What if education were not about becoming something, making something of yourself, becoming some thing? What if we were to consider education as becoming-world? These questions are posed against the background of the current populist nationalist backlash against the consequences of globalization, along with growing anti-intellectualism and anti-democratic sentiment. How can education contribute locally and globally to fostering and safeguarding the very possibility of democratic practices against the neoliberal consecration of reified social relations?

In becoming things, becoming-world contributes to contemporary discussions in philosophy of education by developing a vision of a critical educational cosmopolitanism founded upon a renewed critique of reification. While cosmopolitan education has often been articulated in terms of an ethical and political response to globalization, this thesis proposes a different outlook. I argue that the idea of cosmopolitan education predates the onset of what we now term globalization, and that it provides a meaningful conception of education beyond the present socio-political condition. Moreover, I propose to rethink cosmopolitan education as a critique of reification, i.e. a critique of social relations taking on the character of mere things. The critique of reification helps to foreground aspects that have previously been neglected and marginalized in educational cosmopolitanism, such as its economic-material dimensions. At the same time, a critical cosmopolitan perspective is needed for a timely de-centering of critical social theory.

A fresh look at the critique of reification allows us adequately to describe and understand the interrelation between contemporary capitalism, the forms of subjectivity it produces and the possibilities of democratic education and education towards democracy. Such an understanding is needed in face of the apparent impossibility of imagining a society, and envisioning an education, beyond the conditions formulated by contemporary neoliberal policies. Education as becoming-world maintains a hopeful outlook on the possibilities of our globalizing and pluralizing social reality as well as a keen focus on the tensions and challenges that this poses for contemporary educational endeavors on individual as well as structural levels.

The thesis comprises an introductory chapter and five published articles. It is written for anyone who is interested in thinking critically through the challenges facing democratic education and education for democracy today.

Claudia Schumann has studied philosophy, English and Romance languages at TU Dresden, New School University, New York, and Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, and has been working as a lecturer, researcher and teacher educator in Germany and Sweden. becoming things, becoming-world is their doctoral dissertation in Education at Stockholm University. A digital version of becoming things, becoming-world can be downloaded at: http://su.diva-portal.org
**becoming things, becoming-world**
On Cosmopolitanism, Reification and Education

**Claudia Schumann**

Academic dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Education at Stockholm University to be publicly defended on Friday 17 January 2020 at 13.00 in Nordenskiöldsalen, Geovetenskapens hus, Svante Arrhenius väg 12.

**Abstract**
What if education were not about becoming something, making something of yourself, becoming some thing? What if we were to consider education as becoming-world? These questions are posed against the background of the current populist nationalist backlash against the consequences of globalization, along with growing anti-intellectualism and antidemocratic sentiment. How can education contribute locally and globally to fostering and safeguarding the very possibility of democratic practices against the neoliberal consecration of reified social relations? Becoming Things, Becoming-world contributes to contemporary discussions in philosophy of education by developing a vision of a critical educational cosmopolitanism founded upon a renewed critique of reification.

While cosmopolitan education has often been articulated in terms of an ethical and political response to globalization, this thesis proposes a different outlook. I argue that the idea of cosmopolitan education predates the onset of what we now term globalization, and that it provides a meaningful conception of education beyond the present socio-political condition. Moreover, I propose to rethink cosmopolitan education as a critique of reification, i.e. a critique of social relations taking on the character of mere things. The critique of reification helps to foreground aspects that have previously been neglected and marginalized in educational cosmopolitanism, such as its economic-material dimensions. At the same time, a critical cosmopolitan perspective is needed for a timely de-centering of critical social theory.

Re-assessing the Cynic tradition and drawing on critical theorists such as Gerard Delanty and Axel Honneth as well as on New Wittgensteinian philosophers as Alice Crary, I advance a post-universalist understanding of cosmopolitanism. This is based on dynamic social relations and a broad understanding of rationality which includes imaginary aspects as well as the education of our sensitivities. Cosmopolitanism is understood as a lived practice which critically challenges reified social and cultural relations, including the strictures of particular socio-economic structures. The notion of reification is distinguished from other forms of alienation, objectification and instrumentalization and is deployed to characterize lasting distortions of our relations to each other, to the world and to ourselves. Against any idealizing take on communicative practice, I show that language, knowledge, and education do not necessarily counter-act reifying tendencies. Indeed, they themselves can become sources for enhancing processes of reification.

A fresh look at the critique of reification allows us adequately to describe and understand the interrelation between contemporary capitalism, the forms of subjectivity it produces and the possibilities of democratic education and education towards democracy. Such an understanding is needed in face of the apparent impossibility of imagining a society, and envisioning an education, beyond the conditions formulated by contemporary neoliberal policies. Education as becoming-world maintains a hopeful outlook on the possibilities of our globalizing and pluralizing social reality as well as a keen focus on the tensions and challenges that this poses for contemporary educational endeavors on individual as well as structural levels.

**Keywords:** cosmopolitanism, reification, globalization, education, philosophy, educational theory, critical pedagogy, particularism, universalism, objectivity, Critical Theory, New Wittgensteinism, György Lukács, Gerard Delanty, Axel Honneth, Alice Crary.

Stockholm 2020
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:diva-176291

ISBN 978-91-7797-936-4

**Department of Education**

Stockholm University, 106 91 Stockholm
BECOMING THINGS, BECOMING-WORLD

Claudia Schumann
becoming things, becoming-world
On Cosmopolitanism, Reification and Education

Claudia Schumann
Talking about pedagogy, thinking about it critically, is not the intellectual work that most folks think is hip and cool.
- bell hooks, *Teaching to Transgress*


# Contents

List of Articles .................................................................................................................. 1

Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................. 3

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 6
   1.1. 'There is No Alternative': Neoliberalism and the Consecration of Reified Social 
       Relations ....................................................................................................................... 6
   1.2. Cosmopolitanism and Reification in Philosophy of Education: Current Perspectives 
       ...................................................................................................................................... 8
   1.3. Unfolding “Becoming-world”: Cosmopolitan Education as Critique of Reification . 14

2. Becoming-world: Critical Cosmopolitanism and the Cosmopolitan 
   Imagination .................................................................................................................... 16
   2.1. Three Key Aspects of Gerard Delanty’s Critical Cosmopolitanism ....................... 17
   2.2. Re-assessing the Cynic Tradition ......................................................................... 20
   2.3. “Defacing the Coin” and the Critique of Reified Cultural Practices beyond Western- 
       centric Perspectives .................................................................................................... 22
   2.4. Methodological Considerations ............................................................................ 24
   2.5. Weltbürger or Kosmopoliten? Ideological Nuances .............................................. 26

3. Becoming Things: Renewing the Critique of Reification for a Critical 
   Cosmopolitanism........................................................................................................... 28
   3.1. Cosmopolitanism as a Critique of Reification ....................................................... 28
   3.2. Historical Lineages of the Concept of Reification ................................................. 30
       3.2.1. Disappearance and revitalization ...................................................................... 30
       3.2.2. Two sources in Marx: Between alienation and commodity fetishism ............ 31
       3.2.3. Reconstructing Lukács ................................................................................. 32
       3.2.4. Teilnahmslosigkeit: Reification in contemporary capitalism and neoliberal 
              subjectivity ............................................................................................................. 34
       3.2.5. Reified concepts and Adorno’s critique of identity-thinking ......................... 36
       3.2.6. The possibility of critique: Dereification, standpoint theory and the role of 
              literature ................................................................................................................. 37
       3.2.7. The reification of knowledge and education .................................................. 39
   3.3. Situating Reification in the Social Theory of Axel Honneth ................................. 39
       3.3.1. Honneth and the legacy of Frankfurt School critical theory ......................... 39
       3.3.2. Between disciplines and styles ....................................................................... 40
       3.3.3. Recognition, intersubjectivity and the critique of liberalism ....................... 41
3.3.4. Recognition, acknowledgment and the question of normativity and progress .......................................................... 42
3.3.5. Reification as forgetfulness of recognition .......................................................... 44
3.3.6. Social freedom and re-visiting the idea of socialism ........................................... 46
3.4. Reification and the Critique of Language within New Wittgensteinianism ............. 47
  3.4.1. Wittgenstein as a political philosopher .......................................................... 47
  3.4.2. Reified meanings, educating sensitivities and imagination ......................... 48
  3.4.3. Stanley Cavell: becoming ‘concretized’ rather than ‘reified’ ......................... 51
3.5. Integrating the Critique of Reification into a Critical Cosmopolitan Education ...... 52

4. Cosmopolitan Education as becoming-world: Three Examples and a Prospect .......... 55
  4.1. Dereifying Cultural Belonging ........................................................................... 56
  4.2. Dereifying the Self ......................................................................................... 57
  4.3. Dereifying Knowledge ..................................................................................... 58
  4.4. Solidarity, Bildung, Critique: A Prospect .......................................................... 59
    4.4.1. becoming-world and solidarity ................................................................... 59
    4.4.2. becoming-world and Bildung ................................................................. 60
    4.4.3. becoming-world and critique .................................................................. 62

5. Swedish Summary ......................................................................................... 66

6. Summary of the Articles .................................................................................. 76
  6.1. Article 1: Cosmopolitanism and Globalization in Education .............................. 76
  6.2. Article 2: Boundedness beyond Reification ...................................................... 77
  6.3. Article 3: For Love of Country? ...................................................................... 78
  6.4. Article 4: Graphic Contaminations .................................................................. 79
  6.5. Article 5: Knowledge for a Common World? .................................................. 80

References ....................................................................................................... 82
List of Articles

**Article 1 (Published)**

Available at: [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-72761-5_59](https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-72761-5_59) (requires subscription)

**Article 2 (Published)**

Available at: [https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/egp.v5i4.20296](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.3402/egp.v5i4.20296) (open access)

**Article 3 (Published)**


The essay has also been re-printed in an anthology:
Article 4 (Published)

Available at: https://tidsskrift.dk/spf/article/view/22423 (open access)

The essay has also been re-printed in an anthology:

Article 5 (Published)

Available at: https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7102/6/1/10 (open access)

I would like to thank the following journals and publishers for kindly allowing me to include the articles in the thesis: Springer, Ethics & Global Politics, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Studier i Pædagogisk Filosofi, education sciences.
Acknowledgments

I want to express my gratitude first and foremost to my supervisors Klas Roth, Niclas Rönnström and Paul Standish for all their formal and informal support in writing this dissertation. I also want to thank my readers Marianna Papastephanou, Torill Strand and Gunnar Karlsson for their generous interpretations, their perceptive criticisms and comments during the fifty and ninety percent seminars. Thank you also to Max Scheja for the final reading and the kind estimation. My thanks go to David T. Hansen for his inspiring work and for acting as the opponent in the thesis defense. I would also like to thank all the committee members, Rebecka Lettevall, Tore West, Ninni Wahlström and Maria Olson.

I want to thank all my fellow doctoral students at the Department of Education at Stockholm University, especially Eric Larsson for his encouragement and company from the beginning to the end of the doctoral years and for becoming a godparent, to Anki Bengtsson for her sharp eyes and her ability to discern the most important parts in writing and in life from the superfluous, to Natalie Nielsen, Tyra Nilsson, Christine Bendixon, Anthemis Raptopoulou, Rama Alshoufani, Ingrid Andersson, Niklas Hill, Ali Mohamed, Noam Ringer, and Jakob Ulenius. Further, I would like to thank my colleagues at the department who I had the pleasure to work together with in teaching and also to those who encouraged me with my endeavors for post-doc applications, Mikiko Cars, Meeri Hellstén, Susanne Andersson, Eva Amundsdotter, Pia Skott, Susanne Kreitz-Sandberg, Ulf Fredriksson, Larissa Mickwitz and Malgorzata Malec Rawinski. My thanks go to my teachers at graduate level, in particular Thomas Rentsch, Richard Bernstein, Julia Kristeva and Theda Rehbock. To Theda also for her friendship and her visits in Stockholm. To Krasimir Stojanov for introducing me to philosophy of education during our joint stay in New York and all the support ever since. My thanks go to my teachers at doctoral courses at the department, Anna-Lena Kempe, Camilla Thunborg, to Agnieszka Bron and Lazaro Moreno Herrera. My thanks go also to the external teachers of doctoral courses, Tina Rosenberg, Jack Halberstam and Dorthe Staunæs, as well as to the doctoral students I met through them, especially Maria Eriksson and Hilda Jakobsson.

I want to thank all my colleagues at the Department for Special Education at Stockholm University, especially to Liz Adams Lyngbäck, Khaleda Gani Dutt and Enni Paul who I met already as doctoral students and who I now have
the joy to work together with. Thank you for your relentless support, the travels, for introducing me to your families. I also want to thank Mina Sedem, Åsa Murray and Barbro Johansson who are great teachers to learn from, and to Wieland Wermke for the coffee break talks about growing up in East Germany. Finally my thanks go to Jari Linikko and Didi Berthén and their ability to shape such a caring working environment.

My heartfelt thanks go to my fellow colleagues and philosophers of education in Stockholm. To Corrado Matta and Marie Hållander who I had the immense pleasure to share a room with, physically and intellectually, in the starting years of my doctoral position. To Rebecca Adami for persuading me to come to Sweden for my PhD studies, for believing in me and in my work and for all the trust, the gladness and support in writing and in life throughout the years. To Viktor Johansson for all the joint interests and projects and all the thoughtful comments on my work. To Liza Haglund and Erica Hagström for the joint interests and support in our work. To Lovisa Bergdahl and Elisabeth Langman for inspiration and their encouragement at ECER, NERA and during a joyful time in New York. To Karin Gunnarsson and Simon Ceder for the conversations on touch and the contribution to our special issue. I want to thank the international community of philosophers of education who have inspired and supported me and my work before and during the writing of this thesis. Thank you to Marianna Papastephanou for organizing our gatherings on Tilos. To the friends I made at Tilos, Annie Pirrie, Maria Mendel and Tomasz Szkudlarek, Sunni Yun, Andrés Mejia, Richard Smith, Zdenko Kodelja, Caroline Babayan, Zelia Gregoriou, Lukas Perikleous, Anna Kouppanou, and many more. Thank you to Torill Strand for inviting me to be part of the Nordic research project Educating Humanity and to present my work at the University of Oslo on several occasions as well as at two pre-conferences to NERA. Thank you to Paul Standish for inviting me to participate in the KU Leuven and IoE colloquia and to discuss my work at the 2017 PESGB Gregynog Conference. Thank you to Bianca Thoilliez, Stefan Ramaekers, Jan Masschelein, Joris Vlieghe, Amanda Fulford, Ian Munday and David Lewin for their comments at these occasions. Thank you to PESGB for the inspiring conferences, all the stipends, summer schools and writing retreats, and not least to Women in philosophy of education, especially Morwenna Griffiths, Sharon Todd and Aislinn O’Donnell. Thank you to Carl Anders Säfström for inspiring comments during ECER and on many other occasions. Thank you to ECER network 13 for their trust in electing me as convenor for the philosophy of education network. I also want to thank David Hansen for an invitation to present an early version of one of the articles of the thesis at Columbia University, New York in early 2015. I want to thank Stockholm University for providing me with Donation Scholarships on several occasions, in this way making it possible for me to participate and present my work at a variety of international conferences.
Thank you to my family and friends in Germany. To those who have been there since childhood and have stayed, Barbara Schirmer, Maria Leonhardt, Diana Pecht, Ulla Loge, Julia Kammerer, Justus Braunschweig, Katharina Severin, and to those who joined a bit later, Hanna Dettner, Priska Herger, Christiane Rütten. To my brother and sister-in-law, Carsten and Luise Schumann, and to Frederick and Richard for being so smart and cute. To my parents, Andrea and Andreas Schumann, who have been there with their steady love and support throughout the years and encourage me to go for and pursue what feels right, and taking care of Leia despite all the hair. To my grandparents Helga and Karl Zimmermann who still guide me even after their passing.

I want to thank my Swedish friends and extended families. To Bella Berg, Joella and Aron for all the warm Sunday night dinners. To Jennifer Tomie Lee with Mika, Kinman, Theo, Ester and Nancy for fredagsmys and skogsrejv. To Maja Fläcke with Vidar and Melker for all the love and all the cuddles. To Karina Sarkissova for introducing me to thinking with dance and to Stockholm. To Mar Fjell, Lo Lööf and Geraldo Lombano for the music. To Mar Fjell and Malin Arnell for midsummer cake and New Year yoga and all the other intra-actions that reminded me of the possibilities of thinking beyond the constraints of academia. To Paloma Madrid for all the shared walks and thoughts on philosophy, the body and decolonization. To Vilda Kvist and Eva Kenell for wonderful vacations and their loving support. To Alexis Nilsdotter and Maja Andersson for getting me out and moving. To Holly Green for all the talks about neurons, red wine and our passion for science and other things. To Alica Tserkovnaja and Bian Nyman for all the joint dinners, fikas and sleepovers and making Essinge-Öarna the best neighborhood. To Jenny Wendefors for all the unconditional care and phone support. The thesis might not have been written without your pomodoros. To Ulrika Gomm for being such a sharp and loyal friend. To Amanda Angelman for making a home for me and grodan.

Finally, I want to give a particular thanks to the friends who were directly involved in the final stages of finishing this text. To Annie Pirrie for our shared times with poetry and philosophy on the Greek island of Tilos, for your joyful encouragement, and the most thorough and generous proof-reading I could ever have wished for. To Katarina Elvén for all the insightful conversations on art, politics and philosophy throughout the years, for the generous contribution with the cover picture and your sharp final thoughts on language and layout. To Jorun Kugelberg for all the trips to islands, for all the shared evenings with performances and dance and Donna Haraway, for the loyalty and friendship, the tireless company and your ever-new ideas on places to retreat to together in those times when writing seemed hardest.
1. Introduction

1.1. ‘There is No Alternative’: Neoliberalism and the Consecration of Reified Social Relations

What if education were not about becoming something, making something of yourself, becoming some thing? What if we were to consider education as becoming-world? What would such a conception imply in terms of adequately thinking through the contemporary challenges and possibilities that we face today in educational institutions and beyond, on existential, individual, social, political, economic and not least environmental levels?

The idea of a cosmopolitan education, of educating ourselves and others to become “inhabitant[s] of the world” (Hansen 2017, p. 209) rather than qualified employees or loyal members of predefined communities such as the nation-state can be traced far back in the history of Western and non-Western thought. Since the 1990s, the ethical and political conditions of living in an increasingly globalized world has inspired a revival of the Classical and the modern notions of cosmopolitanism, above all in its Stoic and Kantian variants. Furthermore, it has inspired reformulations which have become known as the so-called new cosmopolitanisms, inflecting the traditional, universalist aspirations of cosmopolitanism with particular, local perspectives, within cultural studies, social and political theory, philosophy and also within the study of education. Cosmopolitanism, in all these variants, was taken up by educational theorists and philosophers in order to explore possibilities of shifting our educational imaginaries from the predominant national to more encompassing, globally-oriented perspectives. While cosmopolitan education has often been formulated in terms of an ethical and political response to the globalizing world, this thesis proposes a somewhat different outlook. The argument is developed over two discrete but inter-related phases. Firstly, I suggest that the idea of cosmopolitan education predates the onset of what we now term globalization, and that it provides a meaningful conception of education beyond the present socio-political condition. Secondly, I propose to rethink cosmopolitan education in terms of a rejuvenated critique of reification, i.e. a critique of the misunderstanding of social relations as mere things. Many educational philosophers have argued for a cosmopolitan education precisely in order to counter predominant instrumental understandings of education. Recent renewals of György Lukács’ critique of reification, however, offer scope
to acknowledge instrumental aspects of education that are relevant and appropriate, while at the same time helping us to understand the development and effects of the detrimental effects of these reifying tendencies, as well as the normative implications for a critical understanding of a cosmopolitan education today. Such critiques also have the advantage of allowing us to question the ideologies that drive educational policies and theories, and which have promoted reified understandings of the concept of cosmopolitanism itself. These approaches have tended to narrowly focus on culturalist interpretations, which has been to the detriment of economic and political analysis of the intricate involvement of current neoliberal global capitalism and the subjectivities, knowledges and educational paradigms it produces.

In her study of the devastating effects of neoliberal policies on the situation of institutions of higher education in the US, Wendy Brown gives an acute analysis of what I will argue can best be described as both the process and the result of such reifying tendencies:

> At the triumphal ‘end of history’ in the West, most have ceased to believe in the human capacity to craft and sustain a world that is humane, free, sustainable, and, above all, modestly under human control. This loss of conviction about the human capacity to craft and steer its existence or even to secure its future is the most profound and devastating sense in which modernity is ‘over.’ Neoliberalism’s perverse theology of markets rests on this land of scorched belief in the modern. Ceding all power to craft the future to markets, it insists that markets ‘know best,’ even if, in the age of financialization, markets do not and must not know at all, and the hidden hand has gone permanently missing. Neoliberal rationality did not germinate this civilizational despair. However, its figuration of the human, its reality principle, and its worldview – ‘there is no alternative’ – consecrates, deepens and naturalizes without acknowledging this despair. (Brown 2015, p. 221)

Axel Honneth makes a similar point in the introduction to one of his recent award-winning publications:

> It might help to recall that current economic and social events appear far too complex and thus opaque to public consciousness to be capable of intentional transformation. This is particularly true when it comes to processes of economic globalization in which transactions are carried out too quickly to be understood; here a kind of second-order pathology seems to make institutional conditions appear as mere givens, as being ‘reified’ and thus immune to any efforts to change them. On this view, Marx’s famous analysis of fetishism in the first volume of *Capital* is only applicable today, as the general sense that social relations essentially consist in ‘the form of a social relation between things’ did not exist as long as the workers’ movement still regarded society as capable of change – as is demonstrated in their dreams and visions. Reification, therefore, only applies to the present state of capitalism. If this were true, as everyday observations and empirical analyses indeed seem to suggest, we are unable to anticipate social improvements in the basic structure of contemporary societies
because we regard the substance of this structure as being impervious to change, just like things. On this account, the inability to translate widespread outrage at the scandalous distribution of wealth and power into attainable goals is due neither to the disappearance of an actually existing alternative to capitalism, nor to a fundamental shift in our understanding of history, but rather to the predominance of a fetishistic conception of social relations (Honneth 2017, pp. 3ff.)

This is one of the places where Honneth explicitly relates the critique of reification to current concerns of global reach. I will argue that a rejuvenated critique of reification has the potential to draw attention to some of the detrimental effects of aspects of economic globalization. A reconsideration of the critique of reification is needed for a deeper understanding of a critical cosmopolitan perspective in education. This approach lends us the vocabulary adequately to describe and understand certain forms of “participatorilessness” (Allen in Allen, Biebricher, and Ciccariello-Maher 2017, p. 550) produced by the economic dimensions of a globalizing world, and it helps us conceptualize why the “end of educated democracy” requires an analysis of the processes by which economic globalization “consecrates, deepens and naturalizes without acknowledging this despair” (Brown 2015, p. 221). Such an analysis is crucial in face of the apparent impossibility of imagining a society, and envisioning an education, beyond the conditions formulated by contemporary neoliberal capitalism.

