Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 4.
    Aghion, Philippe
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Dewatripont, Mathias
    ECARES, Free U Brussels.
    Kolev, Julian
    Harvard University.
    Murray, Fiona
    MIT.
    Stern, Scott
    Northwestern University.
    The Public and Private Sectors in the Process of Innovation: Theory and Evidence from the Mouse Genetics Revolution2010In: The American Economic Review, ISSN 0002-8282, E-ISSN 1944-7981, Vol. 100, no 2, p. 153-58Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 5.
    Andersen, Torben
    et al.
    University of Aarhus.
    Bergman, Michael
    University of Copenhagen.
    Calmfors, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Flodén, Martin
    Stockholm School of Economics.
    Hartman, Laura
    Centre for Business and Policy Studies (SNS).
    Svaleryd, Helena
    Reseach Institute of Industrial Economics.
    Tobisson, Lars
    Åsbrink, Erik
    Kommentarer till Budgetpropositionen 20102010Report (Other academic)
  • 6.
    Andersen, Torben
    et al.
    University of Aarhus.
    Bergman, Michael
    University of Copenhagen.
    Calmfors, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Flodén, Martin
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Hartman, Laura
    Centre for Business and Policy Studies (SNS).
    Svaleryd, Helena
    Reseach Institute of Industrial Economics.
    Tobisson, Lars
    Åsbrink, Erik
    Svensk finanspolitik: Finanspolitiska rådets rapport 20102010Report (Other academic)
  • 7.
    Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    London School of Economics.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    State Capacity, Conflict, and Development2010In: Econometrica, ISSN 0012-9682, E-ISSN 1468-0262, Vol. 78, no 1, p. 1-34Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The absence of state capacities to raise revenue and to support markets is a key factor in explaining the persistence of weak states. This paper reports on an ongoing project to investigate the incentive to invest in such capacities. The paper sets out a simple analytical structure in which state capacities are modeled as forward looking investments by government. The approach highlights some determinants of state building including the risk of external or internal conflict, the degree of political instability, and dependence on natural resources. Throughout, we link these state capacity investments to patterns of development and growth.

  • 8.
    Besley, Timothy
    et al.
    London School of Economics.
    Persson, Torsten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Sturm, Daniel M.
    London School of Economics.
    Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the US2010In: The Review of Economic Studies, ISSN 0034-6527, E-ISSN 1467-937X, Vol. 77, no 4, p. 1329-1352Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper develops a simple model to analyse how a lack of political competition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth. We test the predictions of the model on panel data for the US states. In these data, we find robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state is associated with anti-growth policies: higher taxes, lower capital spending, and a reduced likelihood of using right-to-work laws. We also document a strong link between low political competition and low income growth.

  • 9.
    Björkman, Martina
    et al.
    Bocconi University.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    When is Community-Based Monitoring Effective?: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Primary Health in Uganda2010In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 8, no 2-3Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 10.
    Boschini, Anne
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Muren, Astri
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Men among Men Don’t Take Norm Enforcement Seriously2010Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 11.
    Boschini, Anne
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Sjögren, Anna
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI).
    Håkanson, Christina
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Rosen, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, The Swedish Institute for Social Research (SOFI).
    Trading Off or Having It All? Completed Fertility and Mid-career Earnings of Swedish Men and Women2010Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 12.
    Calmfors, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Fiscal Policy Coordination in Europe2010Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A fundamental overhaul of EU economic governance is needed. The most important reform is a strengthening of national fiscal frameworks, including the establishment of independent fiscal watchdogs in Member States that do not yet have such institutions. At the European level, a permament crisis resolution mechanism should be integrated with both broader macroeconomic surveillance and the sanction system. An independent European fiscal council could, based on macroeconomic risk considerations, decide in advance appropriate haircuts in the event of future sovereign debt restructuring.

