Change search
Refine search result
12 1 - 50 of 83
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Rows per page
  • 5
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100
  • 250
Sort
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
Select
The maximal number of hits you can export is 250. When you want to export more records please use the Create feeds function.
  • 1.
    Acemoglu, Daron
    et al.
    MIT.
    Aghion, Philippe
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Bursztyn, Leonardo
    Harvard.
    Hemous, David
    Harvard.
    The Environment and Directed Technical Change2010Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper introduces endogenous and directed technical change in a growth model with environmental constraints. A unique final good is produced by combining inputs from two sectors. One of these sectors uses “dirty” machines and thus creates environmental degradation. Research can be directed to improving the technology of machines in either sector. We characterize dynamic tax policies that achieve sustainable growth or maximize intertemporal welfare. We show that: (i) in the case where the inputs are sufficiently substitutable, sustainable long-run growth can be achieved with temporary taxation of dirty innovation and production; (ii) optimal policy involves both “carbon taxes” and research subsidies, so that excessive use of carbon taxes is avoided; (iii) delay in intervention is costly: the sooner and the stronger is the policy response, the shorter is the growth transition phase; (iv) the use of an exhaustible resource in dirty input production helps the switch to clean innovation under laissez-faire when the two inputs are substitutes. Under reasonable parameter values and with sufficient substitutability between inputs, it is optimal to redirect technical change towards clean technologies immediately and optimal environmental regulation need not reduce long-run growth.

  • 2.
    Alonso, Irasema
    et al.
    Yale University.
    Prado, Jr., Jose Mauricio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Ambiguity Aversion, the Equity Premium, and the Welfare Costs of Business Cycles2007Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We examine the potential importance of consumer ambiguity aversion for asset prices and how consumption fluctuations influence consumer welfare. First, considering a simple Mehra-Prescott-style endowment economy with a representative agent facing consumption fluctuations calibrated to match U.S. data, we study to what extent ambiguity aversion can deliver asset prices that are consistent with data: a high return on equity and a low return on riskfree bonds. For some configurations of preference parameters – a discount factor, a degree of relative risk aversion, and a measure of ambiguity aversion – we find that it can. Then, we use these parameter configurations to investigate how much consumers would be willing to pay to reduce endowment fluctuations to zero, thus delivering a Lucas-style welfare cost of fluctuations. These costs turn out to be very large: consumers are willing to pay over 10% of consumption in permanent terms.

  • 3.
    Bengtsson, Claes
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Willenhag, Peter
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Gender and Overconfidence2004Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Do males differ from females in terms of self-confidence? The structure of the Economics I exam at Stockholm University provides an opportunity to shed some light in this question. By answering an extra, optional question, the students can aim for a higher mark. We find a clear gender difference in that male students are inclined than female students to take this opportunity. This difference in self-assessment is more pronounced among younger than among older students.

  • 4.
    Björkman, Martina
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Income Shocks and Gender Gaps in Education: Evidence from Uganda2006Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper uses exogenous variation in rainfall across districts in Uganda to estimate the causal effects of household income shocks on children's enrollment and cognitive skills conditional on gender. I find negative income shocks to have large negative and highly significant effects on female enrollment in primary schools and the effect grows stronger for older girls. The effect on boys' enrollment is smaller and only marginally significant. Moreover, I find that a negative income shock has an adverse effect on test scores in general and test scores of female students in particular. The results imply that households respond to income shocks by varying the quantity and quality of girls' education while boys are to a large extent sheltered -- a finding consistent with a model where parents' values of child labor differ across sexes.

  • 5. Björkman, Martina
    et al.
    Reinikka, Ritva
    Svensson, Jakob
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Local Accountability2006Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Identifying and implementing incentives that give rise to a strong relationship

    of accountability between service providers and beneficiaries is viewed by many as critical

    for improving service delivery. How to achieve this in practice and if it at all works,

    however, remain open questions. Systematic evaluation of service delivery innovations

    to increase accountability can show what works, what doesn’t and why, a first step to

    scaling up success. This paper discusses one such attempt: a randomized evaluation of a

    Citizen Report Card project at the community level in primary health care in Uganda.

    The Citizen Report Card project collected quantitative information on the quality and

    quantity of health service provision from citizens and public health care providers. This

    information were then assembled in "easy access" report cards that were disseminated,

    together with practical information on how best to use this information, in community,

    staff, and interface meetings by local community organizations in order to enhance citizens’

    ability to monitor the health care providers. The intervention improved both the quality

    and quantity of health service provision in the treatment communities: One year into

    the program, average utilization was 16 percent higher in the treatment communities; the

    weight of infants higher, and the number of deaths among children under-five markedly

    lower. Treatment communities became more extensively involved in monitoring providers

    following the intervention, but we find no evidence of increased government funding. These

    results suggest that the improvements in the quality and quantity of health service delivery

    resulted from increased effort by the health unit staff to serve the community.