1.2. Cosmopolitanism and Reification in Philosophy of Education: Current Perspectives

The above quotations from Brown and Honneth suggest that a study of cosmopolitan education that draws on a renewed critique of reification is timely and promising. As I will attempt to demonstrate, it is also an area that has hitherto been relatively under-explored in philosophy of education. In Article 1, I give an extensive summary of how the discourses on globalization and cosmopolitanism have shaped cultural studies, political and social sciences generally in recent decades. I then outline the main strands of the different varieties of cosmopolitanism as they have been formulated in educational theory and philosophy. I confine myself here to providing an overview of the different theoretical positions related to the perspective advanced in this thesis. In this way I hope to provide sufficient background for the reader to be able to situate my contribution in the context of the current scholarship in the field. A more in-depth overview of the field is provided in Article 1.

It is not only in the course of its long history that the idea of cosmopolitanism has taken on different meanings. It is explored from an incredible variety of perspectives in contemporary discussions, and yet it eludes precise definition. Indeed, some have argued that it lies in the very nature of the term that
“specifying cosmopolitanism positively and definitely” (Pollock, Bhabha, Breckenridge, and Chakrabarty 2000, p. 577) would be an ‘uncosmopolitan’ thing to do. In their introduction to After cosmopolitanism, Braidotti, Blaagaard and Hanafin (2013) start with the question of the continued usefulness of the idea of cosmopolitanism. In the current political climate, it seems that “the ideal of belonging to a harmonious global community of cosmopolitan citizens [is] naïve at best, at worst simply futile” (Braidotti et al. 2013, p. 1). Nevertheless, rather than dismissing the idea of cosmopolitanism, they argue for the need to redefine our theoretical concepts as well as the practices of cosmopolitanism “at a time when social and political reality seems to move away from the practice of cosmopolitanism, while being in serious need of a new international framework to regulate global interaction” (ibid.). This “double pull” is also a starting point for many philosophers of education as well in their discussion of cosmopolitan education. Educational philosopher David Hansen writes: “In some respects, alas it’s not a happily chosen term” as it “conjures the stereotypical image of the cosmopolitan as an elite globetrotter treating the world’s cultures and traditions as a source of commodities to consume and trophies to collect” (Hansen 2013, p. 37). Nevertheless, he considers reclaiming, reconstructing and rehabilitating the concept more worthwhile than dismissing it outright.

Despite many potentially problematic aspects of cosmopolitanism (and even cosmopolitics), most educational philosophers still appear to agree with Walter Mignolo who attributed the upsurge of interest in the new “buzzword” cosmopolitanism in the late 1990s to an attempt to formulate an alternative to nationalism which “did not fall into the hands of neo-liberal and economic globalization” (Mignolo 2010, p. 113). For Mignolo, cosmopolitanism implied the promotion of “an ideal of flexible and open cultural citizenship” (ibid.) in critical distance from multiculturalist conceptions of identity. A noticeable exception here is Thomas Popkewitz’ (2008) outright proclamation of an anti-cosmopolitan position. Writing through a Foucauldian lens he takes issue with the normativity implied in cosmopolitan theorizing. I would argue, however, that his one-sidedly critical attitude can be attributed to his narrow reduction of cosmopolitanism to an Enlightenment glorification of scientific reason, thus dismissing the post-universal approaches within the new cosmopolitanisms.

When considering the field of cosmopolitan studies within philosophy of education today, we find a large variety of perspectives represented, beyond Martha Nussbaum’s early influential Stoic-Kantian proposal (Nussbaum 1996). The notion of “cosmopolitan learning” is coined by Fazal Rizvi (2009) as an ethical response to increased global connectivity. He employs everyday cosmopolitanism and pedagogical encounters in his argument for a cosmopolitan curriculum that has a moral orientation of students in terms of a productive openness as its primary aim (Rizvi and Beech 2017). David Hansen (2008) and William Pinar (2009) also explore cosmopolitan education from
the perspective of curriculum theory with a focus on concrete, lived experience, rather than a commitment to abstract principles. In his later work on teacher education, Hansen (2011) considers Kwame Anthony Appiah’s notion of a “rooted cosmopolitanism”, which shifts the focus from a classical, abstract, universalist understanding of cosmopolitanism to a cosmopolitan space between the local and the global, the universal and the particular. Hansen conceives of cosmopolitanism in terms of “an art of living” (2011, p. 23) that balances “reflective openness to the new with a reflective loyalty to the known” (Hansen 2011, p. 1). We also find reassessments of Kant’s conception of cosmopolitanism in the light of contemporary scholarship on his philosophy with regard to teacher education and in relation to the societal function of education (Roth 2012a; Roth 2012b). From the perspective of Critical Theory, Rönnström (2012) also contributes to the study of cosmopolitanism in teacher education. Furthermore, he critiques the economization of education as a problem for democratic participation and citizenship and discusses critical social imagination in education and educational research employing Charles Taylor’s notion of the social imaginary (Rönnström 2016; 2018). A communicative understanding of cosmopolitanism, in teacher education as well as in classroom communication, has been developed from a Davidsonian perspective both theoretically and empirically (Wahlström 2014; 2016).

Beyond pragmatist, liberal, Kantian, Hegelian and communication-theoretic approaches, cosmopolitan education has also been explored from post-structuralist, feminist and postcolonial perspectives. Building on Chantal Mouffe’s “agonistic pluralism”, Sharon Todd (2009; 2010) develops the idea of an agonistic cosmopolitics for education, which focuses on conflict rather than consensus as central to cosmopolitan theorizing. Against liberal and humanist cosmopolitan idealizations, Todd uses approaches within the new cosmopolitanisms which explore the way in which humanity is lived and experienced in both its positive and negative potential. Asking for a cosmopolitics to face humanity also in its imperfections, her approach contrasts with Kantian and other perfectionist accounts, in so far as she argues for the value of acknowledging and respecting difficulties, differences, imperfections and dissonances as central aspects of the pluralist nature of human life. This analysis is also used as a critique of the discourse on human rights and the manner in which this is implemented in education (cf. also Schumann and Adami 2014). Working with Luce Irigaray’s notion of sexual difference, Todd’s account introduces to the field of cosmopolitan studies in philosophy of education a decidedly feminist perspective.

As regards the introduction of a postcolonial critique of cosmopolitanism within the field, it is particularly Marianna Papastephanou (2012) and Walter Mignolo (2010) who call out the Eurocentric view of cosmopolitanism within philosophy of education and asks for a decentering of cosmopolitanism. Walter Mignolo argues for a decolonial cosmopolitanism which “delink[s] from both neo-liberal globalization and liberal cosmopolitan ideals” (2010, p. 111).
This decolonial proposal is positioned at a critical distance not only from neo-liberal globalization but also from liberal, theological or Marxist cosmopolitanisms that are presented as new, better universalisms. In his proposal, the transformation towards a poly-centric world needs to be accompanied by a critical detachment from European colonial modernity as well as from capitalist global economy. In a seemingly paradoxical shift, Mignolo’s decolonial cosmopolitanism becomes a call for a pluriversal localism. As he points out, such a “decolonial localism is global or, if you wish, cosmopolitical” (Mignolo 20010, p. 127). A similar gesture of decentering is proposed by Marianna Papastephanou in her development of an “eccentric ethico-political cosmopolitanism” (Papastephanou 2012). Inspired amongst others by Homi Bhabha’s postcolonial critique, she articulates an educational cosmopolitanism which pushes the critique of liberal proposals toward a much thicker notion of moral and political commitment, which extends to questions of redistributive historical justice as well as to environmental questions.

Another theorist who has contributed extensively to the discussion on cosmopolitanism in philosophy of education is Torill Strand (2010a; 2010b; 2010c; Strand & Huggler 2011). In Strand’s discussion, the pitfalls and possibilities of new cosmopolitanism are critically weighed against each other, and she develops an understanding of cosmopolitanism with Paul Ricoeur in terms of metaphor. Cosmopolitics intervene and disrupt established cognitive and logical frameworks, and introduce “radically new modes of learning of and from reality” (Strand 2010b, p. 241). Elaborating critical cosmopolitanism in terms of a critique of reification, my thesis supports this interventionist impetus of understanding critical cosmopolitanism. It is important to emphasize that this is not in the sense of a generalist call for disruption of established thinking and for development of new learning. Rather, the focus is on the disruption of reified and reifying patterns of thinking and conceptual schemes within educational research paradigms as well as educational practices. Similarly, I share with Todd the focus on plurality and difference. However, the notion of critical cosmopolitanism that I advance below is concerned with a critique of the reification of universals as well as the reification of difference.

The approach to critical cosmopolitan education advanced in the thesis shares with many of the other authors in the field the commitment to a careful consideration of both the promises, the pitfalls and challenges of cosmopolitanism. I am firmly convinced of the importance of avoiding a naïve, idealizing perspective on cosmopolitanism. Therefore, the arguments in the thesis align closely with the new cosmopolitanisms’ critique of the classical and modern universalist understandings of cosmopolitanism and share the new cosmopolitan inflection of the universal with the particular. I also share the interest in understanding cosmopolitanism in terms of concrete, lived experience. Nevertheless, the approach advanced in the thesis also retains a critical normative perspective on cosmopolitan education. Cosmopolitanism is thus
conceptualized as distinct from and independent of the lived reality on globalization, also in the historical reconstruction of the term (cf. also Papastephanou 2005; 2012). In employing Rosi Braidotti’s notion of cosmopolitanism as “becoming-world” (Braidotti 2013) I also subscribe to her demand for an expansive transformation and redefinition of cosmopolitanism. That said, I start from a decidedly different theoretical angle than Braidotti herself, namely the recent attempts at rejuvenating György Lukács’ critique of reification.

The renewed interest in and the further developments of the theories of reification are still to a large extent underexplored in their potential contribution to the philosophy of education, particularly in respect of the contemporary debates within the German Frankfurt School philosophical circles. This is not to say, that the difference between an education with a focus on “who” rather than “what” has not been widely discussed, for example with reference to authors such as Martin Buber and Hannah Arendt. For example, Swedish philosopher of education Moira von Wright (2000) argues that pedagogical encounters between educators and students are not enhanced by a reductive understanding of student’s ethnic, familial or class backgrounds, or by learning even more about students’ possible neuropsychiatric diagnoses, i.e. in relation to different questions starting with what. Her relational approach focuses instead on the meeting with a concrete, unique individual other, i.e. a who. (cf. v. Wright 2000, p. 25). We find a similar attentiveness to the uniqueness and irreducibility of the Other in works inspired by the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (e.g. Todd 2003) or Adriana Cavarero (e.g. Adami 2014), combined with a problematization of the potential reductiveness of sociological categorizations. Furthermore, especially in the various discussions on educational cosmopolitanism, many authors advance a vision of a cosmopolitan education as distinct from, and even in opposition to, different forms of instrumentalism, instrumentalization and commodification that pervade current educational discourse and practice (e.g. Hansen 2017; Rönnström 2015).

In respect of the philosophical work of Axel Honneth, it is primarily his theory of recognition and his intersubjective critique of the liberal notion of individual freedom that has had a significant influence within the educational research. In recent years, we can also find a number of more comprehensive studies of his philosophical work within philosophy of education. (cf. Stojanov 2006; Huttunen 2009; Huttunen & Murphy 2012; Murphy and Brown 2012; Lysaker & Jakobsen 2015) His renewal of the critique of reification, especially in the context of other recent attempts at such a reappraisal of this term, has not been explored in the context of these studies. Furthermore, the notion of recognition employed in Honneth’s work on reification is different from his earlier conceptions and lies closer to Wittgenstein’s conception of “acknowledgment” (cf. Cavell 1979; Saito & Standish 2012). By focusing on Honneth’s work on reification, this thesis also contributes to the field by exploring the critical points of overlap between Critical Theory and Wittgen-
stein’s philosophy of language. There are several authors within general philosophy who discuss the potential confluence of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy and of the social philosophy and theory of Critical Theory (Crary 2018; Demmerling 1996). Scholarly interest in the study of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, including the so-called New Wittgensteinianism, is rather comprehensive within philosophy of education (cf. for an overview of the scholarship within philosophy of education, see Peters & Stickney 2017; Johansson 2013). In my own contribution to the volume by Peters and Stickney, I discuss the potential of Wittgenstein’s thought for feminist political philosophy (Schumann 2017). However, a more systematic analysis of Wittgenstein’s philosophy in terms of its potential contribution to a critical theory of society is lacking in the field of philosophy of education, especially as regards reifying tendencies of hypothesis conceptual schemes within educational research paradigms and educational theorizing. The Wittgensteinian critique of reification of thought can here be read as a different exploration of the line of argument advanced by Sharon Todd and her Arendtian understanding of "cosmopolitan thinking" as a critique of "thoughtlessness" (Todd 2009, p. 138 ff.). The critique of reification, though, allows us to locate these tendencies in relation to neoliberal educational policy-making and to critically engage with and disentangle the social, economic and political reasons behind these developments. By focusing on the way in which Wittgenstein’s language theoretical arguments can contribute to an expanded understanding of the critique of reification, I hope to further expand the dialogue between Wittgenstein and Critical Theory scholars within philosophy of education.

One of the specific contributions of the present thesis is that by turning to the recent studies on reification, the problem of instrumentalist understandings of education and of the ‘thingification’ of human beings through education is not just presupposed as an already known and well-understood phenomenon, but the critique reification provides us with an analysis that is specific to contemporary social, political and economic conditions. The analysis I propose distinguishes between innocuous, or even necessary and useful forms instrumentalization, for example for the purpose of sociological study of our empirical reality, and harmful, long-term tendencies of the reification of social relations that have detrimental effects on our relations to each other, to the world and to ourselves. In this way it does not juxtapose a philosophical insistence on the uniqueness of the other to the reductiveness of sociological categorization. I argue that a renewed look at György Lukács’ notion of reification deserves particular attention because it aligns particularly well with a reconceptualization of the critical impetus of the Cynic notion of cosmopolitanism, where the critical challenge of restrictive boundaries of cultural and social identities went hand in hand with a critical challenge to the strictures of particular socio-economic structures.

Considering the current challenges of populist nationalist backlash against the consequences of globalization, of growing anti-intellectualism and anti-
democratic sentiment, an educational philosophy needs to reflect on the ways in which education can contribute to fostering and safeguarding the very possibility of democratic practice. This unfolds against the background of a political theory which incorporates rather than neglects a thorough analysis and critique of the way in which contemporary capitalism threatens to undermine the very foundations of democracy.

1.3. Unfolding “Becoming-world”: Cosmopolitan Education as Critique of Reification

In the texts that comprise this thesis, I elaborate a vision of critical cosmopolitanism in terms of a critique of reification. Following Honneth (2008), I explain reification as a second-order process of forgetfulness of a primary recognition. I further explore reification in language theoretic terms as a forgetfulness with regard to the primary context of linguistic expressions that are constitutive of their meaning. In this respect I am indebted to the work of Christoph Demmerling (1994) and other Wittgensteinian approaches, especially Alice Crary (2000a; 2000b; 2007). I stress that a reification-theoretic critical cosmopolitanism makes it possible to see that “the choice between the culturalist emphasis on the necessity of local contexts for meaning to be established and the cosmopolitan universalist abstraction is wrongly put” (Schumann 2012a, p. 230). We need to criticize educational cosmopolitanisms that reinforce “a selective, reifying attitude of appreciating the new worldwide possibilities of consumption”. An alternative approach is to reframe the cosmopolitan attitude through education in terms of a “commitment to non-reifying forms of boundedness, as taking responsibility for resisting the reifying attitudes modern capitalism enhances” (ibid.). A critical cosmopolitan education, I argue, is not about fostering an “abstract, merely observing detachment from all cultural or normative boundaries”. Rather, it needs to be “primarily concerned with providing the epistemic as well as the normative theoretic means for resisting being bound by reified entities, and with finding, founding and finding back to non-reifying ways of boundedness” (ibid.).

In the following chapters of this introduction, I will outline some of the major strands of thought underlying the arguments advanced in the five articles that comprise the main body of the thesis. I will position the perspective I develop in the five articles that form the main body of the thesis in relation to the previous approaches in the area (cf. especially Article 1) and describe in more detail how my own approach can be understood against this background. The central suggestion is that a reappraisal of the critique of reification, as attempted by different authors writing in the Frankfurt school tradition in the early 2000s, can be helpful in reformulating a critical educational cosmopolitanism. This allows us to provide an adequate analysis of the current
social and political situation as it pertains to and is supported through educational institutions and practices; and to conceptualize educational futures beyond the reifying tendencies explored below.

I begin by tracing the inspiration for the critical educational cosmopolitanism that informs all four published articles in the work on “the cosmopolitan imagination” by critical social theorist Gerard Delanty (2006; 2009). I also offer an historical excursus to the Cynics’ notion of cosmopolitanism in order to illustrate the commonalities and divergencies between my approach and Delanty’s in respect of the development of a critical cosmopolitanism (see Chapter 2 below). I then sketch historical developments and some recent attempts to reanimate the critique of reification, with reference to authors such as György Lukács, Axel Honneth, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Alice Crary (Chapter 3). I conclude this introduction with a summary of how this perspective can be employed in different educational debates on cosmopolitanism, in relation to patriotism and nationalism; questions of self-formation and hybrid identities; and epistemological questions (Chapter 4). I consider the limitations of the perspectives developed and reflect on potential further developments exploring the relation of a reification-theoretic account to new materialist perspectives, as well as to contemporary discussions on solidarity and Bildung.

Throughout this thesis throughout I argue for a necessary “renewal of critical theory” (Delanty 2009, p. 2) and a reassessment of some of the blind spots of the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, such as its failure to adapt its theoretical lens so as to adequately take into account the challenges for social theory posed by globalization and its systematic neglect of concerns beyond those that affect the Western world. As Edward Said poignantly put it:

Frankfurt School critical theory, despite its seminal insights into the relationships between domination, modern society, and the opportunities for redemption through art as critique, is stunningly silent on racist theory, anti-imperialist resistance, and oppositional practice in the empire. (Said 1994, p. 336)

By reading the renewal of the critique of reification together with and against cosmopolitanism, this thesis contributes both to the discussion of cosmopolitanism in education as well as to critical social theory. The critique of reification helps to articulate interesting aspects previously neglected and marginalized in educational cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, a critical cosmopolitan perspective allows for a timely de-centering of critical social theory.
2. Becoming-world: Critical Cosmopolitanism and the Cosmopolitan Imagination

In the previous chapter I gave an overview of the current scholarly perspectives on cosmopolitanism and reification within philosophy of education. I also sketched out some of the central ideas of my own development of a reification-critical cosmopolitan education in terms of *becoming-world*. The purpose of the following pages is to give a more thorough account of my engagement with recent interpretations of cosmopolitanism from historical and theoretical perspectives. In particular, I will show how I derive a post-universal conception of cosmopolitanism which is based on dynamic social relations rather than on static notions of personal and cultural identity, and includes imaginary dimensions as part of a broad conception of rationality. I further introduce my re-assessment of the Cynical tradition, its conception of cosmopolitanism as a lived practice and as a critical challenge to social boundaries, including their economic-material dimensions. Reflecting on the different connotations of the notion of ‘Weltbürger’ and ‘Kosmopolit’ respectively, I argue for a pluralist, decadent and subversive notion of cosmopolitanism in contrast to a cosmopolitanism of empire. I also reflect on methodological questions, and emphasizes the importance of a critical normative understanding of cosmopolitanism that avoids a conflation of cosmopolitanism with the merely empirical conditions of transnationalization.

In advancing the notion of “becoming-world” in order to characterize a critical cosmopolitan education, I draw on the work of the feminist social philosopher Rosi Braidotti. She argues that cosmopolitanism has to undergo a “radical mutation” in order to retain relevance for contemporary challenges. In particular, she maintains that such a transformation of cosmopolitan theory has to “relinquish[…] the historical and conceptual attachment of cosmopolitanism to the idea of liberal individualism as a unitary vision of the subject.” (Braidotti 2013, p. 29) She summarizes her idea for a renewal of cosmopolitanism as follows:

Cosmopolitanism needs to ‘become-world’, i.e. embrace diversity and the immanence of structural relationality so as to account also for the atrocities and structural injustices, as well as for the many benefits, of pan-human perspectives today (ibid.).
Although I draw on different theoretical traditions than Braidotti herself, I share her commitment to a critique of simplistic notions of liberal individualism in the critical cosmopolitan perspective developed below and exemplified in the articles that constitute the main body of the thesis. Furthermore, I share her conviction that such a transformed cosmopolitanism has to a problematize and move beyond a pre-occupation with European and Eurocentric perspectives. (cf. Braidotti 2013, pp. 47ff.) The idea that an education as becoming-world needs to keep a hopeful outlook on the possibilities of our globalizing and pluralizing social reality, as well as a keen focus on the tensions and challenges that this poses for contemporary educational endeavors on individual as well as structural levels.

2.1. Three Key Aspects of Gerard Delanty’s Critical Cosmopolitanism

One of the main theoretical inspirations for my early explorations of the relevance of cosmopolitanism for educational questions in Article 2 of the thesis is the notion of a critical cosmopolitanism as developed by critical social theorist Gerard Delanty (2006; 2009). There are three main aspects of Delanty’s approach that I wish to highlight as they are particularly relevant for the development of my own variety of a critical educational cosmopolitanism. Firstly, Delanty writes in the tradition of critical theory and shares its “concern with the critique of social reality” (Delanty 2009, p. 2). In his analysis, critical theory allows the development of a critical cosmopolitanism that “offers both a critical-normative standpoint and an empirical account of social trends” (ibid.). This enables Delanty to combine the normative perspectives on cosmopolitanism developed within political theory with empirical sociological inquiry. In this way he is able to move social theory beyond its “failure to respond to the challenges of globalization” (ibid.) while at the same time developing a more situated cosmopolitanism than the normative universalist approaches characteristic of previous political theoretical approaches. With its commitment to articulating a “post-universal cosmopolitanism” which aims at “alternative readings of history and the recognition of plurality rather than the creation of a universal order, such as a cosmopolis” (Delanty 2009, p. 67), the social theoretical understanding formulated can thus be situated much more closely to Kwame Anthony Appiah’s rooted cosmopolitanism which was introduced in the previous chapter. Furthermore, it invites an understanding of cosmopolitanism that cannot be reduced to “a generalized version of multiculturalism where plurality is simply the goal” (ibid.), but which encompasses more demanding conceptualizations. These involve an understanding of “world openness in which societies undergo transformation in their self-understanding as a result of coming into contact with each other” (ibid.). While
Delanty couches this demand for a transformative dimension to cosmopolitanism primarily in communicative terms, my thesis develops a broader understanding of this transformative requirement which I will spell out further below. That said, the post-universalist perspective, the commitment to combine normative and empirical concerns as well as the insistence on a transformative dimension rather than a simplistic affirmation of diversity are strong inspirations for my own approach.

Secondly, Delanty’s approach insists on an understanding of cosmopolitanism that is centered on an understanding of dynamic social relations and tensions rather than on the idea of the development of post-national individual or supra-individual identities. As he writes:

A post-universalistic conception of cosmopolitanism should rather be seen in terms of moral and political shifts in self-understanding that occur as a result of the impact of global tensions. Of particular importance in this respect is the tension between the global and the local, on the one side, and on the other the universal and the particular. It is possible to see these tensions as constituting the basic animus of cosmopolitanism. (Delanty 2009, p. 67)

The formulation he chooses here could be read as implying a somewhat problematic understanding of cosmopolitanism as a reaction to globalization. I do not subscribe to this view, and try to resist it in my own approach by emphasizing instead on the central place of tensions as animus of cosmopolitanism in a broader sense, which is not so narrowly connected to current globalizing conditions. Furthermore, in his historical analysis Delanty himself presents multiple counter-examples to such a narrow reading. When summarizing the historical spread of the idea of cosmopolitanism during the European Renaissance and Enlightenment, he emphasizes that “the primary inspiration for cosmopolitanism was not the critique of nationalism but the critique of the present, and the present, in the eyes of the cosmopolitans, was one of absolutism and dogmatism” (ibid., pp. 29f.). As I will argue below, it is readings such as these which indicate a much stronger historical anchoring within the Cynic rather than the Greek and Roman Stoic tradition of the early articulations of the cosmopolitan idea than Delanty himself advances. I think this historical emphasis aligns well with Delanty’s notion of a critical cosmopolitanism as “a dynamic or orientation rather than a concrete identity or a specific culture [which] can arise anywhere and at any time” (ibid., p. 13) and which puts into central focus its “essentially critical and transformative nature” (ibid., p. 6). It also further supports his understanding of “cosmopolitanism as a social process as opposed to being a specific condition or voluntary choice” (ibid., p. 82). Furthermore, it is consonant with the idea that cosmopolitanism is not primarily a critique of nationalism per se. Rather, certain “hybrid and multivocal” (ibid., p. 74) conceptions of the nation can be discussed in terms of their intrinsic cosmopolitan potentials, with the result that cosmopolitanism is
not crudely opposed to nationalism as such. This aspect has been particularly relevant for the arguments I put forward in Article 3 of the thesis where I argue against the opposition of a rational cosmopolitanism to a passionate patriotism and show how outward and inward directed aspects as well as ‘love’ and ‘justice’ need to be inflected in both a critical cosmopolitanism and a critical patriotism.

The third aspect of Delanty’s critical cosmopolitanism that is highly relevant for my own approach is the role he attributes to the idea of the imaginary or imagination. Delanty’s concept of cosmopolitan imagination draws on Cornelius Castoriadis’s conception of the imaginary as a dimension which is inherent to all societies and informs and institutes their symbolic negotiations of culture and identity (Castoriadis 1975). This becomes relevant because cosmopolitanism is then not formulated as a philosophical or utopian ideal that transcends reality, but rather as an “immanent orientation that takes shape in modes of self-understanding, experiences, feelings and collective identity narratives” (Delanty 2009, p. 15). The role of an imaginary dimension in cosmopolitanism relates particularly to the way in which I reformulate moral judgment and the critical interventions of feminist epistemologists in Article 3 and 5, drawing on the work of the Wittgensteinian philosopher Alice Crary (2007).

In Crary’s broad understanding of rationality and objectivity, the contrast between a Kantian rationalism and its post-structural rejection is critically undermined. She insists that in order to achieve an objective grasp of reality we need to employ reason in a way that already includes the employment of our sensitivities, and that the formation of reason and rationality goes hand in hand with the education of relevant sensitivities. In Article 3, I demonstrate how this notion of rationality helps to clarify why understandings of cosmopolitanism as an abstract distancing from emotional attachment, as suggested for example by Nussbaum, are not meaningful. I argue that these are in fact counterproductive since they construe emotion as divorced from any requirements for commitments to justice, thus relegating emotions purely to patriotic discourses. The notions of the imaginary and the imagination are also indicative of the way in which different negotiations and tensions involved in processes of identity constitution are discussed as forms of cosmopolitan experience and self-formation in Article 4. Looking particularly at the possibilities of the medium of the graphic novel to transgress linear and linguistic forms of understanding, I show how the authors come to grips with the understanding of their historical, social and political contexts. Their complex critical cosmopolitan self-appropriation in relation to these contexts (rather than a self-detection or self-construction) presupposes that imaginary and realistic aspects overlap and interact on the page.
2.2. Re-assessing the Cynic Tradition

In Article 1 I provide an overview over different historical and contemporary variants of cosmopolitanism which have been influential in the field of philosophy of education. The article also briefly touches on the differences between the Cynic and the Stoic notions of cosmopolitanism, but I will now deepen this discussion in a short historical excursus in order to illustrate how my own approach is both a further development of Delanty’s critical cosmopolitanism, but yet also diverges from his approach in several key respects. I will argue that my own historical alignment actually lies closer to some of the central ideas that lay behind Delanty’s critical cosmopolitanism while avoiding some of the problematic tendencies I see in his own interpretations of the history of cosmopolitanism. In his chapter on the origins of cosmopolitanism, Delanty credits the Cynic philosopher Diogenes of Sinope (412-323 BC) with coining the Ancient Greek term *kosmopolitès* as a declarative “act of individual freedom” and as the “repudiation of local forms of belonging that has been a source of inspiration for all subsequent forms of cosmopolitanism” (Delanty 2009, p. 20). While he positively emphasizes the Cynics’ contribution to cosmopolitanism in terms of “a critical sensibility” and for their questioning of the distinction between citizens and non-citizens so central to social and political life in the Greek polis, his interpretation of Diogenes’ declaration needs to be understood and problematized against the background of Delanty’s overall dismissal of Cynic philosophy. In Delanty’s view, Cynic philosophy promotes “a limited individualistic pursuit of an ascetic ideal that had no real substance beyond the rejection of that which is conventional” (ibid., p. 21). He discusses the later Stoic versions of cosmopolitanism in both the Greek and Roman variants at much greater length than Cynicism and subjects them to far greater in-depth and laudatory analysis. This appears somewhat unbalanced in relation to other commitments of his critical cosmopolitanism developed elsewhere in the book; firstly, because he describes the relationship between Stoic cosmopolitanism and the historical development of the Roman empire without problematizing it in any specific way; and secondly, because he here draws on Martha Nussbaum’s work in an affirmative manner which is rather inconsistent with his critique of her moral universalist approach. It is worth noting that he later positioned his own conception of a critical cosmopolitanism as situated and rooted.

Costas Douzinas has given a rather poignant description of the profound differences between the Cynic and early Greek Stoic cosmopolitanism as proposed by Zeno and the universalist morality underpinning later Roman Stoicist cosmopolitanism, as proposed by Cicero, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, who were “men of power and office” (Douzinas 2013, p. 61). As Douzinas summarizes: “According to Diogenes and Zeno, the cosmos or physis of eros, virtue and spiritual equality are tools of resistance against the injustices of the polis. The Roman version expands the law of the polis to that of the cosmos.
This is the cosmopolitanism of empire” (ibid., p. 61). In contrast to the later Roman Stoic’s “cosmopolitanism of empire”, Douzinas characterizes the earlier Cynic variant in the following terms:

The first Cynic cosmopolitanism was critical and even antinomian precisely because the nomoi and institutions of the age were falling far short of the ideals of justice and law. […] Diogenes, who first used the term cosmopolites, described himself ‘cityless, homeless, without issue, poor, wandering man who lives from day to day’ and added that he does not feel at home anywhere except in the cosmos itself. This cosmopolis is not situated in a particular place; it can be everywhere and nowhere. Its citizens were errant, nomadic, wise today they would be refugees, migrants, itinerants. (Douzinas 2013, p. 74)

By taking Diogenes and the Cynic tradition as the historical point of reference, it is not only a critical sensibility that is introduced into cosmopolitan theorizing. This approach also enables us to draw on the Cynic philosophical practice of questioning and criticizing laws and social conventions which are considered obsolete, inauthentic and unjust. I further specify these in terms a critique of reified social conventions. A further advantage of this approach is that it avoids the problematic alignment with an understanding of cosmopolitanism in terms of a history of mobility characteristic of the expansion of empires. Such a historical point of reference does not place “men of power and office” as central examples for who is cosmopolitan. Rather, it offers scope to discuss the refugee, the migrant and the exile as possible figures of critical cosmopolitanism.

Against Delanty’s hasty dismissal of Diogenes, I want to suggest that the history of Diogenes being exiled for “defacing the coin” and other cynical practices of questioning and challenging social norms of the time should not be regarded as a mere rejection of convention. Instead, it can be read as a positive suggestion for other, alternative modes of social relations. For example, “defacing the coin” and practicing an ascetic lifestyle should not be written off as a crime against monetary regulations or a rejection of all material pleasures. Rather, it could be viewed as a necessary and urgent critique of dominant ideas on the importance and value of money, and as a reminder of other forms of social relatedness beyond the purely economic. Demanding a reevaluation of the role of economic relations does not necessarily imply their complete rejection. Importantly, Diogenes not only discursively criticized certain norms in speech, but he also actively lived and practiced his philosophical ideas. Further evidence that the Cynic tradition amounted to more than a rejection of previously cherished practices is the role attributed to women philosophers within Cynicism. Kristen Kennedy has interestingly shown in her study of the Cynic Hipparchia that the Cynics were also sensitive to those who were excluded and exiled from political participation for reasons other than “defacing the coin”. The Cynics, as Kennedy emphasizes, were “one of the
few sects that allowed and even encouraged the participation of women, observing no intellectual differences between men and women” (Kennedy 1999, p. 49). These examples should help to illustrate that the cynical practice need not be dismissed as a mere anti-attitude. Instead it is a risky, engaged embrace of the critique of the present through illustration in lived practice of the possibility of transformation and of living otherwise.¹

2.3. “Defacing the Coin” and the Critique of Reified Cultural Practices beyond Western-centric Perspectives

Within philosophy of education, Marianna Papastephanou’s has played a key role in highlighting the radicality and the economic perspective of Cynic cosmopolitanism. As she writes: “Most contemporary thinkers tend to forget Diogenes’s cynical, uncompromising, radical and anticonventional (or, frequently, postconventional) selfhood, which the modern bourgeois mobility or politeness would find cumbersome, to say the least.” (Papastephanou 2012, pp. 101f.) It is important to highlight that it is not Diogenes’ anticonventionalism or radicality in itself that makes this philosophy attractive for contemporary educational contexts. In the context of my thesis, with its juxtaposition of the critique of reification and a critical cosmopolitanism, it is first and foremost the explicit inclusion of economic aspects that makes the Cynic tradition an interesting historical point of reference. As Papastephanou spells out in more detail:

Diogenes indeed emphasized mobility and rootlessness in his citizenship. But unlike the modern, globalized Western self who moves about motivated by distinction, adventure, settling down, pleasure, or profit, Diogenes traveled light, with a modest sack rather than a full purse, and philosophized aeconomically. […] For the Cynics, if love of money is the metropolis of all evil, its antipolis is a cosmopolis […] there is much more in Cynic philosophy than just blending with the traveler category or claiming the existentially aesthetically uplifting position of the citizen of the world who is alienated from her narrow and conventional locality. Homelessness may not entail a refusal to inhabit, or be formed by, a single communal space but a rejection of the systematic and ongoing educational conditioning of pupils to always make economic sense whether within or across borders. I am not suggesting that the Cynic version of

¹ For the purpose of motivating the Cynic rather than the Roman Stoic tradition as the historical point of reference for my development of a critical cosmopolitanism, this short excursus has to suffice due to the restrictions of the present study. A further exploration could elucidate these points more in-depth drawing on the discussion on Diogenes and Cynic philosophy by Peter Sloterdijk (1983) and by Michel Foucault in Le courage de la vérité (1984/2009). There are also some interesting studies on the relation between the 20th century punk movement and Ancient Cynicism (Curran 2015; Blair 2019), which could be related further to my discussion of Marjane Satrapi’s Persepolis in Article 3.
cosmopolitanism is the only possible alternative to globalization of that its an-
economical character is totally defensible. I am saying, rather, that the cosmo-
politanism of the Cynic is not as undemanding on selfhood as it is now made to
appear when limited to mobility beyond locality or to a moralized Other ori-
entation. (2012, p. 101)

Papapstephanou is very careful in her description of Diogenes’ embrace of
mobility. She explicitly avoids a Western, modernist conflation of cosmopol-
titanism with an idea of the economically privileged traveler, and emphasizes
instead the rather radical economic critique advanced and practiced by Cynic
philosophers. The limitation to mobility beyond locality, and the moralized
Other orientation, are both descriptions of the limitations Papastephanou sees
also in Kwame Anthony Appiah’s work on what in Diogenes thinking can be
appropriated for a contemporary, rooted cosmopolitanism. I have offered a
critique of the purely culturalist tendencies of Appiah in Article 4 below. Un-
derstanding a critical cosmopolitanism in terms of a renewed critique of reifi-
cation, allows us on the one hand to follow Appiah’s conception of a rooted
cosmopolitanism as a critique of reified cultural conventions, and on the other
hand it also allows to deepen the notion of a rooted cosmopolitanism beyond
the culturalist dimension. It is the specific sensitivity towards the economic-
material dimension which in my view recommends Diogenes’ philosophy as
a point of departure for the notion of critical cosmopolitanism that I explore
in the thesis.

In Delanty’s critical cosmopolitanism there is a strong emphasis on allow-
ing for different kinds of cosmopolitanisms in the plural to co-exist. In contrast
to the Kantian ideal that inspired many approaches to cosmopolitanism within
political theory, Delanty’s model aligns with “a different kind of cosmopoli-
tanism, one less premised on the assumptions of a world republic or on elites
and also one less Eurocentric” (2009, p. 52). Both in his historical overview
and throughout his contemporary analyses, for example in his discussion of
cosmopolitanism in relation to multiculturalism. Delanty emphasizes that the
central ideas of cosmopolitan thinking can be traced back to non-Western phil-
osophical traditions and that a contemporary cosmopolitanism needs to be re-
formulated in a way so as to overcome a Eurocentric outlook. While his at-
ttempts to integrate Asian philosophy and to relate to non-Western perspectives
and issues surely remain insufficient in terms of a thorough-going decentering
of cosmopolitanism, the approach in the thesis shares his commitment to re-
fect on the challenges to contemporary critical social theory posed by decolo-
nial critique. This is one of the aspects that I would like to be develop further
in later work.
2.4. Methodological Considerations

After this historical excursus, I would like to return one more time to Delanty’s conception of critical cosmopolitanism as situated, ‘real’, and as an immanent orientation that discloses the world through experience and interpretation (cf. Delanty 2009, p. 14). In particular, I want to explore how his methodological considerations and his attention to cosmopolitanism as an empirical phenomenon have influenced my own work. In the following chapter I will show further expand the discussion of methodological commitments in terms of how I relate the critical social theory of Axel Honneth to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophy as therapy of conceptual confusions through the critique of reification. This chapter is dedicated to illustrating how Delanty’s work has influenced my own thoughts in the thesis. His methodological point of departure has been of particular importance for me. In line with authors as Craig Calhoun, James Gilroy, Fuyuki Kurasawa, and Kwame Anthony Appiah, Delanty argues for a situated cosmopolitanism that “does not entail the negation of solidarities, as liberal cosmopolitan theorists”, and that “goes beyond conventional associations of cosmopolitanism with world polity or with global flows, […], stressing the socially situated nature of cosmopolitan processes while recognizing that these processes are world-constituting or constructivist ones” (2009, p. 78).² In his methodological reflections, Delanty then more specifically starts with a critical discussion of the well-known work by Ulrich Beck (2002, 2006, 2007), and in particular Beck’s concepts of ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’ and ‘cosmopolitanization’. He lauds Beck’s efforts to shift the focus to an analytical-empirical, social-theoretic understanding of cosmopolitanism that tries to embrace a chaotic and internal-transformative view of cosmopolitanization as a multidimensional process. This works against both a “top-down economic-led” globalization and an order-imposing, overly normative Kantian understanding that is prevalent in political theory. But he is also critical of Beck’s approach, arguing that Beck tends to “conflate cosmopolitanism with transnationalism” (Delanty 2009, p. 82). Beck’s notion of cosmopolitanization, according to Delanty, is so general as to make it difficult to discern what is not cosmopolitan, and also his notion of methodological cosmopolitanism remains insufficient. In contrast, Delanty stresses the difference between possible preconditions (not causes!) to cosmopolitanism, such as transnationalization, and empirical manifestations of cosmopolitanism, for which the indicators have to be established through a normative analysis of what should count as cosmopolitan phenomena empirically. Delanty argues that we have to make use of normative criteria that allow us to describe situations in which certain “forms of self-transformation occur and how these

² In my own work, I have argued for a constitutivist rather than a constructivist understanding of cosmopolitanism, leaning first and foremost on the works of Alice Crary and David Finkelstein.
Delanty’s concern with a distinction between preconditions and empirical manifestations of cosmopolitanism guides my own approach to a critical cosmopolitanism in education. Throughout the different articles, I take up the question of how Lukács’ notion of reification can be used in relation to developing a critical cosmopolitanism despite the critical attitude towards cosmopolitanism within the Marxist tradition. As Delanty emphasizes in his historical overview, “cosmopolitanism received its first major negative connotation in the works of Marx and Engels” (Delanty 2009, p. 44). As I argue in Article 2, the use of the term cosmopolitanism as a descriptor of the global spread of capitalist market and commodity structures is more akin to contemporary notions of globalization than to the notion of critical cosmopolitanism that I defend in the thesis. Drawing on Michael Löwy, I demonstrate in Article 2 that while “Marx is indeed highly critical of the sort of pseudo-cosmopolitanism which serves to declare the ideals and hegemonic interests of one nation, one social class, or one cultural group as universal and absorb all others into it” (Schumann 2012a, p. 221), this does not necessarily imply the incompatibility with a situated, critical cosmopolitanism of the sort suggested in the thesis. In contrast I propose that by “understanding cosmopolitanism in terms of a critique of reification” (ibid.), it is possible to “capture the important difference Löwy finds in Marx’ and Engels’ writings between a ‘pseudo-cosmopolitanism’, which promotes nothing but the universal hegemonic rule of one privileged group of people or nations, and a ‘genuine cosmopolitanism’” (ibid., referring to Löwy 1984, p. 248). It is here that the distinction I take from Delanty becomes important. By suggesting that, for example, transnationalization per se does not necessarily produce those forms of self-transformation and societal development that should count as cosmopolitan, I argue for a clear conceptual distinction of a contemporary critical cosmopolitanism, in Diogenes’ spirit, as concerned with a critique of economic injustices rather than the global expansion of capitalist markets and commodities. However, it is important to keep in mind that the “genuine cosmopolitanism” which Löwy finds in Marx and Engels carries strong universalist tendencies, and lacks the multidimensional, pluralist conception that is characteristic of the critical approach I defend. This also informs my discussion of the post-colonial and feminist critiques of Critical Theory and its methods and their relevance for my own study, in particular from the perspective of feminist epistemology in Article 5.
2.5. Weltbürger or Kosmopoliten? Ideological Nuances

In this context, and before concluding these historical considerations, I think it is helpful to elaborate further on the development of the relationship between positive and negative connotations of cosmopolitanism. Ulrike M. Vieten, in her study *Gender and Cosmopolitanism in Europe*, has given an acute analysis of the different developments the notion of cosmopolitanism has taken in the British and the German context respectively. Vieten explains that in Germany two parallel concepts of the world citizen co-existed: “historically, the potential of cosmopolitan subjectivity was split ideologically: Jews and Roma were constructed as rootless *Kosmopoliten* in opposition to a culturally shaped ideal of the *Weltbürger*” (Vieten 2011, p. 51). Furthermore, she links this ideological distinction to a specific educational idea:

Paradoxically, the negative connotation of a ‘rootless cosmopolitan’ evolved along with a positive connotation of Eurocentric *Weltbürgertum* as a cultural commitment to be educated and to educate others. In the late 19th and early 20th century Germany’s thinking and acting on nationalism and *Weltbürgertum* are strongly embedded in an ideological project of federal cultural integration, linked to *Bildung* and European visions of ‘superior’ civilisation and further fostering social cohesion in society. (Vieten 2011, p. 51)

In line with Douzinas’ distinction between the Cynic cosmopolitanism as “resistance against the injustices of the polis” and the Roman Stoic “cosmopolitanism of empire” (Douzinas 2013, p. 61), as well as Löwy’s distinction between a “pseudo-cosmopolitanism” and a “genuine cosmopolitanism” (Löwy 1984, p. 248), I suggest considering Vieten’s distinction between the coloni-alist tendencies of “Weltbürgertum” and the parallel development of the notion of “Kosmopoliten”. Despite my insistence on a multidimensional, plural-ist understanding of critical cosmopolitanism, I also wish to caution against historical alignments with notions of cosmopolitanism that lean towards a problematic inheritance of the imperial and colonialist aspirations of the “cos-mopolitanism of empire”, of the globalist, economic “pseudo-cosmopolitan-ism” and those of “Weltbürgertum”. Instead I suggest following a different historical trajectory of cosmopolitanism as a critique and resistance against reified and unjust social structures, which inhibit rather than enable an openness to the world, to others and towards self-transformation in the encounter with others and the world. In future work it would be interesting to explore further how the “gradual demise of the cosmopolitanism of the nineteenth century and the concomitant rise of nationalism and the national state” (Delanty 2009, p. 45) led to a shift of the concept of cosmopolitanism to become “a label attached to the socially uprooted and with the decadence of the cosmopolitan city to which the national state had an ambivalent relation” (ibid., p. 46). He explains the developments in the late nineteenth century as follows:
The condition of cosmopolitanism was nationalism. As with national capitals, universalistic projects such as world exhibitions and monumental architecture were intended to make the nation part of a universalistic Western civilization. In this centralizing mission cosmopolitanism was absorbed into the universalism of the nation-state, but without its critical, self-transformative and ambivalent relation to fixed reference points. Despite this, the figure of otherness and rootlessness could not easily be domesticated. In terms of a wider conception of modernity, it could be suggested that nationalism and cosmopolitanism reflected different aspects of modernity: the homogenizing project of the modern national state and the pluralization of modern culture and social relations (ibid., p. 47).

These pluralist, “decadent”, and subversive dimensions of the conceptual reach of cosmopolitanism serve to establish a contemporary understanding of a critical cosmopolitanism that avoids rather than builds upon the universalistic, civilizing mission of a “cosmopolitanism of empire”.

Following the summary of some of the main commitments in my historical and theoretical reconstructions of a critical cosmopolitanism, in the next chapter, I turn to a discussion of the way in which the recent attempts at reappraising the critique of reification have informed the development of the critical educational cosmopolitanism advanced in this thesis. The commitment to a post-universalist understanding of cosmopolitanism that puts dynamic social relations at its center and advances an understanding of rationality which comprises imaginary aspects remains decisive for the development of an educational cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, the re-assessment of the Cynic cosmopolitanism as lived practice which also emphasizes a critique of economic-material aspects will be further substantiated by my reading of Lukács’ critique of reification. It will lend additional support to the idea that in order for cosmopolitanism to retain a critical edge, it needs to be transformed from conceptions of cosmopolitanism that conflate it with the empirical conditions of transnational globalization and propose a complementary moral or cultural variant of a ‘cosmopolitanism of empire.’ Instead, I advance a critical, pluralist and subversive understanding of cosmopolitanism. As I will show in the following chapter, it is particularly the critique of reification that can help us adequately to explore contemporary challenges for an education which is concerned with retaining and reproducing the possibility of democratic practice. For this a potent political philosophical approach is needed, on that affords scope to analyze the challenges contemporary capitalism poses for education as well as for democracy.
3. Becoming Things: Renewing the Critique of Reification for a Critical Cosmopolitanism

So far, I have traced my understanding of a critical cosmopolitanism to Gerard Delanty and illustrated the similarities and differences between his approach and the one advanced in this thesis. The salient point both in which my approach to a critical cosmopolitanism, and hence to a critical cosmopolitan education, departs from his approach is a stronger anchoring in the Cynic rather than Stoic tradition. At various stages I have also sketched the way in which my reinterpretation of Delanty’s critical cosmopolitanism can be understood in terms of my own approach to cosmopolitanism as a form of critique of reification. This approach is further supported through my re-assessment of the reading of Cynic cosmopolitanism. In the following I now turn to a more in-depth analysis of why I argue that cosmopolitanism should be read in terms of a specific form of the critique of reification. I will provide more context with regard to the historical varieties as well as the contemporary readings of the notion of reification than I was able to do in the respective articles. In this way I hope to specify and further clarify my suggestion for reading cosmopolitanism as a critique of reification. The implications of this reading for an educational cosmopolitanism in the way I propose will then be spelled out in the final chapter. Prior to that I will explicate the theoretical premises underpinning my interpretation of a critical cosmopolitanism in terms of a critique of reification.

3.1. Cosmopolitanism as a Critique of Reification

In Article 2, I suggest that reading cosmopolitanism together with the critique of reification enables us to problematize reified particularisms and purely culturalist understandings of cosmopolitanism as well as readings of cosmopolitanism in terms of an abstract, detached universalism. I characterize cosmopolitanism as a “commitment to non-reifying forms of boundedness, as taking responsibility for resisting the reifying attitudes modern capitalism enhances” (Schumann 2012a, p. 230). Furthermore, I argue:

Cosmopolitanism understood in this sense could mean to remind ourselves of the primary form of recognition inherent in our relations towards every human
My interpretation of reification is informed by Axel Honneth’s reading of reification as a forgetfulness of a primary form of recognition. I will spell this out further below in Section 4.3. But it is also committed to an understanding of the intricate involvement of reification as a social form with the economic conditions of contemporary forms of neoliberal capitalism. Any convincing critical cosmopolitanism, in my view, needs to take account of the relationship between the political and the economic. Adorno, probably one of the last encompassing theorists of reification, had stated that in his time “to know how social relations are determined by the exchange mechanism, is now almost impossible” (Rose 1978, p. 51). In contrast, I would like to highlight a recent study by Anita Chari (2010; 2015) who argues that the critique of reification can make a unique contribution to understanding the “fundamental forms of domination in neoliberal polities” (Chari 2015, p. 91). She argues against an autonomous understanding of “the political” or intersubjectivity as well as against a Marxist prioritizing of (political) economy. Instead she suggests that a fresh reading of György Lukács’ critique of reification makes it possible to understand the interrelation between contemporary capitalism, certain forms of subjectivity it produces and the possibilities of democratic politics. As Chari explains:

Lukács brings a perspective to the critique of capital that I would suggest is overlooked in current discussions. While there is much work being done on issues of class struggle, redistributive politics, and the problem of inequality, there is less focus upon the relationship between neoliberal socioeconomic forms, forms of political subjectivity, and the structure of capitalist experience. (Ibid., p. 112)

She argues that a contemporary analysis based on Lukács has the ability to develop an account of the mutual constitution and inter-relationship between economic distribution, the operation of production and prevailing forms of perception in society. In particular her analysis of “Teilnahmslosigkeit” (ibid., p. 118), in which she develops further Honneth’s 2008 analysis of Lukács, is useful for a current reading of a critical cosmopolitanism and its possible function within education. When I published Article 2, in which I gave the main outline for my theoretical commitments and my interpretation of reification,

---

3 One of her reviewers translated this term pointedly as “participatorilessness” (Allen in Allen, Biebricher & Maher 2017, 550).
Chari’s book was not yet available. Since I find her work most insightful and compatible with my own approach, I will take the opportunity here to refer to her work where appropriate in order to further specify my own position.

3.2. Historical Lineages of the Concept of Reification

3.2.1. Disappearance and revitalization

The concept of “reification” was introduced by György Lukács in his *History and Class Consciousness* (1925) and has been one of the central inspirations of the early Frankfurt School critical social theorists and received its last prominent systematic attention in Habermas’ *Theory of Communicative Action*. In its simplest articulation in Lukács reification describes the fact that “a relation between people has taken on the character of a thing” and affects our self-relations, our relations to others, and also our relations to the world. In recent years, after the concept had virtually disappeared in debates within social theory, various authors have started to argue for a renewal of Lukács’ critique, on the grounds that many social pathologies also of post-industrial societies can only be adequately described as reifications and that these pathologies go beyond what can be captured in justice and democracy oriented social theories (cf. Honneth 2008; Demmerling 1994; Jaeggi 2014; Dahms 2011; Bewes 2002). In her introduction to the Norwegian edition of Axel Honneth’s study on reification, Torill Strand argues that the analysis of reification has not disappeared, but merely taken on a different form (cf. Strand 2019, p. 15). She mentions examples from literary works (Elfriede Jelinek) and from contemporary philosophy, such as Catherine Malabou’s critique of neuroscience and Martha Nussbaum’s discussion of objectification. As for Nussbaum’s analysis, I argue in Article 2 together with Honneth against an equation of objectification and reification. This is mainly in order to avoid a narrow reading of reification as a purely moral mistake and also to make room for those cases of objectification which can be considered legitimate, or even pleasurable.

In Article 2, I gave a thorough account of my theoretical commitments towards a renewal of the critique of reification based mainly on the recognition-theoretic account by Axel Honneth and Christoph Demmerling’s Wittgensteinian approach and outlined my own understanding of the premises of a contemporary critique of reification. Due to the limited scope of a journal article, I could not include some of the important historical nuances in the interpretation of reification. Therefore, before turning to different recent reappraisals of the notion of reification, I would like to take this opportunity to give a more encompassing overview of the history of the notion of reification and to introduce in more detail the conceptual distinctions that are important for the
direction of my own account of a critical educational cosmopolitanism as a critique of reification.

After its coinage by Lukács, the concept of reification, together with the related concept of alienation, was widely used by different neo-Marxist and even non-Marxist writers throughout the twentieth century. The notion of reification played a prominent role in the work of first- and second-generation Frankfurt School writers. Since then, however, the concept of reification has virtually disappeared from the theoretical landscape, having been used, overused and watered down to the point of near meaninglessness. On the one hand, it has become a common place, referred to in its dictionary meaning of “turning into a thing”, but it has long been considered too vague, overworked or outdated to serve as an analytical tool for contemporary social theory and criticism. Adorno warned that reification might be a mere “epiphenomenon” and that “the cause of human suffering […] will be glossed over rather than denounced in the lament about reification” (Adorno 1973, p. 190). At the same time, the concept of reification was the “centrifuge of all his major works and of his many shorter articles” after 1932, and even an “obsession” (Rose 1978, p. 43). Adorno himself worked consistently with what I describe below as reification’s paradoxical structure. However, he was also concerned with the fact that many interpretations of reification relied on misattributions and overly broad uses of the notion, and that it had become almost interchangeable with alienation. As Gillian Rose shows, Adorno himself is responsible for some of these misattributions, as he wrongly attributes the notion to Hegel, but he also lauds him for developing a concept of reification that is “consistent and original” (Rose 1978, p. 43).

3.2.2. Two sources in Marx: Between alienation and commodity fetishism

It is helpful to trace the notion of reification to its sources in Karl Marx’ writings. This will help to clarify both Lukács’ conceptual commitments as well as Adorno’s self-critical assessment of the critical possibilities of one of his most central theoretical concepts. I also think it is useful to follow Anders Ramsay in his distinction between two main versions of reification theories. One version is based on a generalization of Marx’ analysis of commodity fetishism in Capital, and can be understood as a critique of impersonal power structures. Here, reification signifies that human social relations within capitalist societies can become so rigidified in different social institutions that they appear as naturally given rather than human-made and thus subject to social

---

4 Other misattributions are by Lukács, who ascribed the notion to Marx in the chapter on commodity value and who also exaggerates its importance in Simmel. Both Adorno and Marcuse state that Hegel used the notion of reification which is unfounded. For further detail cf. Rose 1978, p. 28-31.
change. This version of understanding reification is characteristic of Lukács’, Adorno’s and Habermas’ accounts. I turn to a more fine-grained analysis of the similarities and differences between these accounts of reification in terms of impersonal power below (cf. Ramsay 2005, p. 75f.). The second version which Ramsay discusses is less concerned with a critique of power, and is characterized by a more general concern with the loss of unmediated, social relationships, and the quality of interpersonal relationships due to modern economic and administrative structures. This version draws on the Marx’s notion of alienation in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts and is connected to the early Marx’s philosophical anthropology, where humans become alienated from their own product of work, and with this from the world they create as well as from themselves. The notion of reification based on the 1844 manuscripts has been read into the work of authors such as Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel and Max Weber. As Ramsay points out, it can have a nostalgic, anti-individualistic, anti-modern tone and defend traditional power relations rather than critically analyze contemporary impersonal power structures. Ramsay here follows closely in Adorno’s footsteps who himself was highly critical of Lukács’ generalist understanding of reification.

3.2.3. Reconstructing Lukács

Deeply influenced by Marx and Simmel, Lukács constructs reification both in relation to alienation and objectification in a way that according to Adorno obfuscates the critical kernel of a notion of reification. This is based on Marx’s critique of commodity fetishism, and the shifts in the relationship between use-value and exchange value. Lukács himself makes concessions to such a weakness in his 1967 preface to the study. While Marx’s early work on alienation was appreciated, especially also by authors in the East during the Cold War era, because it allowed to criticize the communist countries from within, Adorno insisted that the critique of reification be more closely connected to a critique of economy. He also held that theorists of alienation tended even more problematically than Lukács towards merely criticizing a state of consciousness rather than discussing the actual sources for suffering in society.

I consider Ramsay’s distinction a relevant pointer also with regard to my own positioning in relation to various renewals of the critique of reification. My understanding of a critical cosmopolitan education does not propose a nostalgic turn backwards, towards stipulated idealized unmediated relations, nor does it propose a general and simplistic skepticism towards modernity’s tendencies towards producing alienating relations towards others, the product of one’s work or towards ourselves. Rather it suggests that Marx’s critique of commodity fetishism and its consequences for social experiences and the formation of contemporary subjectivity needs to be reconstructed as a central moment in any contemporary critique of reification. It needs to provide the
analytical means critically to lay bare the contemporary functioning of impersonal power, and provide the tools for analyzing the relation between subjectivity, politics and economy. In Honneth’s approach (the main inspiration for Article 1), we find such a cautioning against a generalist conservative interpretation of reification in his careful distinction between his reconstructed notion of reification and useful and necessary forms of objectification. In modern, differentiated societies, he has emphasized again and again, also in his latest work *The Idea of Socialism* (2017), that neither economic nor culturalist reductivism or foundationalism is promising.5

In Anita Chari’s reconstruction, however, both the critique of alienation and the critique of commodity fetishism are considered important and relevant influences on Lukács’ analysis. She reads both as valuable descriptions of different forms of depoliticization. She interprets the analysis of alienation in Marx’s early political writings, and most prominently in his 1844 *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, as a specific form of the “rigidification of the political” (Chari 2015, p. 95) and as an analytical tool that meaningfully crosses the line between the study of politics and economy. As a critique of the hyposatization of abstraction, i.e. an abstraction that takes the appearance of an objective state, it reveals that alienation on the level of production, on the level of the state and on the level of civil society leads to perception of certain structures and institutionalizations as beyond the possibility of political influence. Chari regards Marx’s critique of alienation as a critique of the rigidified of political forms which separate state and civil society is interpreted by her as a “criticism of the illusion of the political that denies the material and social conditions of its own possibility” (ibid., p. 104). Without reducing the political to the socioeconomic, she argues for a turn toward the political character of the socioeconomic conditions considered as extra-political by theories of democracy, such as Jacques Rancière’s, which define the political in a more narrow, autonomous sense.

As regards Marx’s later work and his study of the commodity form, she interprets these analyses not as a critique of depoliticization in terms of the *rigidification* of the political, but as a critique of another aspect of depoliticization in capitalism, namely in form of the “*bracketing*” of the political (Chari 2015, pp. 105ff.) In Chapter 1 of the first volume of *Capital*, Marx introduces the distinction between the use-value of a commodity, i.e. the value it has in relation to satisfying certain human needs, and the exchange value of a commodity, i.e. the value a commodity gains in relation to being exchangeable

---

5 When considering the nostalgic, conservative variants with Ramsay, it is important that Honneth’s notion of reification as a forgetfulness of recognition does not fall into the trap of nostalgia. It is not just a call for a general turn back to unmediated conditions of mutual recognition. Honneth is very clear with that certain forms of objectification (and even ‘positivistic’ empirical sociological research) are necessary and unproblematically useful parts of the differentiation in modern society.
with other commodities. As Marx shows, there are different illusions involved in capitalist production and commodity exchange, and the value of a commodity is actually not something that naturally resides within an object, but it emerges in exchange and represents the “abstract human labor materialized in it” (Marx 1976, p. 129). What Marx then describes with religious terminology as commodity fetishism, has given rise to different theories of value which emphasize different aspects of this phenomenon as described by Marx:

The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists therefore simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the social characteristics of men’s own labor as objective characteristics of the products of labor themselves, as the socio-natural properties of things. Hence it also reflects the social relation of the producers to the sum total of labor as a social relation between objects, a relation which exists apart from and outside the producers. Through this substitution, the products of labor become commodities, sensuous things which are at the same time supra-sensible or social. (Marx 1976, p. 165)

In Marx’s analysis of commodity fetishism, we can distinguish between different emphases: a personification of the commodity; as the misconception that value is a natural property of the commodity; or as the misconception that social relations are actually relations between things (thus obscuring the actual status of the commodity as socially mediated). Regardless of which interpretation we follow regarding the particular emphasis of Marx’s analysis, Chari summarizes that the effect of this fetishizing of the commodity, is “to bracket certain areas of social life from political deliberation and subjective experience and to render them invisible from the perspective of political transformation” (Chari 2015, p. 109). Furthermore, she argues that Lukács deepens exactly this analysis of commodity fetishism and shows how this produces a specific form of subjectivity and operates as a specific “politics of the senses” (ibid.). This means that, against Adorno’s critique of Lukács as discussing merely a state of consciousness (similar to his critique of alienation theorists), Chari credits Lukács with describing how the shaping of subjective experience, perception and sensations are part and parcel of the functioning of contemporary capitalist economy.

3.2.4. Teilnahmslosigkeit: Reification in contemporary capitalism and neoliberal subjectivity

Lukács’ account explicitly relates reification to Marx’ analysis of commodity fetishism, only he explores more deeply the way in which the processes of obscuring and fetishization described by Marx lead to the development of a

---

6 Cf. Rose 1978, pp. 30ff. for a more detailed synopsis of the different emphases in Marx’ analysis of commodity fetishism that was followed by Lukács, Benjamin and Adorno respectively.
pathological habit of experiencing the world in a distanced, detached, dissociated manner, both on an individual and on a societal level. As Chari describes poignantly, the spectatorial attitude shaped by reification produces a specific form of consciousness, “Teilnahmslosigkeit, or lack of participatory involvement” (Chari 2015, p. 118). It is this spectatorial stance and the description of the development of this pathological habit to which Honneth connects to in his rejuvenation of reification as I explore in Article 2. Chari points out that Honneth’s intersubjective approach fails to take account of the fact that the intricate involvement of the processes of reification as described by Lukács are not merely an interpersonal issue, but a problem fundamentally related to capitalist political economy. I will return to this criticism in the next chapter. Both Honneth and Chari, however, find Lukács’ analyses of the subjective experience and the shift from an active involvement to a growing contemplative, detached stance towards one’s own labor, others’ lives, one’s own life and nature as a fruitful further development and extension of the critique formulated by Marx. While Adorno had clearly distanced himself from Lukács’ use of reification as a subjective category, Chari sees a peculiar strength in Lukács’ mutual intertwinement of politics, economy and subjectivity. The subjectivities produced by contemporary capitalism, in their turn, with their specific form of passivity, pose a danger to democratic structures and will formation. As Chari writes: “The demand for reflexivity, then, is not meant to simply reduce objectivity to subjectivity to demonstrate the socially constructed nature of reality; conversely, it reveals the objective, practical character of the reified appearances, reified forms of consciousness, themselves” (Chari 2015, p. 141). She explains that Lukács’ call for a collective consciousness raising should not be dismissed as being restricted to a philosophy of subjectivity or of consciousness, as in Adorno.

Chari also problematizes whether neoliberal subjectivity7 contradicts Lukács’ analysis precisely because of the way in which subjects “may appear to be active, involved, and innovative, rather than passive and disengaged” (Chari 2015, p. 113). Neoliberal subjects are encouraged to be active and entrepreneurial, and in this way contribute to capital accumulation and neoliberal economy. This “has actually rendered the so-called active stance of the individual functional to capital accumulation” (ibid.). Chari holds that “neoliberal subjectivity exhibits a way of inhabiting the world that is formalistic and dissociated and thus creates a closed system that forecloses the possibility for subjects to become cocreators in the social and economic worlds they inhabit” (ibid., p. 113). I would here like to add that the entrepreneurialism and activity

---

7 Neoliberalization, according to Chari entails a “specific way in which class dynamics are being obscured and depoliticized, mainly through a reorganization of the relationship between the neoliberal state and the economy and through shifts in the relationship between the economic and political spheres more broadly.” (2015, p. 23)
neoliberal subjectivity is encouraged to inhabit remains on a highly individualized level, and within the criteria and paradigms set by the goal of capitalist accumulation. Collective deliberation and action upon the very social conditions we live under becomes inhibited through the processes of passivization described by reification. Therefore, I maintain with Chari and others who argue for a rejuvenation of the critique of reification that “far from becoming obsolete, […] the paradigm of reification critique has only become increasingly relevant in the context of neoliberalism” (ibid., p. 113). Before turning to these more recent attempts at renewing the critique of reification, some of which informed my conception of a critical cosmopolitanism as a critique of reification in the thesis, I want to briefly discuss Adorno’s main criticism of Lukács. I shall also consider his interpretation of reification as identity thinking directed especially against the reifying processes he saw as pervading positivistic, non-dialectical philosophies and sciences.

3.2.5. Reified concepts and Adorno’s critique of identity-thinking
As mentioned above, reification was one of the central notions connecting different threads and themes of Theodor W. Adorno’s wide-ranging oeuvre. He interpreted reification not as a relation between men being turned into a relation between things. Rather, he emphasized that a relation between men appears to be a property of a thing. In advanced capitalist society, according to Adorno, “an illusion of pure use-value, as displayed by cultural goods, has been substituted for pure exchange-value. This exchange-value has deceptively taken over the function of use-value” (Adorno 1976/2002, p. 25).8 Reification, importantly, is not a fact of consciousness for Adorno. It is first and foremost a social phenomenon caused by the shift from use-value to exchange-value, which determines consciousness but does not originate there. He argues that Lukács’ interpretation tends towards idealism, maintains a dichotomous split between subject and object and that Lukács criticizes capitalist division of labor in a way that “verges on a criticism of ‘thingness’ as such” (Rose 1978, p. 40). This critique I will return to this critique below when discussing the question of the compatibility of a renewed critique of reification with contemporary new materialist approaches. For now, I would like to emphasize that Chari’s recent interpretation of Lukács at least opens up the possibility of a different reading of Lukács, which is more generous than Adorno’s interpretation, which may well have stemmed from the need to demarcate his own approach against that of Lukács.

Adorno’s emphasis on relationships between men appearing as properties of things, rather than as relationships between things, allows him to leave

8 I would like to mention two contemporary examples which appear to confirm Adorno’s analysis: cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin and another example would be the “like economy” in social media.
room for the appreciation of the positive effects of the modern division of labor and other liberties that arise from the modern dissolution of traditional bonds. In this way, as Anders Ramsay shows (2005, p. 85f.), Adorno can avoid the nostalgic, traditionalist tendencies of other versions of the critique of reification and alienation that express a form of backwards-oriented desire for unmediated social relationships without paying attention to the detrimental, oppressive and restrictive aspects of these idealized traditional bonds. Focusing on the aspect of commodity fetishism in which Marx describes the relation between men becoming perceived as a property of a thing, Adorno develops his critique of identity-thinking. This is a form of thinking that is shaped by the shift towards pure exchange-value, which equates different things with each other as they are equalized in the process of commodity exchange. Furthermore, this is also how he reconstructs the equation of concepts and objects in the non-dialectical sociologies and philosophies. Non-identity thinking of the type that Adorno develops in his negative dialectic argues that in capitalist societies the concept can never identify its true object. As Rose summarizes: “In capitalist society, reified concepts are the only form in which non-reified properties can appear. […] Reified concepts describe social phenomena, the appearance of society, as if it has the properties to which the concepts refer.” (1978, p. 47) I will return to the problem of reification as a specific problem of positivist social sciences and philosophies when discussing the Wittgensteinian language-theoretic approaches to reification which I employed in the articles below.