  • 13.
    Calmfors, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Oberoende ekonomisk-politiska institutioner och (de frånvarande) statsvetarna2010In: Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, ISSN 0039-0747, Vol. 112, no 5, p. 346-362Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 14.
    Calmfors, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Role of Independent Fiscal Policy Institutions2010Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper analyses how independent fiscal watchdogs (fiscal policy councils) can strengthen the incentives for fiscal discipline. Several countries have recently established such institutions. By increasing fiscal transparency they can raise the awareness of the long-run costs of current deficits and increase the reputational costs for governments of violating their fiscal rules. Councils that make also normative judgements, where fiscal policy is evaluated against the government's own pre-set objectives, are likely to be more influential than councils that do only positive analysis. To fulfil their role adequately, fiscal watchdogs should be granted independence in much the same way as central banks. There are arguments both in favour and against extending the remit of a fiscal policy council to include also tax, employment and structural policies. Whether or not this should be done depends on the existence of other institutions making macroeconomic forecasts and analysing fiscal policy, the existence of institutions providing independent analysis in other economic policy areas, and the severity of fiscal problems.

  • 15.
    Calmfors, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Swedish Fiscal Policy Council: Experiences and Lessons2010Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The Swedish Fiscal Policy Council, established in 2007, has small resources but a broad remit. In addition to monitoring the long-run sustainability of fiscal policy, the council evaluates the short-run fiscal stance from a cyclical perspective. The council also analyses long-run employment and growth developments. Another task is to evaluate the motives, explanations and research basis for government policies. There is no unique best set-up of a fiscal policy council. Instead, it has to be adapted to the special characteristics of each country. The set-up of the Swedish council appears consistent both with the pre-existing institutional framework, with also other bodies making detailed budget evaluations and macroeconomic forecasts, and with a strong tradition of academic participation in the policy debate. The broad remit could lead to less focus on the fiscal watchdog role. On the other hand, the council plays a "supervicory" role in the general economic policy debate, helping to raise the standards of the doscussion, which is a fundamental democratic objective.

  • 16.
    Calmfors, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Vilka lärdomar bör den nationalekonomiska professionen dra av den ekonomiska krisen?: Nationalekonomiska föreningens förhandlingar2010In: Ekonomisk debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, no 3Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 17.
    Cheung, Maria
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Perotta, Maria
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Impact of a Food For Education Program on Schooling in Cambodia2010Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Food for education (FFE) programs, which consist of meals served in school

    and in some cases take-home rations and deworming programs conditional on

    school attendance, are considered a powerful tool to improve educational outcomes,

    particularly in areas where school participation is initially low. Compared

    to other programs, such as conditional cash transfers and scholarships,

    school meals may provide a stronger incentive to attend school because children

    must be in school in order to receive the rations, and have the potential

    to improve nutritional and general health status as well. In this paper, we nd

    that the Cambodia FFE, that was implemented in six Cambodian regions between

    1999 and 2003, increased enrollment, school attendance and completed

    education. We also ask who bene ted the most, and how cost-eective such a

    program is compared to other types of interventions.

  • 18.
    Doepke, Matthias
    et al.
    Department of Economics, Northwestern University.
    Zilibotti, Fabrizio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Do International Labor Standards Contribute to the Persistence of the Child Labor Problem?2010In: Journal of economic growth (Boston), ISSN 1381-4338, E-ISSN 1573-7020, Vol. 15, no 1, p. 1-37Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 19.
    Dube, Arindrajit
    et al.
    CWED, UC Berkeley.
    Kaplan, Ethan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Does Outsourcing Reduce Wages in the Low-Wage Service Occupations?: Evidence from Janitors and Guards2010In: Industrial & labor relations review, ISSN 0019-7939, E-ISSN 2162-271X, Vol. 63, no 2, p. 287-306Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

     Outsourcing of labor services grew substantially during the 1980s and 1990s and Was associated With lower wages, fewer benefits, and lower rates of unionization. The authors focus on two occupations for Which the), can identify outsourcing in those two decades using industry and occupation codes: janitors and guards. Across a wide array of specifications, the), find that the Outsourcing Wage penalty ranged from 4% to 7% for janitors and from 8% to 24% for guards. Their findings on health benefits mirror those on Wages. Evidence suggests that the outsourcing penalty Was not. due to compensating differentials for higher benefits or lower hours, skill differences, or the types 017 industries that outsourced. Rather, outsourcing seems to have reduced labor market rents for workers, especially for those in the upper half of the occupational Wage distribution. Industries With higher historical Wage premia Were more likely to outsource service work.

