Crossing borders, creating boundaries

Identity making of the Angolan diaspora residing in the border town of Rundu, northern Namibia

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Abstract

This Bachelor’s thesis explores the relationship between borders, boundaries and migration, and their effect on identity making from a diasporic perspective. The study focuses on notions of national, regional, cultural, tribal and ethnic identity, and set in relation to the influence borders and boundaries have on these processes. It investigates this topical realm within the specific conditions of the Angolan-Namibian border, following the developments from the era of colonization, independence struggle and decolonization and the transformation of Angola and Namibia into self-asserting and sovereign states, in which it focuses on the identity making of the Angolan diaspora residing in the border town of Rundu, northern Namibia. In doing so, it sets out to investigate the connection between macro variables and processes such as colonialism, the Cold War in Africa, and independence movements, to micro processes focusing on the living conditions and experiences of border residents. The study aims at a holistic approach drawing from theoretical developments within border and boundary studies stemming from disciplines such as political geography and anthropology, along with migration studies and social psychology. The results suggest that differing dominant conditions of the Angolan and Namibian states in terms of historical and political development, living conditions and the manifestation of the border and political assertion of the nation-states, has indeed helped to inform and construct different social categories and identities. In terms of the Angolan diaspora, the results indicate that migrants acquiring Namibian citizenships and thereby rights, did redefine their national identity to a greater extent than those denied documentation as their agency has become curtailed, leaving this group in an identity-limbo. The main contribution of this study is an investigation of what the border-migration-identity nexus means in terms of the Angolan diaspora and the Kavango region.

Keywords
Border, boundary, identity, Namibia, Angola, diaspora, migration, colonialism, independence struggle, civil war, proxy war
Acronyms and abbreviations

CCPA  Cuando Cubango Province of Angola
DSWA  “Deutsche Südwestafrika”, German South-West Africa
DTA  Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
FAA  “Forças Armadas Angolanas, Angolan Armed Forces
FALA  “Forças Armadas de Libertação de Agnola, Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola
FAPLA  “Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Agnola, The People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola.
FNLA  “Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, National Front for the Liberation of Angola
IDP  Internally displaced person
IJC  The International Court of Justice
IPD  Internally Displaced Persons
MHAII  Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration, Republic of Namibia
MPLA  “Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola
NDF  Namibian Defence Force
OAU  Organization of African Unity
OPO  Owamboland People’s Organization.
PCA  “Partido Comunista Angolano”, the Angolan Communist Party
PLAN  People’s Liberation Army of Namibia
PLUA  “Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola”, Party of the United Struggle for Africans in Angola
RDP  Rally for Democracy and Progress
SA  South Africa
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SADF  South African Defence Force
SAMP  Southern African Migration Project
SFF  (Namibian) Special Field Force
SWA  South West Africa
SWAFT  South West Africa Territorial Force
SWANLA  South West African Native Labour Association
SWANU  South West Africa National Union
SWAPO  South West Africa People’s Organization
UN  United Nations
UNGA  Unite Nations General Assembly
UNSC  United Nations Security Council
UNITA  União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.
UPNA  “União das Popilações do Nortre de Angola”, Union of Peoples of Northern Angola
U.S.  United States (of America)
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1 Introduction

Identity making of border communities has gained an ever increasing interest among border scholars within a number of disciplines during the last decades. The African continent is no exception to this enquiry, and provides a particularly dynamic venue as postcolonial societies transform European artificial constructs to self-asserting sovereign state-projects. The colonial borders of Africa have been argued to be arbitrary artificial constructs with little meaning or legitimacy on local populations as they have been imposed on and often dividing peoples of the same tribal and ethnic origin (Bakewell, 2015; Zlotnik, 2003). Or as Coplan phrases it: “These borders were in any case conceived (not always accurately) as ’arbitrary,’ divisions in the midst of powerfully self-identified pre-colonial polities or language groups” (2010, p. 1). Therefore, these borders have been described as imposed and not in alignment with the boundaries of local peoples (Westin & Hassanen, 2014b, p. 23). There has however been a shift in this academic field with a growing number of scholars arguing that borders are constructs and bearers of meaning not only for states, but also for borderlanders and those who try to cross them (for example Miles and Rochefort 1991; Nugent 2002; Flynn 1997, cited in Mechlinski, 2010, p. 98). This in turn, together with the reluctance of any modern African state to concede its territory to another, may explain why colonial borders has proven remarkably stable (Westin & Hassanen, 2014b, p. 23). The complexity of African border construction thus becomes interesting to set in relation to the ongoing scholarly debate that has played out in the last couple of decades, regarding whether the theoretical development of a border theory is possible and meaningful (see for example Brunet-Jailly, 2005; Newman, 2003, 2011; Paasi, 2009a, 2011a; Prescott, 1965; Rumford, 2006; Sidaway, 2011).

This study centres identity-formation of the Angolan diaspora residing in urban Rundu, a Namibian town situated by the Kavango River and the Angolan-Namibian border. The topical scope of the study focuses on notions of national, regional, cultural, tribal and ethnic identity; set in relation to the influence borders, boundaries and migration have on these processes. It is based on a series of qualitative interviews, and intends to voice some experiences of this diverse group with perspectives from migrant cohorts as well as second generation immigrants. Incentives for migration vary greatly from the involuntary migration of former war refugees, to the voluntary migration of workers and students. The essay begins by outlining the methodological premises of the study. This section is followed by a review of relevant theoretical developments within the border-migration-identity nexus, in which a selection of interconnected theories within these fields are accounted for. Next, it sets the historical stage at which the identity making processes of the Angolan-Namibian border took and takes place, zooming in from an international geopolitical context to a regional and local one. This is done by giving the broader historical and geopolitical development of Namibia, Angola and in part South Africa, setting this Southern African regional perspective in relation to a broader backdrop of European colonialism and later the Cold War in Africa. Further, an account of related research follows, focusing on the Angolan-Namibian border as well as identity-formation and migration in Southern Africa. These sections are foremost based on a literature research which is complemented by interviews with scholars within the field. The following result sections are dominated by the findings from the empirical research. Here, an outline of specific conditions of the Angolan-Namibian border (and especially the stretch in the former Kavango region) links the historical context with the heart of research focusing on first-hand experiences of the Angolan diaspora in Rundu. The result is organized
according to migrant cohort experiences and dominant themes that came forth as important areas determining differences between what evolved into modern day Angola and Namibia. Last, notions of identity are investigated in which views of the Angolan diaspora along with local Namibian narratives are put forth. Marrying these components, the main contribution of the study is being an investigation of what the border-migration-identity nexus means in terms of the Angolan diaspora and the Kavango region.

2 Background

This thesis is sprung from a C-level essay written in 2011-2012 which was based on research conducted in Rundu in 2011 (Danielsson & Hernodh 2012). The theme of that essay was how the Angolan-Namibian state border influenced the identity making of residents of Rundu, and whether these border identities were bounded to a territory or developed into territorially unbounded identities. The results suggested that the border affected the identity making both directly by regulation of movement as it provided both protection and a hindrance, but also by being the end of one territory and the beginning of another functioning as a separation of what gradually became two different places. This in turn shaped distinct identities among border citizens. The findings and limited extent of this study however generated many attendant questions for potential scholarly enquiry. Further, relatively little research has been carried out on the Kavango region in general, and Rundu specifically, compared to other parts of Namibia and the Angolan-Namibian border. Angolans are the greatest immigrant group in Namibia (Namibia Statistics Agency, n.d.-c) and are highly concentrated to this border region. As Rundu historically has been and presently still is subject to heavy Angolan immigration, this thesis therefore aims to investigate the identity making of the Angolan diaspora residing in Rundu.

3 Aim of study and research question

This study aims at illuminating the relationship between borders, boundaries and migration, and their effect on identity making from a diasporic perspective. Given the above stated parameters, the central question of research is as follows:

What were the dominant conditions and factors on both sides of the Angolan-Namibian border that shaped life for ordinary citizens, and how did these conditions affect the identity making of the Angolan diaspora residing in Rundu? Further, did the manifestations of the border contribute to this process and in that case how?
4 Scope and limitations

This section outlines the theoretical, spatial and temporal scope of the study, along with stated limitations of the research.

4.1 Theoretical scope

In line with Paasi’s statement that border studies must reach out into a broader realm of context-bound social-cultural theory (Paasi, 2009), this study draws from a range of theoretical frameworks developed within academic fields such as geography, anthropology, migration studies and psychology. The main theoretical perspectives are theorization of borders and boundaries; the academic discourse of the viability of an all-encompassing border theory; stereotyping and othering; identity theory and social identity theory; a combined macro and micro perspective on migration and diaspora; and critical human geography. The theoretical framework with regard to identity formation is limited to cultural, ethnic, tribal and national identity.

4.2 Spatial scope

The spatial scope of this study is the historical and present day development of Namibia and Angola, and in part also that of South Africa (see Figure 1. below) due to the historic entanglement of the former apartheid regime into the regional politics of Southern Africa. More specifically, the study locale is urban Rundu, a border town in northern Namibia. Rundu is located along the Angolan-Namibian border and on the banks of the Kavango River (see Figure 2, p.5), situated in what was formerly the Kavango region. Since the empirical data was collected in spring 2013, Kavango has been divided into two regions; Kavango East with Rundu as capital, and Kavango West with Nkurenkuru as capital (Namibia Statistics Agency, n.d.-a)\(^1\). Due to the timing of the empirical data collection, this study refers to the old regional delimitation thus referring to the Kavango region. Rundu has a population of 63 000 residents compared to the total Namibian population of 2 100 000 (Namibia Statistics Agency, n.d.-c), and borders the Cuando Cubango Province of Angola (see Figure 2, below).

The historical and geopolitical context in which migration and the formation of the Angolan diaspora in Rundu took place is focused on conditions of Namibia and Angola in general, and specifically on the former Kavango border region and the Cuando Cubango province in Angola (see Figure 2, below). This entails that specific attention has been given the outcrop of the Angolan-Namibian border constituted by the Kavango River. The greater geopolitical context of the Cold War and post-Cold War world is touched upon in order to elucidate the drivers of the geopolitical development of Southern Africa and the study area, which in turn greatly affected nationalistic movements and indirectly the focus group.

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\(^1\) The division came as “part of the recommendations by the 4\(^{th}\) Delimitation Commission and announced in the Government Gazette of August 2013” (Namibia Statistics Agency, n.d.-a, p. 1). Rundu was prior to this division the capital of the Kavango region, and subsequent became the capital of Kavango West (Namibia Statistics Agency, n.d.-b) whereas Nkurenkuru became the capital of Kavango East (Namibia Statistics Agency, n.d.-a).
The empirical research was carried out among the Angolan diaspora residing in urban Rundu. Most of the interviews with the focus group were carried out in the urban/suburban areas of Safari and foremost Kehemu, where a substantial portion of the Angolan diaspora resides. An urban perspective was chosen for a number of reasons. First, despite reason for migration, urban areas were and still are attractive areas for settlement. Second, many of the Angolan refugees moved to the larger border towns after having left the refugee camps, where Rundu is the largest town situated along the portion of the Angolan-Namibian border adjacent to the Kavango River. Further, higher population density of towns provided a certain degree of anonymity and protection for those immigrants who crossed the border illegally and who subsequently feared authorities and aimed to avoid deportation to refugee camps. Migration movements also tend to correlate to the spatial distribution of social networks where migrants move to places where they have family or friends who have already migrated and settled (Newbold, 2010). Moreover, the cohorts of Angolan immigrants arriving after the end of the Angolan civil war have mostly been motivated by work opportunities and commerce as well as access to education, health care and other services that are generally considered to be more accessible and of higher quality in Namibia compared to Angola. Therefore Rundu, being the biggest town in the Kavango regions (Namibia Statistics Agency, n.d.-c), a service provider and a hub of economic activity, is relevant and justifies an urban perspective on the subject matter at hand.

Figure 1. Southern Africa
4.3 Temporal scope

The temporal scope of the study encompasses the timeframe of the lived experiences of the Angolan diaspora presently residing in Rundu. The focus is hence on the development of Angola and South West Africa/Namibia from the time when the anti-colonial movements gathered momentum by the mid-20th Century, and onwards to the present day. However, some attention is given to the colonial historical settings of the countries prior to independence struggle, as those colonial administrations shaped societies and the living conditions of the peoples, hence giving the colonial legacy bearing on present day identity making.
5 Terminology

Below, a number of central concepts, acronyms and their respective definitions are given. Capitalization of words is used to indicate a concept that is defined in another part of the terminology section.

5.1 Concepts and definitions

1st generation immigrant - The first person to migrate from a sending country to a recipient country.

2nd generation immigrant – The offspring of a 1st generation immigrant, who is born in the recipient country or arrived at infancy.

Alien - “A person resident in a country who has not acquired citizenship by naturalization” (Newbold, 2010, p. 253).

Angolan-Namibian border – First defined in 1886 in the ‘Declaration on the delimitation of Portuguese and German possessions in Southern Africa’ in which the respective colonial powers’ spheres of interests were to be settled in order to reassure so called ‘peaceful co-operation’ (Brambilla, 2007, p. 23). It comprises two rivers and two straight terrestrial lines. The riparian parts constitute the Kunene river from the Atlantic coast in the west to the area of the Ruacana (Namibia) and the Kavango river stretching from Katwitwi to Kapako (Namibia). The terrestrial areas constitute a straight line between the two rivers in its central reach, and a section along the Caprivi strip. In this study, what is mostly referred to as the Angolan-Namibian BORDER is the Kavango reach where Rundu is situated.

Bantu education – Educational system based on the South African Bantu Education Act of 1953, which was implemented in South Africa and Namibia (Unesco Press, 1974).

Bantu peoples – Primarily a linguistic classification denoting speakers of Bantu languages. Culturally, the Bantu-speaking peoples are a diverse group that differs greatly in terms of social, religious and political organisation as well as economic status (“Bantu peoples,” 2015).

Bantustan/Bantu homeland – Territories, or pseudo-national homelands for the black populations in South West Africa, created by the South African apartheid government in order to attain segregation and political exclusion (“Bantustan,” 2015). Act No. 54 (1968) on the Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa, detailed the structure of government for the 10 identified homelands, and was first suggested in the Odendaal Report. The structure echoed the concept used in South Africa (Tonchi et al., 2012), and were created by white ethnographers based on ethnolinguistic categorizations. It functioned as administrative units from the mid- to late 20th Century (“Bantustan,” 2015).

Border – In the widest sense, the concept of borders “denotes the adjacent areas lining boundaries” (Paasi, 2009b, p. 217). A more common understanding of borders is their association with the relating concept of the BOUNDARIES of NATION-STATES, and how the creation of the modern nation-state project in turn has established a geopolitical order (Sparke, 2009a). Another term for border studies is limology, although it is not as commonly used (Balogh, 2014). For a further development of the concept, see 7.1 Borders and boundaries – moving towards a theory?
**Borderland** – The concept may refer to “the geographical REGIONS surrounding international BORDERS” (Sparke, 2009b, p. 53) of nation-states, but can also be conceptualized as transition zones of boundaries or BOUNDARY lines (Paasi, 2009b). Further, the borderland concepts has metaphorical meanings, relating either to “cross border regional development [...] or as a meaning remaking metaphor designed to disrupt normalizing notions of NATION and the NATION-STATE” (Sparke, 2009b, p. 53), in which both interpretations aims to capture the daily lives and practices of border residents (Ibid.).

**Boundary** – As traditionally defined within political geography, boundaries have denoted either “physical or imaginary lines of contact between the key power containers, the states” (Paasi, 2009b, p. 217). The term has undergone significant theoretical development, and has come to encompass a broader understanding of boundaries to include varying institutions and symbols of social practices along with academic discourse (Ibid.). Within the scope of this essay, this dual meaning of the boundary concept as both pertaining to the division of nation-states and social groups and their internal relation is particularly explored. For a further development of the concept, see 7.1 Borders and boundaries – moving towards a theory?

**Chain migration** – Term denoting the process in which MIGRATION occurs in a sequence, a when the move of one person motivates the move of others. Theoretically, the concept is central to network-based migration theories (Hiebert, 2009a).

**Cohort** - An aggregate of individuals defined by a common denominator being a significant event in their life histories (“Cohort analysis,” 2013). In this paper the term mostly refers to the year of immigration for Angolan citizens/REFUGEES to Namibia, and/or legal status.

**Cultural/ethnic/national/tribal identity** – The entities of a person’s IDENTITY that pertain to any of these concepts of identification.

**Culture** – Along with ETHNICITY, culture is attributed being one of the most complex, difficult and widely used concepts within the humanities and social sciences (Barnett, 2009; Hiebert, 2009b). According to Barnett, culture is “best thought of as a process, not a thing” (2009, p. 135) which reveals the transformational nature of cultural expressions and interpretations of the concept itself. For the purpose of this study the concept will remain relatively undefined, as it must aim at capturing all of the contexts in which it has been mentioned and all of the notions it has been attributed by the interviewees and particularly the focus and control group of the research. For most parts when culture has been referred to by the subjects, it has alluded to any of or a combination of ethnic, tribal, traditional or national expressions of belonging to a particular in-group which indirectly is considered separate from other out-groups. For a further development of the concept, see 7.3 Identity and social categories – formed by processes of social construction and politics.

**Deutsche Südwestafrika (DSWA)** – See German South-West Africa.

**Diaspora** – The term may denote voluntary or non-voluntary population dispersals (Daniels et al., 2008), but in so doing also refers to “scattering of people over [space] and transnational connections between people and places” (Blunt, 2009, p. 158). For a further development of the concept, see 7.2 Migration and diasporas.
**Ethnicity** – According to Hiebert (2009b) one of the most disputed and problematic concepts within the social sciences to define, largely due to its diverse expressions among different social groups. The contemporary usage refers to ethnicity as a way in which personal IDENTITY is expressed, along with notions of perceived (constructed) or real (primordial) origins and distinct CULTURE of groups that mark difference from other social groups and creates cohesion. Thus, a prerequisite of ethnicity is modes of inclusion and exclusion, in turn creating an ‘us’ and ‘them’. The term is also fraught with ambiguity in its interchangeable use with race and racialization, often as a negative process in which one group define another as inferior based on conceptions of race and ethnicity (Hiebert, 2009b). In this study, the usage of ethnicity leans towards the constructionist view of the term. For a further development of the concept, see 7.3 Identity and social categories – formed by processes of social construction and politics.

**Ethnic group** – Has by Romanucci-Ross and De Vos been defined as “a self-perceived inclusion of those who hold in common a set of traditions not shared by others with whom they are in contact. Such traditions typically include ‘folk’ religious beliefs and practices, language, a sense of historical continuity, and common ancestry or place of origin. The group’s actual history often trails off into legend or mythology, which includes some concept of an unbroken biological-genetic generational continuity, sometimes regarded as giving special inherited characteristics to the group” (1995, p. 18). In this study there is no single-handed and all-encompassing definition of the term as the result of the study itself suggests that there are many notions of how such concepts as ETHNICITY, ethnic belonging, language and tribes has been categorized, interpreted and described by the different subjects. See Appendix B Tables of ethnolinguistic groups and tribes for an illustration. For a further development of the concept, see 7.3 Identity and social categories – formed by processes of social construction and politics.

**Ethnolinguistic group** – As ethnolinguistics are the “anthropological linguistics concerned with the study of the interrelation between a language and the cultural behaviour of those who speak it (“Ethnolinguistics,” 2013), the concept is here used as a categorisation of ethnical belonging interrelated to language and related social categorisation. Within each ethnolinguistic group, different tribes may exist. However, especially certain Angolan tribes may have less cultural common denominators with tribes of the same ethnolinguistic group than with tribes of other ethnolinguistic groups due to geographical location and social exchange. For a further development of the concept, see 7.3 Identity and social categories – formed by processes of social construction and politics.

**Frontier** – The concept has become gradually exchanged by the BORDER concept. To quote Mignolo and Tlostanova; “Frontiers were conceived as the line indicating the last point in the relentless march of civilization” (2006, p. 205). The quote echoes the conceptual framework of the NATION-STATE project and how it came forth during the 19th and 20th centuries. The frontiers delimited civilization on which the other side there existed nothing but emptiness, barbarism (Mignolo & Tlostanova, 2006), unclaimed space or terra incognita. Contemporary applications of the term may denote a similar usage but usually for “a division between the settled and uninhabited areas of a state” (Paasi, 2009b) or to political divisions that may exist between sates (Ibid.). The concept may also vary in meaning between different languages (Brunet-Jailly, 2005).

**German South-West Africa** – The Anglicized name of Deutsche Südwestafrika (DSWA), which was the official name of the present day Namibian territory during German occupation from 1884-1915 (Tonchi et al., 2012). See SOUTH WEST AFRICA and NAMIBIA.
Hybridity – Denoting a condition in which seemingly binary relationships of different categories are transgressed or perturbed, hybridity is of interest as a theoretical and philosophical concept within cultural studies and IDENTITY politics (Whatmore, 2009).

Identity – According to the Oxford English Dictionary², the word identity denotes “[t]he quality or condition of being the same in substance, composition, nature, properties, or in particular qualities under consideration; absolute or essential sameness; oneness”, or “[t]he sameness of a person or thing at all times or in all circumstances; the condition of being a single individual; the fact that a person or thing is itself and not something else; individuality, personality” (“Identity,” 2015). Thus, in its semantic sense the term refers to a static stage in which the condition for an identity in order to be an identity is resistant to change. However, as much of the literature on the topic suggests (see 7 Theoretical framework), identity making is a social process and a complex compound of different entities, such as cultural, ethnical, class-related, national, generational, ideological and gendered traits and is hence transformative by nature. Kangumu, who has investigated Caprivian identity making, defined identity in broader terms as “a set of feelings, perceptions and actions that colluded with one another over time, a result of both self-ascription (an assertion of who or what we claim to be) and assignment (what others say we are)” (Kangumu, 2011, p. 263). He further suggests that identity may exist in the form of “a spatial or geographical entity” (Ibid.) such as an administrative area, and in the form of a people such as specific tribes or ETHNIC GROUPS or a broader categorization of those (i.e. “Caprivians”). This makes the concept of identity specifically interesting to explore within BORDER and MIGRATION studies. The concept is further intertwined with notions of difference, social construction and categories, stereotyping, OTHERING, and TRIBALISM. In the case of migrants, it may also be associated with trans-NATIONALISM and HYBRIDITY. For a further development of the concept, see 7.3 Identity and social categories – formed by processes of social construction and politics.

Informant – In this study, an informant is any person interviewed for the purpose of acquiring information on the subject matter and not being a RESPONDENT.

Interviewee – In this study, the term refers to denote both RESPONDENTS and INFORMANTS.

**Jus sanguinis** - Latin for “right of ‘blood’ or descent” (Lee, 2011, p. 507). Legal principle in which citizenship is based on descent (Minter, 2011). Compare **Jus soli**.

**Jus soli** - Latin for “right of ‘soil’ or TERRITORY” (Lee, 2011, p. 507). Legal principle in which citizenship is based on the “right of birth in a country” (Minter, 2011, pp. 65–66). Compare **Jus sanguinis**.

Kavango/Okavango River – Also called the Cubango River in Angola, this river system is the fourth longest on the African continent originating in central Angola stretching 1600 km via the north-eastern section of the Angolan-Namibian BORDER and into northern Botswana where it terminates as an inland delta (“Okavango River,” 2015). Being the major water resource of the REGION, it has been a reason for settlements and cross-river activity both historically and presently, and is crucial for people’s livelihoods in the region. Therefore, the river has a political dimension as the basin becomes subject for implementation of a trans-BORDER resource management (Reinhold Kambuli 2013, interview; Dorothy Lutangu Matengu 2013, interview).

² Note that the on-line version of the Oxford English Dictionary has been used, which is why no page number has been given in the citation despite the use of direct quotes.
Migrancy - As the term refers to the state of being a migrant, it is generally concerned with the experiences of migrants and how they are culturally, socially and politically constructed. To illuminate the migrancy and diasporic conditions, analyses of both institutional and ethnographical dimensions are needed (Gregory & Gidwani, 2009).

Migration – At the very core, the term refers to relocation of people on an individual or group basis, which entails a residential move from one PLACE to another (Hiebert, 2009c). However, the term may include a wide range of greatly varying conditions which, within social sciences, traditionally have been categorized into the dichotomous criteria of “intra-national versus international; temporary versus permanent; forced versus voluntary; and legal versus illegal” (Hiebert, 2009c, p. 462, referring to Bailey, 2001; Castles & Miller, 2003) migration. As to this study, the majority of the interviewees of the Angolan DIASPORA belong to the categories of “international”, “permanent”, “forced” and “voluntary” as well as “legal” and “illegal” migrants, although these categories may not be as easily defined in reality as in theory. For a further development of the concept, see 7.2 Migration and diasporas.

Namibia – Formally REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA (see SOUTH WEST AFRICA).

Namrights – National Society for Human Rights in Namibia. According to the organization itself, “Namrights is a national private, independent, non-profit making and non-partisan human rights monitoring and advocacy organization. Founded on December 1 1989 by concerned citizens, the Organization envisages a world free of human rights violations and its mission is to stop human rights violations in Namibia and the rest of the world” (Namrights, n.d.).

Nation/nationalism – Nation as a concept is the produce of nationalism (Sparke, 2009d) which advocates the idea of a fellow identification, union and TERRITORY/homeland of national citizens (Sparke, 2009e). Early conceptions of nation has implied an idea of a primordial nationhood which has often been violent and exclusionary (Sparke, 2009d), although the existence and cohesion of nations are products of continuous processes (Sparke, 2009e). The conceptual interrelationship of territory and peoples are evident in the semantics of the word nation, as it may refer to both nation as a STATE which implicitly has a territory, and nation as a people (Lundén, 2002). This calls for a distinction, of which this study will foremost relate to nation as a state, and to peoples rather in terms of groups categorized on the basis of legal status such as NATIONALITY, or cultural, tribal or ethnic belonging.

Nationality – In this study, nationality foremost denotes the legal status of a person in terms of citizenship of a particular NATION/STATE.

Nation-state – The concept was historically based on an idea of a distinct ethnic homogeneity, i.e. a group of people forming a nation, which was entitled to the control of a bounded TERRITORY or STATE (Hiebert, 2009b). It emerged as the norm for state-building in Europe in the 1700- and 1800s, and was exported to former colonies during the 1900s as part of a post-colonial state-building paradigm (Sparke, 2009f).

Naturalization – The act in which an ALIEN acquire national status in a given STATE via citizenship. Naturalization may be accomplished via number of circumstances, such as voluntary application by the alien, marriage to a citizen of the receiving state, legislative direction or by change of political conditions of a TERRITORY such as annexation by a foreign country (“Naturalization,” 2015) or by liberation from such a power.
**The Other/Otherness/Othering** – The Other is everything excluded from the Self, thus determining the boundaries of Self (Secor, 2009b) whereas otherness is the quality or state of being other, i.e. different and separated from what is usually being considered the norm (“Otherness,” 2015). Othering is the process in which a perception or representation is formed of persons or groups different from the self or the own group, usually expressing a power relation in which the other is inferior to the Self (“Othering,” 2015).

**Pacification** – In colonial terms, pacification implies “the enforcement of both military and economic control of a TERRITORY through the establishment of an administrative unit” (Guimarães, 2001, p. 4).

**Place** – In the context of this study and lending conceptual framework from the formulations of Henderson (2009a), the term denotes a geographical locale or space that is given particular meaning as it is constructed through cultural and historical processes attributing it differentiated meaning. Thus, one place as a unit of space is confined by discrete boundaries and relies on the difference from another place. Further, places are subject to continued temporal transformation (Ibid.), which in turn may affect the spatiality and boundaries of places.

**Proxy war** – A proxy may be defined as “a non-state paramilitary group receiving direct assistance from an external power” (Hughes, 2012, p. 11). The fundamental cornerstone of proxy war is indirect interference, as the strategy circumvents the moral risk it entails for a STATE to risk own lives. Instead, a third-party may be used for interventions on behalf of the non-intervening party being part of the proxy war (Mumford, 2013). The relevance of proxy conflicts rests on the fact that there exists external dimensions to many internal conflicts (Hughes, 2012).

**Refugees** - “Individuals or groups who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular group, or political opinion, are outside the country of nationality and are unable or unwilling to return” (Newbold, 2010, p. 256).

**Region** – The term can be, and are in this context, best conceptualized as a geographic area of which its delimitation is based on “socially constructed generalizations” (Henderson, 2009b, p. 630). Here, the definition of a functional or nodal region applies in part, as that is spatially defined by linkages provided by a particular phenomenon (in this case the Kavango River and BORDER alike), but also to that of ‘the new regional geography’ for which “goal was to see the region as a medium and outcome of social practices and relations of power that are operative at multiple spatial and temporal scales” (Henderson, 2009b, p. 631).

**Republic of Namibia** – The formal name of independent Namibia (see SOUTH WEST AFRICA).

**Respondent** - INTERVIEWEE belonging to the focus group, being the Angolan diaspora residing in Rundu. Compare with INFORMANT.

**South West Africa (SWA)** – The name was first used by Swedish explorer Charles John Anderssson as he referred to a territory bordering the Atlantic Ocean, the Kunene River and Orange River. After the Berlin Conference, the territory came to be known as GERMAN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (DSWA) under German colonization, and again South West Africa (SWA) during South African occupation (Tonchi et al., 2012). The UN General Assembly proclaimed in 1969 that the name NAMIBIA should be used for the territory “in accordance with the desire of its people” (as cited in Tonchi et al., 2012, p. 395). There is however no coherent usage of names in the literature as some scholars/authors consistently use Namibia (formally REPUBLIC OF NAMIBIA), whereas others may
use any of the other names (Deutsche Südwestafrika, German South-West Africa, or South West Africa) depending on the context. In this essay, Namibia will be used in general terms, whereas the other terms may be used if more suitable for the context.

**State** – According to Flint (2009a) there is no adequate definition for ‘state’ due to the different forms that states have taken. However, common denominators of different state-structures can be identified as a suite of centralized institutions with law-making, economic and enforcing capacities (i.e. the state apparatus), exerting governing and coercive power over a TERRITORY with defined boundaries (Flint, 2009a, 2009b). The use of local governments is a strategy for the central state to gain legitimacy over the periphery, but may include risks if the local level challenges the central state which would increase regionalism (Flint, 2009). The case of Caprivi may reflect such a situation. The South African governance of South West Africa was regionalized into the designated homelands and thus relatively decentralized compared to the highly centralized Portuguese governance in Angola (Hodges, 2004; Napandulwe Shiweda 2013, interview). Further, states are “normative ideological construction[s]” (Flint, 2009, p. 723) and is only identifiable in relation to other states (Ibid.)

**Stereotype** – According to Pickering, stereotypes may be seen as “one-sided characterizations of others” (2001, p. 47) in which stereotyping is a way of representing THE OTHER. Both processes of stereotyping and ‘OTHERING’ function as a means of the privileged to define, fixate and control other people and CULTURES (Ibid.). Pickering argues that stereotypes usually are considered inaccurate due to the implicit view of stereotyped groups being unchangeably uniform and homogenous, which tie into his broader point of the differences between (social) categories and stereotypes. Categories are according to Pickering a cognitive device for organizing and making sense of the world, which also implicitly calls for these categories to be flexible and changing with the world. Stereotypes however, although having similar functions as categories to organize our cognitive impression of the world, aims at fixating and imposing a world order which does not give room for flexible thinking, all this in favour of the power-structures the stereotypes aims to uphold (Pickering, 2001). For a further development of the concept, see 7.3 Identity and social categories – formed by processes of social construction and politics.

**Territory** – Although the term may denote any “unit of contiguous space that is used, organized and managed by a social group, individual person or institution to restrict and control access to people and places” (Agnew, 2009, p. 746), this study will foremost refer to territory as the spatiality of STATES. In this mode, the territory is the space surrounded by delimited BORDERS within which the state exerts absolute power and control over its subjects (Ibid.).

**Tribalism** – Being a frequently used but seldomly defined term, tribalism semantically refers to either “[t]he condition of existing as a separate tribe or tribes; tribal system, organization or relations”, or “[l]oyalty to a particular tribe or group of which one is a member” (“Tribalism,” 2015). Although the term often occurs in literature relating to the overall theme of this study, it lacks theorization and can best be understood indirectly as negative expressions and assertions of tribes and related concepts such as ETHNICITY and CULTURE in which the own group is favoured at the expense of another, often in relation to politics and resource distribution. As Mhlanga express it, tribalism has a “pejorative ring and retrograde connotations” (2013, p. 58), and although its ambivalent status in academic discourse it is commonly referred to on the ground by Namibian and Angolan people.
5.2 Acronyms and definitions

CCPA  Cuando Cubango Province of Angola. Angolan province on the opposite side of the Angolan-Namibian border from the Kavango regions in Namibia (see Figure 2, p. 5). Was a UNITA-controlled territory (Polack, 2013) under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi from the 1980s to his death (Brinkman, 1999).

DTA  Democratic Turnhalle Alliance, oppositional party in Namibia. Prior to independence, DTA “represented local actors in favour of close collaboration with the South African government” (Melber, 2009, p. 465). DTA have had its majority of sympathy from white and coloured voters (Keulder, 2000).

FAA  “Forças Armadas Angolanas, Angolan Armed Forces, the new Angolan government army formed on the eve of the UN-observerd general election in September 1992” (Maier, 2007, p. 7).

FALA  “Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola, Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola, UNITA’s army” (Maier, 2007, p. 7).

FAPLA  “Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola, The People’s Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola. Initially the armed wing of MPLA, FAPLA became the name of the Angolan armed forces after 1975 and was renamed after the 1991 Bicess Accord to FAA (Forças Armadas Angolanas) (Hughes, 2012).

FNLA  “Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, National Front for the Liberation of Angola, one of three nationalist groups which fought for independence; leader, Holden Roberto” (Maier, 2007, p. 8).

MHAI  Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration, Republic of Namibia.

MPLA  “Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola, the governing party: leader, José Eduardo dos Santos” (Maier, 2007, p. 8).

NDF  Namibia Defence Force, created in 1990 from the former members of PLAN, SWATF and Koevoet (Tonchi et al., 2012).

PCA  “Partido Comunista Angolano”, The Angolan Communist Party.

PLAN  People’s Liberation Army of Namibia. Military wing of SWAPO, formed in 1970 as part of the increased militarization of the movement (Tonchi et al., 2012).

RDP  Rally for Democracy and Progress, oppositional political party in Namibia. RDP was formed in 2007 as a response to political stagnation (The Rally For Democracy & Progress, 2014), and emerged from within SWAPO (Melber, 2011a, p. 84).

SADC  Southern African Development Community is a regional economic community established in 1992, with the main objectives to promote regional integration, poverty eradication, economic development and to ensure peace and security for the 15 member states (Southern African Development Community, 2012).

SFF  Namibian Special Field Force, paramilitary border police comprised by foremost former PLAN-combatants (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). Formed in 1999 it has a history of several cases of abuse in its early history (Tonchi et al., 2012).

SADF  South African Defence Force. Attained a higher profile in Namibian from the 1960s and onwards due to the increased activity of SWAPO and PLAN. Main objectives were to defeat SWAPO forces and protect SA:n and SWA:n borders from Angolan and Cuban hostilities (Tonchi et al., 2012).

SWA  South West Africa, the name of Namibia before independence in 1990. Whether SWA or Namibia is used, is dependent on which time an event took place; events before independence is referred to have taken place in SWA and after independence in Namibia.
SWATF South West Africa Territorial Force. In the 1970s, SADF under SA rule formed ethnic units of black Namibians that were recruited to SWATF in order to fight SWAPO (Tonchi et al., 2012). SWATF came to comprise both black and white soldiers and have allegedly been reputed for the maltreatment of civilians. Parts of the combatants were assimilated into NDF (Ibid.).


SWAPO SWAPO Party of Namibia, formerly South West Africa People’s Organization. The main Namibian independence movement and since 1990 the ruling party (“SWAPO Party of Namibia,” 2015). Sam Nujoma was up to 2007 the former leader of SWAPO and the first president of independent Namibia (1990-2005) (“Sam Nujoma,” 2015). Successor Hifikepunye Pohamba was the second Namibian president (2005-2015) and president of SWAPO (2007) (“Hifikepunye Pohamba,” 2015). Present president of SWAPO and Namibia alike is Hage Geingob, the first non-Ovambo having been chosen for these positions (Saunders, 2015). SWAPO has strong sympathies within the Oshiwambo-speaking group (Keulder, 2000), and is by many seen as an Ovambo-party (Henning Melber 2013, interview; Phil Ya Nangoloh 2013, interview).