  • 6.
    Bonfiglioli, Alessandra
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Equities and Inequality2005Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, the development of financial markets and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, investor protection promotes financial development by raising confidence and reducing the costs of external financing. Developed financial systems spread risks among financiers and firms, allocating them to the agents bearing them the best. Therefore, financial development plays the twofold role of encouraging agents to undertake risky enterprises and providing them with insurance. By increasing the number of risky projects, it raises income inequality. By extending insurance to more agents, it reduces it. As a result, the relationship between financial development and income inequality is hump-shaped. Empirical evidence from a cross-section of sixty-nine countries, as well as a panel of fifty-two countries over the period 1976-2000, supports the predictions of the model.

  • 7.
    Bonfiglioli, Alessandra
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    How Does Financial Liberalization Affect Economic Growth?2005Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper assesses the effects of international financial liberalization and banking crises on investments and productivity in a sample of 93 countries (at its largest) observed between 1975 and 1999. I provide empirical evidence that financial liberalization spurs productivity growth and marginally affects capital accumulation. Banking crises depress both investments and TFP. Both levels and growth rates of productivity respond to financial liberalization and banking crises. The paper also presents evidence of conditional convergence in productivity across countries. However, the speed of convergence is unaffected by financial liberalization. These results are robust to a number of econometric specifications.

  • 8.
    Calmfors, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Fiscal Policy Coordination in Europe2010Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A fundamental overhaul of EU economic governance is needed. The most important reform is a strengthening of national fiscal frameworks, including the establishment of independent fiscal watchdogs in Member States that do not yet have such institutions. At the European level, a permament crisis resolution mechanism should be integrated with both broader macroeconomic surveillance and the sanction system. An independent European fiscal council could, based on macroeconomic risk considerations, decide in advance appropriate haircuts in the event of future sovereign debt restructuring.

  • 9.
    Calmfors, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Role of Independent Fiscal Policy Institutions2010Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper analyses how independent fiscal watchdogs (fiscal policy councils) can strengthen the incentives for fiscal discipline. Several countries have recently established such institutions. By increasing fiscal transparency they can raise the awareness of the long-run costs of current deficits and increase the reputational costs for governments of violating their fiscal rules. Councils that make also normative judgements, where fiscal policy is evaluated against the government's own pre-set objectives, are likely to be more influential than councils that do only positive analysis. To fulfil their role adequately, fiscal watchdogs should be granted independence in much the same way as central banks. There are arguments both in favour and against extending the remit of a fiscal policy council to include also tax, employment and structural policies. Whether or not this should be done depends on the existence of other institutions making macroeconomic forecasts and analysing fiscal policy, the existence of institutions providing independent analysis in other economic policy areas, and the severity of fiscal problems.

  • 10.
    Calmfors, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Swedish Fiscal Policy Council2011Report (Other academic)
  • 11.
    Calmfors, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Swedish Fiscal Policy Council: Experiences and Lessons2010Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The Swedish Fiscal Policy Council, established in 2007, has small resources but a broad remit. In addition to monitoring the long-run sustainability of fiscal policy, the council evaluates the short-run fiscal stance from a cyclical perspective. The council also analyses long-run employment and growth developments. Another task is to evaluate the motives, explanations and research basis for government policies. There is no unique best set-up of a fiscal policy council. Instead, it has to be adapted to the special characteristics of each country. The set-up of the Swedish council appears consistent both with the pre-existing institutional framework, with also other bodies making detailed budget evaluations and macroeconomic forecasts, and with a strong tradition of academic participation in the policy debate. The broad remit could lead to less focus on the fiscal watchdog role. On the other hand, the council plays a "supervicory" role in the general economic policy debate, helping to raise the standards of the doscussion, which is a fundamental democratic objective.

  • 12.
    Calmfors, Lars
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Wages and Wage-Bargaining Institutions in the EMU: A Survey of the Issues2001Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper distinguishes between the impact of th EMU on nominal wage flexibility and on equilibrium real wage and unemployment levels. A preceived need to increase nominal wage flexibility as a substitute for domestic monetary policy and a tendency to less real wage moderation in the EMU are likely to promote informal bargaining co-ordination and social pacts in the medium run. But such co-ordiantion is not likely to be sustainable in the long run, as it conflicts with other forces working in the direction of decentralization and deunionisation. This could lead to more government intervention in wage setting during a transitional period. Although monetary unification will strengthen the incentives for higher-level transnational co-ordination of wage bargaining, such a development is improbable in view of the co-ordination costs involved. If transitional co-ordination develops, it is most likely to occur within multinational firms.