  • 20. Ellingsen, Tore
    et al.
    Östling, Robert
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    When Does Communication Improve Coordination?2010In: The American Economic Review, ISSN 0002-8282, E-ISSN 1944-7981, Vol. 100, no 4, p. 1695-1724Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We study costless pre-play communication of intentions among inexperienced players. Using the level-k model of strategic thinking to describe players' beliefs, we fully characterize the effects of preplay communication in symmetric 2 x 2 games. One-way communication weakly increases coordination on Nash equilibrium outcomes, although average payoffs sometimes decrease. Two-way communication further improves payoffs in some games but is detrimental in others. Moving beyond the class of symmetric 2 x 2 games, we find that communication facilitates coordination in common interest games with positive spillovers and strategic complementarities, but there are also games in which any type of communication hampers coordination.

  • 21.
    Hassler, John
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Krusell, Per
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Olovsson, Conny
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Oil Monopoly and the Climate2010In: The American Economic Review, ISSN 0002-8282, E-ISSN 1944-7981, Vol. 100, no 2, p. 460-464Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 22.
    Johannesson, Magnus
    et al.
    Handelshögskolan i Stockholm.
    Ranehill, Eva
    Handelshögskolan i Stockholm.
    Östling, Robert
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Effect of Competition on Physical Activity: A Randomized Trial2010In: B.E. Journal of Economic Policy and Analysis, ISSN 1935-1682, Vol. 10, no 1Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 23.
    Järliden Bergström, Åsa-Pia
    et al.
    ESO.
    Palme, Mårten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Beskattning av privat pensionssparande2010Report (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 24.
    Krueger, Alan B.
    et al.
    Princeton.
    Mueller, Andreas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Job Search and Unemployment Insurance: New Evidence from Time Use Data2010In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 94, no 3-4, p. 298-307Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper provides new evidence on job search intensity of the unemployed in the U.S., modeling job search intensity as time allocated to job search activities. The major findings are: 1) the average U.S. unemployed worker devotes about 41 min to job search on weekdays, which is substantially more than their European counterparts; 2) workers who expect to be recalled by their previous employer search substantially less than the average unemployed worker; 3) across the 50 states and D.C., job search is inversely related to the generosity of unemployment benefits, with an elasticity between -1.6 and -2.2; 4) job search intensity for those eligible for Unemployment Insurance (UI) increases prior to benefit exhaustion: and 5) time devoted to job search is fairly constant regardless of unemployment duration for those who are ineligible for UI.

