During forensic interviews, eyewitnesses are to retrieve correct information from memory. Cognitive load should be high, leading to risks of giving in to suggestive questions and difficulties in memory retrieval generally. Testifying in a non-native vs. native language may require even more cognitive effort due to the need to inhibit the interference of the native language. Such witnesses may also be more motivated to appear credible because they often belong to ethnic outgroups relative to forensic professionals, risking more scepticism. In this study, Swedish participants (N = 51) reported their memory of a simulated crime event either in English (non-native language) or in Swedish (native language) and were tested for suggestibility and accuracy. Results showed that English-speaking witnesses yielded to more suggestive questions, perceived themselves as less credible but were equally accurate. Results suggest that testifying in a non-native language is taxing cognitive resources, in turn increasing suggestibility and suboptimal memory search.

Deliberate fire-setting, such as the crime of arson, can have devastating, even lethal, consequences. This study compared factors at the time of arson by female and male offenders in Sweden between 2000–2010. The women (n = 100), and men (n = 100) included in this study were randomly chosen from among all individuals who had been convicted for arson during this period and who underwent forensic psychiatric investigations. Information regarding psychiatric and somatic characteristics, their psychosocial situation, and whether they were in contact with health or social services before the arsons were examined. The results showed that both women and men have complex psychiatric and somatic characteristics, as well as psychosocial situations. Women showed more self-destructive behaviour, lower Global Assessment of Functioning scores, and had been in contact with psychiatric health services to a greater extent than men. More women than men had children. These findings suggest that specific actions may be needed for preventing and treating women compared with men at risk for committing arson.

The default ideological position is status quo maintaining, and challenging the status quo is associated with increased efforts and risks. Nonetheless, some people choose to challenge the status quo. Therefore, to challenge the status quo should imply a strong belief in one’s position as the correct one, and thus efforts may be undertaken to undermine the position of others. Study 1 (N = 311) showed that challengers undermined, by ascribing more externality and less rationality, the position of defenders to a larger extent than defenders did of challengers’ position. Studies 2 (N = 135) and 3 (N= 109) tested if these effects were driven by the implied minority status of the challenging position. Results revealed no effects of experimentally manipulated numerical status, but challengers were again more biased than defenders. Study 3 also revealed that challengers felt more negatively toward their opponents (possibly due to greater social identification with like-minded others), and these negative emotions in turn predicted biased attributions. Results are important as they add to the understanding of how intergroup conflict may arise, providing explanations for why challengers are less tolerant of others’ point of view.

Decision-makers tend to change the psychological attractiveness of decision alternatives in favour of their own preferred alternative after the decision is made. In two experiments, the present research examined whether such decision consolidation occurs also among individual group members in a large group decision-making situation. High-school students were presented with a decision scenario on an important issue in their school. The final decision was made by in-group authority, out-group authority or by majority after a ballot voting. Results showed that individual members of large groups changed the attractiveness of their preferred alternative from a pre- to a post decision phase, that these consolidation effects increased when decisions were made by in-group members and when participants identified strongly with their school. Implications of the findings for understanding of group behavior and subgroup relations are discussed.

The current research investigated biases in attributions of the origins of others’ preferences in a group decision situation. In two experiments, students indicated their preferred alternative in a decision on an important issue in their school, and then explained the bases for preferences of those agreeing and disagreeing with them. Results showed that participants saw preferences of those who agreed as more rationally and less externally based than of those who disagreed. This effect increased with perceived issue importance, when the decision was made by in-group representatives, when the decision outcome was concordant with their own preference (Study 1), and, on the externality dimension, when their representatives were in the majority when deciding on an important issue (Study 2). Findings have important implications for our understanding of the tolerance of others and acceptance of group decisions, and ultimately, how group members behave and interact.

Important issues seem to elicit attributional biases regarding origins of attitudes, such that people holding the same attitude as oneself (ingroup) is seen as more rational and less externally influenced than people holding an opposing attitude (outgroup) (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002). The current research examines the role of issue importance for such biases in three studies. In Study 1, students read about pros and cons of prohibiting religious symbols in Swedish schools. They stated their preferred alternative, issue importance, and rated origins of preferences for the ingroup and outgroup. Issue importance was related to biases. This relation was tested in two follow-up studies where high school students read about a hypothetical decision situation where their school was to decide whether to prohibit religious symbols or not. In both studies, participants stated preferred decision alternative and issue importance. Decision outcome was manipulated to concord or discord with participants’ preferences. In Study 2, decision-making form varied so the decision was made by the student council, school authorities or by voting. In Study 3, the student council of participants’ own and an adjacent school were going to make the decision together. School size and composition principle of the student council varied. Results showed that biases varied with target group and issue importance in both studies. In Study 2, biases also varied with decision-making form and outcome, although this was not replicated in Study 3. Importance seems to be decisive for biases, and decision-making form and outcome may under some circumstances influence biases.