  • 13.
    Calmfors, Lars
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Dimdins, Girts
    University of Latvia and SSE Riga.
    Gustafsson Sendén, Marie
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Montgomery, Henry
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Psychology.
    Stavlöt, Ulrika
    Fores.
    Why Do People Dislike Low-Wage Trade Competition with Posted Workers in the Service Sector?2012Report (Other academic)
  • 14.
    Calmfors, Lars
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Forslund, Anders
    IFAU (The Swedish Office of Labour Market Policy Evaluation).
    Hemström, Maria
    IFAU.
    Does Active Labour Market Policy Work?: Lesson from the Swedish Experiences2002Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The Swedish experiences of the 1990s provide a unique example of how large-scale active labour market programmes (ALMP's) have been used as a means to fight high unemployment. This paper discussses the mechanisms through which ALMPs affect (un)employment and surveys the empirical studies of the effects of ALMPs in Sweden. The main conclusions are: (i) there is hardly any evidence for a positive effect on matching efficiency; (ii) there are some indications of positive effects on labour force participation; (iii) subsidised employment seems to cause displacement of regular employment, whereas this appears not to be the case for labout market training; (iv) it is unclear whether or not ALMPs raise aggregate wage pressure in the economy; (v) in the 1990s, training programmes seem not to have enhanced the employment probabilities off participants, whereas some forms of subsidised employment seem to have had such effects; and (vi) youth programmes seem to have caused substantial displacement effects a the same time as the gains for participants appear uncertain.

    On the whole, ALMP's have probably reduced open unemployment, but also reduced regular employment. The overall policy conclusion is that ALMPs of the scale used in Sweden in the 1990s are not an efficient means of employment policy. To be effective, ALMPs should be used on a smaller scale. There should be a greater emphasis on holding down long-term unemployment in general and a smaller emphasis on youth programmes. ALMPs should not be used as a means to renew unemployment benefit eligibility.

  • 15.
    Calmfors, Lars
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Johansson, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Nominal Wage Flexibility, Wage Indexation and Monetary Union2002Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Membership in a monetary union (EMU) is likely to imply stronger incentives for nominal wage flexibility in the form of wage indexation and shorter contract length than non-membership. For example, EMU entry may cause a move from non-indexation to an indexation equilibrium. But more wage flexibility is only an imperfect substitute for an own monetary policy. It is possible that an increase in wage flexibility is welfare-decreasing, because of the accompanying rise in price variability. If indexation occurs outside the EMU, wither multiple equilibria or full-indexation equilibria may occur.

  • 16.
    Calmfors, Lars
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Johansson, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Unemployment Benefits, Contract Length and Nominal Wage Flexibility2001Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We show in a union-bargaining model that a decrease in the unemployment benefit level increases not only equilibrium employment, but also nominal wage flexibility, and thus reduces employment variations in the case of nominal shocks. Long-term wage contracts lead to higher expected real wages and hence higher expected unemployment than short-term contracts. Therefore lower benefits reduce the expected utility gross of contract costs of a union member more with long-term than with short-term contracts and thus create an incentive for shorter contracts. Incentives for employers work in the same direction. Lower taxes associated with lower benefits also tend to make short-term contracts more attractive.

  • 17.
    Calmfors, Lars
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Larsson, Anna
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Pattern Bargaining and Wage Leadership in a Small Open Economy2009Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Pattern bargaining where the tradables (manufacturing) sector acts as wage leader is a common form of wage bargaining in Europe. Our results question the conventional wisdom that such a bargaining set-up produces wage restraint. We find that all forms of pattern bargaining give the same macroeconomic outcomes as uncoordinated bargaining under inflation targeting and a flexible exchange rate. Under monetary union (a fixed exchange rate) wage leadership for the non-tradables sector is conducive to wage restraint and high employment, whereas wage leadership for the tradables sector is not. Loss aversion and comparison thinking in wage setting, where unions evaluate the utility of the wages of their members relative to a wage norm, may lead the follower to set the same wage as the leader. Such equilibria can arise when the leader sector is the smaller sector and promote high employment.