  • 25.
    Krusell, Per
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Kuruscu, Burhanettin
    Dep. of Economics, University of Toronto.
    Smith, Jr., Anthony A.
    Yale Department of Economics.
    Temptation and Taxation2010In: Econometrica, ISSN 0012-9682, E-ISSN 1468-0262, Vol. 78, no 6, p. 2063-2084Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 26.
    Krusell, Per
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Mukoyama, Toshihiko
    University of Virginia.
    Rogerson, Richard
    Arizona State University.
    Sahin, Aysegül
    Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    Aggregate Labor Market Outcomes: The Roles of Choice and Chance2010In: Quantitative Economics, ISSN (web)1759-7331, (print)1759-7323, Vol. 1, no 1, p. 97-127Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 27.
    Krusell, Per
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Mukoyama, Toshihiko
    Dep. of Economics, University of Virginia.
    Sahin, Aysegül
    Purdue University, Krannert School of Management.
    Labor-Market Matching with Precautionary Savings and Aggregate Fluctuations2010In: The Review of Economic Studies, ISSN 0034-6527, E-ISSN 1467-937X, Vol. 77, no 4, p. 1477-1507Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 28.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Ekonomisk politik och politisk ekonomi: ett personligt perspektiv2010In: Ekonomisk debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, no 5Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 29.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Lärdomar av finanskrisen2010In: Ekonomisk debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, no 4Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 30.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    A Continuous Theory of Income Insurance2010Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we treat an individual’s health as a continuous variable, in contrast to the traditional literature on income insurance, where it is regularly treated as a binary variable. This is not a minor technical matter; in fact, a continuous treatment of an individual’s health sheds new light on the role and functioning of income insurance and makes it possible to capture a number of real-world phenomena that are not easily captured in binary models. In particular, moral hazard is not regarded as outright fraud, but as a gradual adjustment of the willingness to go to work when income insurance is available. Further, the model can easily encompass phenomena such as administrative rejection of claims and the role of social norms. It also gives a rich view of the desirability of insurance in the first place.

  • 31.
    Lindqvist, Erik
    et al.
    Stockholm School of Economics.
    Östling, Robert
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Political Polarization and the Size of Government2010In: American Political Science Review, ISSN 0003-0554, E-ISSN 1537-5943, Vol. 104, no 3, p. 543-565Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article, we study the relationship between political polarization and public spending using the dispersion of self-reported political preferences as our measure of polarization. Political polarization is strongly associated with smaller government in democratic countries, but there is no relationship between polarization and the size of government in undemocratic countries. The results are robust to a large set of control variables, including gross domestic product per capita and income inequality.

  • 32.
    Mueller, Andreas
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    On-the-Job Search and Wage Dispersion: New Evidence from Time Use Data2010In: Economics Letters, ISSN 0165-1765, E-ISSN 1873-7374, Vol. 109, no 2, p. 124-127Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper provides new evidence on time devoted to job search by the employed in the U.S. I find that search effort decreases with the current wage, with an elasticity between −0.7 and −1.3.

  • 33.
    Muren, Astri
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Boschini, Anne
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Constructing Gender in the Economics Lab2010Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Several experimental studies on altruism have found women to be more generous than men. We investigate whether observed gender gaps in generosity can be explained by experimental setting, where some settings are more conducive than others to activating gender identity and social norms. In a dictator game we study priming along two dimensions: 1) some subjects enter their gender on the first page of the questionnaire (Pre) while others enter their gender on the last page (Post) and 2) some subjects are seated in single-sex rooms (Homogeneous) while others are seated in gender-mixed rooms (Mixed). It turns out that gender differences occur (women are more generous than men) only for the combination Pre and Mixed. The effect is driven by males: men are sensitive to priming, while women are not.

  • 34.
    Nandy, Shailen
    et al.
    Bristol University.
    Svedberg, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Composite Index of Anthropometric Failure (CIAF): An Alternative Indicator of Malnutrition in Young Children2010In: Handbook of Anthropometry: Physical Measure of Human Form in Health and Disease / [ed] Victor R. Preedy, Springer Verlag , 2010Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 35.
    Olovsson, Conny
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Quantifying the risk-sharing welfare gains of social security2010In: Journal of Monetary Economics, ISSN 0304-3932, E-ISSN 1873-1295, Vol. 57, no 3, p. 364-375Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The welfare effects of intergenerational risk sharing through a pay-as-you-go social security system that is efficiently indexed to wages or interest rates are quantified. Comparing steady states, there are large welfare gains of being born into an economy with efficient risk sharing as compared to the current U.S. system. Efficient policy involves an increasingly risky net of tax income over the life cycle. When adjustment to steady state is taken into account, the welfare gains largely turn negative. The results are also compared and contrasted to the first best allocation.