UNITA União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. UNITA was the armed opposition movement headed by Jonas Malheiro Savimbi (Maier, 2007) and having its supporter base among the ethnolinguistic groups of Ovimbundu and Chokwe residing in central and southern Angola (“UNITA,” 2015).
6 Methodology

6.1 Philosophic perspective and scientific approach

The study draws on critical human geography, in that the research scope falls within questions of culture and representation; that the study uses multiple theoretical wells; and aims at unmasking power-relations and how space can be used as a tool of power (Blomley, 2009). Further, as to be noted in the following section (see 7 Theoretical framework), this study and critical human geography alike lacks a “distinctive theoretical identity” (Hubbard et al., 2004, p. 62) and is committed “to expose the socio-spatial processes that (re)produce inequalities between people and places” (Ibid.). The study embraces stands of holism, positionality and reflexivity, adopting mixed methods but with an emphasis on qualitative ones as outlined by England (2006). As implicit in qualitative research, the study aims at achieving a “[h]olistic understanding of complex processes” (Mayoux, 2006, p. 117) by using informal interviews, open-ended scope and questions, and “[i]nductive causal inference from detailed systematic analysis of patterns of difference and similarly between the various accounts and case studies” (Ibid.). Positionality comes forth as a particularly relevant element as much in the theoretical underpinnings of this study as in the execution of empirical and literature research, data handling and analysis (see section 6.4.3). The study thus recognizes how knowledge making is situated; being a product of the situatedness of both the author as a researcher and the participants of the study in terms of differences in experiences depending on social, intellectual and spatial locus (England, 2006). In so doing, it rejects the traditional notion of science as disembodied objectivity (Barnes, 2009b) although it does recognise and utilize the idea of social construction. A process of reflexivity in which questions of “who we are, what we know, how we come to know it” (Aitken & Valentine, 2006, p. 341) have thus permeated the scientific approach. As Barnes argues, “the spirit of hermeneutical enquiry” (2009a, p. 329) comes forth in the philosophical perspective of critical human geography, as it both recognize the importance of interpretation and reflexivity.

6.2 Chosen methods

The broad definition of the chosen methodology is being a case study as the conducted research aims at being a detailed investigation focusing on the lived experiences of individuals from a particular group (Barnard & Spencer, 2002), letting these epitomize a complex set of processes thus bridging theories and the social world (Chari, 2009). However, as the term is somewhat of a “definitional morass” (Gerring, 2006, p. 17) possibly entailing a number of methodologies and types of data (McGregor, 2006), the following sections will further outline how this case study has been conducted. The study contains features of both inductive and deductive research, since it is partly based on previous research (Danielsson & Hernodh, 2012) which was constructed on theories and the development of a hypothesis prior to data collection, and which outcome laid the foundation for the research ideas and questions posed within this study. However, this study also carries traits of inductive research as data was collected with a relatively open scope to begin with, letting the research questions evolve and be determined as important features for the identity making process of the focus group came forth through the interviews and the literature research. Thereafter, theoretical lenses were chosen for analysis amongst a greater number of theories that by the initiation of the study had been posed as potentially relevant ones.
The study aims at a holistic methodology, taking into consideration a variety of variables and connections (Gummesson, 2004) where the personal experiences and views of the respondents of the focus group is connected to the cultural and ethnic (including ethnolinguistic) mosaic of the region as well as historical and political dimensions on different spatial and temporal scales. It comprises of both empirical data analysis and a literature review including a wide range of sources (see 6.3 Data collection and sampling methods). The study is primarily qualitative by nature as the empirical research relies on oral methods being qualitative semi-structured open-ended interviews in order to investigate different aspects of the questions posed. This approach to empirical data collection was applied both in terms of interviews with respondents of the focus group being the Angolan diaspora in Rundu, and informants of the Namibian reference group in Rundu. Interviews with other informants were conducted in Windhoek and Rundu (Namibia) and Sweden with historians, academics, officials and representatives of organizations in order to acquire information regarding the historical and contemporary development of the border region. The primary data harvesting was accompanied by a literature review and archival research for the purpose of collecting secondary data, including both qualitative and quantitative material.

6.3 Data collection and sampling methods

6.3.1 Primary data

Primary data collection was carried out through interviews with informants\(^3\) such as academics and other relevant persons in Uppsala and Stockholm (Sweden), Windhoek and Rundu (Namibia) during different occasions in February to May 2013. Interviews with the focus group, being respondents\(^4\) of Angolan origin, were conducted in April and May 2013 in Rundu. Further, a series of interviews with Namibian citizens in Rundu were conducted during the same time period to be used as informants as well as reference group, against which the focus group was compared. This was done as the research topic implicitly demands comparisons between Angolans and Namibians, despite the study not being a comparative study per se. The study applied non-probability sampling, using snowball, judgemental/purposive and accidental sampling. The translators were used as gate openers and researchers of potentially interesting interviewees\(^5\). Further snowballing, being common practice in qualitative methodology (England, 2006), were used among the interviewees in order to acquire contact with other relevant subjects of a particular background. For all of the interviews, notes were taken either on computer (mostly for interviews with academics and officials) or by hand (mostly for fieldwork interviews with civilians of the focus and reference groups). Part of the interviews was also recorded after the given permission of the respective interviewee. A number of interviews were conducted together with Ninja Hernodh, as our respective studies are sprung from a common C-level essay and study conducted in 2011 (see Danielsson & Hernodh, 2012) and our research interests therefore partly eclipse. For interviews of lesser importance for one of us, the other functioned primarily as a research assistant focusing on taking notes. All of the interviews were transcribed for which all available material (i.e. recordings and notes) were used. By this technique, most of potential uncertainties could be eliminated via triangulation.

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\(^3\) Informant – Any person interviewed for the purpose of acquiring information on the subject matter and not being a respondent.

\(^4\) Respondent – Interviewee belonging to the focus group, being the Angolan diaspora residing in Rundu.

\(^5\) Interviewee – Term referring to both respondents and informants.
6.3.2 Secondary data
Secondary data includes a literature review on the theoretical scope of border studies, migration, identity making and social categories; research on the history and geopolitical development of the border region, Angola and Namibia; and relevant statistical information. Large parts of this inquiry rests on literature research carried out at multiple institutions and organizations, being the libraries of the Nordic Africa Institute, Stockholm University, the Anna Lindh library of the Foreign Policy Institute and National Defence School in Sweden; at the National Archive, National Library and the archive of Namrights in Windhoek, Namibia; and at University of Cape Town in South Africa.

6.4 Method critique, quality of data and sources of error

6.4.1 Sampling methods and data analysis
As the study is a nonprobability sampling case study using gate openers and snowballing, the selection of interview subjects need specific attention. The advantage of these techniques are that interviewees directly relate to the research topic as they are purposefully selected (England, 2006), and that the level of trust between interviewer and interviewee tend to be higher if the researcher has been introduced to the interviewee by someone they know. Snowballing also proved an effective method to find relevant subjects as using the social network provided background information on potential interviewees, and mostly facilitated a certain level of initial trust between the interviewee and me as a researcher. However, some interviewees declined or did not have the possibility to participate in interviews. The disadvantage is a potentially skewed selection with a frame population not necessarily representative of the target population. This effect was also enhanced by the fact that students, pensioners, homemakers and unemployed were overrepresented groups as they were in general more available for interviews, compared to the working part of the population. The interview data was further limited in terms of representation of different Angolan ethnolinguistic and tribal groups. It is unclear how well the distribution of ethnolinguistic and tribal belonging among the respondents represents the Angolan diaspora in Rundu. According to the translator however, a great part of the Angolan refugees in Kavango came from southern Angola which is where many Ovimbundus reside (Natanael 2013, interview). Thus, under coverage is likely due to this possible discrepancy between target population and frame population. However, as the study has a qualitative approach and is based on individual narratives, it does not aim at a quantitative analysis predicating the experiences of the whole target population. Rather, the narratives of lived experiences of subjects from the target group were put at centre for analysis. Further, selection and data analysis did not imply strict categorization of respondents in terms of social categories such as gender, age and ethnicity, even though the selection of respondents was aiming at getting a variety of those categories. Therefore, no reliable and generalized conclusions can be made based on these criteria; although visible trends in the material are discussed as they become apparent, most notably as migrant cohort analysis emerged as being relevant as an investigation of time-specific conditions that proved crucial for answering the major questions. Triangulation was used for both interview situations through posing a variety of questions to secure information, and in terms of methodology by comparing primary data from respondents and informants with various secondary data such as journal articles, literature, statistics of various kinds, reports and official documents.
As for secondary data, triangulation proved necessary due to conflicting data among different sources (see the next section 6.4.2 Reliability, validity and interviews as method). The research and interviews at Namrights proved fruitful as that organization was observing and documenting local activities in Namibia along the Angolan-Namibian border during the Angolan civil war, of which there is little documentation elsewhere. According to Werner Hillebrecht, who at the time of the interviews was the Head of Archives at National Archives of Namibia, most of the documentation regarding Bantustans and regulations of border control was never recovered from local administrative offices as the South African personnel left and the new independent government seized power (Werner Hillebrecht 2013, interview). Hillebrecht stated that the new government had at first a centrally run administration that gave little attention to the legacy of previous local apartheid-run administrations. It is unclear whether this was done by purpose or by ignorance in regard of the value of such documentation, but very little was retrieved by the National Archive that at the time of independence lacked the capacity to administrate and contain such material (Werner Hillebrecht 2013, interview). Thus, little original documentation is preserved regarding the border control and events taking place along the border. Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview) at Namrights confirms that there is little information on how rules of border regulation has been implemented, and states that most evidence of that kind is circumstantial. However, according to historian Jeremy Silvester the South African apartheid administration kept copies of military records in both South Africa and in Namibia so what has been lost in Namibia may exist in South Africa. To gain access to such material is however a very time-consuming and complicated process (Jeremy Silvester 2013, interview). Further, what exists is mostly written in Afrikaans, which required translation and resources not available within the scope of this study. Therefore, the study has mostly relied on oral accounts from interviewees regarding related issues, and must be considered as relatively incomplete and potentially erroneous.

6.4.2 Reliability, validity and interviews as method

It is difficult to judge the accuracy of the information given by the interviewees, and there have been instances where it has been obvious that respondents of Angolan origin have not given accurate information out of fear. However, snowballing might have increased reliability as using social networks seemed to heighten the level of trust between interviewer and interviewee. Due to the choice of using open ended research questions and a holistic approach, the validity of the material was at first difficult to judge. In retrospect however, it seems as if much of the collected data was relevant, either directly or indirectly to the posed research question. As pointed out by Gregor Dobler (2013, interview) however, it proved less effective to merely directly ask the interviewees of the focus and reference group of their views and sentiments in regard of identity and identity formation. Rather, answers to questions regarding identity was only a minor part of the collected material as identity is always shaped within physical and social settings shaped by specific circumstances and conditions. Therefore, the material collected on circumstances such as historical development and living conditions dominated the interviews and collected material in order to find out what may have been dominant conditions for identity formation. As this may indeed include a wide array of conditions and indicators, the validity of the material had to be tested in an iterative writing process where different facts were included and excluded as they were tested against the overall research questions.
The answers of ordinary citizens were anonymised and all interviewees were informed of this practice at the beginning of each interview. This was done out of aspects of personal integrity and safety, as certain information asked for was of a sensitive nature. Even though some interview subjects seemed to get reassured by this practice, the potential of acquiring unreliable data cannot be underestimated and there were a couple of cases where misinformation was detected. These cases were discovered by comparing the interview results with other interviews or literature, but despite this practice to discover pitfalls of this nature there is a risk of the data being inconsistent in terms of reliability. The most probable reason for this stated misinformation was fear among interviewees in regard of their legal status in Namibia and in relation to Namibian authorities such as Ministry of Home Affairs and Immigration (MHAII). There were instances where potential subjects declined interviews allegedly suspecting the research being part of operations conducted by foreign intelligence. This in turn indicates that the experiences and fear of foreign intervention seem still be very much alive with some of the older subjects. Further, the influence of translation, power-relations and the interviewer effect must be considered. Positionality hence emerges as a crucial consideration when using interviews as method. Within the question of positionality come not only aspects of researcher biases pertaining to culture (me as a westerner), gender (me as a woman), socioeconomic background (me as a relatively wealthy and educated foreigner) and scope (western, cultural and gendered biases), but also my limited knowledge and understanding of the subject matter as a western student, which is exemplified by the confusion regarding tribes, accounted for below (see 6.4.3 The Ovimbundu/Umbundu/Mbundu/Ambundu/Kimbundu/Chimbundu-confusion. These aspects thus confirm the notion of situated knowledge, and further calls for a humble approach as the phenomenon of white westerners aiming at studying and categorizing Africans are burdened by a legacy justifiably criticised by post-colonial theory.

6.4.3 The Ovimbundu/Umbundu/Mbundu/Ambundu/Kimbundu/Chimbundu-confusion

The terminology used for Angola’s two major ethnolinguistic groups Ovimbundu and Mbundu is confusing due to semantics and terminological usage. The terminology denoting the ethnolinguistic group, tribes and language of these groups are interchangeably used to describe belonging to any of these categories. Subsequently when for example asking the interviewee about their ethnic or tribal belonging, it was common among respondents to use terminology referring to any of the terms denoting tribe, ethnic group or language. The problem can be illustrated as follows. The literature on the topic often refers to the largest ethnic group in Angola as the Ovimbundu, but the majority of residents of Rundu would use the name of the language (Umbundu) or the tribe (Chimbundu) when asked about their ethnic origin. As the Ovimbundu prior to colonization were organized into 13 kingdoms (Minorities at Risk, 2006b) and had been known to absorb smaller tribes (van der Waal, 2011), it was not clear to me as a researcher what was referred to or to what degree these different groupings or categories eclipsed. Further confusion was added due to inconsistencies in some of the empirical research as well as the literature when groups were to be related to one another and further was denoted by these various ways of naming them.

Another area of possible errors was due to semantics. When pronounced, Umbundu (the languages of the Ovimbundu ethnic group and the largest of the Angolan ethnolinguistic groups alike) can sound very similar to Mbundu (the second largest of the Angolan ethnolinguistic groups). Mbundu may further be referred to as Ambundu (one sub-group or tribe of the Mbundu), which in turn may sounds similar to Umbundu (the language of the Ovimbundu group). Mbundu may further be referred to as Kimbundu (the language of the Mbundu), that in turn was at some point mistaken by me for being
Chimbundu (a sub-group or tribe of the Ovimbundu). Further, the matter of how names of tribes and languages has been transcribed (i.e. spelled in English) in the literature was another issue, as the names of ethnic groups, tribes and languages may vary depending on who is talking about a specific group and in which language. This also applied when an interviewee spoke English, as interviewees would still often use a name for a specific group in the way it is denoted in their language. This particularly applied to Namibian categorizations. For example, Kavango can also be named Okavango (according to my understanding if pronounced by an Ovambo/Oshiwambo-speaking person as it is common to add an O to certain words), and similarly Ovambo may be referred to as Ambo. The English literature is also using different variants, although some terms may be more common than others. This combined with the above mentioned situation in which interviewees and the literature may use the name of an ethnic group, a language or a sub-group or tribe when referring to a category of people, catered for more confusion and difficulties to sometimes distinguish what was referred to.

Uncertainties regarding the data were dealt with by mapping out the various ethnolinguistic groups and all of the related terminology in regard to names used for the group, its tribes and language (see Appendix B Tables of ethnolinguistic groups and tribes). However, when comparing the data to the literature on the topic, it proved to be a challenge as much literature did not define the usage of the words creating a potential source of error as the term could denote different things. Some literature also proved to contain what seemed to be erroneous or unclear usage of the terms and attributed information. At first, this was aimed to be overcome by triangulation; that is by comparing any information with other information on the same topic, be it empirical research or secondary information via literature research. However, this proved less satisfying as this process often just provided more inconsistencies and added to the confusion. Thus, contradictory information is inserted in Appendix B as it was difficult to judge which information was more correct.

Another interrelated issue is the question of how closely related ethnic subgroups were to each other. In the case of Namibian ethnic groups and tribes, the issue is a little more straightforward or at least better documented, whereas this is not the case when it comes to some Angolan tribes as ethnic, cultural and linguistic traits may or may not converge and the literature on the topic is limited (see the discussion on tribes and the reference to Brinkman in section 10.1.3 Independence struggle, native territories and ethnic separation. The situation thus raised questions of how these categorizations were made in the first place, and the results suggest that there may be various ways in which this has happened in the past as well as in the present. The problem has indeed historical roots, discussed earlier by other academics (see Brinkman, 1999, pp. 422–424; Wallace, 2011, pp. 12–13; Winterfeldt, 2002, pp. 227–238) and is further touched upon in this study. Interestingly enough, these seemingly semantic problems have their roots in the main topic of the essay; by which criteria are these ethnolinguistic groups defined, by whom, at what time and for what purpose? To answer these questions; the criteria have by large sprung from western research on the topic as it dominates the field, which is certainly problematic for many reasons: the research for this study has been carried out by me being a white western student with limited initial knowledge within the field; the research has been carried out in a time that could be described as both an aftermath of decolonization and an era of neo-colonization; and the purpose is at a Bachelor’s level gain knowledge within a classic academic field that has been preoccupying anthropologists and historians as well as human and political geographers for decades.
Hence, my work indeed echoes that of former westerners who in academic, political, religious or other contexts has previously studied, organized, categorized, labelled and aimed at understanding and organizing peoples outside of their own geographical and cultural context and doing so often trying to make various African realities fit into neat European or Western constructions or ideologies of social categories. It can therefore be argued that the outcome of the colonial ambition of categorizing local populations has been a pervasive process which is still echoed in this study. There are many potential pitfalls, such as Collelo refers to in terms of “the naming process and the tendency to treat the named people as a discrete entity distinct from all others” (Collelo, 1991, p. 66). Therefore, this issue lies at heart of this study. Aware of some of these pitfalls; humbled by those not discovered; and somewhat daunted by parts of the historical legacy of this practice; it should be stated that the results for this matter is by no means conclusive and may in part be erroneous. Given time constraints of the field work the possibility to further investigate this issue was limited, and combined with my ignorance of the complexity of the above mentioned semantics, I as a researcher did not ask the necessary follow-up questions to safeguard ambiguity. Thus Haraway indeed seems to have a valid point in her argument that all knowledge is embodied, partial and thus situated (as discussed by Barnes, 2009b, p. 684) and certainly do not reflect an impartial “gaze from nowhere” (1988, p. 581). Instead, knowledge making is a process that is created as a result of the studied matter and the student/scientist, which thus may take many forms.
7 Theoretical framework

7.1 Borders and boundaries – moving towards a theory?

In the last decades and in the era of increased globalization and transnational connections, studies of borders, boundaries and frontiers have grown to a significant plethora covering an array of geographical space and academic fields. Thus, being intrinsically disciplinary multifaceted, the front of border studies is conducted within anthropology, social studies, geography and history amongst other (Sidaway, 2011), and hence comprise a collective body of work that transcend disciplinary boundaries. This provides a dynamic field rich in potential academic tools, but also a maze of connected but also possibly contradictory theories and terminologies. (Just note the different use of the concepts of borders and boundaries between anthropology and geography discussed by Van Houtum (2005), which suggest the challenges of this endeavour.) In this essay, the connection between the concepts of border, boundary, identity, nation and nation state is at focus, although it inevitably touches upon related concepts such as frontiers, transnationalism, globalization and hybridity.

When juxtaposing the concepts of border and boundary, the conceptual distinction between the two easily gets blurred as the words are often used in parallel sense (Paasi, 2009b). The border concept has come to be gradually associated with the boundaries of the modern nation-state (Sparke, 2009a), meanwhile the boundary concept may pertain to physical or imaginary lines of states along with a broader realm of boundaries relating to symbols of social practices and academic discourses (Paasi, 2009b). In so, boundaries may mark borders between nation-states or other political zones, but they may also be markers of racial, religious, sexual and cultural boundaries, that is, regulative power relations (Sparke, 2009c), hence existing as both external and internal entities. “In other words, international boundary lines actively operate to create and consolidate the global norms of nation-state territoriality and the national identities forged under the resulting aegis of state sovereignty” (Anssi Paasi, 1996, referenced and put in the words of Sparke, 2009c, p. 55). However, as shall be accounted for below, borders are also theorized as institution and a social process. Moreover, the border concept has gradually exchanged the frontier concept (see 5.1 Concepts and definitions) and therefore frontiers are of less relevance to the theoretical scope of this essay.

Some scholars are proponents of conceptualising borders as being both expressed and formulated by state power, but also understood as social constructs, defined by the lived experiences by those who live in the borderlands and those who cross them; i.e. borders theorized as both institution and process (Anderson, 1996, cited in Donnan & Wilson, 1999 and Brambilla, 2007; Anssi Paasi, 1996, cited in Brambilla, 2007). As institution, borders are expressed as the markers that delimit the state and implicitly its sovereignty and citizens (Anderson, 1996, cited in Donnan & Wilson, 1999) hence reflecting a macro-perspective of state construction in terms of institutional, juridical and territorial limits (Brambilla, 2007). As a process, borders may have many different functions ranging from being instruments of state policy, markers of identity and especially the national identity (and political identity alike) of the modern state (Anderson, 1996, cited in Donnan & Wilson, 1999). As a process the border may also work in a micro-perspective in which it “produce distinctions between social groups and are at the same time produced by them” (Brambilla, 2007, p. 35). This in turn gives rise to a paradoxical relationship in which borders both separate social groups and communities and at the
same time mediate contact between them (Barth, 1969, cited in Brambilla 2007). The community-border relationship is often described as dichotomous where the border either reinforces the effect of division or bridges the international boundary depending on if the culture, that is language, ethnicity and socio-economic conditions, is shared or not (Reitel et al., 2002, cited in Brunet-Jailly, 2005).

The notion of borders as institution and process is also distinguishable in Mechlinski’s research that recognizes borders “as both formulations of state power, and lived-experiences of those crossing them” (2010, p. 96). In his research which examines the relation between borders and migration in an African context, Mechlinski aims at developing a theoretical approach based on the relationship between culture, border and border crossing as a social processes, and how social categories operate at borders (2010). In doing so, he gives a relevant account on Balibar (2002) who has focused on developing a border theory as a reaction against the simplification of the border concept to merely representing a line between territorial entities. According to Balibar, a border cannot be attributed an essence “valid in all places and at all times, for all physical scales and time periods, and which would be included in the same way in all individual and collective experience” (2002, p. 75). Thus Balibar recognizes the equivocal character of borders. According to him they are both expressions and products of nation-states, and internalized by their subjects thus becoming an essential reference to a collective communal sense and hence identity. With this reference to Balibar, and aiming at remedy the poor theoretical bridge between migration and borders, Mechlinski concludes that a “theorization of the border in African contexts could lead to a better understanding of the lives of mobile people in Africa” (2010, p. 102).

This sheds light on the major academic discourse within border studies on the possibilities and limitations of the theorization of borders. In geography, border studies were for a long time a descriptive field (Péter Balogh 2013, interview). Political geographers such as Jones and Prescott argued that since boundaries are unique the meaning of generalization is questionable (Prescott, 1965). Since the 1990s and the collapse of the Cold War, border studies have undergone a renaissance (Paasi, 2011b; Sidaway, 2011), and since the burgeoning literature on border research have seen a shift from context-bound studies to those exploring the possibility of a border theory (or theories); a trend again countered by yet another strand moving away from this kind of theorization. Border research has thus been described as being “trapped in the dilemma of whether to concentrate on situated knowledge or instead build on a more general bordering (and ordering) theory” (Jukarainen, 2006, p. 473). Or to put it in the words of Gregor Dobler (2013, interview): “My perception of this debate is to be a bit polemic, that political geography for a long time has forgotten theory, and then replaced this with forgetting empirical data”.

Brunet-Jailly, one of the advocates of a common border theory, suggests such a theory grounded “in the work of border scholars from a variety of social science disciplines” (Brunet-Jailly, 2005). This theory provides different analytical lenses with which to understand borders, being local culture, the political clout of borderland communities, market forces and governmental policy activities (Brunet-Jailly, 2005). With this framework, Brunet-Jailly argues that by empirically comparing borders with these lenses, the result will provide an escape from the views of borders as inherently unique and that no border-theory will withstand falsification (Brunet-Jailly, 2005). Brunet-Jailly further indicates a need to develop the discipline to go beyond borders as they have traditionally been conceptualized pertaining to territorialist and geopolitical policy traditions (Brunet-Jailly, 2011). Along these lines, Rumford has theorized that the ‘spatial turn’ within social sciences has connected border studies centrally within social theory. Thus, theorization of borders and processes of bordering and debordering presuppose investigation of the “nature of the social” (2006, p. 155), that is social and political change. By this, border work is not exclusive to the nation-state. He further argues that the
new globalized world has both lead to a process of debordering associated to the concept of a ‘borderless world’, and the subsequent reaction of rebordering as the existence of ‘open’ or porous borders have made many nation-states worry of losing control of various kinds of migration and refugee flows (2006).

Others have more recently moved away from the notions of an all-encompassing border theory. Newman for example, that once called for solid holistic theorization of borders and boundaries applicable on different scales that would “enable us to understand the process of ‘bounding’ and ‘bordering’ rather than simply the compartmentalized outcome of the various social and political processes” (Newman, 2003, p. 135), now levitates towards a sceptical position and suggests that “[p]erhaps borders are too diverse and varied for a single model to be applied, not least given the vastly different empirical understandings of what constitutes a border as perceived by an anthropologist, a geographer or an expert in International Relations, respectively” (2011, pp. 43–44). Sidaway concurs by stating that “[t]he idea of a general border theory is probably a chimera”, but further underlines the importance of borders within “wider social and political theory” (2011, p. 974). Paasi joins this choir of the sceptical, formulating the question that has emerged as whether a “border theory [is] a realistic aim, an unattainable ideal or perhaps something that is not needed at all, as the empiricist tradition of political geography implied?” (2011b, p. 12). For Paasi, a border theory would challenge the situated knowledge of social science. An all-encompassing border theory is for him thus problematic, not so much because borders are unique, but because the theorization of borders is dependent on “a broader effort towards social-cultural theory, and this in turn would again be context-bound” (Paasi, 2009a, p. 223).

Newman argues that “most borders, by their very definition, create binary distinctions between the here and there, the us and them, the included and the excluded” (2011, p. 44). This function of borders makes them also interrelated to processes of identity making. As discussed by Donnan and Wilson in their standard piece “Borders: Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State” (1999), the relation of borders and identity is not only being expressed as borders being symbols and locations of changes that occur in the state apparatus, but also their agents (Donnan & Wilson, 1999, p. 4). Arguing from an anthropological standpoint, Donnan and Wilson identify ethnicity and national identity as fundamental forces active by all state borders which thus challenges and threatens many states as such identities are rooted in historical territories or homelands (Donnan & Wilson, 1999). At the same time, border identities may also be ambiguous as border residents may be pulled in two directions (Wilson & Donnan, 2012). Coplan discusses the interplay of porosity and negotiability of borders in an African context, connecting this to the “seemingly friability of African national states and their lack of a unified, popularly rooted social identity” (2010, p. 1). Both Coplan (2010) and Bakewell (2015) comment the widespread conception of African borders being arbitrary and artificial as they were colonial constructs that cut through self-identified precolonial groups that ended up being border residents, who subsequently gave little legitimacy to the border. However, both seem to deny this position as still valid, arguing that African borders have today gained acceptance and are actively reproduced by borderlanders (Coplan, 2010) as the social contract between borderlanders and the state is negotiated (Bakewell, 2015). However, Coplan (2010) argues that African borderlanders have greater self-justification and a common border identity, making the state border less of a dividing boundary.
7.2 Migration and diasporas

Migration studies are intimately and inseparably connected to that of border studies, and so are concepts such as diaspora, nationality and citizenship. Yet, borders and their effects have for long been a neglected area within classical migration theory, which calls for attention to the work done on borders within other disciplines (Mechlinski, 2010). Further, the traditional categorization of migration has recently been critiqued within critical geography as migrants have been recognized to consider a number of factors prior to the decision to move, thus challenging the traditional distinctions in which migration is defined as either forced or voluntary, legal or illegal, and temporary or permanent (Bailey, 2001; Castles and Miller 2003; cited in Hiebert, 2009). Frayne and Pendleton (2001b) have applied both macro and micro variables in their study of migration in Namibia, arguing that macro factors such as political history, population dynamics, disasters such as war, economics and culture are crucial dimensions to understand micro processes such as life histories and motivators which make up the personal circumstance that in turn impact the decision making of migration. Thus, they wish to expand the theoretical approach of migration studies, moving away from the traditional strands of migration theory in advocacy of a multidisciplinary approach and combined methodology for migration research and case studies on migration (Frayne & Pendleton, 2001b).

As Westin and Hassanen argue, “[t]he nation state as a geo-politically defined territory with distinctly defined borders has been central to conceptions and discourses on migration” (2014b, p. 23), as it has created a context in which human relocation is conceptualized into categories such as IDPs versus refugees and internal versus international migration (Ibid.). According to Bakewell (2002), the nation-state logic further dictates that people have a judicial as well as an emotional attachment to their country, of which the latter sentiment is not easily reproduced on another territory. Thus, repatriation has been presented as the optimal solution to refugee problems, and the cure to situations in which refugees are conceptualised as stereotypical homesick, powerless and exposed subjects to circumstance. Bakewell however, who has studied Angolan refugees in Zambia, contends this notion as his results suggest that repatriation may be seen as yet another form of migration rather than a return to normality (Bakewell, 2002).

Migration is a relevant field of enquiry to geography due to its connection to the development of and relationship between places (Skeldon, 1997; Black, 1998; cited in Hiebert, 2009c). So are studies focusing on the concept of transnationalism, which at large is used to describe processes of transcendence of the nation-state (Kearney, 1995), and “phenomena in which the cultural or territorial boundaries of the nation and/or the regulatory apparatuses of the state are crossed or contested” (Mitchell, 2009, p. 772). Studies on the interrelationship of borders, places, migration and transnationalism suggest that container concepts such as place, nation and identity do not suffice in their conceptualization of national communities and identities, which are rather to be considered transnational communities and identities (Ernste, van Houtum, & Zoomers, 2009). According to this school of thought, “[m]igrants develop transnational identities which question traditional notions of distinct national belonging” (Castles & Miller, 1998, p. xii, as cited in Ada Uwakweh, 2014, p. 3). The transnational view on migration does however not imply abandoning the notion of the nation state as a means of identification, but rather to challenge and reinterpret its traditional meaning based on transcendence of “geographic, cultural and political borders” (Westin & Hassanen, 2014a, p. 27).
The concept of diaspora has traditionally been associated with forced migration, but has in the last couple of decades gained wider conceptual grounds to also encompass other types of transnational migration with subsequent notions of transnational connections and attachments (Blunt, 2009). Further, diaspora can be conceptualized as a mode categorization or a process, in which the former may refer to labels such as diasporas as victims or labour, whereas the latter theorize along the lines of other concepts such as identity, culture and space (Blunt, 2009). Further, the conceptualization of diasporas have shifted from that of victimized refugees to “global forces which shape the interaction and the interdependencies between countries, regions and continents” (Laakso & Hautaniemi, 2014, p. 2).

7.3 Identity and social categories – formed by processes of social construction and politics

The concept of identity is intertwined with those of social categories and processes of social construction, difference, culture, ethnicity, nationality, stereotyping and othering. The examination of identity must begin by examination of the self, such as is done in social psychology. Stets and Burk have called attention upon the “need to establish a general theory of the self, which can attend to both macro and micro processes” (2000, p. 224) and further argues this can be done by combining identity theory and social identity theory. In both, the self is conceptualized as reflexive as it is able to perceive itself as an object that can be categorized. Via this identification or self-categorization into different social categories, identity formation takes place, largely due to comparison in which perceived similarities and differences are identified with so called in-group and out-group members respectively. In identity theory, the basis of identity is the role (what one does) whereas in social identity theory, identity relies on the group (who one is) (Stets & Burke, 2000). Stets and Burke however, argue that “being and doing are both central features of one’s identity” (2000, p. 234), thus both acknowledging the individual’s position and agency. By that, the group, the role and the person, as expressed in social processes ranging from macro- to micro-level, are considered as constituent parts of the formation of a person’s identities.

A crucial element of the construction of social categories is the concept of difference, as “socio-spatial boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are produced on the basis of categories” (Secor, 2009a, p. 159). Thus, it emerges as particularly relevant to illuminate aspects of the geographical discourse on difference in relation to border and migration studies and the creation of identity in various spaces and places, as “[s]patial practices such as [segregation] and the [policing] of [borders] work to enforce and consolidate difference” (Secor, 2009a). McKittrick and Peake (2005) argues that difference is central to both ‘Geography’ as a discipline, and ‘geography’ as in place and space which may be expressed as sites of G/geographic inclusion and exclusion. In terms of the discipline Geography, the Anglo-American tradition has been known to express difference via inclusion of western white men, and the exclusion of women and the non-west. In terms of geography as space and place, these are conceptualized as “material and conceptual spatialization of difference” (K. McKittrick & Peake, 2005, p. 39). To McKittrick and Peake, difference is understood through socially produced markers such as race, class and so on, and as their associated geographies such as colonial, post-colonial and cross-cultural ones, which in turn perpetuates social differences.
The categorization and division of people into groups may be based on criteria pertaining to notions of culture, ethnicity or nationality. Culture, allegedly being one of the most influential but complex words in the English language and concepts within science alike, cannot be reduced to a single meaning due to the vast variation of usage. Thus, culture should rather be conceptualized as a process and not an entity (Barnett, 2009); a process which ultimately relies on as many contexts as it refers to. For Pickering (2001) it is the cultural experience that generates identity as it creates a sense of similarity and belonging between those who share the same culture. Cultural belonging is not single-handed however, and people shift between different cultural worlds and social milieux. He further argues that nationalism has deeply shaped our sense of belonging, as the literal boundaries around nations are defined by symbolic boundaries. Thus, Pickering (2001) acknowledges how territories and boundaries indirectly inform our identities once they are symbolically defined. In this sense nations manifest their existence through creating national identities through symbolic differences, i.e. national stereotypes, and thus a sense of national belonging. Or as Lundén argues; most modern states aim at making their citizens forming a “nation”, as in identifying with the territorial state, because that is essential to the state project (Lundén, 2009). With the dominance of nationalism as collective association and belonging, it has profoundly altered the way in which we understand people and cultures, in turn producing and reproducing stereotypes that confirm notions of ‘us’, ‘them’ and the ‘Others’ who are excluded from the community of ‘our’ nation (Pickering, 2001). Stereotyping, as defined by Pickering (2001) should however not be considered an interchangeable term nor process to that of social categorization. Although both are tools to conceptualize the world, the former presuppose rigidity of the subjects it aims describing, whereas the latter allows flexibility.

The European concept of the nation-state was founded on the idea of ethnic homogeneity (Hiebert, 2009b), which had bearing on colonial rule in Africa. The conceptualization of African ethnic identities is thus a product of the interrelationship of colonial intervention; “European assumptions of neatly bounded and culturally homogenous ‘tribes’” and a bureaucratic preoccupation with demarcating, classifying and counting subject populations” (Berman, 1998, p. 305); the endeavours of missionaries and anthropologists; and the reaction of local societies to these enforced notions throughout time. Further, the political dimensions of ethnicities are substantial as the colonial logic of the divide and rule politics compartmentalized and fragmented the populations on allegedly ethnic grounds and used local authorities to rule (Berman, 1998). Both Berman (1998) and Mhlanga (2013) acknowledges how discourse on ethnicity risk being labelled as tribalism. According to Berman, political tribalism in Africa was the product of asymmetrical relations between groups of the local populations created by colonialism, and has subsequently stigmatized debates on ethnicity until today (1998). Mhlanga, notes how ethnicity is criminalized as tribalism, which in turn is rooted in post-colonial nationalistic reactions in which both are considered a threat to national unity (2013). As Berman puts it; “Ethnicities are the ambiguous, constantly contested and changing results of cultural politics” (1998, pp. 311–312) which reflects a constructivist approach in which ethnicity is perceived as a historical process and not a fixed entity (Ibid.).
Due to the interconnectedness of national belonging and identity, it also emerges as important to investigate the relationship between citizenship and identity, especially in border and migration studies. Citizenship can be conceptualized as the formal link between the individual person and the state, constituted by a set of certain rights and obligations by which the individual person is recognized to belong to the state in question (Westin & Hassanen, 2014a). Westin (2014) takes a theoretical point of departure in social psychology when discussing citizenship as an identity-giving classification that is often associated with nationality, and argues that “citizenship serves as a crucial instrument for social cohesion” in which identity is a “mediating variable” (2014, p. 194). Thus for Westin, citizenship is a kind of social category. Further, Westin argues that “the identity concept is politically important” as it enables “minority groups to assert distinctiveness and gain recognition” (2014, p. 195). Malkki (1992, cited in Westin & Hassanen, 2014a) sheds light on the perceived threat that refugees pose to many societies, which springs from a fear of disruption of national unity and identity alike as refugees lacks this social contract. Thus, the emotional attachment of people who settles in another country to their citizenship is important, as that is synonymous with the attachment of the individual person to the state (Westin, 2014).
8 Historical setting

In this section we shall explore the broader historical context in which the experiences of the Angolan diaspora in Rundu were shaped, and therefore the macro-historical development that shaped living conditions of the border populations.