3.2.6. The possibility of critique: Dereification, standpoint theory and the role of literature

But let us look more closely at the idea that reified concepts are all we have available and are the means through which we can understand our social reality within capitalist societies. If reification, and with that identity thinking, is all-encompassing, then this poses the epistemological question of how, if at all, a critical theory is possible in a society that is completely reified. Here, Adorno and Lukács give rather different answers. Adorno tries to avoid the paradox of the principled unknowability of total reification by differentiating between different levels of the extent of reification. He contends that total reification is used only as a means continuously to interrupt identity thinking. A critical theory of reification, for Adorno, cannot be grounded, but he uses a fragmented method and employs the paradox of reification in his own thinking through an ongoing construction and denial of universals. He promotes the employment of various modes of thinking in order to avoid the distortions produced by one-sided theoretical doctrines (cf. Rose 1978, p. 48ff.). Whereas Adorno finds that bourgeois ideology can only be criticized by means of an
immanent critique, Lukács insists on the standpoint of the proletariat providing another epistemological viewpoint from which to criticize and overcome reification. This is because it is only from the standpoint of the proletariat that the illusions and distortions of bourgeois theory and philosophy can become visible.

In Article 5 of the thesis I discuss in greater detail how Lukács’s standpoint theoretical epistemology influenced and was further developed within feminist standpoint theory. Within the feminist discussion, the problematic essentialism inherent in standpoint theory has long been debated. This has led to further developments and variations that are compatible with pluralized social struggles rather than privileging the epistemic position of any particular, closed societal group. Emphasizing that Lukács’ critique is a critique of abstract domination through the production of the pathological habit of inhabiting a merely spectatorial stance rather than a traditional critique of class and economic exploitation, Chari opens up an interpretation of Lukács’ proposal of overcoming reification through reintegrating reified perspectives into the ‘totality’ of social relations that does not presuppose an essentialist, substantialized understanding of the proletariat. She suggests that “the perspective of totality can be reconciled with a democratic, nonessentialist political perspective, provided it is theorized as a principle of political action itself rather than as an extrapolitical social positioning, and that the basis for such an analysis can be found in Lukács’s text” (Chari 2015, p. 122). As she explains further, “Lukács’s argument for the standpoint of totality as the standpoint of dereified practice is, from a methodological standpoint, intended to challenge the ahistorical, reifying outlook of bourgeois society and of positivist science, which, by decontextualizing processes from their historical becoming, posits them as immutable, necessary and fixed” (ibid., p. 124). Beyond such a reinterpretation of Lukács’s notion of totality, a further way of approaching his understanding of the possibilities of dereification is his earlier, pre-Marxist work on literature, where he was striving to combine sociological and aesthetic perspectives. For Lukács, literary criticism and the study of cultural form was deeply entwined with, and not separate from, philosophical and epistemological questions. Wheras Adorno blames Lukács for a naïve Hegelian belief in the resolution of the dialectic, Chari suggests with Fredric Jameson that for Lukács, “the ultimate resolution of the Kantian dilemma is to be found [...] not in Hegel, but rather in the nineteenth-century novel: for the process he describes bears less resemblance to the ideals of scientific knowledge than it does to the elaboration of plot” (Jameson, quoted in Chari 2015, p. 125). When turning to the re-conceptualizations of reification which have informed my work in the articles of the thesis, it is noteworthy that many of the authors experiment with including literary styles of writing (e.g. Rahel Jaeggi), and draw on literary examples in their philosophical presentations (e.g. Axel Honneth).
3.2.7. The reification of knowledge and education

As mentioned above, after Habermas, the concept of reification has largely been absent from social theory. However, since the late 1990s and in the early 2000s there have been several serious attempts to renew the theory of reification (and alienation) for contemporary philosophy and sociology (e.g. Demmerling 1994; Hammer 2000; Bewes 2002; Honneth 2008; Dahms 2011; Hedrick 2019). These re-appropriations understand reification in terms of “forgetfulness of recognition” (Honneth 2008), as “the failure to think totality” (Bewes 2002), or as forgetfulness about the context within which a linguistic expression first gains its meaning (Demmerling 1994). They are concerned with demonstrating in which way reifying processes make us forget or fail to understand the ways in which objects, linguistic terms, events and situations stand in relation to each other and are brought about by social practices that evolve in historically situated contexts. What has been particularly relevant in these recent appropriations and their analyses for my arguments in the different articles in the thesis is that these authors point to the way in which the realms of language, communication, knowledge, and thus education, are not simply the points to look for resistance to reification, as prominently held by Habermas, but are themselves highly susceptible to and contribute to processes of reification.

The notion of reification that inspired my re-conceptualization of cosmopolitanism in education in the thesis, was founded mainly on the recognition-theoretic concept of reification proposed by Axel Honneth (2008) as well as a language-theoretic Wittgensteinian reformulation of the critique of reification. I develop my account of both notions and how I see them functioning together in some detail in Article 2. In Articles 2, 3 and 4, I show how a critical cosmopolitanism in terms of a renewed notion of reification can usefully be employed to contribute to different debates on cosmopolitanism within philosophy of education. For the present purpose, I think it is therefore sufficient to give a short summary of the most important aspects. I will also situate the notion of reification in relation to the social and political theories of both authors in a way which I was not able to do within the confines of the articles.

3.3. Situating Reification in the Social Theory of Axel Honneth

3.3.1. Honneth and the legacy of Frankfurt School critical theory

Axel Honneth is a contemporary German philosopher who is well-known for his theory of recognition. He has led the renowned Frankfurt Institute for Social Research from 2001 to 2018 and since his retirement from the German
university system, he holds a professorship in philosophy at Columbia University. As one of the most prominent proponents of the third generation Critical Theory he has taken over the legacy of the Frankfurt School after Jürgen Habermas. His theory of recognition developed in *Kampf um Anerkennung* (1992)/ *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts* (1996) is still highly influential. Originally, the book was his habilitation work with Jürgen Habermas. Honneth has published around twenty books and over two hundred articles throughout his career. There are several key themes that are evident throughout his oeuvre, such as inter-subjective recognition and the idea of social freedom, i.e. a critique of political liberalism’s concept of freedom from the perspective of a social philosophy (cf. Raffnsøe-Møller 2015). I will situate his study on reification and the attempt to renew Lukács’ work in relation to some of his most important writings.

From early on, Honneth tried to bridge the growing divide between the French and the German philosophical traditions. In his doctoral study, later published as *Kritik der Macht* (1985)/ *The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory* (1991), he brought Frankfurt School critical theory from Horkheimer and Adorno to Habermas’ theory of communicative action into conversation with Michel Foucault’s analyses of power. One of the continuities with this early work is the central emphasis on conflict in his seminal text *The Struggle for Recognition*. Here conflict which receives a much more detailed treatment than in Habermas’ consensus-oriented theory. Another such continuity between his early study on Foucault and the development of his theory of recognition, is the critical questioning of Habermas’ rationalism. This leads Honneth to insisting on the importance of adequately theorizing the role of the affective dimension of human life in understanding the social world as well as the structure of social change. In his analysis of social struggle, he points out that it is different forms of misrecognition and the accompanying forms of emotional hurt and injury that lead to social pathologies and social conflict.

### 3.3.2. Between disciplines and styles

In line with the tradition of Frankfurt School Critical Theory, Honneth’s analysis of recognition combines philosophy, social theory, psychology and empirical sociological research. Like Adorno and Horkheimer, his work tends to fall more on the side of general philosophical questions and analyses. He writes in a style closer to forms of cultural criticism than empirical social science, and arguably lacks concrete analyses of specific social and political institutions. On the other hand, the unique combination of different theoretical and empirical research traditions allows him to formulate an original conception of recognition from a new perspective. This methodological openness and interdisciplinarity is also characteristic of his work on reification. In his de-
scription of the social pathologies, which he is trying to present there in a concise conceptual framework, Honneth draws additionally on literary sources, in a way which inspired my own work in the thesis, in particular in Article 4. In an interview with Marcelo Gonçalo, Axel Honneth describes why he started openly referring to as well as actively engaging with literature in his own social philosophy as part of his later theoretical works. He thinks that literary works can serve as “phenomenological testimonies of certain structures of everyday life” (Gonçalo & Honneth 2013, p. 215). Inspired by Bernard Williams and also the Swiss analytical philosopher Peter Bieri, Honneth in his philosophical work after The Struggle for Recognition, considers literature to have a unique potential to provide a certain form of empirical basis for his philosophical work. According to Honneth, literature can capture certain aspects that he deems are not available from “empirical research in sociology because that research is very often too quantitative and not sensitive enough to the nuances in everyday life.” (Gonçalo & Honneth 2013, p. 215). In Article 4, I have followed this example and discuss two graphic novels in order both to question given conceptions of cosmopolitan education and to move beyond them through problematizing the potential negative implications of border crossing and transgressing. I argue that the sensitivity and phenomenological richness that are the hallmarks of the graphic novel enable a particularly nuanced and sensitive portrayal of is of central aspects and structures of self-constitution, autobiography, political stance-taking, educational and cosmopolitan experience in the lives of contemporary young adults.

3.3.3. Recognition, intersubjectivity and the critique of liberalism

In The Struggle for Recognition, Honneth combines arguments from the Jena Writings of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, George Herbert Mead’s social psychology and Donald W. Winnicott’s developmental psychology, in particular his object relations theory. Grounding his account of recognition in the psychological theories enables Honneth to develop a normative framework for the necessary recognitional preconditions for human self-realization. According to Honneth, we can distinguish between three different dimensions of recognition which require and constitute both individual (ontogenetical) and societal (phylogenetical) learning processes. The first form of recognition is love, an unconditional form of recognition that Honneth models on the relationship of care between mother and child, but which also includes forms of intimate personal relationship. This form of recognition belongs purely to the private sphere in Honneth’s model. The second form of recognition is moral respect. It is attributed to each and every human being qua their humanity, and reflected in legal systems that guarantee that everyone is treated equally qua their status as moral being, irrespective of any specific qualities a person might have. The third form of recognition which Honneth describes is social esteem. Here, recognition is tied to specific contributions an individual makes to a
society via their engagement in work, in the market or in civil society. The three forms are derived from the respective forms of misrecognition and the forms of hurt they instill and they ways in which they hinder individuals’ self-realization. It is particularly through the third form of recognition that it becomes evident that Honneth’s approach implies a critique of liberalism which is evident throughout his work. While he agrees with liberalism on the value of individual autonomy and as a central achievement of modernity, which is preserved in his recognition model in the form of moral respect, he criticizes liberalism for its narrow understanding of freedom, for disregarding the social and political conditions of individual freedom.9 As Genel writes, “the question of democracy is shifted to the question of the social conditions of possibility for the participation of citizens in the public sphere” (Genel in Honneth, Rancière, Genel, & Deranty 2016, p. 23). Our autonomy, our ability to articulate appropriate life-goals and freely choose between different options is predicated on the experience of the different forms of recognition.

3.3.4. Recognition, acknowledgment and the question of normativity and progress

It is important to keep in mind that the notion of recognition that Honneth employs in his study on reification does not coincide with any of the different notions of recognition employed in his earlier theory of recognition. This provides the key to understanding why some of the criticisms raised against his theory of recognition do not apply in the same way to his conception of recognition in Reification. I would like to briefly explore two criticisms of Honneth’s theory of recognition, which we can be read as examples of feminist post-structuralist and for post-colonial objections respectively. Let us begin with Judith Butler, whose writings have also been centrally concerned with the question of recognition and social in/visibility. As Stefan Deines (2007) convincingly shows in his comparison of Honneth and Butler, while both assign recognition a crucial function for the motivation of social transformation and change, and theorize this in relation to the goal of a highly inclusive and differentiated order of recognition, Butler strongly disagrees with some of the principles underlying Honneth’s theory of recognition.

Firstly, for Butler every normative structure necessarily operates via exclusion so that the possibility of an eventual, complete inclusiveness of any normative structure is a contradiction in itself. Secondly, Butler cautions to a much greater extent than Honneth about the universal and transcultural character of values such as inclusion and individualization. Any such value is itself part of a political position which has to be considered as in principle subject to change through concrete interaction and confrontation with other cultural

---

9 An interesting study on the problematic consequences of liberal theorizing in relation to globalization can be found in Demuth (2018).
norms and values. In his theory of recognition, Honneth believed that he had established the necessary forms of recognition and accordingly legitimate expectations of recognition in a way that enabled a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate demands for social change. Oppressed groups or minorities struggle for recognition by appealing to already implicit normative grounds, which have not previously been explicitly recognizable by the majority so far. Butler here is much more sensitive to the situation of societal groups which are placed outside the normative order, to an extent that they have no expectations whatsoever. She also cautions against the structural problems involved in a concept of recognition where the happiness of the minority finally depends on the recognition by the majority.

The understanding of social progress subscribed to by Honneth is another point of disagreement between Butler and Honneth. The harmonious conception, based on a certain reading of Hegel, where individual and social learning processes (Bildung) imply a continuous increase in rights and freedoms through the growing inclusiveness of our normative order, is historically questionable. This last criticism has been importantly raised in a recent decolonial critique of the Critical Theory tradition by Amy Allen. In *The End of Progress* (2017) Allen argues that the unifying problematic of critical theory from a postcolonial perspective is its articulation of critique in a way that presupposes a certain concept of progress. This is problematic not just because it contributes to a modernist arrogance against non-modern others, thus impeding epistemological openness, but in so far as it betrays a blindness toward “the entanglement of our normative ideals with relations of power” (Allen 2017, p. 207). As Allen explains:

> To be clear: Honneth does not explicitly make any claims about the superiority of Western, industrialized, wealthy European and American democracies vis-à-vis non-Western societies. Nonetheless, it is a plausible inference from his progressive reading of the central practices and institutions of modern, Western societies to the claim that such societies are developmentally superior not only to the premodern, feudal European societies from which they emerged but also to other actually existing ‘premodern’ or ‘nonmodern’ societies. (Allen 2017, p. 83)

Allen identifies a tendency to measure the respective achievements of self-determination (through adequate dispersal of recognition) against the modern worldview of specific western societies. She points to the necessity of considering that which has not yet been included, and considering those cultures or normative arrangements that do not yet live up to these criteria. If these are considered to be ‘fixable’ through future improvements and amendments to...

---

10 Honneth states repeatedly that progress is irreversible. If we look at the historical development of the situation of different minority groups, it seems naïve to suppose that what we have won cannot be lost again or forgotten.
our normative frameworks, then it is all too easy to overlook how the modern conception of reason relies on the stipulation of inferior “others”.

3.3.5. Reification as forgetfulness of recognition

In his interpretation of reification as forgetfulness of recognition, Honneth (2008) reconstructs recognition on an existential-ontological level, connecting Lukács’ critique to the philosophy of language of the late Wittgenstein. This reinterpretation is fueled both by analytic motivations, and by an attempt to make one of the core ideas of the Frankfurt School accessible to students mainly trained in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition. This is already apparent by the quotes chosen to introduce the book: the first from Horkheimer and Adorno’s *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947/2002), the second from Wittgenstein’s *On Certainty* (1969). Honneth elaborates the thesis that our acts of cognition are based in a prior form of recognition in relation to Stanley Cavell’s analyses regarding the relation of knowledge and acknowledgment. He characterizes reification with reference to Cavell as a forgetting of acknowledgment which is logically antecedent to all knowledge.

Loosely building on a passage from *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* Honneth describes reification as a forgetfulness, as a loss of consciousness of a stance of care and acknowledgment which precedes knowledge of others, of the world and of ourselves. This corresponds to inter-subjective reification processes, to the reification of our natural surroundings and to the reification of ourselves. (cf. Article 2, pp. 223f.) As I emphasize in Article 2, I find two main strengths in Honneth’s account of reification: his clear distinction of innocuous forms of objectification, instrumentalization and de-personalization from pathological forms of reification; and the way in which his account of the sources of reification in ideologies supplements the critique of reification based in commodity exchange in a meaningful way. This provides a sound basis for the critique of research paradigms within the study of education more generally, and with regard to theories of cosmopolitanism more specifically (cf. Article 2, p. 225).

Throughout the different articles I work intensively with Honneth’s reconstruction of reification in terms of a second-order process of forgetfulness. In Article 1, I position my own reification-critical approach in relation to other perspectives on cosmopolitanism in philosophy in education, which I further explicate in Article 2 in relation to Honneth and Demmerling. In Article 3, it is in particular Honneth’s analysis of inter-subjective reification which I employ to criticize simplistic understandings of patriotic love being able to provide the social bonds necessary for securing social justice. The focus of Article 4 is a critique of cosmopolitan conceptions of identity which promote rather than critically challenge self-reification. Self-reification is here analyzed as resulting from both ‘detectivist’ and constructivist understandings of the self. Article 5 is concerned with the reification of conceptual schemes, research
paradigms and theoretical approaches within the academic discipline of education. Discussing the example of the reception of feminist approaches within epistemology in philosophy of education, I argue for the necessity of a critique of the reification of knowledge and exemplify the value of shaping a curriculum for solidarity in the 21st century. Throughout the articles that comprise the main body of this thesis, I draw extensively on Honneth’s notion of reification as forgetfulness as well as his approach to meeting reifying tendencies through a recalling of ontological awareness and empathic engagement. The discussion of Anita Chari’s reconstruction of the critique of reification indicates further implications and extensions of the analyses that are available based on Honneth’s interpretation. Her approach, in my understanding, despite its critical points against Honneth, is not incompatible with his reading, and can further complement and strengthen the discussion of the preconditions of a democratic education and an education for democracy under current conditions.

Honneth argues that the forgetfulness of recognition (or acknowledgment) can lead to a specific form of “invisibility” (Honneth 2001), a blindness in our perception of our relations to others, our relations to the world, and also in the relations to ourselves. Furthermore, he states with Adorno that it is “at the moment in which our reflexive efforts lose consciousness of their origin in an act of antecedent recognition that we cross the threshold to pathology, skepticism, or – as Adorno would have called it – identity thought” (Honneth 2008, p. 57). Both Cavell’s notion of acknowledgment, which Honneth’s notion of recognition in Reification builds on, as well as the other Wittgensteinian reconstructions of reification that I work with in the thesis are not based in the same problematic way on the postulation of stable, universal norms as the notions of recognition in Honneth’s The Struggle for Recognition.11 Furthermore, these Wittgensteinian approaches are are more insistent on discussing concrete rather than generalist situations and confrontations with otherness and they display a greater sensitivity towards those cases in which claims for recognition cannot be articulated or become visible at all because they lie completely outside the current boundaries of our recognitional orders.

In this way, the Wittgensteinian approaches do not subscribe to an idea of incremental progress of our recognitional orders and increase in freedom as criticized by Amy Allen. I think it can convincingly be argued that the notion of recognition employed in Honneth’s interpretation of reification avoids some of the problematic issues addressed by the critics of his theory of recognition. The notions of recognition and acknowledgment employed in his interpretation of reification are formulated more closely in relation to Cavell and

11 Honneth himself acknowledges this: “Finally, a Wittgensteinian interpretation has come to rival the Hegelian usage of the term; ‘recognition’ here functions as a performative response to the actions [Lebensäußerungen] of other people. As a consequence of the writings of Stanley Cavell in particular, which make do without any recourse to Hegel, the category of ‘acknowledgment’ has penetrated into the inner circle of analytic philosophy.” (Honneth 2008, p. 329)
to Adorno’s critique of identity thinking, which presupposes his negative dialectic rather than the reconciliatory Hegelianism evident in The Struggle for Recognition. By directing the critique of reification to concrete formations of contemporary forms of capitalism, and describing the consequences as social pathologies in relation to a notion of recognition placed at a very fundamental and basic level, the analysis is not defending specifically modernist conceptions in a grounding or foundational manner as in other of Honneth’s works. Nevertheless, I think, that the critique of reification as put forward by Honneth would need to be re-visited from a decolonial perspective, to a greater extent than I have been able to achieve in the articles that comprise the thesis.

3.3.6. Social freedom and re-visiting the idea of socialism

In his ambitious project to reconstruct Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, the monograph Recht der Freiheit (2011)/ Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life (2014) Honneth departs from the idea of an anthropological grounding of his philosophy of recognition and turns toward a historical reconstruction of our established democratic institutions and practices and their role in relation to freedom. The critique of thin understandings of autonomy and freedom already plays a central role in his inter-subjective account of personal autonomy in The Struggle for Recognition. It is also a key theme for his elaboration of the nature of “social freedom” in Freedom’s Right. The historical-reconstructive method, however, lacks the critical edge of his earlier works, which proceeded on the basis of an analysis of points of conflict and injury as perceived by social minorities. Freedom’s Right in contrast tends towards a conservative affirmation of existing legal, social and political institutions of current democracies.

Lastly, the concept of reification figures in a challenging and interesting way in one of Honneth’s latest publications, in which he argues for a renewal and re-articulation of the idea of socialism for our time, namely Die Idee des Sozialismus (2015)/ The Idea of Socialism: Towards a Renewal (2017). He argues that “the globally unrestrained market economy since the end of World War II” (2017, p. 15) has led to enormous social and political problems, to global inequalities and injustice that outrage many people. However, this outrage is not becoming unified in any vision of any feasible alternative to contemporary capitalism. Honneth argues that reification, as an absence of the idea that society is capable of change, “only applies to the present state of capitalism” (ibid., p. 4). He notes that it is only now that we seem to be “unable to anticipate social improvements in the basic structure of contemporary societies because we regard the substance of this structure as being impervious to change, just like things” and that “the inability to translate widespread outrage at the scandalous distribution of wealth and power into attainable goals is due neither to the disappearance of an actually existing alternative to capitalism, nor to a fundamental shift in our understanding of history, but rather to the
3.4. Reification and the Critique of Language within New Wittgensteinianism

3.4.1. Wittgenstein as a political philosopher

Wittgenstein, in his later philosophy, often described the method of his philosophizing in terms of therapeutic interventions. For example, in the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, he wrote: “The sickness of a time is cured by an alteration in the mode of life of human beings, and it was possible for the sickness of philosophical problems to get cured only through a changed mode of thought and of life, not through a medicine invented by an individual” (RFM, II.4). In remarks like these, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy appears compatible with the philosophy of praxis of the Critical Theory tradition. From Philosophical Investigations I and II up till On Certainty, his language-theoretic analyses become more and more intertwined with a philosophy of life forms, and with an analysis of how language itself is embedded into different lived practices and our lived realities. In this way philosophy of language and philosophy of praxis are not two separate, mutually exclusive fields, but intrinsically related. In this way, as the German philosopher Christoph Demmerling has argued, Wittgenstein’s therapeutic notion of philosophy “corresponds to the emancipatory aspects of classical Critical Theory” (Demmerling 1996). This is not at all an obvious position.