  • 36.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Adam Smith: En kluven liberal2010In: Ekonomisk Debatt, Vol. 38, no 8Article, book review (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 37.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Paul Samuelsson: En forskare och pedagog i världsklass2010In: Svenska Dagbladet, ISSN 1101-2412, Vol. 1, no FebruariArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 38.
    Persson, Mats
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Siven, Claes-Henric
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Ingvar Svennilson2010In: Ekonomisk Debatt, ISSN 0345-2646, Vol. 38, no 7Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 39. Reinikka, Ritva
    et al.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    WORKING FOR GOD?: EVIDENCE FROM A CHANGE IN FINANCING OF NONPROFIT HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS IN UGANDA2010In: Journal of the European Economic Association, ISSN 1542-4766, E-ISSN 1542-4774, Vol. 8, no 6, p. 1159-1178Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    What motivates religious nonprofit health care providers? This paper uses a change in financing of nonprofit health care providers in Uganda to test two theories of organizational behavior. We show that financial aid leads to more laboratory testing, lower user charges, and increased utilization. These findings are consistent with the view that religious nonprofit providers are intrinsically motivated to serve (poor) people and that these preferences matter quantitatively. (JEL: L31, I11, O15)

  • 40.
    Snyder, James M., Jr.
    et al.
    Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
    Strömberg, David
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Press Coverage and Political Accountability2010In: Journal of Political Economy, ISSN 0022-3808, E-ISSN 1537-534X, Vol. 118, no 2, p. 355-408Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We estimate the impact of press coverage on citizen knowledge, politicians' actions, and policy. We find that voters living in areas where, for exogenous reasons, the press covers their U.S. House representative less are less likely to recall their representative's name and less able to describe and rate him or her. Congressmen who are less covered by the local press work less for their constituencies: they are less likely to stand witness before congressional hearings, to serve on constituency-oriented committees (perhaps), and to vote against the party line. Finally, federal spending is lower in areas with exogenously lower press coverage of congressmen.

  • 41.
    Svedberg, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Child Malnutrition in India and China: A Comparison2010In: The Poorest and the Hungry: Assessments, Analyses and Actions / [ed] Joachim von Braun, Ruth Vargas and James Snyder, Washington D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute , 2010Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 42.
    Svedberg, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Estimates of Child Malnutrition in India2010In: Economic and Political Weekly, ISSN 0012-9976, no 12Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 43.
    Svedberg, Peter
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Tilton, John
    Colorado School of Mines.
    Long-term Trends in the Real Real Price of Primary Commodities: Inflation Bias and the Prebich-Singer Hypothesis2010In: Resources policy, ISSN 0301-4207, E-ISSN 1873-7641, no 35Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 44.
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Local Accountability Improves Health Services2010In: Institutional Microeconomics of Development / [ed] Tim Besley and Rajshri Jayaraman, Mass.: MIT Press , 2010Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 45.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Monetary Policy and Financial Markets at the Effective Lower Bound2010In: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, ISSN 0022-2879, E-ISSN 1538-4616, no 42Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 46.
    Svensson, Lars E.O.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Policy Expectations and Policy Evaluations: The Role of Transparency and Communication2010In: Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review, ISSN 1404-6768, no 1Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 47.
    von Below, David
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Skogman Thoursie, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Last In, First Out?: Estimating the Effect of Seniority Rules in Sweden2010In: Labour Economics, ISSN 0927-5371, E-ISSN 1879-1034, Vol. 17, no 6, p. 987-997Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we investigate whether a relaxation in seniority rules (the “last-in-first-out” principle) had any effect on firms' employment behaviour. Seniority rules exist in several countries, but consequences of seniority rules on firms' employment behaviour have not been examined previously. The “last-in-first-out” principle in Sweden was reformed in January 2001 such that employers with ten or fewer employees were allowed to exempt two workers from the seniority rule. Using an employer–employee unbalanced panel data for the period 1996–2005, we find that both hires and separations increased in small firms relative to large firms by 5%. This also implies that there were no effects on firms' net employment. Our results show that firms reacted to changes in the seniority rules, but we argue that the effects are not overwhelmingly large.

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