8.1 Early colonial rule in Angola and South West Africa

The rapacious politics of Europe by the late 19th Century came to define the development of the African continent with long-reaching consequences. Following the Berlin Conference in 1884-85 in which European spheres of interest in Africa were to be determined, imperialism took a new turn as colonial claims no longer could be legitimized solely by historical right but further needed to be enforced by occupation (Guimarães, 2001). This marked the onset of the Scramble for Africa, which instigated a change in Portuguese colonial ambitions including Angola (Guimarães, 2001; Ruigrok, 2010). The trade-oriented and coastally located administrations needed to change policy to that of ‘pacification’ (see 5 Terminology) as well as spatial focus to also include hinterlands, or Portugal would risk to lose its colonial claims altogether (Guimarães, 2001). This new rule were to “be built from the urban centres and outward” (Ruigrok, 2010, pp. 42–43), although the Portuguese system remained highly centralized (Hodges, 2004) and only by the later stages of colonialism managed to penetrate the territory’s interior (Tvedten, 1997). The colonial agenda included enforced and partly unpaid labour; forcible reallocations of local populations (Tvedten, 1997); and separation of Europeans (civilized) from Africans (natives) (Guimarães, 2001) who were further divided into the categories “indígenas (indigenous peoples) and assimilados (assimilated nonwhites)” (Tvedten, 1997, p. 27). This division was based in a Portuguese vision of assimilation, in which traditional societies were to be destroyed and “detribalised”, followed by inculcation of Portuguese culture which would enable assimilation of the assimilados who were separated from those subjects deemed insusceptible to such a process, the indígenas (Nugent, 2012). Despite an instable political and economic situation in Lisbon, the colonial administration managed to build a functioning system (Guimarães, 2001) that earned a reputation of having a repressive political climate (Hodges, 2004) and a harsh and implacable rule (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview).

South West Africa⁶ was only truly colonized by the 1880s as the Germans arrived; bringing substantial military means in order to assert colonial possession and dominance (Tonchi et al., 2012, p. 6), with significant demographic consequences (Frayne & Pendleton, 2001b). The German rule was however short-lived and ended with the South African invasion in 1915 being part of the First World War (Tonchi et al., 2012). The outcome of the World War I further stripped Germany of all its colonial possessions which were taken over by the Allied parties (Ejikeme, 2011). Subsequently the Allied agreed the colony to be administered as a League of Nations mandate by South Africa (Ejikeme, 2011), but in effect the territory was gradually subsumed and South Africa came to act as a colonial power (Tonchi et al., 2012). Following the Second World War, the country was annexed by

⁶ The present territory of Namibia officially went under the German South West Africa (Deutsch-Südwestafrika, DSWA) (Brambilla, 2007) during the German occupation 1884 to 1915 (Melber, 2009), and subsequently under the name of South West Africa (SWA) during South African rule (Tonchi et al., 2012). In this essay, Namibia will be used in general terms, whearas the other terms may be used if more suitable for the context (see discourse on the naming topic under SOUTH WEST AFRICA (SWA), in 5.1 Concepts and definitions).
South Africa (Ejikeme, 2011), although much to the rejection of the United Nations (Tonchi et al., 2012). This resulted in the implementation of apartheid policies (Ejikeme, 2011), laws virtually identical to those of South Africa and a substantial influx of white South Africans (Frayne & Pendleton, 2001b). Despite the temporally brief presence of Germany, the rule had substantial long-term effects as it brought German soldiers, settlers and missionaries that stayed behind, and further had disrupted local societies by genocidal campaigns. This legacy combined with South African hegemony and politics came to dominate South West African conditions until the native resistance gained momentum, and increased attention of the UN, by the late 1940s (Tonchi et al., 2012).

8.2 The Angolan and Namibian independence struggles

Subsequent the Second World War, Europe’s waning grip of African soil resulted in the era of decolonization, an uneven process which was only complete with the independence of Namibia in 1990 (Watts, 2009). In the geopolitical landscape of the post-war period, a new dichotomous world order rose which came to characterize world politics and culminated in the Cold War (Campbell, 2009). Portugal did not voluntary relinquish its colonial possessions (Oyebade, 2007) and the Portuguese colonial rule proved persistent largely due to its ability to splinter the nationalist movement (Spears, 2010). This resulted in almost fifteen years of armed rebellion in Angola (Oyebade, 2007) until the military coup in Lisbon in April 1974 marked a quick end to Portuguese colonial rule (Hughes, 2012). Thus, independence by large came indirectly due to internal politics within Portugal itself rather than directly from the efforts of the liberation movements (Spears, 2010). Further, the legacy of the highly centralized colonial administration with its repressive political monolithism lingered and was conveyed in Angolan post-colonial politics with devastating effects; firstly it created a climate in which a democratic multi-party state could not take form ( Hodges, 2004), and secondly it put people against each other as the population was by no means monolith in terms of ethnicity, class or political affiliations (Tvedten, 1997). Subsequently and due to the failure of the Alvor Accords in 1975 (Hughes, 2012), Angola plunged into a civil war that would prove to endure until 2002 and with an estimated death toll ranging from 300 000 (Oyebade, 2007) to 500 000 (Hughes, 2012). The three major guerrilla-movements of the Angolan war of independence, and belligerents of the subsequent civil war alike, were FNLA, MPLA and UNITA; each with a traditional support base of the Bakongo, the Mbundu and the Ovimbundu tribal groups respectively (Hughes, 2012, pp. 62–63). The internecine feud had however not only ethnic dimensions although they exacerbated it, but also pertained to centuries of economic and political patterns in which the domestic scene was shaped by certain modes of power. These created elites, and thus divides, relating to class and urban versus rural settlers (Soares de Oliveira, 2015).

The resistance to South African occupation of South West Africa had many reasons. The Report of the Odendaal Commission was published in 1964 and laid the ground of the Odendaal Plan and the South African Homeland Policy alike, in which the land was divided into ten homelands and access to land was redistributed with a recommended 40% of the land designated to reserves for 89% of the population and another 43% to whites only (Tonchi et al., 2012). The implementation of the policy entailed forced resettlements (Melber, 2011b), brought some judicial changes in which laws of traditional courts were legislated (Friedman, 2011) and catered for a development in which many of the homeland ‘governments’ were to be dominated by tribal leaders (Hopwood, 2007). Other measures taken by the colonial government to make use of the resources of South West Africa and at

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7 The homelands were a South West African version of the South African Bantustans (Tonchi et al., 2012).
the same time control the population was the implementation of the contract labour system, which catered for cheap labour within mining, agriculture and industries in both South Africa and South West Africa (Nambadi, 2007) but also in the farmlands of Angola and tobacco plantations in Zimbabwe (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). Along with providing cheap labour the system kept a social order in place in which the population was further controlled as abled men were sent away to work meanwhile leaving women, children, the elderly or disabled to run the subsistence farming in the homelands. This practice disrupted social life as it broke down traditions and family ties (Nambadi, 2007), gave little benefits for the workers and was perceived by the workers as a modern slave trade (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview).

The independence struggle in South West Africa really began to gain momentum in the 1950s and 1960s with the formation of the nationalist parties of SWAPO and SWANU (Melber, 2013). Contrary to earlier formations of resistance which centred traditional leaders, these movements by and large sprung from student and worker elements and claimed to be nationwide organizations, albeit the former had ties to the Ovambo group and the latter to the Herero and Nama (Tonchi et al., 2012). SWAPO had emerged from the Owamboland People’s Organization (OPO) that had been founded in 1957 to protest the contract labour system (Melber, 2007). Given the failures of a peaceful resistance against apartheid, SWAPO began to prepare for a military strategy already in the early 1960s (Wallace, 2011). It was however only with the formation of the South West Africa Liberation Army in 1966 and its successor PLAN (SWAPOs armed wing) in 1970, that SWAPO-leaders emphasized the necessity of armed struggle (Tonchi et al., 2012). This in turn signalled the beginning of the Namibian War of Independence, a conflict known by many different names in the literature such as the border war, bush war, frontier war or liberation war, each of them reflecting different aspects of the war

8 Wars by proxy, liaisons by circumstance

With the Cold War in Africa, aspirations of foreign powers again became prevalent on the African ground, which once more was divided into spheres of foreign interest. The same colonial borders applied, and although local actors assumed the stage of events, local conflicts became fuelled and partly orchestrated by proxy warfare of other states which revealed macro-spatial dimensions of seemingly local conflicts. As stated by Mumford (2013), the fundamental cornerstone of proxy war is indirect interference, as the strategy circumvents the moral risk it entails for a state to risk own lives. Instead, a third-party may be used for interventions on behalf of the non-intervening party being part of the proxy war. This applied to Southern Africa, which according to Hughes (2012), became subject to a hodgepodge of foreign geopolitical interests, notably the overarching logic of Cold War politics in which the superpowers competed for global influence, the Sino-Soviet feud, and the Cuban ideological agenda of supporting Third World revolutionary movements. In Angola, this interference exacerbated internal strife for power among the liberation movements as the leaders of those understood that they could not successfully combat each other without the support of foreign powers (Spears, 2010). This had devastating effects and resulted in a protracted and convoluted conflict, also intertwined with other regional developments such as Zaire’s regional ambitions; the South West African insurgency against South African rule and conversely the apartheid administration’s determination to maintain regional control and white supremacy (Hughes, 2012). The liaisons of local

8 For a discussion on the semantic implications of the naming of the conflict, see Dale who elaborates on the connotations of various designations referring to “its geographical location or its declared purposes” (2014, p. 2).
and foreign actors were complicated and shifted over time. The course of events of these conflicts are
too great a topic to give account for within the scope of this essay, but the main themes relevant to the
essay can be outlined as follows.

Initially, MPLA received significant support from USSR, the Castro regime of Cuba and likeminded
European countries, whereas FNLA was backed by Zaire and had received funds from the US (via the
CIA) both prior to and after decolonization (Mumford, 2013). Already from 1963 MPLA was
supported by Cuba, and the Soviet saw a strategic advantage in supporting and thus aligning SWAPO,
ANC and MPLA. Therefore, USSR began to back MPLA military in 1972 and continued doing so
following the Lisbon revolution in 1974, whereas China supported FNLA reflecting the Sino-Soviet
conflict (Hughes, 2012). UNITA who had held an anti-Western agenda had subsequently been
receiving support from China (Mumford, 2013). The UNITA-Chinese relations extended from 1965
to early 1970s due to Savimbi’s alleged support of the Maoist ideology, and China also supported
FNLA as part of undermining the influence of USSR in Africa, but terminated all support by 1975 in
fear of being associated with South Africa (Hughes, 2012) as UNITA began to collaborate with
Pretoria.

The US incentive for supporting FNLA was an expression of realpolitik (Mumford, 2013). The Soviet
support for MPLA was seen as part of an expansionist strategy which called for reciprocal actions or
else other African states would rule out the US as a factor in Southern African politics. Subsequently,
the US funded FNLA from 1975 and supported UNITA from 1975 up until the early 1990s (Hughes,
2012). By the outbreak of the Angolan Civil War in 1975, Cuban troops were used as a kind of third
party surrogate force in direct intervention, but under the auspice of the USSR that supplied with
funding and weapons in a Cold War against the pro-American forces (Mumford, 2013, pp. 21–22).
The proxy assistance given to MPLA contributed to the movement gaining control of significant parts
of the country, and in 1976 MPLA declared themselves the new government of the Peoples’ Republic
of Angola (Mumford, 2013, p. 50) with a continued solid support from the Soviet and Cuba (Hughes,
2012). The support given MPLA by the beginning of the civil war had given the movement a lead that
UNITA only later managed to recuperate from via the foreign support from South Africa, Morocco,
Zaire and the US (Hughes, 2012). The civil war had enormous effects on the Angolan civilians, and
only between 1975-1988 half of Angola’s population of 8,5 million were displaced due to the
fighting, which was prolonged by this external intervention (Hughes, 2012).

The independence of African states and the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
contributed in the 1960s to an international policy shift from a tolerance of South African occupation
to an open conflict between the UN and South Africa that would last over two decades (Melber, 2013,
p. 55). Further, the collapse of Portuguese colonialism in 1974-1975 strengthened the position of
SWAPO as it was now possible for SWAPO to gain access to allies nearby and establish military
bases on the other side of the border from which PLAN-fighters could infiltrate South West Africa
(Ejikeme, 2011; Hughes, 2012). Thus, Angolan independence made South Africa fear that MPLA-
ruled Angola would assist SWAPO in their insurgency. According to du Preez (2013, p. 45), this
“black nationalism and communism became one and the same thing” and the fear of the ‘rooti gevaar’
(the ‘communist threat’) became the main justification for white minority rule and a militarization of
politics which brutally fought anti-apartheid activists. This combined with a US request to Pretoria to
back FNLA and UNITA, made South Africa launch Operation Savannah and enter an era of
militarization (du Preez, 2013). South African military suppression took many forms, and in the 1970s
and 1980s SADF in effect acted as an occupational power in South West Africa/Namibia (Tonchi et
al., 2012, p. 390). By the Angolan independence, Angola began to receive troops from Cuba that
would fight there for the coming 15 years (du Preez, 2013). As part of this alleged fear of
communism, the US and South Africa deemed Namibian independence impossible unless Cuban troops withdrew from Angola (Ejikeme, 2011).

From 1966 to 1975 UNITA was supported by Zambia, and during this period also cooperating with SWAPO (Hughes, 2012), especially collaborating from 1967 to 1970 (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). According to Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview) SWAPO fought with UNITA against MPLA until 1976. This, according to ya Nangoloh, had not that much to do with ideology as with ethnicity, as the Ovambos in Namibia are geographically and ethnically closer to the Ovimbundus than the Kimbundus in Angola (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). Following the collapse of the UNITA-SWAPO-alliance, UNITA was identified as a potential ally by South Africa. The objective was to disrupt PLAN intervention into Namibia, and therefore South Africa backed UNITA with substantial funds from the late 1970s to the late 1980s (Hughes, 2012). According to Hughes (2012) however, Angola became a refuge for the military wings of SWAPO (PLAN) already after 1975, and were thus used as auxiliaries by MPLA (FAPLA) to fight UNITA (FALA). Following the 1978 UN Security Council’s Resolution 435 on Namibian independence it became clear for the South African regime that preparations for a Namibian election would be inevitable. As stated above, South Africa had justified its territorial holding of South West Africa via an alleged fear of communism (Tonchi et al., 2012, p. 391). Thus to counteract the Marxist oriented SWAPO, the South African government and the SADF came to support the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) that was formed in 1977 as a multi-ethnic counterpart (du Preez, 2013, p. 47). “The DTA formed a ‘national assembly’ which ran the territory with the South African administrator-general and in June 1979 it formally scrapped all forms of apartheid in the territory” (du Preez, 2013, p. 47).

The political landscape changed dramatically following the end of the Cold War, and loyalties shifted again. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 made Cuban support futile, and Cuba subsequently pulled out from Angola (Hughes, 2012). MPLA controlled the oil-fields (Hughes, 2012), and was after the Soviet collapse in need to find new buyers in order to get funds to keep on fighting UNITA (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). By 1993 the US abandoned UNITA and instead recognized the MPLA government (Hughes, 2012) from which it began to buy oil, and in turn also commenced to fight its former ally UNITA Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). Thus, despite the end of the Cold War and the fall of both USSR and apartheid South Africa, the civil war in Angola did not come to an end. With the 1991 Bicesse Accords MPLA and UNITA committed to a process of demilitarization but after the failed elections in 1992 in which Savimbi denounced the MPLA victory, the civil war was resumed (Hughes, 2012). The Lusaka Protocol of 1994 was again aiming at a peaceful agreement between MPLA and UNITA, but in 1998 it collapsed and warfare recommenced until the death of Savimbi in 2002 when Angola finally declared peace (James, 2011).

8.4 Post-war Angola and independent Namibia

With the death of Jonas Savimbi in 2002 (James, 2011) UNITA underwent its final defeat and Angola transitioned into peace (Hughes, 2012), leaving MPLA the sole remaining political force of significance (Angola Country Report, 2014). Despite the immense humanitarian and economic implications of the prolonged conflict (Hughes, 2012), post-war Angola has undergone a formidable economic development much dependent on its remarkable natural resources comprising of petroleum, diamonds, minerals, and rich hydroelectric and agricultural resources (Hodges, 2004). However, the civil war left a deeply corrupt society (Ann et al., 2014; Sogge, 2007) with immense economic divides between the rich and the poor, a situation much caused by the effects of the war on local communities...
with subsequent massive internal displacement, underfunding of the social sector, population growth and urbanization on the one hand, and the gradual dismantling and exchange of a socialist system to unregulated capitalism dominated by a political elite on the other hand (Hodges, 2004). These conditions have catered for a different development compared to the relatively resource scarce, sparsely populated and economically weak Namibia.

In 1989 South African president Botha initiated the final stages of South West Africa’s transition into independence, and in 1990 SWAPO leader Nujoma was sworn president of Namibia. But as Leys & Saul articulates; “it was the broader geo-political and military dynamic of the region, in which SWAPO’s military activity could play only a limited role, that ultimately dictated South Africa’s acceptance of the UN-supervised transition, and SWAPO’s accession to power” (1995, p. 13). After the deconstruction of apartheid, good relations but also a high degree of Namibian dependency have characterized the countries’ interaction, and only in recent years Namibian reliance on South Africa has decreased (Tonchi et al., 2012). Ever since independence Namibian politics have been dominated by SWAPO, which according to Melber (2013) is both a legacy from the 1970s when the UN General Assembly in Resolution 3111 declared SWAPO as the “authentic representative of the Namibian people”, and relates back to military confrontation with South African occupation forces especially along the Angolan-Namibian border which allows a narrative of struggle and patriotic history. According to Melber, SWAPO-dominance in contemporary Namibia further signals a lack of meaningful political alternatives due to weak oppositional performance (Melber, 2013). Although comparatively poor with a GDP half of that of Angola (Youngblood Coleman, 2015a, 2015b), Namibia has according to the empirical research of this study presented below, earned a reputation of having better education, healthcare and services than Angola.
9 Related research – an overview

The following section maps out related research in Kavango and neighbouring borderlands in order to contextualize and localize the study within the existing field of knowledge of bordering processes, migration and identity-making in a Southern African context.

9.1 The Kavango as a boundary and site of identity making

The Angolan-Namibian border has raised some relevant scholarly attention, but there is however comparatively little research on the Kavango region and what the Kavango means as a boundary (Gregor Dobler 2013, interview; Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). This is presumably because both the Kavango region and the Cuando Cubango province has been situated in the colonial periphery holding a low status in the respective colonial economies and thus being little researched (Brinkman, 1999). One preceding study, conducted by Brinkman (1999), is nevertheless of particular importance for this study. It features the conditions for an identity making of Nyemba refugees residing in the suburbs of Kaisosi and Kehemu in Rundu in the late 1990s.

The Nyembas are originally Ngangela people who fled the Angolan civil war, who are called Nyembas in Rundu (Brinkman, 1999). According to Brinkman, ethnic identity as a category is not stressed among peoples residing in the Cuando Cubango province in Angola which may appear as unusual in an African context. Also for the Nyemba refugees, most of who originated from this province, ethnicity was not essential for self-designation and they did avoid ethnic identity as a category. To Brinkman, two hypotheses explain this phenomenon; first a ‘thesis of marginality’ in which the development of ethnic consciousness was moderate in African communities relatively spared from colonial penetration; and secondly a ‘thesis of strategy’ in which migrants pragmatically avoided labels of that sort to avoid expulsion from their new communities.

Brinkman (1999) refers to the scholarly debate on whether ethnicity is to be seen as a colonial construct or not, pointing out the different arguments such as the contribution of indirect rule to the development of ethnic identity on the one hand, and the existence of pre-colonial ethnic categories and post-colonial multiple identities on the other. According to Brinkman (1999), Portuguese policies on ethnicity and tribal matters has rendered little attention as important for the invention of African identity making. Yet, tribalism was on the one hand fostered via the appointment of cooperative chiefs, but on the other hand neglected as the remotely situated Cuando Cubango lacked educational institutions and thus provided no base for the creation of assimilados which in other parts of the country provided a tool for the Portuguese colonial administration. Marginality is therefore depicted as a key element for both peoples from Cuando Cubango and for refugees, possibly posing a problem or a perceived threat for the state as a project (Brinkman, 1999). It has further been suggested that the

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9 It should be further noted that according to Brinkman (1999), all of the people coming from Angola are called Nyembas by Namibians. Ngangela may further be spelled in different ways (see Appendix B Tables of ethnolinguistic groups and tribes).
shift from flexible identities to bounded tribes was partly a result of local populations defending themselves against slave raids (Papstein, 1991).

Brinkman conveys an important point that seems valid also in the 21st Century; whereas the five Kavango tribes are recognised and thus taken for granted as the rightful inhabitants of Kavango, this is not the case of other ethnic groups also inhabiting the same land such as Khoisan-speaking groups or peoples known as Chokwe, Nyemba or Ovimbundu although their presence may stretch back well into the 19th Century and make up significant parts of the local population. This reveals what Brinkman calls an “apparently complex identity politics in the area” (1999, p. 422), often neglected by scholars. Further, research relating to the same topic in south-eastern Angola is described as anxious and non-conclusive, and reveals complex and interwoven lineages among Mbunda, Luchaze and other categories.

McKittrick (2008) has studied identity formation in the Kavango riparian communities focusing on what today is categorized as the five Kavango tribes, and their ownership and relation to the river itself in terms of instrumental and symbolic value. She points out that colonialism was responsible for the process in which not only royal families but also Kavango residents largely came to redefine themselves as indigenous to the area. The process entailed a shift in which the legitimacy of traditional authorities was at first claimed by a ‘first-comer’ status to the area, but later on in a process related to indirect rule via former alliances with colonial officials. McKittrick argues that it was in the interest of the German colonial administration to conceptualize “Kavango communities as ethnically homogenous entities with clear territorial boundaries” (2008, p. 789). Referring to Kletus Likuwa, McKittrick reproduces his argument that the forced removals of peoples from the banks of Kavango at the same time threatened their identity as a riparian people and also reinforced in a process that allowed a transcendence of polities uniting the local communities (M. McKittrick, 2008).

9.2 The terrestrial section of the Angolan-Namibian border

Brambilla (2007) and Dobler (2010) has studied the terrestrial section of the Angolan-Namibian border, stretching from the Kunene River in the west, to the Kavango River in the east (see Figure 2, p. 5). For Brambilla (2007), who has studied the identity making of the Kwanyama people residing on both sides of the border, the border is both an ‘institution’ expressing the power of state construction, and a ‘process’ in which the bordering process is also produced by the everyday practices of the borderlanders. This dual macro- and micro-perspective approach renders an analysis in which Brambilla perceives the Kwanyama identity making as plurivocal. The Kwanyama territory was divided following European divide and rule policies, creating new identity dynamics as a result of an imposed new reality (Brambilla, 2007). The creation of the border, with the function of defining German and Portuguese spheres of influence, can according to Brambilla be perceived as borders as ‘institutions’. This situation created the premise of a trans-perspective, as the Kwanyamas would have to negotiate their identity in relation to border crossing and to the two identity constructions of ethnicity and nationality (as in being subjects of different states). What was once “family” gradually became “foreigners”, as the boundary tracing impacted both social construction and linguistics. But more importantly, the Kwaynamas had to reinvent themselves as borderlanders, of which the common experience of the border became an identity marker perhaps more important than ethnicity and nationality. By this, the border is also social practice and a ‘process’.
Dobler’s (2010) study on boundaries and identity formation on the Angolan-Namibian border focus on what was formerly colonial Ovamboland. By the manifestation of the border, it cut through cultural homogeneity and created difference and initiated a process of othering which laid the foundation to the development of different states and identities. According to Dobler (2010) the conceptualization of the Angolan-Namibian border has developed over time. First, it separated two colonial administrations and aided the legitimacy of the South African one as that was constructed as benign and orderly in comparison to the Portuguese administration. For Dobler, these notions of difference in identity connected to the colonial territories are cradled in European identity construction in which a supposedly rational Protestant North is contrasted with a supposedly impulsive Catholic South. Secondly, the Angolan civil war made the border a fortification against communism and terror, and with the liberated states of Angola and Namibia it has come to be the separation of different economic and political regimes in which Angola has been constructed as violent and chaotic whereas Namibia as safe and democratic (Dobler, 2010). Thus today, what was once an arbitrary line has materialized into a rarely challenged and accepted boundary integrated into not only the political and social landscape of the borderlands but also as an integral part of the identity of the states as being formed by their margins. Dobler argues that these established notions of difference is reinforced by small everyday actions such as small-time corruption in trading (Dobler, 2010).

9.3 Neighbouring borderlands

Kangumu (2011) deals with both regional, national and border identities in his research on Caprivi, and argues the existence of an identity of ‘Caprivian-ness’, defined by contestation. This was in turn a result of notions of Caprivians as different from the rest of Namibia due to their pre-colonial origin and pre-Caprivi identity, although that was influenced by later social interaction during the liberation struggle. Colonial legacy had little bearing on Caprivi identity in many respects, but the recommendations of the Odendaal Commission to implement a Bantustan called “East Caprivi” was significant for the formation of a Caprivi identity. Thus and for other geopolitical reasons, Kangumu argues the Caprivi secessionist identity being a direct result of colonialism in which South Africa stressed difference from other ethnic groups in South West Africa. According to Melber, these are notions still being maintained and relating issues unresolved in liberated Namibia, challenging the slogan of ‘One Namibia, one Nation’ (Melber, 2009).

Neighbouring borderlands have also generated relevant research. Flint (2003) argues that contemporary postcolonial identity formation among the Lozi peoples of Zambia and Namibia diverge in terms of nationalist aspirations, as a result of the differential impacts of the former formal imperialism. Bakewell (2015) have studied how the shift from war to peace has changed the nature of the Angolan-Zambian border and how this in turn has affected borderland communities and identities. In this region, colonial taxation policies, repression, political violence and contract labour also initiated movement between the colonies. Unlike the conditions in South West Africa and Namibia, refugees in Zambia cannot be citizens, but many border communities facilitated help to Angolan refugees in terms of acquiring papers. Bakewell’s research indicates that the identity of Angolan refugees in terms of nationality were flexible and pragmatic being able to shift according to situation. Some however, who had stayed a long time in the new country, took upon a Zambian identity. Despite the prolonged war, Angola was however perceived as a place of opportunity and prosperity. Bakewell, as does Brambilla (2007), also recognizes the impact of both formal policy and government action on the one hand, and the locally negotiated conditions on the other, and concludes that peace simultaneously and paradoxically brought both a more open and a more closed border.
10 Result

The results of this study comprise primarily of two components, namely; a literature study which together with a series of interviews with historians and Namibian officials contextualizes the historical and locational theatre in which the identity making processes of the borderland peoples have been shaped; and secondly an interview series concentrating on the experiences of the focus group of the Angolan diaspora, set in relation to the Namibian counterparts in the host community via interviews with a Namibian control group. As complimentary reader assistance, Appendix A Table of historical development includes a historical overview structured as a chronological table which highlights the course of events taking place in Angola, South West Africa/Namibia and the Kavango border region respectively. Further, Appendix B Tables of ethnolinguistic groups and tribes, includes tables in which certain information of relevant ethnolinguistic groups and tribes are mapped out along with the many inconsistencies of information regarding these categorizations.

10.1 The Angolan-Namibian borderland and its peoples

In this section we shall explore the development of the Angolan-Namibian border and thus the conditions that has shaped the life of borderlanders and refugees over time. The Angolan-Namibian borderland is inhabited by a great variety of peoples who are more and less well defined in the literature as well as among the inhabitants themselves. However, and as pointed out by Collelo (1991), categorization and naming of peoples have been common within colonial territories in which foremost colonial authorities have initiated the process with the overarching incentive to understand and excerpt control over local populations.

10.1.1 The border region in pre-colonial time and during German and Portuguese rule

“The majority of people living in Kavango are descended from Angolans that moved south over many generations” (Mendelsohn & el Obeid, 2004, p. 52) and the history of the migration to the Kavango goes back to the 17th Century (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). A migration of people from the Angolan plains to the Kavango area took place in pre-colonial times (Brinkman, 1999) with the Nyemba, Mbundu and Chokwe migrating from Angola in the 1800s (Tuhafeni Pessa 2013, interview). Before the Scramble for Africa the Kavango River was a lifeline with local people moving from one side to the other. There was only one chief or traditional leader for each tribe that ruled territories that stretched over both sides of the river (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview; Mike Shirungu 2013, interview). Thus, the section of the Kavango River that today constitutes the Angolan-Namibian state border has undergone a transition over the past 150 years in which diverse and mobile communities were divided into separate nations (M. McKittrick, 2008). Before colonialism, each traditional authority or kingdom was a state, but with colonialism these became part of the state. As for the riparian states or kingdoms of the Kavango, these were divided by the colonial states and the border (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). According to Romanus Shampapi Shiremo (2013, interview), people would live on both sides of the border and probably did not consider it a border during the precolonial and the early colonial times. The territories of chiefs were not clearly defined and there were no strict borders. Rather, borders were conceived more in terms of where one village of a tribe ended and another village of another tribe started, but the villages also shifted and moved...
such as with the death of individual chiefs. This notion is confirmed by Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview) who has researched narratives of elders. According to his research, precolonial notions of borders and boundaries was not similar to the European sense in which the function of borders and boundaries were determined to regulate or prohibit border crossing, which had a tangible effect on the ground. Instead, the function of precolonial borders and boundaries was only to indicate the territories of different traditional leaders but did not mean to prevent people from crossing these borders or boundaries. Any group of people could settle wherever they wanted to and no one was denied, not even a stranger, as long as they did report to the traditional leaders of the specific area, so that he or she had knowledge of new persons in the area (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview).

The Angolan-Namibian border was defined in 1886 with “the ‘Declaration on the delimitation of the Portuguese and German possessions in southern Africa’, better known as the Barros Gomes-Schmidtals Convention” (Brambilla, 2007, p. 23). It was to follow the Kunene River in the west, then be drawn over land to the Kavango River in the east, further follow the course of the Kavango River up to Andara, and then being an imaginary line to Katima Mulilo (Romanus Shampani Shiremo (2013, interview) (see Figure 2, p. 5). There were additional agreements made in 1890 and in 1929 that aimed at shifting the border, but Romanus Shampani Shiremo stated that the border remained fixed. However, Brambilla (2007) states that due to water disputes, the terrestrial reach of the border between the Kunene and the Kavango rivers was contested. The water dispute had defined the historical development of the border and its delimitation with regard of water courses, as water was a crucial resource for each colony given the arid lands. Therefore, a 11 km wide and about 400 km long neutral zone was established between Portuguese Angola and German South West Africa, and it was only with the Agreement of Kakeri in 1931 that the final delimitation of the border was set between Portugal and the South African administration that had emerged as administrators after Germany lost its colonial possessions following the defeat in World War I (Brambilla, 2007).

Various sources state that the border to begin with was not felt nor acknowledged by local populations. According to Dobler (2010) the border was rather a delimitation of colonial interest than one of domination as administrative presence was limited and the border arbitrarily divided local populations and thus had no legitimacy on the ground. Romanus Shampani Shiremo (2013, interview) argues that at first, the local population would not acknowledge the Kavango River being a border and the border did not affect people. However, from 1890 it gradually became apparent for people that the river was a border and that they lived in different territories, although they did not respect the agreement (Romanus Shampani Shiremo 2013, interview). Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview) exclaims that “The border had always been fluid, it was not a rigid border”. Thus, although the border had been created for official purposes as national boundaries, there was no real enforcement before World War I and the German administration was not really present at the border, but would only come visit the region. Thus the local people did not take notice of the border and related rules, and would cross it as there was not much to stop them. In 1903 Kavango was still governed from Grootfontein, and only in 1909 German posts were installed in Nkurenkuru, not far from Ndara in the Mbukushu area. The Portuguese station on the Angolan side of the border was abandoned in 1914/1915 and was revived again in the 1930s (Romanus Shampani Shiremo 2013, interview). Apart from this kind of colonial presence, foreign presence mostly consisted of German catholic missionaries (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview) that were established in eastern Kavango aiming at converting people and teaching agriculture (Vincent Kanyetu 2013, interview).
Before 1909, the majority of the Kavango peoples lived on the Angolan side of the border, including all the chiefs. When they moved, they did not consider themselves moving between countries, but only within their own territory (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). There was therefore a likely discrepancy in how the river and the border were perceived between the local populations versus the missionaries and the colonial administrators (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). For administrative, political and economic reasons, the Germans had an interest of people staying put on their side of the river, and this was the process in which the river started to be manifested as the border (Mike Shirungu 2013, interview).

10.1.2 South African versus Portuguese rule

During World War I, the Germans fought the Portuguese along the border (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview), but with the defeat Germany lost its colonial possessions (Ejikeme, 2011). From 1915 and onwards, the border therefore became apparent as the division between a harsher Portuguese direct rule and an allegedly more relaxed South African rule (Brambilla, 2007). In general, Portuguese presence was much more notable via heavy taxation, forced labour and a cruel display of colonial power (Dobler, 2010). There are several accounts of various degrading and violent practices. For example, the Portuguese forced people to carry their colonial masters on their shoulders, or beat people with the *Mbarama*, a whip with sharp objects attached to the end, practices that kept on until the 1920s (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). The South African takeover brought different policies, notably taxation policies that shaped border conditions (Mike Shirungu 2013, interview). This resulted in decades of migration in which big numbers of the riparian population moved to the South West African side, virtually emptying certain parts of the Angolan side (M. McKittrick, 2008; Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview; Napandulwe Shiweda 2013, interview). Apart from such push-factors, pull-factors such as a search for cash, education and healthcare was notable already by the first part of the 20th Century (Brinkman, 1999).

Portuguese presence along the border increased during the South African period, and the Portuguese established themselves along the Kavango River by setting up a military post (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). After the 1920s the German catholic missionaries and South African officials in the form of commissioners (officers in charge of Native affairs), established their foothold on the Namibian side, first stationed in Nkurenkuru (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). In 1936, the South African administration however moved from Nkurenkuru and established the main office in Rundu. This shift that came with stricter border control as it enabled the commissioner to travel among communities, visit the chiefs, implement rules, and installing native police officers that enforced the rule not to let people cross the border/river as they wished. Enforcement of border control was especially noticeable in the Mbukushu area where people were also living on islands, as the colonial administration, in order to gain easy control over the populations, would forcefully relocated people from the islands to live on the mainland (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). According to Romanus Shampapi Shiremo (2013, interview), it was always clear in the reports of the commissioners and the missionaries what was considered South West Africa and what was considered Angola, and further that the river was the border.

10 The Gciriku king moved to the German side in 1908/1909; the Kwangali chief in 1910 and the Mbuza chief around the same time. The Shambyu king moved to the South West African side in 1925, meanwhile the Mbukushu chiefs lived on the islands in the Kavango River located on the South West African side (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview).
Both colonial powers wanted to compel people to settle on their side of the river as they were in need of labour (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview), and thus a fierce competition developed between the South Africans and the Portuguese to attract the local population to their side of the border (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). According to both Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview) and Romanus Shampapi Shiremo (2013, interview), colonial powers understood that the people would follow their traditional leaders. Therefore, the South African officials from the native commission tried to compel people to move from the Angolan side to the South West African side, meanwhile the Portuguese officials in vain attempted to convince the chiefs to come back to the Angolan side (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). Kletus Likuwa stated there are official documents in the Namibian archives in which administrators complained about local chiefs and encouraged them to cross to their side. For example, officials of the Northern labour organization complained about the mobility of local populations especially in regard of the Kavango region. As Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview) paraphrases;

“Although you want us only to recruit labourers who were in South West Africa, you must understand that this is very difficult because the village that was this week on this side on the Namibian border the next week the whole villages has crossed to the other side. So how do you make sure that the people that you are recruiting are only from the Namibian side?”

As the Portuguese failed at compelling the riparian communities to their side of the border, they instead tried to install new chiefdoms on the Angolan side for the same communities. This strategy was unsuccessful to begin with, but in the late 1930s many of the old chiefs died, and the Portuguese started to achieve their ambitions (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). Thus, the Portuguese began to install their own local chiefs from the same royal family on the Angolan side of the border. This was done to attract people to their side of the border again, using the rationale that people would follow their chiefs. This applied to all of the Kavango tribes; Gciriku, Shambyu, Mbunza, Kwangali and the Mbukushu (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). From that time on, the different chiefs were to stay at their respective side of the river with their people, and were not supposed to have control of the other side of the river. This practice ultimately separated communities and created new boundaries (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview).

As the border was gradually manifested, it also came to serve purposes for the local population such as providing protection when escaping the justice system of one side to the other, but also inevitably had negative impacts on people (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). Angolans who had moved to Namibia to escape the Portuguese system still had cattle posts in Angola, although the Portuguese tried to control the movements (Reinhold Kambuli 2013, interview). Therefore, local populations could not as effectively move around as before. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, this in turn initiated a population movement back to Angola due to droughts (Napandulwe Shiwedwa 2013, interview). The situation led to agreements between the Portuguese and the South Africans in terms of the use of the river, where people were allowed to fish and cross for the purpose of visiting family. There was some control to make sure that the local populations were not relocating permanently, although these efforts were not particularly successful. Even the colonial officials themselves were not law abiding, but for example encouraged locals who ran away from the harsh Portuguese administration to stay in South West Africa. Especially the South African officials also tried to work with the chiefs for the labour recruitment, giving them goods and money to create incentives for the chiefs to send more people for labour (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview).
The Kavango native territory was created in 1937 for the sake of traditional tribal tax collection. According to Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview), the word Kavango means place, although within this place there flows a river, and therefore the Kavango River “it is the river of a place”. Thus the term was never at first used to refer to the people living there. It was only with South African colonialism that the term was put to use as an instrument of the “divide and rule” policy in the 1960s. Further, the South African administration wanted to bring “these people of a place” to see themselves as “belonging to that place”, and thus the five ethnic groups of Kavango were to define themselves as one, and subsequently different from other groups such as the neighbouring Ovambos and Caprivians (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). Quoting Joseph Diescho, Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview) argues that one positive consequence of apartheid was that for the first time, the different tribal groups of Kavango were brought together as Kavangos. Thus and paradoxically, although apartheid was supposed to divide, it first had to unite.

The borderlands of Kaoko and the Kunene River resembled that of Kavango and Kavango River. According to Krieke (2004, cited in Van Wolputte et al., 2002), the colonial border opened up more opportunities than it closed as people could just cross the floodplain and thus escape from one colonial reality (that of the Portuguese harsh rule with forced labour, taxes and violence) to another (the somewhat milder South African one). As Van Wolputte et al. sees it; “Kaoko was at the divide between two colonial regimes – a difference that had less to do with the supposed intrinsic characteristics of Lusophone versus Anglophone colonization than with the way these regimes responded to local and national political and economic contingencies” (2002, p. 173).

10.1.3 Independence struggle, native territories and ethnic separation

During the Angolan War of Independence, the Portuguese decided to separate people based on ethnicity. As the fight against the Portuguese gained momentum in the early 1960s, the Portuguese wanted to put people in closed settlements to ensure the freedom fighters did not have access to the people (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). According to oral accounts collected by Kletus Likuwa, this was due to the fact that the Portuguese had not prepared themselves for such an upheaval. Especially after the first attack in northern Angola, the Portuguese wanted to prevent people from the north, who were already influenced by MPLA, to mix with people from the south who had not yet been influenced by MPLA or their allied, SWAPO. The Portuguese subsequently thought the solution to be separation of these groups to gain control and separated the Nyembas from the other Kavango groups, keeping some of them in Kuito/Cuito and some of them in camps along the Kavango River on the Angolan side (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview).

Due to the political unrest during the liberation struggles, both colonial administrations conducted forced reallocations. SWAPO and UNITA worked close together in southeast Angola from 1967 up to the 1970s (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). During this time the Portuguese forcefully relocated people from the Angolan interior to the river in order to isolate them from SWAPO and UNITA forces (M. McKittrick, 2008). Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview) describes the situation as follows: Due to this liaison, SWAPO would even assist UNITA killing Portuguese people which made the Portuguese want to rid themselves of the problem. Thus in the late 1960s and 1970s, it happened that the Portuguese accused people of collaborating with SWAPO, and a forced reallocation of people

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11 It should be noted that this information is conflicting with that of Hughes (2012) in regard of the liaisons between SWAPO and MPLA and UNITA respectively. Although Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview) did not state a specific time but rather alludes to the early 1960s and an alliance of MPLA and SWAPO at this time, Hughes states that SWAPO was used as an auxiliary by MPLA to fight UNITA from 1975 (see section 8.3 Wars by proxy, liaisons by circumstance).
began from the Angolan side of the river to the South West African side. In Cuito/Kuito\textsuperscript{12} people did not live according to ethnic groups as they could choose to live with any group as long as they had a chief. However, from 1966/1967 people were separated as the Portuguese let the Nyembas stay in Kuito/Cuito but relocated the other groups to the Kavango River. The Portuguese installed camps in which they were very cruel towards the residents. Subsequently, people fled across the Kavango River to the South West African side. This situation in turn caused concerns for the South African authorities as they could not determine whether these people were actual refugees or SWAPOs fighters pretending to be refugees, meanwhile trying to infiltrate the Kavango population. South African authorities counteracted by rounding up refugees and sending them back to Angola. This created an outcry from the local communities on the South West African side, because according to them these people were sent back to be killed, a destiny they did not wish upon these people of which many were family from the Angolan side of the river. From a South African perspective however, this, along with border control, was a necessary measure to remain in control of the area and prevent SWAPO from establishing bases inside South West Africa (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview).

Following the Report of the Odendaal Commission\textsuperscript{13} in 1964, the South African administration developed ten Native Territories or reserves\textsuperscript{14} in which non-white groups were to be categorized and placed (Tonchi et al., 2012) as separate nations within South West Africa. This structure echoed the South African construction of Bantustans or “homelands”, and came to be implemented as the Homelands Policy\textsuperscript{15} in which reallocations of people to these designated areas was executed by force in the cases where people lived outside of designated boundaries. The homelands of Owamboland, Kavango and Caprivi were declared self-governing under the act (Tonchi et al., 2012). The Kavango region, as defined by the South African apartheid administration, had officially five tribes being the Kwangali, Mbuya, Gciriku, Shambuy and Mbukushu. These tribes “all had their origins along the upper reaches of the Zambezi River” (Mendelsohn & el Obeid, 2004, p. 52). However, this regional category did not replace the tribal ones as unifying structures (Wallace, 2011), although the empirical findings of this study suggests the development of a complimentary Kavango-identity over the past decades among these peoples, as confirmed by both interviewees of the border region and scholars (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview; Mike Shirungu 2013, interview).

As for groups of foremost Angolan origin, Brinkman (1999, p. 422) illuminates the situation; “Other people who have migrated into the area, and are known as Chokwe, Nyemba, Ovimbundu, etc., do not fit into this neat scheme. If they are referred to at all, it is often with considerable nervousness.” The literature covering Angolan tribes as well as the empirical research of this study confirms Brinkman’s claim, giving non-conclusive and contradictory results. Dorothy Lutangu Matengu (2013, interview) refers to such tribes with Angolan origin that now exist in Namibia being Chokwe, Nyembas, Ngangela, Mbunda, Luvale and Chimbundu amongst others.

\textsuperscript{12} Unfortunately, it was unclear from the interview material whether Likuwa (2013, interview) was referring to Cuito (as in Cuito Cuanavale, a town and municipality) or Kuito (the town). From the context, it is rather likely to be Cuito that is referred to.

\textsuperscript{13} Commonly referred to as the Odendaal Report.

\textsuperscript{14} The ten homelands: “Owambo, Damaraland, Hereroland, Namaland, Kavango, East Caprivi, Kaokoland, Bushmanland, Tswanaland and the Rehoboth Gebiet” (Tonchi et al., 2012, p. 309).

\textsuperscript{15} The structure of the Homelands Policy was outlined in the Development of Self-Government for Native nations in South West Africa Act No. 54 (1968) (Tonchi et al., 2012).
Romanus Shampapi Shiremo (2013, interview) argues the Kavango people had by the 1960s and the 1970s still not formed a strong sense of nationality, as in belonging to a state. If anything, they were more Kavango than South West African/Namibian or Angolan. By 1974 or 1975 people started to join the different liberation movements. This was a time when SWAPO was operating in Kavango and UNITA was still working with SWAPO. Thus, people were separated to help either SWAPO or UNITA depending on which side of the border/river they came from. In the view of Romanus Shampapi Shiremo, this may indicate that people did not have a strong sense of fighting for either countries, but rather for the Kavango River border region, and as a result there were a lot of Kavango people in UNITA (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview).

During the wars of liberation, the colonial rule and management over the riparian space became much more aggressive along the border. McKittrick describes it as “[d]raconian wartime security measures taken on both sides of the river from the 1960s to the 1980s” (2008, p. 788). The colonial administrations saw reasons for their actions. The Namibian liberation war came with an increase of border operations along the Kavango River. In 1966-67 as part of the Namibian liberation struggle, PLAN-fighters would infiltrate the territory from the Angolan side of the Kavango River. On the 21st of March in 1966, the first groups of PLAN fighters entered South West Africa through the Kavango River, but were caught in Rundu (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). Thus after 1966 the Angolan-Namibian border became exceedingly unstable due to the Namibian independence struggle (Nangulah & Nickanor, 2005) and much more control was installed by the border as there were an incentive to control people both leaving and entering as a lot of youths wanted to join the struggle (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). Under the South African administration, Rundu was also fenced off for some time. According to one respondent (Sebastião 2013, interview), the fences had four entrances; one in the direction of the river; one towards Sayema; one towards Grootfontein, and one south-west of Rundu, by which the South African administration controlled the in- and out flux to the area.

The Kavango parliament was created in 1970, and there were suggestions to erect an electric fence along the river which the parliament however turned down. Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview) interprets the suggestions of a fence as a sign of the apartheid government’s desperation to control the border and the people from infiltration. Approximately at the same time in the early 1970s, the fence that ran along the border over land was destroyed as the people wanted to remove what contained them (Napandulwe Shiweda 2013, interview). UNITA and SWAPO stopped collaborating in 1975 (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). As the loyalties shifted and SWAPO instead became allied with MPLA, Kavango became a difficult area for SWAPO to operate in. Unlike other stretches of the border over which SWAPO could escape into Angola under the protection of PMLA, the Kavango stretch offered no such protection as UNITA, which was then working with the South African administration, was controlling the Cuando Cubango province opposite Kavango (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). Further, the tensions that rose between the former allies UNITA and SWAPO after 1975, resulted in Kavango peoples being accused of collaborating with UNITA (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview).

16 Note that there is a discrepancy of information in regard to how loyalties of the different independent movements extended over time. According to Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview), SWAPO fought with UNITA against MPLA until 1976.
As the South African administration perceived the river as a security threat, they forcefully removed whole communities from the banks to prevent SWAPO forces to move easily from Angola over the border (McKittrick, 2008, referring to information given by Kletus Likuwa). In Rundu, there were forced reallocations of villages from the 1950s to the late 1970s motivated by similar political reasons. The South Africans wanted to remove communities from the river and the border as the area had become increasingly hostile in the 1960s with SWAPO and PLAN-fighters on the Angolan side. As people were related on both sides of the border, South Africa feared infiltration of Angolan fighters in Namibia via the border communities (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). In the 1970s the banks of Kavango were cleared of people who were forcibly removed by the South African administration, which according to apartheid logics resettled people in specifically assigned areas for different ethnic groups in Rundu. Although the border laws were relaxed by the 1980s, there was no return of people to the riverine lands (Brinkman, 1999). All in all, SADF and South West African Territorial Force fought PLAN (and SWAPO) for over twenty years along the Angolan-Namibian border, entailing forced reallocation of civilians with devastating effects (Frayne & Pendleton, 2001a).

### 10.1.4 The border region during the Angolan civil war

According to Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview), contract labourers that came back to Angola from the mines in South West Africa and South Africa in the late 1960s and 1970s were associated with SWAPO, and therefore risked being assassinated by the Portuguese. The authorities were afraid that labourers had been politicised during their stay in the compounds, as SWAPO was very active amongst the mine workers there. The Portuguese thus accused the returning contract labourers for being anti-government and forced them and their families to move from Angola and settle in South West Africa. Once there, they were again rounded up by the South African authorities and sent back to Angola, which is a possible reason why they were hiding from the authorities. Thus, people were also going from Kavango to western Zambia and Botswana to hide from the South African and Portuguese authorities (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview).

As the Portuguese started to lose control in Angola in 1974-1975, there were clashes between the MPLA and UNITA that had tribal connotations. Because of this, Ovimbundus and white Portuguese fled to Namibia, and were received by the Apartheid regime and resettled along the Kavango River (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). Further, the outbreak of the Angolan civil war in 1975 had huge impact on migration in the region. First, Angolan contract labourers returning from South Africa and South West Africa struggled to return to Angola (Siwayi 2013, interview). Second, the violent conflict came to dominate as a push-factor for migration from Angola to Namibia (Brinkman, 1999). The refugees coming into Kavango were called *Vatjwayuki*17. The word has both positive and negative connotations and is used in various contexts, but foremost to name those who run away from a fight, a war or abort a mission. In Kavango, *Vatjwayuki* refers to Angolan refugees coming after 1975 during the Angolan Civil War18 (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview), but has later come to refer to any person of Angolan origin disregarding the reason for migration, which according to Brinkman (1999) conceptualize all Angolans as an undifferentiated and monolith entity. Yet, the conflicts in both Namibia and Angola created huge movements of people crossing over the border, who were quite heterogeneous (Jeremy Silvester 2013, interview). The South African administration closed the border in 1976, although this had little effect on civilians who continued to flee the fierce fighting that from time to time took place in Calais (Brinkman, 1999) and in other parts of the country. Many of the

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17 The term is in Rukwangali.
18 Even before 1975 people were crossing from Angola due to maltreatment, but those are not considered being *Vatjwayuki* (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview).
people who fled were easily integrated on the other side because tribes extended over the border (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview).

In the 1980s, UNITA established control over the southern parts of Cuando Cubango province (Brinkman, 1999), and a lot of people fled from there to Kavango (Dorothy Lutangu Matengu 2013, interview). Therefore, many of the people that resided along the river were not original Kavangos but Ovimbundus linked to UNITA. As SWAPO were in military alliance with MPLA at the time, they were aiming to sanction and isolate UNITA economically through closing the border. In the process it did not only affect the Ovimbundus living along the river in Rundu and in Kavango, but also the local Kavango people. Thus, the closing of the border was not really aimed at Kavango people but towards UNITA (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). In the view of Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview), this was subsequently the reason for blaming so called “UNITA-bandits” when Kavangos were killed. Further, anyone speaking any Ovimbundu-related language, or who were married to an Ovimbundu, risked being accused of being an UNITA-bandit. Phil ya Nangoloh argue these people were actually killed by Namibian and Angolan soldiers, as it would make no sense for UNITA to kill its own support base.

By the late 1980s Rundu had grown as a strategic place and military base for the South African administration (Brinkman, 1999). Thus, during the liberation struggle and even after Namibian independence, the border became apparent. The control was stricter in the UNITA-controlled territories although it proved little effective as people, despite it, used to cross the border (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). There are however accounts that even during the 1980s and 1990s, people would still not consider the river being a border and people crossed over to fish, harvest local resources and bring cattle to graze in Angola during the dry season (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). Although one of the respondents argues the military presence along the border was established in order to secure the safety of the people (Samuel 2013, interview), another interviewee of Namibian origin claimed that border crossing during the apartheid period was dangerous and could have consequences such as soldiers punishing those who crossed it unlawfully (Magdalena 2013, interview). Others argue that it was still easier to cross the river at this time compared to the present situation (Nedine 2013, interview). The presence of SWAPO was also affecting civilian life. In the 1980s, there was a curfew after sunset in Rundu as the South African authorities tried to combat SWAPO elements (Magdalena 2013, interview; Osvaldo 2013, interview). One respondent of Angolan origin stated that SWAPO used to go from house to house and ask people for their papers to check whether they had someone in the house that belonged to the Angolan side. “If you didn’t have your papers they could take you away, thinking you were a South African snitch or collaborated with South Africa” (Eve 2013, interview).

In 1990 after the Namibian independence, the border residents were granted free cross-border movement according to agreements signed by the Namibian and Angolan governments, but following incidents in 1994 the Namibian government closed the border and signalled an intent to deport illegal Angolan immigrants (Brinkman, 1999). Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview) confirms that the border had been free to pass until an incident in 1994; the case of Faustino Decour. Decour, a Namibian business man who had shopping outlets along the Namibian side of the border, was shot dead at a road block. Nujoma claimed UNITA responsible, closed the border and issued Namibian Security Forces to severely deal with (in other words, shoot) any person crossing the river. Namrights however believes the Angolan Special Forces were responsible for the attack against Decour as part of a conspiracy between SWAPO and MPLA, in which the killing was supposed to be a pretext for closing the border and thus starving UNITA of supplies as they were getting most of it from Namibia. The closure of the border had great social and economic implication for the borderlanders as well as for
Angolan refugees who were trying to escape to Namibia. One interviewee of the Namibian reference group stated that they crossed the river by boat for fishing and cutting grass for building material for houses. However, border crossing was allegedly very difficult at the time (around 1998), and people needed permission to cross as UNITA were patrolling the border. “If you didn’t have papers you were stuck in Angola”, as she stated, but according to her UNITA was unpredictable and even with a permit no one was safe and border crossing always entailed a risk (Theresa 2013, interview). According to Tuhafeni Pessa (2013, interview), there was unity between the populations at some reaches along the river, but not at all places due to the UNITA presence along the border. That meant that it was not at every point people could cross over as they risked being reported to or being killed by UNITA (Tuhafeni Pessa 2013, interview).

As to how the Angolan civil war affected life in Rundu, the accounts diverge. Some interviewees, foremost of Namibian origin, were not directly affected but rather experienced the civil war as an Angolan affair at a distance. They recount of memories from hearing and seeing the war across the river as bombs and the armed fight went on, although they were protected by the border and not affected themselves (Nangura 2013, interview; Weka 2013, interview). Other border residents were affected directly themselves. One respondent of Angolan origin recounts swimming over the river as a child in 2001 to visit family in Calais, and found himself in the middle of a shootout. The violence further caused him constant worries for his family (Adam 2013, interview). There are accounts of people hearing the bombs along the border well up into 2002, and there are further accounts of violence erupting in Kavango after Namibian independence. According to Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview), the Kavango violence started around 1994 and ended in 2004, in which most of the local people who were brutalized were firstly from ethnic groups other than the Ovambo-dominated SWAPO. Namrights collected data in the Kavango border region within this period on killings and disappearances, torture and robbery against the local population. In the late 1990s there were almost daily reports on people in villages on the Namibian side being hurt, and people in the Kavango region lived in fear of violence according to Vincent Kanyetu (2013, interview). In 1999 Angolan forces were officially allowed to operate on Namibian soil (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview), and SFF was formed foremost by former PLAN-combatants acting as a paramilitary border police force (Tonchi et al., 2012). According to Vincent Kanyetu (2013, interview) SWAPO had to give MPLA permit to fight UNITA from the Namibian side of the border due to old loyalties, and both UNITA and MPLA were violent towards the local population with alleged rapes, thefts and killings.

It was foremost villages that suffered from this violence, and not Rundu itself (Weka 2013, interview). One Namibian informant claimed she had to flee from the village as she got caught in the middle of fighting in which people were injured and killed, and she subsequently moved to Rundu in 2000 (Theresa 2013, interview). Allegedly, some people of Namibian origin also left Rundu due to a fear of the war (Nangura 2013, interview; Weka 2013, interview). Among other reported events were night-time robberies in which anti-personnel mines were left in civilian houses; cattle theft in which Namibian cattle was brought across the river; and robbery in which Namibian shops were raided (Dorothy Lutangu Matengu 2013, interview; Siwayi 2013, interview; Theresa 2013, interview; Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). One Namibian interviewee (Magdalena 2013, interview) reported her grandson lost his leg to a landmine that was planted inside of the family yard, and held UNITA responsible for the event. Therefore, the family slept in the bush out of fear of raids up until the year of 2000. She also stated that two young girls were abducted from her village in 1999 by UNITA, that kept them to carry out domestic work. The girls managed to escape and thereafter UNITA bombed the

19 Vincent Kanyetu, regional coordinator for Democratic Tournahalle Alliance (DTA) in Kavango, worked in the late 1990s collecting data for Namrights on events along the border in Kavango that affected civilians.
village as revenge in which a man lost his leg. The incident was reported to Namibian authorities who according to her did nothing to prevent these events from happening (Magdalena 2013, interview).

The local Kavango population attributed these assaults to UNITA-members operating on the Namibian side of the border (Lukushu 2013, interview; Dorothy Lutang Matengu 2013, interview; Siwayi 2013, interview; Weka 2013, interview). According to Namrights however, the perpetrators were most likely the Namibian Security Forces and the Angolan Security Forces, and not UNITA as was the public picture being displayed. According to Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview), the victims were not aware of what was going on, as the white controlled media did not report on the events out of self-censorship or disinterest, and the Namibian government controlled media was biased and only blamed UNITA. ya Nangoloh further argue that it seems odd that UNITA could operate that freely on the Namibian side of the border when it was controlled by Namibian and Angolan Security Forces. According to Brinkman (1999)²⁰, even after Namibian independence rumours of UNITA bandits being responsible for arms smuggling and violent attacks severely affected the status of Angolan refugees, and the Kavango borderlands gained a reputation of being a liability among Namibian government officials. This notion was confirmed by one interviewee of the Namibian reference group; “MPLA is much better, UNITA are only crooks and bandits” (Lukushu 2013, interview). The events that took place during the Angolan civil war and Namibian independence struggle had other implications too. One elderly interviewee of the Namibian reference group stated that there prior to the Angolan civil war was no difference between living in Calais or in Rundu, but that the civil war changed that and split the communities into two different areas (Tulikie 2013, interview).

10.1.5 The border region since independence and peace

According to the 1964 OAU-resolution, colonial borders were agreed upon to be maintained (Organisation of African Unity, 1964), and this also applied to the Angolan-Namibian border. After the Namibian independence, especially in 1999-2000, the Namibian state tried to reinforce the territory and control border movement Romanus Shampapi Shiremo (2013, interview). For example, language and culture was used by the Namibian police in 1999-2000 in order to identify people as Angolan or Namibian. Apart from checking IDs, the police would interrogate people with historical questions and check their pronunciation. Those who spoke Umbundu or other Angolan tribal languages were suspected not being Namibian. Thus, even in recent time some people in the Kavango region are afraid of being accused of being Angolan, because as Romanus Shampapi Shiremo explains, these people would then be considered foreigners in what they regard being their motherland. According to Henning Melber (2013, interview) Angolans are generally not popular in Namibia especially further south than Tsumeb, although the situation is different in the border communities. Romanus Shampapi Shiremo argue these interrogations being part of a process in which Namibia tried to gain status of being an autonomous state via establishing territorial integrity, as it had previously mostly been considered a province of South Africa.

Although the border, as described above, had been more or less controlled during the colonial era, Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview) argues that the local population actually experienced less border control prior to independence compared to after. According to him and Romanus Shampapi Shiremo border control has become austere in the new independent states of Namibia and Angola, and the border has become strictly enforced with the installation of border posts at which border crossing can

²⁰ Brinkman (1999) refers to a press conference by NSHR: Shoot Them!: The Practical Consequences of the De Facto State of Emergency in Kavango”, Press Conference, NSHR, March 29 1995, p.2-3. The original source has not been able to be found and verified, but is referred to in numerous publications by NSHR/Namrights.
only happen with permits. This was something new to the borderlanders that were used to be able to cross at any point of the river. Mike Shirungu (2013, interview) further argues that only in the post-colonial states distinct notions of “Angola” and “Namibia” has become evident. This implies that people must decide to which side they belong in order to benefit from government services. Before independence this had less importance, and implicit in this situation is a social inclusion and exclusion of people. However, according to the research of both Shirungu and Shampapi Shiremo, it is common that the locals understand the river as just a river and not a border, which is confirmed by some of the interviewees of the Namibian reference group. The Namibian state however, is using its resources to manifest the territory and the border in people’s minds (Nyjamba 2013, interview; Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). Certain events also suggest the border to be a sensitive political matter. In 2003, Bernard Nakale Shevanyenga was shot dead in Oshikuku village by unknown gunmen armed with an AK-47 rifle. Shavanyenga was a border activist who chaired The Age of March (Tagoma) movement (Weidlich, 2006), an organisation campaigning for reuniting the Kwanjama border population by moving the Angolan-Namibian border north of the Kwanjama communal areas in Angola (Namrights, 2003). Allegations have been made towards the Namibian government being responsible for the incident, although there is no proof of who killed Shavenyenga and what their motif was (Weidlich, 2006). That the border has become more politicized since 2003 is also mentioned by one of the Namibian respondents (Nyjamba 2013, interview).

Opinions and indications diverge as to how porous or fixed the border has become in more recent years. Even after the Namibian independence, borderlanders could take their animals to the other side of the border to graze, but this practice has become restricted with economic effects for border residents (Mike Shirungu 2013, interview; Tulikie 2013, interview). After the death of Savimbi in 2002 (Bakewell, 2015), the border control was eased for some time (Tuhafeni Pessa 2013, interview). According to Napandulwe Shiweda (2013, interview), the contemporary border is a more fluid boundary as both sides can be accessed with a certain permit, but as it closes at a certain hour it still constricts the populations. She further argues that the border is still a very sensitive matter for the Namibian and Angolan governments. According to Romanus Shampapi Shiremo (2013, interview), the relation between the Angolan and the Namibian governments are however quite relaxed as MPLA and SWAPO are old allies. Border residents are allowed to cross and move within 60 km of the border, which for example allows Angolan merchants and street vendors to sell their produce on the open market and benefit from the cross-border market (Dorothy Lutangu Matengu 2013, interview). Post-war emigration from Angola to Kavango has been motivated by benefitting from better services and economic opportunities (Mendelsohn & el Obeid, 2004, p. 52). In the Cuando Cubango province people depend on Namibia with regard to retailers, business, service, building materials and healthcare, which is the reason why Rundu is one of the fastest growing cities in Namibia (Napandulwe Shiweda 2013, interview).

On both the Namibian and the Angolan side of the border, the states are establishing border posts (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). There is a border post in Rundu and an emigration point in Calais (Tuhafeni Pessa 2013, interview). In Namibia the police, and a para-military force exists whose main task it to safeguard the border, control immigration and border crossing and prevent illegitimate crossing (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). Part of the reason for border control has also been identified as to controlling illicit activities such as preventing illegal cigarettes from Angola flooding the Namibian market, or to prevent criminals moving over the border and assuming new identities (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). One informant claims it is harder to enter Angola than Namibia as the Angolan administration is stricter and more bureaucratic. For example, permission is needed for Namibians to go to Calais (Reinhold Kambuli
Another interviewee argues that it is easy to pay bribes in order to cross the border (Oliver 2013, interview). At the time of the interviews, the respondents however claimed it to be generally easy to cross the border into Angola. In general, border crossing is accessible, but permits are needed which was not the case decades ago when the border was not policed and people could cross whenever and wherever they liked (Eve 2013, interview). One of the respondents with Angolan documents stated they needed a three months VISA from both the Namibian and Angolan authorities to cross the border (Eduardo 2013, interview). Another respondent claimed that persons without documents cannot cross the border (Luciana 2013, interview), which would entail that people who have been deprived of their documents are unable to move.

A comparison between the 2001 and 2011 population census shows that the Kavango population has grown by only approximately 20,000 inhabitants (from 203,000 to 223,000) (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2003; Namibia Statistics Agency, n.d.-c), a situation Romanus Shampapi Shiremo (2013, interview) believes is connected to the peace in Angola and that immigrants are returning there. Dorothy Lutangu Matengu (2013, interview) however claim that most of the refugees that came to Namibia remain there, and that further the majority of the residents of Calais were once refugees in Namibia. Shampapi Shiremo nevertheless believes more people will return, because as in the 1930s, new local chiefs are installed on the Angolan side which are “imported” from Namibia to attract people. This is supposedly a strategy of the Angolan state to claim authority and legitimacy over their territory. Enforced territorial claims via stricter border control are established to make people more conscious that they are moving between different countries and to establish an idea of nationality. This is further reinforced by making it compulsory for people to state their reasons for crossing the border. Another example of this trend that Shampapi Shiremo refers to, is a project run by the Ministry of Information, Communication and Technology (ICT) called “My Namibia, My Country, My Pride”. According to him it was initiated in order to reinforce the concept of state and that people are Namibians. There are however interviewees of this study that think the border control is unnecessary as the same people are living on both sides of the border and because of initiatives such as free movement within the SADC region.

According to Kletus Likuwa, the colonial legacy also comes forth in terms of the regional boundaries as they are today argued and justified by previous colonial delimitations. This is the case with the delimitation of the Caprivi region as well as the former Kavango region, although the changes of regional delimitations will not change the ethnic boundaries. However, those tribal boundaries were first delimited by Native Commissioners during South African rule, but yet they are considered being traditional boundaries today. Kletus Likuwa argues that even after independence, Namibians instead of finding their own solutions to border issues always still refer back colonial solutions and documents to explain and justify their rights and to delimit borders and boundaries, be them national, regional or tribal (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview).
10.2 The Angolan diaspora in Rundu

The following section is devoted to the specific experiences of the interviewees of the Angolan diaspora residing in Rundu. The narratives are put in a somewhat chronological order starting with the experiences of older first-generation immigrants, moving on to younger generations and second generation immigrants.

10.2.1 The focus and reference groups

The Angolan diaspora of Rundu is a diverse group, of which some subjects are first and some second generation immigrants and some have been subject to forced and others to voluntary migration or no migration at all. Migration has taken place during different times over the past decades and under greatly varying conditions. Further, the diaspora comprises of people of different generations, ethnic and geographic origin, class strata, educational and professional background, economic circumstance and legal status. However, some common denominators for this otherwise heterogeneous group are forthcoming, such as that the vast majority are black and that they mostly reside congregated in the poorer areas of the town. The focus group of this study were by large residing in the suburban area of Kehemu where general income levels are low. Many of the interviewees of the focus group described themselves as having tribal belonging to the Chimbundu or Umbundu. The Chimbundu is part of the larger categorization of the Ovimbundu that speak the language Umbundu (Natanael 2013, interview) (see References and Appendix B. Tables of ethnolinguistic group tables and tribes, table B.10). Other tribes that were represented were Nyemba/Nganguela, Luchazi (a subgroup of the Nyemba), Chokwe, MbaKongo, Owambo and Ngoyo (see Appendix B Tables of ethnolinguistic groups and tribes). One interviewee was of white Portuguese/Angolan descent and of a much wealthier background. According to Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview) though, the majority of the Angolan people in Rundu are Nyemba. The focus group consisted of pensioners, students, homemakers, working and unemployed people.

During the interviews, a number of areas came forth as particularly interesting for the subject matter at hand, and the following sections are organized according to these themes and are based on accounts of the interviewees. The results are put in context in relation to the Namibian setting, as views, experiences of and information from the focus group of Angolan origin is compared and related to that of the control group of Namibian origin. As for this group (see References, and Appendix B Tables of ethnolinguistic groups and tribes), most of the interviewees were living in the close by suburb of Safari which is an area mostly defined by lower-middle class residents. A smaller portion of this group also resided in Donkerhoek and Kehemu. The majority belonged to one of the Kavango tribes of Kwangali, Mbukushu and a few to the Gciriku and Shambyu tribes. Further, one white interviewee of white (Boer) origin was part of the reference group.

21 Kehemu was also called “the ghetto” by younger interviewees.

22 Likuwa further stated that when a Kavango talk of a Nyemba, the term has come to denote all those people that reside beyond Kuito in the Rimbaranda area situated north of Cuito in Angola, beyond Cuito River which is an area also called the Mbunda area. Some Angolans call themselves Mbunda, and those who call themselves Nyemba in Namibia, refer to themselves as Mbunda if they live in western Zambia (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview).
10.2.2 The first generation: Migrating and crossing borders

In Namibia, cross-border migration into the country has had greater importance than the opposite (Frayne & Pendleton, 2001b). The motives for migration among the Angolan diaspora reflect macro-perspectives of the historical development of the region. During the Portuguese rule, labour migration functioned as a motivator for Angolans to migrate to SWA due to forced labour in the Portuguese contract labour system (Anna 2013; interview; Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview; Sebastião 2013, interview). In Namibia, conditions were better and shortage of workforce especially in the mines created a demand for Angolan workers under the South African administration (Anna 2013, interview). The vast majority recruited by the South West African labour organization (SWANLA) in Rundu in the 1950s were of Angolan origin (Brinkman, 1999). During the Angolan War of Independence, the violence in Angola increased with respondents allegedly having family members killed by the Portuguese (Angelica 2013, interview; Eve 2013, interview) resulting in people fleeing (Sebastião 2013, interview). Although, it was with the outbreak of the Angolan Civil War migration came to be dominated by refugees; a situation reflected among the respondents in the focus group of which many had to flee due to violence and starvation. The violence hit people from different social groups, which is reflected among the respondents as they represent varying ethnic, social, political and locational origins. Common to these categories was also that the flight for many was unplanned and rushed, in which families were scattered and family members were separated or killed, and some respondents were on the run for years. These conditions further resulted in the majority of migrants losing both assets and livelihoods, arriving empty-handed to their new country. As the war was intensifying, many of the migrants were coming as far as to the Osire refugee camp south of Otjiwarongo (Moses 2013, interview).

With the end of the civil war in 2002, the causes of migration changed again. Many of the interviewees of the focus and control groups mention that access to services dominated among incentives for migration, as war torn Angola was left in a much worse state by the time of peace in 2002 than Namibia by independence. Since then, Angola has experienced rapid economic growth and reconstruction surpassing Namibia in certain respects. However, despite the economic development of Angola and the present day economic differences between the countries, living conditions are still by many considered favourable in the relatively poor Namibia, with Angolans continuously being the net biggest immigrant group in Namibia although numbers have declined since the end of the Angolan civil war (Namibia Statistics Agency, n.d.-c). Corruption, social inequalities and unevenly distributed access to resources, work, education and healthcare in Angola are named as motivators for cross-border migration, and access to education is described as the most common incentive for migration among the younger respondents (Eduardo 2013, interview; Otávio 2013, interview).

23 Brinkman (1999) refers to the following sources; “Antunes Valente, ‘Problemas da Emigrção de Trabalhadores Rurais Angolanos Para os Territórios do Sudoeste Africano, da República da África do Sul e da Zâmbia, Portugal em África, 147 (1968), pp. 187-192; Bosch, ‘Die Shambiu’, p. 50; Bruwer, Matriılıiëtre Orde, pp. 16-17”. These original sources and their nature have not been able to be found within the research of this study and is therefore not included in the reference list.
10.2.3 Border control and reception in South West Africa and Namibia

The border control and reception of Angolan migrants to South West Africa and Namibia can be divided into two components; one relating to local social aspects and one to political, institutional and legal aspects of migration. The first denotes how the local communities received and treated the immigrants, and the second to how the South African and Namibian authorities did the same. The findings of this research indicate these dimensions changed over time. Prior to the Angolan civil war, the borderland was more homogeneous on the Namibian and the Angolan side (Anna 2013, interview). In the early 1970s there were no need for permits to cross the border, and if one wanted to establish oneself on the Namibian side immigrants would have to go to the local chief to pay tax and get a permit for a piece of land to stay on, but by 1972-73 the South African administration established border posts and registration offices where immigrants needed to register (Sebastião 2013, interview). As the Angolan Civil War entered the stage, the conditions shaping the borderland started to transform. For many of the immigrants coming during the early stage of Angolan Civil War, the reception to local communities in SWA was problematic as the local citizens sometimes were treating them with suspicion. This was largely due to segregation, as immigrants came in big groups, were held in camps, and did not at first mix with local populations (Moses 2013, interview). As immigration increased and immigrants established themselves in the local communities, the Namibian population to a greater extent absorbed the Angolan refugees. In general terms, the opposite relationship applied for the institutional dimension. The early migrant cohorts that came during the Angolan civil war were received by the South African administration that according to the empirical research gave any immigrant documentation. However, as Namibia gained independence, the new Namibian government in general did not facilitate but rather obstructed immigration.

The first major cohort of war refugees to arrive came already in 1975, followed by a second in 1976 (Angelica 2013; interview; Daniel & Dorotéia 2013, interview; Dominique 2013, interview; Luciana 2013, interview) of which some were transported in convoys by South African forces from the Angolan territory into South West Africa (Moses 2013, interview; Serafina 2013, interview). One interviewee recalls there was 3750 refugees coming to Rundu in 1975 (Dominique 2013). Refugee camps were installed by the South African regime, where refugees were kept sometimes for years, although under allegedly decent conditions being provided with food, healthcare, clothes and basic accommodation (Angelica 2013, interview; Serafina 2013, interview). Some of the respondents stayed in a camp outside of Rundu (Daniel 2013; interview; Dorotéia 2013, interview; Serafina 2013, interview), others were relocated to other camps and only came later to Rundu.

The accounts on how the local community received the Angolan immigrants diverge. Some respondents coming with the first cohort in 1975 claim to have been treated welcoming (Angelica 2013, interview; Daniel 2013, interview), whereas there are accounts of the opposite (Dominique 2013, interview). In the 1970s, local chiefs were still integrated in the legal system and the immigrants needed to go to the local traditional leaders to get permission to stay in the community. Sometimes, the chief had to make certain strategies in order to get the community to accept the refugees, who further had to come under the jurisdiction of those local chiefs (Angelica 2013, interview; Serafina 2013, interview; Shimuketa 2013, interview; Tulikie 2013, interview). Some interviewees claim that the people of Rundu had acceptance of the immigrants that fled from the war (Adam 2013, interview; Nangura 2013, interview). Respondents coming in the late 1980s and after generally refer to the local community being rather welcoming and that it was fairly easy to blend in (Rosalie 2013, interview), although there are accounts of children being bullied for being Angolan (Elias 2013, interview; Leo 2013, interview). As one respondent remembers; “Sometimes they just called you UNITA instead of your name. You had to deny your past and heritage, who you were in order not to get into trouble”
However, there are some accounts of life becoming harder for refugees in the 1980s as job opportunities decreased (Serafina 2013, interview). Further, one respondent who migrated in 1987 claims that she was not received well by the Namibian local community and that she had to move all the time as the local people claimed she had no land rights, but that the situation was still much better in Namibia than in Angola (Eve 2013, interview). Some immigrants coming in the late 1990s recounts for difficulties finding work and livelihood (Lolo & Rita 2013, interview) whereas others found it fairly easy and recount having gotten work permit and land to rent from the Namibian government in the early 1990s (Catarina 2013, interview). One respondent who acquired Namibian citizenship, claim life to be easier in Namibia after independence, as she then acquired land rights and gained the same possibilities as any Namibian citizen (Eve 2013, interview).

During the whole extent of the civil war Angolan refugees continued to flee to South West Africa/Namibia, but the border control and the conditions under which they arrived varied greatly. In the 1970s and 1980s SADF were positioned along the border (Anna 2013, interview). Those who arrived in the 1990s had great difficulty crossing the border. In the 1990s from independence and onwards the Namibian Defence Force (NDF) patrolled and controlled the river, and people who crossed the river risked being shot. As one respondent who managed to swim across the river in 1991 recounts: “NDF used to say ‘Stay on that side, you who don’t have documents will be illegal’. But people went anyways and were shot” (Otávio 2013, interview). Another respondent described the situation as such: “Anyone who came across the border were here [in Namibia] considered to be a UNITA, and on the Angolan side people were forced to be a UNITA in order to survive” (Elias 2013, interview). Other respondents that arrived in the late 1980s and early 1990s experienced that it was easy to cross the border into Namibia, at least if you had Angolan documentation to show by the border (Lolo & Rita 2013, interview; Rosalie 2013, interview). By the late 1990s the border was still heavily controlled (Elias 2013, interview), and one respondent states that MPLA occupied parts of the border in 1999 (Daniel 2013, interview).

10.2.4 Deportations

With the Namibian independence in 1990, the political climate on immigration changed. The shift in policy can be discerned in political policy that entailed the government ordering law enforcement agencies in the Kavango region to suspend border-crossings indefinitely and clear the region of allegedly illegal immigrants (NSHR, 2008)24. There are several accounts within this study of raids in the 1990s, also confirmed by Brinkman’s research (1999), in which Namibian authorities and police came to the homes of border residents and aimed to find Angolan refugees without valid papers.

“First we were received nicely. The problem only started in 1998 when the government began to arrest Angolans to go back to Angola. For this they never gave a specific reason to why they wanted the people to go back. The authorities came and knocked on the door and asked for documents, and then they suddenly stopped with this practice.” (Lolo & Rita 2013, interview)

24 The NSHR (2008) report are referring to the following press conferences; 2”Murderous ambush in Kavango on 28 September 1994”, Press Release by the President of the Republic of Namibia, State House, September 28 1994; “Indefinite closure of Namibian/Angolan border in the Okavango Region”, Press Release, State House, Republic of Namibia, March 31 1995 and “‘Shoot Them’: The Practical Consequences of the de facto state Emergency in Kavango”, Press Conference, NSHR, March 29 1995”. As these original sources have not been able to be found within the research of this study, they are therefore not included in the reference list.
One of the respondents, being white of Angolan-Portuguese descent with a Namibian citizenship remembers that he was spared from the raids, but that his family’s gardener was taken in a raid in the early 1990s being accused for being UNITA. As he explained, the new independent Namibia would not have old enemies within the territory, and they checked the man for marks on his shoulder as this was supposedly a method to single out young men that had been used by UNITA to carry guns (Osvaldo 2013, interview). Other respondents refer to an incident in 1999 when people were arrested and sent back to Angola, but there are also accounts of deportations in 1998 (Natanael 2013, interview). One respondent was arrested together with her family, but was later released and allowed to stay as they had entered Namibia before independence (Rosalie 2013, interview). Another had his only relative, an uncle, deported meanwhile he managed to stay under the radar of the authorities as no one checked his papers because he was a child at the time (Elias 2013, interview). There were several strategies to escape the attention of the authorities, of which name-change was one. This could be done either via the help of friends and family of which the immigrants took the name, or via marriage to Namibian locals (Elias 2013, interview; Leo 2013, interview). In this political climate, people in Rundu became more suspicious towards each other;

“You never knew who was knocking on the door. UNITA and MPLA soldiers came to Rundu to force recruit soldiers to the war, take the Angolans home to Angola. Even South African soldiers questioned people’s citizenship, if one could not prove that one was Namibian one could be deported to Angola. This was before Independence. South Africa thought it was better to be safe than sorry, because they didn’t know if an Angolan was an UNITA or a MPLA.” (Anna 2013, interview)

With the Angolan peace in 2002 the Namibian government again tried to capture and send refugees back to Angola (Moses 2013, interview). Namibian police went from house to house to arrest and deport Angolan citizens and also Umbundu people, and Namibian authorities used to catch people in order to test their language skills in English and vernacular languages, and make them pronounce difficult words so they could single out the Angolans (Elias 2013, interview). One interviewee states that she experienced that the local population would report Angolans to the authorities and accuses them for being UNITA, if they had not yet learnt the local language and had to speak Portuguese. This resulted in deportations, and she claims a lot of Angolans died because of these deportations that came as a result of those false accusations that was pinned on anyone speaking Portuguese or Umbundu (Serafina 2013, interview). There are accounts of the police coming to look for illegal immigrants up to the year of 2004, with witnesses of people being taken and sent back to Angola. It did not matter if they had resided in Rundu for a long time, if they had not managed to acquire Namibian papers (Nico 2013, interview). However, there were Namibian civilians that helped to house, feed and clothe Angolans at their own risk as there was “a witch hunt for Angolans”, as one interviewee described the situation (Elias 2013, interview). Those who had papers from the South African administration received a Namibian citizenship, but those who came later did not. Among suspected reasons for this was fear of competition on the job market (Moses 2013, interview).
The “second generation”: Balancing the boundaries

A minority of the respondents were strictly speaking second generation immigrants, whereas some came to Namibia as infants or as small children which is why they are also accounted for in this section. The reason for parental migration of the second generation were more versatile than that of those who came as children, in which the Angolan civil war dominated as push-factor for migration. Common to the majority of both of these groups are the relatively young ages, with the majority being in their twenties and only a couple being middle aged. Thus, the results lack accounts from older second-generation subjects. The experiences of those who migrated as older children bridge those of first and second generation immigrants. This further sheds light on the versatility of migrant experiences and similarly the difficulties encountered in the categorization of such experiences.

Those who migrated to Namibia as children ranged in age from infants to ten years of age. All but one came as a consequence of the Angolan civil war and migrated in the early 1990s, whereas one respondent migrated alone at the age of 10 in 2000 to escape the corrupt educational system in Angola and get schooled in Namibia (Eduardo 2013, interview). Of those who migrated due to the civil war, two had family who were high ranking UNITA militants and were thus targets in Angola (Natanael 2013, interview; Leo 2013, interview), and one had family being UNITA-supporters (Angél 2013, interview). Two respondents just had to flee in a rush due to violence which scattered their families (Otávio 2013, interview; Elias 2013, interview). One of them fled with his mother in 1991, and managed to cross over to Namibia by swimming over the river and claim they were lucky to escape the bullets of the NDF (Otávio 2013, interview). He and his mother were helped by Namibian civilians who hid, fed and clothed them at their own risk as the Namibian police went from house to house to arrest and deport Angolan citizens and Umbundu peoples. In the day they went hiding in the bush and in the night under the beds of their Namibian hosts, and they feared being caught and sent back to Angola, as UNITA were on the Angolan side and enrolled all boys for the army (Otávio 2013, interview). However, in Namibia they did not see the war although they would hear the bombs on the other side of the river. Another respondent fled with his uncle in 1997 and had to stay by the border for a year before they managed to cross as it was heavily patrolled. He also accounted for that Namibian authorities tried to catch people and test their skills in vernacular languages in order to single out the Angolans (Elias 2013, interview). Some respondents also stated having been bullied in school for being Angolan, and that it was hard to integrate at first due to the language barrier.

The majority of the respondents had experienced difficulties acquiring Namibian citizenship, although some had succeeded. “You noticed these people wouldn’t want to help you”, as one respondent commented the process (Natanael 2013, interview). Another respondent thinks it might be the law that restricts the Namibian authorities to grant citizenships. A few of the respondents managed to acquire citizenships by taking the name of relatives, friends or helpful locals who were Namibian or who already had gotten a citizenship via labour migration for the South African administration (Elias 2013, interview; Leo 2013, interview; Otávio 2013, interview). “To get a citizenship was a life-changing event as I could go to school”, as one respondent said (Otávio 2013, interview). One of the respondents who migrated at infancy with her family had still not acquired citizenship, although the parents had applied for it (Lolo 2013, interview). She stated that she wanted to make a life in Namibia and was scared of being deported back to Angola, a country she had barely lived in. One respondent who came at the age of 10 stated he would like to acquire a Namibian citizenship if he could, and only cross the border to renew his VISA every three months (Eduardo 2013, interview). Some of the respondents still maintain connections to family in Angola and go there regularly, and state it is fairly easy to cross the border as long as they organize the right papers (Angél 2013, interview; Leo 2013, interview).
The respondents that strictly speaking were second generation immigrants were of different ages and backgrounds. Their families had migrated for either work or due to the civil war, and all of them had acquired Namibian citizenship. One respondent states that it had been easy for Angolan immigrants to acquire citizenship before independence, but that it became very difficult afterwards, especially for Nyemba speaking people. He thought that was because Nyembas are not accommodated for in the political structure in Namibia and that there is a fear that Angolans will outcompete Namibians because they are industrious; a fear he argues is ungrounded (Samuel 2013, interview). Two had experienced discrimination for being Angolan; “In school, the teachers even said ‘Hey Chimbundu’. They even forgot your name” (Joao 2013, interview). They also mentioned a fear for Angolans competing for jobs and schooling as a reason for the discrimination (Joao 2013, interview; Marta 2013, interview).

10.2.6 Citizenships and legal documents

The legal status of the Angolan diaspora varies. The empirical research suggests that Angolan refugees that arrived to South West Africa early in the 1970s and during the beginning of the Angolan civil war were given documentation from the South African administration, which is also confirmed by Brinkman’s research (1999)\textsuperscript{25}. The South African administration would even threaten to arrest those who did not register, but easily facilitated documentation once refugees applied, allegedly until the mid-1980s (Eve 2013, interview). The majority of these refugees got their South West African documents converted after independence to Namibian citizenships (Angelica 2013, interview; Moses 2013, interview Samuel 2013, interview; Sebastião 2013, interview). However, those who failed to apply for this conversion by independence and only later applied for Namibian citizenship did not automatically acquire one. One respondent, who migrated with the first cohort in 1975 but first applied for a conversion in 1994, only got permanent residence but claimed to still be entitled benefits like healthcare and pension (Daniel 2013, interview). Another respondent from the same cohort applied in 2008 as the authorities had a program for this at the time, but were denied citizenship without motivation and further lost her and her family’s South African documents to the Namibian Home Affairs, and have been paperless ever since;

“Now we are just stuck in the middle. We are not Angolan nor Namibian because we have no documents. We have no rights”, she commented (Serafina 2013, interview).

This problem, that some people were not registered and therefore not recognized by either of the states, is confirmed by Mike Shirungu (2013, interview) who further stresses the problem that the Namibian government demand from local people to be able to prove they are Namibian without defining how they should do this. Yet another respondent from the same cohort applied in 2011 and got her citizenship granted (Dorotéia 2013, interview). One informant of Namibian origin claimed that many Angolans got their Namibian ID-cards marked with the number 99 in order to separate them from Namibians. This made it possible for Angolan soldiers from both MPLA and UNITA to search for Angolans in Namibia and send them back to Angola in 1994–1995, to recruit them. Allegedly the

\textsuperscript{25} It should however be noted that the results are contradictory to some degree. According to Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview), the Nyembas who came after 1975 had more difficulties acquiring citizenship. Most of those who were called Vatjwayuki after 1975 were not Nyembas however, and the term referred mainly to Chimbundus. The reason for this was because the Nyembas had always been amongst the local population on the Namibian side as they had lived on the Angolan side of the Kavango River. Therefore, they were not seen as much as Vatjwayuki as those coming from deeper within Angola.
MPLA had permission from the Namibian authorities to do these raids whereas UNITA did not (Siwayi 2013, interview).

Further, those who had not acquired documents from the SA administration, or had arrived after the Namibian independence, also encountered difficulty and have in general not acquired Namibian citizenship (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview; Moses 2013, interview). None of the respondents who arrived in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and who applied for citizenship in the 1990s and onwards, have acquired citizenship (Catarina 2013, interview; Luciana 2013, interview; Lolo & Rita 2013, interview; Rosalie 2013, interview). Some of them had tried consecutive times during the span of a decade without success, and without getting any reason for the decline and with the only reply from the Namibian authorities to come back and try again another time. A few of the younger respondents that had immigrated after independence had acquired citizenship through, as they stated, “tricking the system”. This was done either via claiming being closely related to Namibian friends or Angolan relatives who had already obtained Namibian citizenship (Nico 2013, interview; Otávio 2013, interview), or by getting baptised in Namibia under a false Namibian name and five years later apply for citizenship, which is why many Angolans in Rundu allegedly live there under false names (Leo 2013, interview). This provided them with the opportunity to go to Namibian schools. Another obstacle mentioned were the matter of proving national belonging. According to Mike Shirungu (2013, interview) many refugees, but also locals, did not have documents such as birth certificates or baptism cards. Reinhold Kambuli (2013, interview) however stated that a lot of people have dual citizenships and gets benefits from both sides. According to one informant, a Namibian Shambyu headwoman (Tulikie 2013, interview), Angolans historically just needed to go to the local chiefs to get accepted and ask permission to become a Namibian citizen, but as this was taken over by the state it has since become a more difficult process.

When the interviewees were asked why they thought they were not granted a Namibian citizenship, a number of them stated they had no idea why and if it was the government or the people they recruited that did not want to grant immigrants citizenships. Others suggested reasons such as judicial restrictions (Leo 2013, interview); that the authorities did not considered those who arrived in the 1990s as refugees but illegal immigrants (Luciana 2013, interview); and fear of competition on the job market (Moses 2013, interview). One respondent claims her brother managed to obtain a citizenship via bribing Namibian officials, although she was denied citizenship as she applied without paying bribes and was told she did not go through the procedure “in the right way” (Luciana 2013, interview).

One respondent who had formerly had a high position in the local political structure of Rundu, argued that Nyemba speaking people especially were denied documentation as they were not accommodated in the political structures in Namibia and due to the fear of Angolan influence over Namibian society (Samuel 2013, interview). This notion was confirmed by staff and multiple writings of the Namibian human rights organization Namrights who were active monitoring the development in the Kavango border region during the Angolan civil war and its aftermath (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). Further, Namibia allows dual citizenships, but only for certain conditions. For ordinary people the bureaucratic process is too difficult to go through, and the regional officers are not supportive for anyone who falls outside of the five regional ethnic groups (Mike Shirungu 2013, interview). Yet and in terms of constitutional rights, Namibian authorities draw upon the principle of jus soli as the constitution bans discrimination ‘on the grounds of sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, dreligion, creed or social or economic status’ (Constitution of the Republic of Namibia, Adopted by the Constituent Assembly in Windhoek, Namibia on 9th February 1990, art. 10 §2). Further, the Namibian Constitution art. 4 §5 inter alia reads:
Citizenship by naturalisation may be applied for by persons who are not Namibian citizens under Sub-Articles (1), (2), (3) or (4) hereof and who:

(a) are ordinarily resident in Namibia at the time when the application for naturalisation is made; and

(b) have been so resident in Namibia for a continuous period of not less than five (5) years (whether before or after the date of Independence); and

(c) satisfy any other criteria pertaining to health, morality, security or legality of residence as may be prescribed by law.

Moreover, according to The Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons within SADC, member states are obliged to facilitate any citizen of the SADC lawful entry without a visa into the territory of another member state as well as residence and the possibility of establishment and working in another member state (Frayne & Pendleton, 2001a). However, a survey on experiences and attitudes towards cross-border migration, conducted as interviews on 600 Namibians in 1998 by Frayne and Pendleton, reveals that Namibians at that time did “not support free movement of people into the country” (2001a, p. 218).

The effects of not having Namibian citizenship, parents without citizenship, or any documentation at all, have considerable repercussions in the everyday lives of these respondents. Among the stated disadvantages are: restriction of movement within Namibia and over international borders; limited possibility to be employed; limited or no possibility to own land or a plot; denied access to open bank accounts with certain banks; and limited or no access to higher education and student loans. As Mike Shirungu (2013, interview) puts it, a person may speak the language, belong to an ethnic group and do everything the local people do, but may still not be a legal person in the technical sense. The data thus suggests that many of the respondents without citizenship and documents allegedly feel discriminated and marginalized, deprived of the opportunities that other citizens have, even those of Angolan origin that were fortunate to acquire Namibian citizenship.

10.3 Perceptions of difference and identity

The following section focuses on differing living conditions and historical legacies in Angola and Namibia for the time-frame experienced by the interviewees, and further explore the perceived characteristics of cultural, tribal and national traits. This exploration leads to the final part of the result in which the many faces of identity is investigated (see 10.4 The many faces of identity). The section relies on accounts from the focus group which are set in context by information and views given by the reference group of Namibian citizens and other informants.

10.3.1 Differing historical developments and legacies

Although the colonial legacy is described as notable in both countries (Reinhold Kambuli 2013, interview; Nyjamba 2013, interview), these legacies were described as differentiated in many respects. According to Napandulwe Shiweda (2013, interview) Angolan and Namibian administrations are very different, which is possibly a colonial legacy. Angola has adopted much of the structure of the former colonial power such as a strong implementation of the Portuguese administrational system which weakened local traditional systems (Otávio 2013, interview). In Angola, people were not accustomed to govern the country and had no chance to pull themselves towards the power, which is why it is less democratic (Vincent Kanyetu 2013, interview).
In Namibia, many of the laws supposedly remain from the apartheid administration (Otávio 2013, interview; Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview) however argue that SWAPO is not the defeater of apartheid as it has been portrayed, but the keeper of apartheid. Since the apartheid regime was dislodged in 1989, there has been little done to undo the practices of apartheid. It is no longer a priority of doing away with apartheid, and therefore a historical legacy is carried on in practices such as the legal system. “Hendrik Verwoerd, the architect of apartheid, is laughing in his grave” (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). But ya Nangoloh argue there is a difference of how the old apartheid system was manifested and how the new order is manifested. In the South African apartheid doctrine, the black people were “separate but equal”, but how politics is being played out today, people are “separate and unequal”.

Many respondents described the Portuguese rule to be harsher towards the populations than the South Africans (Daniel 2013, interview; Eve 2013, interview; Kolomo 2013, interview; Moses 2013, interview; Rosalie 2013, interview; Samuel 2013, interview; Serafina 2013, interview; Theresa 2013, interview). To quote one respondent who experienced the Portuguese rule; “The Portuguese colonial power had no mercy on anyone; they just killed people and left them there” (Eve 2013, interview). The Portuguese were allegedly forcing people to work without payment, used corporal punishment and whereas the South Africans were described as softer and more Christian (Dominique 2013, interview; Moses 2013, interview). Opinions seemed to vary when it came to which one of the colonizers being most racist. Although the Portuguese were described as racist, some interviewees claimed that they would still blend with the black part of the population whereas the South Africans kept more to themselves and that the colonial systems differed much (Daniel & Dorotéia 2013, interview; Sebastião 2013, interview). Further, the South Africans were described as having managed to implement the notion of superior and inferior into the population, (Otávio 2013, interview). One interviewee argued that the German colonial power was actually harsher than the Portuguese, given the genocide on Hereros, Damaras and Namas (Samuel 2013, interview).

As for why Angola plunged into civil war and Namibia did not, there are a few factors that are mentioned as explanations by many of the interviewees. The different historical developments, in which the transition to independence in Namibia took time and were negotiated under the supervision of the UN, whereas Angolan independence came about abruptly with a quick withdrawal of the Portuguese colonial power, were by some informants mentioned as determining factors (Oliver 2013, interview; Weka 2013, interview). Differing independent movements were also mentioned as a reason, in which SWAPO was described as a strong and unifying factor with one common enemy (Cornelia 2013, interview; Joao 2013, interview; Marta 2013, interview; Samuel 2013, interview; Tulikie 2013, interview); “People were united like solid rock” as Tuhafeni Pessa (2013, interview) articulates.

Angolan independent movements however were described as divided along ethnic lines (Eric 2013, interview) and according to Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview) the reason for this was because of how the two colonial powers treated the populations. In Angola, the Portuguese favoured the Kimbundus following the colonial logic in which minorities were put in positions of power, whereas the majority population such as the Ovimbundus were used for slavery or work. Under the South African administration however black tribes had been separated but were still equally discriminated. This provided for rivalry among the liberation movements in Angola that more or less followed ethnic lines when independence came, meanwhile it provided a more unified struggle in South West Africa which catered for a smoother transition into independence (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). Other reasons mentioned were the power and resource hunger in Angola that followed independence (Leo 2013, interview; Tuhafeni Pessa 2013, interview; Samuel 2013, interview). Although local and
regional conflicts were subject to proxy warfare, only a few interviewees mentioned foreign interests
as a contributing factor to local conflicts, those notably of a higher educational level (Dominique
2013, interview; Luciana 2013, interview; Nyjamba 2013, interview; Osvaldo 2013, interview; Otávio
2013, interview; Tuhafeni Pessa 2013, interview; Samuel 2013, interview).

10.3.2 Political climate and the state
The Angolan political system is described as more centralized and bureaucratic than the Namibian one (Reinhold Kambuli 2013, internet; Dorothy Lutangu Matengu 2013, interview; Napandulwe Shiweda 2013, interview). “In Angola, black bosses are even colonizing their own more than the Portuguese did” (Dorothy Lutangu Matengu 2013, interview). One major legacy ascribed to the civil war in Angola which is mentioned by many interviewees of both Angolan and Namibian origin is corruption (Eduardo 2013, interview; Esmeralda 2013, interview; Vincent Kanyetu 2013, interview; Kolomo 2013, interview; Leo 2013, interview; Nico 2013, interview; Osvaldo 2013, interview; Tuhafeni Pessa 2013, interview). “One needs to be corrupt there in order to survive” (Leo 2013, interview), as one of the Angolan immigrants stated it. Social and economic divides are thus perceived as greater in Angola, whereas corruption is considered not to be accepted in the same degree in Namibia. “The war changes people and Angola has changed with it”, as one respondent stated (Eduardo 2013, interview). Angola’s history of violence, corruption and lack of democracy is also described as having the effect in which the Angolan population do not dare criticise the government (Vincent Kanyetu 2013, interview).

Many respondents argue there is much more freedom in Namibia than in Angola. Namibia is associated with human rights and freedom of speech whereas Angola is rather associated with political oppression and violence (Anél 2013, interview; Daniel 2013, interview; Eduardo 2013, interview; Elias 2013, interview; Esmeralda 2013, interview; Julius 2013, interview; Osvaldo 2013, interview). As one respondent argues; “Angolans say they live in a democracy, but they don’t” (Daniel 2013, interview). This is also a notion held among informants of Namibian origin (Dorothy Lutangu Matengu 2013, interview; Theresa 2013, interview). Yet, some interviewees still consider Namibians not being properly freed from the constrictions of colonialism. As Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview) argues: “There is a clear difference between independence of a country and freedom of the people in a country”. Another respondent claims Namibians being freer than Angolans, but still not free in mind from the colonial administration; “The Boers really managed to implement a notion of superior and inferior” (Otávio 2013, interview). Yet another interviewee claims the apartheid system still exists and that the only thing that happened was a shift in power (Anna 2013, interview).

According a couple of informants of Namibian origin Namibia is unified by words but not really by practice, and there are ethnic and regional dimensions to national politics (Kolomo 2013, interview; Dirk 2013, interview). Mike Shirungu (2013, interview) further articulates this notion as follows; “A person who has been colonized is the most likely to become the colonizers. One could argue that the oppressed become the oppressor”.

Gregor Dobler (2013, interview) however argues that it is important to recognize that in Namibia, SWAPO make and implement policies that benefit the entire population in which tribal matters become less significant as there are networks of power that are more complex than only being related to tribes as their mobilization may have other causes too. He further argues that it is foremost outside observers that describe Namibian parties as being ethnic parties. To Dobler, what is really a legacy of apartheid politics is the argument that a SWAPO-government would be an Oshivambo speaking government suppressing all the other groups. Dobler argues that this is not what has happened and that there is no systematic oppression of minorities in Namibia. Rather, networks of power tend to be
organized according to local belonging. To him, the importance of tribal belonging is rather related to European ways of looking at Africans than what really matters on the ground.

10.3.3 Living conditions in Angola versus Namibia

Many interviewees stated that life was and is very different in Angola compared to Namibia (for example Daniel 2013, interview; Dominique 2013, interview; Eduardo 2013, interview). The living conditions changed with the liberation struggle in Angola and further with the outbreak of the Angolan civil war which had great impact on civilian life. According to some accounts the liberation movements and Portuguese recruited people by force which caused migration (Sebastião 2013, interview; Serafina 2013, interview). The South African authorities would accommodate those Angolan civilians that were not associated with politics. “We would hear gunshots, but we were well protected by the South Africans”, as one respondent who migrated in 1975 recollects (Dominique 2013, interview). Many respondents who migrated due to the war state that living conditions in Namibia were rough at first but still better than those in Angola (Angelica 2013, interview; Lolo & Rita 2013, interview). The Angolan civil war also affected civilian life in Rundu.

A few of the older interviewees thought that life was better during the South African period as they claim society was more orderly and safe with less crime, better health care, more job opportunities and access to services such as electricity (Eve 2013, interview; Nangura 2013, interview; Reggy 2013, interview; Serafina 2013, interview; Tulikie 2013, interview). Today Namibian society is stricken by poverty, discrimination (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview) and violent crime (Reggy 2013, interview) but that life in Namibia is still better than life in Angola. One respondent claims that living conditions changed to the better for Angolan immigrants in the mid-1990s after Namibian independence, as she gained a home, land rights and the same possibilities as any other Namibian citizen (Eve 2013, interview). With the end of the Angolan civil war, living conditions changed again. However, opinions diverge in terms of what contemporary living conditions they think that the respective countries can offer. Some respondents thought that life opportunities are better in Angola (Marta 2013, interview; Joao 2013, interview) whereas others thought the opposite. Many respondents argue that they have gotten used to the lives and living conditions they have in Namibia and that they do not consider to move back, and some have also lost contact with their Angolan relatives.

The overall development of the countries is stated as important to the living conditions, for which war ridden Angola is being stated as less developed (Angél 2013, interview; Joao 2013, interview; Marta 2013, interview). Governmental service is described as being very different by the majority of interviewees, whether they are of Angolan or Namibian origin. The system of governance is generally considered being of poor quality in Angola and better in Namibia, which affects living conditions in terms of education, pension, health care, infrastructure, water and sanitation (Catarina 2013, interview; Cornelia 2013, interview; Joao 2013, interview; Julius 2013, interview; Reinhold Kambuli 2013, interview; Vincent Kanyetu 2013, interview; Marta 2013, interview; Samuel 2013, interview). Some argue that Namibians are tolerant and do not deny Angolans to come to Namibia for benefits (Reinhold Kambuli 2013, interview) and one of the respondents acquired Namibian pension although he only has permanent residence in Namibia (Daniel 2013, interview). There are however other accounts of Angolans being discriminated against. Mike Shirungu (2013, interview) argues; “More service must reach the people, then they can become part of the national project”.

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Criminality is stated as much higher in Angola by many interviewees, and therefore safety is perceived to be higher in Namibia. Two respondents state that they have seen shoot-outs when visiting Angola after peace, in which people were killed (Eduardo 2013, interview; Natanael 2013, interview). Furthermore, the military police in Angola are allegedly violent and follow their own laws, which is different from Namibia in which the police do not even carry weapons (Eduardo 2013, interview). Many interviewees thought it impossible to speak of politics in Angola as they thought that would be associated with risk of harm, death or jail.

10.3.4 Work and livelihood

Work and livelihood conditions have been stated as different both in the past and in the present. The narratives confirm other sources testifying that the Portuguese colonial system was oppressive and gave less or no pay with hard working conditions compared to the South African administration (Anna 2013, interview; Sebastião 2013, interview). There were allegedly fewer work opportunities in Angola and heavier taxation which caused migration into South West Africa (Anna 2013, interview; Moses 2013, interview) and between 1925-1975 a lot of Angolan male immigrants went through the territory in order to travel to South Africa (Siwayi 2013, interview). Some argue that salaries improved with independence in Namibia (Gabriel & Natália 2013, interview). Many account for getting by in their new communities by doing small business like cooking (Angelica 2013, interview) and or sell food items (Rosalie 2013, interview).

Both Namibian and Angolan interviewees state that it is hard to find a job in independent Namibia and it is allegedly harder for those of Angolan origin to find employment (Eduardo 2013, interview). Further, paperless refugees state that it is difficult for Angolans without documents to find work, and that they may have to quit work if they lack proper documentation (Lolo & Rita 2013, interview; Luciana 2013, interview; Serafina 2013, interview). Far more respondents claim discrimination against Angolans exists (Eduardo 2013, interview; Elias 2013, interview; Serafina 2013, interview) than claim there is no discrimination (Leo 2013, interview).

“If you are from the ghetto people judge you. I don’t drink or smoke, but only sitting home doing my thing but people don’t believe you just because I live in the ghetto. And of course a lot of Angolans live here because how they came to Namibia.” (Elias 2013, interview)

According to Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview) Nyembas for example are discriminated in Kavango, as exemplified by Nyembas being prohibited from broadcasting in local radio in their native tongue. ya Nangoloh however argues that discrimination is poorly documented and reported in media, which is confirmed by one respondent who argues that no one in Namibia nor Angola voices the situation of the Angolan refugees and that they have difficulty to fend for their rights (Serafina 2013, interview). According to Reinhold Kambuli (2013, interview), many people of Angolan origin do not dare to reveal their origin in fear of losing benefits.

Angola is perceived as more resource rich, fertile and an easier place to make money than Namibia (Eve 2013, interview; Joao 2013, interview; Lolo & Rita 2013, interview; Marta 2013, interview), and some younger respondents could consider to go work in Angola (Angél 2013, interview). Trans-boundary business poses a challenge as the authorities do not know who belongs in Angola and who belongs in Namibia. An example is fishing in the Kavango, for which you need a permit in Namibia but not in Angola which makes people fish on the Angolan side but sell the fish in Namibia (Eve 2013, interview; Reinhold Kambuli 2013, interview). Further, when grazing gets poor in Namibia,
people still go to Angola to get grazing which allegedly causes tensions between the chiefs (Reinhold Kambuli 2013, interview). Family members divided by the border may still have responsibility for their family on the other side (Tuhafeni Pessa 2013, interview).

10.3.5 Educational systems

The educational systems of the Portuguese and South African colonial systems developed under differing conditions. In Portuguese Angola resources were greatly under-dimensional until the last decade of colonial rule when investments were undertaken (Tvedten, 1997). However, all children went to the same school (Daniel 2013, interview; Dominique 2013, interview). “They were more oppressive than racist” as one of the subjects describes the Portuguese (Samuel 2013, interview), although it has been argued that the Christian missions responsible for Angolan colonial education had as its main objective to “keeping the natives in their place” (Tvedten, 1997, p. 125). The experience of the different educational system seems to deviate among the older subjects, as some argue that the Portuguese was fair in not separating the blacks from the whites and giving all the same European education meanwhile the South Africans separated and discriminated via differentiated education (Dominique 2013; Siwayi 2013, interview), whereas others argue that the South African system was fairer as it did not impose their culture onto local populations (Daniel & Dorotéia 2013, interview).

In apartheid-run SWA however, principles of segregation were applied following the introduction of Bantu education in the 1950s. Its aim was to simplify administrative control over schools and the educational system; facilitate implementation of current political policy; and provide education that would produce a workforce of desired qualifications (Unesco Press, 1974) for the apartheid administration as the rapidly industrialising society were in need of providing appropriate labour on a mass basis (Giliomee, 2009). It embodied the idea of separation of the citizens by race (Jefferson, 1972), and in effect this created an educational system which promoted unskilled black labour for white areas and limited access to skilled occupations outside of the homelands for black citizens (Unesco Press, 1974). The implementation of Bantu education created inequalities between white and black pupils, partly depending on differing expenditure (Harber, 2014; Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). One interviewee, a school teacher trained in the Bantu educational system, referred to the education for blacks as having less quality in terms of content, as it prohibited blacks from entering higher education due to lack of theoretical education (Siwayi 2013, interview). Thus, most of the interviewees described the education for blacks of general lesser quality than that for whites in SWA, and also in relation to Angolan education. The Portuguese educational system was thus described as better compared to the Bantu system, a situation that however changed with reforms of the educational system in Namibian in the 1980s and due to the effects of the civil war (Samuel 2013, interview).

Subsequent to the Angolan independence, substantial efforts were made to increase quality and accessibility, and in 1975 education was made free for all (Tvedten, 1997). However, the system had insufficient capacity in relation to the enrolments (Tvedten, 1997), and further deteriorated during the civil war as the internal displacement of populations, sometimes being on the run for years, prohibited regular participation in education (Esmeralda 2013, interview). In the late 1990s, the majority of Angolan teachers still lacked adequate training (Tvedten, 1997), a situation also prevalent in contemporary Namibia that suffered the consequences of the Bantu education system (Siwayi 2013, interview). Namibian schooling as a whole became gradually more competitive in comparison to the Angolan one, although there are accounts among the interviewees of Angolans being academically stronger given they had access to education (Natanael 2013, interview; Otávio 2013, interview).
Further, the post-independence Namibian educational system underwent reforms\(^\text{26}\) in which the new system should be governed by four goals, namely access, equity, quality and democracy (Harber, 2014), and “education has been given the task of bringing about reconciliation and nation-building” (Coombe, 1993, cited and put in the words of Harber, 2014, p. 151). In comparison, the contemporary educational system of Namibia is generally considered to be of higher quality than that of Angola, both within the reference and control group as the Angolan system suffers from corruption (Elias 2013, interview) whereas this is not commonly occurring in Namibia. Furthermore, the teaching style is different in Angola and Namibia according to interviewees (Leo 2013, interview). Still, one interviewee who went to primary school in the late 1990s and early 2000s, recounts that the history education in Namibia taught the students that SWAPO was the force that brought down apartheid, and that MPLA was the only party to fight for freedom in Angola (Angél 2013, interview).

### 10.3.6 Language

In Angola, the population became linguistically transformed by the colonial power to a much higher degree than in Namibia, with the majority of the population having Portuguese as first language and vernacular languages as the second one. For Namibia the case is reverse and vernacular languages have continued to be dominant despite, or perhaps even because, of colonization. There, the linguistic setting was further diversified as the administrations have shifted from the colonial German and Afrikaans speaking to the Independent English speaking one. According to the interviewees, many Angolans do not speak English even today, and to acquire English skills is one of the motivators for migration of Angolan students to Namibia. Even among the Angolan diaspora many of the older and some of the younger subjects do not speak English, something they have in common with many Namibians. English skills in Namibia are dependent on factors such as class, spatial distribution and generational aspects, where English skills tend to be meagre among the poor, rural populations as well as middle-aged and elderly people as those learnt Afrikaans as second language during the control of the apartheid administration (Siwayi 2013, interview). In Rundu, the majority of younger subjects of both the Angolan and the Namibian control group spoke English, whereas the majority of older subjects did not.

For most of the migrants, this situation created a language barrier as the vernacular languages spoken by the Angolan diaspora are very different from Kavango languages. Thus, migrants needed to learn local Kavango-languages to integrate (Sebastião 2013, interview) which premiered younger refugees as they learnt the local languages faster than the older (Elias 2013, interview). Language came to have political dimensions, especially up until early 2000s. Some subjects account for a situation in which local Namibian residents would threaten to report Angolan immigrants to the Namibian authorities for being UNITA, in turn risking deportation, unless they integrated and learnt local tongues (Otávio 2013, interview; Serafina, 2013, interview).

> “The Namibian authorities used to catch people in order to test their language skills in English and vernacular languages, and make them pronounce difficult words so they could single out the Angolans”, as one of the interviewees reported (Elias 2013, interview).

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\(^{26}\) For more information, see “the Constitution of Namibia (1990); the Ministry of Education’s 1990 document titled *Education in Transition: Nurturing our Future*, in which the broad goals of Namibia’s education system are outlined; the Ministry of Education’s 1993 policy document *Towards Education for All: A Development Brief for Education, Culture and Training*; the Namibian Qualifications Authority Act, Act 9 of 1998; and the 2001 *Education Act – Act 12 of 2001*” (Harber, 2014, p. 150).
Another interviewee however, contest this statement by claiming that Angolans, like the Nyembas, are free to speak their language and practice their culture in Kavango although that is not the case to the same degree in the rest of Namibia (Samuel 2013, interview). It is however the case that in Kavango schools only the languages of the five tribes are taught, and not for example, Nyemba or Chokwe (Mike Shirungu 2013, interview) although they make up a considerable part of the population (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013; interview). Another informant of Namibian origin argued that in the case of, for example, a Nyemba Angolan living in Rundu, but also speaking other languages, it is impossible to detect whether that person is Namibian or Angolan (Reinhold Kambuli 2013, interview).

The part language plays in the culture-identity vortex is evident. “Especially when we speak of culture, we speak of language”, as one subject states (Moses 2013, interview). For Angolans this had specific implications. According to another subject, Angolans adopted most of the ways of the colonial power including the language, and vernacular languages were not even on the curriculum (Otávio 2013, interview). “Angolans speak the tribal language as a second language but in Namibia it is the reverse.” as another informant stated (Tuhafeni Pessa 2013, interview). The situation was further perpetuated as the Angolan civil war contributed to a loss of tradition, culture, customs, history and vernacular language skills as people did not have time to be taught by the elders as local communities were shattered and major parts of the population was on the run, sometimes for years. “That is why you find Angolan people who do not speak their vernacular language, and they are proud of speaking the colonial language” (Otávio 2013, interview). At the same time, Portuguese is by the Angolan diaspora in general considered a major component of the conceived connection to Angola, although the issue is conflicting. To quote one 2nd generation immigrant:

“When you know the language, you feel part of the place. But you still don’t feel a part of it because I was born in Namibia and have Namibian documents” (Marta 2013, interview).

In Namibia however, Namibians tried by all means to preserve their culture and language during the colonial era (Otávio 2013, interview), but since independence the adoption of English as an official language has been thought of as a unifying factor (Moses 2013, interview).

10.4 The many faces of identity

This section focuses on the interviewees’ notions of cultural, ethnic, tribal and national identity. Here, the views of the focus group of Angolan origin, referred to as respondents, are compared to those of the reference group of Namibian origin and other informants, which are referred to as interviewees or informants.

10.4.1 Cultural, ethnic and tribal identity

“A culture is the belief people have about something” (Natanael 2013, interview).

Cultural differences are by interviewees of both Namibian and Angolan descent described as something that makes Angolans and Namibians different from each other (Elias 2013, interview; Eduardo 2013, interview; Magdalena 2013, interview). Certain cultural traits are pointed out as markers of difference between Angolans and Namibians. Among those mentioned by many interviewees are cultural expressions such as food, music, dances, clothing, language, housing,
traditions and rituals (Daniel & Dorotéia 2013, interview; Eduardo 2013, interview; Lolo & Rita 2013, interview; Magdalena 2013, interview; Moses 2013, interview; Nyjamba 2013, interview). Cultural differences are said to be dependent of the different tribes that exists in Angola and Namibia (Daniel & Dorotéia 2013, interview). Angolans are by some however considered to have lost their tradition due to the disruptive effects of colonialism, the civil war and migration (Daniel & Dorotéia 2013, interview; Lolo & Rita 2013, interview; Natanael 2013, interview). As one respondent puts it: “The Umbundu that has lived in Namibia for 20-30 years are now living the life of Namibians but Angolan [lifestyle] is very different” (Rita 2013, interview). Namibians however, are considered to have preserved their cultures and languages to a greater extent (Otávio 2013, interview).

Many interviewees of both Angolan and Namibian origin argue that the difference between the people residing along the border is very slight or hardly existing (Eve 2013, interview; Luciana 2013, interview; Reggy 2013, interview; Theresa 2013, interview; Weka 2013, interview) and that Rundu and Calais feel the same (Leo 2013, interview). This is allegedly because many tribes reside on both sides of the border (Reggy 2013, interview) and for example the Kwangali and Nyemba have a long history of trading and intermarriage (Weka 2013, interview). In this regard, regional differences within Angola and Namibia may be greater than between the peoples residing along the border (Rosalie 2013, interview; Leo 2013, interview), and due to historical linkages Kavangos are more integrative towards for example Nyembas compared to other parts of Namibia (Samuel 2013, interview). For example, Angolan and Namibian Nyembas have been described as only slightly different from each other (Eve 2013, interview). Napandulwe Shiweda (2013, interview) also refers to a strong relationship between Namibian and Angolan Kwanyamas despite their differing colonial histories and the installation of a new queenship on the Namibian side which is only for Namibian Kwanyamas.

According to Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview) cultural and tribal identities prior to colonization can be described as rather flexible. A person could, despite tribal belonging, walk into another tribe’s homestead and turn the cooking stones of the fire. By this gesture it was implicit that the person needed help and asked to be accepted to the group and to become part of the family, which is a reason why it may still be difficult to make clear distinctions between peoples. Although people of various ethnical groups could perceive themselves as one before colonialism, Likuwa argues that “colonialism is the thing that taught us to see ourselves as different from others, and not to see ourselves as one”; a colonial legacy of the divide and rule policy that Likuwa argue today is reflected in how immigrants are described as different and separate groups.

Interviewees (Anna 2013, interview; Vincent Kanyetu 2013, interview; Moses 2013, interview; Oliver 2013, interview; Otávio 2013, interview Samuel 2013, interview; Mike Shirungu 2013, interview; Jeremy Silvester 2013, interview; Weka 2013, interview) from all categories (those of Namibian and of Angolan origin along with academics) further argue that tribal belonging was less important prior to Namibian independence as the struggle unified the people, but that tribal belonging has increased in importance after independence at a grass-root level which in turn creates ethnic tensions. This is described as related to the question of tribal representation within the political power, but also to work opportunities and land issues. Many consider Ovambos to have gained most advantages after independence and to dominate the political scene, which according to Vincent Kanyetu (2013, interview) has created a feeling of misrepresentation in other regions and among other tribes in Namibia, although some literature argue Namibian politics being an example of non-ethnically dominated party politics in Africa in which SWAPO is a prototype of a “catch-all” party (Elischer, 2013). Mike Shirungu (2013, interview) however argue that “ethnic ideology” and tribal issues among ethnic groups poses a real problem in Namibia as party politics gain ethnic connotations. This is partly
confirmed among the interviewees; “Now there is more racism going on today between tribes than it was between blacks and whites during the apartheid era”, as one Angolan respondent stated (Osvaldo 2013, interview).

Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview) believes ethnic divides are the greatest obstacle to development and cause of conflict in Africa, with Angola and Namibia being no exceptions as ethnicity and party politics are interlinked. He further argues that tribalism is rising in Namibia, even overriding ethnicity as a factor of importance. He further claims that xenophobia is present in the Namibian society and is expressed in various ways, for example in semantics. Ovambos have derogatory terms for other groups such as “Mbvela” which is used to denote Kavangos, Caprivians and Ovimbundus meaning “uncivilized people”, and “Kwankara” which is used to denote Namas, Damaras, Basters, San, Khoi and coloureds meaning “a person who does not cater for tomorrow”. ya Nangoloh further argues that because of this, the SWAPO government payed little attention to the Kavango border population suffering from violence during the Angolan civil war, as the Ovambo-dominated SWAPO payed little attention to the protection of the Kavango population. In the view of Mike Shirungu (2013, interview), the question of belonging has become very complex in Kavango. Prior to independence Angolans needed to hide among the five ethnic groups in Kavango to be safe and avoid the authorities. With independence these groups that would identify themselves as Nyemba, Kimbundu, Ovimbundu, also wanted to assert and identify themselves, as did the five Kavango tribes. Shirungu mentions an effort which illustrates this situation, in which Nyembas wanted to be officially recognized as an own Kavango tribe/ethnic group, but failed to do so.

There are however a few interviewees that argue that tribal belonging has become less important, and that there is more unity in liberated Namibia (Gabriel & Natália 2013, interview; Kolomo 2013, interview; Siwayi 2013, interview). Another respondent being in her late 80s further recalls that people lived more in separate groups when she was a child, and that people of different tribes mix more today (Eve 2013, interview).

10.4.2 National traits and stereotypes

A few national traits come forth as particularly notable in the descriptions made by the interviewees in an almost stereotypical manner. An overwhelming majority of all interviewees residing in Rundu, whether they were of Angolan or Namibian origin, characterized Angolans as much more ambitious, business minded and hardworking (Anna 2013, interview; Cornelia 2013, interview; Joao 2013, interview; Kolomo 2013, interview; Leo 2013, interview; Dorothy Lutangu Matengu 2013, interview; Marta 2013, interview; Nelson & Ethan 2013, interview; Tuhafeni Pessa 2013, interview; Samuel 2013, interview;). Kavango’s growing businesses have been related to this Angolan influence (Leo 2013, interview; Dorothy Lutangu Matengu 2013, interview). The main reason stated for this was the effect of the treatment of the Portuguese administration and later the Angolan civil war that forced people to become hardworking and industrious for survival (Cornelia 2013, interview; Kolomo 2013, interview; Luciana 2013, interview; Nelson & Ethan 2013, interview; Samuel 2013, interview). “The Angolans didn’t get anything served”, as one interviewee phrased it (Anna 2013, interview).

Namibians in general and Kavangos in particular, were however described as lazy, dependant and too relaxed by the majority of interviewees (Anna 2013, interview; Dominique 2013, interview; Eduardo 2013, interview; Elias 2013, interview; Ethan & Nelson 2013, interview; Leo 2013, interview; Marta 2013, interview; Otávio 2013, interview; Reggy 2013, interview). Also in the case of Namibian national traits, it was argued that the South African colonial power was lenient in comparison to the Portuguese, “spoon feeding” the population and not educating them properly (Anna 2013, interview;
Tuhafeni Pessa 2013, interview; Samuel 2013, interview). The notion of Angolans being hardworking and Namibian lazy along with competition for work were suggested as a reason for Namibians sometimes being resentful towards Angolans (Leo 2013, interview).

Notably, a few Namibian interviewees all spoke of a “civil war hangover”, a post-traumatic stress ascribed to Angolan individuals as well as to the whole Angolan society that allegedly shape behaviours of individuals and the society at large (Ethan & Nelson 2013, interview; Kolomo 2013, interview; Siwayi 2013, interview). Also respondents of Angolan origin describe a transformation of Angolans and Angolan society due to the war in which people became different from each other (Anna 2013, interview; Eduardo 2013, interview; Gabriel 2013, interview; Otávio 2013, interview; Samuel 2013, interview; Sebastião 2013, interview).

“The legacy of the civil war was that it changed the mind of the people. It has decreased trust, increased societal fear. Much of former militaries are now in the offices and that influence how the administration is run.” (Samuel 2013, interview)

The war also allegedly affected the population as they along with material losses also lost traditions, culture, customs and their vernacular languages as the population were scattered and these traditions and knowledges could not be passed on from the elders (Otávio 2013, interview).

In terms of appearance, Angolans and Namibians are described as having different style. Angolan style is associated with wearing skinny jeans, being neat and clean and having a different walking style, traits asserted by both the focus and the reference group (Elias 2013, interview; Ethan & Nelson 2013, interview; Leo 2013, interview; Natanael 2013, interview; Nico 2013, interview; Nyjamba 2013, interview; Otávio 2013, interview; Siwayi 2013, interview; Theresa 2013, interview). Angolan style has in parts also become popular in Rundu also among Namibians (Leo 2013, interview; Luciana 2013, interview; Moses 2013, interview).

10.4.3 Notions of national identity

Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview) argue that people in South West Africa did not see themselves as having a nationality as in being “South West Africans”, a notion confirmed by several interviewees (Magdalena 2013, interview; Moses 2013, interview; Nedine 2013, interview; Siwayi 2013, interview; Tulikie 2013, interview). Instead, regional and tribal belonging was what mattered and interviewees from the Namibian reference group state that they would just consider themselves as “being Kavango”. Therefore, according to Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview), the river was not perceived as a border and the borderline was just perceived as Kavango, and in the early colonial period people would not perceive themselves as crossing a border and entering a new country when they crossed the river. The land beyond the Kuito River (see Figure 2, p. 5) however, was considered “Nyemba-land”, which to Likuwa may be why Kavango people consider themselves as owners of the land just across the Kavango River and perceive Nyembas not being part of that land as they know where the “Nyemba-land” starts which is beyond that land. “This affects how they think about themselves and the others” (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). From a Kavango perspective this may be why they think that the Nyembas cannot claim that everyone north of the Kavango River come from Angola, whereas from a Nyemba perspective people north of the Kavango River all come from Angola and therefore there is not a sound reason for denying any Angolan immigrant citizenship, equal rights and land. According to Likuwa (2013, interview), this shows how the knowledge and notion of where the tribal land extended before colonialism still affects how people think now.
Therefore, a Namibian national identity is a recent phenomenon, and according to Henning Melber (2013, interview) very much a “political construction”. However, according to Frayne and Pendleton who have studied attitudes to migration and national identity in Namibia, “Namibians have a strong attachment to their own country”. They further argue that “Namibian citizenship is an essential component of identity and self-determination” (2001a, p. 218). According to Napandulwe Shiwedwa (2013, interview), people in Namibia during the liberation struggle and right after independence would emphasise being Namibian, but that tribal and ethnic belonging has become more accentuated after independence. According to her, state policies have put emphasis on ethnicity, such as having different traditional authorities within the Ovambo group for the different dialects; “You are Ovambo, but you are Kwanyama”. Further, it has become important for different groups to have a local authority recognised by the Namibian state (Napandulwe Shiwedwa 2013, interview). Henning Melber (2013, interview) however argues that the recognition of tribal identity as part of Namibian nation building officially is a “no go” as it relates back to race politics, but yet everyone is turned towards cultural values and tribal sub-cultures. The political loyalty is to the state, and that is what constitutes being Namibian, but below this there are cultural and regional differences. Gregor Dobler (2013, interview) argues that the fine line Namibia is presently walking, is to accept that people see themselves as belonging to cultures, but to take that belonging and transform it to national belonging. Romanus Shampapi Shiremo (2013, interview), refers to his father when illustrating how national belonging has an instrumental function. The father, born in Angola, consider himself as Namibian as he had lived in Namibia for a long time. However, Shampapi Shiremo claims that his father’s generation, whose grandfathers in turn were born in Namibia before they moved to Angola, would regard themselves as Namibian because of that history.

“This type of argument serves a purpose at a certain point of time. Because if they have to cross into Angola, they will again use that argument, saying that ‘we are Angolans, we were born here.’” (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview)

This claim resonates with the argumentation of Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview), according to whom national belonging rather refers to geographic origin than to identity. Therefore, ya Nangohol thinks there is no such thing as a national identity, but only tribal identities, and hence tribalism is a challenge to the state which is why the political system initiates patriotic programs such as “My Namibia, My country, My pride” to enhance a sense of belonging to Namibia, a kind of “Namibianness” (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). Henning Melber (2013, interview) further argues that the political climate in Namibia since independence implicitly incorporates a view in which “anyone who is not SWAPO is not Namibian”, and that other parties are only tolerated as long as they do not constitute a real threat, a notion in part confirmed by some of the Namibian interviewees (for example Kolomo 2013, interview; Reggy 2013, interview).

As for the Angolan diaspora, all but one of the older respondents with Namibian citizenship (Angelica 2013, interview; Dominique 2013, interview; Moses 2013, interview; Sebastião 2013, interview) described themselves as feeling like Namibians, and they refer to the amount of time spent in Namibia as an important factor of this identification. By having been living in Namibia for a considerable part of their lives, they stated that they had gotten used to the country and its peoples, and that they had integrated and taken to some of the Namibian traditions. The common denominator of the respondents who similarly had spent a great part of their lives in Namibia, but felt more like Angolans, was that they had not obtained Namibian citizenship (Daniel 2013, interview; Lolo & Rita 2013, interview) and/or stressed the fact that they were forced to migrate and thus never chose to move to Namibia (Dorotéia 2013, interview; Eve 2013, interview; Serafina 2013, interview). The persons without
Namibian citizenship articulated a disappointment with the Namibian authorities. A couple of respondents who had lived in Namibia since the Angolan civil war and who had not obtained a Namibian citizenship still felt more Namibian than Angolan. Both mainly referred to the fact that they had lost much of the contact with the Angolan society and that they had become accustomed to a Namibian lifestyle (Luciana 2013, interview; Rosalie 2013, interview). One respondent, who had stayed in Namibia without obtaining citizenship, said that if she could choose she would prefer a Namibian citizenship, but that she considered herself both Angolan and Namibian as Angola was her birth country but Namibia was where she had lived for a long time. As she stated; “Even going to Calais I feel like a Namibian” (Catarina 2013, interview).

Notably many of the respondents who migrated as children or were second generation immigrants, speak of the benefits of being able to fit in and identify with both Angola and Namibia, and two of the respondents call themselves “chameleons” adapting to whatever environment they are in (Elias 2013, interview; Leo 2013, interview). Some from this category however identified as being Namibian (Julius 2013, interview; Nico 2013, interview; Otávio 2013, interview), mainly stating that it was because they had lived most or all their lives in Namibia. One respondent had an Angolan citizenship but felt like a Namibian as he had lived most of his life in Namibia and had lost his culture as his mother wanted to forget about Angola and the war, and instead focused on integrating into the community in Namibia (Otávio 2013, interview). Two respondents (Angél 2013, interview; Leo 2013, interview) that came as small children and who had obtained Namibian citizenship still identified as Angolan, and stated that this was because of family ties there and because circumstance had forced them to move to Namibia. The vast majority of those who came as children or were second generation immigrants had obtained a Namibian citizenship. One respondent argue that national identity is a self-fulfilling prophecy, and that identity and belonging is interlinked (Samuel 2013, interview).

Some of the interviewees of Namibian origin argue that it is easy for Angolans to become Namibian as many of the immigrants have resided in Namibia for a long time and their cultures are similar (Dorothy Lutangu Matengu 2013, interview; Tuhafeni Pessa 2013, interview; Weka 2013, interview). Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview) refers to Brinkman’s study (1999) on Nyemba refugees in Rundu and how the result suggested that there seemed to be harder for them to feel Namibian as they had difficulties acquiring citizenship. According to Likuwa it may well be the case that there exists a differentiation between Angolans coming from the border region and those coming from other parts of Angola, possibly and as stated above, due to the notion of the border residents historically have been considered one and the same. Mike Shirungu (2013, interview) raise the question of how you become an “authentic citizen” if you are a border resident with family and history on both sides of the border, and further claim many people are part of the community that is Kavango, and not the bigger project that is the state. According to Shirungu, this situation becomes an identity crisis relating to the border.

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11 Discussion

This study has aimed at illuminating the relationship between borders, boundaries and migration, and their combined effect on identity making from a diasporic perspective. The following discussion will analyse the result in a transversely in which it will discuss the presented result and the concept of identity under four major themes, being that of difference, social categorization, migration and citizenship, and lastly borders and boundaries.

11.1 What difference does difference make?

This study takes a point of departure from the assumption that there is a connection between living conditions and identity formation, and in so acknowledging Frayne and Pendleton’s (2001b) idea of the interrelationship between macro variables such as historic development, politics, war, economics and culture, to micro variables and processes such as life histories and personal circumstances. Therefore, it becomes relevant to discern what the dominant conditions and factors on both sides of the Angolan-Namibian border were, that shaped life for ordinary citizens. The study has further acknowledged the importance of difference in terms of the identity formation process (as discussed by K. McKittrick & Peake, 2005 and Secor, 2009a), as borders are the boundaries of different polities and thus living conditions, and social construction of identity depends on and feeds off social boundaries between different social constructs (as noted by Stets & Burke, 2000). Therefore, it does not seem possible to understand contemporary identity formation of the Angolan diaspora without understanding the very complex and shifting historical context in which it has been formed, and within which legacy it is continuously being shaped. Thus, in order to answer the research question and determine what shapes identities on both sides of the Angolan-Namibian border, some of the dominant conditions and factors that shaped civilian life has been traced back and mapped out, and has further been set in relation to identity making of the Angolan diaspora in Rundu.

The result suggests a few conditions and factors that emerge as particularly important for peoples in colonial and independent Angola and Namibia. First, the Portuguese, German and South African colonial regimes differed within a range of areas important for local populations. Thus, the colonial experiences of Angola and Namibia has catered for differing societal development, such as the case with the political climate, conceptions of different social groups, work and livelihood opportunities, living conditions, state bureaucracy and services, language influence and education. Although both countries were defined by an uneven colonial penetration, the Angolan and Namibian differing modes of power set on a gradual transformation of the two colonies. The Portuguese administration was highly centralized (Guimarães, 2001; Hodges, 2004; Napandulwe Shiweda 2013, interview), and although German penetration similarly was moderate (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview), the South African administration was decentralized as a result of the indirect rule policy (Lovett, 1989, cited in Keulder, 2000) which catered for an earlier presence in the border region. However, despite South African presence and repression, the results of this study strongly indicate a general conception of the Portuguese colonial system being more oppressive and violent, thus creating less favourable conditions in terms of work, livelihood and living conditions which created incentives for the early migration flows to South West Africa.
Another area of distinction between the two countries was their different paths to independence. Although the Namibian war of independence implied warfare and bloodshed, it was a far less violent process than that of Angola, which has come forth as perhaps the most important factor also in terms of identity formation as will be discussed below. The results suggest reasons in a few particularly significant areas as to why that happened. As found in both the literature review of the historical context along with the empirical material, it paradoxically seemed as if the centrifugal forces of the Namibian liberation movement(s) were far less than those among the Angolan counterparts despite South African segregation policies, as SWAPO managed to mobilize more of the ethnic groups than did any Angolan movement. Further, South African hegemony and apartheid’s gradual weakening along with decades of continual pressure from the UN resulted in a peace process negotiated with the help of the UN, which in turn catered for a more controlled transition into peace in Namibia (Leys & Saul, 1995; Oliver 2013, interview; Weka 2013, interview; Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). The Angolan liberation however, came as a result of the sudden collapse of political structures in Portugal (Hughes, 2012), which led to an abrupt white withdrawal that left a political vacuum towards which all Angolan liberation movements were drawn and collided. This situation, along with the fact that Angola is more resource rich than Namibia, was held forth by many interviewees as a reason as for why Angola plunged into civil war and Namibia did not, which ultimately shaped very different histories for the two countries. The Angolan civil war may by this symbolize the difficulties that lay at the heart of the nation-state project, as Westin and Hassanen argue the general principle of the nation-state is for “one dominant people in a given territory to form a state by assuming power” (2014b, p. 21).

The civil war was perhaps also the most important factor that differentiated the Angolan and Namibian societies, as it left Angola deeply corrupt with major economic divides, underfunding of the public sector and a society altered by internal displacement and migration. Thus, the result suggests that foreign proxy intervention had greater impact on Angola than on Namibia. It is not central to this thesis as to why southern Africa became the object of proxy warfare and the inner workings and incentives of the super-powers, but rather that it became the battle ground of the Cold War as that determined crucial conditions on the ground that affected the lives of the people. Therefore, the grand politics is really only relevant as to have shaped the crude reality in which the local population found itself in and subsequently had to relate to. As has been demonstrated in this thesis, the proxy warfare had an enormous effect on the Angolan diaspora for primarily two reasons. First, it fuelled internal conflict in Angola which for decades acted as the greatest push-factor for migration. Secondly and as will be discussed below, the shifting liaisons during this period of civil war and border wars determined the possibilities for refugees to cross the Angolan-Namibian border, and further how they were received in South West Africa and Namibia. This notion is confirmed by Leys and Saul (1995) and Melber (2013), who argue that international geopolitical and military factors such as the end of the Cold War contributed greatly to Namibia gaining its sovereignty. However, the result of this study suggests that this macro-dimension to the regional historical development were not a narrative commonly referred to or even known by the interviewees, although it proved crucial to understand shifting political conditions and border conditions which greatly affected migration and migrant status. It is not the intention of this study to put forth a master narrative and undermine the importance of local agency and resistance to colonialism for the regional development of the Angolan-Namibian borderlands. However, the lack of a complementary macro dimension may be a result of winning liberation movement historiographies in making in turn being reflected in political discourse and education, which may overemphasize the importance of the national liberation struggle in order to assert own legitimacy to power in both Angola and Namibia.
This research suggests that the Angolan civil war has left a system of governance in Angola that is considered poor in relation to Namibia, which in turn affects living conditions in terms of education, pension, health care, infrastructure, water and sanitation etc. It has further catered for a reputedly more corrupt society in which criminality is higher. Namibia however, has despite weaker economic development still managed to provide with better services and is considered less corrupt and safer, which is presented as a pull-factor among the interviewees. It was however stated that it was harder for people of Angolan background to find work in Namibia. Another area of differentiation held forth is the language – culture – identity vortex of Angola and Namibia. In lusophone Angola, the status of vernacular languages deteriorated as they were not being taught in schools, and further by the uprooting that the civil war entailed, whereas in Namibia the homeland policy of separation and Bantu education rather implied a strengthening and further enforcement of conceptions of an ethnolinguistic and cultural identity. Many Angolans have Portuguese as their first language which enforces an Angolan identity, whereas this is not the case in Namibia. Due to this development, which has previously been pointed out by Dobler (2010), the Angolan-Namibian border came to cut through cultural homogeneity that in part existed along the border. The processes separated by this administrative border gradually created different states and identities by separating different regimes and being the fortification against the Angolan civil war, communism and terror, which transformed the border from arbitrariness to something accepted and legitimate. Further, the results suggest the societal offprint of these different colonial experiences gradually created different places of which the border was the separator. The Kavango River that in pre-colonial times was a uniting entity therefore gradually transformed into the boundary between different historical developments and polities, at which the colonial and later the independent states of Angola and Namibia have asserted their existence. However, the result also indicates a complex bordering process among the border residents, in which the border is simultaneously seen as a separator of difference and yet described as a somewhat uniting entity as it creates a border region extending on both of its sides hence echoing the results of Brambilla (2007) and Dobler (2010).

11.2 The creation of social categories, identities and stereotypes

As Stets and Burke (2000) argue, the examination of identity must start with the examination of the self in which both macro and micro processes are considered. The above mentioned different conditions and factors in Angola and South West Africa/Namibia shaped the lived experiences on the ground for people, and are important to this enquiry as the formation of social categories and identities seem to depend on the context within which they are produced. Therefore, much attention of this study has been given to map out what emerged as significant differences in the development of Angola and Namibia, and referring to Secor (2009a) which socio-spatial boundaries that emerged as important determinants for inclusion versus exclusion of different groups based on conceptions of different social categories. Further and relating to McKittrick and Peake (2005), in- and out-groups in Rundu has been created where differences are established via socially produced markers. In this study the focus has been on the markers of ethnicity, tribe, culture and citizen status, and other potential important markers pertaining to race, class, and the urban versus the rural has been left out. The historical colonial development suggests a differentiation between social, ethnic and tribal groups, such as the case of especially South West Africa where the South African administration via Bantu politics separated and perhaps to some degree re-defined ethnic and tribal groups, or by the Portuguese installation of chiefs which was done to reinforce the state project and to attract
populations and work force to the Angolan side of the border. Thus, the combination of pre-colonial and colonial legacies has created social categories in the minds of people, pertaining to ethnic, tribal, cultural and national origin. These in turn are further the constituent parts or criteria for which in- and out-groups are created, and consequently identity formation. That is, as categories are created and associated with various traits and stereotypes, boundaries function to both unite and separate people.

The interviews with scholars (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview; Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview) as well as Namibian and Angolan interviewees suggests that people by the early stages of colonialism in South West Africa did not see themselves as having a national identification as in pertaining to the state, but rather identified with the community and region where they lived. As has been demonstrated, this seems especially forthcoming in the case of the Kavango. One possible explanation for this may be what McKittrick (2008) points at, by which the local peoples in Kavango redefined themselves as “Kavango” as a result of the German administration conceptualizing ethnic entities with clear territorial boundaries. Another explanation may be due to Kavango’s location in the colonial periphery as well as its autonomous status as self-governing during the apartheid rule (Tonchi et al., 2012). This may in part be a product of political circumstances in which the territory of South West Africa rather became a filial to South Africa than becoming integrated or treated as a separate independent territory, and in part with apartheid politics such as the Homeland Policy in which regions were delimited and connected to ethnic groups also being delimited as products of institutional processes. Therefore, it can be argued that the Namibian national identity is a rather modern political construction that slowly grew out of the independence movement and liberation, as the fostering of a national identity can be seen as an important component of state legitimacy and territorial claims. The centralized Portuguese rule and uneven colonial penetration in Angola may also have catered for a similar development, and therefore an Angolan national identity may be largely derived from political rhetoric of the liberation movements in order to justify the claim of rule of the whole colonial territory, and perhaps the shared experience of the civil war.

What may be included in a national identity is a contested area. The results suggest that geographic origin, legal status and therefore the ability to benefit from and participate in the state project has significant importance to the sense of belonging to a state. However, the result of this study moreover shows that the concept of nationality, as in belonging to a state, is also related to other notions of identity such as ethnic, tribal and cultural identity which are interlinked with the historic development. By this, national identity also becomes a container concept which is inevitably filled with different qualities depending on who is talking, and has therefore also been challenged to exist at all (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). Notably, the results simultaneously suggest that ethnic belonging has become accentuated after independence in Namibia, by some seen as evidence of the disintegrative effect the lack of a common enemy (the South African apartheid administration) has on contemporary Namibian society. Others have suggested that the Ovambo dominance of SWAPO caters for a favourable position of Ovambos in the Namibian society, which in turn have fostered discontentment within other ethnic and tribal groups. Van Wolputte (2002, p. 174) confirms this notion of the increasing importance of ethnicity, pointing out the paradox of the effects of South African colonial gerrymandering which seems to have become most notable in the post-colonial society, as commonality among political factions were stressed during apartheid whereas stressing difference has become more prevalent after liberation. Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview) connects the political and the ethnical dimension, arguing that the apartheid separation of peoples in South West Africa did not create but aggravate separateness due to ethnicity. Gregor Dobler (2013, interview) argues that the challenge for the present Namibian state is to accept that people perceive themselves as belonging to cultures, and transforming this into national belonging. Due to this interconnectedness of national
identity and ethnic or tribal identity, a notion also strongly put forth among the border residents, it also becomes important to comment the different evolution of so called Angolan and Namibian ethnic groups or tribes. As has been accounted for in this study (see section 6.4.3 and Appendix B), the categorization of ethnic and tribal groups of Angola is in stark contrast to the comparatively orderly and neat categorization of the Namibian counterparts. This situation obscured the results to some degree and made it difficult with detailed comparisons as to how ethnic, tribal and cultural identities relate to notions of national identity between the countries. All in all, these voices along with the many of the Angolan and Namibian interviewees, point towards Wallace’s statement as still holding true, that “[e]thnic identities are, however, realities that have been constructed through historical processes, not uncontested, primordial and unchanging sets of cultural and linguistic attributes” (Wallace, 2011, p. 12). The result however seems to suggest that these historical processes has indeed created concepts of typical Angolan and Namibian tribes.

To Pickering (2001), nations manifest their existence by pointing out symbolic differences via the creation of national identities or stereotypes, which should be regarded an institutional top-down process. National traits, sometimes bordering on stereotypes, have also emerged in the empirical material of this study as a social bottom-up process, but was often associated or blended with other social categories such as ethnic, tribal and cultural ones, which follows the former colonial boundaries of which they were formerly contained within. These conceptions of what is considered Angolan or Namibian, may for example also explain the failure of Angolan immigrants to gain Namibian citizenships, or the failed efforts by the Nyemba to gain status as one of the recognized ethnic groups or tribes of Kavango. It may be that these ethnic groups and/or subjects, fail at gaining recognition in Namibia due to a conception of them being “Angolan”, although they may have inhabited both sides of the border for a long time and contribute to the local society. This confirms the view held by many scholars (Kangunu, 2011; Tötemeyer, 1977; Wallace, 2011; Winterfeldt, 2002; Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview) that what was previously colonial borders, boundaries and differentiation is often used in order to justify present day structures. The slogan “One Namibia, One Nation” does seem to be based on what was formerly identified as South West Africa, as “Angolan” tribes are not accommodated within political structures in Namibia and Kavango although (or perhaps because of the fact that) they are numerous and have been present in the areas for a long time. By this, the “complex identity politics in the area” referred to by Brinkman (1999, p. 422) still seem valid. Further, as Winterfeldt reflects upon the matter: “Is it not an irony of history when a newly independent society – unconsciously and unwillingly – equates its colonial uprooting with its sociocultural roots?” (2002, p. 227). There are however conflicting results in regard of this situation which could imply a difference of view between the centre and periphery of the state as well as between the peoples and the administration of the state, as some Kavango Namibians would not describe the Angolan diaspora or the people across the river as Angolan but rather just part of a riverine community. To what degree this is a remanence of the formerly predominant regional identity described above, or a product of integration, is unclear.

It is within this specific context that also the Angolan diaspora in Rundu is situated, as typical for migrants who inevitably are both shaped by the conditions of the society from which they come from, and the conditions of the society at which they arrive and settle. It can be concluded that the above stated differences of both the history and present day societies of Angola and Namibia have created different living conditions. These differences have become associated with national traits, which should perhaps not be confused for identity but are nevertheless often connected to it. As has previously been discussed by Dobler (2010), many narratives of this study confirm notions in which Angola is described as chaotic and corrupt and yet a land of opportunity, whereas Namibia is
portrayed as orderly, safe and with good societal services. Further, the common direct or indirect experience of the harsh Portuguese rule or the Angolan civil war has been associated with what is considered typical “Angolan”, and was by many interviewees of both Angolan and Namibian origin used to explain certain national traits ascribed to Angolans such as being hard working and business minded, industrious and harsh. Similarly had Namibians, and specifically Kavangos, earned the reputation of being less industrious and even lazy and dependent, easy going, more democratic and peaceful. These traits were connected to a common direct or indirect experience of South African colonialism that in comparison to the Portuguese one was considered as more lenient, as well as the comparatively less violent history of Namibia.

As also stated by many interviewees of both Angolan and Namibian origin, Angolans and Namibians differ in terms of appearance, style and culture, although some would argue it can be hard to tell the difference between those who live in the border region. Stets and Burke’s (2000) merge of social identity theory and identity theory seems valid here, in which identity formation takes place, largely due to comparison in which perceived similarities and differences are identified with so called in-group and out-group members. It is therefore reasonable to assume that ideas or notions of difference in national, ethnic, tribal and cultural traits also reinforce and create difference, which becomes a reinforcing process expressed as both top-down institutional and bottom-up social processes. It seems as if identity making of the Angolan diaspora is especially susceptible to interplay of what Kangumu termed (2011) self-ascription and self-assignment, as notions and “myths” of how Angolans are projected onto them by the local Namibian society, and in some cases re-enacted thus confirming notions of a separate Angolan identity from that of the Namibian one. Although such “national” traits may in part have been created by the different settings of the countries, this process also reinforces these notions and identities. Therefore, it seems as if national identity and ethnic, tribal and cultural identity is interlinked as they are by largely colonial and historical constructs, reinterpreted into the paradigms of the modern independent Namibian and Angolan states. It should however be noted that the diasporic identity making did not seem to be that single handed. The result of both Flint (2003) and Brinkman (1999) suggested a degree of pragmatism when it came to the identity making of their respective migrant research groups. This was also something noticeable among some of the interviewees of Angolan origin notably the second generation, which held forth the benefits of being able to fit in and identify with both Angola and Namibia.

11.3 Migration, citizenships and the politics of othering

Differing conditions seem to have affected the identity making in specific ways for the Angolan diaspora. As macro and micro processes of identity making meets, macro processes such as historical development and political circumstance at a certain time eclipse the micro processes that determine a particular migrant’s circumstances and decisions which creates specific conditions for identity making. These may be fairly individual, although certain trends have been discerned among the different cohorts and groups of immigrants that make up the Angolan diaspora in Rundu. It also seems as if the processes of decolonization are yet unfolding, as accounts of the Angolan diaspora bear witness to discrimination based on ethnic origin, which brings us to the question of how these differing conditions affected the identity making of the Angolan diaspora residing in Rundu? A few areas have emerged as of particular importance.
The Angolan diaspora can be recognized belonging to foremost the following of Frayne and Pendleton’s (2001b) identified categories; migration as a disaster mitigation strategy (the war refugees); migration as an economic strategy (workers of the contract labour system and subsequent job seekers); and migration as a lifestyle issue (attraction of Rundu and Namibia as a provider of education, health-care, social amenities and chain migration due to the possible support of family). Therefore, the experience of migrancy vary greatly from subject to subject. Macro-processes such as the global politics of the Cold War and subsequent proxy warfare in Africa had repercussions on the regional historic development and local politics of Angola, Namibia and South Africa. This is particularly evident in the case of the strength and liaisons of the former colonial powers as well as the liberation movements of Angola and Namibia, by which shifting loyalties and power positions of the regional wars have rendered very different reception and status of Angolan refugees and immigrants over time. It is therefore important to distinguish certain shifts of political allegiances among the liberation movements and the foreign powers that played out in the proxy warfare, that in turn impacted how Angolan immigrants were treated as they tried to cross the border as well as when they established themselves in South West Africa/Namibia. As these historical determinants for migration eclipse the personal motivators, some more and less well defined migrant cohorts did emerge among the respondents of the Angolan diaspora.

Depending on the time of migration and the political context of that time, Angolan immigrants have been treated differently in terms of legal status. Those who came as labourers and as immigrants among the first cohorts during the Angolan civil war and were received by the South African administration, were by and large more successful in attaining South West African citizenships than those who came later during the conflict and were received by the independent SWAPO-lead Namibia. Thus, the results of this study confirms that of Brinkman (1999); Angolan immigrants that came during South African rule by large gained identity cards and residential permits whereas later arrivals have mostly been considered illegal and thus remained as alien. Possibly, political loyalties as they played out during the liberation struggles defined this shift. As has been described, SWAPO and UNITA were initially collaborators, but by the beginning of the Angolan civil war loyalties shifted and SWAPO began collaborating with MPLA (Hughes, 2012). Hence, the South African administration allied with UNITA to fight the alleged ‘rooi gevaar’ (du Preez, 2013) that consisted of SWAPO and their allied MPLA that were backed by the eastern bloc. This may explain why refugees from the first cohorts that came in 1975 and 1976 claim to have been treated well by the South African administration when they arrived, as many of them were Ovimbundu27, the traditional support base of UNITA (Collelo, 1991). It should however be noted that this study does not have detailed evidence of when loyalties and alliances shifted, or any direct evidence of why that happened and which political decisions that lay behind. For example, there are uncertainties in regard of this thesis, as some of the data suggests UNITA and SWAPO collaborated until 1975 (Hughes, 2012) which was the year the first big migrant cohort came, and other sources claiming the cooperation went on until 1976 (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview), which was the year the second big migrant cohort came. If SWAPO were still collaborating with UNITA, it would speak against the South African administration facilitating for anyone who they suspected had ties to SWAPO. The results of this study further did not have respondents from other ethnic groups migrating at that time, which makes these theories inconclusive as to how other ethnic groups, such as refugees of the Mbundu ethnic group was treated, being the traditional support base of MPLA (Collelo, 1991; “Mbundu,” 2016).

27 Note that these interviewees described themselves as Umbundu (that is the language spoken by Ovimbundu) or Chimbundu (part of the larger categorization of the Ovimbundu). See the discussion in 6.4.3.
There seems however be other evidence for this thesis; that political alliances and ethnic and tribal origin may have affected refugee status among the Angolan diaspora migrating to Rundu. As Namibia transitioned into independence and SWAPO assumed power, SWAPO and MPLA were still allied. As have been described, Savimbi had established a stronghold for UNITA in the bordering Cuando Cubango Province and the border region experienced a time when armed fighting was common. The incident of Faustino Decour in 1994 marked the beginning of stricter border control along with the period of Kavango violence. As border control increased, immigrants coming from Angola struggled to pass the border as it entailed great peril. Further, the results suggest that refugees coming at this time were not granted citizenships, of which the majority of the interviewees were Ovimbundu although some were from other ethnic groups such as Chokwe, Mbekong and Ngoya. This political situation may also explain the raids against and deportations of Angolan immigrants and refugees that began after Namibian independence in the 1990s and continued up until 2004 well after the end of the Angolan civil war in 2002. Notably, ethnic markers such as language skills of vernacular languages was used to determine national origin and belonging, connecting ethnic and tribal groups to the territories once demarcated by colonialism. The reasons for this “witch-hunt for Angolans” seem to have been obscure and unknown to many interviewees. Although fear of competition on the job market and xenophobia have been mentioned as reasons, the old political loyalties of SWAPO and MPLA, or perhaps even to the apartheid regime, should perhaps be not neglected as a possible explanation which further confirms the connection between ethnic, national and colonial categorizations.

In part, these old loyalties may also explain the Namibian reluctance to grant Angolan immigrants citizenships, although they may have lived in the country for decades being fully integrated into the border communities, being productive residents and seemingly fulfilling the criteria of naturalization. Some within this group however managed to acquire citizenship, and had that in common that they were children and managed to “trick the system” to gain a citizenship mostly via pretending to be the child of someone who already had citizenship and being quick learners of local languages. Young respondents gave accounts of their safety to begin with were dependent on a kind of covert acculturation, in which they would have to learn local languages, change appearance and the way they carried themselves to pass as Namibian locals (Leo 2013, interview; Otávio 2013, interview). By this they could escape the Namibian authorities raids in which linguistic, ethnic and tribal markers were controlled, as they were connected to nationality. The results therefore suggest that the independent Namibian government were not in favour of giving Angolan immigrants citizenship, but rather considered them illegal immigrants than war refugees seeking asylum.

Further difficulties encountered by Angolan refugees could also have been produced by erroneous inferences that any Ovimbundu-related person was immediately associated for being a UNITA affiliate. This rhetoric or misconception sometimes also applied to any person of Angolan origin. Further, refugees that got stopped on the Angolan side of the border as it had closed given the shoot-on-sight order by Nujoma (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview), were literally stuck in-between a rock and a hard place, as they were often forced to be associated with one of the Angolan liberation movements such as UNITA in order to survive in Angola, whereas they would be accused for the same reason when entering Namibia. Interestingly enough, the results of both Brinkman’s (1999) research and this work suggest that there existed reasons for the immigrants not to stress their Angolan origin once in Namibia, but for different reasons. Meanwhile Brinkman’s interviewees who expressed MPLA sympathies were cautious to not reveal their Angolan origin as UNITA forces were present right across the river, interviewees of this study had done the same but out of fear of either being involuntary associated with UNITA or for being associated with UNITA, none of which was
favourable in Namibia at the time SWAPO and MPLA were allies. Notably, there also seems to have been a rather paradoxical development regarding how Angolan immigrants were received in South West Africa and Namibia. As the first big cohorts came with the outbreak of the Angolan Civil War, they were allegedly treated well by the official apartheid regime whereas received with suspicion among the local communities as many of the refugees came from remote parts in Angola which earlier had been less present in the border region. However, as the war progressed and the immigrants established themselves in the new communities, acceptance increased among the Namibian local communities meanwhile the official policy changed dramatically with the liberated Namibian state that proved averse and even hostile towards Angolan immigrants. This may also indicate a difference between the state and the local community, or the centre and periphery.

This research confirms that the results of Brinkman’s research from the late 1990s seem to prevail well into the 2010s, in which Angolan refugees are in part denied the basic citizenship rights of their Namibian counterparts. These accounts suggest what sometimes could be called an almost Orwellian implementation of the constitution, and further bring up the question of discrimination. Many interviewees of the Angolan diaspora describe their work and livelihood opportunities as worse compared to Namibians, especially for those lacking citizenship. As Brinkman put it the “SWAPO government does not seem willing to extend the national policy of reconciliation to this group of people” (1999, p. 434), a statement that seems valid even 15 years after publication. Although the results of this study indicate that Angolans face some discrimination from both local and national government, there appears to have been some positive development since Brinkman conducted research on the topic in the late 1990s when Angolans were depicted as a ‘problem’. The effect of the above stated differing situations for Angolan immigrants in terms of identity making comes as one of this studies perhaps most interesting findings. The results suggest that migrants acquiring Namibian documentation and thereby rights, did seem to redefine their national identity to a greater extent than those denied documentation as their agency has become curtailed leaving this group in an identity-limbo in which they “belong to no place and both places” as one of the interviewees stated. This results confirm Westin’s (2014) argument of citizenship as an identity-giving classification important for social cohesion. By this, it can be concluded that reception, legal status and life opportunities affect identity making, which sheds light on the importance of agency, institutional and legal aspects for identity formation and redefinition of national identity. If you are denied the basic rights of a citizen, then you are not part of the state project and it is hard to gain a national identity.

Those who have acquired Namibian citizenship may still be ‘Angolan’ in terms of language and ethnic, tribal and cultural association, but describe themselves as feeling Namibian as they are no longer part of the Angolan society but are active members of the Namibian society. This was exemplified in a range of ways, such as by contributing via work and studies or receiving services such as pension and healthcare, and taking upon a lifestyle and some cultural attributes associated with what is conceptualized as “Namibian”. Those who did not acquire citizenship and associated benefits tend to lack a clear national identification and also seem to have a more complex relation to both what is associated to be “Namibian” and “Angolan”, having lost much of the connection to Angola whereas they are still not able to fully integrate in Namibia. Those who migrated as children or were second generation immigrants seem to more easily integrate and associate with both countries and associated cultures, often stressing their Angolan origin as an important means of identification and association also with their respective ethnic, tribal and cultural backgrounds. Thus, the results of this study contrast those of Brinkman (1999) in one respect. The Nyemba interviewees of Brinkman would normally refuse to be categorized either as belonging to a distinct ethnic or tribal group, nor national group supporting the proposed thesis of strategy and thesis of marginality. The interviewees
of this study however did not show such tendencies in terms of ethnic/tribal origin, and mostly not in terms of national identity. The results further suggest that national identity is by no means a dichotomous affair, but rather seems to be able to exist in a kind of identity continuum between an Angolan and a Namibian identity (it should however be noted that what each and every interviewee may fill these identity containers with, may vary greatly). This result may indeed resemble transnational arguments, but is different on a key point. That is, that borders and boundaries have not lost their meaning via transnational migration and exchange, but may instead be attributed with meaning for the same reason. These identities become enforced by both self-ascription and assignment, creating new in-groups (those with Namibian citizenship) and out-groups (those without) which creates new boundaries between other in-groups and out-groups (such as the Angolan diaspora vs. Namibians).

The study thus confirms what Laakso and Hautaniemi (2014) describes, that diasporas rather than being merely victimized refugees prove to be multi-faceted groups by which interaction with both the sender and receiving state sheds light on these countries’ histories, interdependencies and political climate. The results suggest this historic legacy also being evident in modern politics, without which it would be difficult to explain why the treatment and living conditions of the Angolan diaspora may vary in the way it does. Therefore, as these processes shaped living conditions on the ground for people, both macro and micro variables have determined incentive for migration, living conditions and identity formation over time, which is also reflected in the experiences Angolan diaspora in Rundu. Thus, identity formation comes forth as a malleable and ongoing process, of which agency and institutional aspects emerge as important elements.

### 11.4 Crossing borders, creating boundaries

The results of this study confirms that the Angolan-Namibian border was indeed an arbitrary line to begin with, especially the reach that follows the Kavango River as the river was a lifeline for many communities moving freely from one side to the other, and colonial presence was limited. By this, the results confirms the more general argument of the arbitrariness of African borders, which has earlier been proposed (Asiwaju, 1984 and Zlotnik, 2003, cited by Mechlinski, 2010). However, the results also confirms Coplan’s (2010) and Bakewell’s (2015) critique of the validity of this notion in present day Africa. As differentiated colonial presence became apparent on the ground on each side of the border, bringing different work conditions, livelihood possibilities, diverging natures of the respective Angolan and Namibian independence struggles and subsequent wars, the border gradually became a division of different polities and living circumstances that manifested it and made it tangible. Further, the results points towards that the Angolan-Namibian border has become an integrated part with local communities, confirmed by both the state and the border residents. Therefore, the border is asserted as both institution and process (Anderson, 1996; Brambilla, 2007; Donnan & Wilson, 1999). This brings us to the last question of research, which was whether the manifestations of the border contributed to the identity making process of the Angolan diaspora, and if so, how and in what sense? The results suggest that the border indirectly affected the identity making process, as borders acts as separators and are bearers of meaning.
According to Gregor Dobler (2013, interview), boundaries matter as they delimit rooms of regulation in which the conditions of life on both sides becomes different, and only by this process boundaries and borders become meaningful to people. The border, as argued by Brambilla (2007), is both an institution created by colonial powers and liberated states, and a process in which border residents create and recreate the meaning of the border in their everyday lives. The border thus embodies and epitomizes the macro processes of historical development and political policy, and manifests them in micro processes such as the particular local border control (or lack thereof) and border activities. As an institution, the results of this study shows how the border was gradually manifested via institutional factors such as the instalment of border posts and border control, forceful reallocations of border residents and instalment of local chiefs. Further, it can be argued that the South African authorities through their divide and rule policies managed to instil a sense of place into the population. According to Kletus Lukova (2013, interview) no one called themselves Kavango before that was pushed for by the colonial administration in the 1960s, and the results of this study has also pointed to a Namibian identity as a relatively new phenomena connected to the independence struggle and new narratives of the post-colonial state. This created a new arena for boundary making and identity making in the Kavango border region.

In the case of the Angolan diaspora, the regulation of the border further indirectly represents policies and conditions which in turn help to inform and contribute to identity making processes. During the time the border was penetrable and porous, the institutional dimension of the border could be seen as either welcoming, disinterested or perhaps just as a sign of lacking capacity in terms of the institutional dimension. This situation correlates with conditions for the Angolan migrants where they were allowed legal rights and also seemed to renegotiate their national identification at a larger extent. On the contrary, the time the border became a hardened militarized frontier, the border as an institution demonstrate a political shift to this groups’ disadvantage. This state of the border also went hand in hand with an institutional climate with hostile policy by which immigrants were obstructed to enter Namibia, or were caught and deported. Here, ethnic and tribal markers such as language were used to differentiate between what was considered “Angolan” and “Namibian”, enforcing the boundaries between residents of the border communities. This political climate came with greater difficulties for Angolans to attain citizenship and correlates with a lesser degree of renegotiation of national identification. These policies also came simultaneously as the notions of differing national characteristics or stereotypes emerged. The results suggest that the crossing of the border by Angolan immigrants at these different times and conditions, seemed to not only create boundaries between what came to be associated with “Angolan” and “Namibian”, but also created boundaries within the Angolan diaspora between those who got citizenship and were included in the new in-group of Namibians and those excluded, becoming the out-group of illegal Angolan settlers or aliens. By this, the bordering also becomes a process, created by the actions and interactions of border residents, may them be recognised by the state or not. Thus, and has been pointed out by van Houtum (2005), borders has gone from being a noun to a verb in the academic discourse, that is from being solely a demarcation of state territory and influence to a process in which both the state apparatus and the border communities are involved in the processes of bordering.
It may seem a paradox that some results suggest that the border control has become heavier in the liber­ated and modern states of Angola and Namibia. However, and referring to the points made by Romanus Shampapi Shiremo (2013, interview), a harder border control in the independent states may serve the purpose of making citizen realize they are crossing a national border which in turn asserts the state. Much of the national identity further came as a result of the liberation struggle and is actively enforced in the liberated state, which caters for social inclusion and exclusion. The eruption of Kavango violence and the case of Faustino Decour in 1994 marked a time of increased border control. It goes beyond the scope of this essay to determine the origin and reasons for this violence. What it however demonstrates, is that it contributed to stigmatizing Angolan elements in Namibia via the association with UNITA, which worked to the disadvantage of Angolan immigrants as well as the Kavango as a region. As Fumanti (2007) have suggested, “the [Namibian] government is drawing its legitimacy from the moral weight of the nationalist past” (2007, p. 169). Thus, if the past is still an important feature of present legitimacy, then anything associated with the enemies of the past may also be given significance. Further, may the killing of the border activist Bernard Nakale Shevanyenga in 2003 be understood as circumstantial evidence, regardless of who the perpetrator was, of intolerance towards any element challenging the demarcations, territories and orders of these new states. Border control after independence can thus be interpreted as a way of the new-born states to display territorial integrity and thus assert their sovereignty and legitimacy. The treatment of Angolan immigrants in those early years of the Namibian state formation, as well as in present time, should perhaps be interpreted in this light.

Due to the method of using gate openers and snowballing in order to acquire interviews, it is not possible to draw any general conclusions of whether the focus group of this study are representative for the whole Angolan diaspora of Rundu. The nature of a case study also implies that theorization is difficult. Yet this is symptomatic of the whole question of the theorization of borders, as case studies indeed seem to be how much of the border studies are being approached. The situatedness of knowledge as has been demonstrated by the difficulties regarding the categorization of Angolan ethnolinguistic groups and tribes, also supports Paasi’s (2009a) argument that the situatedness of knowledge may speak against an all-encompassing border theory. This brings us to the more general question of the theorization of borders. Brunet-Jailly suggests a border theory based on a variety of social science disciplines (Brunet-Jailly, 2005), but does not provide more extensive elaboration of the compatibility of those social sciences to provide for one border theory. Further, as he limits the scope of his development of a border theory to four analytical lenses, being market forces, governmen­tal policy activities, the political clout of border com­munities and the culture of borderland communities (Brunet-Jailly, 2005), he for example misses the central aspects of this essay being migration, diaspora and identity. Further, the lens of culture is founded on the base of a common borderland culture comprised by a “[s]ense of belonging, common language, or ethnic, religious, socio-economic background” (Brunet-Jailly, 2005). Meanwhile, the results of this study rather points towards many border cultures and differentiated ethnic, religious and socio-economic backgrounds even within the Angolan diaspora. Further, depending on partly discriminatory treatment by the government towards Angolan immigrants, there is no common sense of belonging. Rather, the diaspora is divided by those who acquired Namibian papers enabling a sense of belonging and a renegotiation of identity, and those denied this ending up in a possible feeling of statelessness and alienation. Further, the identities developed within those who migrated as kids, or those being the second generation immigrants, points toward an even more versatile set of different identities in relation to identification with a state. This in turn may indicate the difficulty aiming at one border theory applicable to all fields of interest within border studies, and the results of this study therefore do not line up with the advocates of a common border theory such as Brunet-Jailly (2005), Rumford (2006) or Newman (2003) in his previous
standpoint. Yet, it would still not go as far as Prescott (1965) and argue the uniqueness of boundaries being too great to make any meaningful generalizations.

Border and migration studies seem indeed in essence to be dependent on a variety of disciplines. As Paasi (2011a) and Newman (2011) suggests, the quest for an all-encompassing border theory is therefore perhaps neither possible nor desirable. This study, focusing on the interrelation of borders, migration and identity making, must indeed reach out into a broader realm of context-bound social-cultural theory (Paasi, 2009) to help illuminate causalities, which further confirms Westin and Hassanen’s (2014) call for an interdisciplinary approach in migration studies. An array of theories can and must be applied in order to understand the many functions of borders. As identity is built on the meaning attributed to categories (us vs. them), as is also borders built on the meaning attributed to the separation of different places (Namibia vs. Angola). Here, the us versus them eclipse the national categories of space creating “Namibians” and “Angolans”, a process in which identities gain a geographical locus. Despite globalization and contrary to transnational arguments, this study therefore joins those who propose that borders and boundaries remain important as they emerge as bearers of meaning. They are creators of difference in terms of spaces, places and social categories, in which identity making processes both confirm and enforce their existence.


12 Conclusions

This study has aimed at illuminating the relationship between borders, boundaries and migration, and their effect on identity making from a diasporic perspective. In part based on the findings of an earlier study (Danielsson & Hernodh, 2012), it takes a point of departure from the assumption of a connection between living conditions and identity formation; in so acknowledging Frayne and Pendleton’s (2001b) idea of the interrelationship between macro variables such as historic development, politics, war, economics and culture; and micro variables and processes such as life histories and personal circumstances. Therefore, the first question to be asked was what the dominant conditions and factors on both sides of the Angolan-Namibian border were, that shaped life for ordinary citizens? The result suggests a few conditions and factors that emerge as particularly important for peoples in colonial and independent Angola and Namibia. The different structures, ideologies, politics and rule of the former colonial powers of Portugal, Germany and South Africa created different living conditions, and affected civilians in domains such as work, education, language development and regulation of cross-border movement. The political entanglements of these colonial powers on the regional arena of Southern Africa as well as on the global political stage, and the different development of the various independence movements along with the proxy warfare of the Cold War, also catered for very different developments by which Angola were plunged into a civil war that would last for decades whereas Namibia were drawn into a protracted liberation struggle. These stated differences, gradually transformed the territories that were to develop into the liberated modern nation-states of Angola and Namibia, by which differences have also been noticeable on a micro level in the border region as well as at the Angolan-Namibian border. Moreover, they have functioned to motivate cross-border movement and migration, which over decades have created the Angolan diaspora in Rundu.

The following question to be asked was how these differing conditions affected the identity making of the Angolan diaspora residing in Rundu? Here, the foundation of argument is that identity is based on social categories, which may pertain to notions of ethnic, tribal, cultural and national belonging. The results suggest that the differing historical conditions that developed in Angola and Namibia, helped to inform these identities and correlate certain ethnic, tribal and cultural categories to a certain territory, in turn associating certain identity categories with a geographic locus. This had importance to Angolan immigrants, who depending on the time of migration were received differently by both the local community and the official colonial and later independent government. The results suggest that the individual migrant has been greatly influenced by the political conditions of the time of arrival to Namibia, as those shifted greatly and regulated border crossing, determined legal status, life opportunities and thus identity making.

The last question of research was whether the manifestations of the border contributed to the identity making process of the Angolan diaspora, and if so, how and in what sense? The results suggest that the border indirectly affected the identity making process, as borders act as separators and are bearers of meaning. In the case of the Angolan diaspora, the regulation of the border indirectly represents policies and conditions which in turn help to inform and contribute to identity making processes. The differing dominant conditions of the Angolan and Namibian colonial and liberated states in terms of historical and political development as well as border control, has indeed helped to inform and construct different social categories and identities. In terms of the Angolan diaspora, the results indicate that migrants acquiring Namibian documentation and thereby rights, did redefine their
national identification to a greater extent than those denied citizenship as their agency has become curtailed, leaving this group in an identity-limbo.

As has been shown in this study, borders may separate an existing place into different places, and places in turn influence identity-making processes. The results suggest that national identities exist as a kind of container-concepts, and are interrelated to other identities such as ethnic, tribal and cultural identities. Boundaries and social categories affect life and bear meaning to those included or excluded from those categories; a reality particularly relevant for immigrants. Further, the results of this study suggest that border and migration studies in essence seem to be dependent on a variety of disciplines and theories to help illuminate causalities, and therefore joins the theoretical strand of border scholars that doubts the need and feasibility of an all-encompassing border theory, and yet sees the need of theorization within these interconnected disciplines. Despite globalization and contrary to transnational arguments, this study therefore joins those who propose that borders and boundaries remain important as they emerge as bearers of meaning. Thus, borders are creators of difference in terms of spaces, places and social categories, in which identity making processes both confirm and enforce their existence.

12.1 Suggestions for further research

This study has perhaps generated far more questions than it has been able to provide with answers. Therefore, a few areas for further research are suggested as follows. As Mechlinski (2010) has suggested, a theoretical development of what borders and boundaries mean for migration (and vice versa) has peculiarly enough been a neglected area in traditional migration theory. A further enquiry of what this means in terms of the Angolan-Namibian border focusing on Angolan conditions, would be of an added value as little seems to have been published in this regard. Further, this study has pointed out the scant hodgepodge of literature in regard of identification and identities of Angolan ethnolinguistic groups and tribes, which seems an area of academic neglect and therefore similarly interesting for further research. This study has also generated many questions in regard to why Angolan immigrants have been so differently treated depending on their time of arrival. A more detailed study of the politics of the independence movements and how that affected policies and treatment of the refugees (also in relation to their ethnic/tribal belonging and political association) would therefore be of interest, as this study has mostly been able to give circumstantial and inconclusive evidence and theories on this issue.
13 Summary

This study aims at illuminating the relationship between borders, boundaries and migration, and their effect on identity making from a diasporic perspective. The spatial and topical scope is the identity making of the Angolan diaspora residing in Rundu, a border town situated by the Kavango River and the Angolan-Namibian border in northern Namibia. Notions of national, regional, cultural, tribal and ethnic identity are set in relation to the historical development of Angola and Namibia in general as well as the Kavango region and Angolan-Namibian border in particular. The questions at heart of research read as follows:

What were the dominant conditions and factors on both sides of the Angolan-Namibian border that shaped life for ordinary citizens, and how did these conditions affect the identity making of the Angolan diaspora residing in Rundu? Further, did the manifestations of the border contribute to this process and in that case how?

The study is a case study which comprises of empirical primary data being a series of semi-structured open ended interviews with Angolan and Namibian residents of Rundu and other informants; and secondary data being an extensive literature research. The study aims at a holistic approach drawing from theoretical developments within border and boundary studies stemming from disciplines such as political geography and anthropology, along with migration studies and social psychology.

The Angolan Diaspora comprises of more or less well defined cohorts, of which the time for and causes of migration vary. The most prominent push- and pull-factors in the Kavango region has historically been defined by varying living conditions as defined by the former Portuguese, German and South African colonial powers of which labour migration was a significant phenomenon, and later the independence struggles and notably the Angolan civil war which caused major internal and cross-border migration and contributed significantly to the development of an Angolan diaspora in Rundu. Since independence and peace, migration has been motivated by benefitting from services such as healthcare, education and business, although the border region has always been defined by the Kavango River over which populations have moved in search for optimal living conditions.

The results suggest that differing dominant conditions of the Angolan and Namibian states in terms of historical and political development, living conditions and the manifestation of the border and political assertion of the nation-states, has contributed to shaping the conditions for identity making and indeed helped to inform and construct different social categories and identities. The analyses suggest that these social categories are continuously produced and reproduced as both top-down and bottom-up processes, potentially creating an us and them, an inside and outside. The results further suggest that the historical legacy of the border region weighs heavy on present identity formation of the Angolan diaspora; echoing colonial construction of ethnic groups (see Wallace, 2011); the Cold War in Africa which influenced regional politics, independence struggle and fuelled civil war; and new national identities asserting the legitimacy of the contemporary Angolan and Namibian states. The border creates physically and psychologically different places and has enhanced ideas of national traits based on these historical events. The individual migrant has thus been greatly influenced by the political conditions of the time of arrival to Namibia, as those shifted greatly and regulated border crossing, determined legal status, life opportunities and thus identity making.
The main conclusions are that the different circumstances and historical developments of Angola and Namibia created different places of which the national border became the separator. This in turn shaped identity formation processes on both sides of the border, which especially emerges in the narratives of migrants and border residents. Borders further indirectly influence identity formation, as they act as separators and are bearers of meaning. The results suggest that migrants acquiring Namibian documentation and thereby rights, did redefine their national identity to a greater extent than those denied documentation as their agency has become curtailed leaving this group in an identity-limbo. The main contribution of this study is an investigation of what the border-migration-identity nexus means in terms of the Angolan diaspora and the Kavango region.

The results of this study propose that border and migration studies in essence seem to be dependent on a variety of disciplines and theories. Therefore, and as Paasi (2011a) and Newman (2011) suggests, the quest for an all-encompassing border theory is perhaps neither possible nor desirable. It is concluded that this study, focusing on the interrelation of borders, migration and identity making, must indeed reach out into a broader realm of context-bound social-cultural theory (Paasi, 2009) to help illuminate causalities.
References

Literature


Interviews

Informants

Dobler, Gregor (2013). Professor at the Institute for Ethnology, University of Freiburg (Germany). Interview 2013-03-22, Windhoek, Namibia.


Melber, Henning (2013). Senior Adviser (Director emeritus) at the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation (Sweden), Extraordinary Professor at the Centre for Africa Studies at University of the Free State (South Africa), Extraordinary Professor at the Department of Political Sciences at University of Pretoria (South Africa). Interview 2013-01-21, Uppsala, Sweden.


Shirungo, Mike (2013). Medical anthropologist at University of Namibia. Interview 2013-04-04, Windhoek, Namibia.


**Focus group: Respondents of Angolan origin or descent**


Anna (2013). Age 42 years, ethnolinguistic group/tribe Nyemba (Luchazi), civilian. Interview carried out by Ninja Hernodh 2013-04-24, Rundu, Namibia.


Julius (2013). Age 21 years, ethnolinguistic group/tribe Umbundu, civilian. Interview carried out by Ninja Hernodh 2016-04-11, Rundu, Namibia.


Osvaldo (2013). Age 36 years, ethnolinguistic group/tribe Portuguese and Angolan/Portuguese origin, entrepreneur. Interview 2013-04-24, Rundu, Namibia.


Reference group: Informants of Namibian origin or descent

Cornelia (2013). Age 30 years, ethnolinguistic group/tribe Ovambo, home maker. Interview carried out by Ninja Hernodh 2016-04-17, Rundu, Namibia.


Eric (2013). Age 26 years, ethnolinguistic group/tribe Kavango (Mbukushu), civilian. Interview 2013-04-12, Rundu, Namibia.

Ethan (2013). Age 21, ethnolinguistic group/tribe Kavango (Kwanga), civilian. Interview carried out by Ninja Hernodh 2016-04-22, Rundu, Namibia.


Magdalena (2013). Age 64 years, ethnolinguistic group/tribe Kavango (Kwanga), civilian. Interview carried out by Ninja Hernodh 2016-04-16, Rundu, Namibia.


Nedine (2013). Age 64 years, ethnolinguistic group/tribe Umbundu, pensioner. Interview carried out by Ninja Hernodh 2013-04-12, Rundu, Namibia.

Nelson (2013). Age 24, ethnolinguistic group/tribe Kavango (Kwanga), civilian. Interview carried out by Ninja Hernodh 2016-04-22, Rundu, Namibia.

Oliver (2013). Age 23 years, ethnolinguistic group/tribe Kavango (Kwangali), student. Interview 2013-04-29, Rundu, Namibia.

Reggy (2013). Age 24 years, ethnolinguistic group/tribe Ovambo (maternal) and Shambyu (paternal) but consider herself only Namibian, works for (RDP). Interview 2013-04-26, Rundu, Namibia.

Shimuketa (2013). Age approximately 80 years, ethnolinguistic group/tribe Kavango (Shambyu), pensioner. Interview 2013-04-10, Safari, Rundu, Namibia.


Theresa (2013). Age 39 years, ethnolinguistic group/tribe Kavango (Gciriku), civilian. Interview carried out by Ninja Hernodh 2016-04-19, Rundu, Namibia.

Tulikie (2013). Age approximately 80 years, ethnolinguistic group/tribe Kavango (Shambyu), head woman. Interview 2013-04-10, Safari, Rundu, Namibia.

Weka (2013) Age 21 years, ethnolinguistic group/tribe Kavango (Kwangali), student. Interview 2013-04-12, Safari, Rundu, Namibia.

Note
For the privacy of the interviewed civilians residing in Rundu of both Angolan and Namibian descent, of which the first category is used as interviewees for the research question at hand and the latter as informants in order to gather information of local conditions and notions in the past and for the present, the names of these people are fictitious in order to protect personal integrity and safety. All persons from the focus group and reference group were residents of Rundu apart from two interviewees who also resided elsewhere part-time. Some material was retrieved from Ninja Hernod’s interviews, which is accounted for in the reference list for the interviews. For a few interviews, there were two respondents attending the same interview. Those are listed separately in the reference list, but are put together conjoined with a &-sign in the in-text reference if both of them claimed the same thing.
Thank you

I want to thank Sida and the Minor Field Study (MFS) Programme, Gösta och Märtå Mobergs Minnesfond and Smålands Museums Stiftelse for the financial support that made this research project possible. Further, I want to thank the many individuals that with their time, knowledge and skills provided me with valuable assistance during the course of this project. To name but a few, I want to thank Constantino Joaki Fransisco and Immanuel Haimbanga for their excellent translations and research in order to find relevant interviewees and informants; my supervisor Peter Kinlund at the Department for Human Geography at Stockholm University for support and supervision throughout the project; Prof. Emer. Professor Emeritus Thomas Lundén at Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES), Södertörn University and Péter Balogh, PhD in Human Geography from Stockholm University, for their expertise in border studies and guidance of the project in its infancy; Henning Melber, Senior Advisor and Dir. Emer. at the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation/former research Dir. at the Nordic Africa Institute for sharing his initiated knowledge of Namibia’s development; Prof. Dr. Gregor Dobler at Institut für Ethnologie, University of Freiburg, for valuable perspectives on border research; Christer Blomstrand, country informant for Sida’s MFS Programme for sharing contacts that was of great use as I began the work in Namibia; Phil ya Nangoloh, founder and Exec. Dir. Namrights, for his generosity with his time, initiated knowledge and valuable resources; and last but not least fellow student and research support Ninja Hernodh for the common effort of organizing the field research, for functioning as research assistant and colleague, and for all the moral support.
Without your support, this research and thesis would not have been possible to conduct. I want to give my warmest regards to you and many more that are here unnamed.
# Appendix A. Table of historical development

## Table A.1. Colour code for table A.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colour code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year/timespan</td>
<td>Angola/Namibia under foreign influence or more or less enforced colonial rule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year/timespan</td>
<td>Angolan/Namibian war of Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year/timespan</td>
<td>Angolan civil war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year/timespan</td>
<td>Angola after peace/Namibia after Independence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Table A.2. Historical overview of Angola, Namibia, the Kavango border region and Rundu.

**NOTE:** For the sections where references are not stated, the claims are based on several accounts from the empirical research of the study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Angola</th>
<th>The Kavango border region and Rundu</th>
<th>(German) South West Africa / Namibia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1500-1850</td>
<td>Under the Portuguese, Angola becomes an important slave-trading area and approximately four million people are exported to the New World, especially South America. Luanda and Benguela are the main slave-trading ports (Oyebade, 2007).</td>
<td>The history of migration to the Kavango region goes back to the 17th Century (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview), and the “majority of people living in the Kavango are descended from Angolans that moved south over many generations” (Mendelsohn &amp; el Obeid, 2004, p. 52). A migration of people from the Angolan plains to the Kavango area took place in pre-colonial times (Brinkman, 1999) with the Nyemba, Mbandu and Chokwe migrating from Angola in the 1800s (Tuhafteni Pessa 2013, interview). Before the Scramble for Africa the Kavango River was the lifeline for local populations that inhabited both sides of the river and there existed only one</td>
<td>New waves of Bantu migrants following the ancestors of the Nama and Damara, settles in present day Namibia between 14th-17th centuries and the Ovambo and Herero cultures emerge. The first presence of Portuguese explorers in present day Namibian waters and land takes place in the late 1480s. Dutch settlers and Orlam Afrikaners from Cape Colony settle by late 1700s, followed by English Christian missionaries in the early 1800s and failed attempts of German missionaries in 1842. In 1878 “Britain annexes Walvis Bay to Cape Colony” (Eijkeme, 2011, pp. xvii–xviii).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1764-1850</td>
<td>Angola undergoes a gradual transformation from a slave-trading society to a subsistence economy (Oyebade, 2007).</td>
<td>1800s</td>
<td>1400-1870s</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>White Afrikaners from South Africa being Boers (farmers) migrates to SWA (Tonchi et al., 2012).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>“Portugal’s claim to Angola is recognized by other European powers at the Berlin West African Conference” (Oyebade, 2007, p. x).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>The Angolan-Namibian border is defined by “the Declaration on the delimitation of the Portuguese and German possessions in southern Africa”, better known as the Barros Gomes-Schmidtals Convention” (Brambilla, 2007, p. 23).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1890s</td>
<td>The border gradually becomes apparent for the local border populations along with a notion of living in different territories, although the colonial border is not respected (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). The German presence in the region is limited (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1904-1908</td>
<td>The Nama and Herero war against the Germans. The diamond rush begins following a discovery, resulting in new German settlements (Ejikeme, 2011).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>By the early 1990s Kavango is still governed from Grootfontein, but in 1909 German posts are installed in the areas of Nkurenkuru and Ndara (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1914/1915</td>
<td>The Portuguese station on the Angolan side of the border is abandoned by 1914/1915 (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). However, after Germany lost its colonial possessions after the defeat in WW1 in 1915, the border becomes more notable as a division between a harsher Portuguese direct rule and a somewhat more relaxed South African rule (Brambilla, 2007). Differing policies for work conditions and taxation brings on massive migration from Angola to SWA (M. McKittrick, 2008; Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview; Mike Shirungu 2013, interview; Napandulwe Shiweda 2013, interview).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1915, 1920</td>
<td>German rule ends in 1915 with a SA invasion as part of the events of WW1 (Tonchi et al., 2012). South Africa’s invasion and occupation leads to a substantial influx of white South African settlers. In 1920, the League of Nations authorizes South African governance of SWA (Ejikeme, 2011). In effect, the territory was gradually subsumed by SA that came to act as a colonial power (Tonchi et al., 2012).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1920s</td>
<td>The German catholic missionaries and South African officials (commissioners of Native affairs) establishes a foothold on the in Nkurenkuru (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview). Droughts in the late 1920s and early 1930s forces people to move back from SWA to Angola (Napandulwe Shiweda 2013, interview).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>The first labour agencies are created, that later in 1943 becomes SWANLA, an organization that up to 1972 administered the extensive contract labour system (Ejikeme, 2011).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1930s</td>
<td>The Portuguese station on the Angolan side of the border is revived (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>The Agreement of Kakeri between Portuguese Angola and South African governed SWA defines the final delimitation of the border (Brambilla, 2007).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>The SA administration establishes a main office in Rundu and moves the administration from Nkurenkuru. Border control subsequently hardens (Romanus Shampapi Shiremo 2013, interview).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>The Kavango native territory is created for the sake of traditional tribe tax collection (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Late 1930s</td>
<td>The Portuguese begins to be successful in the attempt to install local chiefs on the Angolan side of the border in order to attract the population to the Angolan side (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946-1950</td>
<td>UN rejects the South African application regarding an incorporation of SWA, and subsequently relations turn cold between the UN and SA. Meanwhile, South African chiefs leads internal struggle to end the South African occupation while SA implement apartheid politics (Ejikeme, 2011).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>The anti-colonial struggle emerges as an increasingly potent threat to Portugal’s colonial claims, and a rising Angolan nationalism takes form as revolutionary movements working underground and with guerrilla warfare against the Portuguese colonial power (Oyebade, 2007).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>“The status of Angola changes from colony to overseas province” (Oyebade, 2007, p. x).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>MPLA is formed by the merge of earlier nationalist movements (PLUA and PCA), and is established under the leadership of Antonio Agostinho Neto (Oyebade, 2007).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>Armed struggle following the anti-colonial struggles marks the early 1960s (Oyebade, 2007). The Portuguese colonial rule proves persistent largely due to its ability to splinter the nationalist movement (Spears, 2010).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>In the early 1960s the Angolan war of independence gained momentum and the Portuguese began to separate people based on ethnicity to prevent people from the north that had already been exposed to MPLA and independence war from those of the south that had yet not been influenced (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Violent revolts on coffee plantations bring on an abolishment of the system of forced labour previously practiced by the Portuguese colonial power. This marks the</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>The South African government appoints the Odendaal Commission that produces a report recommending SWA to be divided into native reserves, white territories and government</td>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>Details</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>FNLA is established under the leadership of Holden Roberto. It first</td>
<td>FNLA is established under the leadership of Holden Roberto. It first emerged as UPNA in 1957 to secure the interests of the ethnolinguistic group Bakongo residing in northern Angola, and was later merged with other movements of northern peoples. Attains foreign support by USA and China (Oyebade, 2007).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>emerged as UPNA in 1957 to secure the interests of the ethnolinguistic</td>
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<td>group Bakongo residing in northern Angola, and was later merged with</td>
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<td></td>
<td>other movements of northern peoples. Attains foreign support by USA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and China (Oyebade, 2007).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Cuba begins to support MPLA (Hughes, 2012).</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>China begins to support UNITA (Hughes, 2012).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>UNITA is established. Led by Jonas Savimbi, the movement is the third major nationalist movement to evolve (Oyebade, 2007).</td>
<td>UNITA is established. Led by Jonas Savimbi, the movement is the third major nationalist movement to evolve (Oyebade, 2007). Savimbi had been the main representative of the Ovimbundu within FNLA/GRAE but had resigned due to controversy with Roberto (Collelo, 1991).</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>As part of the Namibian liberation struggle, PLAN-fighters would infiltrate South West Africa from the Angolan side of the Kavango River (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). Thus after 1966 the Angolan-Namibian border became exceedingly unstable (Nangulah &amp; Nickanor, 2005).</td>
<td>As part of the Namibian liberation struggle, PLAN-fighters would infiltrate South West Africa from the Angolan side of the Kavango River (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). Thus after 1966 the Angolan-Namibian border became exceedingly unstable (Nangulah &amp; Nickanor, 2005).</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>The Kavango parliament is created. A plan to erect an electric fence along the river is turned down (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). In the 1970s the fence that ran along the terrestrial reaches of the border was destroyed (Napandulwe Shiwed 2013, interview).</td>
<td>The Kavango parliament is created. A plan to erect an electric fence along the river is turned down (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). In the 1970s the fence that ran along the terrestrial reaches of the border was destroyed (Napandulwe Shiwed 2013, interview).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>USSA begins to support MPLA (Hughes, 2012).</td>
<td>USSA begins to support MPLA (Hughes, 2012).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>The banks of Kavango were cleared of people who were forcibly removed by the South African administration, which according to apartheid logics resettled people in specifically assigned areas for different ethnic groups in Rundu (Brinkman, 1999).</td>
<td>The banks of Kavango were cleared of people who were forcibly removed by the South African administration, which according to apartheid logics resettled people in specifically assigned areas for different ethnic groups in Rundu (Brinkman, 1999).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resolution 2145 is issued by the UNGA where South African mandate of SWA is terminated due to South African failure to meet its obligations (Ejikeme, 2011). The South West Africa Liberation Army is formed (Tonchi et al., 2012) and subsequently armed conflict between SWAPO and South Africa begins (Ejikeme, 2011) signalling the beginning of the Namibian War of Independence (Dale, 2014).</td>
<td>Resolution 2145 is issued by the UNGA where South African mandate of SWA is terminated due to South African failure to meet its obligations (Ejikeme, 2011). The South West Africa Liberation Army is formed (Tonchi et al., 2012) and subsequently armed conflict between SWAPO and South Africa begins (Ejikeme, 2011) signalling the beginning of the Namibian War of Independence (Dale, 2014).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969-1971</td>
<td>UNSC ratifies Resolution 2145, and passes Resolution 269 that condemn South African presence in SWA followed by Resolution 276 declaring the presence an illegal occupation. The latter is supported by IJC. Throughout the process, Britain and France dissent to UN policy. Meanwhile, massive resistance among the population against the apartheid and contract labour systems are expressed through national strikes and protests (Ejikeme, 2011). PLAN is formed in 1970 (Tonchi et al., 2012).</td>
<td>UNSC ratifies Resolution 2145, and passes Resolution 269 that condemn South African presence in SWA followed by Resolution 276 declaring the presence an illegal occupation. The latter is supported by IJC. Throughout the process, Britain and France dissent to UN policy. Meanwhile, massive resistance among the population against the apartheid and contract labour systems are expressed through national strikes and protests (Ejikeme, 2011). PLAN is formed in 1970 (Tonchi et al., 2012).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event/Description</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>A military coup in Portugal overthrows Prime Minister Marcelo Caetano (Oyebade, 2007) and ultimately puts an end to Portuguese colonial claims in Angola (“UNITA,” 2015).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Independence of Angola. Subsequent the failure of the Alvor Accords Angola plunges into civil war (Hughes, 2012). MPLA seizes power under the presidency of Neto (Oyebade, 2007). Subsequently, Cuban-supported Angolan troops under MPLA begin an offensive the following year against the rivaling FNLA and UNITA (“UNITA,” 2015). China terminates support for UNITA and FNLA in fear of being associated with South Africa as UNITA began to collaborate with Pretoria (Hughes, 2012). The power of FNLA is diminished (“UNITA,” 2015) although the S begins to support FNLA (Hughes, 2012). UNITA however continues the power struggle against MPLA depicting itself as an anti-communist guerrilla movement, hence acquiring the support of SA and the USA (“UNITA,” 2015).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>MPLA is greatly supplied by the Soviet Union in the civil war and thereby strengthens its position towards UNITA-SADF and FNLA. Meanwhile, Angola is recognized and becomes a member state of OAU and the UN (Oyebade, 2007).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>“MPLA […] formally adopts Marxism-Leninism as party and state ideology” (Oyebade, 2007, p. xiii).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Following collaboration between leftist MPLA and SWAPO, these national movements assisted each other in their respective struggles against UNITA-SADF/FNLA and the South African apartheid regime.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>SWAPO is recognized as the sole legitimate representative of SWA by UNGA (Ejikeme, 2011).</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1975-1977</td>
<td>The Turnhalle Constitutional Conference is initiated by conservative parties (both black and white) and develops a draft for a Namibian constitution which suggests an administrative division of the country which is based on ethnicity. Many parties including SWAPO condition their participation to the event of the conference being held under UN auspice, which does not happen. The suggested constitution is rejected by SWAPO and the UN which advocates the implementation of a parliamentary system and universal suffrage (Ejikeme, 2011). The independence of Angola in 1975 strengthen the position of SWAPO as it becomes possible for SWAPO to establish military bases on the other side of the border enabling PLAN-fighters to infiltrate SWA from the other side of the border (Ejikeme, 2011; Hughes, 2012). In response, SA launches Operation Savannah and enter an era of militarization (du Preez, 2013) and military suppression (Tonchi et al., 2012).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>The South African administration closes the border but the which however has little effect on the influx of migrants (Brinkman, 1999). A second group of Angolan immigrants arrive similarly to those coming in 1975. In the following period, Angolan refugees from the refugee camps are gradually introduced into border towns, villages and settlements. Some of the interviewees give accounts of a relatively warm welcome by the local Kavango communities and a fairly smooth integration whereas others state that they met some scepticism and even hostility.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>UNSC Resolution 385 supports the Namibian claim of independence and call upon SA to initiate the process (Ejikeme, 2011). Collapse of SWAPO-UNITA alliance (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). This leads to collaboration between SA and UNITA and SWAPO and MPLA respectively (Hughes, 2012).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>DTA is formed (du Preez, 2013).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Following collaboration between leftist MPLA and SWAPO, these national movements assisted each other in their respective struggles against UNITA-SADF/FNLA and the SA apartheid regime (du Preez, 2013; Ejikeme, 2011).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Apartheid Regime

Apartheid regime (du Preez, 2013; Ejikeme, 2011; Hughes, 2012). Therefore, South African forces launch a major attack on SWAPO-bases that have been established inside Angola (Oyebade, 2007). SA strikes against Cassinga, a SWAPO camp on the Angolan side of the border, resulting in 600 casualties. Great controversy rises regarding the issue of whether Cassinga was a military or civilian base, or both (Wallace, 2011).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Angola acquires new leadership following the death of president Neto who is succeeded by José Eduardo dos Santos (Oyebade, 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>UNITA established control over the southern part of Cuando Cubango province (Brinkman, 1999). Rundu grows as a strategic place and military base for the South African administration (Brinkman, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Further condemnation of South Africa’s illegal occupation and rule of SWA by UNSC through Resolution 532. The UNGA and UNSC come to pass more than 50 resolutions on this matter (Ejikeme, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Civil war continues between MPLA and UNITA despite the SA and Cuban mutual agreement of withdrawal. MPLA subsequently renounces Marxist-Leninist ideology in 1991 and turns to social democracy (Oyebade, 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Border residents were granted free cross-border movement according to agreements signed by the Namibian and Angolan governments (Brinkman, 1999).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Families of high ranking UNITA-military flee Angola as a result of the failed elections and subsequent MPLA assassination of UNITA-representatives in 1992. Some of them end up in Rundu as refugees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>The US abandoned UNITA and instead recognized the MPLA government (Hughes, 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>dos Santos and Savimbi sign the Lusaka Protocol, a peace agreement that aims at ending the war by the demobilization of the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNITA-army. UNSC decides on sending peace-keeping forces to Angola, and a reconciliation government is inaugurated which Savimbi denounces. Increased fighting causes a new refugee crisis in 1998 (Oyebade, 2007).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994-2004</td>
<td>Violence in Kavango with reported killings, disappearances, torture and robbery of civilians (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). Interviewees of the Namibian reference group report that the fear made families sleep in the bush, and some report of violent incidents including abduction of villagers, planting of land mines in home steads, shop raids, cattle theft and shoot outs. Raids against Angolan immigrants in Rundu are reported from 1998 to 2004, in which the Namibian government arrests and deports immigrant without proper documents back to Angola.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Redistribution of land is made possible through the implementation of Landmark Land Reform Act (Ejikeme, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>In order to make a re-election of Nujoma possible, the Namibian constitution undergoes an amendment. In 1998-1999 secessionist political movements creates political tension and outbursts of violence in the Caprivi (Ejikeme, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Savimbi is killed by government troops, and the MPLA-government and UNITA initiates negotiations of cease-fire, demobilization and integration of UNITA-fighters into Angolan armed forces (FAA). Peace is proclaimed August 2nd. Estimations of the number of people who had perished in the conflict ranges from 300 000 (Oyebade, 2007) to 500 000 (Hughes, 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Following the death of Savimbi the border control was eased for some time (Tuhafeni Pessa 2013, interview).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Re-election of Pohamba and SWAPO (Ejikeme, 2011).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B. Tables of ethnolinguistic groups and tribes

Table B.1 to B.11 summarizes some key findings for a number of ethnolinguistic groups and tribes that is included in the study. It should be noted that the tables are not complete in terms of all ethnolinguistic groups and tribes existing in Angola and Namibia, but rather reflects those groups that turned out to have much or some importance for the specific scope and location of the study. Although maternal lineage is common among these groups, the interviewees would normally account for if they were of mixed origin, which is an interesting detail in terms of lineage and conception of ethnic and tribal categorization.

NOTE: For the sections where references are not stated, the claims are based on several accounts from the empirical research of the study.

Table B.1. Afrikaners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnolinguistic group/category</th>
<th>Afrikaners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alt. Ethnic group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnolinguistic sub-groups alt. Tribes</td>
<td>There are generally no distinctions made in the literature in regard of the white Afrikaner population in Namibia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language/s</td>
<td>Afrikaans. The majority of whites in Namibia is Afrikaans speakers (Tonchi et al., 2012), and Afrikaans was an important identity marker and a tool of the apartheid system (Haugh, 2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial distribution</td>
<td>Afrikaners in Namibia originated from South Africa and were white settlers of Dutch descent (Tonchi et al., 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated population size</td>
<td>10.4 % of the population speaks Afrikaans as in 2011 (Namibia Statistics Agency, n.d.-c), although this does not only include white Namibians that would identify themselves as Afrikaners.²⁸ The majority of whites in Namibia are Afrikaans speakers (Tonchi et al., 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to former colonial power/s</td>
<td>Formed the ruling colonial elite in South Africa and South West Africa.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²⁸ No credible source has been found that estimates the number of Afrikaners in Namibia, although the empirical research indicates this group being bigger than white Namibians of German descent.
Political affiliations: Primarily loyal to the South African apartheid administration during the colonial era. After independence and as to the year of 2000, one study (Keulder, 2000) states that the party most popular among the Afrikaans speaking group as well as with white Namibians were the DTA. It should be noted that these two groups only partly eclipse, as not only white Afrikaners speak Afrikaans, and the white community/communities also include other groups as those of German, British and Portuguese descent.

Other information: The first cohort to migrate to SWA were Boers (farmers) that came in the 1870s, followed by new wave of immigration subsequent the end of WW1 as Germany lost its possessions and SA invaded and occupied the territory (Tonchi et al., 2012).

Table B.2. Bakongos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnolinguistic group/category Alt. Ethnic group</th>
<th>Bakongo, also referred to as Mbakongo (Natanael 2014, interview).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic/ethnolinguistic sub-groups alt. Tribes</td>
<td>Historically there were eight sub-tribes of the Bakongo that developed distinct own identities (van der Waal, 2011), namely the Congo, Iacas, Pombo, Sorongo, Suco, Sasso, Xikongo and Zombo (James, 2011). According to other sources Bashikongo is a subgroup (Tvedten, 1997), which may refer to the same group as do the Congo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language/s</td>
<td>Kikongo (van der Waal, 2011). In 1960 13.5% of the population spoke Kikongo, in relation to 8.5% in 1996 (Hodges, 2004).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial distribution</td>
<td>Resides in the north and north-western parts of Angola, especially concentrated to Cabinda and the provinces of Uíge and Zaire (Hodges, 2004; Oyebade, 2007). The Bakongo has also been located in some areas of Zaire, the Congo Republic (van der Waal, 2011) or Republic of the Congo (RoC) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (James, 2011). Large numbers were subject to displacement during the Angolan civil war up to 2002 (Minorities at Risk, 2006a).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated population size</td>
<td>The third largest ethnolinguistic group in Angola (Oyebade, 2007) at approximately 13% of the population (Ann et al., 2014) or 1.3 million (James, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to former colonial power/s</td>
<td>Bakongos strongly opposed Portuguese rule, and the Bangalas were forced into submission under the colonial power relatively late in comparison to other groups (van der Waal, 2011). After WW1, the Bakongo peoples had stronger ties to Leopoldville (Kinshasa) in Belgian Congo rather than to Luanda in Portuguese Angola (Guimarães, 2001; van der Waal, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political affiliations</td>
<td>Traditional support base of the FNLA (Collelo, 1991) as FNLA mostly gained support in the northern regions. Became associated with UNITA as FNLA became defunct (Minorities at Risk, 2006a). Bakongos and Ovimbundus were discriminated against by MPLA as it ascended to power after independence (Minorities at Risk, 2006b).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other information

Were historically linked to the old Congo kingdom (van der Waal, 2011). The Bakongo had little contact with the Portuguese from 190 to 1859 (James, 2011). Had strong ties to Kimbundu speaking peoples in the south of Angola (van der Waal, 2011). The Bakongo as the Ovimbundu, “suffer chronic poverty and have little access to economic or political opportunities” (Minorities at Risk, 2006a).

Table B.3. Chokwe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnolinguistic group/category</th>
<th>Chokwe or Lunda-Chokwe (van der Waal, 2011).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alt. Ethnic group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnolinguistic subgroups alt. Tribes</td>
<td>Includes the subgroups of Cacongo, Chokwe, Lunda, Lunda-Lua-Chindes, Lunda-Ndembo, Mai, Mataba (James, 2011) and Uchokwe (Natanael 2014, interview). According to Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview), Nyembas are part of the Chokwe ethnic group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language/s</td>
<td>Kioko (Chokwe) (Natanael 2014, interview).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial distribution</td>
<td>According to Tvedten (1997) the Chokwe is inhabiting the north-eastern parts of Angola in the provinces Lunda Sul, Lunda Norte and the Nganguela-belt that stretches through several provinces in central Angola. According to James (2011) they are distributed over an area overlapping Angola towards Zambia, The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Bié, Moxico and Cuando Cubango. van der Waal (2011) however claims they are concentrated mainly to the Lunda district, but also in the Moxico region and in central Angola.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated population size</td>
<td>Approximately 8% of the Angolan population (Tvedten, 1997) or amount to 400 000 (James, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to former colonial power/s</td>
<td>Had little contact with the Portuguese colonial power until the 1930s (James, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political affiliations</td>
<td>First formed a political organisation in 1959 (James, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other information</td>
<td>Known for being good business people (Natanael 2014, interview), and have a history of trading in ivory and rubber from the 1800s (James, 2011). Traditionally had a nomadic life style, and were engaged in fishing, hunting and raiding but also agriculture as they gradually became settlers (van der Waal, 2011).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table B.4. Germans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnolinguistic group/category</th>
<th>Germans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alt. Ethnic group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic/ethnolinguistic subgroups alt. Tribes</th>
<th>There are generally no distinctions made in the literature in regard of the German population in Namibia.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Language/s</td>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial distribution</td>
<td>German South West Africa/South West Africa/Namibia. Especially in Swakopmund and Windhoek (Tonchi et al., 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated population size</td>
<td>In the 1980s only 23 % of the white population in SWA was German speaking, compared to approximately 70 % Afrikaans speakers (Tonchi et al., 2012). As in 2011, German was spoken by approximately 0.9 % of the Namibian population (Namibia Statistics Agency, n.d.-c).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to former colonial power/s</td>
<td>Formed the ruling colonial elite in German South West Africa from 1884 (Ejikeme, 2011) to 1915 (Tonchi et al., 2012) and belonged as whites to the privileged part of society during the SA period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political affiliations</td>
<td>There has been no conclusive result within this study as to what the majority of the political loyalties of the German Namibian population are. According to a study from 2000 (Keulder, 2000) the white group, of which the Germans are a minority in relation to the Afrikaners, the party sympathy mainly leaned towards the DTA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other information</td>
<td>The German influence comprised of German administrators, militaries, missionaries, settlers and businessmen that migrated to what became German SWA. Immigration began in the early 19th Century and continued into the 20th Century (Tonchi et al., 2012).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

29 This study has not been able to find credible sources to the number of the white population. The empirical research however suggests that the number and composition of the white population has fluctuated in relation to historical development, national policies and opportunities in agriculture, business, trade etc.
Table B.5. Kavangos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnolinguistic group/category</th>
<th>Kavangos (also called Okavango)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alt. Ethnic group</td>
<td>Comprise five different tribes (Wallace, 2011) and descend from the Ovambo peoples that became an offshoot centuries ago (Tonchi et al., 2012).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic/ethnolinguistic subgroups alt. Tribes</th>
<th>Kwangali</th>
<th>Mbunza</th>
<th>Gciriku</th>
<th>Shambyu</th>
<th>Mbukushu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

| Spatial distribution                       | The Kavango people’s spatial distribution is primarily along the Okavango River (Tonchi et al., 2012). |
| Estimated population size                  | Kavango languages are spoken by approximately 8.5 % of the Namibian population according to the 2011 population census (Namibia Statistics Agency, n.d.-c). |
| Relation to former colonial power/s       | In Kavango South African colonial rule was administered via indirect rule, and hence the integrity of the hierarchy of local communities were kept relatively intact in the Kavango and among the so called Kavango tribes (Lovett, 1989, cited in Keulder, 2000). |
| Political affiliations                     | By the mid-1990s Kavango voters by large were turned towards SWAPO (Youngblood Coleman, 2015b), but no conclusive answer to dominating party loyalties among the Kavango tribes has been found within the research of this study for contemporary time. |
| Other information                          | The Kavango peoples, like the closely related Ovambo peoples, are a matrilineal society (Tonchi et al., 2012, p. 207) and primarily practice cultivation even though cattle are also raised to a certain extent (“Kavango [area, Namibia],” 2015). Kwangalis are much closer to Ovambos than are Nyembas (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). Mbukushu and Gciriku have similar culture but differing languages (Eric 2013, interview). |
**Table B.6. Mbundus**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic/ethnolinguistic sub-groups alt. Tribes</td>
<td>&quot;There are a number of tribal identities within the Mbundu group, of which the Ambundu are the self-appointed aristocrats&quot; (van der Waal, 2011, p. 31). Other sub-groups that occur in the literature is Mbaka 30, Ndongo, Dembos (Tvedten, 1997) and Mbondo (“Mbundu,” 2016). The Dembos has a history of strong ties with the Bakongo and opposed Portuguese rule. Further, Bangalas were known as an independent tribe (van der Waal, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language/s</td>
<td>Kimbundu (James, 2011; van der Waal, 2011), which is a Bantu-language (“Mbundu,” 2016). Alternate names are Dongo, Kimbundo, Kindongo, Loanda Mbundu, Loande, Luanda, Lunda, Mbundu, N’bundo, Nkando and North Mbundu (Etnologue - Languages of the World, 2015a). There was a decline of people speaking Kimbundu as first language from 1960 with 23 % to 1996 15 % (Hodges, 2004).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial distribution</td>
<td>Based in the central highlands of Angola (Maier, 2007) and in the western parts, mainly in Luanda, the Cuanza Valley and Malanje (Tvedten, 1997) but also found in Bengo, Malange and the Kwanza Norte and Kwanza Sul provinces (James, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated population size</td>
<td>The second-largest ethnic group of Angola with approximately 25 % of the Angolan population (Tvedten, 1997) or 2.6 million people (James, 2011). According to Angola Country Review 2014, 25% of the population are Kimbundu (Ann et al., 2014) 31.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to former colonial power/s</td>
<td>According to Maier (2007, p. 8), the Mbundus are “[c]onsidered to have felt the colonial penetration least of the three main ethnic groups”, whereas others sources (Guimarães, 2001, p. 33; Hodges, 2004, p. 23; “Mbundu,” 2016) argue the Mbundus historically were the group that had the most sustained interaction with the Portuguese, and thus became most westernized (van der Waal, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political affiliations</td>
<td>Traditional support-base for MPLA (Collelo, 1991; “Mbundu,” 2016) and therefore having been criticized for having benefitted most from the post-war reconstruction among the ethnic groups and at their expense (James, 2011) 32.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other information</td>
<td>Distinct from, yet linguistically related to, the Ovimbundu, and culturally related to the Kongo (“Mbundu,” 2016). “The western Mbundu were the only major group to be ruled by the Portuguese until the Scramble for Africa” (Hodges, 2004, p. 24). Had great influence by the Portuguese especially in urban areas with subsequent major influence of linguistics and culture (Ibid.). The majority of Mbundus are agriculturalists, but especially the Ambundu tribe were engaged in the industrial sector and hence accommodated among the white sphere (van der Waal, 2011).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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30 Also spelled Ngbaka (“Mbundu,” 2016).
31 This could be perceived as evidence that the terms Mbundu and Kimbundu are used interchangeable to denote this group.
32 Compare the similar debate for the Ovambos and SWAPO in Namibia.
Table B.7. Nganguelas (Nyembas)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnolinguistic group/category</th>
<th><strong>Nganguela</strong> (also <strong>Ganguela</strong> and <strong>Ngangela</strong>).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alt. Ethnic group</td>
<td>In Kavango, <strong>Nyemba</strong> is used to refer to Nganguela peoples (Brinkman, 1999; Natanael 2014, interview). It should however be noted that in Kavango, the term Nyemba has also been used to refer to any person of Angolan origin regardless of ethnic or tribal belonging, something confirmed both by Brinkman (1999) and Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Ethnic/ethnolinguistic subgroups alt. Tribes | According to Brinkman (1999), some include the **Chokwe, Luvale** and **Mbunda** to the Nganguela, meanwhile others do not, and further some of Brinkman’s sources include **Lucazi, Mbuela** and **Nkangala** as sub-groups (Brinkman, 1999). According to Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview) **Nyembas** are however part of the Chokwe ethnic group. According to Nyjamba (2013, interview) Nyembas include such tribes as the **Mbwela, Luchazi, Vambunda, Vankalala**. Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview) state that the **Mbunda** include those calling themselves **Luchazi** and **Ngangela**, and that these people are the **Nyemba** people even though they do not call themselves Nyemba. Likuwa further argued that when a Kavango talk of a Nyemba, the term has come to denote all those people that reside beyond **Kuito** in the **Rimbaranda area** situated north of Cuito in Angola, beyond **Cuito River which is an area also called the Mbunda area. Some Angolans call themselves Mbunda**, and those who call themselves Nyemba in Namibia, refer to themselves as Mbunda if they live in western Zambia. He further states that the Nyemba are all of those people from Mbunda area north of Cuito River in Angola (Kletus Likuwa 2013, interview). According to Dorothy Lutangu Matengu (2013, interview), **Luvale** are closely related to **Mbunda** but she does not relate them to **Nganguela**. van der Waal refers to the group as “a mixture of related tribes” (2011, p. 34). |

| Language/s | **Nyemba** and **Nganguela** (Natanael 2014, interview). According to Brinkman “one of six national languages of Angola were first called Mbunda and sometime in the 1990s the name of this languages was changed to Ngangela without any alterations in the language data” (1999, p. 423).33 |

| Spatial distribution | Main spatial distribution in the Angolan districts of Moxico, Bié and Cuando Cubango (van der Waal, 2011). According to Kletus Likuwa (2013, interview) the majority of the Angolan people in Rundu are **Nyemba**. |

| Estimated population size | Approximately 6 % of the Angolan population (Oyebade, 2007). |

| Relation to former colonial power/s | Western influence on the Nganguela was very limited (van der Waal, 2011). |

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33 Brinkman base this argument on a number of sources, being: Histórico Sobre a Criação dos Alfabetos em Línguas Nacionais (Lisbon, 1980); Matthias Brenziniger, Axel Fleisch, Friederike Lupke, ‘Situationanalyse zur mehrsprachigen Bildung in einigen afrikanischen Staaten’, Unpublished report, 1995, p. 7. Information provided by Axel Fleisch, 14 April 1998. Since the original sources were not being able to retain, they are stated here in their full length.
According to Brinkman (1999), most Nyema/Ngangela were MPLA affiliates. However, according to Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview), Nyembas have been associated with UNITA and therefore being considered “UNITA-bandits”.

According to van der Waal, the Nganguelas were “refugees from the Ovimbundu in the west, the Chokwe in the north and the Lunda in the east” (2011, p. 32). Main livelihood is based on subsistence fishing and farming (van der Waal, 2011).

In Kavango, the colonizers generalized among the various tribes and used the same name to denote many different groups, such as in the case of the Nyemba speaking peoples and the Ovambo (Moses 2013, interview).

**Table B.8. Nyanekas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic/ethnolinguistic sub-groups alt. Tribes</td>
<td>The Nyaneka-Humbe comprises “of a number of different tribes with little communication between them” (van der Waal, 2011, p. 34). An example is the Nkumbi (Natanael 2014, interview).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language/s</td>
<td>Humbi (Natanael 2014, interview).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial distribution</td>
<td>In the southern parts of Angola (Natanael 2014, interview) mostly concentrated to the Huíla district (van der Waal, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated population size</td>
<td>Approximately 4 % of the Angolan population (Natanael 2014, interview).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to former colonial power/s</td>
<td>Were almost untouched by Portuguese influence, and also their Ovimbundu neighbours in the north (van der Waal, 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political affiliations</td>
<td>The research within this study has not been able to find any information in regard of trends to political affiliations among the Nyaneka.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other information</td>
<td>Traditional livelihood is cattle breeding and farming (van der Waal, 2011).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table B.9. Ovambos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnolinguistic group/category</th>
<th>Ovambo, variants are Ambo, Wambo, Owambo (Tonchi et al., 2012). In Namibia this group is mostly referred to as Ovambo, whereas they in Angola mostly are called Ambo (“Ambo,” 2013). Also called Oshiwambo after the native name of the language.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alt. Ethnic group</td>
<td>According to Tonchi et al. (2012), Ovambo is the collective name for eight sub-groups or societies of Bantu-speaking peoples, being the Kwanyama, Kwambi, Kwaluudhi, Eunda, Ndonga, Ngandjera, Mbalantu and Nkolonkati. The Kwanyama are the largest of the Ovambo subgroups (Tonchi et al., 2012). According to Brambilla (2007) however, the Ovambo has 13 sub-tribes. Most commonly referred to is the Kwanyama (Vambo), and by some, the Ngandjela and Ndonga are considered subgroups of the Kwanyama and not the Ovambo (Ntanael 2014, interview).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic/ethnolinguistic sub-</td>
<td>Language/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>groups alt. Tribes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimation population size</td>
<td>Estimated population size: Ovambos only account for approximately 3% in Angola (Ntanael 2014, interview), whereas they collectively are the largest ethnolinguistic group in Namibia with an equivalent of approximately half of the population (Tonchi et al., 2012). According to the 2011 population and housing census Ovambo speaking peoples amount to 48.8 % of the Namibian population. Kwanyama - Approximately 5 % of the Angolan population (Ntanael 2014, interview). Ngandjera – 7 % of the Ovambo group according to statistics from the 1970s (Tonchi et al., 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to former colonial</td>
<td>As Ovambo has dominated among the ethnic groups within SWAPO (Tonchi et al., 2012) they were the in fierce opposition to the former SA apartheid regime and according to the empirical research seen by many other Namibian ethnic groups as the self-ascribed to dominate political and public life in Namibia due to this legacy. Scholars and figures such as Henning Melber and Phil ya Nangoloh have criticized the dominance of SWAPO and (directly and indirectly) the Ovambo within Namibian politics and society, whereas others such as Gregor Dobler argue that Ovambo dominance is inevitable given their relative population size compared to other groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political affiliations</td>
<td>Political affiliations: Ovambo dominate among the ethnolinguistic groups within SWAPO (Tonchi et al., 2012) despite SWAPO-claims of representing the whole nation of Namibia under the slogan “One Namibia, One Nation” (Ntinda, 2013). SWAPO is by</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
many seen as an Ovambo-party. Sam Nujoma, founding president of Namibia, belongs to the Ngandjera subgroup (Tonchi et al., 2012).

| Other information | The **Ovambos** have traditionally been primarily pastoralists (Tvedten, 1997), but presently the Ovambo “economy rests almost equally on agriculture and animal husbandry” (“Ambo,” 2013). They have matrilineal societies (Tonchi et al., 2012). In Angola, the main livelihood is based on subsistence farming and cattle ranching (van der Waal, 2011). |
| | The **Kwanyama** is the largest tribe within the Ovambo ethnic group, and the largest tribe fighting in SWAPO alike (Phil ya Nangoloh 2013, interview). Historically known for an outstanding political and military organization (Williams, 1991, cited in Brambilla, 2007). |
| | The **Cuanhama** is according to van der Waal (2011) mostly settled in Namibia and the most important of the Ambo tribe. |
**Table B.10. Ovimbundus**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnolinguistic group/category</th>
<th><strong>Ovimbundu</strong>, also referred to as <strong>Umbundu</strong> after their language (Hodges, 2004) and sometimes <strong>Chimbundu</strong> which is a tribe (Natanael 2013, interview; Leo 2013 interview), which many of the interviewees stated as their ethnic/tribal belonging.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alt. Ethnic group</td>
<td>Organised into 13 kingdoms prior to colonization (Minorities at Risk, 2006b), but is considered one ethnic group and tribe alike (Natanael 2013, interview) and is according to James (2011) the most homogenous of all the Angolan ethnolinguistic groups. They have been known to absorb smaller tribes (van der Waal, 2011). <strong>Chimbundu</strong> is one tribe that speak the Umbundu language (Leo 2013, interview).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic/ethnolinguistic subgroups alt. Tribes</td>
<td>Language/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial distribution</td>
<td>Were originally predominant in the west-central parts of Angola (Minorities at Risk, 2006b). “[C]oncentrated in the central highland provinces of Huambo, Bie and Benguela” (van der Waal, 2011, pp. 33–34), as well as Moxico and Huila (James, 2011). Has been subject to internal dislocation due to war (Minorities at Risk, 2006b). Most Angolans in northern Namibia belongs to the Angolan southern tribes and are Umbundu (Angél 2013, interview).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated population size</td>
<td>The largest ethnolinguistic group in Angola that constitutes 38 % of the population (Hodges, 2004; Oyebade, 2007), estimated to 3.9 million (James, 2011). Due to this, van der Waal (2011) argues it should rather be considered a nation than a group of associated tribes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to former colonial power/s</td>
<td>The Ovimbundu were in alliance with the Portuguese (Brinkman, 1999) and was often appointed to high positions under Portuguese colonial rule (Minorities at Risk, 2006b). According to van der Waal (2011), they developed good relations with the Portuguese and adopted Christian values meanwhile maintaining their ethnic identity. However, Phil ya Nangoloh (2013, interview), argue that the Ovimbundu were rather the suppressed majority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political affiliations</td>
<td>Traditional support-base for UNITA (Collelo, 1991). Former UNITA-leader Jonas Savimbi was Ovimbundu. Both the Ovimbundu and the Bakongo were discriminated against by MPLA as the movement ascended to power after independence (Minorities at Risk, 2006b). Both UNITA and MPLA had a nationalist agenda but nevertheless had what Hodges (2004, p. 26) called an “ethnic loci of gravity”. According to Hodges, UNITA was further even more Ovimbundu-dominated than MPLA that managed to attract other ethnic groups than the Mbundu to a larger extent than did UNITA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other information</td>
<td>The Ovimbundu as the Bakongo, “suffer chronic poverty and have little access to economic or political opportunities” (Minorities at Risk, 2006b). They were often engaged in the labour contract system and further were active in farming and urban complexes in the central and coastal regions (van der Waal, 2011).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Historically, the Ovimbundu maintained good relations with the Mbundu and the Nyaneka-Humbe according to some sources (van der Waal, 2011) whereas other such as James state that the “Ovimbundu still employ the historical argument that Mbundu raiders, working for the Portuguese, conducted slave raids through Ovimbundu areas” (2011, p. 92).

Table B.11. Portuguese

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnolinguistic group/category Alt. Ethnic group</th>
<th>Portuguese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic/ethnolinguistic sub-groups alt. Tribes</td>
<td>To some degree, the Mestiço could be perceived as an own ethnic group related to Portuguese, as they were the result of relationships between white Portuguese men and African women. However, this heritage has been what James calls an “identity crisis” (2011, p. 167) amongst the Mestiço.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language/s</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spatial distribution</td>
<td>The Portuguese were trade-oriented and coastally located (Guimarães, 2001) and only by the later stages of colonialism managed to penetrate the interior of the territory (Tvedten, 1997).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated population size</td>
<td>1 % of the Angolan population is of European descent(^34) (Ann et al., 2014) of which the majority is of white Portuguese descent (James, 2011), whereas Mestiços make up 2 % (Ann et al., 2014).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation to former colonial power/s</td>
<td>From the 1500s the Portuguese establishes slave-trade (Oyebade, 2007) and continues to form a trade-oriented colonial power (Guimarães, 2001; Hodges, 2004). Thus, the Portuguese formed the ruling colonial elite in Angola that only ended in 1975 (Hughes, 2012).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political affiliations</td>
<td>Being the colonial elite, the Portuguese were loyal to Portugal. The research within this study has not however been able to find any information in regard of trends to political affiliations among the white of Portuguese descent in contemporary Angola and Namibia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other information</td>
<td>Following the Angolan liberation and the outbreak of the Angolan civil war, there was an exodus of the European population from Angola, including hundreds of thousands of Portuguese (Guimarães, 2001).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{34}\) Note that also other groups than those of Portuguese origin are included in this category.