Wittgenstein’s philosophy has long been considered as irrelevant for political philosophy. Furthermore, since he himself aligned first and foremost with authors such as Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard, and because of remarks such as that philosophy “leaves everything as it is” (PI I, § 124), Wittgenstein has been interpreted as arguing for a conservative preservation of our practices. However, Wittgenstein’s insistence on the lack of foundation for our practices beyond their grounding in our life forms is not meant in an affirmative manner. On the contrary, he draws attention to the potential for transforming even the most foundational of our practices. This has led to the appropriation of his philosophy by left-leaning political philosophers in terms of an alignment with strongly relativist positions in a way which would strongly contradict the normative concern characteristic of much of Critical Theory. However, Honneth in his study on Reification draws, as mentioned above, on interpretations of Wittgenstein by, amongst others, Stanley Cavell and David H. Finkelstein. Both these authors belong to an interpretive approach which since Alice Crary...
and Rupert Read’s publication *The New Wittgenstein* (2000) has become known as new Wittgensteinianism. Characteristic for these readings, despite their internal variety and breadth, is not only that they postulate a certain continuity, rather than break, between the early and the late Wittgenstein, but also that they can all be understood under the heading of a “therapeutic reading” of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy (Crary 2000a, p. 7). In these interpretations, Wittgenstein’s anti-foundationalism does not lead to the suggestion that his philosophy parallels Derrida’s deconstruction. Rather, the distinctive feature of Wittgenstein’s therapeutic intervention is in contrast to free us from the philosophical confusion that meaning-making practices, in order to not be relativistic, would need to be able to absolutely exclude misunderstandings. Alice Crary, in the mentioned volume (Crary & Read 2000), develops such a reading of Wittgenstein with regard to the potential relevance of his philosophy in relation to other traditions in political philosophy. She demonstrates how a third possibility between “right-wing” and “left-wing” Wittgenstein (Crary 2000b, p. 119) can be developed. Crary criticizes relativistic interpretations for portraying Wittgenstein as “allowing human activity, in the form of linguistic conventions, to shape language only by fixing meaning and hence only by playing an external role with regard to language” (ibid., p. 140). In contrast, she reads Wittgenstein as calling for a broadened understanding of rationality and objectivity, one that is more demanding and to all practical purposes retains a strong idea of our responsibility toward a world (rather than considering our linguistic and other conventional practices as free-floating from any such responsibility). Wittgenstein’s point, in her view, is that an objective account of the world includes the education of our sensitivities as well as a requirement “to use – and perhaps stretch – our imagination” (ibid.). I consider Crary’s account, which she developed further in her later work *Beyond Moral Judgment* (2007), highly relevant for a Wittgensteinian reading of the critique of reification, and it inspired many of the arguments in the articles in the thesis.

### 3.4.2. Reified meanings, educating sensitivities and imagination

The initial interpretation of reification in a Wittgensteinian sense which I use in the thesis is the one proposed by Christoph Demmerling (1994). In a reading of Wittgenstein’s late philosophy together with Adorno’s critique of “identity thinking”, Demmerling suggested that Wittgenstein’s critique of language can be understood in terms of a critique of semantic fetishisms (cf. Article 2). Demmerling interprets Wittgenstein’s private language argument, his analysis of rule-following, his re-evaluation of our ordinary linguistic practices and his critique of representational theories of meaning in terms of a critique of reification. According to Demmerling, Wittgenstein’s philosophy functions as a reminder of the contextual, procedural and temporal nature of our meaning-constitutive practices. If we forget that these are the conditions of meaning-
constitution, then we misunderstand our linguistic concepts and practices in a reifying manner. The critique of “semantic fetishisms” (Demmerling 1994) in philosophy and other thought practices is not supposed to replace the critique of commodity fetishism, but it is understood as a meaningful extension of it. Both Honneth and Demmerling develop their language-theoretic interpretations of reification with a view to supplementing the critique of political economy with a critique of reification caused by ideological distortions.

How then can we think about the possibility of dereification from such a perspective? Wittgenstein’s therapeutic interventions often aim at putting reified philosophical concepts back into the context of ordinary language. Through such recontextualization we become reminded of the history of specific concepts that help to dissolve the hypostatizations that lead to philosophical confusions and misunderstandings of our own practices. In the articles in the thesis, I draw on various lines of arguments developed by Alice Crary (2000a; 2000b; 2007) in order to explore the possibility of dereifying cosmopolitanism, and to sketch a concept of cosmopolitan education in terms of a critique of reification.

Alice Crary, in her interpretation of Wittgenstein’s critique of narrow understandings of rationality and objectivity, concludes that Wittgenstein’s philosophy teaches us that “getting at the facts of a situation may require us to try to see it in a different light, to use our imagination in a variety of ways, to seek new experiences which help us to refine our sensitivities” (Crary 2000b, 141). Wittgenstein affirms the “groundlessness of our believing” (OC §166), but in Crary’s reading this still makes room for a normative point from which we can legitimate our critique. Wittgenstein’s point is that there is no point wholly external to our established practices from which to raise such claims. However, he points back towards the ‘rough ground’ and examples in our ordinary practices in which we are able to raise legitimate criticism and in which our justifications are accepted as legitimate and sufficient. In positing a broader understanding of objectivity and rationality, Crary argues against the deconstructive and relativist assimilations of Wittgenstein’s work, and shows that Wittgenstein’s point is that our narrow understandings of objectivity wrongfully abstract from our sensitivities and the way in which there is an affective dimension to all of speech. This also applies to her analysis of moral judgment, which in many contemporary moral and political theories become narrowed by ideas of objectivity and rationality consisting in an abstraction from all emotional and affective aspects. Moral thought in her account (Crary 2007) is not limited to moral judgment, but rather is a dimension of our linguistic practice throughout: “ethics is distinguished by a preoccupation not with judgments in one region of discourse but with a dimension of all of discourse” (ibid., p. 3). Through showing the “abstraction requirement” as inherently mistaken, Crary succeeds in developing a strategy for dereifying (moral) philosophy in a way that inspired other such suggestions in the articles in the thesis.
I will discuss some examples of the ways in which her analysis manifests itself in my approach more specifically in the next chapter.

Crary draws attention to the “education of our sensitivities” in order to arrive at a more fully-fledged notion of objectivity and rationality, rather than their mere dismissal. This endeavor is also evident in the work of other feminist Wittgensteinians such as Linda M. G. Zerilli and Aletta J. Norval. As I have argued elsewhere: “Rather than taking the negative critique of a narrow understanding of rationality as a call to abandon the […] commitment to rationality […] Crary and Zerilli emphasize the need for positively broadening our understanding of rationality in order to not falsely underestimate the importance of our sensitivities and the affective dimension in their contribution to a rational outlook on the world” (Schumann 2017, p. 386). Crary demonstrates the implications of her understanding of the role of affect for our rational grasp on the world pointedly in her exploration of ‘the case of literature’ (Crary 2007). She argues against the conception that “any stretch of discourse capable of making a direct contribution to understanding must be recognizable as such prior to and independently of any emotional engagement with it” (ibid., p. 129). Instead she highlights cases where literary works comprise “rational modes of instruction not because they contain moral arguments but because they engage our feelings in various ways” (ibid., p. 131). In turn, these elicit “moral thinking that, while rationally fully legitimate, does not take the form of moral judgment-making” (ibid., p. 132). In Zerilli’s work (2005), we find a similar emphasis on the role of imagination for judgment. In her case it is first and foremost an interest in political judgment that drives her analysis.

Aletta J. Norval keenly summarizes Zerilli’s and Crary’s arguments regarding the role of acquired sensitivities and our imagination in rational judgement-making:

Characterizing our relations to others as relations of knowing runs the risk of neglecting the role of imagination in our critical activities. It also excludes serious engagement with our practical life, not as something to be overcome in any simplistic sense, but as something to be engaged with without taking an external point of view. If the disruption of our naturalized ways of doing things rests not on skeptical doubt but on the ability to see things anew, to ‘figure’ the thinkable differently, the task of theory is also transformed. (Norval 2008, p. 64).

The interpretations by Zerilli, Crary and Norval emphasize the importance of the affective dimension, of educating our sensitivities and of stretching our imagination. These all indicate possible routes towards de-reifying our conceptual practices as well as our educational practices.
3.4.3. Stanley Cavell: becoming ‘concretized’ rather than ‘reified’

It is also worth exploring the connection between Lukács’ critique of reification and Wittgenstein’s later philosophy even further by looking at Cavell’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s private language argument. Cavell spells out the problem that Honneth describes as “invisibility” or “forgetfulness of recognition” in terms of the question of the possibility of “soul-blindness” (Cavell 1979, p. 378). Cavell interprets Wittgenstein’s private language argument as “a fantasy, or fear, either of inexpressiveness, one in which I am not merely unknown, but in which I am powerless to make myself known; or one in which what I express is beyond my control” (ibid., p. 351). Wittgenstein’s skeptical problem thus describes a state in which we would have lost “a glimpse of the possibility that I am not exhausted by all the definitions or descriptions the world gives of me to me” (ibid., p. 390). The skeptical worry arises in the historical period “in which a ‘science’ of the human was being called for” (ibid., p. 473) and results “not from a disappointment over a failure of knowledge but from a disappointment over its success (even, from a horror of its success)” (ibid., p. 473). Furthermore, the skeptical problem is not just an intellectual riddle. According to Cavell, it is lived in modern human history; it articulates the (horrific) “phantasy of the vanishing of the human”, a state “in which […] we no longer recognize, or take an interest in, the difference between things and beings (the difference!)” (ibid., p. 468).

For Cavell, the private language argument thus hints at an answer to the question: “What happens to individuals if they tire of history, can take no further mediation, become lost or captivated on the path of self-realization and inter-subjectivity – if they become ‘reified’ rather than ‘concretized’?” (ibid., p. 471). The fear of the “vanishing of the human” expressed in Wittgenstein’s language-theoretic arguments aligns with what Timothy Bewes describes as the “anxiety towards reification”, which he argues is “central to the emergence of the concept itself” and is the pervasive “anxiety of late capitalism” (Bewes 2002, p. 115). According to Bewes, also post-structuralism and deconstruction are by no means free of the anxiety towards reification, which as he emphasizes itself is reifying. This in spite of the fact that they attempt to resist reifying thought through their emphasis on “différance” maybe most urgently of all contemporary theories. Bewes argues that reification “as anxiety and phenomenon, speaks to our present condition more than any other” (ibid., p. xvii), and that it deserves our attention precisely because it “is a signifier of its own inadequacy” (ibid.).

As I have demonstrated elsewhere (Schumann 2019), Stanley Cavell’s moral perfectionism as a necessity for democratic life presupposes, “conditions of ‘good enough justice’” (Cavell, 1988/1990, p xxii). In a similar way as Honneth, Cavell argues that redistributive justice and Rawls’ liberalism need a critical deepening in order to safeguard the continual renewal of democratic life. However, this also implies that these analyses remain limited “to
a group of individuals who is neither most advantaged nor most disadvantaged economically” (Schumann 2019, p. 496) as well as that Cavell presupposes that “basic democratic constitutions are in place and functional enough so as to exclude political chaos or tyranny” (ibid.). While Honneth is more concerned with reflecting on these more basic institutional preconditions of democratic social life, he still pushes for a wider and more exacting understanding of the preconditions of autonomy that exceed the reflections of liberal political theories.

3.5. Integrating the Critique of Reification into a Critical Cosmopolitan Education

As the some of the most prominent critiques of cosmopolitanism have been launched by educational theories inspired by post-structuralism and deconstruction, I think it is important to draw out the implications of the critique of reification in relation to the consequences of a critical cosmopolitanism formulated on its basis. Considering the interrelation of the possibilities to defend and to criticize cosmopolitanism from the perspective of a renewed critique of reification does not just carry a critical-negative point. Rather, keeping in view the analyses and the negative possibility of the reification of cosmopolitanism points us towards what we can understand as possible dereified forms of educational life; i.e. in educational practice, research and theory. It forces our attention towards developing a contemporary critical educational theory in a different direction. Honneth asks us to remember the primacy of acknowledgment to knowledge. Demmerling argues that we have to re-contextualize and historicize reified notions, and he finds further ways of resisting reification in Adorno’s concept of experience. Alice Crary, in her interpretation of Wittgenstein’s critique of narrow understandings of rationality and objectivity, concludes that Wittgenstein’s philosophy teaches us that “getting at the facts of a situation may require us to try to see it in a different light, to use our imagination in a variety of ways, to seek new experiences which help us to refine our sensitivities” (Crary 2000b, 141).

What are the implications of these analyses for the possibility of a critical educational cosmopolitanism today? I illustrate possible contributions and develop several suggestions for this in the respective articles. The problematic that becomes apparent from a reification theoretic point of view is that if a cosmopolitan education follows trends which encourage neoliberal trends of abstraction, fragmentation and decontextualization, if certain theoretic and bureaucratic notions, labelling and categorizing practices are not any longer seen as one potentially useful means in a broader educational endeavor, but start to become aims in themselves which determine educational practice and the in-
teraction with students, then these practices can encourage reified self-relations, relations to others, and to the world. For example, as I explore in Article 4 with regard to reified self-relations, such processes can encourage students to observe themselves in the hope of “detecting” desirable qualities according to context, or that students feel they need to be able to “construct” those features required by social expectations. Honneth argues with the Wittgenstein scholar David Finkelstein (2003) that both “detectivist” (naturalistic) and “constructivist” understandings of the self can be seen as deficient, reifying modes of relating to ourselves. In his view, they also inhibit our standing in a relation of acknowledgment to ourselves. In order to establish expressivist, explorative self-relations we need to be acknowledged and learn to acknowledge ourselves as worthy of exploration and expression.

But how is it possible to retain “a glimpse of the possibility that I am not exhausted by all the definitions or descriptions the world gives of me to me” (Cavell 1979, p. 390) in educational practice and research? There are two levels on which I think the consequences of re-thinking the possibility of critical educational theory with Lukács and Wittgenstein need to be drawn out. Firstly, on a conceptual level the theoretical analysis can lead us to re-interpret cosmopolitanism in terms of resistance to the reification of knowledge in education, in terms of promoting broader conceptions of rationality and objectivity. This might require the cultivation of experiential dimensions and of our sensitivities in order to get the facts right. With regard to the second dimension, I think that it leads to questions of how we can do critical educational research differently today. If the reification of education leads to an inhibition of our abilities to perceive of educational situations, students, ourselves, and knowledge, beyond the given forms and categories, if it blocks certain forms of experience, acknowledgment and with this a rational responsible assessment of educational situations, then a critical understanding of cosmopolitanism in relation to the critique of reification points us to having to re-conceive of critical educational research in terms of opening up possibilities of working against the fixing of meaning. This opens up new possibilities to experience and educate our sensitivities for educational situations and the beings involved in them. It also suggests new forms of experiments with doing educational research. One of the paths taken by Honneth is the engagement with literary works. I choose this form of philosophizing in Article 4 where I discuss graphic novels in relation to critical cosmopolitan education as a de-reifying practice.

As the thesis is a study within educational philosophy, one of the primary aims is to contribute with a research perspective that has been so far unexplored within the field. The framework developed provides analytical as well as normative tools, while eschewing a bullet point list of pre-packaged solutions. Beyond developing a research outlook, however, the ideas and arguments put forth in the respective articles also provide relevant insights for ed-
ucational policies, the institutional requirements for education in the 21st century as well as for specific formations of ordinary, everyday educational practices, classroom interactions and experiences that are relevant for teachers and students at different levels and in a range of formal and informal educational contexts. By suggesting different ways of thinking through, analyzing and re-imagining educational actualities and possibilities, I hope to contribute to an understanding of the specific challenges faced by democratic education and education for democracy in today’s globalizing societies.
In the thesis I develop a conception of a critical cosmopolitan education in terms of a renewed critique of reification. The first chapter introduced and considered this idea in relation to contemporary assessments of the consequences of neoliberal globalization by Wendy Brown and Axel Honneth. In order to critically understand the challenges facing democratic societies today, we need to adopt a theoretical perspective that enables us to connect global outlooks with a concrete analysis of local contexts and offers scope to reflect on the prevailing sense of despair at the lack of realistic hope for possibilities of socio-political participation, influence and possibilities for social transformation. Departing from an overview of current perspectives within philosophy of education, I suggested that a critical cosmopolitanism could be developed fruitfully in connection with a renewed look at the critique of reification in order to highlight the ways in which democratic education and education towards democracy is hindered by what is best described as “participatorilessness” (see Chapter 1). In Chapters 2 and 3, I outlined the salient theoretical perspectives that support the arguments in the respective articles in the thesis. These are developed in relation to Gerard Delanty’s critical cosmopolitanism, the Cynic tradition and Axel Honneth’s and a New Wittgensteinian critique of reification respectively. In this concluding chapter, I will now draw together some of the main threads of the argument as to how the theoretical framework developed can contribute to different discourses within educational theory and philosophy. Furthermore, I will reflect on the limits of the perspective presented in the articles and propose ways in which the analysis could be further expanded in future studies.

Article 1 should be read as an introduction into the field of global and cosmopolitan studies within educational theory and philosophy. It provides an overview of the current scholarship in the field and situates my own approach in relation to other theoretical and empirical perspectives. In Article 2 I develop my theoretical model and the motivation for reading critical cosmopolitan education in terms of the critique of reification. Articles 3, 4, and 5 can then be understood as exemplary models for how this approach plays out with regard to different educational issues and debates within philosophy of education and beyond. While each of the articles focuses on a particular theme discussed respectively in the following sections, all of the articles touch upon and
contribute to each theme mentioned. I will now provide a brief overview of the arguments, lines of thought and topics raised in the respective articles.

4.1. Dereifying Cultural Belonging

In Article 3, I show how my approach can be used to dismantle some of the problematic premises of Martha Nussbaum’s turn from defending a cosmopolitan orientation in education (Nussbaum 1996) to her dismissal of that position and arguing for an education for patriotic attachment instead (Nussbaum 2008, 2012). In Nussbaum’s account, as well as in many other defenses of teaching patriotism, an education toward the ‘love of country’ is posited as a necessary, and as Nussbaum claims, a hitherto unique source of motivation for citizens to perform their civic duties, to pay their taxes, to gain an interest in social justice and to participate in other ways in solidarity with the community of fellow citizens. I argue that she feels pressed to dismiss her former cosmopolitan position since the ‘love of the world’ as constructed by her, depends on a problematic universal abstraction from particular attachments which lead to her to postulate a strict opposition between cosmopolitan and patriotism. Understanding cosmopolitanism instead in a critical manner, and specifically in terms of a critique of reification, it is possible to show with Crary (2000a; 2000b; 2007) that both cosmopolitan as well as patriotic attachments require the education of our sensitivities.

Nussbaum’s notion of cosmopolitanism as universalist in a way that requires the dismissal of our particular, local attachments, betrays reified understandings both of cosmopolitanism and patriotism. Her notion of patriotism as a possessive emotion blocks the stretching of our imagination to consider alternative forms of fostering civic solidarity, where social bonding can be conceived of as a form of love that is inflected by justice and makes room for a conception that can inform both a ‘love of world’ and a ‘love of country’ in a way that the two are compatible with each other. Furthermore, her adoption of the typical, reified form of patriotism as an ‘inward-looking’ concern prevents her from imagining a patriotism that is concerned with the historical and present economic and political injustices perpetrated on other countries and non-citizens. For the future of educational practice as well as the future of educational research, a concern for the local and a concern for the global have to be considered together in their intricate intertwinements under present conditions. We have to imagine forms of social bonding which are adequate to these conditions, not by constructing the one as the opposite of the other and playing out reified concepts of the universal and the particular concerns against each other. The question of how education can stimulate the motivation for global and local solidarity here needs to be connected to an analysis of how we can challenge and confront the “participatorilessness” instilled by present neoliberalism.
4.2. Dereifying the Self

The main focus of Article 4 is how dereifying conceptions of the cosmopolitan ‘I’ can highlight the critical and conflictual dimensions of border crossing by considering them from the perspective of a critical educational cosmopolitanism. I discuss the examples of the main characters of two graphic novels in order to challenge reified images of the cosmopolitan self that a cosmopolitan education is supposed to foster. The medium of the graphic novel itself has qualities that lend themselves particularly well to such an endeavor. The universal appeal of ‘cartooning’ is paralleled by the unique ability of comics to particularize and to introduce complexity. In both graphic novels explored in Article 4, the medium lends itself to a more complex and nuanced portrayal of our notion of childhood and leads us to question the corresponding notions that the child as well as the immigrant must first to ‘be cultured’. The autobiographical authority is one that is first to be established and the comics are literally able to picture the processual development and the processes of negotiations between different inner and outer self-images and depict the negative as well as the joyful experiences of crossing borders between cultures, social classes and religious affiliations.

Building on analysis of Rahel Jaeggi (2014), David Finkelstein (2003) and Stanley Cavell (1994) I develop an interpretation of the graphic novels as portraying processes of self-appropriation that avoid reified understandings of selfhood in terms of the self as being something to be ‘detected’ as well as in terms of the self as being something that is ‘constructed’ at will. Neither is there a true self to be unveiled (a theme prevalent in the graphic novel Persepolis), nor is there a self that we (or anyone else) is free to construct in a way that the possibilities of the transformation of one’s self or of society would be unlimited (transformation is a central theme in American Born Chinese). This is portrayed in the characters political stance-taking in relation to national identity, gender, religion, their own bodies and with regard to cultural belonging. Instead the self is appropriated in negotiation with the categories and labels the social world assigns, but it is not exhausted by those. With Stanley Cavell, I discuss the fear of such an exhaustion, but with his notion of the “founding of a self-reliant voice” I also emphasize the possibilities of political stance-taking, ordinary resistances to ascriptions and self-appropriations that at the same time imply a critique of the present state and can articulate a transformative vision of society.

Such a notion of dereifying the self is key to articulating the difference between a critical cosmopolitan approach in education and multiculturalist approaches. It also connects meaningfully to intersectional perspectives by enabling us to explore how concepts of class, race, culture, religion, gender, etc. need to be thought as interconnected in order to do justice to concrete cases and individual experiences. It also emphasizes that even with a multiplicity and simultaneity of different social factors in place, the self’s possibilities are
not finally exhausted by these categories neither, and that their reification is something a critical cosmopolitanism needs to remain wary off. At the same time dereifying the self sheds a critical light on approaches that highlight difference or uniqueness in a generalist sense. This is because the critique for reification nevertheless allows for meaningful forms of objectification, for example, in terms of social theory and social analysis which need to articulate forms of discrimination and social stratification in society without forgetting that these analyses never exhaust an individual narrative, potential or possibilities, real or imaginary. Furthermore, the critique of reification forces culturalist approaches to confront issues of politics and economy in a way that is too easily forgotten in overly affirmative accounts of cosmopolitan education.

4.3. Dereifying Knowledge

How are we to think about knowledge from a critical cosmopolitan perspective? In Article 5, I exemplify some of the epistemological consequences of my approach to reading critical educational cosmopolitanism as a critique of reification. Taking the example of feminist philosophy and its role within philosophy of education as a starting point, I discuss Lukács’ theory of reification as a predecessor of feminist standpoint theory. I also explore different variants of feminist standpoint epistemology are explored and challenge the role they have been attributed within philosophy of education. While mainstream epistemologists might entertain similar anti-foundationalist positions, their work is not met with the same dismissive attitude as their feminist counterparts. I use these questions about the canon in epistemology within philosophy of education as an example of what a dereified, critical cosmopolitan perspective on knowledge might look like. The challenge for education to strive for, foster and sustain practices that encourage epistemic justice and resist or counteract epistemic injustices, exists on multiple levels. Our curricula from primary education through to higher education, including our own research perspectives, I argue, would benefit from embracing non-traditional understandings of objectivity and rationality.

The position I develop here is in some respect similar to, but also in certain key respects different from so-called normcritical pedagogy (Björkman & Bromseth 2019). Another interesting question that would merit future investigation is how a renewed critique of reification would relate to object oriented philosophies and the theoretical commitments of new materialist approaches to the study of education. Rather than letting the Lukácsian notion fall on the

12 This can be read as a theoretical unfolding of Hannah Arendt’s famous statement: “I realized what I then expressed time and time again in the sentence: If one is attacked as a Jew, one must defend oneself as a Jew. Not as a German, not as a world citizen, not as an upholder of the Rights of Man, or whatever” (Arendt 1994, pp. 11f.)
side of a critique of ‘thingness’ as such, as Adorno warned, it would be interesting to explore how the challenge of an anthropocentric perspective does not coincide with the embrace of commodity fetishism and related forms of reification in contemporary society, but rather broadens the Marxist perspective so as to focus more strongly on the reification of our natural environment.13

4.4. Solidarity, Bildung, Critique: A Prospect

In this final part I want to draw attention to three topics that lend themselves to critical reflections on the limits of the framework proposed in the thesis. I will also provide a brief overview of future points of departure for extending, folding and unfolding the analyses provided in the thesis to as yet unexplored or underexplored terrains.

4.4.1. becoming-world and solidarity

Building on the lines of thought presented in Section 4.1., one of the dimensions that certainly deserves further exploration in future work is an adequate reconceptualization of the notion of solidarity under the conditions of the current social and political climate. The difficulty of this task is illustrated by two critics of Anne Imhof’s award-winning performance piece ‘Faust’ at the Venice Biennale 2017. They describe Imhof’s portrayal of contemporary social reality as follows: “Aimless individuality persists even as it clusters into groups. They may sing together, but their song is of the ‘I’” (Pfeffer 2017, p. 10). Another critic observes that: “The alienation that is at issue here is no longer that between subjects and things; it is one between the subject and itself-as-agent.” (Rebentsch 2017, p. 28f.). If performance art in the 1970s was devised in order to transgress the structures of commodification in the art market, Imhof now uses the same medium so as to show the impossibility of escape. What remains is to illustrate the “the perversion of the euphoric sense of possibility into a feeling of emptiness” (Rebentsch 2017, p. 29). The renewed look at the critique of reification, the analysis of the production of a specific form of Teilnahmslosigkeit (‘participatorilessness’) under the conditions of present neoliberal global capitalism, can help to shed light on and understand better the dynamics behind these diagnoses of our time. On a somewhat more hopeful note, in Section 4.1. and also in Article 3, I suggest that the third notion of recognition which Honneth operates with in his early work on recog-

13 This is argued, for example, by Timothy Morton: “To hold that objects have agency, even simply to hold that they are thingly (‘dinglich,’ Marx’ own word in this passage in Capital), to think objects as sensuous, is not only irrelevant to capitalist operations, so that OOO definitely isn’t a manifestation of commodity fetishism.” (Morton 2017, p. 59)
nition (Honneth 1996) might provide an interesting starting point for conceiving of ways of encouraging social cohesion and an attitude of interested participation in local-global issues of concern beyond without falling prey to homogenizing and nationalist ideas of patriotic love as the only available source for such motivation. I would like to mention two recent contributions to these discussions which I find particularly helpful in this regard. Firstly, Clare Hemmings’ concept of “affective solidarity” (Hemmings 2012) and secondly Sara Ahmed’s notion of “snap” (Ahmed 2017). The strong potential I see in both these contributions to the discussion on solidarity is their conceptualization of the potential fruitfulness and the opening of new possibilities precisely in moments of dissonance or break with traditional bonds of solidarity. Against narratives of a decline of cohesion through the destruction of those bonds which are conceived as holding together more traditional, homogenous communities, their critical disentanglement and the challenges to the power dynamics inherent in these arrangements become reconceived as moments of possibility for reshaping different and new forms of attachment and solidarity. Furthermore, in both approaches, but particularly in Hemmings’ proposal, these attachments are conceived of in terms of a reflexivity which inflects empathetic engagement with rational modes of reflexivity. As Hemmings explains, reflexive politicization as a result of affective dissonance can become the basis for seeking “solidarity with others, not based in a shared identity or on a presumption about how the other feels, but on also feeling the desire for transformation out of the experience of discomfort, and against the odds” (Hemmings 2012, p. 158). How such a form of solidarity can translate into concrete educational practices is illustrated meaningfully in Chandra Mohanty’s curricular strategy for a decolonizing of the subject of feminist studies which “is based on the premise that the local and the global are not defined in terms of physical geography or territory but exist simultaneously and constitute each other” (Mohanty 2008, p. 42). As Mohanty states in terms close to the critical cosmopolitan educational perspective developed here, such a framework would foreground “the links, the relationships, between the local and the global […]. Thus, the focus is not just on the intersections of race, class, gender, nation, and sexuality in different communities of women but on mutuality and complicity, which suggests attentiveness to the interweaving of the histories of these communities. In addition the focus is on individual and collective experiences of oppression and exploitation and of struggle and resistance” (ibid.).

4.4.2. becoming-world and Bildung

Another aspect which I consider worthy of further exploration would be to bring the proposed idea of a reification-critical cosmopolitan education as “becoming-world” into relation with my studies on the notion of Bildung (Schumann 2012b; 2014; 2019; Schumann & Johansson 2019). In my previous work
in this area, I suggest that the neo-humanist notion of Bildung, one of the influential German concepts on 18th century thinking, should be critically revisited and recovered for our time. The concept has rightfully been criticized for carrying with it Enlightenment notions of progress and individualism. It has been charged with remaining tied to the specific conditions of German thinking of the period and not translatable into different cultural contexts. Moreover, it is frequently appealed to in the media and also in academic contexts with a conservative interest in defending and maintaining a classical knowledge canon. Nevertheless, I argue in the above-mentioned papers that a critical retrieval of the concept of Bildung is possible and promising, but requires serious reconstruction.

In 2012 Axel Honneth opened the congress of the German educational society with a keynote lecture about the topic of education (Bildung) having become a forgotten chapter of political philosophy. This keynote speech was later also published in English (see Honneth 2015) and highlights two factors for this forgetfulness that are indeed of interest and relevance to democratic societies beyond the German-speaking parts of the world. He attributes this firstly to an interpretation of the Beckenförde theorem which considers the forming of moral, ethical and religious attitudes that sustain democratic communities as relegated to a pre-political realm of socialization, and secondly to the “radicalization of the ideal of state neutrality” (Honneth 2015, p. 22). In its attempt to remain impartial as to the growing diversity and heterogeneity within contemporary societies, the latter is “extended to the point where even the very idea of a democratic education is no longer a matter of normative common sense” (Honneth 2015, p. 23). For Honneth, this normative neutrality poses a “threat to one of the very few instruments that a democratic society has at its disposal to regenerate its own ethical foundations” (Honneth 2015, p. 24). There is a growing awareness among scholars, and even in the general public, that democracy, and with it democratic understandings of education’s aims and purposes, have come under serious threat, which in turn has led to renewed scholarly interest in a more radical and critical recuperation of the notion of Bildung.

It is not possible to give a comprehensive picture of the kind of renewal of the concept of Bildung which I envision based on the reification-critical educational cosmopolitanism developed in the thesis. I would, however, like to sketch why I find such a critical recovery possible and meaningful and to determine the criteria that such a renewal would have to meet, and which are reflected in other recent studies. The particular strength that I see in the notion of Bildung is its articulation of an extremely comprehensive and demanding understanding of education, comprising instrumental as well as ethical, social, political and aesthetic components. It encourages an idea of individual growth, learning and personal formation as well as a vision of a society where social class, gender, ethnicity and other identities do not set predetermined limits on
the individual’s educational and formational life journey. While in Humboldt’s time, the idea of a general education had a revolutionary appeal particularly regarding social class, contemporary analyses need to reframe the idea in a way that moves it from the conservative frameworks it is frequently used in towards a more progressive and radical framework closer to critical pedagogy (cf. Burman 2011, p. 25). One of the angles so far underexplored in scholarship is how the idea of Bildung can be of highest relevance for questions within theories and research regarding special education. In order to meet some of the critiques that led to the relative neglect of Bildung in the last decades of educational theorizing, the individualist orientation has to be reworked in intersubjective and relational re-conceptualizations (cf. Stojanov 2006; Sörlin 2019). In addition, there is potential for the political dimension of Bildung to be further elaborated (cf. as promising examples of such an approach Burman 2011; Burman 2018; Sörlin 2019). Another important challenge, which could be further supported and sustained through the analyses in the present thesis, is the necessity for a serious feminist and decolonial critical reworking of the concept (cf. Gustavsson 2014; Taylor 2017). In this respect, the classical idea of Bildung as a process of formation of self-relations, or relations to others and to the world, opens up the prospect of new materialist interpretations (e.g. Taylor 2017). It also allows for a reconsideration of the Hegelian conception of Bildung as a process of alienation. Especially in this regard, a renewal of the critique of reification is helpful from an educational perspective. As James Williams states in the Posthuman Glossary “against the accusation that the posthuman is unethical because it fosters alienation, posthuman theorists have insisted on the possibility of posthuman ethics based on ideas of collective ecologies” (Williams 2018, pp. 28f.). Furthermore, he considers alienation as a “useful critical concept for posthuman thought” (ibid., p. 29) because it allows for a critique of alienation due to “false ideas of human essences and properties” (ibid.). It allows for the tracking of “positive kinds of alienation” as well as destructive kinds when a “process of becoming is taken too far or too fast and a line of transformation disappears or loses power, thereby leading us to be alienated from collective creative powers” (ibid.). In that sense if I propose to think of cosmopolitan education as processes and individual, situational as well as institutional efforts of fostering becoming-world, this implies a critical distance from destructive forms of alienation, i.e. a critique of reification. This is a constant reminder of how processes of alienation, processes of fostering our ‘becoming things’ are and need to be a part of our becoming-world, but they can also hinder our becoming-world if education is reduced to becoming-things.

4.4.3. becoming-world and critique

As a philosophical study this thesis aims to contribute to the explicit reflection on the normative conditions of the regeneration of democratic practices
through education. While I draw on contemporary critical theorists of the Frankfurt School tradition as well as Wittgensteinian philosophers, both strands share an understanding of social criticism in terms of a broad understanding of rationality. In its methodological conception, the concept of critique in the thesis is informed both by the Anglo-American and the Continental conception of the role of philosophy in educational research (cf. Biesta 2011). This in-between, or critical cosmopolitan, positioning is also the case for the way in which I have developed the theoretical lens. Contesting, in line with other recent attempts, “the artificial professional strictures that are sometimes taken to speak against reaching across the so-called ‘Continental Divide’ in philosophy” (Crary 2018, p. 7), the thesis explores the potential of drawing on the Anglo-American new Wittgensteinianism as well as contemporary proponents of the Frankfurt School critical theory tradition. One of the lines that certainly needs further and more thorough-going exploration in future work is the positioning of the critical approach developed in relation to Delanty and Honneth in relation to its contemporary conceptual challenges. As mentioned above, we find interesting attempts at advancing a dialogue between Critical Theory with decolonial theory in Amy Allen’s The End of Progress (2016). I also think that the renewed interest in a systematic exploration of the potential of a content-oriented dialogue between the French Continental tradition and the Critical Theory tradition of the Frankfurt School provides a fruitful line for future inquiry.

The recent publication Recognition or Disagreement (Honneth, Rancière, Genel, & Deranty 2016) produces one of the most exciting boundary-crossing debates after years of mutual disinterested co-existence between two highly influential representatives of the respective traditions, philosophers Jacques Rancière and Axel Honneth. Rancière draws attention to the dangers of “any conception in terms of the normal, normality, and pathology,” and emphasizes that for him “the point is not pathology and how to heal this pathology; the point is that we have conflicting ways of describing or constructing a common world” (ibid., p. 119). By underpinning Honneth’s analysis of reification with Adorno’s more careful warnings about the “reification of reification”, I hope to have advanced a notion of reification that avoids sliding down the dangerous path of a nostalgic call for a return to an authentic form of community-making. As Maria Olson insightfully warns, “the site of education infallibly falls into historically-established and constantly reproduced order-words and deeds that denote its imperialistic endeavor” (Olson 2012, p. 86). This has to be resisted in our theoretical practices through a “suspiciousness and reluctance to forget in education as a way of acknowledging and countering these imperialistic practices” (ibid.). One of the advantages that I see in naming such challenges in terms of a renewed critique of reification is that, as Timothy Bewes writes, reification “is a signifier of its own inadequacy” (Bewes 2002, p. xvii). At the same time, the dialogical engagement between Honneth and Rancière also shows the limits of the French tradition’s purism about political
philosophy as well as the advantages of Honnethian social theory’s insistence on the historical and social formation of thought.

Furthermore, I hope to have demonstrated in the thesis that the charge of a merely negative-critical outlook, as in Wittgenstein’s famous worry, “I destroy, I destroy, I destroy”, does not apply to the form of critique proposed by the approach presented here. Rather, negative critique opens and unfolds new creative and imaginative possibilities. In order to explore these aspects further the critical approach developed in the thesis could be meaningfully connected to the recent debate on negative and affirmative modes of critique within feminist philosophy (cf. Schumann 2018). This leads to the further observation that the approach presented here could be deepened in a more thorough-going dialogue with feminist philosophy more generally. Wendy Brown introduces an issue on feminism in relation to the Frankfurt School tradition with a lesser-known quote by Herbert Marcuse “Feminism is a revolt against decaying capitalism” and further continues:

The tendency of Anglo-American feminist theory to make occasional use of the later Habermas but not Adorno, Horkheimer, Bloch, Benjamin, or Neumann suggests that the eschewal of Critical Theory by feminism is not simply consequent to its absorption with French rather than German thought or its contingent coming of age with poststructuralism rather than a Hegelian-Marxist tradition. (Brown 2006, p. 2)

Instead, she attributes this relative disinterest to “an abandoned radicalism on the part of feminist theory itself and especially its replacement of ambitions to overthrow relations of domination in favor of projects of resistance, reform, or resignification, on the one hand, and normative political theory abstracted from conditions for its realization, on the other” (ibid.). Brown acknowledges that feminist discourse reflects the more general despair at the apparent limits of possibilities for political transformation in the 21st century. Nevertheless, she still emphasizes the continued importance of the form of critique proposed by Critical Theory that aims beyond traditional spheres of political and economic analysis. She considers it as “a model for the complexity and self-reflexivity feminist theory requires” (ibid., p. 5). Brown is certainly right in stressing that the history of Critical Theory holds a lot of unexplored potential for feminist theory. I hope that this thesis can contribute to furthering these conversations and to extending the influences on feminist theory. Yet, in another light, I think a lot of work is also left for those working from within the Critical Theory tradition. Honneth’s work, for example, has not only been criticized for remaining limited to a “methodological nationalism, pertaining to nations in the industrialized West”, but also for its limited acknowledgment of feminist insights: “Feminist political economy suggests that love, rights and solidarity overlap and interact in ways not yet accounted for by Honneth” (Connolly 2016, p. 104). It is also in this regard that the critical educational
cosmopolitanism proposed in the present thesis tries to expand the current field of philosophical discussion. Feminist philosophy, and especially feminist epistemology, has long been indebted to Lukács and it can certainly benefit and draw insights from a renewed look at his critique of reification. But the critical cosmopolitan extension of Honneth’s lens and the feminist inflection of Delanty’s cosmopolitanism are timely and necessary broadenings of the scope of Critical Theory.
5. Swedish Summary


¹⁴ The translation of the chapter “Swedish Summary” from English into Swedish has been prepared by Semantix, one of the language technology companies contracted through Stockholm University, with the kind support of the Department of Education, Stockholm University. I decided to not interfere with the work of the translator and instead preserve the integrity of the original translation as it was prepared by the company. I hope that the text as it stands allows the reader to grasp some of the central lines of thought I propose in the thesis. Especially when it comes to the nuances of specific philosophical concepts, however, more in-depth work with the translation and a closer cooperation with a philosophically interested translator will be necessary in order to fully do justice to some of the ideas I put forward. The notion “becoming-world” is translated to “bli-värld”. Other possible translations of this concept, which I take from Braidotti, would be “värld-blivande”, “värld-tillblivelse” or “att-bli-till-värld”.
att en förnyad reifieringskritik har kapacitet att fästa särskild uppmärksamhet på en del skadliga effekter av vissa ekonomiska globaliseringsstendenser på ett sätt som fördjupar vårt begrepp om vad ett kritiskt kosmopolitiskt perspektiv i utbildningen kan innebära. En sådan kritik ger oss ord för att adekvat beskriva och förstå vissa av de former av Teilnahmslosigkeit (“deltagarlöshet”) och hopplöshet som den globaliserande världens ekonomiska dimensioner producerar. En sådan förståelse är nödvändig när vi ställs inför den synbarliga omöjligheten att föreställa oss ett samhälle, eller en utbildningsform, bortom de villkor som den samtida nyliberala kapitalismen ställer upp.


Avhandlingen består av ett introduktionskapitel (kappa) och fem vetenskapliga referee-granskade artiklar. En av dessa fem artiklar har publicerats som fackgranskat kapitel i en nyutgiven internationell handbok om utbildningsfilosofi. Övriga fyra artiklar har publicerats i internationella, fackgranskade vetenskapliga tidskrifter. Introduktionskapitlet beskriver och expanderar centrala argument från de publicerade artiklarna genom att utförligare redogöra för det teoretiska ramverkets specifika utgångspunkter och implikationer för utbildningen. Jag börjar här med att sammanfatta introduktionskapitlets viktigaste delar och avslutar sammanfattningen med en översikt av de bidrag som var och en av artiklarna gör på respektive tema.

I avhandlingen utvecklar jag en förståelse av kritisk och kosmopolitisk utbildning genom en förnyad reifieringskritik. Första kapitlet i introduktionsdelen (kappa) presenterar idén och ställer den i relation till samtida analyser av den nyliberala globaliseringsens konsekvenser. För att nå en kritisk förståelse
av de demokratiska samhällenas utmaningar idag behövs ett teoretiskt perspektiv som låter oss kombinera globala utgångspunkter med en konkret analys av lokala kontexter och som ger utrymme att reflekttera över den utbredda känslan av hopplöshet inför bristen på realistiskt hopp om möjlighet till sociopolitiskt deltagande, påverkan och möjlighet till samhällsomvandling. Jag ger en översikt över den samtida forskningen om kosmopolitism, kritiker av instrumentalism, och Axel Honneths och Ludwig Wittgensteins arbeten inom det utbildningsfilosofiska området, och lägger fram idén att en kritisk kosmopolitism fruktbart kan formuleras i kombination med ett förnyat studium av reifieringskritiken, genom att därmed sätta fokus på hur demokratisk utbildning och utbildning mot demokrati hindras av vad som lämpligast kan beskrivas som ett slags ”deltagarlöshet” (se kapitel 1). I kapitel 2 och 3 beskriver jag utförligare de viktiga teoretiska perspektiv som ligger till grund för argumenten i avhandlingens respektive artiklar. Jag diskuterar begreppet kritisk kosmopolitism, i hur det står i skuld till och utgår från Gerard Delantys arbete, särskilt med avseende på min omvädering av den cyniska traditionen (kapitel 2). Jag motiverar sedan hur det kritiskt kosmopolitiska ramverket kan utvidgas vidare genom en diskussion av den senare tidens försök att förnya reifieringskritiken, och föra samman Frankfurtskolans kritiska teori i dialog med de nya wittgensteinierna (kapitel 3). Jag avslutar kappan med en diskussion bestående av exempel på de implikationer och möjliga bidrag en reifieringskritisk kosmopolitism skulle kunna göra till tre olika diskurser inom det utbildnings- och utbildningsfilosofiska området, rörande kulturell tillhörighet, självutveckling och epistemologiska frågor. Jag presenterar även ett perspektiv på begränsningar för det här ramverket och teman att utforska i framtiden: bli-värld i relation till solidaritet, bildning och kritik (kapitel 4). Innan jag går vidare till innehållet i respektive artikel sammanfattar jag här först de centrala idéer som ligger till grund för min särskilda förståelse av kosmopolitism i samband med reifiering och beskriver utförligare huvuddragen i de argument som ligger till grund för mitt teoretiska påstående.

Begreppet ”bli-värld” som ett sätt att beskriva en alternativ, reifieringskritisk kosmopolitisk utbildning är inspirerat av den feministiska samhällsfilosofen Rosi Braidotti. Jag utgår från andra teoretiska traditioner än Braidotti, men delar hennes utgångspunkt i att kritisera ytliga föreställningar om liberal individualism i det kritiskt kosmopolitiska perspektiv som jag formulerar. Jag delar även hennes övertygelse att den nya kosmopolitismen måste problematisera och ta sig bortom sitt fokus på europeiska och eurocentristiska perspektiv. Utbildning som bli-värld måste även bibehålla ett hoppfullt perspektiv på möjligheterna för vår globaliserande och mångfaldigande sociala verklighet, lika som ett skarpt fokus på de spännings och utmaningar detta innebär för det samtida utbildningsarbetet, både på individuell och strukturell nivå. Utifrån min utgångspunkt i kritiken av ny kosmopolitism lägger jag fram en post-universalistisk förståelse av kosmopolitism, som bygger på dynamiska sociala
relationer snarare än centrala, statiska föreställningar om individuell och kulturell identitet. Jag lägger även fram en bred förståelse av rationalitet som sätter centralt fokus på imaginära aspekter och dimensioner. Jag analyserar den cyniska traditionens kosmopolitism och föreställningen om kosmopolitism som leva handlingar och som ett kritiskt utmanande av sociala gränser, inklusive dessas ekonomisk-materiella dimensioner, och reflekterar över de olika associationerna hos orden **världsmedborgare** och **kosmopolit**. I detta argumenterar jag för en pluralistisk, dekadent och subversiv föreställning om kosmopolitism, i kontrast till imperialistisk kosmopolitism. Jag argumenterar för att en sådan kritisk omläsning av kosmopolitismens historia, som samtidigt betonar kritiken av dess ekonomisk-materiella aspekter, ges ytterligare stöd om den kritiska kosmopolitism inom utbildningsområdet som avhandlingen presenterar sätts i relation till Lukács reifieringskritik. Denna kritik ger ytterligare stöd åt idén att kosmopolitismen, för att bibehålla kritisk skärpa, måste transformeras bort från sådana kosmopolitisca föreställningar som låter den sammanblandas med den transnationella globaliserings empiriska situation, och därmed bli till en kompletterande moralisk eller kulturell variant av ”imperialistisk kosmopolitism”. Jag företräder istället en kritisk, pluralistisk och subversiv förståelse av kosmopolitism.

I avhandlingen argumenterar jag för att i synnerhet reifieringskritiken hjälper oss att adekvat utforska de utmaningar som samtiden presenterar för en utbildning som vill bevara och föra vidare möjligheten till demokratiskt handling. För detta krävs en kraftfull politisk filosofi, som skapar utrymme för att analysera de utmaningar som den samtida kapitalismen innebör både för utbildningen och demokratin. Om kosmopolitismen uttolkas i kombination med reifieringskritik, menar jag, blir det möjligt att problematisera reifierad particularism och rent kulturhistoriska förståelser av kosmopolitism, liksom lösningar av kosmopolitismen som en abstrakt och rotlös universalism. Genom att använda sig av den nyare tidens reifieringsstudier är det ett av avhandlingen specifika bidrag att problemet med en instrumentalistisk förståelse av utbildning och förtillgängelget av människan genom utbildning inte endast förutsätts som ett känt och väl förstått fenomen. Avhandlingen presenterar istället en analys som är specifik för dagens sociala, politiska och ekonomiska förutsättningar. Jag föreslår att en ny läsning av György Lukács reifieringskritik gör det möjligt att förstå samspelet mellan samtida kapitalism, vissa av de subjektiviteter som den producerar, och möjligheten till demokratisk politik. Utifrån Axel Honneth och andra samhällsteoretiker i den kritiska traditionen, liksom wittgensteinska filosofer, kompletteras rekonstrueringen av reieriering som glömska av en föregående insikt med en analys av ”semantisk fetischism” som ett resultat av glömska av meningsbyggande kontexter. Avhandlingen bidrar därmed också med en systematisk analys av Wittgenstein's filosofi, med avseende på dess eventuella bidrag till en kritisk samhällsteori, särskilt med avseende på tendenser till reifiering av hypostatiserade begreppsscheman inom utbildningsforskningens paradigmgor och teoribyggen. En sådan dialog
mellan Wittgenstein och Frankfurtskolans kritiska tradition har än så länge förblivit otillräckligt utforskad inom det utbildningsfilosofiska området.


De respektive artiklarna bidrar till artikeln sedan på följande sätt:

1) En översikt över diskussionen om globalisering och kosmopolitism inom det utbildningsfilosofiska området. (Artikel 1)


2) Utvecklande av ett teoretiskt ramverk för en kritisk kosmopolitism inom utbildningsområdet som reifieringskritik snarare än kultiverandet av en ny substantiell identitet. (Artikel 2)

Artikeln avslutas genom att visa hur en kosmopolitism inom utbildningsområdet bestående av reifieringskritik kan användas för att förstå de aktuella utmaningarna för lärarutbildningen i Tyskland. En kritisk kosmopolitism inom utbildningsområdet undviker förhastade reaktioner på en upplevd ”global utmaning”, liksom reifieringstrender i utbildningsforskningen. Den uppmuntrar till en lärarutbildning som undervisar i ansvarsfulla sätt att synliggöra den situationella och historiska kontexten för våra anspråk och krav, och som tillhandahåller, stärker och främjar icke-reifierande former av engagemang och gränssättning, och möjliggör därmed nya former av uttrycksfrihet.

3) Att avreifiera kulturell tillhörighet: den reifieringskritiska kosmopolitiska utbildningens teoretiska ramverk i relation till utbildningsdiskurser om patriotism. (Artikel 3)

En av de mest framstående tidiga förkämparna för kosmopolitism inom utbildning, Martha Nussbaum, övergav sedermera sin tidigare position i senare, mindre kända skrifter, där hon gör ett radikalt brott med kosmopolitismen och nu förespråkar en utbildning inriktad på globalt känslig patriotism istället. I artikel 3 visar jag att både hennes tidigare förståelse av kosmopolitismen, liksom hennes anledningar till att nu försvara patriotismen, är problematiska, och att båda är ömsesidigt beroende av varandra. Nussbaums tolkning av kosmopolitismen byggde till stor del på de varianter som utvecklade av stoikerna, särskilt Marcus Aurelius. Detta innebar ett konsekvent förnekande av alla specifika mänskliga band, vilket skapar en artificiell spänning gentemot patriotiska och andra lokala intressen och känslostämningar. För det första argumenterar jag för att en sådan förståelse är problematisk ur ett dekolonialt perspektiv. För det andra visar jag, i likhet med Alice Crary, att den bygger på en snäv förståelse av rationalitet, vanligt inom liberal morale, där korrekt moraliskt omdöme anses kräva att alla särskilda band och känslor avlägsnas. I likhet med Crary argumenterar jag för att ett sunt moraliskt omdöme är djupt förankrat i vår känslighet och vår affekt, och att dessa behöver förfinas och utvecklas snarare än avlägsnas för att nå fram till en objektiv och rationell bedömning av tingens natur och hur vi bör handla.


4) Avreifiera jaget: implikationer för det reifieringsteoretiska ramverkets tonvikt på kosmopolitismens kritiska dimensioner och konfliktdimensioner i utbildningsdiskurser om självutveckling och hybrididentiteter i relation till gränsöverskridande, förhandlande om gränser och appropriering av jaget. (Artikel 4)

I artikel 4 utforskar jag kosmopolitismens kritiska dimension och konfliktdimension med hjälp av två litterära exempel, serieromanerna American Born Chinese och Persepolis. Jag argumenterar för en kritisk kosmopolitism inom utbildningsområdet som tar på allvar de konfliktfyllna där självomsätelsen ”rotfast kosmopolitism” visar upp sin paradoxala struktur och uttryckligen formulerar sin kritiska, transformativa avsikt. En av förutsättningarna är seriemediet, vars unika egenskaper passar särskilt bra för att avbilda det kosmopolitiska tillståndet, då det kan skildra flera, konkurrerande sätt att känna och föreställa sig verkligheten samtidigt och samfällt. De gränsöverskridningar och gränsförhandlingar som skildras i dessa två serieromaner omfamnar även de glädjejädda aspekternas av kulturell korsning och kulturell ”smitta”, utan naiva
hyllningar av kosmopolitisk mångfald och med stor känslighet gentemot dess konkreta och lika vardagligt konfliktyllda potential och utmaningar.

I artikelns huvuddel analyseras de två serieromanerna som visualiseringar av det kosmopolitiska tillståndet, både med avseende på seriemediets formella kapaciteter, liksom kampen för berättelsernas huvudpersoner att lära sig hitta en röst som kan tala med självbiografisk auktoritet från sin placering på den plats där flera gränser möts. Seriemediets potential för att abstrahera och universalisera diskuteras och problematiseras, liksom dess potential att specificera, citera stereotyper och underminera, överskrider och omvandla dem på den ritade sidan. Motståndet mot puristiska idéer om kulturell identitet liksom mot ytlig, abstrakt universalism analyseras närmare genom exempel: transformer-leksakens symboliska roll i American Born Chinese, och motivet beslöjande-avslöjande i Persepolis. Jag utgår ifrån Rahel Jaeggi, David Finkelstein och Stanley Cavell, och tolkar huvudpersonernas kamp, för att hitta och grundlägga en självständig röst som med rätta kan kallas deras egen, som en ”kritisk” snarare än en rent ”klinisk” fråga. Båda serieromanerna skildrar hur författarjaget varken går att ”detektera” eller fritt kan ”konstrueras”, utan snarare samtidigt existerar i en mångfald av former på seriens sidor, och hela tiden måste utforskas, appraperas och formuleras kritiskt i det dagliga arbetet med att appraperiera sitt eget jag. Till skillnad från andra, överdrivet psykologiserande tolkningar, föreslår jag att dessa ordinarie självappraperieringar, som sker genom kritiska analyser av det egna jaget, inte enbart har psykologiska implikationer, utan formulerar en vision om samhällets omvandling och bildar en central del av all demokratisk politik som vill innebära mer än masskonformitet.

5) Avreifiera kunskapen: implikationer för det reifferingskritiska utbildningskosmopolitiska ramverket på epistemologiska utbildningsfrågor. (Artikel 5)

kritiserat traditionell, snäv objektivism ur en mängd perspektiv, där anamman-
det av relativism endast är ett av många alternativ, och jag ger exempel på
konventionella epistemologier som utgör paralleller till dessa feministiska
epistemologiska positioner. Jag argumenterar för att det traditionella, snäv
objektivitetsbegreppet, som kräver att vi avlägsnar oss från våra subjektiva
kapaciteter, är otillräckligt och behöver omarbetas. Istället för att bara avfärda
objektiviteten och omfamna relativismen krävs dock en bredare förståelse av
objektivitet och rationalitet, som tar hänsyn till vikten av att förfina vår känsl-
lighet. Slutligen diskuterar jag några Implikationer av Miranda Frickers be-
grepp ”epistemisk orättvisa” (2007) för att förstå ambivalensen i mottagandet
av feministisk filosofi, liksom utmaningarna för att förstå kunskap och ut-
forma läroplaner inom samtida utbildningsteori och utbildningspraktik.

I hela avhandlingen argumenterar jag för en nödvändighet att förnya den
kritiska teorin och ta fasta på några av de blinda fläckarna i Frankfurtskolans
kritiska teori, i synnerhet dess oförmygna att anpassa sin teoretiska lins så att
det blir möjligt att adekvat ta hänsyn till de utmaningar som globaliseringen
innebär för samhällsteori, och dess brist på systematiskt intresse för frågor
som inte direkt påverkar västvärlden. Genom sin läsning av den förnyade re-
fieringsskritiken med och mot kosmopolitism bidrar avhandlingen dels till den
utbildningsfilosofiska diskussionen om kosmopolitism, dels till den kritiska
samhällsteori. Reifieringskritiken hjälper till att formulera intressanta
aspekter som tidigare förbisetts och marginaliserats inom kosmopolitism inom
utbildningsområdet. Det kritiska kosmopolitiska perspektiv som läggs fram i
avhandlingen möjliggör en decentralisering av kritisk samhällsteori som tiden
nu är mogen för.
6. Summary of the Articles

6.1. Article 1: Cosmopolitanism and Globalization in Education

This article was written as a contribution to the *International Handbook of Philosophy of Education*. As a handbook article it is meant to summarize the ongoing discussion in the field and to provide a general overview for students, scholars and other interested readers. It can be read as an introduction to the other articles in the thesis. It introduces the general topic as well as outlining how my own contribution is positioned in relation to other approaches in the area.

In the first part of the article I outline different theorizations of the era of globalization, in particular with regard to its impact on the field of education. Authors concerned with globalization in education often proceed from a description of empirical phenomena of increasing mobility, exchange and interaction between the local and the global on economic, cultural and political levels to argue for extending the national orientation of education to a global perspective. In practice, supranational intergovernmental and nongovernmental institutions and multinational testing corporations shape educational cultures, with an emphasis on international comparative assessments and global competitiveness of educational systems, institutions and actors. While the renewed interest in cosmopolitanism has frequently been interpreted as a reaction towards, or as formulating a moral, political or socio-cultural answer to the perceived demands of globalization, I suggest that educational cosmopolitanism can and should be understood independently of the concept of globalization, both historically and in its more contemporary formulations.

The second part of the article gives a short historical overview of the perspectives of Diogenes the Cynic, the Stoic and Kantian developments, and the more recent turn in social and cultural theories towards the so-called new cosmopolitanisms. The latter inflect the modernist universalism of the old cosmopolitanism with localized, historicized and subaltern particularisms. Subsequently I introduce some of the main perspectives on cosmopolitan education as they have been developed within philosophy of education. I outline the pragmatist perspective of a cosmopolitanism “on the ground” advanced by David Hansen, the agonistic cosmopolitical perspective of Sharon Todd, and
the eccentric ethico-political cosmopolitanism developed by Marianna Papastephanou. I also introduce the critical cosmopolitan perspective in which I position my own approach. In conclusion, I draw on Derrida to suggest a vision of cosmopolitanism as something other than a mere response to globalization. With Derrida I open the question if cosmopolitanism as something other than what it has hitherto been articulated as might still be an idea to be thought. It might be an idea that has not yet arrived, that is still to come.

6.2. Article 2: Boundedness beyond Reification

The article develops a theoretical framework for a critical educational cosmopolitanism that considers cosmopolitan education in terms of a critique of reification rather than as the cultivation of a new substantive identity. It argues that the dichotomy between an old, universalist cosmopolitanism and a new, isolationist particularism obscures the critical core of Diogenes' refusal to identify himself in a traditional form through a polis. World citizenship is here not construed as a new form of identity that any of us can easily claim or strive for. Rather, the cosmopolitan attitude is understood in terms of a resistance to reified universalisms, insensitive to historical, situational contexts and concrete particular conditions, as well as resistance towards reified particularistic outlooks, over-stylizing difference to the 'other'.

Among the recent theoretical attempts to revive György Lukács' theory of reification for contemporary critical theory, the approaches by Axel Honneth and Christoph Demmerling are discussed as particularly relevant. Both renewals theorize reification as more than an epistemic error or moral failure and situate their analyses on a socio-ontological and anthropological level respectively. Honneth's reconstruction of reification as a forgetfulness of an antecedent acknowledgment complements Demmerling's analysis of 'semantic fetishisms' as deriving from a forgetfulness of meaning-constitutive contexts. They both reserve the notion of reification to characterize lasting distortions of the whole of human practice, and distinguish it from alienation as well as from temporary, harmless, under certain conditions useful, necessary or even joyful forms of instrumentalization and objectification. Reification is as a deficient relation to oneself, to others, and to the world can describe contemporary social pathologies beyond the scope of liberal social philosophies. Furthermore, in contrast to Habermas' idealizing take on communicative practice, both Honneth and Demmerling show that language, knowledge, and education are not necessarily opposed to or counter-acting the reifying tendencies of economic processes in post-industrial societies. Indeed they themselves can become sources for enhancing processes of reification.

The article concludes by demonstrating how an educational cosmopolitanism as critique of reification can be used to understand current challenges within teacher education in Germany. A critical educational cosmopolitanism
avoids hasty reactions to a perceived 'global challenge' and reifying trends in educational research. It encourages a teacher education which educates responsible forms of making the situational and historical context of our own claims and demands visible, and which provides, strengthens and enhances non-reifying forms of relatedness, commitment and boundedness thus enabling new forms of expressive freedom.

6.3. Article 3: For Love of Country?

In this paper I discuss why a critical cosmopolitanism should not be construed as in necessary and mutually exclusive opposition with patriotic attachments. One of the most prominent early advocates for a cosmopolitan turn in education, Martha Nussbaum, has discarded her previous position in later, lesser-known writings in which she radically breaks with cosmopolitanism and now endorses educating for a globally sensitive patriotism instead. I show that both her early understanding of cosmopolitanism as well as her reasons for defending patriotism are problematic and that the two are mutually conditional for each other.

Nussbaum's interpretation of cosmopolitanism relied heavily on variants developed by the Stoics, especially Marcus Aurelius. It implied a thoroughgoing denial of particular attachments, thus creating an artificial tension with patriotic and other local interests and affects. Firstly, I argue that this conception is problematic from a decolonial perspective. Secondly, I demonstrate with Alice Crary that it is based on a narrow understanding of rationality, widespread in liberal theories of morality, that considers sound moral judgment as requiring abstraction from all particular attachment and sentiment. With Crary I argue that sound moral judgment is deeply tied to our sensitivities and affects, and that their refinement and education rather than abstraction from them is required in order to arrive at an objective and rational assessment of how things are and what course of action to take. A critical cosmopolitanism thus requires impartiality in an ordinary sense of distancing ourselves from feelings that severely distort our judgment. But this should not be confused with the hypostatized, reified philosophical requirement to abstain from any affective propensity, and thus from all local and partial attachments which first make us possible as moral beings. It is in this way that Nussbaum reduces cosmopolitanism to a narrowly rationalistic, principled dutifulness. The critical cosmopolitanism suggested in the paper, argues instead in line with other rooted cosmopolitanisms for a compatibility of a cosmopolitan position with local and other partial attachments through the critical education of our sensitivities and affects, not through their denial. Thirdly, I problematize the reasons Nussbaum and others give in their defense of patriotism. Nussbaum suggests that without patriotic attachment and its specific aptitude to create bonds of belonging and decentralize the self, citizens' interest in a political system
that is oriented towards providing social justice cannot be sustained. Analyzing the model of love employed by Nussbaum more closely, I argue that her understanding of love of country is incapable of doing the work it is meant to do. Her construal of love of country in terms of possessive and exclusivist attachments is shown to contribute to an extended sense of self-aggrandizement, self-importance and egotism instead of a decentering of the self to serve the struggle for justice.

In the final part of the paper, Axel Honneth's and Paul Ricoeur's arguments for dialectically relating the logic of justice with the logic of love are revisited. Honneth's notion of solidarity, as a form of affective sentiment infected by the logic of justice, is suggested as an alternative for conceptualizing social bonds beyond legalistic structures based on negative freedom and constraints. Furthermore, I explicate how an understanding of an educational cosmopolitanism in terms of the critique of reification makes room for theorizing a critical patriotism that is compatible with cosmopolitan aspirations through commitment to the fostering of non-reifying forms of boundedness and through the re-contextualization and temporalization of reified concepts. Such a context-sensitivity enables more complex distinctions between concerns of global and local reach, allowing that some of our concerns are focused on local rather than global issues. In line with Marianna Papapstephanou's critique of dominantly inward-looking patriotisms, I argue against the de-politicization of culture in civic and constitutional patriotisms for an acknowledgment of the empowering potential of legitimate claims towards cultural self-determination and resistance against domination. In so doing, I emphasize that such claims necessarily need to imply responsiveness to critical outsiders' perspectives as well as to historical relationships with and political obligations towards non-citizens.

6.4. Article 4: Graphic Contaminations

In this paper I explore the critical and conflictual dimension of cosmopolitanism with the help of two literary examples, the graphic novels American Born Chinese and Persepolis. One of the premises is that the comics medium with its unique characteristics is particularly apt to visualize cosmopolitan conditions, as it is able to portray multiple and competing ways of knowing and imagining reality simultaneously and coincidentally on the comics page. Also, the border crossings and the negotiations of boundaries portrayed in the two graphic novels embrace the joyful aspects of cultural mixing and 'contamination' without a naive celebration of cosmopolitan diversity and with a great sensitivity towards its concrete and equally quotidian conflictual potentials and challenges.

To begin with, the article traces the history of the understanding of cosmopolitanism from its classic form appealing to universalist ideas of humanity
and principles of justice to the so-called "new cosmopolitanisms". Whereas the former has invited criticism for its universalization of western liberal ideals and for producing yet another version of western imperialism, the 'newer' cosmopolitanisms try to take into account our particular attachments and affiliations and develop a theoretical hybrid between universalism and particularism. I critically discuss Kwame Anthony Appiah's "rooted cosmopolitanism" and caution with Bruce Robbins against too facile and depoliticized conceptions of cosmopolitanism. I argue for an educational cosmopolitics that takes seriously the cases of conflict where the oxymoron of a 'rooted cosmopolitanism' shows itself in its paradoxical structure and explicitly formulates its critical, transformative intent.

In the main part of the paper, the two graphic novels are analyzed as a visualization of the cosmopolitan condition, both in terms of the formal possibilities of the comics form as a medium as well as in terms of the struggle of the central characters of the narrative to first establish a voice that could speak with autobiographical authority while situated at the crossing of multiple boundaries. The potential of cartooning as abstracting and universalizing is discussed and problematized as well as its potential to particularize, to quote stereotypes and undermine, transgress and transform them on the page. The resistance of purist ideas of cultural identity as well as facile abstract universalism, are analyzed more closely in the examples of the symbolic role of transformer toy in American Born Chinese and the motifs of veiling and unveiling in Persepolis. Drawing on Rahel Jaeggi, David Finkelstein and Stanley Cavell, I interpret the main characters' struggle for finding and founding a self-reliant voice that could rightfully count as their own as a 'critical' rather than a mere 'clinical' issue. Both graphic novels portray how the authorial self is neither there to be 'detected', nor can it be freely 'constructed', but rather exists in a multiplicity of forms simultaneously on the comics page and needs to be critically explored, appropriated and articulated again and again in the quotidian work of self-appropriation. Against other, overly psychologizing interpretations, I suggest that these ordinary self-appropriations through critical self-investigation have not merely psychological implications, but articulate a transformative vision of society. Rather, they constitute an integral part of a democratic politics that is to amount to more than mass conformism.

6.5. Article 5: Knowledge for a Common World?

In this paper I examine the role of feminist epistemologies in relation to the field of philosophy of education. I argue that the debate in the field has been unnecessarily polarized between feminist and mainstream epistemologies. On closer analysis, it becomes apparent that the discussion within feminist epistemology is far more complex and varied than is perceived by outside critics. Many mainstream (non-feminist philosophers) defend post-positivist and
post-foundationalist epistemological positions nowadays without inviting the same kind of patronizing criticism. Furthermore, I suggest that the pluralistic and diverse societies of post-traditional modernity require a thorough re-thinking of the problematic biases and blind spots within epistemological theories and practices in order adequately to assess which knowledge, epistemic skills and abilities are needed in 21st century education in order to make knowledge for a common world possible.

In their critique of women’s exclusion from the field of education, science and philosophy as both subjects and objects of knowledge production, feminist epistemologists, together with postcolonial and other critics, have challenged the modernist conception of knowledge as relatively neutral with regard to the social and political status of the knower. I give an overview of how this critique has been embraced, dismissed and it has also led to promising instances of serious mutual dialogue between feminist and mainstream epistemologists in the field. One of the debates centers on the use of epistemology in the plural and almost interchangeably with methodologies within educational research. Also, while there appears to be agreement about the importance of giving equal attention to hitherto marginalized voices, there is large disagreement about whether the political dimension of knowledge is of secondary importance to epistemology and should be relegated to theories of social justice, or whether it poses and important and central challenge for epistemology itself. After an overview of the historical development of different traditions within feminist epistemology, from standpoint theory, postmodern and empiricist perspectives, I argue with Alice Crary that the traditional, narrow conception of objectivity requiring an abstraction from our subjective endowments is inadequate and needs to be revised. Instead of rejecting objectivity and embracing relativism, a broader understanding of objectivity and rationality is required, which takes into the account the importance of cultivating our sensitivities.

I conclude the article by showing that feminist epistemologists have criticized traditional, narrow objectivism from a multitude of angles where the adoption of relativism is only one amongst many options. I give further examples from mainstream epistemologies which parallel these different positions within feminist epistemology. Furthermore, I discuss some of the implications of Miranda Fricker’s concept of “epistemic injustice” (2007) for understanding the ambivalence of the reception of feminist philosophy as well as the challenges for understanding knowledge and designing curriculum in contemporary educational theory and practice.
References


[https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110492415-006](https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110492415-006)