  • 18.
    Calmfors, Lars
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Wren-Lewis, Simon
    Oxford University.
    What Should Fiscal Councils Do?2011Report (Other academic)
  • 19.
    Calvó-Armengol, Antoni
    et al.
    Department of Economics, Universidad Carlos III .
    Zenou, Yves
    Department of Economics, University of Southampton.
    Job Matching, Social Network and Word-of-Mouth Communication2001Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Workers are embedded within a network of social relationships and can communicate through word-of-mouth. They can find a job through either formal agencies or personal contacts. From this micro scenario, we derive an aggregate matching function that has the standard properties but fails to be homogenous of degree one. Search frictions arise endogenously because of coordination failures between workers as in the standard urn-ball model. However, contrary to the latter, the network of personal contacts allows here for a (partial) replacement of redundant jobs. Therefore, introducing word-of-mouth communication among network-related individuals reduces coordination failures and alleviates the associated search frictions. In particular, when the network size increases, on average, the unemployed workers hear about more vacancies through their social network but, at the same time, it is more likely that multiple vacancies reach the same unemployed worker. Above certain ciritical value, this job overcrowding becomes so important that job matches decrease with network size. Finally, we show the existence and uniqueness of the labor market equilibrium and study its properties. In dense enough networks, the corresponding equilibrium unemployment rate increases with network size.

  • 20.
    Cheung, Maria
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Perrotta, Maria
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Impact of a Food For Education Program on Schooling in Cambodia2011Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Food for Education (FFE) programs, which consist of meals served in school and in some cases take-home rations and deworming programs conditional on school attendance, are considered a powerful tool to improve educational outcomes, particularly in areas where school participation is initially low. Compared to other programs, such as conditional cash transfers and scholarships, school meals may provide a stronger incentive to attend school because children must be in school in order to receive the rations, and have the potential to improve nutritional and general health status as well. In this paper, we find that the Cambodia FFE, that was implemented in six Cambodian regions between 1999 and 2003, increased enrollment, school attendance and completed education. We also ask who benefited the most, and how cost-effective such a program is compared to other types of interventions.

  • 21.
    Cúrdia, Vasco
    et al.
    Princeton University.
    Finocchiaro, Daria
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    An Estimated DSGE Model for Sweden with a Monetary Regime Change2005Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Using Bayesian methods, we estimate a small open economy model for Sweden. We explicitly account for a monetary regime change from an exchange rate target zone to flexible exchange rates with explicit targeting. In each of these regimes, we analyze the behavior of the monetary authority and the relative contribution to the business cycle of structural shocks in detail. Our results can be summarized as follows. Monetary policy is mainly concerned with stabilizing the exchange rate in the target zone and with price stability in the inflation targeting regime. Expectations of realignment and the risk premium are the main sources of volatility in the target zone period. In the inflation targeting period, monetary shocks are important sources of volatility in the short run, but in the long run, labor supply and preference shocks become relatively more important. Foreign shocks are much more destabilizing under the target zone than under inflation targeting.

  • 22. DellaVigna, Stefano
    et al.
    Kaplan, Ethan
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting2006Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Does media bias affect voting? We analyze the entry of Fox News in cable markets and its impact on voting. Between October 1996 and November 2000, the conservative Fox News Channel was introduced in the cable programming of 20 percent of US towns.

    Fox News availability in 2000 appears to be largely idiosyncratic, conditional on a set of controls. Using a data set of voting data for 9,256 towns, we investigate if Republicans gained vote share in towns where Fox News entered the cable market by the year 2000. We find a significant effect of the introduction of Fox News on the vote share in Presidential elections between 1996 and 2000. Republicans gained 0.4 to 0.7 percentage points in the towns which broadcast Fox News. Fox News also affected the Republican vote share in the Senate and voter turnout. Our estimates imply that Fox News convinced 3 to 28 percent of its viewers to vote Republican, depending on the audience measure. The Fox News effect could be a temporary learning effect for rational voters, or a permanent effect for non-rational voters subject to persuasion.

  • 23.
    Doepke, Matthias
    et al.
    UCLA.
    Zilibotti, Fabrizio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Patience Capital and the Demise of the Aristocracy2005Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We model the decision problem of a parent who chooses an occupation and invests in the patience of her children. The two choices complement each other: patient individuals choose occupations with a steep income profile; a steep income profile, in turn, leads to a strong incentive to invest in patience. In equilibrium, society becomes stratified along occupational lines. The most patient people are those in occupations requiring the most education and experience. The theory can account for the demise of the British land-owning aristocracy in the nineteenth century, when rich landowners proved unable to profit from new opportunities arising with industrialization, and were thus surpassed by industrialists rising from the middle classes.

  • 24.
    Epifani, Paolo
    et al.
    Università di Parma.
    Gancia, Gino A.
    MIT Department of Economics, .
    The Skill Bias of World Trade2002Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We argue that, with an elasticity of substitution in consumption greater than one and higher scale economies in the skill-intensive sectors, the entire volume of world trade matters for wage inequality. This implies that trade intergration, even among identical countries, is likely to increase the skill premium. This result can also explain the increase in skill premia in developing countries that have experienced drastic trade liberalizations. Further, we argue that evidence of a falling relative price of skill-intensive goods can be reconciled with the fast growth of world trade and that the intersectoral mobility of capital exacerbates the effect of trade on inequality. We provide new empirical evidence in support of our results and a quantitative assessment of the skill bias of world trade.