The default ideological position is status quo maintaining (Skitka et. al., 2002), and people typically perceive more self-interest in arguements undermining rather than maintaining the status quo (O’Brien & Crandall, 2005). However, it is not known how people pro status quo change perceive those disagree rather than agree with themselves. In three studies the current research explored how individuals pro and con a status quo change on a controversial issue (e. g., gay couples’ right to child adoption, prohibition of religious symbols in schools) perceived the externality and rationality of preferences among those who agreed and disagreed with their own preference (Kenworthy & Miller, 2002). In all three studies, individuals pro- as compared to con a status quo change showed more bias, that is more perceived externality and less rationality behind preferences of those disagreeing rather than agreeing with themselves. Individuals pro status quo change were more biased when a decision on the target issue was made that concorded rather than discorded with their own preference, whereas those against a change showed more bias with a discordant decision outcome. Because status quo is default position, people who challenge it take a risk, possibly inducing threat feelings which should increase biases (Stephan et. al., 2002). A concordant decision outcome in this situation may have a validating function, boosting self-enhancement and increase biases (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

Cognitive dissonance has been studied for more than 60 years and many insightful findings have come from this research. However, some important theoretical and methodological issues are yet to be resolved, particularly regarding dissonance reduction. In this paper, we place dissonance theory in the larger framework of appraisal theories of emotion, emotion regulation, and coping. The basic premise of dissonance theory is that people experience negative affect (to varying degrees) following the detection of cognitive conflict. The individual will be motivated to alleviate these emotional reactions and could do so by reducing dissonance in some manner. We argue that detection of dissonance will follow the same principles as when people interpret any other stimuli as emotionally significant. Thus, appraisal theory of emotion, which argues that emotions are generated via the cognitive evaluation of surrounding stimuli, should be applicable to the dissonance-detection process. In short, we argue that dissonance-reduction strategies (attitude change, trivialization, denial of responsibility, etc.) can be understood as emotion-regulation strategies. We further argue that this perspective contributes to reconciling fragmented (and sometimes contrary) viewpoints present in the literature on dissonance reduction. In addition to proposing the general model of dissonance reduction, we illustrate at the hand of empirical data how research on dissonance reduction can be performed without relying on experimental paradigms that focus on a specific reduction strategy.

This study investigated the effects of cognitive conflict on abstract thinking. According to action-identification theory, an ambiguous and unfamiliar situation might propel an individual to a more abstract mindset. Based on this premise, cognitive conflict was hypothesized to put people in an abstract mindset. The induced compliance paradigm, in which participants are asked to write a counter-attitudinal essay under either low choice (producing little dissonance) or high choice (producing more dissonance), was employed. Results showed that an abstract mindset was in fact activated in the induced compliance paradigm, and this effect was more pronounced for participants having a more concrete mindset to begin with. The results suggest that the experience of cognitive conflict is closely related to increased abstraction.

The aim of this study was to clarify how positive and negative emotions are related to the common attitude-change effect in cognitive dissonance research. Drawing on appraisal theories of emotion, and emotion-regulation research, we predicted that negative emotions would be inversely related to attitude change, whereas positive emotions would be positively related to attitude change in the induced compliance paradigm. In two studies, participants (N = 44; N = 106) wrote a counter-attitudinal essay under the perception of high choice, and were later asked to state their emotions in relation to writing this essay, as well as to state their attitude. Results confirmed the predictions, even when controlling for baseline emotions. These findings untangled a previously unresolved issue in dissonance research, which in turn shows how important emotion theories are for the understanding of cognitive dissonance processes.

This study investigated the effects of cognitive conflict on abstraction. Results revealed that an abstract mindset was in fact activated when participants experienced cognitive conflict. This suggest that cognitive conflicts are closely related to increased abstraction.

This study investigated the effects of cognitive dissonance on abstract thinking. According to action-identification theory, whenever people try to understand a situation in a new way, they activate an abstract mindset. Based on this premise, dissonance was hypothesized to put people in an abstract mindset. The induced compliance paradigm, in which participants are asked to write a counter-attitudinal essay under either low choice (producing little dissonance) or high choice (producing more dissonance), was employed. Results showed that dissonance did in fact activate a more abstract mindset, and this effect was more pronounced for participants having a more concrete mindset to begin with. This suggests that increasing abstraction, as a reaction to cognitive conflict, is a way for people to resolve inconsistencies.