  • 25.
    Flam, Harry
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession2003Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper identifies and discusses important political and economic aspects of Turkish accession to the EU. Under the present rules, Turkey’s size would give it the greatest number of votes within twenty years and its low income and dependence on agriculture the largest net transfer from other members. Free labor mobility would lead to substantial migration to the present EU; the Turkish immigrant population in Germany may increase from 2 to 3.6 million in thirty years. Most of the economic effects will be felt by Turkey, particularly in agriculture. The main obstacles to accession are not economic, but political, however. Historical experience makes it difficult for Turkey to eliminate the decisive political role of the military, to give Kurds and other minorities cultural rights and uphold basic human rights; these issues are perceived to threaten national unity and territorial integrity. Turkish membership is resisted by many in the EU because Turkey is not considered to be part of Europe geographically and culturally.

  • 26.
    Flam, Harry
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Nordström, Håkan
    Swedish Board of Trade.
    Euro Effects on the Intensive and Extensive Margins of Trade2006Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We estimate that the euro has increased trade within the eurozone by about 26 per cent and trade between the eurozone and outsiders by about 12 per cent on average for the years 2002-2005 compared to 1995-1998. The percentage increases were smaller for products that were exported every year during the sample period than for products that were not, indicating significant and substantial effects on the extensive margin of trade. The euro effects were concentrated to semi-finished and finished products, in particular to industries with highly processed products such as pharmaceuticals and machinery.

  • 27.
    Flam, Harry
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Nordström, Håkan
    Trade Volume Effects of the Euro: Aggregate and Sector Estimates2006Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The gravity model is used to estimate the trade volume effects of the creation of the European currency union. The euro is estimated to have raised the level of aggregate trade between euro countries in 1998-2002 compared to 1989-1997 by 15 per cent and the level of trade with outside countries by 8 per cent. The effect is clearly increasing over time.

    Estimates for one-digit SITC sectors yield a concentration of effects to highly processed manufactures, indicating that the spillover is caused by increasing vertical specialization across countries.

  • 28.
    Fredriksson, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Dispatchers2009Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    It is a well-established fact that the government bureaucracy in many developing countries is large, difficult to understand, non-transparent and time-consuming. However, “de jure” bureaucratic procedures sometimes have little to do with how firms or individuals actually go about when dealing with the government bureaucracy. One institution that has emerged in many countries is a specialized intermediary, henceforth called dispatcher, that assists individuals and firms in their contracts with the public sector. It is often the workings of this “de facto” institution, rather than the de jure procedure, that determines outcomes. A model where firms demand a license from the government bureaucracy is developed in order to address two sets of questions related to the use of dispatchers. First, what is the impact of dispatchers on time and resources that firms spend in obtaining licenses and what is the impact on the degree of informality, i.e. on the fraction of firms that choose to not get the license? How do these results depend on the organization of bureaucrats and dispatchers, the regulatory framework and the extent of corruption in the bureaucracy? Second, what are the incentives of corrupt bureaucrats and dispatchers to try to make regulation more/less complicated? When are the incentives of bureaucrats and dispatchers to create “red tape” aligned? Ultimately and ideally, the answers to these questions can help explain why reforms of the public sector have been so difficult.

  • 29.
    Fredriksson, Anders
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Informal Firms, Investment Incentives and Formalization2009Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In a typical developing country, the majority of small firms are informal and entry costs into formality are high. This paper is motivated by these two observations. It asks the question of what can be expected in terms of firm investment, growth and formalization in such a setting. It also studies the effects of policies towards the informal sector on formalization decisions. I show that the investment paths and growth trajectories differ substantially between firms that choose to formalize and those (ex-ante almost identical firms) that do not. Second, the formalization decision depends non-trivially on the productivity of the informal firm, due to the balancing of an accumulation effect and a threshold effect. This, in turn, has an effect on how policies towards the informal sector should be designed. Third, when aggregating over firms and a range of larger firms, but also a “missing middle”, much in line with actual firm size distributions observed in developing countries. Fourth, the long-run form-size distribution turns out to depend on the initial firm-level stock of capital, a result that can be interpreted as a poverty/informality trap.

  • 30.
    Gancia, Gino A.
    CREI; Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    Globalization, Divergence and Stagnation2003Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual property rights, market integration will systematically shift technical change in favor of rich nations. For this reason, free trade can increase international income differences. At the same time, integration with countries where intellectual property rights are weakly protected can have a large adverse effect on the world growth rate. These results provide a strong rationale for global regulations, critical in a system of interdependent economies for sustaining innovation and reducing income inequality. Supportive empirical evidence is presented.