In this study, we investigated how individuals’ abstract thinking increases when experiencing dissonance. Dissonance theory holds that people reduce dissonance by accommodating their attitudes in order to fit their most recent behavior. This process resembles the reasoning of action-identification theory (AIT), which postulates that people usually try to understand their actions in a meaningful and coherent way, and also that actions can take on new meanings when people move from a low-level to a high-level understanding of the action. Thus, acting inconsistently threatens the coherent understanding of ones action; and in order to regain a sense of consonance, people will try to find a new meaning of their action (e.g., via attitude change). However, this occurs when moving to a high-level understanding (i.e., thinking more abstractly) of ones action. However, the effect of dissonance on abstraction should be stronger for individuals with low level of abstraction to begin with – since AIT holds that people who naturally tend to think abstractly already have high-level understandings of their actions. We predicted that: (1) dissonance puts people in a more abstract mindset, and (2) this effect will be more apparent for individuals low in abstraction. First, we established participants’ natural tendencies to abstract thinking with the Gestalt Completion Test (GCT). This variable was later split into low and high GCT. Several days later, we employed the induced compliance paradigm, in which participants were asked to write a counter-attitudinal essay under either low choice or high choice. High-choice participants usually experience more dissonance. We also created a neutral condition (to serve as a comparison to the other conditions) in which individuals were asked to write a pro-attitudinal essay. After the induced compliance manipulation, the Behavior Identification Form (BIF) was used to measure abstraction. The sample consisted of 125 non-psychology students. A 3 (condition: high-choice vs. low-choice vs. neutral) ˙ 2 (GCT: low vs. high) between subjects factorial ANOVA showed that participants in the high-choice condition (who experienced more dissonance) did exhibit a more abstract mindset, and level of GCT moderated this effect. The following simple effects analysis showed a significant effect for the low-GCT groups: (F(2, 119) = 6.607, p = .002, &#951;2 = .100) and the pairwise comparisons revealed that high-choice participants exhibited a significantly more abstract mindset (M = 16.65, SD = 4.54) compared to both the low-choice participants (M = 13.18, SD = 4.45) p = .013, d = .77 and the neutral participants (M = 12.25, SD = 4.71) p < .001, d = .95. No significant effects were found when comparing the high-GCT groups (p = .398). The present study demonstrated that dissonance activates abstract thinking, which is thought to facilitate people’s understanding their recent actions. This finding has important implication for the future study of consequences of cognitive conflicts, and also the study of how abstraction enables people to find new meanings of their own actions. Hence, investigation on these mechanisms could shed more light on how people regulate their thoughts, emotions and behavior in real time.

A previous study conducted in Sweden showed that criminal investigators who participated in a 6‐month course, including a systematic and extensive training program based on a flexible protocol and during which they received extended supervision, were able to reduce their use of option‐posing and suggestive questions and used more open‐ended questions at the end of the training. However, that study did not determine whether the participants continued to employ preferred interview techniques in the months after the course concluded. In the present study, therefore, we evaluated interviews conducted by 66 Swedish criminal investigators who were given the same training as the previous participants. They attended four different courses between the autumn term of 2013 and the spring term of 2015.The present study specifically focused on changes in interview quality from before the course started, to the final interview at the end of the course and interviews subsequently conducted four months after the course was completed. The coding distinguished between open‐questions (invitations, directives) and risky questions (option‐posing and suggestive prompts). We found that, over time, the participants made increased use of recommended types of questions (invitations and directive questions) and reduced use of risky question types (option‐posing and suggestive questions). This suggests that the training program enhanced the investigators’ interview behavior and that they maintained their good practices after completing the course. This is an important finding because inappropriate interviewing can undermine the legal rights of both alleged victims and suspects. 

Humans express a wide array of ideal mate preferences. Around the world, people desire romantic partners who are intelligent, healthy, kind, physically attractive, wealthy, and more. In order for these ideal preferences to guide the choice of actual romantic partners, human mating psychology must possess a means to integrate information across these many preference dimensions into summaries of the overall mate value of their potential mates. Here we explore the computational design of this mate preference integration process using a large sample of n = 14,487 people from 45 countries around the world. We combine this large cross-cultural sample with agent-based models to compare eight hypothesized models of human mating markets. Across cultures, people higher in mate value appear to experience greater power of choice on the mating market in that they set higher ideal standards, better fulfill their preferences in choice, and pair with higher mate value partners. Furthermore, we find that this cross-culturally universal pattern of mate choice is most consistent with a Euclidean model of mate preference integration.