  • 31.
    Gonzales-Eiras, Martin
    et al.
    Universidad de San Andrés.
    Prado, Jr., Jose Mauricio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Determinants of Capital Intensive and R&D Intensive Foreign Direct Investment2007Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We study the determinants of capital intensity and technology content of foreign direct investment, an important economic driving force for developing countries. For this purpose, we use sectoral industry data on U.S. foreign investment abroad, and data on host countries’ institutional characteristics, like investment climate, protection of property rights, labor standards and constitutional arrangements. Our regressions show that better protection of property rights has a significant positive effect on R&D but not on capital intensive capital flows. There is evidence that an increase in workers’ bargaining power results in a reduction of capital and technologically intensive foreign investment. And although the evidence with respect to constitutional arrangements is not very strong, presidential regimes appear to be less able than parliamentary ones to deliver policies attracting R&D intensive capital flows. This is consistent with recent research on the effects of constitutional arrangements on economic growth.

  • 32.
    Gonzalez-Eiras, Martín
    et al.
    Universidad de San Andrés.
    Niepelt, Dirk
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Sustaining Social Security2004Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyzes the sustainability of intergenerational transfers in politico-economic equililbrium. We argue that these transfers arise naturally in a Markov perfect equilibrium in the fundamental state variables. In contrast to earlier literature, our explanation does not resort to altruism, commitment, or trigger strategies but rests on the incentive for young households to monopolize capital accumulation, as pointed out by Kotlikoff and Rosenthal (1990). Since transfers to the old are instrumental in that respect, the vote-maximizing platform under electoral competition sustains a large social security system. Introducing fully rational voters and probabilistic voting in the standard Diamond (1965) OLG model, we find that transfers in politico-economic equilibrium are too high relative to the social optimum. Standard functional form assumptions yield analytical solutions for both the Ramsey and the probabilistic voting case. Under realistic parameter values, the model predicts a social security tax rate of 12 percent, as compared to a Ramsey tax rate of 3.5 percent. Other predictions of the model are also consistent with the data. Analytical solutions for the case with endogenous labor supply and tax distortions show the results of the model to be robust.

  • 33.
    Groth, Charlotta
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Johansson, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Bargaining Structure and Nominal Wage Flexibility2002Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In a model with hetergenous agents, wage setting by monopoly unions and monetary policy conducted by a central bank, we show that the duration of nominal wage contracts is u-shaped in the degree of centralization, with intermediate bargaining systems yielding contracts of shorter duration and thus more flexible nominal wages than both decentralized and centralized systems. We also find the degree of heterogeneity in the economy. The theoretical predictions of the model are tested on OECD data. There is empirical support for the main results regarding contract length, while there is less support for the predictions regarding the level of centralization.

  • 34.
    Hassler, John
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Rodríguez Mora, José Vicente
    Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    Storesletten, Kjetil
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Zilibotti, Fabrizio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    A Positive Theory of Geographic Mobility and Social Insurance2002Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    this paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model that can explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility, unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote over unemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary effects of insurance on the performance of the labor market into consideration. Agents with higher cost of moving, i.e., more attached to their current location, prefer more generous UI. The key assumption is that an agent's attachment to a location increases the longer she has resided there. UI reduces the incentive for labor mobility and increases, therefore, the fraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. The main result is that this self-reinforcing mechanism can give rise to multiple steady-states - one "European" steady-state featuring high unemployment, low geographical mobility and high unemployment insurance, and one "American" steady-state featuring low unemployment, high mobility and low unemployment insurance.

  • 35.
    Hassler, John
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Rodríguez Mora, José Vicente
    Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    Storesletten, Kjetil
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Zilibotti, Fabrizio
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Survival of the Welfare State2002Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper provides an analytical chracterization of Markov perfect equilibria in a politico-economic model with repeated voting, where agents vote over distortionary incom redistribution. The key feature of the theory is that the future constituency of redistributive policies depends positively on the current level of redistribution, since this affects both private investments and the future distribution of voters. Agents vote rationally and fully anticipate the effects of their political choice on both private incentives and future voting outcomes. The model features multiple equilibria. In "pro-welfare" equilibria, both welfare state policies and their effects on distribution persist forever. In "anti-welfare equilibria", eben a majority of beneficiaries of redistributive policies vote strategically so as to induce formation of a future majority that will vote for zero redistribution.

  • 36.
    Henrekson, Magnus
    et al.
    Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Effects on Sick Leave of Changes in the Sickness Insurance System2001Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In order to get a more complete picture of how labor supply is affected by economic incentives, the effects on absenteeism and not just on contracted hours should be taken into account. In particular, the effects on absenteeism due to sick leave can be considerable. In this paper we examine whether the level of sick leave compensation affects sick leave behavior. Using time-series data for Sweden spanning a long period (1955-99) with numerous changes of the compensation level, we generally find strong effects of the expected sign. Reforms implying more generous compensation for sick leave tend to be associated with permament increases in total sick leave per person employed and vice versa. These findings are reinforced in a panel study covering the 1983-91 period.

  • 37.
    Johansson, Åsa
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The Interaction Between Labor Market Policy and Monetary Policy: An Analysis of Time Inconsistency Problems2002Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper studies the interaction between time inconsistency problems in labor market policy and monetary policy. When both policies are discretionary, there is a positive inflation bias, whereas the bias market programs may be either positive or negative. A commitment of labor market programs to zero increases inflation, as compared to the case when both labor market policy and monetary policy are discretionary. Delegation of labor market policy to a liberal labor market board may improve the discretionary outcome, even if labor market programs crowd out regular employment. A conservative central bank always reduces the social loss, even when monetary policy interacts with labor market policy.

  • 38.
    Larsson, Anna
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Monetary Regimes, Labour Mobility and Equilibrium Employment2006Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyses the impact of the monetary regime on labour markets in a small open economy, by considering the game between large wage setters and an independent central bank in a two-sector model with potential labour mobility between sectors. Two monetary regimes are considered: membership in a monetary union and an inflation target combined with a flexible exchange rate. A key result is that when there is perfect labour mobility between sectors, the monetary regime does not matter for real wages, employment or profits. Moreover, introducing labour mobility substantially reduces wages and increases employment. Other findings are that when labour is immobile between sectors: (i) the real wage in the tradables sector is higher under inflation targeting than in a monetary union, while the reverse applies to the non-tradables sector; (ii) inflation targeting generates higher employment and profits than membership in a monetary union; and (iii) both workers and firms in the two sectors in general prefer inflation targeting to membership in a monetary union.

  • 39.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    An Essay on Welfare State Dynamics2003Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The expansion of welfare-state arrangements is seen as the result of dynamic interaction between market behaviour and political behaviour, often with considerable time lags, sometimes generating either virtuous or vicious circles. Such interaction may also involve induced (endogenous) changes in social norms and political preferences. Moreover, the internationalization process not only limits the ability of national governments to redistribute income; they also increase the political demands for international mobility of welfare-state benefits and social services. I also discuss the dynamics of reforms and retreats of welfare-state arrangements.

  • 40.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Changing Tides for the Welfare State: An Essay2001Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Socioeconomic conditions and values have changed considerably since the emergence of elaborate welfare-state arrangements during the first decades after World War II. For instance, recent socioeconomic changes have created new needs (justifications) for intertemporal reallocations of income as well as for protection against new types of income risks. Some socioeconomic changes have also undermined the financial viability of a number of traditional welfare-state arrangements. This paper emphasizes developments in the labor market and changes in the structure and preferences of the family. A number of alternative welfare-state reforms are considered in the paper.

  • 41.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Improving the Performance of the European Social Model: The Welfare State over the Life Cycle2003Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The achievements of social-welfare arrangements in Western Europe are well known: considerable income security, relatively little poverty and, in some countries, ample supply of social services. But there are also well-known weaknesses and hence considerable scope for improvement. Three types of weaknesses are considered in this paper: social-welfare arrangements are often not financially robust to shocks; individuals make undesirable behavioural adjustments in response to welfare-state arrangements and their financing; and social-welfare arrangements are often poorly adapted to recent changes in socio-economic conditions and preferences of individuals. I discuss these weaknesses, and alternative methods to mitigate them, in the context of various types of welfare-state arrangements that the individual may encounter over the life cycle.

  • 42.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Prospects for the Welfare State2008Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    It is useful to distinguish between exogenous and endogenous factors behind contemporary and expected future problems for the welfare state. This paper tries to identify major problems of both types and to indicate alternative reform possibilities to deal with them. At the same time as several governments struggle with such reforms, new demands on the welfare state emerge. Although the basic structure of today’s welfare-state arrangements certainly can be kept, the reforms required are sufficiently large to create considerable conflicts across interest groups.

  • 43.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Sustainable Social Spending2005Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The paper discusses a number of threats to the financial sustainability of social spending: increased internationalization of national economies, gradually higher relative costs of producing a number of human services, the ”graying” of the population, slower productivity growth in the private sector, low employment rates, and various types of disincentive effects related to the welfare state itself, including services and disincentive effects of welfare-state arrangements, in particular moral hazard and benefit dependency, are more difficult to deal with than the other threats. I also discuss the choice between ad hoc policy reforms and automatic adjustment mechanisms, delegated to administrative bodies, for dealing with these threats.

  • 44.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    The European Social Model: Lessons for Developing Countries2002Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Developing countries, in particular the least developed ones, probably have more to learn from special policies in Europe during the early 20th century than from the elaborate welfare-state arrangements after World War II. In addition to macroeconomic growth and stability, the main ambitions must be to fight human deprivation, including illiteracy, malnutrition, poor access to water and sanitation – and, in some cases, also weak, incompetent and/or corrupt governments. It is also important that informal systems in the fields of transfers and social services are not destroyed when developing countries embark on more formal systems in these fields in the future. The European experience also warns against the creation of social systems that are so generous that disincentives, moral hazard and receding social norms seriously distort the national economy, including the labor market.

  • 45.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Niepelt, Dirk
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Improving the SGP: Taxes and Delegation Rather than Fines2004Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We analyze motivations for, and possible alternatives to, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). With regard to the former, we identify domestic policy failures and various cross-country spillover effects; with regard to the latter, we contrast an “economic-theory” perspective on optimal corrective measures with the “legalistic” perspective adopted in the SGP. We discuss the advantages of replacing the Pact’s rigid rules backed by fines with corrective taxes (as far as spillover effects are concerned) and procedural rules and limited delegation of fiscal powers (as far as domestic policy failures are concerned). This would not only enhance the efficiency of the Pact, but also render it easier to enforce.

  • 46.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Nyberg, Sten
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Raising Children to Work Hard: Altruism, Work Norms and Social Insurance2001Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Children who can count on support from altruistic parents may not try hard to succeed in the labor market. Moreover, parental altruism makes withdrawal of such support non-credible. To promote work effort, parents may want to instill norms which later cause their children to experience guilt or shame associated with failure to support themselves. While social insurance pools risk across families, we show that it also creates a free-rider problem among parents in terms of norm formation. We also examine the formation of norms requiring children to support their parents financially in old age.

  • 47.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Palme, Mårten
    Department of Economics.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Job Security and Work Absence: Evidence from a Natural Experiment2006Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We analyze the consequences for sickness absence of a selective softening of job security legislation for small firms in Sweden in 2001. According to our differences-in-difference estimates, aggregate absence in these firms fell by 0.2-0.3 days per year. This aggregate net figure hides important effects on different groups of employees. Workers remaining in the reform firms after the reform reduced their absence by about one day. People with a high absence record tended to leave reform firms, but these firms also became less reluctant to hire people with a record of high absence.

  • 48.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    A Continuous Model of Income Insurance2008Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    We develop a simple yet realistic model of income insurance, where the individual’s ability and willingness to work is treated as a continuous variable. In this framework, income insurance not only provides income smoothing, it also relieves the individual from particularly burdensome work. As a result, the individual adjusts his labor supply in a continuous fashion to the implicit tax wedge of the insurance system. Moral hazard, in the sense that an individual receives insurance benefits without actually being fully qualified, also becomes a matter of degree. Moreover, our continuous framework makes it easy to analyze both the role of administrative rejection of claims, and the role of social norms, for the utilization of insurance.

  • 49.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    A Continuous Theory of Income Insurance2010Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we treat an individual’s health as a continuous variable, in contrast to the traditional literature on income insurance, where it is regularly treated as a binary variable. This is not a minor technical matter; in fact, a continuous treatment of an individual’s health sheds new light on the role and functioning of income insurance and makes it possible to capture a number of real-world phenomena that are not easily captured in binary models. In particular, moral hazard is not regarded as outright fraud, but as a gradual adjustment of the willingness to go to work when income insurance is available. Further, the model can easily encompass phenomena such as administrative rejection of claims and the role of social norms. It also gives a rich view of the desirability of insurance in the first place.

  • 50.
    Lindbeck, Assar
    et al.
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    Persson, Mats
    Stockholm University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute for International Economic Studies.
    A Model of Income Insurance and Social Norms2006Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A large literature on ex ante moral hazard in income insurance emphasizes that the individual can affect the probability of an income loss by choice of lifestyle and hence, the degree of risk-taking. The much smaller literature on moral hazard ex post mainly analyzes how a “moral hazard constraint” can make the individual abstain from fraud (“mimicking”). The present paper instead presents a model of moral hazard ex post without a moral hazard constraint; the individual's ability and willingness to work is represented by a continuous stochastic variable in the utility function, and the extent of moral hazard depends on the generosity of the insurance system. Our model is also well suited for analyzing social norms concerning work and benefit dependency.

12 1 - 50 of 83
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf