

Dissenting Democrats

Nation and Democracy in the Republic of Moldova

Andreas Johansson

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From the very beginning of independence, the Republic of Moldova became the battleground for competing nationalisms. In the literature on democracy, a divided nation is singled out as probably the most serious threat to democratization. Without a nation in place, it is generally understood that democracy cannot take root. Nevertheless, in a few years Moldova managed to make considerable progress on its path towards democracy. A main theme of the dissertation is, therefore, the issue of national division and how it has affected political developments in general and democratization in particular.

The dissertation contributes to the discussion of how concepts of nation and democracy are linked in the analysis of transitional states. Democracy, as a platform where different political ideas and ambitions compete, can complicate transitions since it provides the potential for conflict. Democracy, however, also offers the prospect of finding common ground on which to negotiate, and this, in the long run, carries the seed of consolidation for both democracy and nation alike.

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DISSENTING DEMOCRATS

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Figure 1: Administrative division of the Republic of Moldova by
authors "Zserghei" and "Conscious", published under the GNU Free
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Cover photo: demonstration in central Chişinău, 6 April 2009 by
John McConnico

Till Alex och Anna

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Abbreviations

AIE	<i>Alianța pentru Integrare Europeană</i> Alliance for European Integration
AMN	<i>Alianță “Moldova Noastră”</i> Alliance “Our Moldova”
AIRM	<i>Alianței Independenților din Republica Moldova</i> Independents’ Alliance of the Republic of Moldova
ASDM	<i>Alianța Social-Democrată din Moldova</i> Social-Democratic Alliance of Moldova
BMD	<i>Blocul Moldova Democrată</i> Electoral Bloc Democratic Moldova
BePSMUE	<i>Blocul electoral “Partidul Socialist și Mișcarea Unitate-Edinstvo”</i> Electoral Bloc “Socialist Party and the Unity Move- ment”
CA	Correspondence analysis
CBM	Confidence Building Measures
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CL	Civil Liberties (Freedom House concept)
CoE	Council of Europe
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
ECMI	European Centre for Minority Issues
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
EU	European Union
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine
FPCD	<i>Frontul Popular Creștin Democrat</i> Christian Democratic Popular Front
FH	Freedom House
FW	Freedom in the World (Freedom House publication)
IEOM	International Election Observation Mission
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ID	Index of Democracy
MASSR	Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

MDR	Moldavian Democratic Republic
MSSR	Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NiT	Nations in Transit (Freedom House publication)
NKVD	<i>Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del</i> People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs
OGRF	Operational Group of Russian Forces
OSCE	The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
PCM	<i>Partidul Comunist al Moldovei</i> Communist Party of Moldavia
PCRM	<i>Partidul Comuniștilor din Republica Moldova</i> Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova
PAM	<i>Partidul Agrar din Moldova</i> Agrarian Party of Moldova
PDAM	<i>Partidul Agrar Democrat din Moldova</i> Agrarian Democratic Party of Moldova
PDM	<i>Partidul Democrat din Moldova</i> Democratic Party of Moldova
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PL	<i>Partidul Liberal</i> Liberal Party
PLDM	<i>Partidul Liberal Democrat din Moldova</i> Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova
PPCD	<i>Partidul Popular Creștin Democrat</i> Christian Democratic People's Party
PMR	<i>Pridnestrovskaiia Moldavskaia Respublika</i> Dniester Moldovan Republic
PR	Political Rights (Freedom House concept)
PS	<i>Partidul Socialist</i> Socialist Party
PSD	<i>Partidul Social Democrat</i> Social Democratic Party
PSL	<i>Partidul Social Liberal</i> Social Liberal Party
RSF	Reporters sans frontières Reporters without Borders
UCM	<i>Uniunea Centristă din Moldova</i> Centrist Union of Moldova
OSTK	<i>Ob'edinennyi Sovet trudovykh kollektivov</i> United Council of Work Collectives
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WVS	World Value Survey



Figure 1. Administrative division of the Republic of Moldova

Preface

It has been said that Moldova is the most understudied country in Europe. At least within some academic fields this can no longer be held as true. An entire literature dealing with Moldovan history, society and politics has emerged over the last two decades. Of specific interest to researchers and popular writers alike has been the diffuse form of the Moldovan nation, the result of successive nation-building efforts. This study draws together the literature on Moldovan national identity and relates it to political developments in general and democracy in specific – the latter an area where Moldova has fared much better than its weak preconditions would suggest.

This dissertation has its distant origins in a study exchange trip to Moldova in November 1999. In hindsight it was one of those moments when, to quote Robert Frost, “two roads diverged in a wood”. A chance occurrence led me to go down the Moldovan path, a choice which I have never regretted. During more than eleven years of study, I have witnessed Moldova through numerous difficult periods, from repeated economic and financial crises caused by the enormous social consequences of the transition to severe international and domestic political conflicts. Amidst all this, the internal discussion about whom the Moldovans are, has never ceased and is likely to continue causing dividing lines amongst the population for years to come. Despite these thorny issues, democratization efforts have continued, and Moldova has repeatedly demonstrated a great propensity to endure numerous hardships. It is my humble observation, therefore, that much of the potential of the country and its population is yet to be realized.

* * *

The question of language is a highly contested notion in Moldova, and the name of the state language has changed depending on the type of political project that has been promoted. Linguistically, there is little that differentiates the Moldovan language from standard Romanian. As the Moldovan language is riddled with political connotations, the Moldovans themselves started to employ the neutral but conceptually vague term *limba de stat* (the state language) in order to avoid officially specifying the language as either Moldovan or Romanian. I have herein decided to mainly let Moldovan developments determine the label of the language. For replication of Moldovan/Romanian sounds, diacritic letters have been kept. This concerns letters

ă ("a" as in "about"), â (a sound between "i" and "u"), î (same as â), ș ("sh" as in *sharp*), and ț ("ts" as in *cats*).¹ Russian keeps a strong position among the minorities, but is also popularly used in inter-ethnic communication. Transliteration of Slavic languages has been done using the 1997 edition of the ALA-LC Romanization Tables: Transliteration Schemes for Non-Roman Scripts (2010).

Names of persons, places and organizations pose a special challenge since they, both for political reasons and for matters of transliteration, may occur with different spellings, names or abbreviations. This has mainly been solved by keeping place names as they are most widely known in the English language (for example the name of one of the main rivers is herein written *Dniester* instead of its Romanian equivalent *Nistru*) or written in the Latin alphabet but with diacritics (for example the two cities Chișinău and Bălți). Names of persons are written either with their Romanian diacritics, when so applicable, or according to their transliteration. Names of organizations, including political parties, are regularly done first in their original name and then corresponding English translation and abbreviation in original language within parentheses on its first occurrence in the text. Exceptions to this rule, and also to the rule of transliteration, have been made for some names and abbreviations that have become common usage in English.

The labeling of the Transnistrian region, harboring the secessionist republic of eastern Moldova, poses a specific problem since it concerns an unrecognized state entity and goes by different names. The official name of the region, chosen by the secessionist authorities, is in Russian *Pridnestrovskiaia Moldavskaia Respublika* or *Republica Moldovenească Nistreană* in Romanian (Dniester Moldavian Republic, PMR), or just *Pridnestrove* in the short form that PMR authorities has promoted in English.^{2,3} In Moldova proper the region is generally called "Transnistria", with such official alternatives as *Unitățile Administrativ-Teritoriale din Sînga Nistrului* (the Territorial-Administrative Units of the Transnistrian Region) or simply "the Eastern region" by Moldovan authorities). In most Western literature the conflict is known as the "Transnistrian conflict". Hence, when referring to the secessionist regime in Tiraspol, this will be done by applying the PMR abbrevia-

¹ For a thorough introduction to the Romanian language please consult Cojocaru (2003) or Gönczöl-Davies and Deletant (2002).

² It is also possible to find examples where the Latin and Slavic roots have been combined, such as Trans-Dniestr or Transdniestria.

³ The Russian prefix "pri-" refers to a territory along the Dniester and not as the Romanian form "trans-" to a region on the other side of the river. By using "Pridnestrove" the political power in Tiraspol opened up for the possibility to claim further areas on the right bank of the Nistru as well, for example the Moldovan city of Bălți (Hanne, 2005).

tion, but “Transnistrian conflict” to denote the conflict as such. For all other applications, the region will be labeled Transnistria.⁴

In the English language, Moldova until 1991 was known as *Moldavia*. In order to stay within a certain historical logic, all political entities prior to 1991 occur in the form of Moldavia. We therefore speak of the Moldavian fiefdom and the Moldavian Soviet republic,⁵ but of the Republic of Moldova. With reference to the discussion on the name of the language above, it was decided to keep it as *Moldovan*, so to not accidentally indicate an existence of different languages.

The present study covers twenty years of Moldovan political developments, i.e. 1989 to 2009 with a short epilogue for the following two years. As I am now conducting the final revision of the text, it also happens to be almost on the day exactly twenty years since the Republic of Moldova proclaimed independence on 27 August 1991. These past two decades offer a rich period of events upon which to look back and bring together for analysis. This dissertation is, hopefully, one contribution towards that task.

⁴ Dealing with the two halves of Moldova, it is common to refer to them as right or left bank, depending on what side of the Dniester it is located. Since the Dniester flows from north to south, left bank implies PMR and right bank Moldova proper.

⁵ As the observant reader may have noted, “Moldavia” also lingers in contemporary PMR language.

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Working on a dissertation implies an enormous accumulation of intellectual debts over the years. Primarily these go to the Political Science departments of Södertörn and Stockholm Universities and not least to the Baltic and East European Graduate School (BEEGS), which was my introduction to the graduate world. When I began my doctoral studies, Södertörn University had been founded a few years earlier and the graduate school just established. It was a fun and dynamic time with the kind of “frontier mentality” that typically exists before institutional routines are fully established. Elfar Loftsson, Södertörn University, has functioned as my supervisor since the start of my PhD studies and has greatly supported this endeavor. Lasse Lindström became the main supervisor at Stockholm University quite late in the process, and he has invested much time in seeing it through to its end. Marie-Louise Sandén at Linköping University, who initially started me down the Moldovan path, has commented on different drafts and continued to follow this study to its finalization.

I am very grateful to the Centre for Baltic and East European Studies and the BEEGS not only for intellectual and academic support but for creating a lively environment around, in my opinion, the most intriguing regional focus for which one can ask. Here I would especially like to mention Thomas Lundén, Helene Carlbäck, Lena Arvidson, Nina Cajhamre, Ewa Rogström, Duško Topalović, and Erika Vikström-Szulc. This gratitude includes fellow PhD candidates Sara Rastbäck, Johnny Rodin, Pelle Åberg, Anders Nordström, Fredrik Doeser, Piotr Wawrzyniuk, and Tove Lindén. We have shared much, ranging from seminars and discussions to painting rooms and arranging bookshelves in anarchic (as well as physically dangerous) patterns.

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nation and contemporary politics. Pål Kolstø, Matt Ciscel, Thomas Lundén, Alla Skvortova, Johan Mathiesen, Luke March, Rickard Mikaelsson, Vlada Lisenco, Florent Parmentier, and Johnny Rodin have all read and commented on different dissertation drafts. Your help was much appreciated. The guidance and methodological discussions with Gianmarco Alberti assisted me in understanding the logics of correspondence analysis. John McConnico kindly provided a suitable cover photo corresponding to the title of the dissertation. The Russian language teaching of Ludmila Ferm and Kerstin Jacobsson and the instructions in Romanian by Coralia Ditvall made it possible for me to approach original sources. Needless to say, any remaining mistakes or shortcomings remain my own.

Between 2007 and 2011 I held different positions working for first Sida and later UNDP in Chişinău and the Swedish Embassy in Bucharest. All of these positions provided many opportunities to both apply theoretical knowledge in practice and to improve my understanding of Moldova in a very broad sense and from perspectives I otherwise probably would not have encountered. In order to avoid any misunderstandings, the views in this book do not in any way represent the views of those organizations. To all friends and colleagues whom I met during these years, and also on behalf of my family, I would like to direct a heartfelt thank you to all of you. You all made our stays in Moldova and Romania so much more pleasant and made it possible to create a home away from home. I feel especially indebted to Violeta Mahu-Poleacov, who has been a great friend and part of this journey since its inception. My gratitude also goes to Silvia and Ion Malic and to Tasso and Peggy Spanos.

I had the fortune to begin my studies of Moldova at the same time as Charles King's book *The Moldovans* was published in 2000. King's book, together with the travel stories of Henry Baerlein and, to some degree within the same genre, Stephen Henighan, and selected short stories of Moldovan author Ion Druţă, soon became trusted literary companions and helped me better understand the complex Moldovan fabric. With the exception of King, their direct contributions are not directly referenced in the following pages, but I, nevertheless, like to think that their impact is there.

I want to express my sincere gratitude to the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies who financed my doctoral studies and part-financed my survey study, for which the remaining part was financed through the project budget of *Societal Transition and Democratic Change within the Baltic Sea Area*. I am also grateful to the Foundation for support in the development of the *Moldovan Bibliographic Database*, which was realized in close cooperation with Michał Bron and Magnus Sandgren at Södertörn University Library.⁶ The Siamon Foundation and the Helge Ax:son Johnson

⁶ Most of the sources applied here, as well as many other, have been made easily searchable through the Moldovan Bibliographic Database, compiled by the author, and available online through the Södertörn University Library at <http://bibl.sh.se/moldova/>. My hope is that this

Foundation have likewise provided much appreciated economic support for travel, conference participation, and article publication.

Language is a tricky business and to venture outside one's own native tongue is always an adventure. Sherwin Das has devoted much time to proofreading and managed to improve the quality of the text as well as deftly pointed out text passages in need of revision. Lilia Surdu and Anastasia Ne-jintseva helped realize my idea of having translated summaries of the dissertation in Romanian and Russian respectively.

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Finally, this dissertation is dedicated to my children, Alex and Anna, who, regardless of their parents' whims, have bravely faced any challenge put in their path, in Moldova and elsewhere.

Huddinge and Chişinău, October 2011

1. Introduction

In 1989 hundreds of thousands of demonstrators gathered in Chişinău, the capital of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR), in order to protest against Moscow's continued rule. The dissent that started to be voiced from 1987 and onwards soon evolved into a mass movement. The Moldovan call for independence and democratization followed the same pattern as in other Soviet republics in the second half of the 1980s, but it also manifested specific traits related to the disputed identity of its titular population. These traits, in combination with other difficult background preconditions further discussed below, presented from the very beginning major obstacles to democratization. Nevertheless, Moldova managed to establish a considerably higher level of democracy than many would have predicted. The achievement of this partial democratization, regardless of weak preconditions, forms the starting point of this study.

Public dissent in Moldova was initially channeled through the Popular Front, organized similarly to its Baltic counterparts. What separated the Moldovan independence movement from similar movements in other parts of the Soviet Union (USSR) was the call for union with a neighboring state. The flags that flew over the rallies were thus not the Moldovan but the Romanian tricolor. The anthem sung was not a call for Moldovans but for Romanians to awaken "from their deadly slumber", as the first verse of the Romanian hymn encourages. At the forefront of protests lay the issue of language. The Moldovan language, save the usage of the Cyrillic alphabet, was largely the same as Romanian. For many reasons a union between the two Romanian-speaking states never came to pass, but the dissolution of the USSR was set in motion and a Moldovan republic, as one of fifteen successor states, was to be proclaimed.

On 27 August 1991 the Moldovan Parliament officially declared independence. Besides the short-lived Moldovan Democratic Republic of 1917-18, this was the first Moldovan state since medieval times. Since then, Moldovan history has largely told the tale of a borderland belonging to other political entities such as the Ottoman Empire, Tsarist Russia, Romania, and the Soviet Union (Kaneff and Heintz, 2006). While Moldova shares the Romanian language and many traditions, developments have differed for two centuries. When the Romanian principalities began to form around what would become the future Romanian state in the middle of the nineteenth century, contemporary Moldova had already in 1812, then under the name of Bessa-

rabia, become subject to Russia. August 1991 marked the beginning of modern Moldovan statehood, but this was only the first hurdle in the country's transition.

In many of the early studies of democratic transitions, which mainly focused on Southern Europe and Latin America, transition was regarded as a political and perhaps economic process (cf. O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986a).⁷ In order to capture the more complex transitions of Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet states, Taras Kuzio (2001b) has suggested that post-Soviet transition is rather a post-colonial and multifaceted process which also includes state- and nation-building. This turns transition into a fourfold and much more complicated process – even if it is the political transition from authoritarian to democratic regime that draws the most attention. In the specific Moldovan case we hardly find any of the classical conditions conducive to democracy. Firstly, the economy is weak and has experienced repeated external and internal shocks, causing hundreds of thousands of Moldovans to seek livelihood abroad. Secondly, the territory of the state is questioned through the de facto secession of the self-proclaimed *Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia Respublika* (PMR), which mainly constitutes the Transnistrian region east of the river Dniester. Thirdly, the political community in the remaining part of Moldova, commonly referred to as Moldova proper, has at times had to grapple with another secessionist movement in Gagauz Yeri (the Gagauz land). Fourthly, and perhaps most seriously, the Moldovan majority nation has yet to agree on whether the nation is to be considered Moldovan or Romanian – or perhaps a combination of both.⁸

One of the main themes in studies on Moldova is the lack of a clear national idea (cf. Heintz, 2007). As mentioned initially, the nationalism around which the Moldovan majority population rallied was not Moldovan, but rather that of neighboring Romania. Although the appeal of Romanian nationalism soon subsided and was, by 1994, largely replaced by a Moldovan version, the conflict between these two nationalisms and the different nation-building projects they imply, coupled with the competing or reactive movements of the minorities and regional elites, have influenced political life

⁷ It has been suggested that transition as a concept implies a linear process from authoritarianism to democracy and is an expression of a teleological reasoning. Hence, it has been intensely debated whether transition should be replaced by the presumably more neutral term of transformation to capture that the end point of change is open-ended (cf. Carothers, 2002a; 2002b; Nodia, 2002; O'Donnell, 2002; Wollack, 2002). As is further discussed in Chapter 3 and shown by Gans-Morse (2004), the teleology of the transition concept is, however, not found in the transition literature. Because of this, and to clearly indicate that it is political rather than societal, change that is examined herein, it was decided to keep transition as a concept in this study.

⁸ In the words of Cașu (2007: 244), “present-day Republic of Moldova epitomizes the most difficult problems Southeastern European and post-Soviet states have experienced in the last fifteen years.”

considerably since independence.⁹ Nevertheless, efforts at Moldovan democratization have been met with considerable success. Although there have also been setbacks, Moldova is widely considered the most democratic post-Soviet country outside of the three Baltic states. This becomes even more intriguing since, within the field of political science, it is generally agreed that the single background condition absolutely crucial for democratization is the perception of citizens that they belong to the same political community. “[T]he vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to.” (Rustow, 1970: 350).

While any regime may encounter difficulties in legitimizing its existence if the nation is not defined, it is even more so the case within a democratic regime where power is stipulated to originate from the people. This peculiarity of Moldovan national ambiguity was well captured by the Romanian scholar Dan Dungaciu (2009) who chose to name his book on Moldova *Cine suntem noi?* (Who are We?).¹⁰ The question of how democracy may be established in a divided nation stands at the center of the present discussion. This is accomplished using a Moldovan lens to study a fairly successful case of democratization amidst contested ideas of what the political community should be. The first part of the study consists of a presentation of political developments from the perspective of national identity, while the second part analyzes the overall nature of Moldovan democracy and, in particular, explores how people express political support based on issues of national and ethnic identity.

Earlier Research on Moldova

For a long time, Moldova was in the unenviable position of being the least studied country in Europe (White, 2000: 2). During large parts of the twentieth century, the region constituting contemporary Moldova drew international attention largely because of the Bessarabian conflict, i.e., the struggle between Romania and the Soviet Union regarding who had the right to the lands between the Prut and Dniester Rivers (Mosley, 1939/1940; Suga, 1971). Already at this point, the identity of the Moldovans became the focus of attention. For the USSR it was important to prove that the population of Moldova constituted a mixture of Romance and Slavic groups that made the people different and distinct from neighboring Romania (Lazarev, 1978).

⁹ As argued by Webster (2007: 7p, Ch. 1) it seems, at least in the case of the Gagauz minority, that mobilization to create a territorial autonomy had begun even before there was a distinct Moldovan nationalism (cf. Chinn and Roper, 1995). It was thus not only the Moldovans who reacted to Moscow’s revised policy.

¹⁰ However, the national division and its relation to politics has as well been noted earlier in the literature by for example Neukirch (1996: 103) and King (2003: 61).

Bucharest, however, regarded the majority population as Romanian. This position was reinforced when Bessarabia was reunited with Romania after the First World War (Pelivan, 1920; Popp, 1942).

Western studies up until the end of the Soviet Union sometimes raised the disputed ethnicity of the Moldovans and often in relation to the issue of language (Bruchis, 1984; Klees, 1955). In later years Cîscel (2010) brought attention to Moldova's bilingual language policy after independence and how this has oscillated between reform, in the form of a greater degree of balance between the state language and Russian, and relapses into Soviet-style minority, i.e., Russian, rule. Van Meurs' (1994) ambitious historiographic study of the Bessarabian question provides an excellent overview of how the Soviet Union and Romania have distinctly framed and portrayed the history of the region.

Moldovan history, nevertheless, remains a minefield for every scholar who approaches it, even with the understanding that Romania, on the one side, and Russia and the Soviet Union, on the other, can both be described as liberators and perpetrators. Deletant has dealt extensively with Romania's role as "Hitler's Forgotten Ally" (2006) and the Romanian-administered Jewish ghetto of Golta in Transnistria (2004). The Roma deportations to Transnistria during the war are much less known than the Jewish, but an October 2010 conference in Chişinău managed to highlight the "Unknown Holocaust" and the plight of Roma during the war (cf. Achim, 2004; Kelso, 2010). Recently, the previously classified archive of the Moldovan Communist Party's Central Committee was opened. Caşu and Şarov (2011) are responsible for a first volume dealing with the time of the independence struggle, 1989-1991, which is bound to shed new light on a key period in Moldova's modern political history.

During the past two decades since the Republic of Moldova was declared, the body of literature has grown considerably, indicating increased interest in the country. Much of the literature from the early years of independence focused on the ambiguous character of the Moldovan nation in order to detail the burgeoning identity conflicts (Chinn and Roper, 1992; Crowther, 1991; Fane, 1993; King, 1994; Kolstø, 1993) and to explain why a union with Romania, against the expectations in 1990, did not take place (Neukirch, 1996). The literature from the remainder of the 1990s shows a focus on the national issue and minority relations, including the attempts to negotiate a solution to the Transnistrian conflict (Hanne, 1998; Kolstø, 1998), the status of the Gagauzian minority in southern Moldova (Demirdirek, 1998; Thompson, 1998) and the political situation (Neukirch, 1998). King's (2000) book *The Moldovans*, which combines both the post-independence literature with older texts dealing with the region of contemporary Moldova, captures much of the main themes of the first ten years of independence with national

identity as leitmotif.¹¹ March (2004, 2006, 2007) has dealt extensively with the meanderings of the Moldovan Party of Communists, not least of which are the nation-building attempts that they too have employed. The turbulent April 2009 parliamentary elections, which resulted in demonstrations and riots, resulted in many books by people who offered their views on what had occurred (Burcă, 2010; Erizanu, 2010; Hîncu, 2011); material that is bound to become part of future analyses of the 2009 elections and aftermath. A more academic approach was offered by the authors of the book “Twitter Revolution” (Ciubotaru, 2010), who aimed to understand the events through an analytical framework.

The works of Mazo (2004) and Roper (2008), who both directly draw attention to Moldova’s institutional setup, and Way (2002; 2003a; 2003b), who offers an explanation to the country’s relatively high levels of democracy, are central for any student of contemporary Moldovan political affairs. Mazo and Roper’s general findings are examined in more detail below, while Way’s approach to Moldovan democracy serves as the point of departure for the present study.

Language and National Identity in Transition

The above-referenced question by Dungaciu “who are we?” is one of identity and refers specifically to how the population of Moldova identifies itself. This invokes concepts of ethnicity and nationality and, furthermore, nationalism and nation-building. These concepts have been the object of much academic debate over the years. While ethnicity and nationality, during the first half of the twentieth century, were considered as almost given by nature, they are now in the academic literature mostly perceived as identity categories created and shaped by the individual in interaction with others. As noted by Wolf (1997: ff), such concepts may only evolve as “bundles of relationships” and not as predetermined parts of human organization. This is also the understanding of this study.

Ethnicity is defined here as a social identity wherein certain characteristics are shared and which are applied to differentiate people within the group from those outside. The roots for differentiation are subjective and may be drawn from tradition, language, feelings of shared history, or likely combi-

¹¹ The domestic literature, rich as it is, is often colored by exactly the conflict on national identity that is described in this study. Therefore, while these studies do make important contributions, they tend to have a strong political bias, arguing either for Moldovanist or Romanianist positions, even though there is also an important spectrum in between these two poles. Noteworthy Moldovanist studies include Stati’s (2008) *Pentru limba noastră moldovenească* and Repida’s (2008) *Suverennaia Moldova – Istoria i sovremennost’*. Amongst Romanianist works, Dragnev et al’s (2003) *Istoria rumyn – S drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei* and Cojocaru’s (2009) *Cominternul și originile „moldovenismului”* are worthy of mention.

nations that include these. Consequently, we can identify an ethnic group only when “the people in it and the people out of it know that it is one; because both the *ins* and the *outs* talk, feel and act as if it were a separate group” (Hughes, 1993: 154). For the purposes of this study, such a definition allows methodological combinations where, for example, census data, which we know in the Moldovan case has not been left entirely to the free choice of respondents, can be compared to survey data, where greater possibilities to combine and state other identities may exist. In the latter case, respondents are given greater liberty to define their own identities while also organizing them into accepted categories that do not contravene the individual’s own perceptions.

The difference between ethnicity and nationality resides in the political implications with regard to the latter. Nationality refers directly to citizenship and derives its legitimacy from the idea of a nation, i.e., a cultural unit that is able to define a political community. This has led to a situation in which national identity is sometimes seen as the combination of nationality and citizenship (Schnapper, 2002: 10). Such an approach is problematic, mainly because the presumed cultural aspect of nationality linking it to the political rights of citizenship does not always exist. In that regard, much of the literature on citizenship fails to recognize that the political community to which citizenship should be granted cannot be directly related to national identity, which in essence rests on the same type of collective constructions as ethnicity does (cf. French and Hinze, 2010: 264). For that reason nationality here refers to citizenship only and is a category related to the state and for which any ethnic group within the state’s borders are able to apply, provided they fulfill the citizenship criteria of that state. National identity is thus reserved for cultural identification with a certain nation or nation-state.

If one were to define the ideal type of nation in a Weberian sense, it could be described as an ethnic group with a nationalistic ideology, i.e. nationalism, aiming to establish a state of its own (Hylland-Eriksen, 1998: 148). Through the means of nationalism, the aspiring nation demands a state in the name of a specific ethnic group. In this study the nation is regarded as a construction, created by nationalistic movements, and as such forms a political community. It is, however, rare that a single ethnic group constitutes the entire population of a nation-state and usually there are numerous minorities present. Either these minorities are assimilated by the majority group or they continue to exist as minority groups within the nation-state. This creates situations where one group, often the majority of a certain state, dominates minority groups. In the words of Rogers Brubaker (1999: 5), this dominating group, or core nation, may be understood “as the legitimate ‘owner’ of the state, which is conceived as the state *of* and *for* the core nation.”

Nation-building, as one of the transitional processes, is focused on inducing or strengthening a common national identity throughout the population of a state. Frequently, disparate population segments are brought together

into one political community. In order to promote a specific set of values, national symbols, such as a national anthem and flag, the reference to a common historical past, common language, shared religion, and perhaps physical appearance, are traits that are propagated to the population through state institutions (cf. Törnquist-Plewa, 1999: 41).

During a transition, i.e. the shift from an authoritarian regime towards democracy, ideas of ethnicity and nation have important roles to play in providing cognitive collective frameworks around which the structure and orientation of the future state may be constructed. It is a move from a certain *now* to an uncertain *later* where the rules of the game still are to be formalized. Kuzio (2001b) has correctly noted that transitions include parallel processes, but in this study it will be argued that it was nationalism and the attempts to establish a Romanian or Moldovan nation that pushed democratization, marketization, and state-building in certain directions. Power relations in society also affect how the nation is defined and nation-building pursued. Nation-building is thus not simply the establishment of a national identity in order to build a coherent *demos* that might share the same idea of what the state is and for whom it exists. It is the struggle of political and economic elites trying to carve out certain spaces in society from where they can craft political platforms to win the support of the masses. As the Moldovan transition became caught up in discussions on language and identity, this provided room for new actors to enter politics, for new alliances to be built and for new conflicts to arise. A struggle commenced between proponents of the old order, who had everything to lose with change, and new elites, who had everything to win by turning the tables. This type of positioning according to identity lines has given rise to the most intense conflicts in the post-Communist societies (cf. Hroch, 1993: 17f).

The assumption of the national question driving the Moldovan transition also finds support in King (2000: 131ff), who argues that the politics of language ran much higher and stronger in Moldova than in other post-Soviet republics and came to be the central component of the independence movement. According to King, three schisms evolved out of the language conflict. First, there was a conflict between the older and younger Moldovan cultural elite. The older generation sought to preserve the structures of the Soviet regime and their own positions, while the younger generation saw an opportunity to opt for unification with Romania and simultaneously promote their own careers. Second, there was a regional rift between the western Bessarabian part of Moldova and the eastern Transnistrian. In Moscow's view Transnistrians had always been regarded as more reliable, coming as they did from a region that had been part of the USSR since 1924, and had thus been allowed to dominate Moldovan politics from the time the MSSR was established in 1940. Language played an important role as Bessarabians mainly spoke Romanian while Transnistrians spoke Russian. The third conflict pitted Moldova's ethnic majority population against its minorities as the

former saw an opportunity to get the upper hand vis-à-vis the latter through the promotion of Romanian language proficiency in the state apparatus. This meant that the Moldovans could gain ground primarily at the expense of Russian and Ukrainian minority groups, which had previously dominated political and economic affairs.

Sometimes the debate about whom the Moldovans are has been latent, while at other times it has been the focal point of political life. During calmer periods the identity battle was fought on the shelves of bookstores between proponents of one or the other perspective, only to suddenly erupt into large demonstrations and even violence. As the 2009 parliamentary elections demonstrated, the unresolved issue of national identity continues to be a source of political capital which parties sometimes selectively exploit. In later chapters we will examine how developments in Moldova were affected by the question of language in light of different nation-building currents.

Democratization and National Division

Democratization is the transition to what, hopefully, will be a more democratic regime, but where the end point remains uncertain. Successful democratization ends when a democratic regime is fully consolidated and has become “the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Przeworski, 1991) – an expression that, on the one hand, describes a situation in which democracy is no longer threatened by sudden authoritarian downturns, but, on the other hand, specifies no period of time within which this may occur. Although it is not a main objective here to conclude how close to consolidation Moldova has come, this study does include a discussion on how the country compares against basic democratic criteria and some of the most commonly applied democracy indices.

While democracy appears to be a straightforward concept, implying that governing power stems from the people, it is, in a global context, applied to widely divergent regimes, many of which are far from achieving the democratic foundation of political equality. However, there are also important disagreements regarding the definition of democracy in the theoretical literature and what political equality really implies.

The theorists of democratization are content with an equality of legal rights, including electoral rights. But democratic theory has come to be concerned with *power*, an equality of degree of control that all human beings can exercise over their own lives” [emphasis in original] (Allison, 1994: 10).

This is just one example of how differently democracy may be understood within a Western context, and, with the inclusion of other cultural perspectives, interpretations of democracy multiply.

One way of avoiding some of the definitional or normative issues with regard to democracy is to focus on procedural content, which directs attention towards how democracy works on a nation-state level. Contemporary democracy is thus mainly perceived as representative democracy, or what Robert Dahl (1971; 1999) has chosen to name *polyarchy* to differentiate it from direct forms of democracy. Polyarchy offers institutional means to bridge the gap between the direct democracy possible in small communities and the need for representation in modern states. The institutional requirements of polyarchy include elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom of expression, alternative information, and associational autonomy. Later in this study, these institutions will provide the basis for evaluating democracy in Moldova overall.

However, the institutional frameworks may only represent the structure of democracy and may not as well allow for understanding the substantive democratic issues of a given polity. For democracy to take root, it requires that the regime enjoys the support of the population and that democratic principles are accepted. On a general level this implies that democracy, as a form of institutionalized political conflict, requires acceptance by citizens of the authority of the government and of certain rules. It is an intricate balance of conflict and consensus in that citizens should participate in politics but only to a certain extent. "Democracy implies dissent and division, but on a basis of consent and cohesion." (Diamond, 1990: 56). The combined beliefs, values, habits, attitudes, and behavior of a specific political community are often referred to as political culture. Any regime is dependent on the support of the people and probably more so a democratic regime that claims that power emanates directly from the people. A certain political culture may thereby either provide or deny a regime its legitimacy to rule.

One way to assess political culture is through public opinion surveys, which can be constructed so that they reveal attitudes towards issues relevant to democracy. While there are different approaches to the study of political culture, for example, the civic culture approach of Almond and Verba ([1963] 1989), the materialist and post-materialist divide of Inglehart (1990; 1997), or the social capital argument of Putnam (1996), a model that could measure levels of political support directly and on different levels was deemed necessary for this study. Such a model is offered by Norris (1999), drawing on Easton (1965), and divides political support into five levels starting with the political community as the most diffuse form of support, followed by regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and, finally, political actors as the most concrete form of support.

As mentioned above, disagreements exist regarding the exact definition of democracy in the theoretical literature. The etymological definition of democracy, namely the rule of the people, enjoys widespread acceptance however. It implies that, in order for democracy to be in place, there has to exist a coherent political community. The population must regard itself as a

people. If rival interpretations of the political community exist, then the prospects for democracy are considerably weakened. Should these interpretations become so strong that they threaten the coherence of the people, questioning its relevance and orientation, attempts to uphold democracy, or to democratize, may become impossible (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Thus it might not only be the political system that is endangered but the entire integrity of the state.

Given the importance of having a coherent political community in order to establish democracy, it would seem that democracy in Moldova would face a bleak future. However, even though Moldova remains a divided nation, democratization has been somewhat successful, and, notwithstanding the three Baltic states, Moldova is generally regarded as the most democratic post-Soviet state. Despite difficulties, Moldova has indeed managed to continue on a sometimes rocky road toward democracy and has consistently held local and national elections – well fulfilling Huntington’s (1991: 267) two-turnover test, which implies that “the party or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election.”¹² None of previous elections has yet been judged to be below international democratic standards, although shortcomings have been reported (cf. OSCE/ODIHR, 2005; 2009; 2009b). In democratic surveys Moldova typically scores in the middle of the range, amongst neither the consolidated democracies nor within the authoritarian camp (Ekman, 2009; Marshall and Jagers, 2004; Spanu, 2004: 13).¹³

The enigma of Moldova’s relative success at democratization, despite the serious challenges faced, did not immediately draw the attention of political scientists. However, an entry point for the study of the country’s political system materialized around the time of the constitutional reform in 2000, when direct election of the president by popular vote was replaced by presidential election by a parliamentary majority. This was followed one year later by the overwhelming victory of the Party of Communists, ending an institutionalized power struggle between executive and legislature. Taking these events as a point of departure, Mazo (2004) argues for the uniqueness of Moldova’s constitutional change from presidential to parliamentary government without first experiencing a systemic breakdown. Paradoxically, this did not result in higher democratic standards, but created a situation in which one dominant party in the legislature could exercise full control over

¹² However, as noted by Lijphart (1999: 6f), such turnover tests of democratic consolidation are based on majoritarian assumptions in which basically two parties would compete for power. Many of the established European democracies would thus have failed Huntington’s test during large parts of the second half of the twentieth century.

¹³ The exception would be Freedom House’s *Nations in Transit* reports on Moldova, which, on a couple of occasions, have evaluated Moldova as an authoritarian state (see Chapter 6).

the executive. Comparing the effects of parliamentarian and types on executive power, Roper (2008: 124f), reasoning along the same lines as Mazo, concludes that this kind of institutional flexibility of the presidential-premier regime may threaten the integrity of the political system as a whole. Even if flexibility may help tackling the challenges of transition, the Moldovan case also illustrates how too much flexibility may undermine democracy. Contrary to what would be predicted by the large body of political science research on democracy and democratization, Moldova did not become more democratic as parliament became less fragmented, but actually less democratic since the executive and legislature were no longer in opposition to each other. In fact, the more stable political environment resulted in worsening democratic standards, attempts to silence the opposition, and, after the 2005 parliamentary elections, cooptation of the main opposition party.

Providing a novel approach to the subject of Moldova's comparatively high level of democracy and to democratization theory in general, Lucan Way (2002; 2003b; 2003c), argues that Moldova's success is less an example of democracy becoming "the only game in town" than it is a failed form of authoritarianism. After having described the major obstacles for successful democratization in Moldova, i.e., economic decline, ethnic conflict, a weak civil society, and poor rule of law, Way concludes that while the international democratic environment may have affected developments positively, it was not enough to keep the country on a democratic path.¹⁴ Instead he argues that democratization in Moldova was as much a positive result of a conscious process as it was a case of *pluralism by default*. Hence, competitive politics becomes the result of a "fragmented and polarized elite and weak state unable to monopolize political control" (Way, 2003a: 463), where ethno-national conflict (Way, 2002: 137) and anti-incumbent nationalism are identified as major causes.¹⁵ Moldovan democracy is thereby reduced to a lucky and haphazard by-product of the political elite's failure to control the domestic political scene within a democratic international context.¹⁶

Way's explanation of the relatively high level of democracy seen in the Moldovan case is interesting but also controversial. Pluralism by default turns on its head the idea that in order to democratize a political community must be in place; it is rather the *lack* of agreement of what the political community is that makes democratization possible. However, this proposition rests on the assumption that Moldova, and possibly other states sharing

¹⁴ It is worth noting that direct support of Moldova by Western institutions during the 1990s was much less than what was provided to the three Baltic states at the same time.

¹⁵ While Way, in his first articles, did not bring attention to the fact that the elite power struggles are more of an internal Moldovan majority issue than anything else, in his later 2003 article *Weak States and Pluralism: The Case of Moldova*, he highlights the conflicts between individuals and the lack of trust within the political elite as a whole (Way, 2003c: 475).

¹⁶ When Way published his articles on pluralism by default in Moldova, the PCRM had just won its first big electoral victory. Way, therefore, could not account for the disappearance, in practice, of any institutional balance between parliament and president.

similar background conditions, would turn autocratic at first chance possible. The elites, according to Way, strive to install an authoritarian regime, and the masses are reduced to supporters of one or another actor divided between themselves along fault lines of national identity. Of Way, Mazo and Roper, none addresses the issue of political support, and all three base their presentations and arguments on the actions of political elites and on institutional changes. If we are to discuss the democratic level of a country, this needs to be done in relation to both political institutions and cultural values (cf. Sin and Wells, 2005: 89).

Aim and Research Questions

This study aims to investigate the relationship between nation and democracy in the Republic of Moldova and, more specifically, to explore the possible paths to democratization for divided nations. In light of the previous research on Moldovan democracy noted above and based on what has been mentioned earlier regarding the preconditions for democracy, two opposite approaches for democratization have crystallized. The first approach is Rustow's (1970) classical model, which argues that democratization necessitates acceptance or agreement by the population of a state as to what political community it belongs, a proposition almost recognized as a tenet in much of political science literature (cf. Dahl, 1999; Linz and Stepan, 1996). Hence, within a coherent political community, competing parties are unlikely to challenge the underlying assumptions of what lies in the national interest. Without a clearly defined citizenry that acts as members of and agrees on the boundaries of the same political community, possibilities for acceptance of the rules of the democratic political game grow slim. In this sense it becomes a great challenge to consolidate democracy in a political community that does not agree whether it constitutes a community or not. Following Rustow, the national division of Moldova should subsequently have been strongly detrimental to any movement towards democracy – the divided political community rendering any such concerted action impossible.

The second approach for democratization, propagated by Way (2002; 2003b; 2003c), takes the opposite stance, i.e., democracy may, in certain situations, be a consequence of national division that denies weak leaders of the support needed to fulfill their autocratic ambitions. Way's model of *pluralism by default* is as innovative as it is controversial and offers a clear break to the earlier understanding of national division being a negative factor for democratization. Where Rustow argues for national unity being a precondition for democracy, Way instead proposes that national disunity may, in fact, foster pluralism in the short run, although it works against consolidation in the long run. Hence, a plurality of opinions grows out of the disagreements on national identity and provides an arena where no single actor

can set the agenda. Of particular interest for this study is that Way applies Moldova to prove his point. Pluralism by default does offer an explanation for Moldovan pluralism and seems to correspond with the actual development of Moldovan politics, but it is based upon an assumption of authoritarian teleology. While Way (2003b: fn. 33) is aware of this problem he nonetheless pursues his case. There is, therefore, a need to look further into the empirical grounds for pluralism by default and widen the discussion beyond power elites.

The main research question posed in the present study is this: *How and why has Moldova, despite being a nation divided, been able to achieve relatively high democratic standards?* The study assumes that the political community, whether united or divided, is of great importance to democratization, and both Rustow and Way's assumptions regarding the nation are taken as the main preconditions for democracy and democratization. The scope of the question posed above, however, is rather broad, and requires the introduction of two supporting sub-questions.

The first sub-question is based on the assumption that Moldovan politics have been extensively influenced by national division and centers on how this division has influenced the actions of elites and the functioning of institutional frameworks. The sub-question has, therefore, been formulated as follows: *What are the effects of Moldova's national division on political developments in general and democratization in particular?* In order to fully explore these issues, the activities of political elites must be detailed and the level of democratic development in Moldova assessed. The objective is to generate a better understanding of specific Moldovan events and to provide an overall picture of where Moldovan democracy stands. Although similar contributions may be found elsewhere in the available literature, the present study will examine these issues more comprehensively and over a longer period of time.

The second sub-question takes as its point of departure the lack of approaches that examine expressions of political support for democracy on the part of elites and institutions as well as on the part of the population at large as these may reveal varying attitudes. Hence, the second sub-question has been formulated as follows: *How does national identity influence the nature of Moldovan political support?* The focus is thereby kept on the national division, but certain methodological steps have been taken to keep the analysis as open-ended as possible to determine, for example, whether there are other factors influencing political support to a greater degree than national identity and also to validate the assumption that Moldova constitutes a nationally divided community.

These questions suggest that different types of research are required to answer them. The main question of how and why Moldova has managed to democratize, despite national division, contains both a descriptive (*how*) and an analytic (*why*) element and is further elaborated through the two sub-

questions. The first sub-question, dealing with the effect of national division on political developments and democratization, is descriptive in its character. The second sub-question, which focuses on the influence of national identity on political support, approaches the subject from an open-ended perspective. This is not for lack of previous studies on national identity in Moldova (even if there are none linking national identity and political support for democracy in a comprehensive manner), which could have guided questions more precisely. Rather it has been done in order to investigate whether the influence of national identity on elite level politics in Moldova correlates to the objects of political support. Hence, this provides ground for the analytical discussion of the main question. Due to the universal character of the nation's relation to democracy, it is assumed that the findings here may also have bearing on democratization and democracy theory as a whole, since the Moldovan case provides specific insights on how democratization may be realized in challenging settings.

Method and material

The questions above imply that different methods and materials are needed to answer them (cf. Swedner, 1969: Ch. 4). First, a better understanding of social phenomena, in this case of how the nation has influenced democracy, is required. Second, the study approaches the question of what dynamics affect political support in an open-ended manner and with the aim of mapping out a topic to which little attention has been devoted. Although there are existing studies on the divided Moldovan nation and on democratic and political issues in Moldova, none have framed these elements in the context of political support

In answering the research questions, both triangulation of data and triangulation of methods have been applied (cf. Denzin, 1970: 301ff). Triangulation of data, by definition, has been applied by utilizing different sources of data, i.e., first and secondary source literature, statistics and survey data, both describing the same events which are being analyzed. Similarly, triangulation of methods has been applied in what Riley (1963: 22f) would call a descriptive and unsystematic fashion in order to further understand a specific case rather than to measure specific properties. In that manner, different data sources were brought together and ordered analytically according to the theoretical framework introduced in Chapter 3. Although interviews do not constitute a major part of this study, they do provide important background information and points of reference to which other sources of data could be related. With regard to the issue of political support, and also to test whether Rustow and Way's understanding of how nation relates to democracy, the aim of mapping how concepts relate to each other draws both on description of empirically relevant material and on statistical analysis of survey data.

The first of the sub-questions above, which concerns the actions of elites and the functioning of institutions, is largely descriptive and highlights Moldova's overall level of democracy as well as how and to what extent political developments have been influenced by the unique national division of Moldova. Thus there is a need to introduce the specific Moldovan setting, including the different ethnic groups, and to describe how different nationalisms have affected political developments. The reason for a descriptive approach here is that it is difficult to provide meaningful explanations to social phenomena without good descriptions (King, et al., 1994: 34).

It was noted earlier in this chapter that the recent literature on Moldova has largely described a country with a troubled and divided national character. In Chapter 3, the theoretical chapter of this dissertation, suggestions are presented regarding how and why nation and democracy are associated along with the strengths and weaknesses of this association. It is important to further develop such a framework empirically and then to establish its validity. This will likely lead to improved theoretical conclusions (ibid.: 46). This part of the dissertation is based on the available academic literature, which generally portrays nationalism as a driving force in Moldovan politics, in combination with news reports, statistics and survey data, statements by political actors, and analyses conducted by national and international organizations.

The second sub-question, focusing on how Moldovans express political support, is open-ended in that it allows factors other than the nation to influence Moldovans' choices. The approach is that of methodological individualism, i.e., the understanding of the collective stems from the behavior of each and every individual (Cuff and Payne, 1996: 159; Schumpeter, 1908: 92ff). The material analyzed is taken exclusively from a survey conducted in 2003. The survey was produced within the project *Societal Transition and Democratic Change within the Baltic Sea Area*, headed by Professor Elfar Loftsson at Södertörn University College. The project incorporated data collected from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland and was expanded to include Moldova as well. The survey questions focused on issues related to democracy in a broad sense and also consisted of a section dedicated to national identity (Johansson and Loftsson, 2003). Both of these themes have been further elaborated and adjusted to fit the scope of this study. Survey interviews were organized through the Institute for Public Policy (IPP), and fieldwork and registration of data was done by *Centru de analiză și investigații sociologice, politologice și psihologice* (CIVIS). A pilot survey, conducted in April 2003, of 17 respondents, nine in Romanian language and eight in Russian, helped to refine the formulation of some of the questions and to tailor them to Moldovan conditions. It should be noted that 2003 was a year of relative calm in Moldova, a time when national identity was not on top of the political agenda. As a result respondents' answers to the survey

questions were probably less affected by ongoing political dynamics than otherwise would have been the case.

Due to the poor quality of the Moldovan population register, it was necessary to conduct direct interviews in which respondents were chosen randomly based on their geographical location. The interviewees were selected through a process whereby the region was first selected randomly, followed by a city, town or village, street, house and, in the case of an apartment building, floor and apartment. The person who opened the door, provided he or she was an adult, would be interviewed if they so agreed. In May 2003 a total of 1,100 interviews were carried out throughout Moldova with respondents ranging in age from 18 to 90 years. 71.4 percent of the interviews were conducted in Romanian and 28.6 percent in Russian. More than 90 percent of the respondents reported that they were Moldovan citizens, but, as we will see later, far fewer identified themselves first and foremost as Moldovans.

Finally, as noted by van Meurs (1994: 3) with regard to another troubled topic in Moldovan history, the Bessarabian question, it needs to be recognized that anyone writing about Moldovan history, culture, or politics immediately becomes a party to the conflict. This is impossible to avoid, and although the aim of the present study has consistently been to steer clear of pro-Romanian and pro-Soviet/Moldovan biases, it will be interpreted by some as a support for the arguments of one or the other side. While there is no such thing as complete objectivity in the social sciences, in the Moldovan case even the aim of objectivity is challenged. This is characteristic of a new state whose people do not agree on their past and may not agree on their future.

Measuring Attitudes

Attitudes do not exist outside the individual. An attitude can be described as an emotional and volitional orientation towards an object within a person's cognitive world (Swedner, 1969: 141ff). More precisely "[a]ttitude is the affect for or against a psychological object" (Thurstone, 1931: 261). Early twentieth century social science held that by knowing a person's attitudes it would also be possible to predict her or his behavior. Later research has shown that the link between attitude and behavior is not so direct, or at least more complicated than first believed (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980: 24). It is not certain that the attitudes measured are precisely those which guide specific behaviors, and it is difficult to determine which attitudes lead to specific actions. There is also the possibility that other circumstances may come into play and thereby reduce the importance of the measured attitudes.

...attitudes do not determine behavior in any one-to-one fashion. One must also take situational factors into account. But the same is true of situations:

by themselves, they do not determine what happens. Behavior requires both motive and opportunity (Inglehart, 1997: 52).

Hence, there is a need to exercise care when survey questions are both formulated and analyzed. Despite these caveats, attitudes have proven of great interest and use to political scientists trying to establish the views of citizens on different political issues. Although the institutional framework and the role of political elites play crucial roles in any democracy, the attitudes of citizens toward the political system are, naturally, of great importance. A political system which enjoys the support of its population has a much higher probability of survival over time and is unlikely to resort to repression as a means to deter rebellion.

Attitudes may be measured by exposing subjects to different types of stimuli, for example, verbal, situational, or visual. In order to establish the direction and intensity of attitudes, different types of analytic tools, such as Thurstone scales, Guttman scales and Likert scales, have been designed (Swedner, 1969: 146ff). The Thurstone scale measures attitudes toward specific objects by proposing statements with which the respondent can either agree or disagree. Formulations are, therefore, slightly cumbersome to construct, and answers may only be dichotomized. The Guttman scale is cumulative, meaning that it progresses from rather vague to more specific statements. Like the Thurstone scale, the Guttman scale can only register replies which are in agreement or disagreement. If a respondent agrees with a statement somewhere in the middle of a set of Guttman questions, this would mean that s/he also has also agreed to all preceding statements, but not necessarily to subsequent statements. Thus Guttman scales are rather complicated to construct. Finally, Likert scales allow respondents to indicate their agreement or disagreement with specific statements (McNabb, 2004: 116, 161f). Commonly, this is measured on a scale ranging from one (1) to five (5), (although seven-point scales are sometimes used), and captures the following spectrum of responses: *strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree*.¹⁷

Likert scales are much easier to construct than Thurstone scales and, on average, take 30 percent less time to formulate, which partly explains their popularity (Erwin, 2001: 53f). Moreover, the Likert scale provides respondents with the possibility of easily diversifying their replies. If there were to be a need for creating an agree-disagree dichotomy, similar categories can be collapsed. In order to abide by these criteria and to keep the study open for other interpretations, a statistical technique suitable for an open-ended approach was sought, which would not violate the assumptions of the interval

¹⁷ Although some researchers may consider this as a basis for interval level data, which allows for other types of statistical techniques, ranking replies from one to five does create an ordinal scale. This is a strong argument in favor of using a statistical method suited for ordinal scale data.

type scale.¹⁸ Correspondence analysis (CA) was thus chosen since it allows for visualization of large contingency tables of categorical data, making interpretation easier. It also allows for data to be explored rather than fit into a predefined scheme.

Correspondence Analysis

In this study correspondence analysis is applied in order to try to discern possible patterns and relations in the survey data. For smaller contingency tables, with low numbers of columns and rows, it is fairly easy to spot possible relationships just by looking at data. For larger tables this becomes highly impractical and may hardly provide us with an understanding of how variables are related. The strength of CA resides within its possibility to visualize nominal categories of tabular data graphically (cf. Greenacre, 2007: 1) and may show not only *if* a relationship between row and column variables exists but also *how* variables in columns and rows are related.¹⁹ In more technical terms CA constitutes “a generalized principal component analysis tailored for the analysis of qualitative data” (Abdi and Williams, 2010: 1). CA relies upon the Chi-2 (χ^2) test of independence and its application is most appropriate when analyzing contingency tables with categorical, non-negative data.

The manner in which data is visualized in CA is by scatter plots of variables. These may be computed by such statistical packages such as Minitab or freeware software Past (Hammer, et al., 2001). The variables are usually plotted in two dimensions according to their relation to the x and y axes. Variables located furthest from origo contribute more to possible variance found, while variables close to origo represent findings closer to the average. Given, for example, a contingency table with age groups broken out into columns and supported political parties divided into rows, it would, through CA, be possible to observe differences in how age groups support political parties and whether there are clusters of parties and age groups that correlate. The scatter plot results would, in the end, depend on the interpretation of the analyst.

¹⁸ Other and more widely used statistical techniques, such as simple or multiple regression analysis, are often applied to test relations between either one independent and one dependent variable (simple) or between one dependent and two or more independent variables (multiple). However, since all variables should be at the interval level, regression analysis is not suitable for the data analyzed here (cf. Champney, 1995: 70, 144). Another popular approach to reduce the complexity of data and find relationships between variables is factor analysis. Factor analysis is based on the assumption that each variable has a normal distribution, but it is, in practice, often applied to variables which are not normally distributed. At a minimum, however, binary variables such as gender should not be added to a factor analytic model (Agresti and Finlay, 1999: 631). Since gender is one of the categories included in the analysis here, this was yet another reason to apply CA instead in the present study.

¹⁹ The strength of CA to analyze relations between variables of nominal data also means that statistical methods developed for higher scale levels, for example regression analysis, would not be applicable here.

Advantages of CA aside, the interpretation of scatter plots does not come as easily as simply measuring distances between variables with a ruler (cf. Blasius, 1987: 184). Instead CA scatter plots show the positions of variables and how they are clustered, a great help for interpretation by itself. It is also possible, and highly advisable, to carefully study the CA outputs of the contingency table provided by statistical packages. Although these may seem complicated at first, they hold important information in a condensed format. Through the scatter plots and the statistical output, it is possible to observe whether variables contribute significantly to the variance in a contingency table and to what extent they do so in comparison to other variables.

While CA can help to clarify whether there is considerable variance between variables, it is up to the analyst to determine what the variance in an axis actually illustrates and, therefore, how the results should be interpreted. A more detailed description of the CA method, including how to interpret scatter plots, is found in Appendix A.

Background Variables Applied

This study sets out to investigate relations between nation and national identity, on the one hand, and nation and democracy, on the other. While the focus is mainly on these issues, it does not imply that other background variables that might help explain the Moldovan case are better left ignored. Described below are the four background variables applied in the analysis of the survey material, namely gender, education, locality, and national identity. A list of all row and column variables, together with their abbreviations, may be found in Appendix B.

Gender

One challenge encountered with the survey data was the unequal gender distribution. The compiled material reflected that 60.4 percent of the respondents were women and only 39.6 percent men. Moreover, the data reflect a regional differentiation of women to men respondents, with the southern city of Cahul having only 1.8 percent more women than men, while northern Soroca had as much as 45.4 percent more women respondents.²⁰ In a Swedish context, for example, where a random sample could easily be derived from state registers, this would constitute a significant difference in gender balance. Indeed, it is unusual in random samples to observe a gender imbalance of more than a few percent. However, because of the sampling method applied and the particularities of the Moldovan case, there are some plausible explanations.

²⁰ An effort to establish whether men and women were home during different hours of the day (by dividing the day into three six hour segments, i.e., morning and noon, noon and afternoon, evening and night) showed no significant divergence from the gender imbalance observed previously.

First, the 2004 census does provide some guidance and reveals that the total population consists of 48 percent men and 52 percent women. Regarding the specific cities noted above, the data show that Cahul is comprised of 46 percent men and 54 percent women, while corresponding figures for Soroca reflect 49 and 51 percent, respectively. Second, while the total level of migration is high, it is still more common for men to leave the country than it is for women. Recent survey data indicate that the prevalence of migration is 20 percent among men and 12 percent for women (Lueke, et al., 2009: 14). Although migration patterns vary by season to some extent, this difference tends to remain consistent. Third, it is more plausible that women rather than men stay at home. Even if men may not be working abroad, it is likely that, as one informant concluded, men would spend considerable time in the local *cafenele*. While it is important to be aware of these factors, CA, as a statistical technique, is rather insensitive to these kinds of imbalances, that is, as long as very a few cases do not greatly exaggerate the results, creating, for example, outliers which skew an entire axis.

Education

The Moldovan educational system was captured in the survey in the following manner, here with explanations in parenthesis: *Primary incomplete* (less than four years of school). *Primary complete or secondary incomplete* (at least four years of education but less than twelve). *Secondary complete* (nine to twelve years of education). *Secondary professional school* (nine years of primary and secondary school together with another two to four years of vocational school). *University level* (may include BA, MA and PhD educations) (cf. Cruc, et al., 2009: 36ff).

Localities

How to code localities posed a specific challenge. In the survey both density of a locality and its name was coded. While cities, towns and villages are separate types of localities in the view of the Moldovan authorities, there may not be much distinguish them in reality. For example, the title of “city” may have been given to a locality during Soviet times when it was understood that it held certain industries or services. After many economic downturns, this may no longer be the case.

Because of these problems, localities have been separated simply by size, not an optional solution perhaps but better than the alternatives. Hence localities were coded in the following manner:

- capital (i.e., Chisianu)
- 50.000-130.000 inhabitants (i.e., Bălți)
- 20.000-50.000 inhabitants
- 0-20.000 inhabitants

The second category only happens to fit the city of Bălți, which is known as the northern capital of Moldova and a regional center. Of interest to this study is that Bălți has a considerable Slavic minority, which could affect the analysis.

Ethnic or National Identity

The survey question on ethnicity, what in Moldova would often be referred to as nationality in accordance with the old Soviet understanding, was formulated so that at least two identities could be included – even if one of them had to be named primary identity and the other secondary (cf. Linz and Stepan, 1996: 35 fn 42). Most respondents chose to define themselves within one identity framework, but almost 16 percent added a secondary identity to their first (see Table 1). This is clearly an imperfect way of trying to define the identity of a person; identities are multi-faceted and become activated depending on situation. Categories are, nevertheless, a reduction of reality and as such offer helpful analytic tools for understanding our surroundings. In this specific case, the categories chosen were pulled from census data, and offering respondents a choice of two identities allowed for the further diversification of answers.²¹

Table 1. *First and secondary identities among respondents*

Do you consider yourself:	
Moldovan	59.8%
Primarily Moldovan, secondarily Romanian	5.5
Primarily Romanian, secondarily Moldovan	2.2
Romanian	3.6
Primarily Moldovan, secondarily Russian	3.0
Primarily Russian, secondarily Moldovan	3.7
Russian	6.2
Primarily Moldovan, secondarily Ukrainian	0.9
Primarily Ukrainian, secondarily Moldovan	0.5
Ukrainian	5.5
Other, please specify	5.4
N/A	3.6

Source: Johansson and Loftsson (2003: q.83)

²¹ The figures on national identity, particularly when a primary identity is concerned, correspond well to the results of Kolstø (2002) and White (2000).

Outline of the Study

Chapter 2 provides a historical and socio-economic background to the lands that today constitute the Republic of Moldova coupled with an economic and social overview. A study like this, especially on a country that still remains unknown to the average reader, requires a certain amount of background knowledge. Hence, the aim of the chapter is to put subsequent chapters into a wider context and also to provide an additional basis for the theoretical choices made later in Chapter 3.²² While the historical passages concentrate on twentieth century developments, the latter part of the chapter draws attention to the socio-economic situation from 1989 onwards, a period in which the strong push for market economic reforms combined with economic crises and huge levels of out-migration. The secession of the Transnistrian region, and later its *de facto* if not *de jure* statehood, is partly raised here, but is otherwise regarded as a political process and further addressed in Chapter 5. Overall this chapter frames the actual context in which democracy was introduced in Moldova.

Chapter 3 is the main theoretical chapter dealing with the relationship between nation and democracy. The primary aim of this chapter is to derive the theoretical tools needed to structure the analysis and of the empirical material. The different phases of transition are introduced here, beginning with the initial period of liberalization and democratization. The ascribed teleological approach of the transitology school is discussed and related to the debate on the general or particular nature of Eastern Europe's transition. Consolidation is understood here as completed when democracy "has become the only game in town" and both the institutional mechanisms and substantive components are in place. State-building is discussed in relation to the institutions needed for the state to function and nation-building as the means of establishing a coherent people through the promotion of a nation. Finally, the implications of nation and ethnicity on individual identity are raised.

Chapter 4 focuses on minority groups and the different ideas among these groups of what the Moldovan nation is or should be. Minority groups are presented based on how they have historically been defined in censuses. While this approach may be crude, the application of 'nationality' in, for example, Soviet passports is a concept that is still likely to hold meaning in contemporary Moldova. Towards the end of the chapter, the fluctuations of Moldovanism and Romanianism, as manifestations of the main nationalisms

²² However, the chapter does not claim to present the only or "true" version of Moldova's past. As in any historical presentation, there is a need to choose how and on which aspects to focus. The aim is to construct a historical recollection of the Republic of Moldova that may be of use for understanding contemporary politics. This, of course, immediately draws criticism from those who do not recognize the existence of a separate Moldovan state. Comments or footnotes have been inserted to clarify certain historical events which are much debated. For those interested in the twists and turns of Moldovan history-education and writing, cf. Solonari (2002), Hausleitner (2004), Ihrig (2008), and Musteață (2010).

in the country, are mapped and periods when they have dominated politics are highlighted. This is done to provide some context for Chapter 5.

Chapter 5 begins with the period when pan-Romanianism was at its peak from 1989 to 1993, competing with other national movements opposed to a Moldova envisioned by the Popular Front. The chapter covers the actions of the Popular Front, the separatist tendencies of the Gagauzians in southern Moldova and Transnistrian secessionism in eastern Moldova. The final sections of the chapter concern the remaining period from 1994 to 2009, divided into the four periods introduced in Chapter 4, and focusing on how political developments have been affected by national divisions.

Chapter 6 provides a description of how Moldova is governed together with an overview of four internationally recognized democracy index estimates of the country's regime. This chapter aims to summarize Moldova's democratic transition with special attention paid to both the institutional framework and to the rights perspective which Dahl (1999) brings to representative democracy through his polyarchy model.

In Chapter 7 we move to the level of citizens in order to better understand the degree of political support within the framework provided by Norris (1999). The basis for analysis is the 2003 survey, and different questions regarding political support are tested by applying correspondence analysis. In order to avoid unnecessarily burdening the core presentation, complicated graphs and tables have been moved to Appendix D.

Finally, Chapter 8 aims to bring together the threads of previous chapters and draws conclusions in order to answer the three research questions posed previously in this chapter. This is also the point at which we return to earlier research on Moldova and examine how we should understand the relationship between nation and democracy within the country and beyond.

Figure 2 below captures the structure of the dissertation and illustrates how chapters are related. Chapters 1, 2, and 3 lay out the empirical and theoretical framework after which the study breaks out into two pillars. Chapters 4 and 5 focus on ethnicity and nation and help to organize the main political events between 1989 and 2009. Chapters 6 and 7 examine polyarchic institutions and the issue of citizen political support given a number of variables related to democracy. The two pillars are, finally, joined in the concluding Chapter 8.




Figure 2. Structure of dissertation

2. The Historical, Economic and Social Setting

The region that today constitutes the Republic of Moldova has experienced a turbulent history as it is situated on one of the crossroads of Europe. Here empires have expanded and contracted over the course of millennia. The Moldovan region was populated early in history. Around the beginning of the first millennium, the southern territories were inhabited by the Geto-Dacians, an Indo-European people.²³ Greek merchants later established trading stations along the coast of the Black Sea, and Roman settlers began to appear from the west (Clark, 1927: 30f). After initial failed attempts, Dacia was finally conquered by Rome towards the end of the first century A.D.²⁴ Five centuries later Slavic tribes arrived from the east and overtime intermingled with the people already residing there. The Latin language, which would absorb strong Slavic and later Turkish influences to, or rather evolve into modern Romanian, largely remained in the countryside, without a written language to support it (Cvasnii Catanescu, 1996). The terminology within the Romanian Orthodox church was, however, influenced by Slavonic forms, which in turn had Greek origins (Deletant, 1980: 21). Until the mid-nineteenth century, Romanian was written in the Cyrillic script in Romania proper and, until 1918, in the Russian-ruled part of Moldavia (Kolstø, 2000: 139).

The origin of the Moldavian fiefdom remains hidden in the past, but chronicles of the period mention that in the early fourteenth century the prince Dragoș was hunting an aurochs far to the east.²⁵ In a stream the prince and his company encountered the aurochs and felled it, but not before the animal had killed Dragoș' favorite dog Molda. The Prince took the head of the aurochs as his personal crest and named the stream after his dog (King, 2000: 13). The legends from this time also claim that the area Dragoș came upon was almost uninhabited and thus free to claim. In reality, many different groups already resided there, and, moreover, the territory was under Tatar rule between 1241 and the fourteenth century. Nevertheless, the stream and later the fiefdom were named *Moldavia*. The territory stretched at its

²³ It is unknown whether the Geto-Dacians constituted one people or, in fact, made up two related tribes of Getae and Dacians.

²⁴ At its greatest extent, Dacia covered large territories of present-day Romania and Moldova and as well included smaller parts of Serbia, Hungary and Ukraine.

²⁵ Eliade (1972: 144ff) may be consulted for the autochthonous role of the aurochs in Romanian and Dacian mythology.

largest from the Carpathian Mountains in the west to the Dniester River in the east, from Bukovina in the north to Bugeac along the Black Sea coast in the south.

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Moldavia successfully defended its borders against invaders. The principality lay on one of the crossroads of Southeastern Europe, and Ottoman Turks, Poles, Hungarians, Tatars and Wallachians were among those who tried to conquer the territory. The princes Alexandru cel Bun (the Good, 1400-1432) and, to an even greater degree, Ștefan cel Mare (the Great, 1457-1504) are remembered for their successful reigns. The latter became well-known for his many victories against foreign invaders and was later regarded as the father of Moldovan nation- and statehood. Ultimately, the pressure on Moldavia became too great, and continued independence could only be bought by paying a tribute to the Porte.²⁶ This marked the first step in increased Ottoman influence in Moldavia (Seim, 2005: 86ff). On the one hand, this meant recognition of Ottoman power; on the other hand, it showed the strength of the Moldavian principality to successfully negotiate such an agreement. External pressure, however, would not recede over the coming decades.

Under the Reign of Empires

In 1538 Moldavia was conquered by the Turks, became a vassal state and stayed as such until 1812. Foreign trade was reoriented, and Moldavia was cut off from its old European contacts. Until an uprising in 1711, which resulted from the Turkish war against Russia the year before,²⁷ Moldavia enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. After the rebellion was crushed, however, so-called Phanariot rule was introduced. Phanariot rule was a system whereby the sultan recruited Greeks from the Constantinople district of Fener (Greek *Fanar*) to administer the region and thus, in practice, ended Moldavia's autonomy (van Meurs, 1994: 43). With the arrival of the Greeks, isolation from non-Ottoman Europe further increased. During the remainder of the eighteenth century, the Balkans became the battleground for repeated confrontations among Ottomans, Russians and Austrians.

²⁶ In written Soviet history, the period of the Moldavian principality was considered fundamental in the development of a separate Moldavian people and national identity, with a language different from other East Roman languages (Lazarev, 1978: 36).

²⁷ The Swedish king Charles XII, who fled to the Ottoman city of Bender (Romanian *Tighina*) after the defeat against Tsar Peter the Great at Poltava in 1709, worked to establish a joint Swedish-Turkish front against Russia, a proposition which the Turks initially found to be in their interest. Both Sweden and the Porte shared an animosity towards Russia during this time. The Swedish court came to reside in Turkey for five years and had its quarters in the territory of contemporary Moldova from 1709 until forced to move to Adrianopol (Edirne) for one year in 1713 after the Skirmish at Bender (Swedish *kalabaliken i Bender*).

Towards the end of the eighteenth century, the territory between the rivers Bug and Dniester was conquered by Russia, effectively bringing the contemporary Transnistrian region under Saint Petersburg's control. In 1812 Russia further expanded its borders and annexed the eastern part of Moldavia between the Prut and Dniester, with the exception of three southern Bessarabian districts, which had been returned to the Moldavian principality after the Crimean war and which were eventually ceded by Romania to Russia in 1878 in exchange for Northern Dobruja.²⁸ In effect, the old Moldavian fiefdom was cut in half.²⁹ While the western part of Moldavia became a part of the Kingdom of Romania during the latter half of the nineteenth century, eastern Moldavia, or Bessarabia as it became known, fell under the rule of the Russian Tsar.³⁰ Between 1812 and 1818 the Bessarabian oblast experienced a significant degree of autonomy comparable to the status enjoyed periodically by Poland and Finland. This was in line with the old traditional *așezământ* (establishment) system, which codified Moldavian administrative traditions already in operation since Turkish times. In 1828, as Russia started to centralize, the *așezământ* was removed and autonomy revoked as Bessarabia became a part of the *Novorossia* (New Russia) oblast. With increased political control over Bessarabia, Russification soon followed, and education in the Romanian language was declared illegal (van Meurs, 1994: 48). In 1874 Bessarabia was constituted as a *guberniia* (province) of its own. However, the Russification policy was mostly contained to the nobility and urban population and did not affect those residing in the countryside to the same extent.

Since Moldavia lay on the periphery of the Ottoman empire, this situation did not change significantly during the period of Russian rule. Situated far from Saint Petersburg, Bessarabia became, in effect, a western Siberia, a place where unwanted persons could be exiled.³¹

²⁸ In official PMR historical records, the period during which the two Moldovan halves were united under common Russian rule is generally forgotten (cf. *Dates and facts: Chronological history of Pridnestrovie*, 2006). This is replicated in the much disputed ICDISS report (Wood, 2006). The ICDISS story and what would seem to be a westward orientated PMR PR-campaign has been covered by Lucas (03/08/06a; 03/08/06b). For PMR it is important to establish that PMR and Moldova have always been separate entities, thereby creating a historical timeline that distinguishes their separateness and traces their union solely to the illegal Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. That the city of Bender would, for the same historical reasons, end up outside contemporary PMR is addressed only in the way that it was joined to PMR by “the will of the people”.

²⁹ Hence, 1812 became the point of bifurcation in the Russian/Soviet and Romanian written history. In the former case Russian annexation was regarded as liberation from the Turkish yoke, in the latter as the dismemberment of a Romanian fiefdom.

³⁰ Since the region was not considered a distinct political entity for a long period of time, there was no need to name it. The name Bessarabia can be traced back to the noble Basarab family who came from the southern parts of the region. It was first applied by the Turks in the fifteenth century. The Russians later used “Bessarabia” in order to describe the entire territory between the Prut and Dniester rivers (Boldur, [1943] 1992-20).

³¹ One of those exiled to Bessarabia was the famous Russian poet and author Alexander Pushkin between the years 1820 and 1823 (cf. Binyon, 2002: Ch. 7).

Independence and Union with Romania

Towards the end of the First World War, the Russian empire drew to its close. Initially shaken by the 1917 February revolution, the old order was completely overthrown by the Communist October revolution. The Tsar was gone, the Provisional Government soon lost control and throughout Russia civil war raged (cf. Figes, 1998: part three). As central power wavered, many regions of the vast empire saw the opportunity to gain greater political freedom.

In 1917 the *Sfatul Țării*, the newly established National Assembly of the Bessarabian *guberniia*, declared the Moldavian Democratic Republic (MDR). The idea was initially that the MDR should remain a part of a future Russian Federation, but with far-reaching autonomy comparable to that of the Finnish Grand Duchy. The situation in Bessarabia at the time was, as in other parts of war-torn Russia, chaotic. Within Moldavia Communist cells operated, and neighboring Ukraine harbored plans to incorporate it into the newly proclaimed Ukrainian People's Republic (King, 2000: 33).³² In this situation the *Sfatul Țării* asked whether Romanian troops could be put at the disposal of the Assembly, but the request was turned down by Iași, which then functioned as the temporary Romanian capital. Nevertheless, Romanian troops did enter Bessarabia at a later stage in order to fight off revolutionaries, which, in turn, led to strong protests from Moscow. When Ukraine declared independence in January 1918, plans for a Russian Democratic Federation vanished, and Moldavia followed Ukraine's lead the next month (van Meurs, 1994: 63ff). In April of the same year, the *Sfatul Țării* voted in favor of unification with Romania along with a list of fourteen privileges which held that Bessarabia would retain its autonomy, representative body, executive, and administration (Clark, 1927: 198ff) as well as provisions respecting the rights of ethnic minorities. However, during the night of November 1918 with an assembly lacking a quorum, the earlier agreed provisions were removed and the *Sfatul Țării* voted to dissolve itself.

The union of Bessarabia to Romania has arguably been one of the most debated issues in contemporary Moldovan history. Depending on whose written history one chooses to follow, Moldavia's union with Romania was either a re-joining to the old fatherland (Ozhog and Sharov, 1997: 160) or a forcible annexation (Stati, 2002: 277f). On the one hand, it can be argued that the *Sfatul Țării* voted democratically in favor of union with Romania and, by doing so, had eradicated a historical injustice. On the other hand, the Romanian army stood in Chișinău and its fighter planes circled around the capital during the time when the votes on unification were cast in the As-

³² The Ukrainian *Rada* or parliament, in fact, claimed that Bessarabia was Ukrainian territory as early as July 1917, even before Soviet power was installed. This claim was, however, revoked one month later (van Meurs, 1994: 58).

sembly (King, 2000: 35).³³ For the Soviet Union, however, which was established in 1922 and inherited the old Russian structures to some extent, there was no doubt that Bessarabia had been annexed by Romania. This marked the beginning of a prolonged territorial dispute between the two states (cf. Tsaranov, et al., 1984: Ch. 10, § 3; Ch. 12).

The Bessarabian Question and the Interwar Period

The Bessarabian question, as the territorial dispute between Romania and the Soviet Union became known, gained considerable international attention. While Moldova's union with Romania was recognized by three of the great powers at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, namely England, France and Italy, Japan failed to do so initially (Cimpoeșu, 2010: 18). Russia, which at the time was ravaged by civil war, took part in the proceedings through representatives of the former Russian empire and objected to Romanian claims to Bessarabia.³⁴ The US also refused to recognize Romania's right to the territory, wary of changing the border with Russia. A year later it became clear to the Western powers that the Bolshevik regime would not be toppled, and a special treaty recognizing Romania's claims to Bessarabia was signed by Romania, England, France, Japan, and Italy. However, Romania's eastern neighbor, the USSR, would stand by the position of the former Russian regime. One key reason why the Soviet Union refused to recognize Romania's claims to Bessarabia was the belief that the region could help spark socialist revolution within Romania proper, which did not seem to be an impossible course of events at the time (van Meurs, 1994: 72ff).

In the mid-1920s, once the civil war ended and the Soviet Union was recognized internationally, the Bessarabian question came into renewed focus. On the left bank of the Dniester, on land belonging to Ukraine, the Moldavian Autonomous Republic (MASSR) was created.³⁵ With Chișinău, then within Romania, initially declared the capital of the MASSR, it was obvious that the Soviet Union had not given up its claims on Bessarabia (Schrad, 2004). In a Soviet pamphlet written by V. Dembo in 1925, this aim was clearly stated.

³³ According to Neukirch (1996: 55) there was no interest among Moldavian farmers, interested primarily in socio-economic reforms at the time, for a union with Romania, and there also seem to have been disagreements within the *Sfatul Țării* leadership on the issue of unification.

³⁴ Meanwhile the Bolsheviks created a Bessarabian Soviet Socialist Republic in May 1919, only to be disbanded in September due to military pressure from the White counter-revolutionary forces.

³⁵ For Soviet written history on how and why the MASSR was established, chapter three in M. N. Bochacher's book "Moldavia" from 1926 may be consulted.

If you have said “A”, you must also say “B”. It is an old logical rule. And if history has said MASSR, then, undoubtedly, history also will say BSSR, – Bessarabian Soviet Socialist Republic. But history does not stop at that. There are many letters in the alphabet and [they] go as far as RSSR, – to Soviet Romania. The liberation of Bessarabia has been on track since the moment when MASSR was founded [translation by the author from Russian] (Dembo, 1925: 40).

The de facto capital of the MASSR was initially placed in the small town of Balta, now within Ukraine’s borders, but later moved to Tiraspol. The same year, in 1924, another attempt to install Soviet power was made in the south-eastern parts of Bessarabia as a short-lived Soviet republic was declared in Tatarbunary (Clark, 1927: Ch. 28). The aim of the revolt was to end the perceived Romanian occupation of Bessarabia and to unify with the Ukrainian SSR. After three days the insurrection was suppressed.

Bessarabia during the interwar period remained a backward region within Romania. As during Tsarist times, it was still regarded as a peripheral land far from the political center to which prisoners could be disposed and unwanted persons exiled (Livezeanu, 1995: 98). In a way, the same could be said for the Romanian civil servants and police officers sent to the province; service in Bessarabia was not necessarily considered a promotion. This, in combination with stern educational and cultural policies, such as Romanian becoming the only language of instruction in schools, made the Slavic minorities especially distrustful of Romanian rule. The introduction of the Latin alphabet and the Gregorian calendar also alienated Romanian-speaking Moldovans (Neukirch, 1996: 59f). Agriculture remained the main source of income for the majority of the population, and industrialization progressed slowly (Bugarin, et al., 2003). One possible reason is that Bucharest already considered Bessarabia a lost territory, knowing the stance of the Soviet Union and predicting a Soviet annexation sooner or later (Skvorțova, 05/17/05).³⁶ Some changes did, however, occur. Illiteracy decreased, infrastructural investments were made and a reform in the early 1920s, which followed an earlier decision by the *Sfatul Țării* from 1918, redistributed land among the population. Eventually, the predicted Soviet annexation also came to pass (King, 2000: 41).

As the German and the Soviet foreign ministers signed the mutual non-aggression Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in 1939, Eastern Europe was effectively divided into two spheres of influence. With the stroke of a pen, political borders were redrawn. In the summer of 1940, the Soviet Union handed Bucharest an ultimatum to evacuate Romanian forces from Bessarabia in order to facilitate a Soviet takeover. Shortly afterwards, the Red Army marched into Romania and annexed Bessarabia. Together with the MASSR, an enlarged

³⁶ It should be borne in mind that Romania, during the same period, was also a highly agricultural economy with the main exception being its petroleum industry (Fischer-Galati, 1969: 12).

Moldavia was created under the name of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR).³⁷ A Sovietification process commenced as did the deportations of those deemed “socially hostile” to the Soviet cause. After the Soviet takeover, 31,699 people from the MSSR and 12,191 from the Romanian parts ceded to Ukraine were deported, according to a signed order by Kobulov, assistant to NKVD head Lavrentii Beria (Werth, 1999b: 213). As pointed out by Paczkowski (1999: 371), the NKVD archives contain only minimum figures, and the real number of deportations remains unknown.

Initially, it seemed that the annexation of Bessarabia by the Soviet Union would be brief. In the summer of 1941, Germany together with its Axis allies, including Romania under the leadership of Ion Antonescu, invaded the USSR. Thereby the region east of the river Dniester, or *trans Nistru* from Bucharest’s perspective, was annexed by Romania, and the territories leading up to the Southern Bug River, deep inside Ukraine, were put under Romanian administration. A reversal of Soviet policies was quickly pursued. Jews and Roma were executed by the thousands, and many localities in Transnistria were transformed into ghettos to which Jews and Roma from the entire Romanian territory were transported, many never to return (Crowe, 1995; Solonari, 2006).

Even though the German army was halted at the gates of Moscow in 1941, the following year’s summer campaign struck deep into Russia. At Stalin-grad, where the German 6th Army was destroyed in the winter of 1943, it became clear that the fortune of war had changed. In the autumn of 1944, the German and Romanian armies, where the now re-established 6th Army again numbered, had been pushed back over the Dniester and forced to face the onslaught of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts in what would be known as the Iași-Chișinău (Jassy-Kishinev) operation (Mazulenko, 1959; McTaggart, 2001). The Germans and Romanians were outnumbered and soon routed. Romania was forced to ally itself with the Soviet Union, against its former ally Germany, and the MSSR was reconstituted. The iron curtain that soon developed between Western and Eastern Europe, as a consequence of the Cold War, ran its divide much further to the west, with the establishment of the MSSR implying a similar demarcation for Romania. Hence no Romanian influence would pass east of the Prut (Leancă, 2002: 367) – at least not officially.

This time the Bessarabian question would lay dormant for two decades, to rise again in the middle of the 1960s as Romania increasingly tried to chisel out a more independent position vis-à-vis Moscow. In 1964 Karl Marx’s *Notes on the Rumanians* was published in Bucharest, wherein Marx argued

³⁷ It should be noted that the geographical borders of the MSSR differed from the borders of Bessarabia and MASSR. Ukrainian leaders influenced the Supreme Soviet’s decision regarding how Bessarabia should be incorporated into the USSR, which effectively meant that half of the MASSR was returned to Ukraine, together with the Bessarabian regions of northern Bukovina, Hotin, Cetatea Albă and Ismail (van Meurs, 1994: 87).

that the Russian annexation of Bessarabia in 1812 was illegal (Deletant, 1984: 619f). Romania consequently reintroduced Bessarabia onto the political agenda, and in 1966 Nicolae Ceaușescu, one year after becoming First Secretary of the Romanian Workers' Party (later renamed the Romanian Communist Party), held a speech on the party's forty-fifth anniversary that touched on the Bessarabian question (Suga, 1971: 320f).

The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic

The Sovietization and modernization of Moldavia following the Second World War was intense and often brutal. Large numbers of Russian and Ukrainian specialists moved into the bigger cities in order to bring the MSSR up to par with the other Soviet republics, which over time resulted in a strong concentration of Slavs in the bigger cities (Neukirch, 1996: 65). The Cyrillic alphabet replaced the Latin in order to signify the difference between the Romanian and the Moldovan languages.³⁸ The famine and drought of 1946-47 caused 150,000 to 200,000 deaths in the immediate post-war years and was exacerbated by the incapacity of Communist Party leaders (Cașu, 2010: 44; Crowther, 1997: 285) or possibly even provoked by the regime (King, 2000: 96f). Shortly afterwards, the collectivization of the Moldavian peasantry began, in which 10,000 or more families were accused of being *kulaks* and deported. They were, presumably, more successful farmers opposed to collectivization, although the fluid definition of *kulak* made no one safe from real or fabricated allegations. Towards the end of 1950, 97 percent of the farm households had been collectivized (Șiscanu and Pavelescu, 2003: 406).

While many Moldavian inhabitants welcomed the end of the war and the change of regime, many resisted Sovietization and collectivization. However, the Soviet system left no place for dissent. In 1949 a huge deportation sweep was carried out. According to Werth (1999a: 237), based on the death rates of similar deportations, 120,000 persons may have been deported, equivalent to seven percent of the entire MSSR population at that time. Anyone with a divergent view on politics, collectivization, religious conviction, or other issues where Soviet hegemony was questioned could be deported or imprisoned. Only after the death of Stalin in 1953 could many of the deportees be rehabilitated and return to the MSSR.³⁹

³⁸ The MASSR had, in fact, employed the Latin alphabet during a period of the 1930s as a likely attempt to influence Romania more easily (King, 2000: 83). In 1938 this initiative was abandoned and the Cyrillic script reintroduced. Brutal as modernization was, it was also the first time in Moldova that mandatory education and general literacy was introduced (Ciscel, 2006: 577).

³⁹ Cașu (2010: 53) estimates the total number arrested, deported or killed directly or indirectly during the Stalinist period, including in the MASSR, to be between 300,000 and 350,000 victims.

Domestic industrialization began after the Second World War, although a substantial part of it was located in the Transnistrian region, exemplified by the Rîbnița metallurgical site and the hydroelectric plant at Dubăsari. In fact, Transnistria accounted for one-third of industrial output and 90 percent of energy production, despite comprising only 11 percent of the republic's total area and just 17 percent of the population (Hanne, 1998: 10). The reason for this gross imbalance was linked to the Transnistrian region's roots in the MASSR, which made Moscow regard it as more loyal to the all-union cause. Indeed when Transnistria, under the name of *Pridnestrovskaiia Moldavskaia Respublika* (Dniester Moldovan Republic, PMR), declared independence following the collapse of the USSR in 1991, much of the heavy industry lay beyond the control of Chișinău. Hence, industrialization affected the regions of the MSSR in different ways, and, despite the Transnistrian industries, the western parts of the republic remained predominantly agricultural. Due to the prominent agricultural character within the Soviet Union, the MSSR was commonly referred to as "Sunny Moldavia" (Brodskii, 1986: 17) or depicted as a "flourishing" or "blossoming orchard" (Diorditsa, 1960). Its fertile soil made it ideal for growing crops of all different kinds, and the republic soon became one of the biggest agricultural exporters within the union of such products as juices, wines and tobacco. Between 1950 and 1963 the production of dairy products increased 9.2 times, while both grape and meat production increased 8 times. In 1963 Moldavia accounted for 30.2 percent of total grape products in the entire USSR, collected 14 percent of all fruits in the union, and was among the top republics when it came to the quantity of sunflowers, cereals, sugar and sugar beet produced. It was, however, an inefficient and environmentally degrading form of agriculture created by the Soviet administration (Enciu and Pavelescu, 2003: 439f, 456). The same deficiencies were to be found in industry. Come independence both of these sectors would have to stand on their own in an economy open to competition from the outside world.

The strong emphasis on agricultural produce remained predominant even when official propaganda lauded the republic's great achievements in industrialization (cf. *Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic*, 1972: 39ff).⁴⁰ Moldavian wines were well known throughout the entire Eastern bloc and won numerous international prizes. As long as Moldavia remained part of a vast empire where energy and imports from other republics were easily accessible and export beyond the USSR and its satellite states was not of greater importance, the strong focus on the agricultural sector was not a problem. This was, however, about to change.

⁴⁰ Among the other republics, only Kyrgyzstan had a higher rural population than Moldova (King, 2000: 99).

Independence and Division

The declaration of independence by the Moldovan parliament on 27 August 1991 was widely hailed among the population. The unity that brought the country to independence, however, was not sufficient to hold the people together for a more long-term vision of what the state should be, how it should orient itself internationally and for whom it existed. With a divided territory and nation, a steep economic downturn and a high level of emigration, it was not long before feelings of Soviet nostalgia developed, adding yet another complicating factor to the mix.

Contemporary Moldova is a unitary state, divided into 32 *raioane* (counties), five municipalities (Chişinău, Bălţi, Comrat, Bender, and Tiraspol), the Gagauzian autonomous territorial unit in the south, and the Transnistrian territorial unit, which functions as a de facto state (*Lege Nr. 764 12/27/01*), in the east. To some extent these outcomes were the reaction to the strong pan-Romanian tendencies the Popular Front manifested (Chinn and Roper, 1995), but they were also the consequence of regional elites' ambitions to craft a future in line with their own interests (Webster, 2007). Neither PMR nor Gagauzian leaders were attracted by the prospect of handing over power to the new Romanian-speaking Bessarabian elite that was now competing for power with the old Soviet *nomenklatura*. This eventually resulted in the Transnistrian and Gagauzian conflicts. The Gagauzian conflict, which never reached the same intensity as the Transnistrian, was quickly resolved with Chişinău granting autonomy to five enclaves in southern Moldova following a referendum. The Transnistrian conflict, however, resulted in a civil war and has still not been resolved.

The secession of PMR raises the question of whether Moldova, not controlling the entirety of its territory, is, in fact, a failed state. On the one hand, PMR possesses all the attributes considered essential for a state to function, i.e., institutions, symbols, population and territory (Johansson and Rodin, 2003). On the other hand, no other state has recognized PMR or seems ready to do so. PMR thus exists in a juridical limbo where its "citizens" need the passports of Moldova, Russia or Ukraine in order to travel outside of Moldova. As long as PMR is not recognized, the region will remain an entity within Moldovan borders despite claims to statehood. In this way Moldovan jurisdiction over Transnistria may be regarded as merely temporarily discontinued. The way to describe the relationship between the two Moldovan entities has, therefore, become one of subjects of negotiation to find a viable solution, regardless of how long it will take before such solution is found. Meanwhile, the stalemate continues to divert Moldova's scarce resources towards a conflict it does not have the means to resolve while keeping important industry and tax revenues outside the central government's control.⁴¹

⁴¹ One example of the complications caused by the country's de facto division is the question of who should pay for Russian gas delivered to Transnistria. In 2010 it was reported that Moldovagaz had a debt to Gazprom of 2.5 billion USD, of which 2.2 billion USD had been

“Transition to Destitution”

At the time of independence, Moldova was one of the most prosperous republics of the Soviet Union. As a Soviet republic, the MSSR was considered to have friendly people, good food and wine and a mild climate. Compared to its Romanian neighbor during the 1980s under the repressive Ceaușescu regime, Moldovan living standards were considerably higher. Even as late as 1990, the food situation in the republic was good and store shelves were full. For Moldovans this created ample opportunities for profitable border trade with Romania for a number of years to come (Skvortova, 2003b).

After a decade of transition, conditions had reversed, and as Romania's economy and living standards improved, Moldova's deteriorated rapidly.⁴² International loans were granted at high interest rates and tough market economic reforms were implemented. One agricultural project named *Pământ* (Land), which aimed to rapidly redistribute collectively held land, became known as *Mormânt* (Grave) for the manner in which it sought to rapidly privatize without due regard for social considerations. While decollectivization did help to ensure food security by enabling subsistence production, it did not decrease poverty levels. In fact, it created fragmented and dispersed land plots which required re-amalgamation (Gorton, 2001: 279). Hence, once the old planned economy crumbled and the eastern markets disappeared, “the blossoming orchard” soon became a place from which one left rather than one for which one longed. As described by Ronnås and Orlova (2000), it was nothing short of a “transition to destitution”.

Between 1991 and 1994, real GDP fell more than 50 percent while inflation peaked at 2,200 percent in 1992 (IMF, 1999: 5). To make matters even worse, the Soviet habit of inflating productivity figures made it close to im-

accrued by Transnistria (IMEDIA, 5/19/10). This has been more of a political question rather than Tiraspol just trying to evade payments, and PMR has, in fact, offered to sign a separate contract with Gazprom. Since this would be an obvious move towards recognizing PMR as a separate state, the central government has turned down such offers, choosing to bear the additional economic burden instead, especially as Chișinău cannot collect gas tariffs on Transnistrian territory. In March 2011, however, Economy Minister Lazar stated that Gazprom would set up separate gas enterprises in Moldova proper and Transnistria to delimit the historical debts (IMEDIA, 3/22/11), a clear break by Chișinău from its earlier position on this issue.

⁴² One powerful impression of Moldova's drastically reduced economic conditions is given in Henderson et al's (2009) study on how satellite data on lights at night can be used as a proxy to the ordinary GDP measure of economic growth. In the study it becomes obvious how Moldova, between 1992 and 2002, shuts down its lights while Romania's luminance increases. One Moldovan informant, to whom the author spoke in 2009, remembered how during her childhood in the 1980s she used to gaze over the Prut River towards Romanian villages clouded in darkness. At independence it was soon the Moldovans who were in the dark, watching as their western neighbors increasingly turned on their lights. Nevertheless, many Moldovans still retained the memory of a time when conditions were the opposite, leading many Romanian-speaking Moldovans to avoid the Romanian identity label even after 15 years of socio-economic downturn (Ciscel, 2006: 579).

possible to get an accurate picture of the situation during the first phase of transition. Economic data on the period prior to 1991-92 is unreliable. From this perspective Moldova was already behind in its economic development from the beginning. Nevertheless, because of the lack of accurate figures, these data were applied by international organizations in the early post-Soviet years when Moldova's economic situation was being evaluated. According to Weeks (2007: 3) this explained why the World Bank estimated Moldovan per capita income at 2,170 USD in 1991, 1,300 USD in 1992 and 1,060 USD in 1993. When the EBRD and the IMF undertook the same exercise in 1993, per capita incomes were established by each organization at 354 USD and 310 USD, respectively.⁴³

Had the initial estimates by the World Bank, which at the end of the 1990s revised its figures to be more in line with the other two institutions, been closer to the real per capita income levels, Moldovan economic development might have looked very different. The inflated per capita income meant that low-income Moldova was defined as a middle-income country. The higher GDP estimate closed the door to concessional lending and forced the government to approach the private commercial market at much worse conditions. In addition to these consequences, the country also had to deal with the loss of old markets, high reliance on energy imports and a dependency on agriculture and agro-industry which made it particularly susceptible to external and internal shocks.

In the early 2000s, 15 percent of GDP came from the agricultural sector, which, moreover, employed a high share of people living near the poverty line. A 2004 World Bank report (Katsu, et al., 2004) thus reported that the agricultural sector accounted “for just under half of all employment, but fewer than a third of all paid jobs, over three-quarters of all part time work, and the largest share of informal employment”. This high dependency on the agricultural and agro-industrial sector has repeatedly exposed vulnerability to natural disasters. In this weather-and climate-sensitive economy, floods, hail storms, cold and droughts have caused USD billions in losses. Official estimates of the cost of the severe drought in 2007 alone were established at 1 billion USD. The 2008 floods caused damages amounting to 300 million USD (UNDP, 2009: 4, 25). In addition to negatively affecting agro-industry, these catastrophes impacted many people whose only livelihoods came from small subsistence farms in the countryside, which also provided important nutrition to friends and relatives in the cities. Combined with these harsh realities were the structural problems endemic to Moldova – the focus on agriculture, weak industry and a high proportion of rural inhabitants – which

⁴³ This is also supported by results from the 2003 survey (Johansson and Loftsson, 2003) in which 50.4 percent of respondents reported a total monthly household income of less than 300 MDL (24 USD) per month after taxes while only 2.0 percent reported a total household income above 2,000 MDL (161 USD).




Figure 3. GDP per capita, 1992-2009
Source: IMF (2010)

together worked to hinder economic growth.⁴⁴ To the outside world, Moldova was to become known as the poorest country in Europe.

Economic recovery during the 1990s was slow and hampered by both internal and external events. In Figure 3 above, the great plunge prior to 1992 is not discernible, but it is possible to see how per capita incomes increased slowly until 1998 when the Russian financial crisis hit hard. After 2000 the economy started to improve once more but was, although not visible here, seriously affected by the 2006 Russian embargoes on wines, cognacs and agricultural produce (“CEPS Neighbourhood Watch, No. 15,” 2006). For purposes of comparison, corresponding GDP per capita figures for Romania were 1,585 USD in 1999 and 9,300 USD in 2008, and for Ukraine 636 USD in 1999 and 3,899 USD in 2008. Yet Ukraine, also hit hard by the Russian financial crisis of 1999, achieved much higher GDP per capita levels than Moldova (*World Databank*, 2010). Furthermore, the increase in Moldovan GDP in the 2000s was largely due to the high amount of remittances sent home by Moldovan *gastarbeiter* rather than domestic improvements. Moldova was quickly becoming a country of migrants and trafficked persons, bypassed only by Togo (Azi.md, 07/30/07). While this brought a much needed influx of money into the country, it had serious social consequences.

⁴⁴ In 2009, 59 percent of the Moldovan population lived in the countryside. Similar figures for Romania and Ukraine were, for the same year, 46 and 32 percent, respectively (*World Databank*, 2010).

Demographics, Migration and Longing for the Past

At one point Moldova was widely hailed as a country oriented toward market economic reform, even when the social and political price was high. The downside was, unfortunately, that the reforms did not bring the quick results which were expected. As in many other countries transitioning from planned to market economies, privatization created immense wealth for some and utter despair for others. As the Soviet trade system fell apart, unemployment rose. Subsistence farming helped people survive during the worst years, but it did little to create growth in an economy that badly needed to expand and diversify.

The economic downfall had detrimental effects on the population, and demographic statistics tell a grim story. In 1989, before the transition started, average life expectancy at birth for women was 70.89 years and for men 63.98 years (see Table 2). Ten years later it had decreased marginally for women, to 70.46 years, but more significantly for men, to 62.73 years, corresponding to figures registered in the early 1960s. By 2008 average life expectancy had improved, with 72.32 years for women and 64.74 years for men. In the same manner the crude birth rate per 1,000 people started to show a downward trend, dropping from 19.59 in 1989 to 12.06 in 1999 and increasing thereafter to 12.32 in 2008.⁴⁵

In neighboring Romania and Ukraine, there was a similar drop in birth rates between 1989 and 1999, with a slight recovery for Ukraine in 2008. Here it is not the birth rates themselves that are dramatic (Sweden's birth rate, for example, was 13.70 per 1,000 people in 1989 and 11.86 in 2008),

Table 2. *Life expectancy and birth rate in Moldova, Romania and Ukraine*

	Moldova			Romania			Ukraine		
	1989	1999	2008	1989	1999	2008	1989	1999	2008
Life expectancy at birth (female)	70.89	70.46	72.32	72.65	74.20	77.22	75.20	73.70	74.28
Life expectancy at birth (male)	63.98	62.73	64.74	66.56	67.10	69.70	66.10	62.95	62.51
Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 people)	19.59	12.06	12.32	16.10	10.50	10.30	13.30	7.80	11.00

Source: *World Databank* (2010)

⁴⁵ Falling birth rates and lowered life expectancies were only part of the explanation for why the Moldovan population diminished from almost 4.4 million in 1991 to slightly above 3.6 million in 2008. The second cause was the loss of Transnistria, which had an impact on data collected in the 2004 census (see Table 4, Ch. 4). The third explanation, related to the huge increase in emigration that started at the end of the 1990s, is further addressed below.

but the downward trend in the Moldovan case likely indicates that conditions in society had deteriorated. In both Moldova and Ukraine, life expectancies for men and women decreased, while Romania saw a steady increase for both categories. Research on the different effects of post-Communist societal transitions upon men and women has shown that the drop in life expectancy for men was more dramatic than for women (cf. Stankuienė, et al., 1999). Typical causes were increased alcohol consumption, coronary heart disease and violent death.

With few signs of economic recovery during the 1990s, people did the only thing they could in order to secure a livelihood for themselves and their families: they migrated. Domestically, this implied a move from rural areas to cities, and the capital Chişinău attracted the most migrants. Internationally, migration streams flowed to Russia followed by Italy, Turkey, Ukraine, other Western European countries and Israel. Although international migration had started in the middle of the 1990s, it increased rapidly as the economic situation in the country continued its decline. A 2007 IOM study estimated that 345,000 Moldovans, equivalent to one quarter of the economically active population, worked abroad (Lücke, et al., 2007). In 2006 remittances reached 1 billion USD or 34.7 percent of GDP, the highest remittance figure registered for the country thus far (*World Databank*, 2010). Most of it was, however, used for consumption, providing the state with tax revenues but doing little to ensure sustainable long-term economic growth. The global economic crisis of 2008 reduced the volume of remittances, and as the economies of countries populated with migrant workers contracted, Moldovans were among the first to lose their jobs.

International migration from Moldova has taken both legal and illegal forms, the latter including numerous cases of trafficking of persons for sexual exploitation (cf. Abiala, 2006; L'orange Fürst, 2003). Although awareness-raising campaigns have brought to light the possible hazards of migration, the examples and images of people who have succeeded abroad ensure that migration remains an alluring alternative to staying in Moldova. Although remittances sent by migrant workers have indeed helped the Moldovan economy, the social costs have been tremendous. In numerous cases both parents are working abroad to support children, who, while benefiting materially, remaining in the care of grandparents or neighbors. Many children are left to fend for themselves without proper adult care, a situation that tears many families apart and has dire social consequences.

The Moldovan economy did expand during the latter 2000s. However, this was largely fueled by remittances, which amounted to almost 31 percent of GDP in 2008 and which were mostly used for real estate purchases, consumption, and education (*Moldova: Policy Notes for the Government*, 2009: 35). This led to a booming construction sector and promoted a service-driven economy. However, it did little to stimulate long-term investment, and it failed to prepare Moldova for the approaching global economic crisis. When

the crisis hit the country in 2008, Moldova was in the midst of preparations for the 2009 parliamentary elections. This was not the most opportune time for politicians to approach the electorate with grim forecasts of budgetary cuts and layoffs. Instead the *Partidului Comuniștilor din Republica Moldova* (Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova, PCRM) argued that Moldova was like an island in a stormy sea and would steer clear of the socio-economic devastation that was occurring in other places (Azi.md, 10/21/08). Indeed the PCRM did manage to protect the country from much of the effects of the global crisis. The Moldovan Leu was kept stable and even increased its value against the dollar and Euro. However, this was done at the cost of using one-third of the nation's total currency reserve of 1.67 billion USD (Moldova.org, 02/04/10). For the new government that came to power in July 2009, long-postponed and unpopular decisions now had to be taken.

Amidst the frequently chaotic transition, the old Soviet system has morphed into a source of nostalgia, generating a longing for a better time when work and social security were ensured. This feeling of nostalgia for the old system is observable in a 2009 opinion poll.⁴⁶ In the poll 48.6 percent of Moldovans regretted the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the accompanying loss of pre-1991 stability while acknowledging that the post-1991 situation increased travel possibilities and ensured democracy and human rights (IPP, 2009b). Asked for their position on Moldova's hypothetical inclusion into a new USSR if a referendum were to be held, 43.7 percent of respondents approved, 21.6 percent disapproved, 30 percent would not participate in such a referendum and 4.7 percent either did not know or did not provide an answer.

A Non-Conductive Setting for Democracy

It is clear that Moldova's geographical position on one of Europe's crossroads has had an enormous impact on its history and current situation. Debating whether these developments have been beneficial or detrimental for the country and its people is, however, a difficult and perhaps fruitless endeavor. The documenting of history often requires navigating events in a larger political context. At the end of the day, how the past is portrayed boils down to the specific qualities and traits that the author brings to the study and the manner in which this is done (cf. Deletant and Hanak, 1988: xiii). In Moldova even the presentation of historical background conditions is challenging, since their very presentation, in whatever manner it is done, will

⁴⁶ The survey was conducted in the wake of the tumultuous parliamentary elections in April 2009 and following the inconclusive presidential elections. This has likely affected respondents' longing for a more stable and predictable system.

cause disagreements. Given its general history, Moldova probably shares many similarities with other border regions of the world. From this perspective Moldova is not so different from neighboring Ukraine and Belarus, two nations with weak or divided national identities, situated on the rim of the old Soviet empire (Törnquist-Plewa, 1999).


The consequences of not coming to terms with the historical past, as we will examine later in this study, was one of the obstacles which had to be tackled in order to build a nation-state following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Indeed the very divisions on how to interpret the past provided fertile ground for the political forces that carved out political platforms for themselves in post-independent Moldova, a process further described in Chapters 4 and 5.

Moldova's difficult transition combined these divisive controversies with a sharp economic downturn and dire social consequences. The transition to a market economy did not deliver on numerous important societal objectives. The young state failed to provide the progress for which people had hoped. The state became divided *de facto*. Market reforms, hampered by external shocks and high dependency on agriculture, did not promote the kind of growth necessary to get the country on its feet again. These socio-economic hardships created a nostalgia for the past Soviet system amongst many and forced hundreds of thousands of Moldovans to search for livelihoods elsewhere. It was both a bad context to introduce democracy and a difficult task for a democratic regime to deliver results to the benefit of people.

3. Political Regime and Nation in Transition

This chapter focuses on the linkage between democracy and nation and explores how they relate to the nation-state during times of transition. The aim is to define these concepts and the relationships among them, which will then create the basis for later examination of ethnic groups' divergent ideas of the nation in Chapter 5; an estimate of Moldova's democracy levels in Chapter 6; and citizen political support in Chapter 7. The discussion here is, however, not an attempt to cover each theoretical field thoroughly, but to create a framework that can be used to structure further analysis.

Transition implies a move from one political system to another. Even if this change may stall or revert, as many transitions do, it should mark a move towards democracy, at least initially. Without political regime change, there can, by this definition, be no transition. References to three- or four-fold transitions (cf. Kuzio, 2001b), in fact, imply that marketization, state- and nation-building has occurred concurrently with democratization.



*Figure 4. The different phases of transition*⁴⁷

During a transition the rules of the old political regime are in upheaval. Usually, this is a conflictive period marred by struggles as elites compete to form a new regime and secure resources. The very rights and liberties that are part and parcel of democracy may also provide opportunities and empower leaders to build power bases around group interests and identities (Elkins and Sides, 2007: 694). The focal points for these conflicts vary according to circumstances and context, and may, for example, be of a social, economic, or national character. As the socialist countries of the Eastern

⁴⁷ The model is inspired by Mikaelsson (2008: 25), who, in turn, refers to Beetham (1992).

Bloc began their transitions, class-based conflicts generally took a secondary position, unlike the early twentieth century democratization processes in Western Europe, and instead centered on the national issue. One possible reason for this could be that social classes in the former category of countries had been largely brought to the same material level (Elster, et al., 1998: 250). Another cause could be that the USSR was built upon an idea of titular nations and national subgroups (i.e., ethnic groups), functioning in practice as an unintended but efficient incubator for nationalities (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 369).⁴⁸ A third possible explanation is that the international environment told a story of democracy within nation-states. If democracy was to be established, there was a need to first define nation and state.

The idea of the democratic nation-state envisages a people's rule of the state. However, it is not just any people but a people who share a common understanding that they constitute a certain political community. This specific population struggling to establish a state of its own is what we usually refer to as a *nation*. If the nation gains control of a state, the state, accordingly, is called a *nation-state*. The link between nation and state is an integral part of the modern political world, brought into being in the nineteenth century through nationalism, the idea that congruence between nation and state should exist. Thus it became possible to link the nation, as a cultural unit, to the political institutions of the state. As a political program, it quickly gained widespread appeal, but it was impossible to realize as territorial space was limited while the number of potential nations was not. Consequently, the idea of national sovereignty caused numerous conflicts between different peoples presenting incompatible claims to the same territory. However, nationalism, the political program of a specific nation to achieve a state of its own, remained a strong political force as demands for representative democracy started to be raised. In that respect, nationalism initially went hand in hand with democracy (Greenfeld, 1992: 10).

For modern representative democracy, the nation provided legitimacy for the political establishment. Through the "imagined community", to borrow Benedict Anderson's (1991) metaphor of the nation as a collective idea of shared belonging, it became possible to define a people even when its numbers and territorial space were large. Thereby a link between *polity*, i.e., the state, and *demos*, i.e., the people, could bridge the divide of these terms'

⁴⁸ Nationalism, as articulated by Joseph Stalin, who later became the first General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's Central Committee, already in his 1912-13 work *Marxism and the National Question*, became an efficient tool in the struggle against Tsarist Russia (cf. Stalin, 1941). This promotion of national, or rather ethnic, identity remained throughout the existence of the Soviet Union. In a 1925 speech Stalin concluded "[w]ho could have imagined that the old, tsarist Russia consisted of not less than fifty nations and national groups? The October Revolution, however, by breaking the old chains and bringing a number of forgotten peoples and nationalities on to the scene, gave them new life and a new development" (Stalin, [1925] 2005). The manner in which life was breathed into these collectives would in time contribute to the end of the USSR.

earlier applications in the city-states of ancient Greece. In practice this was done by granting nationality, formulated as citizenship, to the members of the nation, which often, but not always, included minority groups. Through nationality a link was created between nation and the individual, and through citizenship nationality was supplied with the legal and political content of both rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis the state as well as a further institutionalization of national identity.

If there is one overriding political requisite for democracy, it is the prior existence of a legitimate political unit. Before actors can expect to settle into a routine of competition and cooperation, they must have some reliable idea of who the other players are and what will be the physical limits of their playing field. The predominant principle in establishing these boundaries and identities is that of “nationality” (Schmitter, 1996: 84-85).

In the following paragraphs, we turn, firstly, to democracy, the projected and yet uncertain end point of transition. Secondly, the actual process of transition and its accompanying effects on regime, state and nation are discussed. Thirdly, the concepts of ethnicity, nation and nation-building are considered in the context of democratic transition. Fourthly, an analysis on the consolidation of democracy and nation reveals the difficulties connected to establishing an exact point when transition actually becomes consolidation.

Democracy

Etymologically, democracy means the rule of the people.⁴⁹ In its original application 2,500 years ago in the Greek city-states, democracy was confined to its direct form at the local level. It was the duty of all free men (women, immigrants and large number of slaves were not included), i.e., citizens, to participate directly in the affairs of the state (Held, 1996: 17ff). This direct form of democracy meant that when the Assembly, which was responsible for all major political decisions, met, the quorum counted 6,000 citizens. In such a big group, only a few could speak their minds, but on issues where there were conflicting views, citizens could express their views by voting. In modern times the application of democracy has changed as the size of the polity has grown, but direct forms, such as referendums, are still an important component of how democracy functions. The idea that all who are affected by a decision should meet in order to discuss it has also led proponents to the idea of deliberative democracy, a collective way of decision

⁴⁹ Translated directly from Greek, however, *demos* describes the masses (versus the elite), while the verb *kratin* is more appropriately translated into English as “authority” rather than “rule”.

making based on rational and impartial arguments on which participants take a position (cf. Elster, 1998: 8).

Democracy today, which is understood as rule by and for the people, enjoys widespread global appeal, and the political arena has changed from direct local democracy to representation within the nation-state (cf. Weber, 1978: 951). The power of democracy as a political system that draws its legitimacy directly from the people is such that it has become impossible for even non-democratic regimes to eschew the application of democracy in name if not in practice (Held, 1996: 1; Schmitter, 1994: 58). That said, it needs also to be noted that democracy may mean completely different things to different peoples. While we can rather easily dismiss the democratic claims of authoritarian regimes offering not the slightest civil or political liberties, there are important cultural contexts in which democracy is perceived and practiced. Biryukov and Sergeyev (1994: Ch. 8) have, for example, described “sovereign democracy,” a version of Russian democracy in which human rights, separation of powers, and freedom of political activity, all central aspects of modern Western democracy, are instead regarded as threats to state and society. The capacity of the state instead becomes central, and too much diversity threatens cohesion, economic prosperity and independence. The sovereign democracy concept was officially launched in 2006 and provides that no outsider should have the right to judge the specific type of Russian democracy (Sestanovich, 2007).

How should we then understand modern democracy? Providing a minimalist definition of democracy, Weale (1999: 14) concludes that “in a democracy important public decisions on questions of law and policy depend, directly or indirectly, upon public opinion formally expressed by citizens of the community, the vast bulk of whom have equal political rights.” This is a definition that falls well within the Schumpeterian tradition of focusing on the procedures rather than the substantive qualities of democracy. Schumpeter’s ([1943] 1992) understanding of democracy was a rather bleak, albeit more realistic view of how democracy functions in practice. Instead of taking the people as the point of departure, Schumpeter started with the representatives. The role of the people in a modern democratic state was merely to elect an executive. Hence “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (Schumpeter, [1943] 1992: 269). Democracy was thereby defined as set of procedures rather than ideals. Schumpeter’s thoughts have been further developed and have influenced the polyarchy model of Robert A. Dahl (1971).

Dahl’s attempt to understand democracy in terms of polyarchy, i.e., the rule of the many, was an effort to make the democratic concept more stringent and unambiguous. Since modern democracy no longer was a direct matter but carried out through representation, its original meaning and opera-

tion had greatly changed. This idea was now furthered by Dahl, who likewise argued that democracy as concept was too broad to describe its contemporary application and hence attempted to change it to polyarchy, a term that would better capture the modern form of representative democracy. At the very core of modern democracy lies public contestation, the possibility to form an opposition and run for office, and participation, the right to participate in public contestation. According to Dahl (1999: 243) although polyarchy can be understood in different ways, all of these perspectives point towards different aspects of the same phenomenon. Polyarchy can thus be described as the historical attempt to democratize and liberalize the institutions of the nation-state; as a certain type of regime; as a system of political control where the representatives have to behave in certain ways in order to win elections (here Dahl directly refers to Schumpeter); as a system of rights; or as a set of institutions necessary for large-scale democracy. For the purposes of this study, the last meaning of polyarchy is applied, i.e., as a set of institutions that defines the rules of the political game in society and, accordingly, structures the constraints of human interaction (cf. North, 1998: 3).

Dahl counts seven institutions as central to polyarchy, namely:

1. *Elected officials* – Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in officials elected by citizens.
2. *Free and fair elections* – Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is relatively uncommon.
3. *Inclusive suffrage* – Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.
4. *Right to run for office* – Practically all adults have the right to run for elective office in the government, although age limits may be higher for holding office than for suffrage.
5. *Freedom of expression* – Citizens have the right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socio-economic order and the prevailing ideology.
6. *Alternative information* – Citizens have the right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by laws.
7. *Associational autonomy* – To achieve their various rights, including those listed above, citizens have the right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups.

Although Dahl focuses on the procedural character of democracy, he also includes some substantive aspects of democracy, such as political rights and liberties. Polyarchy as concept did not, in the end, come to replace democracy as the main label for this type of political system, but the idea of democracy *as* polyarchy is widely acclaimed among practitioners and researchers alike and applied as such. In most studies which attempt to establish levels of democracy in certain states, polyarchical criteria are considered in one way or another (cf. Nilsson, 2002; Vanhanen, 2000a). While the institutions central to polyarchy only set a minimum democratic standard, polyarchy does allow for a straightforward measure of a country's democratic level.

Initiatives to Measure Democracy

The prospect of measurement is, thus, one of the reasons that make polyarchy so useful. Over the years there have been a number of different research projects that have focused on measuring democracy globally or regionally using Dahl's polyarchy criteria as point of departure for their estimates. Among these are the Polity project (2010), Vanhanen's (2000a) *Index of Democracy* (ID), Coppedge and Reinicke's (1990) *Polyarchy Scale*, and Freedom House's (2011) two indices *Freedom in the World* (FW) and *Nations in Transit* (NiT). Polity, which has now reached its fourth version (and is consequently called Polity IV), ID and the Polyarchy Scale take minimalist approaches to democracy, while Freedom House applies a maximalist approach.

The Polity database was developed by Ted Robert Gurr, Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jagers. The project started in the 1970s and now contains data on countries' democratic and authoritarian levels from 1800 to 2010. The Index of Democracy, created by Tatu Vanhanen, focuses solely on the variables of participation and contestation and has global coverage from 1850 to 2000. The Polyarchy Scale, constructed by Michael Coppedge and Wolfgang H. Reinicke, also applies a minimalist approach to polyarchy, but where Vanhanen applies Dahl's theoretical underpinnings for polyarchy, Coppedge and Reinicke focus instead on the stipulated institutions and construct variables and scales to measure them. The final two indices, Freedom in the World and Nations in Transit, are both produced by the Freedom House organization. In 1972 Freedom House began issuing yearly FW reports on all the countries of the world. Focusing on political rights and civil liberties, its index does not measure democracy directly but does include variables related to Dahl's polyarchy scale. The NiT Index is dedicated only to the former states of the Soviet Union but otherwise follows the same approach as the FW index. States in the NiT index are graded according to their potential for conducting political and economic reforms and are more

detailed than the FW reports. All four indices apply scales or grading in order to distinguish democratic from non-democratic regimes.⁵⁰

Representation and Participation

From the above introduction to modern democratic theory, two things are apparent. The first is that democracy functions through elected representatives and a set of institutions that enable citizens to participate in political life. Regardless of how polyarchy is understood, its main component is the element of representation. Representation implies that citizens have agreed to delegate power not only to their elected representatives but to numerous categories of civil servants (Dahl, 2000: 113). In Dahl's case he primarily focuses on how this system creates constant bargaining among political and bureaucratic elites and how these continuously have to keep track of public opinion in order to try to secure support in the next elections. Hence, there is a constant influx of political views from the electorate that preclude political and bureaucratic elites from acting without checks.

The situation is, however, different in the case of a transitional state, where the rules of polyarchy are not yet settled and the matter of winning the next elections may imply methods to harm a political opponent far beyond the rules of conduct of any consolidated polyarchy. In such transitional settings, the structure of the party system and the behavior of political parties become central. Parties are the channel to the electorate "aggregating demands and preferences, recruiting and socializing new candidates for office, organizing the electoral competition for power, crafting policy alternatives, setting the policy-making agenda, forming effective governments and integrating groups and individuals into the democratic process" (Diamond, 1997: xxiii). It should also be pointed out here that the traditional left-right scale of politics, which has dominated the Western understanding of political ideologies since the French revolution, may not be applicable in a transitional polity. Instead political labels might be applied in order to gain the electorate's votes, and politics as such is rather free of ideological considerations, having more to do with securing resources and power for the elite. In the Moldovan case, as we will observe in next chapter, to be on the far left of the ideological scale implies almost certainly that one regards the nation as Moldovan, while being on the far right means that one sees the nation as Romanian.

⁵⁰ Although there are other democracy indices available, for example, Bollen's (1993) *Cross-National Indicators of Liberal Democracy* or the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2011), these do not cover the time period under study here and thus are not applicable for analysis in later chapters.

The second aspect crucial for democracy is that it needs, and many would say thrives, on the participation of citizens. It is more likely that citizens who are involved in the functioning of the regime also have an interest in keeping it in place and improving it. Hence, representatives would have closer contact with citizens, be better informed about their wishes and may consequently act in a more democratic way than if they treated citizens merely as electoral tools. A democracy in which citizens only fulfill the function of an electorate would, in most democrats' view, be a rather poor polity (Loftsson and Choe, 2003: 13).

Political Support

The attitudes, values, and behavior of the people are directly linked to the legitimacy of a political system. According to Easton (1965: 29ff) a political system can be understood as consisting of two main aspects, inputs and outputs. Inputs consist of the populations' demands and support for a specific political system, while outputs are the decisions and actions delivered by the political system. Hence, the political system will be evaluated by the population based, to a large extent, on how the output side manages to match the demands of the input side. This evaluation refers directly to the legitimacy of the political system. While people may be forced to behave in specific ways by coercive means, it would be at the expense of legitimacy. One way of entrenching a political system is by perpetuating ideologies that transmit the same set of values and promote similar behavior (ibid, 1965: 311f), for example, through nationalism.

Although the onset of transitions has much to do with the actions of political elites, a political culture that supports the regime is crucial for the consolidation of democracy in the long run and for the stability of regimes in already consolidated democracies (cf. Inglehart, 1990: 24). According to Almond and Verba, there needs to be a political culture in place, i.e., the internalization of the political system "in the cognitions, feelings, and evaluations of its population" (Almond and Verba, [1963] 1989: 13). In their book *The Civic Culture*, which constitutes a thorough study of five states, the case for a democracy to have a civic culture is furthered. Civic culture is, according to Almond and Verba, a specific form of political culture. It emphasizes the importance of political participation as well as more traditional values such as trust in people and other types of social participation, which serve to replace passivity with political activity (ibid: 30). Hence, civic culture is a political culture in which citizens accept the authority of the state and participate in civic duties which they consider to be of great importance.

Norris (1999: 9ff) and a team of renowned scholars, drawing on Easton's three-level model of objects of support (political community, regime and authorities), constructed an expanded model divided into five levels ranging

from diffuse to specific objects of support (see Table 3). The first and most diffuse level refers to support to the *political community*, i.e., the nation. Without a coherent political community, as we have seen earlier in this chapter, democracy cannot be consolidated. The second level is made up of the core *regime principles*, which either tap into general support for democracy or for specific values closely related to democracy such as freedom, participation, tolerance, respect for legal-institutional rights and the rule of law. The third level is associated with how people evaluate *regime performance*, which should ideally reflect how democracy works in practice but is frequently understood by respondents as an evaluation of how the present regime is fairing. (Here the latter interpretation is made.) The fourth level targets attitudes towards *regime institutions*, i.e., government, parliament, the executive, the legal system and police, the state bureaucracy, political parties and the military. Finally, the fifth and most specific level of support draws on the support of particular *political actors*.⁵¹

Table 3. *Objects of political support*

	Object of support
Diffuse support	Political Community
	Regime Principles
	Regime Performance
	Regime Institutions
Specific support	Political Actors

Source: Norris (1999: 10)

The strength of Norris' model lies in the way it arranges the objects of support from the diffuse to the specific. While the model does cover the feelings (affection) and evaluations which are included in Almond and Verba's model of political culture, it does not touch upon cognition (cf. Pettai, 2007f). If the aim is to describe political culture in its broadest meaning in the tradition of Almond and Verba, then Norris' framework is insufficient. However, political cognition, which examines people's awareness of politics, is not easily operationalized as it is both difficult to determine types of questions

⁵¹ See Chapter 7, Table 8 for an overview of how the five levels of political support relate to specific questions from the 2003 survey.

that should be asked and levels of knowledge. Indeed there is a risk that questions might take the form of an intelligence test, which can reflect cultural bias, provide the possibility for alternative answers or contain inaccurate definitions. Establishing the level of civic culture in Moldova, which would be of value to distinguish active participation and passive dimensions from each other, is not the aim here. Norris' model thus offers a much more focused approach to the study of political support.

Transition

According to the textbook understanding, a transition often starts with the liberalization of society and continues with democratization as the old authoritarian regime can no longer control events. Transitions are commonly periods of great social change, conflicts and uncertainty about what rules and norms should guide society and in what direction the state should develop domestically and orientate internationally. While democratic consolidation would be the preferred end point of such changes, transitions may also revert or become stalled.

Following the Second World War, democracy was largely understood in structural terms and linked to modernization, which also affected the understanding of democratization. To study democratization was thus to study the preconditions related to modernization. According to the famous theory of Seymour Martin Lipset (1959; 1993), when states developed, the economy grew, urbanization increased and literacy became widespread, then the installation of democracy was a likely consequence. Dankwart Rustow, in his seminal 1970 article *Transitions to Democracy – Toward a Dynamic Model*, offered a clear break from this previous line of research by opposing Lipset's proposal of a correlation between economic development and democracy, Rustow instead focused on processes, i.e., the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy rather than on a certain set of preconditions. According to the genetic model presented by Rustow (1970: 350ff), there is only one single condition that is absolutely crucial for democracy to take root: the citizens must agree that they belong to a specific political community.

Rustow divided the introduction of democracy into three phases. The first was the *preparatory phase*, during which a prolonged political struggle between a new rising elite and the defender of the old order takes place. Democracy may be one outcome of this struggle. Rustow called the second phase the *decision phase*, referring to negotiations and compromises between elites which allow space for decisive steps towards democracy such as the gradual introduction of universal suffrage. The third *habituation phase* takes root when democracy becomes established both among citizens and the elite. The sooner successes are achieved through the mechanisms of democ-

racy, the greater the probability that the new democratic regime will gain supporters.

Rustow's ideas were later picked up by, among others, the "Transitions project", which was initiated in 1979 at the Wilson Center and included such names as Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead. These early efforts to better understand democratization were focused on Southern Europe and Latin America, geographical areas which were, at that time, undergoing great political change. The project's main findings were later compiled into what became known as "the little green book", or by its full title *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule – Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986). O'Donnell and Schmitter, like Rustow, regarded transitions as a phase of liberalization that could, but did not necessarily need to, be followed by democratization. Central to their understanding of transitions was the role of elites, their composition and actions. If the struggle between the old and new elites so allowed, there would also be a possibility for civil society to further push the authoritarian regime towards its demise. Hale (2005) has, however, argued that transitions are not only unpredictable with regard to their outcomes, some transitional countries end up in a more or less cyclical movement between democracy and authoritarianism. These movements are caused by competing elites who may apply democratic language in order to secure power, but once in office they succumb to the same strategies as the old regime. Hale bases his arguments on transitions in all former Soviet Union states, except the Baltics, which are consolidated democracies, and, interestingly, Moldova, but without explanation.

As a result of the "Transitions project", research on democratization shifted towards the study of the role of different elites in bringing an end to autocratic regimes rather than on structural explanations. This change of perspective did not remain unchallenged and over time gave rise to two main disagreements over the sudden implosion of the Soviet Union and the fall of Central and East European authoritarian regimes. The first had to do with what was perceived as the teleological claim of transitology, as the study of transitions came to be known, regarding democratization as a linear process. The second raised the issue of whether the transition model could be applied to settings outside Southern Europe and Latin America or if it was geographically bound.

Transitions to or from in Post-Communist Europe

The original transitology school of political regime change never stated that democratization would follow a linear development path or that transitions would always end in consolidated democracy (cf. O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986a: 3). The early proponents of the theories on transitions were perhaps

guilty of expressing their hope that a democratic regime would be the end result of a given regime change, but they clearly stated the high level of uncertainty involved in any change of political system. Just because a process of democratization had started, it did not mean that it would continue; reverse tendencies could evolve or democratization could be halted altogether. Nevertheless, a heated debate began on the very topic of transitology's presumed teleological ambitions. As Gans-Morse (2004) shows in his overview on the transitology debates, this critique has largely been unfounded, and prescribed positions are not found amongst the transitologists themselves (Karl, 2005: 7). However, there was an argued need to remove the presumed teleology and instead use the term "transformation" (cf. Bunce, 1995a) as it was considered more open-ended and could describe any political change in society. Transformation would, hence, put focus on a move *from* rather than a move *to* another point. Once again this argument draws upon the prescribed teleology of the transition literature and not on theoretical propositions.⁵² The objection is, consequently, that "transformation" does not capture a specific and time bound process in the same way as a transitional approach does. This debate has, however, shed light on the transitions that seem to get stuck half-way, which, even if there is a theoretical understanding by policy makers and aid practitioners alike that the process could stall or reverse, may still be regarded as in a phase of transition (Carothers, 2002a: 6). On the one hand, this might cause confusion and mismanagement of democratic support programs. On the other hand, there might be positive results achieved by such an approach since the prospect of a democratic regime, as the end result, is not abandoned.

The other debate that sprung from the transitional approach to regime change was the relevance of the East European experiences for the earlier Latin American and South European regime changes. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the Communist satellite regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, transitology moved into a new geographical field and encountered political changes with a somewhat different pattern from transitions which had been mapped before. Karl and Schmitter (1995; 1994) clearly touched a nerve among some area specialists as they argued for the inclusion of Eastern Europe into the transitologist scheme, which they thought would provide ample opportunities for regional comparisons. Valerie Bunce (1995b; 1995c) opposed this proposal strongly and pointed to the differences between the regions that made case comparisons unsuitable. Bunce was correct in her critique that transitology largely focused on domestic conditions and ignored the international dimension and that the transitions of Eastern Europe be-

⁵² One should also note that the title of O'Donnell and Schmitter's book is actually "Transitions *from* Authoritarian Rule", indicating the start rather than the end point. This kind of teleological thinking is, however, possible to find in Francis Fukuyama's (1989) often cited and criticized article *The End of History?*, in which he lays down the future victory of liberal democracy and the coming bankruptcy of all other forms of government.

came more complex than their Latin American and South European counterparts since they also included elements of economic transformation, state- and nation-building (Bunce, 1995c: 118ff; cf. Kuzio, 2001b). This builds on the assumption that Latin American and South European transitions had been easier as they mainly were confined to political changes. The countries in these regions, the argument goes, were already part of the global market economic system; the population or nation already regarded itself as one people; and the borders of the state were internally accepted and externally recognized.⁵³

The population sharing the view that they constitute one people, i.e., the successful establishment of a political identity, and the acceptance of the borders of the state are, by definition, at the heart of any political process that goes under the label of democratization. If democracy is sought, then there may be no major divergence regarding the nation. The cultural and political units need to be defined and in harmony in order to bring legitimacy to the elected representatives.

Democracy and the Nation

In a modern democratic state operating beyond the physical limits of direct democracy, democracy is achieved through representation. Hence, by representation elected officials in legislative and executive offices are granted legitimacy to govern a state and its population through political decisions realized by state institutions. The way the legitimacy problem of representative democracy has been addressed in practice is through the nation-state, which started to take its present form during the nineteenth century.

Democracy was born with the sense of nationality. The two are inherently linked, and neither can be fully understood apart from this connection. Nationalism was the form in which democracy appeared in the world, contained in the idea of the nation as a butterfly in a cocoon. Originally nationalism developed *as* democracy; where the conditions of such original development persisted, the identity between the two was maintained. But as nationalism spread in different conditions and the emphasis in the idea of the nation moved from the sovereign character to the uniqueness of the people, the original equivalence between it and democratic principles was lost (Greenfeld, 1992: 10).

Defining exactly who belongs to the people and who does not, however, is an exercise more difficult than it appears. In order for representation to

⁵³ Karl (2005: fn. 15) has pointed out that Latin American populations are neither homogenous nor have lacked elements of ethnic mobilization during past transitions. Identity issues have, nevertheless, had less impact on democratization in Latin American than in East European transitions.

work, there must exist a belief that the elected officials are truly the representatives of the people. If this is not achieved, it may seem to the entire population, or parts of it, that they are governed by an occupational power, and its willingness to follow government decisions will be weaker. If there is little to no consensus on how to interpret past events, the future can diverge into many different paths.⁵⁴ In the end this might result in a systemic crisis for democracy and seriously challenge the legitimacy of the political system and the authority of the state.

The state thus provides the political borders of a given territory and the institutions to govern it. The nation grants the representatives of the state legitimacy and bridges the gap between the cultural unit and political unit, which can then focus and channel the wishes of the people. Therefore, a nation, or a cultural-political unit like it, must exist in order to have democracy. This assumption, which stipulates a link between nation and democracy, is readily found in many of the classic texts on representative democracy, for example in Mill (1861), Rustow (1970) and Dahl (1999).⁵⁵ In later years the role of the nation in democracy is given an even more prominent position. Canovan (1996) and Miller (2000) both argue that the reason why democracy works at all is precisely because of the nation's unifying abilities; only a coherent *demos* may choose its legitimate representatives. A similar argument is furthered by Linz and Stepan (1996), who demonstrate that democratic consolidation is highly unlikely, or even impossible, in a state where the nation is questioned by rival nations that challenge its legitimacy and authority.⁵⁶

Way (2002; 2003c; 2005), does recognize the problems faced by a divided political community for the successful consolidation of democracy, but widens the perspective to also include the actual phase of democratization. His argument is that strong divisions within society, be they national in

⁵⁴ This fact made Bunce (2005: 434f) conclude that that the common political project of the Poles in 1989, which quickly allowed Poland to leave state-socialism and the Soviet sphere of interest, was exactly caused by the existence of a well-established and strong sense of national identity.

⁵⁵ The striking aspect of the idea that democracy needs a political community, often defined as a nation, is that it usually is not developed further by most writers. It would seem that the link between nation and democracy is either so self-evident that it is accepted as a "truth" or raises such complex questions that it is easier to obscure these underneath the notion of a people's imagined homogeneity.

⁵⁶ Habermas (2001) has quite interestingly argued for a new form of collective identity, constitutional patriotism, to replace the old national and, Habermas would add, emotionally irrational one. With constitutional patriotism the mythical ties to the nation would be cut, and instead allegiance to the constitution as a juridical document could take its place. By this novel approach, Habermas was aiming directly at the creation of a new, enlightened and more positive collective base for a re-unified Germany and perhaps suggesting a solution for the EU in a longer perspective. The empirical attraction of constitutional patriotism has, however, still to be realized. Another problem concerns exactly why West and East Germany should unite? The explanation for the reunification only holds if the old ideas of one German nation are applied (Yack, 1999: 108).

character or something else, have an impact on levels of political competition. It is also important to note that Way does not regard pluralism by default as a possible means to achieve consolidation but rather a haphazard outcome of divisions within society that in the long term hinders consolidation. If not for these divisions, Way argues, countries characterized as democracies by default instead would have turned autocratic. Both the elite infighting and the stipulation that consolidation is a lost cause in a pluralism by default are issues to which we will return in the concluding discussion in Chapter 8.

The basic tenet of democracy, i.e., that there has to exist a political community that can define the limits of the *demos*, remains. Regardless of its fledgling negotiable origin and shape, a politico-cultural unit needs to attain an almost material form in order to become successful. The collective adherence of all citizens of a state, to the symbols, values and goals of a nation, would mean that the acceptance of the nation is strong (while the opposite would imply a weak or non-existent nation). Accordingly, this would imply that at least a majority of individual citizens relate to the nation as substantially real. The nation is, therefore, a social construction, which often draws legitimacy from the idea of a certain group of people linked by ethnicity, but for whom other types of bonds may also exist. What is important is that the nation works to create a political community which legitimizes democracy and instills a feeling among the population that they constitute one people.⁵⁷ The question that then arises concerns the nature of the nation, which, in turn, leads us to collective identities and especially those shaped by ethnicity, often argued to be the basis for the nation.

Ethnic Groups and Nations as Collective Identities

The concept of identity can be divided into two parts: *personal identity*, which is comprised of a unique set of individual features, and *social identity*, which relates to group attributes. Personal identity focuses on a person's self-image within a social context. Self-image is initially constituted in the reflected image of the self coming from family and other close persons such as, in sociological terms, the significant other (Berg, 1998: 159ff; Mead, 1976: 112). Personal identity is influenced by external factors and thus includes identification that, for example, corresponds to occupation, social movements or, of interest here, ethnic and national identities.

⁵⁷ Hence, democracy depends on affinity and the establishment of a collective "we". It is likely that other identities will change or be absorbed as they are incorporated in the majority culture (Connor, 1972), but it is not a predestined development path. While democracy needs a delimited *demos* to function, there are no rules for how a specific culture shall be formed (Johansson Heinö, 2009: 140). Flexibility to define culture is as great as human imagination allows and the people accept.

Social identity can be internalized by the individual or ascribed from outside. However, these should work in combination for social identity to be effective, i.e., regarded as “true” or “real” and certain shared characteristics may be used to differentiate “in-groups” from “out-groups”. Consequently, we can identify an ethnic group only when “the people in it and the people out of it know that it is one; because both the *ins* and the *outs* talk, feel, and act as if it were a separate group” (Hughes, 1993: 154). These are the boundaries which Barth (1969: 15) argues organize complicated systems of behavior and social relations that define members of a group from non-members. The feeling of belonging to a specific group becomes strongest if we consider group identity as natural and not chosen in a conscious process (Bauman and May, 2003: 65).

Identities are negotiable and subject to change. Even if identity changes are possible later in life, it is during our early years that much of our future identities are established through our families and friends, the educational system and state institutions we encounter.

Usually people’s identities change with the level of aggregation: within their community, they may identify themselves on the basis of socioeconomic background; within their country, outside of their community, they may identify themselves with a brand of politics; and outside their country they may identify themselves with their nation...[a]s individuals grow up they consequently feel pressure...to organize ‘identity projects’; that is to say to choose the category that exemplifies them as individuals and ties them to a social group (Laitin, 1998: 11).⁵⁸

In defining ourselves as belonging to a specific group, we, at the same time, clarify to which groups we do not belong. This is in many ways a practical way to handle a complex reality. In the same manner by which we know the appearance and function of a chair or a table, we tend to divide humans into specific groups, such as nurses, football fans, Swedes or any other category, as a way of understanding and reducing a complex environment. It is a strategy intended to draw the group closer but also to exclude those outside (Sartori, 1997: 67). If a transition occurs that changes the previous understanding of ethnicity and nation, it is then plausible that these identities will be at the forefront of politics.

Presumed Ethnic Membership

Since the 1960s, ethnicity has been used increasingly in studies of sociology and anthropology, in which the focus over time has changed from “struc-

⁵⁸ That said, identities may totally shift, and old identities may disappear and become assimilated, for example, under pressure of a majority culture (Barth, 1969: 22ff; Laitin, 1998: 21ff).

ture” and “function” and Marxian terms like “means of production” and “class struggle” to attempts which describe changes and processes, i.e., the multitude and complexity of social worlds (cf. Hylland-Eriksen, 1998: 17ff). Launched initially in contradistinction to race, ethnicity was a concept with no biological determinants to limit its application and thus had the prospects to better encompass collectives and was soon that were perceived as distinct but shared many characteristics with other groups (Marshall, 1998: 201).

Recent global events, such as the fall of the Soviet Union, the violent break-up of Yugoslavia and other examples around the world, have brought forward many analyses of inter-group ethnic conflicts (Daalder, 1996; Gurr, 1994; Horowitz, 2001). This level of attention to ethnicity may largely be considered a reaction to world events and the media’s tendency to report on crises. Conflicts and wars attract great interest from the international community, with a need to understand and explain them, while well-functioning inter-ethnic societies are rarely the subjects of media interest. News without drama is hard to sell. Nevertheless, it is important to make the point that inter-ethnic cooperation is far more common than inter-ethnic conflict (Fearon and Laitin, 1996). While ethnic identities are about differences, we should not have to interpret these differences as constant rallying cries for conflicts. It has been argued that while ethnic identity is based on factors such as history, religion, language and physical appearance, it can only really take shape in relation to other ethnic communities. According to Vincent (1974: 377) “[e]thnic units are never isolates”. Ethnicity, therefore, is a social phenomenon, and it is only possible to identify it subjectively and once the group identity is already well established within a social context. Max Weber viewed ethnicity along similar lines when he concluded that

[e]thnic membership (*Gemeinsamkeit*) differs from the kinship group precisely by being a presumed identity, not a group with concrete social action, like the latter. In our sense, ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the political community. On the other hand, it is primarily the political community, no matter how artificially organized, that inspires the belief in common ethnicity. This belief tends to persist even after the disintegration of the political community, unless drastic differences in the custom, physical type, or, above all, language exist among its members (Weber, [1925] 1978: 389).

Ethnic membership is a “presumed identity”, i.e., constructed, but Weber also connected it to the political community, here understood as the nation, which then draws legitimacy from the group that subscribes to the common ethnic identity. However, the group must have the understanding that it constitutes a nation since a common ethnic identity, in and of itself, is not adequate to establish a nation. In Weber’s quote above, he links ethnicity to the political community, which is viewed in the present study as the nation. While ethnicity is an identity that holds a specific culture together, the nation

has a political aspiration.⁵⁹ If the nation achieves a state of its own and dominates the political institutions, the nation is also going to constitute a major part of the idea of the state (cf. Buzan, 1991: 69ff).

Nation as Political Community

The main difference between an ethnic group and a nation is that an ethnic group is a culturally bound entity that does not indulge in nation-state projects by the means of nationalism. Hence, nations constitute political communities. We may thus count as nations both those who have established a state as well as those striving to establish one. In the former group, we find internationally recognized nation-states whose members can claim a political identity, i.e., nationality. In the latter, we find groups such as the Kurds or the Palestinians, collectives regarded as nations but without international recognition or control over territory. As is the case with ethnicity, the distinction is an arbitrary one and is based on political considerations more than anything else. In the following paragraphs, a nation is understood as an ethnic group with a nationalistic program, i.e., a group that has defined itself as a nation (cf. Connor, 1978: 388) and which ideally should also be recognized as a nation by other nations.

Nations are conceptualized and sustained through nationalism.⁶⁰ Hence, the nation is not simply an interest group that furthers specific common interests. Instead, the presumed common destiny of the nation is paramount to all other interests, although the nation can prioritize other interests when these coincide with the interests of the nation (Bauman and May, 2003: 193). If the nation manages to claim a certain territory, governs it and is recognized by other states in the international system as the legitimate holder of that land, then a nation-state exists. It is, however, rare that a single group constitutes the entire population of a nation-state, and usually there are substantial minorities present. This creates a specific situation where one group, often the majority of a certain state, dominates ethnic minority groups. Rogers Brubaker (1999: 5) has labeled this group the core nation wherein “the core nation is understood as the legitimate ‘owner’ of the state, which is conceived as the state *of* and *for* the core nation.” Furthermore, Brubaker argues, this core nation regards itself as weak because of the discriminatory

⁵⁹ Barth (1969: 9) has simply and straightforwardly defined culture as “nothing but a way to describe human behavior”; i.e., shared values and attitudes of a specific group.

⁶⁰ To be more specific, the conceptualization and spread of nationalism, regarded as a system comprising a set of values related to a people, are disseminated by the means of communication. “Membership in a people essentially consists in wide complementarity of social communication” (Deutsch, 1966: 96ff), for example, learned habits, symbols, preferences and historical memories. Thus it is not necessary that members of the same nation speak the same language but that they are able to relate and use concepts in a similar manner.

policies of the previous regime, and thus feels a need to promote its own national policies strongly. Depending on the policies pursued and the sub-regional context, the outcomes of these nationalizing nationalisms may trigger reactions within other states that serve as external homelands to minorities in the nationalizing state.

Debates on nationalism are both intense and spread over a wide range of topics and approaches. Although theories on nationalism have failed to define the concept unambiguously, this has proven the greatest strength for nationalism in practice. By providing so many different possible interpretations, nationalism can thrive and be applied by almost any social movement that so chooses. With reference to the nation, it has also become possible to rally large groups of people, who might otherwise have diverging interests, around a common cause. Even political adversaries at opposite ends of the political spectrum can be persuaded to join forces on specific issues if these are depicted in national terms. This empirical adaptation of nationalism to diverging practical realities is one of the difficulties of clearly distinguishing the concept theoretically.

The question that arises is whether every nation-state has to be built around an ethnic core nation, especially given that many contemporary states have established their existence on bases other than the myth of national homogeneity. Some states explicitly define themselves as a combination of peoples, which raises the question of whether these states should be understood in different terms from the conventional nation-state. Mauritius may be one example of a multi-national state with a non-ethnic identity construction or perhaps a nationalism which incorporates people originating from continental Africa, India, China, Great Britain and France (cf. Hylland-Eriksen, 1998: 146ff; Williams, 1999). It is not impossible that a state like Mauritius may in the future establish some sort of myth of common origin in the vein of a more traditional nation-state.

Given the adaptive nature of the nation and its ability to contain an almost infinite variation of cultures, it is possible to imagine a nation of separate and well-defined collectives so long as these recognize themselves as parts of the same people constituting a single and distinguishable political community. This would not imply that such a state would be devoid of cultural content. Political principles alone do not constitute national identities. "No matter how much residents in the United States might sympathize with political principles favored by most French or Canadian citizens, it would not occur to them to think of themselves as French or Canadian" (Yack, 1999: 106). Nevertheless, such claims, arguing that some nations are civic while others are cultural, are not uncommon in the literature on nationalism.

Nationalism in East and West

In the literature on nation and nationalism, there is a tradition of dichotomizing nationalism into civic and cultural types (Kohn, [1944] 2005: 4). Empirically, it is argued that the civic version is found in states that sought to strengthen and legitimize the rule of the state by linking it to the nation, as in the case of France and its vast colonial empire. The cultural type is instead found in the national movements that sought to create a nation and state where none had existed before, as in the case of Germany. Since the latter example reflected an attempt to unite a German-speaking population spread out over a large area in Central Europe, the idea of the German nation was closely connected to the idea of shared German ancestry through blood relations. In the French example it was the opposite, i.e., regardless of who you were, you were a Frenchman as long as you lived within the borders of French jurisdiction. The above examples are simplifications, but nevertheless prominent in studies on nationalism even if they offer greater nuance on the issue than initially expressed by Kohn (cf. Brubaker, 1999; Greenfeld, 1992: 11ff; Kamusella, 2001: 237; Kolstø, 2000: 24ff).⁶¹ The German nationalistic principles are usually viewed as cultural, exclusionary and authoritarian, and the French as civic, inclusive and liberal.

Schöpflin disregards the shallow civic versus cultural distinction and, while acknowledging that differences may exist, adds that Western stereotypes of Eastern nationalism might be what affect judgment. “The reality is much deeper, more complex, more subtle and if there is an ‘Eastern’ nationalism, there are perfectly good reasons for this evolution, not merely the cussedness of people who speak – insist on speaking – obscure and unpronounceable languages” (Schöpflin, 2000: 5).⁶² It is likely that most contemporary scholars employing the East-West distinction would agree that there is a need of greater nuances than Kohn expressed. Depending on the context, nationalism has taken different forms in Europe and elsewhere. The end result, however, reveals strong similarities in how the nation is perceived and culturally bound.

As David Brown (1999) has pointed out, there are no societal rules that make cultural nationalism authoritarian or, for that matter, civic nationalism

⁶¹ Concerning the critique of Brubaker’s east-west divide cf. Kuzio (2001a).

⁶² While the nation-state and representative democracy were ideas largely imported by Eastern Europe from Western Europe, it is important to remember that the redrawing of the political map of Eastern Europe following the end of the Great War was also an aim of US diplomacy. It would seem an irony of history that one of the major nations, adhering to the civic national myth, would argue for the right of other nations to self-determination. The new borders of Eastern Europe were based on contemporary Western geographers’ understanding of where specific peoples lived in the German- and Austro-Hungarian-dominated parts of Europe. However, it was far from an easy task to consider historical borders vis-à-vis linguistic differences and whether the rule of the majority over the minority could be justified (Eriksonas, 2006: 45ff).

tolerant. Hence, we find that most nationalisms manifest traits from both types. Cultural nationalism is not necessarily illiberal and often incorporates the promotion of minority rights and social justice. Similarly, civic nationalism may turn authoritarian, as the case of Suharto's Indonesia demonstrates. The French riots in October 2005, which started within the immigrant community of suburban Paris and then spread throughout the country, is another example of how the ideal of civic inclusion may result in exclusionary policies and practices (Duval Smith, 2005; Ireland, 2005).

Thus civic nationalism may develop in either liberal or illiberal directions depending upon how effectively its visions of civic community are employed by the mobilising elites to resolve societal aspirations or fears. And cultural nationalism should be seen as neither intrinsically the 'progressive' engine of minority and indigenous rights, nor intrinsically 'regressive' and oppressive of the individual, as its recent manifestations in the Balkans might seem to indicate (Brown, 1999: 299).

There are certainly aspects of nationalism that may go terribly awry. If one group perceives itself as superior to another, or worse yet, sees its existence as related to the extermination or expulsion of the other, then nationalism is clearly dangerous. Such ideas are indeed possible to formulate within nationalism and may be more abundant in a context where blood and belonging are more pronounced than citizenship. Nevertheless, this does not suggest that one type of nationalism is more prone to atrocities on the one hand, while another to human rights and democracy on the other. It is more plausible that an ethnic group, aiming to establish a nation-state of its own, will pursue its goal by choosing the appropriate nationalizing strategy relevant to its objectives, the context and the current zeitgeist.

With the widespread view that Eastern European nationalism was based on ethnic ties, it is not surprising to see how the language struggles of the late Soviet period were interpreted by researchers as outbursts of old ethno-nationalistic sentiments, confirming earlier assumptions of an Eastern particularism (Törnquist-Plewa, 1999: 39f). The existence of an Eastern nationalism that is distinct from Western is characterized by two aspects that have already been mentioned. First, as Brown noted, it is a question of how we perceive and wish to perceive the policies of a nation-state. Second, it is a question of how we want to present it. Historically, we observe the development of the Eastern nation-state at a later stage than in the West. This, however, does not disqualify or hinder its development into a civic nation-state. Neither does it prevent Western European states from manifesting ethnocentric tendencies (Hermansson, 2005: 139). In *The East European 'ethnic nation' – Myth or Reality?*, Björklund (2006) addresses this issue by analyzing survey data from Latvia, Poland and Lithuania. Finding no evidence for the hypothesized dichotomy on nationalism, Björklund concludes "that the civic-ethnic dichotomy is highly problematic, and...the study of the

construction of public national identity is best served by an approach that is attuned to country- and region-specific historical and social circumstances” (Björklund, 2006: 114). Needless to say, this approach applies to all nation-states regardless of location.

Claiming Territory and Building Nation

State-building concerns how the state forms and exercises its power. It includes the entire central decision making and bureaucratic apparatus of a state, dealing with such areas as defense, administration, economy, police and border control and many other aspects (Kolstø, 2004: 8; cf. Peterson, 2000). According to Charles Tilly, states in Western Europe were historically created through “consolidation of territorial control, differentiation of governments from other organizations, acquisition of autonomy (and mutual recognition thereof) by some governments, centralization and coordination” (Tilly, 1975: 70). In the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, state-building has been applied to post-conflict states where there is a need to strengthen or build state institutions. This has been met with varying degrees of success, with Germany and Japan considered positive examples while Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate how difficult the task can be. State-building thus involves more than the technical establishment of institutions, but also the improvement of government functions so that demands of citizens are met (Whaites, 2008).

Stein Rokkan (1975: 597) has illustrated how Western Europe between 1485 and 1789 saw three specific developments that contributed to the strengthening of the state. The *development of literate bureaucracies and legal institutions* and the *growth of trade and the emergence of new industries* provided the military-administrative machinery with enough resources to expand. A *national script* brought the periphery closer to the center by means of unified means of communications. The new relations and linkages which were created occurred first, according to Rokkan, only at the level of elites, but in time also affected the masses through full monetization of the economy. Finally, as the lower strata of society started to raise participatory claims, the strengthening of national identity and mass participation followed. Rokkan’s analysis of developments in Western Europe provides a good basis for understanding how state- and nation-building evolved historically. However, he was also acutely aware that the experiences of post-colonial states differed much from Western Europe. For these countries, the nation and state had to form simultaneously, making the task of pursuing these goals harder.

Nation- and state-building do thus not need to coincide, and history provides numerous examples where they occurred separately. Occasionally, such as following the demise of the Soviet Union, transition of nation and state began simultaneously. However, the concepts of state- and nation-

building should not be confused. As mentioned above, state-building is concrete and deals with the institutional and legal framework, while nation-building concerns the creation and evolution of a cultural unit into a political community that acts as a bridge to the political institutions of the state.

Like state-building, nation-building was introduced at a specific point in time. Hroch (1993) has attempted to organize the entire range of nation-building into one model and link it to the development of national movements.

...the onset of the modern stage of nation-building can be dated from the moment when selected groups within the non-dominant ethnic community started to discuss their own ethnicity and to conceive of it as a potential nation-to-be. Sooner or later, they observed certain deficits, which the future nation still lacked, and began efforts to overcome one or more of them, seeking to persuade their compatriots of the importance of consciously belonging to the nation (Hroch, 1993: 6).

Hroch describes the different phases of national movements, from scholarly undertakings to enhance national consciousness, to the recruitment of more members of the ethnic group for the national cause, to a full social structure. Nation-building is thus focused on the creation of a common identity, where the educational system, propaganda, ideology, media and state symbols play prominent roles.⁶³ All these efforts are geared towards one objective: to promote common values and to shape a general national framework within which people are “able to do business with each other across all the particularities of context and background” (Taylor, 1999: 221).

Once a nation has become the core nation and determines the policies it wishes to pursue, the government has a number of tools it can apply. Norman (2006: 46f) lists nine such tools:

1. Official language policy
2. Rules for immigration and naturalization (acquiring of citizenship)
3. Core curricula in schools⁶⁴
4. Compulsory military service
5. Fighting and mythologizing about patriotic wars
6. Adopting national symbols and holidays
7. Renaming streets, town-buildings, and geographical features
8. Control or regulation of national media
9. Promotion of sports, particularly in international competitions

⁶³ See Anderson (1991) and Riegert (1998) regarding how the media frames domestic and international events within a national context and provides means for individuals who will never meet each other to share the same understanding of the world.

⁶⁴ To that should especially be stressed the importance of history teaching in schools, which may be described as a “grand narrative of the modern nation-state” or “a story of liberation from oppression” (van der Veer, 1996: 250).

However, when the idea of the nation changed from sovereignty to the unique character of the people, the policies of the state were altered quite considerably. It was no longer enough to be a good taxpayer. It became necessary to accept that you were a part of a specific nation, and for other members of the nation to accept you as such. During this period, the situation of ethnic minorities in nationalizing states, i.e., the question of how democratic a transition that neglected substantial segments of a population could be, was not discussed. Topics such as the nation-*destroying* characteristics of nation-*building* were similarly ignored. Where a nation was to be built, there would also be the need to eradicate or at least push aside other competing types of group identities (Connor, 1972). Already more than a century earlier, Lord Acton had noted that

[t]he greatest adversary of the rights of nationality is the modern theory of nationality. By making the State and the nation commensurate with each other in theory, it reduces practically to a subject condition all other nationalities that may be within the boundary. It cannot admit them to an equality with the ruling nation which constitutes the State, because the State would then cease to be national, which would be a contradiction of the principle of its existence (Acton, 1949: 192f).

Nation-building may, therefore, be seen as both the means to achieve a democratic nation-state as well as the justification for the mistreatment of minority groups, forced assimilation, and chauvinism. If state policies are detrimental to minorities or if there are serious disagreements within the core nation, nation-building can become a tool of oppression. With regard to Norman's nine tools above, restrictions to the official language in media and schools may threaten those who are not fully fluent. Nationalizing citizenship laws may push the core nation to prominent positions within the political system. The legal system may only promote the practices and traditions of the core nation and disregard those of minorities. If one state language were to be introduced within the state bureaucracy, both officials and citizens who request institutional services may risk losing their jobs or being prevented from exercising their rights. In the economic sector, privatization and land distribution may be handled in ways benefitting the core nation (titular nationality) (Linz and Stepan, 1997: 28). Such are the problems that any successful nation might face, i.e., the need to protect its own nationalistic project against competing nationalisms. "The more successful [the nation] has been in promoting its own members into privileged or controlling positions in society, the more it will now have to fear from the rise of other peoples and other nationalist movements" (Deutsch, 1966: 105). In subsequent chapters, we consider how and with what strategies the Moldovan attempt at nation-building proceeded.

When is Consolidation Reached?

The available literature suggests that transition as a process is far easier to study at its inception than at its conclusion as it is not possible to identify a threshold for exactly when a country has moved from democratization to consolidated democracy and from nation-building to uncontested nation. State-building may be an easier process to track, ending with the installment of functioning state institutions and control of the legitimate use of force on its territory (cf. Weber, 1978: 54). Consolidation of democracy and nation, however, are more fluid than state-building. Democracy is a continuing endeavor that can never be considered finished. Nation is likewise a process without concrete forms, where the community exists as an imagined (but not imaginary) bond. Both democracy and nation need to be internalized in order to become frameworks that people accept and upon which they act.

Consequently, it is far easier to observe consolidation in its absence as non-consolidation or even *deconsolidation* (Diamond, 1997: xix). Indeed numerous states have been described as transitional for decades without seeming to move much closer to democracy. This type of regime, lying somewhere between democracy and authoritarianism, has recently caught the attention of researchers and labelled either hybrid or electoral authoritarian regimes (Ekman, 2009: 7). While the institutionalization of polyarchy is possible to measure and track, a result of Dahl's intention to make it an operational concept, the exact point at which democracy is fully consolidated seems more difficult to determine (O'Donnell, 1997: 48). A further complicating factor, often present in transitional states, concerns the occasions where the consolidation of democracy and nation is pursued simultaneously. For some states the only path to democracy seems to go through less democratic means of neglecting minority rights in order to strengthen the foundation of the state and political regime, i.e. the nation. "[I]f the real goal is democratic consolidation, a democratizing strategy would require less majoritarian and more consensual policies" (Linz and Stepan, 1997: 28). Consensual nation-building is not an often observed phenomenon in history.

There have, however, been attempts to address these problems, and ways to identify democratic consolidation do exist in the literature. Przeworski (1991: 26) has suggested that democracy is consolidated when it becomes "the only game in town". There should thus be no doubt in the minds of citizens about the rules of the game, and their behavior should be in accordance with those rules. While conflicts may exist, they should not be illegal, unconstitutional or anti-democratic. Even if the view of consolidated democracy "as the only game in town" seems straightforward enough, it remains a fluid definition. Further specification by Linz and Stepan provides a more concrete, three-level operational definition of consolidated democracy focusing on behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional dimensions.

Behaviorally, democracy becomes the only game in town when no significant political groups seriously attempt to overthrow the democratic regime or secede from the state...Attitudinally, democracy becomes the only game in town when, even in the face of severe political and economic crises, the overwhelming majority of people believe that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic formulas. Constitutionally, democracy becomes the only game in town when all the actors in the polity become habituated to the fact that violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 5).

Concerning the nation, it is possible to take a similar approach, i.e. a nation may be considered consolidated when it is not challenged by rivaling nationalisms and thus becomes the “only game in town”. While none of these definitions provides clearly measurable criteria, they do provide a basis for discussion on consolidation and may be applied in our further analysis.

Moving Ahead

In this chapter we have explored the connection between nation and democracy, with a special focus on transitional changes. Now that the key theories have been highlighted, it is possible to outline the empirical presentations and analyses in subsequent chapters which follow the same dual structure as sketched in Figure 2, Chapter 1. Hence, Chapters 4 and 5 deal with ethnicity, nation-building and nationalism in the context of political developments, while Chapters 6 and 7 address matters pertaining to general democratic standards, institutions of polyarchy and the different levels political support.

The content of Chapter 4 draws on the theoretical framework of ethnicity and nation and relates it specifically to Brubaker’s (1999) discussion on minorities and core nation. The chapter starts by identifying the ethnic groups in Moldova and then describes how the ideas of the nation have been formulated in different versions of Romanianism and Moldovanism. The chapter ends with a description of the periods during which either Moldovanist or Romanianist nationalisms have been able to set the political agenda. These periods provide the structure for an overview of main political developments in Chapter 5.

The bulk of Chapter 5 concerns political developments between 1989 and 2009 during the periods specified in Chapter 4. The Moldovanism and Romanianism nation-building strategies are also discussed in the context of Norman (2006: 46f): i) official language policy, ii) rules for immigration and naturalization (the acquiring of citizenship), iii) core curricula in schools (including history-writing), iv) compulsory military service, v) fighting and mythologizing about patriotic wars, vi) adopting national symbols and holidays, vii) renaming streets, town-buildings, and geographical features, viii) control or regulation of national media, and ix) promotion of sports, particu-

larly in international competitions. This chapter concludes with commentary on political developments and democratization in Moldova in accordance with the theoretical findings.

In order to examine the procedural level of democracy in Moldova, Chapter 6 returns to Dahl's (1999) model of polyarchy and the available indices on democracy. First, democratization in Moldova is introduced as a process as viewed through the Polity IV, Vanhanen's Index of Democracy, and the two Freedom House indices, Freedom in the World and Nations in Transit. This provides an overview of how the indices have tracked fluctuations in democratic levels over the years. Second, the Polyarchy Scale developed by Coppedge and Reinicke (1990) is applied with the suggested variables of polyarchy: i) free and fair elections; ii) freedom of organization; iii) freedom of expression; iv) alternative sources of information; and v) inclusive suffrage (right to vote).⁶⁵ While the case for the Polyarchy Scale is well argued, the lack of temporal data hinders analysis. Instead of trying to establish levels of polyarchy for each year and creating yet another index, the polyarchy variables in this chapter are treated as an average for the period of interest. Thereby it is possible to take a snapshot of democracy as a complement to the direct measure the indices offer. Taken together, this offers some guidance as to the state of polyarchy in Moldova.

In Chapter 7 the framework for studying political support developed by Norris (1999) is applied to the 2003 survey, which allows for the analysis of a range of issues, including diffuse and specific support to the political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions and political actors. This is done by reviewing data from the survey, in which questions referring to the objects of support have been chosen and the background variables of respondents included. Based on the content of this chapter and the general scope of this dissertation to investigate the linkage between nation and democracy, it is clearly of special interest to observe how the variable on national identity influences the different objects of support. The chapter ends with a discussion of the main divides identified.

⁶⁵ Although Coppedge and Reinicke eliminated inclusive suffrage as a variable, it was kept here since it offers the opportunity to raise the issue of suffrage with the considerable Moldovan diaspora.

4. Ethnic Minorities and Divided Core Nation

In contemporary Moldova the idea of the nation is characterized by more than a single phenomenon. The composition of the population and its understanding of ethnicity and nation are a result of the region being subjected to constant border changes and different and contradictory political ambitions. Considering how often borders have been readjusted, it is not surprising to find that collective identities were often understood in ways that might have appeared strange to the outsider, while making sense to the local population (cf. Martonne, 1919: 10). Although the Romanian language in the region has been influenced by other languages over the centuries, it has proven both resilient and a strong marker of identity. As such it has played a part, albeit differently, in both Romanian and Moldovan nation-building projects.

This chapter serves the purpose of introducing the ethnic minority groups identified in the 1989 and 2004 censuses. The focus is mainly on the period following the break-up of the Soviet Union, but some references to past events are also made. The background of the Moldovan and Romanian group, here regarded as belonging to the same core nation but with different ideas of what constitutes the nation, is examined towards the end of the chapter through their different nation-building strategies and how these have varied over time. The historical background of this group was largely presented in Chapter 2, and a political overview is presented in Chapter 5. The approach to keep Romanianist and Moldovanist groups within the same core nation may be criticized, but is taken because the idea of constituting one people, albeit with diverging national definitions, is what much of contemporary Moldovan politics is based on. Chapter 5 explores these divergences over time.

Ethnicity through Censuses

In Chapter 3 we observed the fluidity of the ethnicity concept caused by the nature of the constructs that surround them. Here the ethnic groups are determined through censuses conducted. Censuses operate out of a certain conceptual framework wherein communities have been defined according to an understanding of what ethnic groups dwell in a country. The censuses may then function as the basis for other types of surveys conducted, including the one providing data for this study. However, this type of data gathering

comes with the implication that to conduct a census on ethnicity the ethnic groups must often be predetermined. In such a case, the census results become the state's prescribed definition of its population, often according to political considerations. As long as these categories are accepted as real among the population, they will also function as such.⁶⁶ Censuses, and to some extent surveys, are a way to understand and define people, i.e., to reduce the complexity of reality. Censuses are likely to be influenced by political and economic considerations. Surveys often draw upon census data, rather than developing new categories, sometimes with the possibility for respondents to combine different type of identities (cf. Linz and Stepan, 1996: 35, fn 42) or state an identity underneath a label of "other".

In contemporary Moldova the Soviet procedure of declaring nationality (what we would regard as ethnicity) in the passport of citizens is still a very vivid memory.⁶⁷ Through this system people were ascribed an identity for the purposes of identifying themselves. This was true even in cases where ethnicity otherwise would have had a more fluid or multifaceted meaning to the individual, for example, if a child had a mixed ethnic background, which was not uncommon in the MSSR where inter-ethnic marriage rates were among the highest in the USSR (King, 2003: 60).

This idea that each individual would easily fall within the limits of an ethnic group was a very common Western conception at least until the end of the Second World War. We likewise find it in the Romanian understanding of ethnicity during the interwar period, and we certainly find it in Soviet theory and policies after the war. In Soviet doctrine ethnic groups were real, and the Soviet leaders Lenin and Stalin both concluded that these concepts existed from an objective point of view (Slezkine, 1994: 415ff). When Moldova declared independence, ethnic group conceptualizations were already in place, including the seeds of what would develop into a conflict on the composition of the core nation.

In the following analysis we are first going to let the censuses determine the ethnic groups identified (see Table 4). To better show the ethnic composition and make this comparable to the 1989 census data, a third column has been created that combines the 2004 Moldovan and PMR data, which at this time are the most reliable figures available for the entire country. The PMR census was allegedly constructed and carried out in accordance with the

⁶⁶ As an example of political bias in census processing in the specific Moldovan case, CoE observers reported many instances where respondents were asked to declare that they were Moldovans rather than Romanians and recommended to state their mother tongue as Moldovan and not Romanian (Azi.md, 11/26/04; BBC, 4/10/06). Another critique leveled by CoE was that migrants residing abroad for more than one year were included in the census, in breach of international norms for good census standards but likely in accordance with the authorities' aim of producing a certain demographic pattern.

⁶⁷ This should be even more so since there seem to be some Moldovans, at least until recently, who still hold Soviet passports, not fully comprehending that the USSR no longer exists (Heintz, 2007: 17).

Table 4. *Moldovan population data*

	1989 census (Transnistrian region included)		2004 census (Transnistrian region excluded)		2004 Moldovan and PMR censuses (Transnistrian region included)	
Moldovans	2,794,749	64.5%	2,564,849	75.8%	2,741,849	69.6%
Ukrainians	600,366	13.80	282,406	8.4	442,406	11.2
Russians	562,069	13.00	201,218	5.9	369,218	9.4
Romanians	2,477	0.06	73,276	2.2	-	
Gagauzians	153,458	3.50	147,500	4.4	-	
Bulgarians	88,149	2.00	65,662	1.9	-	
Jews	65,672	1.50	3,608	0.1	-	
Roma	11,571	0.30	12,271	0.4	-	
Other	56,579	1.30	18,520	0.5	371,184	9.4
N/A	-	-	14,020	0.4	14,020	0.4
Total	4,335,360	100.00	3,383,330	100.0	3,938,677	100.0

Sources: King (2000: 97), *Recensământ (2004)*, *Analiticheskaia zapiska. "Ob itogakh perepisi naseleniia Pridnestrovskoi Moldavskoi Respubliki 2004 goda"* (2004)

census methodology in Moldova proper, but without international involvement and oversight.⁶⁸ Short descriptions of each group are then presented in order to provide for a better understanding of their background and possible political aims. Thereafter, results from the 2003 survey are presented and compared to similar endeavors. The results of the survey, namely what ethnic groups people identify themselves with, will form the categories in the analysis.

Studying the 1989 and 2004 censuses, it is possible to observe how the ethnic composition has changed with the passing of political and socio-economic events. When the last Soviet census was conducted in 1989, the MSSR still existed and had a total population of 4.3 million. Moldovans constituted two-thirds of the population, Ukrainians almost 14 percent and Russians 13 percent. After the Second World War, the number of Slavs increased in Moldova, especially changing the demographic composition in the cities. In 2004 this seems to have reversed. If only the Moldova proper census for 2004 is considered, the ratio between Moldovans and Slavs has changed quite considerably with the share of Moldovans having increased to almost 76 percent, while the share of Ukrainian and Russian minorities has decreased to approximately eight and around six percent, respectively. How-

⁶⁸ In the 2004 Moldovan census, it should be noted that figures on ethnicity differ slightly between tables. It is therefore possible to find, for example, that there either are 201,218 (*Populația după naționalitățile de bază, în profil teritorial*) or 201,219 Russians (*Populația pe naționalități și localități, în profil teritorial*). Furthermore, the census data from the Transnistrian region is much cruder, with population counted in thousands, and although figures have been circulated on the Internet as to the numbers of the smaller minority groups, these have not been possible to verify as Tiraspol's official census figures.

ever, it should be noted that in 2004 the total population covered by the census was less than 3.4 million inhabitants. This could be explained partly by migration, but it is also a consequence of the central census not being possible to conduct in the Transnistrian region. The third column in Table 4 shows the population structure when PMR is also included. Although PMR is not directly an object of study here, this was done in order to provide a better understanding of demographic changes. The core nation vis-à-vis minorities then gets closer to the proportions in the 1989 census, even if it is clear that the population has decreased.

Ethnic Minority Groups

Considering Moldova's turbulent past and geographical position on one of Europe's crossroads, the region has been the home to many different peoples. Travel stories and other sources from the last two centuries tell of a multitude of people of different ethnic backgrounds. Hence, in the account of Paul Sumarkoff (1805: 86ff), who journeyed through Bessarabia in 1799, we find recollections of Ukrainians, Moldovans, Wallachians, Jews, Roma, Bulgarians, Russians and Greeks. To that could be added the Gagauzians encountered by Martonne (1919: 10) and, with the establishment of the Romanian kingdom, Moldovans started to be officially defined as Romanians. Some peoples previously living in contemporary Moldova, such as the Germans and Swiss-colonists depicted by Henry Baerlein(1935) and Dorothy Hanbury (1928) during their travels throughout interwar Bessarabia, are no longer present as a result of the conflicts of the twentieth century and the often brutal changes it brought.

Because of wars, genocide, expulsion, encouraged or forced immigration and emigration, the ethnic composition changed greatly over the years.⁶⁹As we can see in Table 4, the population in the 1989 Soviet MSSR census was basically reduced to the categories of Moldovans, Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauzians, Bulgarians, Romanians, Roma and Jews. Subsequent demographic changes have occurred in recent years whereby the Jewish group has diminished.

The following narrative descriptions of the main minority groups reflected in the censuses tell the stories of each group as they most widely appear in the literature. The descriptions are presented beginning from the largest minority, the Ukrainian, to the smallest, the Jewish. While the historical background of the majority Moldovan and Romanian population has already been described in Chapter 2, it still presents a special challenge. On the one hand, both groups apply the same, or similar, markers of identity. On the

⁶⁹ Cf. tables p. 24, 54, 97 in King (2000) for historical data on the ethnic groups and how these have altered in names and numbers over time.

other hand, they risk becoming nationally incompatible. If both identities are taken to their extremes, the Romanian identity denies the validity of the Moldovan, and the Moldovan makes the Romanian identity, on Moldovan territory, impossible as state-bearing identity.⁷⁰ Because both of these groups constitute the core nation (or, at the very, least there is a struggle over defining what is arguably the same people), their position on the question of national identity becomes central to the evolution of the state. The chapter ends with a discussion of the main nation-building strategies employed thus far in Moldova.

Ukrainians

According to Stepanov (2010: 34) the Ukrainian population between the Prut and Dniester rivers can be considered to constitute a sub-ethnic group to the larger Ukrainian people and, moreover, as successors to the Ruthenians.⁷¹ After the Russian annexation of Bessarabia in 1812, the number of Ukrainians in the cities as well as Russians in the region increased considerably (cf. Ciobanu, [1924] 1998: 9, 38f). The increase of Slavs continued until the fall of the Soviet Union.

Between the 1989 and 2004 censuses, the Ukrainian minority in Moldova, PMR included, decreased from 13.80 percent to 11.20 percent. (In Moldova proper the percentage of Ukrainians stood at 8.4 percent). Most Ukrainians in 2004 were to be found along the border of Ukraine and in the municipalities of Chişinău (8.4 percent of the total population) and Bălţi, (23.7 percent). As with other minorities in Moldova, many Ukrainians were disturbed by the strong pro-Romanian sentiments of the early 1990s, and while they did organize themselves culturally, they did not found political movements of their own.⁷² One reason for this might be the high degree of Russification of the Ukrainian minority. In the 2004 census almost half of the Ukrainians in Moldova, with a stronger representation among the rural population, reported Russian as their mother tongue. Nevertheless, language is an important marker of Ukrainian ethnicity and, according to survey data analyzed by Stepanov (2010: 537f), 60.55 percent of respondents considered Ukrainian to

⁷⁰ In an interview conducted by the author on 8 May 2002, PPCD party leader Iurie Roşca, answering in line with the old Frontist discourse of pan-Romanianism, vehemently denied the Moldovan identity as a Stalinist lie. There was no other identity, in his mind, than the Romanian.

⁷¹ Speakers of Ukrainian in Moldova mainly regard themselves as Ukrainians, although one fourth may identify as *khokhly* (singular *khokhol*) or, to a lesser extent, *russki liudi* (Russian people) (Stepanov, 2010: 539, 545). *Khokhol*, which originally describes a specific type of Ukrainian Cossack haircut, is at best used as a neutral term for Ukrainians in general but is often applied derogatorily (cf. Ermolaev, 1991: 22).

⁷² Pure political Ukrainian forces have not existed in Moldova, but there were eight ethno-cultural organizations in operation in the 2000s. A Congress of Ukrainians functions to bring together these organizations within a larger cooperative framework (Stepanov, 2010: 535).

be their native language, and more than 70 percent wished Ukrainian to have a special status in areas with a large Ukrainian presence.

After President Voronin decided not to sign the Russian-brokered plan to unite Moldova and PMR through a federation (see Chapter 5), relations with Russia deteriorated. One might speculate that it was for this reason that Voronin in November 2004 encouraged the Ukrainian minority to increase the number of Ukrainian language schools and strengthen their language (Azi.md, 10/11/04). To keep the Ukrainian minority in Moldova appeased would thus both promote relations with Kiev and ensure that the Ukrainian minority within Moldova would not join ranks with the Russian minority in raising demands that would be in Moscow's, and possibly against Chişinău's, interest.

Another reason for the relatively low profile of the Ukrainian population might be that relations between Chişinău and Kiev have generally been stable, although there were early territorial disputes resulting from the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and raised anew by the Popular Front and the instability caused by the Transnistrian conflict (Fane, 1993: 131; Goodhand, 2001: 42). Some of the issues related to border demarcations, such as the drawn out border dispute at the southern crossing at Palanca over a small strip of land, now seem to have reached a political conclusion (Moldova.org, 08/24/10).

Russians

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the number of Russians in Bessarabia equaled eight percent of the population, which increased to 13 percent in 1989 (King, 2000: 24, 97). When the subsequent census was made in 2004, the number of Russians in Moldova proper had decreased to 5.9 percent. Even if PMR is included, the percentage of Russians had diminished by almost four percent relative to the total population. The share of Russians in the cities was, however, still substantial and constituted 13.9 and 19.2 percent in Chişinău and Bălţi, respectively.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the establishment of new republics was probably a process most difficult for the Russian population, as they were considered representatives of a sort from the center in Moscow. The Russians were deprived of their imperial identity but could not fall back on a national one (Kolstø, 1993: 213). In Moldova, as in the other post-Soviet republics, the Russians became inheritors of a past empire, a beached diaspora with the new Ukrainian state between them and the Russian Federation (Laitin, 1998: 29).

Relations between the Russian minority and Moldovan majority population have mainly been one of peaceful coexistence, characterized occasionally by downturns during times of war and conflict when issues of identity have become more important and manifest. After the Russian annexation of 1812 and the re-annexations of 1940 and 1944, Russian dominance in Moldova

was clearly felt in all spheres of society, albeit more in the cities than the countryside initially. Not until nationalism started to spread into Eastern Europe did the Tsars care much for national identities. As long as taxes were paid in the multicultural empire, ethnic (including religious) identity was not important. Soviet policies were of another kind and strove to build a classless society on a national basis. The Russian language was promoted to the position of *lingua franca* in all union republics. The Moldovan and other ethnic groups' identities were promoted only in versions that would strengthen their ties to Moscow.

Even after Moldova became independent, the strong position of the Russian language lingered as it was the language of communication between ethnic groups who did not share the Moldovan/Romanian language and as it remained an important language of instruction in schools (Mlechko, 1999: 56). Based on the 1989 census data and taking into account the use of the Russian language by many minority groups, the number of people having Russian as their first language far exceed the boundaries of the ethnic group and reached approximately one million speakers (Solonar', 1994: 45). The position of the Russian language in the Moldovan media landscape likewise continued to enjoy a prominent position during large parts of the 2000s, both because of the greater number of Russian language programs and due to the support it enjoyed from the PCRM, which did its best to diminish the impact of Romanian media (Gribincea and Grecu, 2004: 12).

Nevertheless, after independence the position of Russians and the Russian language in Moldova became more difficult. Especially in the bigger cities, there was a growing doubt whether Russian should remain the language of inter-ethnic communication of Moldova. Whereas their Moldovan parents speak a Russian devoid of accent, representatives of the younger generation are sometimes incapable, reluctant, or simply refuse to speak the language. While this may be a strategy to strengthen the position of the core nation, it may also renew problems in majority-minority relations.

The Russians of Moldova have traditionally held positions of influence in all societal spheres, something remembered by them and by many Moldovans who have a positive relation to the language and the people (cf. Henighan, 2002). The view of Moscow on how to support their ethnic brethren abroad has varied over time, as have the strategies (cf. Kolstø, 1993), depending much on the resources of Russia.⁷³ In any case, Moldovan independence made many Russians choose to leave the country as prospects within the expanding Russian economy were much better than in a Moldova struggling to avoid default. Thus the pull factor of Russia rather than the push factor of Moldova likely led many of Moldova's Russians to eventually emigrate.

⁷³ The case of Transnistria, albeit not usually understood as an ethnic case in the literature, has also been argued to be the consequence of a certain Russian "identity trajectory" (Kolstø, 1996).

Gagauzians

Throughout history the origin of the Gagauzians has been debated. Some sources, in describing more than nineteen different theories of origin, serve to confuse more than clarify (cf. Radova, 1995: 263).⁷⁴ What is known is that the Gagauzians are a Turkish people belonging mainly to the Christian-Orthodox faith who, together with the Bulgarians in early nineteenth century, moved up through the southern Balkans away from Ottoman expansion and into Tsarist Russia (Troebst, 1999: 29).⁷⁵ During some periods of Tsarist rule, the Gagauzians enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy and even took the opportunity to proclaim a short-lived “Comrat Republic” in 1906, which coincided with the general unrest in Russia at the time (*Istoričeskaia spravka o Gagauzakh*, 2010). Although today are found mainly in Moldova, there are also Gagauzian minority groups in Ukraine, Bulgaria, Turkey, Russia and Romania. The numbers of Gagauzians in Moldova decreased between the censuses conducted in 1989 and 2004, but not as much as other ethnic groups. According to the 2004 census, the number of Gagauzians equaled almost 150,000 persons or more than four percent of the population in Moldova proper.

The Gagauzians became highly Russified first during Tsarist and then Soviet times.⁷⁶ Soviet collectivization reforms, while met with dissatisfaction by many members of other ethnic groups, were generally welcomed by the Gagauzians. A further step in the strengthening of USSR and Gagauzian ties was taken in 1957 as the Gagauzian language was alphabetized, and printing of books commenced. Romanian rule during the interwar period, on the other hand, is much more negatively remembered by Gagauzians as a time of oppression and corruption (Demirdirek, 2000: 67).

As we will see in Chapter 5, the Gagauzians mobilized themselves as the Soviet Union started to relax its political grip and as Moldovan calls for independence simultaneously began. In addition to the this conflict, the Gagauzians have faced additional difficulties: the redrawing of state borders created obstacles between different Gagauzian settlements; the famines of

⁷⁴ It might be this fact that has caused a number of serological and genetic studies to try to clarify the origin of the Gagauzians, with diverging results. Spitsyn, Varsahr and Spitsyna (1999) have shown that the Gagauz gene pool is similar to other South European populations. Varsahr, Dubova and Kutuyev (2003) have argued that the Gagauz and Bulgarians share a biological heritage different from that of Moldovans and Romanians.

⁷⁵ Interestingly, the Bulgarian government’s National Council for Cooperation on Ethnic and Demographic Issues recognizes Gagauzians as being of Bulgarian origin, and Gagauzians may thus be granted Bulgarian citizenship (*Natsionalen sūvet za sūrudnichestvo po etničeskite i demografiskite vūprosi*, 2006). However, this does not only seem to be the Bulgarian state’s definition as many Gagauzians in Bulgaria harbor an understanding that they are “pure” Bulgars (Menz, 2003: 150).

⁷⁶ Some sources indicate that, before the Russian annexation in 1812, the main languages of Bessarabian Gagauzians were Bulgarian and Greek, which were used in churches and schools. In church Gagauzian was only used to address a person directly (cf. Moshkov, [1900] 2004: 7).

1946 and 1947 struck the Gagauzian community hard, and, finally, the Gagauz language has largely been applied in rural settings and has lacked elite support (Menz, 2003: 150f). Despite these challenges, there was a revival of Gagauz culture in the late 1980s, crowned by the establishment of Gagauz autonomy in 1994, which ensured the official position of the Gagauz language. Through cultural institutions, such as the Gagauz museum in the small village of Beşalma just south of Comrat, Gagauz history and culture is kept alive. In August 2009 the second Gagauzian world congress, with 400 delegates from 18 countries, was held in Comrat. *Başkan* (Governor of Gagauzia) Mihail Formuzal referred to the event as a proof of the strength of the Gagauz people in spite of many historical hardships (Azi.md, 19/08/09). Internationally, for Gagauz Yeri, Turkey is the most important partner, providing development assistance, political support and functioning as a country for immigration. As a Turkish people, albeit of Christian faith, the Gagauzians are sometimes embraced by Turks as brethren who, however, neither call themselves Turks nor speak proper Turkish. (cf. Demirdirek, 2006: 47).

Bulgarians

The Bulgarians began to settle in the Bugeac territory, which later would become southern Bessarabia, during the second half of the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century. With the passing of time, the Bessarabian Bulgarians started to understand themselves in terms different from Bulgarians residing in the mother country. They established villages which often existed in isolation from other Bulgarian communities, but they continued to reflect their distinct ethnicity through language (Ganchev, 2006: 39). In the nineteenth century contact between Bessarabian Bulgarians and Bulgaria was still rather frequent. This changed in the following century as a result of the frequent border rearrangements affecting Bessarabia (cf. Troebst, 1995: 563).

Today the Bulgarian population exceeds 65,000 people in Moldova proper and is mostly concentrated in the same southern parts which their ancestors first inhabited. Taraclia, a town in the very south of Moldova and the capital of the Taraclia *raion*, has become a center for Bulgarians in Moldova. In the entire district two-thirds of the 65,000 inhabitants are ethnic Bulgarians. The languages of instruction in schools are Bulgarian and Moldovan. However, since 1996 many schools in the southern parts of the country started to have Bulgarian teachers from Bulgaria instruct in standard Bulgarian from first grade (Dyer, 2003: 62). Despite these advances, representatives of the Bulgarian community in Moldova in 2009 complained that Bulgarian youths knew neither Bulgarian nor the “state language” sufficiently, making it hard for them to live and work in either Moldova or Bulgaria.

At times relations between the center in Chişinău and Taraclia have been strained. Initially, there were fears that the Bulgarians would join the Gagau-

zians in their struggle for independence, but later it became apparent that the interest of the Bulgarian elite in Taraclia resided rather in trying to establish an autonomy of their own (King, 2000: 175). In 1998 as Moldova planned a territorial reform that would have included Taraclia in the neighboring Cahul *raion*, more than 90 percent voted against the decision in an illegal referendum (Azi.md, 05/18/99). During the time of the 2003 Kozak memorandum, the bilateral Russian-Moldovan plan to solve the Transnistrian conflict through federalization of the country, Taraclia was mentioned as one of the possible federative subjects (Coppieters and Emerson, 2002: 3). This was likely more a consequence of the imprecise number of federative entities stipulated in the Kozak memorandum than an ambition from the Bulgar community to actually reserve seats for Taraclia delegates in a new federative Moldovan parliament.

Roma

In the 2004 census 12,271 Roma people were registered, or 0.4 percent of the total population. These figures are, however, disputed, and human rights NGOs estimate the real figure to be 250,000 people (Guzun, 2011: 13, fn 19). The exact Roma population in Moldova is more difficult to ascertain than for other groups. This is not necessarily, as argued by King (2000: 176), due to their high mobility, since migration today is indeed a trait of all ethnic groups in Moldova. Instead, it may have more to do with the prevailing negative stereotypes of Roma. It might, for example, be in the interest of state officials to downplay the numbers of Roma in a community and of Roma individuals to choose a different ethnic identity because of the stigma otherwise encountered (cf. Cace, et al., 2007: 9).

Roma arrived to South-Eastern Europe in the fourteenth century. Their craftsmanship and trade was highly appreciated but, according to Panaitescu (1941: 65), their then nomadic life made them unreliable as a workforce to the local populations. The solution was to make it impossible for Roma to move. Before the end of the fourteenth century, Roma in the Moldavian principality, as well as in other places, had become slaves to the princes, monasteries or churches. The system of slavery continued in Bessarabia after the Russian annexation of 1812 and was abolished only with the emancipation (peasant) reform of 1861.

Once slavery was lifted, Roma could move as they wanted, but conditions for them often remained much worse than for the rest of the population. As fascism gained momentum and Bessarabia and parts of Ukraine, under the name of Transnistria, were put under Romanian jurisdiction between 1941 and 1944, the situation for Roma deteriorated considerably. During the reign of Marshall Antonescu, Roma and Jews were murdered or brought to Transnistria, where they died in ghettos of mistreatment, malnutrition and illnesses

caused by horrendous living conditions (Ionescu, 2000).⁷⁷ While Antonescu opportunistically changed his stance towards and treatment of Roma and Jews as the fortune of war altered, conditions still remained poor. Between 1941 and 1944 approximately 25,000 Roma (Crowe, 1995: 133), or 12 percent of the total Roma population in interwar Romania, were deported to Transnistria. Out of these it is estimated that 11,000 Roma died (*BBC News. Roma Holocaust victims speak out* 01/23/09).

As in many other countries worldwide, Roma in Moldova are among the most marginalized groups. This marginalization ranges from the lack of participation in political processes (CoE, 2003: 7) to being deprived of a citizen's right to education, health care and housing.⁷⁸ Although Moldova is a country with scarce resources, systematic discrimination may affect policies and behavior more than the lack of funding.⁷⁹

Jews

Moldovan historical documents from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries reveal how Sephardic Jews from the Iberian peninsula came to Moldova from the Balkans (Pilat, 1990: 8). Later Ashkenazi Jews from the North moved in to form a strong majority within the local Jewish community. The history of the Jews in the region has over time been one of marginalization and discrimination. The large number of Jews in nineteenth and twentieth century Tsarist Bessarabia was, to a considerable degree, the consequence of the Russian *Pale* system. The Pale was basically the only region where Jews were allowed to reside within the Russian empire. It functioned between 1791-1917 and included parts of contemporary Poland, Belarus, Ukraine and historical Bessarabia (cf. Feiwel, 1903: 7ff). The anti-Semitic logic was that Jews should not be allowed to migrate into the heartlands of Russia but instead be kept along the Western perimeters of the Empire.

The Jews were, furthermore, not allowed to own land and therefore became concentrated in cities and small towns (*shtetls*) where they had to compete with other groups already residing there. This policy created great social tensions and led to repeated pogroms. In Chişinău, which at the be-

⁷⁷ As pointed out by Mihok (2001), the deportation of Roma to Transnistria is much less known and researched in comparison to the discrimination and persecution of the Jewish population, not least because of a lack of general public interest.

⁷⁸ In the 2010 parliamentary elections, a Roma party ran for the first time but garnered only 0.14 percent of the votes (e-Democracy, 2010a).

⁷⁹ In 2007 UNICEF in Moldova struggled to get parliament to officially register Schinoasa, a Roma village close to Țibirica in the *raion* of Călărași, in the administrative maps of the country. It eventually met with success and ensured that the local mayor of Țibirica would have to take responsibility for the 350 to 500 inhabitants dwelling in Schinoasa and could no longer pretend they did not exist (Radița, 2001). Tellingly, the data from the 2004 census show zero Roma inhabitants in Țibirica (*Populația pe naționalități și localități, în profil teritorial*, 2004).

ginning of the twentieth century had a significant Jewish population of 50,000 persons, or slightly less than half of the city's population, the pogroms of 1903 and 1905 received a high degree of international media attention. In the first pogrom alone, 49 people were killed, 495 wounded and around 2,000 were made homeless (Penkower, 2004: 188).⁸⁰

During the Second World War, Jews were murdered directly by Romanian military or police units or moved to the ghettos in Transnistria. While these were not like the German-administered extermination camps, conditions were so deplorable that tens of thousands died as a direct cause of maltreatment, undernourishment and disease. As argued by Solonari (2006: 471), the Romanian anti-Semitic policy was an opportunistic one which spanned close cooperation with Germany, followed by cancellation of all transports to German death camps and, finally, facilitation of emigration to Palestine. These changes of policy were more a consequence of the developments in the war than a change in the political views of the leadership in Bucharest. It has been estimated that as least 250,000 Jews and Roma were murdered between the rivers of Dniester and Bug, most of them during the years 1941 to 1943 (Schafgen, 1999: 825).

In 1989 Jews numbered more than 65,000 persons, or 1.5 percent of the total population, and had been decreasing for decades (cf. Pilat, 1990: 95f). One reason for leaving Moldova may have been that Jews generally were considered Russian-speakers, which could have put them in a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the core nation. They could also have been the targets of anti-Semitism (Fane, 1993: 147; U.S. Department of State, 2010). However, as in the case of other minority groups, it is likely that it was the pull factor of the receiving countries that in the end made many people emigrate. At the time of the 2004 census, 3,608 Jews remained in Moldova proper. Immigration to Israel and the US had diminished the Jewish presence in the country considerably. According to official figures, 47,302 Jews left Moldova for Israel between 1989 and 2000 (Keyser, 12/15/01).

Contradicting Nationalisms

In central Chişinău right outside the *Palatul Republicii* (Palace of the Republic), a large sign reads “Republica Moldova este patria mea” which translates into “The Republic of Moldova is my Fatherland”. For an outsider this might appear a truism, since it would be natural for Moldovan citizens to regard Moldova as their fatherland. For many, however, Moldova is not the country

⁸⁰ The 1903 pogrom later inspired the Jewish poet Hayim Nahman Bialik to write the poem “The City of Slaughter” The poem describes how the Jews of Bessarabia allowed themselves to be murdered by failing to put up an active resistance (Klein, 1990). As such, it was also an appeal to Jews everywhere to organize themselves into self-defense units in order to counter future pogroms.

with which they primarily identify. The sign, therefore, is the manifestation of a young nation attempting to prove its existence. An already established national identity does not have to be promoted in the same manner; it is already integrated into the other types of identities we apply in our interactions with others (cf. Hylland-Eriksen, 1998). Moldova is currently in a situation where national identity is either forming or failing to form. At such a stage, the construction of identity becomes more vivid and illustrates that national identities are not historical facts, even if we like to think of them as timeless or natural. For the time being, the core nation is being divided into two narratives.

The composition of the Moldovan population is, as we have seen, a product of its geographic position within a borderland of Europe. By the constant redrawing of political borders and movement of peoples, a multicultural society has formed subject to divergent nation-building strategies. While the Ottoman and Russian empires did not care much for nationality, twentieth century Romanian and Soviet policies were based on the idea of nation. These political systems were legitimized through the formulation of the nation, i.e., they were Romanians and should be part of Greater Romania; they were Moldovans and should constitute one of the peoples of the Soviet Union. These were elite projects, as nation-building projects usually are, and rarely were the masses addressed, other than with demands of what they should learn and how they should behave. Depending on the individual's own ethnic or political background, social class or religious denomination, nation-building policies were received differently. Hence, it is not surprising that the core Moldovan population of today has diverging views on who they are and how they should shape their common future, both on a national and on an international level (cf. King, 2000: 230). While this might not be surprising, it raises uncertainties regarding what constitutes the *polity*.

The divisions regarding national identity in Moldova have been dealt with in a number of studies, and these can be elucidated by examining respectively the extremes of Moldovanism, the belief in a separate Moldovan nation, and Romanianism, where the Moldovans are a part of the Romanian nation, but with different markers of identity (Cărăuș, 2003; King, 2003; Solomon, 2000; van Meurs, 2003; Zgureanu-Gurăgață, 2007). Moldovanism, draws upon the old Soviet idea of a separate Moldovan nation as first laid down with the establishment of MASSR in 1924 (Ihrig, 2008: 169). Since independence Moldovanism has found strong political supporters promoting the idea of a Moldovan nation. Among these we find President Snegur, as well as his successors, Lucinschi and Voronin (King, 2003: 64). Moldovanist positions come in different guises. Staunch Moldovanists would hold that the Moldovan language is different from the Romanian. They would argue that while Moldovan and Romanian are offshoots of the same Latin branch of languages, they have become separated (Stati, 2003: 12; 2010: 5). Provided that the languages are different, the proponents of Moldovanism can logical-

ly make the case for a separate people developing from a separate language (even if half of the old Moldovan fiefdom is now part of Romania), and, therefore, for a sovereign Moldovan state. Following this line of argument, Romania has occupied a part of the historical western parts of Moldova rather than lost the eastern part.⁸¹

This is clearly a convoluted claim and immediately draws attention to the fact that Moldovan and Romanian can hardly be considered two different languages. If the separateness of the language is questioned, then the idea of a unique Moldovan people becomes much more difficult to entertain. The PCRM government's Moldovanist claims from the early 2000s thus became an issue of distancing Moldova from Romania, with all the political complications this created. The strongest proponents of a separate Moldovan nation are, however, to be found in PMR (van Meurs, 2003), which has relentlessly argued for the uniqueness of the Moldovan people and continues to use the Cyrillic alphabet for the language, just as during Soviet times.

To staunch Moldovanists, if a less strict Moldovanist attitude is pursued, it serves to deny the Moldovan nation in favor of the Romanian. This leads us to the Romanianist view on the core nation of Moldova: if the people are Romanian, speak Romanian, have the same traditions as Romanians, then they should also be part of Romania. This line of argument has, from time to time, also been embraced by Bucharest (cf. Moldova.org, 02/12/10).⁸² While Romania was the first government to recognize Moldova as a sovereign state in 1991, it seems to consider Moldova as stolen from the Romanian motherland and created through the schemes of Stalin (cf. Baconschi, 01/22/10). The Romanianist line of argument, however, is hard to apply within the Moldovan political context, since it evokes memories of interwar Romanian rule and the fear of again ending up under Bucharest's jurisdiction – in a way that mirrors how Romanianists remember the Soviet created famine and deportations of the 1940s. Generally speaking, the pro-Romanian parties have not been able to attract more than approximately 10 percent of the electorate since the demise of the Popular Front in the early 1990s.

Depending on whether one subscribes to the Moldovanist or Romanianist view of national identity, there are numerous questions related to history, politics and culture that need to be addressed. These issues are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and there are indeed some overlapping areas. Furthermore, once either a Moldovanist or Romanianist position is chosen, there

⁸¹ A good example of this perspective is Vasile Stati's book *Istoria Moldovei în date* (1998), which has a map of the historical Moldavian fiefdom on its front cover.

⁸² In 2006 Romanian President Basescu clarified that he did not foresee the unification of the two states, but that through Moldovan accession to the EU, there would be a "transmutation of the entire Romanian nation" and then "it would be possible to speak of two states, one nation, and one system" (Azi.md, 1/24/06). Other similar statements have led commentators to conclude that Basescu considers Moldova (or rather Bessarabia) a part of Romanian territory (cf. Amariei, 2/2/06).

also follow specific foreign policy considerations. A Moldovanist stance as applied by Lucinschi, for example, mitigated a foreign policy of close Eastern and Western ties, but this could just as easily have taken the form of a neo-Soviet Moldovanism with Russia as the most important partner, as was the case during the first half of PCRM rule following its electoral victory in 2001. For the Moldovanist, Romania is regarded as the country that once annexed Moldova and is hence considered an enemy. For the Romanianist, Romania is a bridge westwards and the country with which, minimally, close and special relations should exist and, maximally, the issue of union is prominent on the agenda, as during the period when the Popular Front was at its strongest.

Generally, however, Moldova's geographic location and economic and energy dependency on both West and East has forced Moldovan politicians to try to strike a balance between the positions of the Moldovanist and Romanianist camps. This has caused ambivalent stances on a number of important foreign policy issues such as integration in CIS structures and continued EU reforms. While the dominant strand of national identity can, at any one time, determine the political agenda and direction of developments, the opposing strand can hinder progress if it perceives that the other camp's policies have been taken too far. Such was the case with the failure of the Romanianist Popular Front to unify Moldova with Romania. On the other side of the spectrum, the same fate befell the PCRM in 2002 as the party attempted to solidify Moldovanism, through a Moldovan writing of history, and strive towards much closer ties to Russia and Belarus. It is, moreover, plausible that it was the national identity issue that tipped the scale in favor for some of the parties later constituting the *Alianța pentru Integrare Europeană* (Alliance for European Integration, AIE) when they managed to win the early elections after the tumultuous political year of 2009. While Moldovanism is not incompatible with EU integration, there seem to be difficulties in pushing ahead with a western agenda without giving due consideration to the eastern partner Russia, which to some is regarded as the liberator from the Turkish and Romanian yokes. Depending on how national identity is formulated, i.e., Moldovanist or Romanianist, Russia and Romania can either become partners or adversaries.

The above analysis on contradicting nationalisms serves as background to a description of the political landscape of Moldova and provides a rough introduction as to how parties position themselves. According to the textbook understanding, derived from the left-right division established in parliament during the French revolutionary era in the late eighteenth century, the Moldovan political spectrum reflects history and geography rather than ideology. There are, however, no major ethnic parties, and different ethnic groups have been represented in all parties of the legislature. The fault line instead runs between perceptions of the core nation and diverging views of whether the nation is Moldovan or Romanian (Protsyk and Osoian, 2010:

15). Because of developments in Moldova over the course of twentieth century, any party promoting right-leaning values runs the risk of being regarded as Romanian nationalist and intolerant (depending, of course, on one's own political stance). A socialist or social democratic stance is, meanwhile, regarded as favoring Moldovan nation- and statehood, tolerant, and, usually, with an eastward, Russian, orientation.

The Moldovan experience shows that the striving of the national movements which Hroch (1993: 6) describes, from the point where they start discussing their own identity, to conceiving of it as a nation-to-be, and then to persuading people around them of the supremacy of the nation, is an arduous task. Nation-building is an elite project, based on the work of writers, artists and thinkers, forwarded by politicians and received and reproduced by the people. While the Moldovan elite has succeeded in establishing a state of its own, it has failed to build consensus around the very substance of the nationalistic project. It has brought together a people who, on the one hand, acknowledge that they constitute a people, but, on the other hand, cannot specify who the members of the nation are. Returning to Hughes (1993: 154) in Chapter 3, we can observe that this creates a specific problem in which neither the *ins* nor the *outs* relate to the nation as if it were a separate group.

Consequently, how Moldovans understand their individual and national identity greatly affects how they are inclined to view political parties. Choosing between either a Romanian or a Moldovan identity, with its related nation-building projects, may mean that “[i]f you speak ‘Romanian’ chances are great that you vote for democrats, if you speak ‘Moldovan’ you vote for Communists” (Heintz, 2007: 20). While what the languages are called is a matter of choice, it returns us once more to the question formulated by Duncăciu, i.e., *who are we?*

Cine suntem noi?

The question of “who are we?” does imply subscribing to a certain version of the past, folklore and values, but behind the question of a common past lies the more urgent need for a vision of a common future. Politics is a matter of power relations in order to attain certain goals. If the people are divided, then the task of working towards specific aspirations is made more difficult. Thus nation-building addresses the question of how to arrive at a common future based on a certain defined past. The meandering nation-building and nation-denying efforts of the Moldovan majority population, itself divided, contributed to the reactions of the Slav and Gagauzian minorities, created grounds for regional identities to be promoted and strengthened and came to shape post-independence political life for years to come. As the very existence of a Moldovan people (and thus the legitimizing basis for Moldovan statehood) was questioned, activities such as stating one's identity

or promoting a political program that might have an impact on the interests of the nation, became difficult in practice (cf. Protsyk, 2007: 12). Over time the state language has come to be referred to as “the state language”, a vague paraphrase that removes the possibility of conflict over adjectives, but does nothing to address the complex underlying conflict. Following this line of reasoning, the population should accordingly be thought of as “the state population” and the state simply as “the state”. While this is an interesting theoretical exercise and indeed might go far in installing a true civic nation and making nation-states superfluous, the avoidance of certain sensitive terms does not resolve the underlying identity dispute. In the following chapter we will examine how the core nation’s disputed identity has come to set the parameters for the evolution of political conflicts. Evidently, the conflict over identity reached its peak during the time of the independence struggle, but the conflict fault lines never receded and continued to play an important role during the following two decades.

Chapter 5 focuses on how national identity has affected political developments. This is done by dividing the twenty-year period between 1989 and 2009 into five segments based on their main characteristics.⁸³ The first phase, 1989-1993, centers on the nationalist upheaval of the independence movement and the reactions this caused among regional minority groups, and it ends with the demise of the pro-Romanian forces. Here it is possible to talk about conflicts between the majority population and the minorities even if, as we will see, the Transnistrian region has an ethnic character not very different from Moldova proper.

The second phase, covering 1994 to 2000, began with then President Mircea Snegur’s launching of *Casa noastră* (Our Home), which definitely marked the establishment of a Moldovan state separate from the Romanian, thereby opening the way for closer relations with Russia and CIS structures. Snegur’s approach was later shared by his successor Petru Lucinschi and continued during the latter’s term at the helm of state. Both Snegur’s and Lucinschi’s presidential terms were thus marked by attempts to strengthen Moldovan statehood, continued market economic and democratic reforms, and improved relations with Moscow.

⁸³ Naturally, timelines like this may be constructed in different manners and from different perspectives. While the aim here has been to devise a timeline that captures the main strands of identity, it should be acknowledged that a change of perspective also changes how the different periods are defined and labeled. Hence, Stepanov (2010: 524ff) tracing the ethno-political stages of Moldova proper from a minority point of view calls the first period, from 1980s to mid 1990s, the stage of *self-expression*; the second stage, from 1994 to 2000, is the time of *reconsideration*; the third stage, between 2001 and 2005, *the time of thaw* (and between 2004 and 2005, even *the time of hope*); a still unconcluded stage begun with the riots of April 2009, which the author labels *the time of shock*. What makes Stepanov’s timeline different from what is proposed here is mainly that it does not set out to capture how national identity has fluctuated over the years, but, out of a Moldovanist approach, to show how Moldovanism either has been strong or weak.

In 2001 the eastward turn seemed to become even more pronounced as the Communist Party came back to power, and the First Secretary of the PCRМ, Vladimir Voronin, was elected president. Voronin began his term in office by attempting to fulfill his electoral promise of closer eastward ties, wherein the idea of a Moldovan nation separate from the Romanian had a prominent role.⁸⁴ The first phase of PCRМ rule, from 2001 to 2003, was marked by attempts to bring back certain elements of the old Soviet system such as the administrative division of the country and the custom of government directly appointing local representatives instead of voters directly electing them. Moreover, an effort was made to change school curricula by introducing Moldovan history, instead of Romanian, and ensuring Russian education. These initiatives met strong opposition by pro-Romanian forces, led by the heirs of the old Popular Front, the PPCD, and definitely came to an end in 2003 as Voronin, very late in the process, refused to sign the Russian-brokered deal on Transnistria. By necessity PCRМ had to modify its foreign policy and, therefore, also its position on some domestic issues. National identity thus became of secondary importance.

Between 2003 and 2007, a softer form of Moldovanism emerged. The idea of a separate Moldovan nation was promoted, but not as strongly as before. With the cooptation of the PPCD by the PCRМ after the 2005 elections, there was for some time no strong pro-Romanian force in Moldovan politics. A pro-European (pro-EU) orientation was initiated under the PCRМ government, but implementation of the EU-Moldova Action Plan was slow. With issues of national identity more in the background during this period, Moldova was rather characterized by its stability and economic development than for its unresolved identity conflict.

Between 2007 and 2009 the PCRМ restarted an approach to the East and Russia, affected by the political and economic cost of worsening relations to Moscow. The earlier installed Russian trade embargo on Moldovan wines and foodstuffs was removed, and talks on Transnistria resumed. After the 2007 local elections, in which the office of Chişinău's mayor was won by the young and charismatic Dorin Chirtoacă of *Partidul Liberal* (Liberal Party, PL), conflicts over identity between the capital and the government arose from time to time. In the 2009 parliamentary elections, national identity was once more at the center of politics in a way that it had not been since the early 1990s. By this time the PPCD was completely marginalized by the pro-Romanian electorate, who instead turned towards PL and its leader Mihai Ghimpu. Tensions culminated in the riots of 7 April, when both the parliament building and the presidential palace were looted and destroyed. This deepened the rift within Moldovan society and brought back the confronta-

⁸⁴ These Moldovanist ideas were fully spelled out in the 2004 *Nationality Concept* where the Moldovan identity was declared "state-forming" and the Romanian appeared as number six among the ethnic minorities (March, 2007: 611).

tional atmosphere of the early 1990s. After early elections in July, it became clear that the PCRМ would have to step down and make way for AIE, a coalition consisting of four parties that formulated as their joint goal continued democratization and integration into European structures. However, not even the Alliance would break with Russia, and much daily business was conducted as before. However, with Ghimpu as acting President, the pro-Romanian orientation was strengthened and relations with Moscow were at times strained.

5. Politics of National Division

While inter-ethnic accord rather than violent conflict has been a recurrent theme in Moldovan society, the issue of national identity has nevertheless been highly present in political life. Party politics has, to a considerable degree, been divided according to identity politics rather than, for example, social class, placing it squarely within the conflict nexus of language (King, 2000: 160; Protsyk and Osoian, 2010). The strands of national identity upon which these ideological differences are based were earlier discussed in Chapter 4. Even if the political landscape has evolved over twenty years of independence, the three main divides, as presented by King (2000: 131ff), remain: i) those adhering to the pan-Romanian camp, primarily the offspring of the old Popular Front; ii) Moldovanist parties with their base of support among old leaders of collective farms and the agricultural industry who are attempting to balance a position between east and west; and iii) minority parties striving for closer relations with Russia and longing for the old Soviet order of things. Each of these orientations implies quite fundamentally different and contradictory views regarding the Moldovan nation and, consequently, very different political programs.

The presentation is structured chronologically according to the main strands of identity politics pursued, keeping the initial focus on the identity issue as the main demarcation line as presented at the end of Chapter 4. The first phase occurs from 1989 to 1993, marks the height of pro-Romanian sentiments in Moldova and includes the Gagauz and Transnistrian conflicts.⁸⁵ Thereafter follows “Casa noastră, 1994-2000”, which covers the early years of a more institutionalized Moldovanism. “Moldovanism with a Soviet face, 2001-2003” deals with the PCRM electoral victory and the promotion of an even more pronounced form of Moldovanism. Next “a softer form of Moldovanism: 2003-2007” describes the results of changed PCRM policies and the lack of a strong pro-Romanianst political alternative. Finally, “the return of identity conflict: 2007-2009” describes how identity politics once more

⁸⁵ Admittedly, the period from 1989 to 1993 is a complex one, and it is not so simple as to say that it is characterized by purely Romanianist or Moldovanist orientations. Nevertheless, the reason to keep this time frame is because it facilitates showing how pro-Romanian sentiments were at their strongest between 1989 and 1991, experienced a downturn with the declaration of independence in 1991 and, finally, came to a definite halt after the Transnistrian civil war. By the end of 1993, the former Popular Front movement had been reduced to a shadow of its former self.

became a central theme on the Moldovan political agenda. Table 5, on following page, was compiled in order to capture the main national elections between 1991 and 2009 and to put the parties within an electoral context.

Nationalism and Re-active Nationalisms: 1989-1993

During the final decade of the Soviet Union's existence, it became increasingly apparent that the state socialist system had to be reformed. The economic performance of the USSR had been falling for decades, political support was diminishing and the weakening of Marxist-Leninist ideology through *perestroika* (restructuring), the attempt to invigorate Soviet economic and political policy, caused a crisis of legitimacy rather than the intended strengthening (Lane, 1996: Ch. 8). Coupled with the policy of *glasnost* (openness), implying a relaxation of censorship, Mikhail Gorbachev, then General Secretary of the Communist Party and a strong proponent of the reformist line, began a process to open up and liberalize society. It would become the last attempt to reestablish Soviet legitimacy and catch up with Western progress. The consequence, however, was that the national republics observed Moscow's loosened grip, and a process started that would end only with the fall of the USSR.

Ronald Suny has described the derailing of Gorbachev's political program as "hijacked...by massive demonstrations of ethnic nationalism, interethnic conflict, and a seemingly irreversible movement toward independence by the non-Russians" (Suny, 1998: 462). Nationalistic sentiments also ran high in the MSSR, beginning in 1987, but it was not the Moldovan nation that was promoted initially. Moldovanism, the idea that the Moldovans constitute a distinct people, was rendered defunct early in the independence movement and regarded as Soviet-imposed and false. Instead, pan-Romanian sentiments increased in strength. This created a situation in which the Romanian flag represented the nation for a period, and the Romanian anthem *Deșteaptă-te, române!* (Awaken thee, Romanian!) was officially sung until replaced in 1994 by *Limba noastră* (Our language).

The Moldovan independence movement grew out of the *Cenaclul Literar-Muzical Alexei Mateevici* (Alexei Mateevici Literary and Musical Club) and the *Mișcarea Democratică pentru Susținerea Restructurării* (Moldovan Movement in Support of Restructuring), which were not political parties but rather informal groups of intellectuals. In the beginning these organizations met and voiced concerns on topics such as environmental problems, but they soon turned to much more politically sensitive issues such as the illegality of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the fact that Romanian and Moldovan were the same language, and the view that Moldovan should be declared state language (cf. King, 2000: 127ff; Singurel, 1989). In May 1989 the Moldovan Movement and the Alexei Mateevici Club, together with other groups,

Table 5. *Presidential and parliamentary elections, 1991-2009*

Year	Type	Candidates	Percentage		Mandates
1991	Presidential Elections	Mircea Snegur (sole candidate)	98.17		
1994	Parliamentary Elections	Agrarian Democratic Party	43.18		56
		Socialist Unity	22.00		28
		Peasants and Intellectuals	9.21		11
		Alliance of the Christian Democratic Popular Front	7.53		9
1996	Presidential Elections		1st round	2nd round	
		Petru Lucinschi	27.7		54.0
		Mircea Snegur	38.8		46.0
		Vladimir Voronin	10.2		
		Andrei Sangheli	9.5		
		Valeriu Matei	8.9		
1998	Parliamentary Elections	Party of Communists	30.01		40
		Democratic Convention	19.42		26
		Movement for a Democratic and Prosperous Moldova	18.16		24
		Party of Democratic Forces	8.84		11
2001	Parliamentary Elections	Party of Communists	50.07		71
		Braghiș Alliance	13.36		19
		Christian Democratic Popu- lar Front	8.24		11
2005	Parliamentary Elections	Party of Communists	45.98		56
		Democratic Moldova	28.53		34
		Christian Democratic People's Party	9.07		11
2009	Parliamentary Elections (April)	Party of Communists	49.48		60
		Liberal Party	13.13		15
		Liberal Democratic Party	12.43		15
		Alliance "Moldova Noastra"	9.77		11
	Early Parliamentary Elections (July)	Party of Communists	44.69		48
		Liberal Democratic Party	16.57		18
		Liberal Party	14.7		15
		Democratic Party	12.54		13
		Alliance "Our Moldova"	7.35		7

Source: e-democracy.md, King (2000: 158)

united in the Popular Front. The political influence of the Popular Front increased rapidly. On August 27 1989 the Front alone rallied 300,000 to 500,000 people to Chişinău to demand that the Moldovan language in the Latin script become the state language in the MSSR. This was realized four days later through the adoption of a new language law by the Moldovan Supreme Soviet. Deadlines were set for when state employees had to demonstrate proficiency in the state language (King, 1995: 22). The election of Mircea Druc, a prominent Popular Front spokesman, as Prime Minister in 1990 was a strong signal to Moscow of the strength of the Front at this time.

Attempts were made by the Communist regime to control the situation, and as late as April 1990 Petru Lucinschi, then First Secretary of the *Partidul Comunist al Moldovei* (Communist Party of Moldova, PCM), who had replaced the much-criticized Semion Grossu, called for a roundtable meeting between the PCM and the new political movements which had sprung up in Moldova (Crowther, 1991: 199). For those wanting to retain the old order, these roundtable talks manifested the hope of liberalization while maintaining the socialist union in some form, but the regime proved unable to control either the pace or the scope of reforms. In February 1991 Lucinschi was succeeded by the reformist Grigore Eremei, who stayed in office until the declaration of Moldovan independence by parliament in August of the same year. By the time Eremei took office, however, power over the republic had, in effect, been passed on to parliament and President Mircea Snegur, previously chairman of the Supreme Soviet (King, 2000: 191).

Because of the broad and inclusive themes reflected in early Popular Front activities, even some minority groups participated in the protests of the titular population. The minority organization *Gagauz Halkı* (Gagauz People), for example, was represented at the founding congress of the Popular Front (cf. Webster, 2007: 57). It was not long, however, before the Frontist agenda was changed to the much more sensitive issue of uniting Moldova with Romania, which served to sever inter-ethnic accord.⁸⁶ Thus the height of Romanian nationalism in Moldova also marked a low in inter-ethnic relations. The call for Russians to leave the country, formulated as *chemodan, vokzal, Rossiia!* (suitcase, train station, Russia!) by nationalist

⁸⁶ This also caused problems in relations with Ukraine and not only because of how it could affect the political and geographical situation in western Ukraine. Kiev, at the time, feared that if they consented to any border changes with Moldova, additional claims to Ukrainian territory could also be put forth by, for example, Hungary. To counter any attempts to alter the Ukrainian borders, the Rada passed a law on public association, making illegal any activity that could threaten the territorial integrity of the state (ELAW, 6/16/92: art. 4). Even though the likelihood of such border adjustments decreased, the topic continued to be on the agenda for some years, especially during the Transnistrian conflict when speculation arose that Ukraine might be interested in trading Transnistria, where many Ukrainians live, for the old Bessarabian territories (Minahan, 1998: 191). This would have included contemporary Moldova and the territories directly north and south of it. However, these speculations neither materialized into any concrete political action nor spawned similar Hungarian reactions.

groups, was an example of how quickly the situation had deteriorated (Munteanu, 2003: 214).⁸⁷ These calls were followed by attacks on Russian-speakers and authorities by Frontist supporters (Skvortsova, 2003: 184).

As a reaction to the activities of the Popular Front, *Edinstvo* (Unity), an organization furthering the position of the Russian language in Moldova, was established in 1989 (Crowther, 1991: 194). In a wider Soviet context, *Edinstvo* was a part of the all-union Interfront (Internationalist Front), which aimed at countering the independence movement in the republics. Demands furthered by *Edinstvo* included the recognition of Russian as an equal state language should Moldovan achieve that status, resistance to changing to the Latin script, and opposition to the ethnic nationalism that was considered a threat to Soviet unity. In Transnistria Russian workers started to organize within the framework of the *Ob'edinennyi Sovet trudovykh kollektivov* (United Council of Workers' Collectives, OSTK), which demanded "parity" between the Russian and Moldovan languages (Socor, 1989: 33). OSTK spread throughout Moldova but was mainly located in the Transnistrian region. As its self-proclaimed main goal OSTK had a "more just nationality policy" (Crowther, 1991: 195). Kolstø (2000: 139) has pointed out that, more than anything else, Transnistrian managers were worried about losing their direct link to Moscow and their own power base should Moldova become independent.

The Gagauz conflict

Representation of the minority group in Gaguzia was mainly done through the earlier mentioned *Gagauz Halkı*.⁸⁸ Initially, it was a cultural organization, but it also came to include members of state and party elite in southern Moldova. To minority groups such as the Gagauzians, who had strong ties to the Russian and Soviet cultures, the prospect of ending up in an enlarged Romanian state did not appeal. In November 1989, against the will of the central power in Chişinău, the Gagauz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was declared by an Extraordinary Congress of Gagauz deputies (Webster, 2007: 63f). The small Gagauzian city of Comrat was named capital.

According to the official view in Chişinău, Gagauzians did not constitute a people but rather an ethnic group, and as such they had no rights to national sovereignty. Neither were they considered an indigenous population, since this could have provided them a certain claim to the land they inhabited. This hard-line approach did little to appease the Gagauz. After the election of Popular Frontist Mircea Druc as Prime Minister in May 1990, tensions

⁸⁷ As argued by Munteanu (2010: 23), the radicalization of the Popular Front served to create a more pluralistic political arena as some of the Frontist leaders chose to leave for other right and center-right parties.

⁸⁸ Two other Gagauz movements, *Birlik* (Unity) in Ceadăr-Lunga, and *Vatan* (Homeland) in Vulcăneşti, later united within the *Gagauz Halkı* (Webster, 2007: 58).

increased even more. On 19 August 1990, the earlier-declared autonomy was expanded as a Gagauzian Soviet Socialist Republic was proclaimed. Two months later elections to the Gagauzian Supreme Soviet were announced. Because of these developments, Gagauz Halkı was declared illegal, and Druc encouraged Moldovan nationalist “volunteers” to stop the separatists’ ambitions. Some 40,000 volunteers came to heed Druc’s call (Webster, 2007: 70). Strong support for the Gagauz cause came both from the Edinstvo and OSTK in Transnistria (Socor, 1990: 10). As the volunteers travelled to the Gagauzian territories in busloads in October 1990 to stop the separatists, a civil war was only avoided by the intervention of Soviet interior ministry troops. In August 1991 Gagauzia declared itself independent.

During the more violent Transnistrian conflict, Gagauzia was not directly involved in the fighting but did nevertheless become part of general political developments there. Presumably, there were close contacts between Comrat and Tiraspol, both “capitals” striving to foil the pro-Romanian plans of Chişinău. The power struggle between Chişinău and Comrat did, however, continue for some time. In the early 1990s, Gagauz leader, Stepan Topal, strove to attain as much sovereignty as possible while Chişinău tried to suppress such ambitions. When Snegur, during the Transnistrian conflict, declared a state of emergency in March 1992, Topal never recognized this and instead countered with a Gagauzian state of emergency and created a national security council and committees to monitor its application within the Gagauz communities.

In 1994 as pan-Romanian nationalists lost ground in the parliamentary elections, inter-ethnic relations improved and the conflict between Chişinău and Comrat grew calmer. A further step of reconciliation was taken as Gagauzia, albeit belatedly, allowed the 1994 parliamentary elections also to be arranged within Gagauzian communities. In January 1995 President Snegur promulgated a law, passed by Parliament the previous month, granting the Gagauzian people a far-reaching autonomy in five enclaves where they formed a majority (Gurr and Haxton, 2000; Neukirch, 2002). Thus *Gagauz Yeri* (the Gagauz Land) was formally established and territorial incorporation into the new political entity was decided after local referenda. Although there have been political confrontations between Chişinău and Comrat since then, none have been so serious as to threaten the integrity of the state.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ One such confrontation revolved around the 2002 *Başkan* (Governor) elections, when a Communist governor was elected after being openly supported by the PCRM President (Johansson, 2003: 38). Another example of when Comrat and Chişinău were not in agreement on policies was the 2008 recognition by the Gagauzian parliament of the independence of the two secessionist republics in Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which Moldova did not recognize (Regnum.ru, 9/19/08).

Transnistria Secedes

The conflict between Chişinău and Tiraspol became much more serious than the Gagauzian conflict (Kolstø, 1998). In the 1989 Soviet census the Transnistrian population totaled 601,660, where Ukrainians (28.3 percent) and Russians (25.5 percent) together made up a majority of the population, but Moldovans (39.9 percent) were the single largest ethnic group.⁹⁰ Transnistria, with its political roots stretching back to the 1924 MASSR, was always considered more loyal to the Soviet cause by Moscow than the Western parts of the country. Hence, a dominant part of Moldovan industrial facilities were placed in the region, and a majority of the political elite was recruited from there. Moreover, the Soviet 14th Army, meant to push down through the Balkans in case of a Third World War, was based in what is now the left-bank's unrecognized capital, Tiraspol.⁹¹ In Moldova after the Second World War, the privileged status of this region was illustrated by the saying *pentru ca să fii ministru – tre' să fii de peste Nistru* (in order to become minister, you have to be from the other side of the Dniester) (Munteanu, 2003: 208). When the USSR came to its end, this assumption of greater Transnistrian loyalty to the Soviet cause proved correct.

The secessionist process began as Transnistrian irregulars step by step seized Moldovan installations such as police stations throughout the region. With the tacit support of the 14th Army, weapons and ammunitions proliferated. In 1990 the *Pridnestrovskaia Moldavskaia Respublika* (Dniester Moldovan Republic), or PMR, declared independence from Moldova proper and stated that it wanted to sign a new Union Treaty with Moscow directly. During the August 1991 coup attempt, which tried to reverse the dismantling of Soviet power, PMR was on the side of the putschists, while Chişinău supported Gorbachev, who had become the first and only President of the Soviet Union in March the same year.

On 28 March 1992, as mentioned above, Snegur decided to declare a state of emergency, a move that caused confusion at the time and raised tensions between the left and right banks of Moldova considerably. Snegur likely felt that the situation was getting out of control and, by increasing international attention, hoped to include the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). However, the political perils were considerable. First, the

⁹⁰ In the PMR census of 2004, the total population was reported to be 555,347 and the different ethnic groups were Moldovan (31.9 percent), Russian (30.4 percent) and Ukrainian (28.8 percent) (*Analiticheskaia zapiska. "Ob itogakh perepisi naseleniia Pridnestrovskoi Moldavskoi Respubliki 2004 goda"*, 2006).

⁹¹ The 14th Guards Army, as its full name read, included in 1991 four motor rifle divisions. Of the four rifle divisions, only the 59th Guards Motor Rifle Division, including the 1162nd Anti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment, was stationed in Transnistria. The headquarters were initially in Chişinău but were moved to Tiraspol in 1980. In wartime, the 14th Guards Army would have consisted of some 80,000 to 100,000 soldiers, which meant a peacetime staffing of 5 to 15 percent of those numbers.

risk of worsening relations with Moscow was obvious, and the state of emergency triggered the heightened interest of Russian national patriotic forces in Moldovan events. Even if Russian President Boris Yeltsin had stated that he was going to fight against both right and left extremist forces in domestic politics, he found himself increasingly bound to protect the Russian diaspora abroad. PMR was one such region where Russians resided, and Yeltsin reacted accordingly. Second, another consequence of the declared state of emergency was that the 14th Army increased its level of attention and began to improve its positions and capacities in order to counter a possible military strike from Chişinău.

In June 1992 Chişinău attempted to retake Bender from the separatists. Although situated on the right bank of the Dniester, Bender consisted of a population that had opted to join the PMR in a referendum held against the will of the central power. While Chişinău was provoked by PMR insurgents, the attack on Bender escalated the conflict and sharply raised the stakes even more. Although Russia had taken a balanced approach on how to deal with the rapidly escalating situation in Moldova, there was little doubt regarding Moscow's reaction if Russians were to be subjected to a direct assault.⁹²

When Russian troops intervened on the side of PMR irregulars, a stalemate ensued and the conflict, in effect, became frozen. Later the 14th Army was renamed the Operational Group of Russian Forces (OGRF). According to the OSCE summit in Istanbul in 1999, the OGRF was due to leave in 2002 (OSCE, 1999), but it has remained. A number of settlement initiatives have been launched, and talks between the Moldovan and PMR parties, including Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE, while frequent, have not led to any major breakthroughs. The original negotiating format was later expanded to include the US and EU as observers. Thus far only a portion of the troops and military material has been removed, and it is likely that Russian forces will remain in the region for a considerable period of time.⁹³

⁹² Moscow's position on the Transnistrian conflict was initially undecided. Firstly, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense did not always seem to agree on what policy to pursue (Lynch, 2000: 114). Secondly, it was not only the Ministries that were unable to agree on an approach. While Yeltsin took a more balanced approach to the conflict, he also had to pursue a certain policy line because of Russian domestic politics, i.e., to show that Russia would protect its diaspora abroad. Thirdly, further complicating the situation was the fact that Yeltsin was on a US state visit when the Bender attack occurred. This left the reins to Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy. Rutskoi (who in September 1993 would be Yeltsin's main opponent in the constitutional crisis that ended with the military storming the Parliament on Yeltsin's orders) had a much stronger view on Russia's responsibilities in its near abroad and would certainly not let Russian forces stand idle as Russians in a former Soviet republic were being attacked. In a public gathering in Bender in April 1992, Rutskoi openly declared his support for the separatists (*Russia VP supports Transnistria's right to independence* 1992). Hence, the eventual full support of the 14th Army on the side of the separatists should not have come as a surprise to Chişinău.

⁹³ For researchers trying to grasp the complexity of the Gagauzian and Transnistrian conflicts, the causes are often debated. Some have chosen to regard both conflicts as ethnic (Crowther, 1991; Dima, 2001; Kaufman, 2001; Lamont, 1995). Kolstø (1998; 2002), on the other hand,

The Immediate Regional Consequences of the 1992 Conflict

At the height of the Transnistrian conflict, some analysts proposed that the PMR, together with other territories along the rim of the former Soviet empire, for example, a Crimean republic, could constitute a chain of Russian external states. However, as suggested by Portnikov (03/20/92), Russia probably has more to gain by keeping Moldova intact geographically and divided politically than having an independent Russia-oriented state in the form of a new enclave a la Kaliningrad. By preserving Moldova's territorial integrity, Russia can continue to influence Moldovan political and economic affairs considerably, and a re-unification with Romania, which was on the agenda in the early 1990s, will not take place while the PMR is within Moldovan borders. By stopping short of formal recognition, moreover, Russia need not take official responsibility for its nationals in the region. Even if the room for maneuver of the PMR leadership is restricted by geopolitical realities, Tiraspol has exerted a certain degree of its own political will and has, at times, gone against Moscow's interests. While there is always the possibility that this frozen conflict will unthaw, to be resolved either peacefully or violently, no move in this direction will take place without the tacit support or outspoken involvement of Moscow.

In addition to the Russian reaction, the Transnistrian conflict caused considerable unrest in both Kiev and Bucharest. Bucharest did support Moldova with arms, and there were also an unknown number of Romanian volunteers who joined Moldovan forces. However, despite strong rhetoric and feelings of solidarity for its perceived Romanian brethren, Romania had neither the

has instead stressed the multifaceted origins of the civil war and the prolonged stalemate along the Dniester, and Katchanovski (2001: 241) has suggested that ethnic and linguistic factors cannot explain regional cleavages and conflicts without taking into account historical experiences. It is likely, as suggested by King (2000: 177), that "ethnic conflict" became a convenient label for outsiders to quickly grasp and categorize what was going on in Moldova. As in any conflict labeled ethnic, it is hard to tell what sprung from group identity issues and what actually had other causes. For political purposes Yeltsin, Lebed and the Tiraspol elite, chose to regard the Transnistrian conflict as ethnic, making easier the justification for Russian intervention and strengthening the argument for separate Transnistrian nation- and statehood. To Moldovan and Western powers and institutions, the ethnic label has come to be regarded as a hindrance in finding a solution to the conflicts. Interestingly, the Council of Europe and the OSCE, describe the Gagauzian conflict in ethnic terms while the causes for the Transnistrian conflict are labeled non-ethnic (Hill, 2006; Meyer, et al., 2006). Munteanu (2003: 226) quotes an OSCE observer as saying that "the main reason for the secessionist demands [in PMR] is not ethnic, but political and ideological". Munteanu consequently argues that ethnic conflicts such as the Gagauzian may very well be easier to resolve than political conflicts such as the Transnistrian, "especially when there are also external pressures in favor of a settlement". If we were to accept the above categorization of conflicts, this could indeed be true for Moldovan case. However, this argument runs contradictory to the conclusions reached by Elster, Offe and Klaus (1998: 249f), who maintain that cultural cleavages are harder to resolve than socio-economic since they do not allow for "splitting the difference" It also ignores the entire formation of Moldova's party system, which is structured, sometimes too narrowly, on ideas of the nation.

political will nor the resources to get involved in a conflict with Russia, Ukraine and possibly Hungary, which could attempt to reclaim Transylvania if territorial borders started to be called into question.⁹⁴

In Kiev the Transnistrian conflict created a perceived need to control Bucharest's intentions and prevent the potential creation of a Greater Romania. For Ukrainian President Kravchuk, it spawned serious domestic problems as 1992 alone saw the arrival of 72,000 Transnistrian refugees to Ukraine (Goodhand, 2001: 42). Moreover, the crossing of Cossack volunteers through Ukrainian territory to support the PMR separatists was a source of concern in Kiev, and attempts were made to curb it as early as 1991 (Kolstø, et al., 1993: 991). While Ukraine had sided with Moldova and Romania against Russia initially, Kiev, given its own sensitive relations with Moscow, found it increasingly difficult to circumvent Russian interests. The meeting between Yeltsin and Kravchuk in Dagomys, Russia on 23 June 1992 was a sign that Russia and Ukraine would put certain differences behind them for their common good, even if Dagomys was the beginning of negotiations between the countries rather than the conclusion (Kolomayets, 06/28/92; Zaborsky, 1995). This common good included convergent positions on military and economic issues, of which the question of the Russian Black Sea fleet at in Crimea and strategic nuclear weapons were among the most important, but it also included a shared view on the Transnistrian conflict (Kolstø, et al., 1993: 991). Whether it was for the common good of Moldova is doubtful.⁹⁵

Casa Noastră: 1994-2000

After pro-Romanian sentiments had receded, the political scene opened up to more moderate politicians such as presidents Snegur and Lucinschi. This implied a strengthening of the Moldovan nation, the diminishing urgency of talks regarding union with Romania and closer relations with Russia and the CIS.⁹⁶ Since 1991 *Partidul Democrat Agrar din Moldova* (The Moldovan Agrarian Democratic Party, PDAM) had managed to draw together many

⁹⁴ Romanian media did, however, exert considerable pressure on President Iiescu during this times, calling for greater involvement by Romania in Moldova, but, as argued by Berenznitskaya (3/20/92), economic realities and the desire to integrate in the European community reduced for the likelihood for Bucharest to intervene militarily on the side of Chişinău.

⁹⁵ For a more detailed discussion of the Transnistrian conflict and its evolution until 2006, see Johansson (2006).

⁹⁶ As has been pointed out by Neukirch (1996: 108ff), the Moldovan *nomeklatura* had little incentive to embrace a union with Romania. The political elite was heavily Russified and came mainly from the old Communist Party, albeit with a reformist agenda. The bureaucracy, where civil servants had little to no command of the Romanian language, was in a similar position and feared what would happen to them should a union come to pass. Finally, the agro-industrial complex feared losing their influence if Moldova were to turn towards Romania.

leading politicians from the agricultural and agro-industrial elite (King, 2000: 154f). Within this group, where former communists constituted a majority, Moldovanist currents ran strong, and the integrity of the Moldovan state was emphasized. The Moldovanist approach became even more pronounced after the *Casa noastră* (Our Home) speech made by Snegur prior to the 1994 elections, in which the existence of a Moldovan people was directly linked to the legitimacy of a Moldovan state.

The 1994 parliamentary elections occurred one year ahead of schedule because of the need to end the political crisis caused by the Transnistrian and Gagauzian conflicts. To avoid the risk of a boycott by the PMR and Gagauzia and the consequent failure to fill all legislative seats, the entire country was constituted as one national constituency (Legea nr. 1609-XII cited in *Buletin informativ*, 2007: 5). On the one hand, this made it possible to create a parliament that could, in fact, run the country. On the other hand, it eliminated the possibility for regional representation, and was, therefore, opposed by the Gagauzians. At first Comrat objected to holding elections within the autonomous region, but finally approved and thereby allowed for closer future relations with Chişinău. In the elections PDAM won an overwhelming victory, collecting 43 percent of the votes which converted into 56 out of the 104 legislative seats. The pro-Romanian parties, comprised of the electoral blocs *Țăranilor și Intelectualilor* (Peasants and Intellectuals) and *Alianța Frontului Popular Creștin Democrat* (Christian Democratic Popular Front Alliance), were together unable to garner more than 20 mandates. However, the bloc *Partidul Socialist și Mișcarea "Unitate-Edinstvo"* (Socialist Party and the Unity Movement) managed to win the support of 22 percent, equaling 27 mandates. This bloc opposed both extreme Romanianist and Moldovanist calls, nostalgic for the Soviet past and opting for close association with CIS structures (e-Democracy, 1994).

On 6 March 1994 the parliament approved Snegur's proposal to hold a referendum regarding the future of the Moldovan state. The referendum, strangely called a "sociological poll", aimed to secure Moldovan statehood and national integrity by holding a "council with the people". The question posed to Moldovan citizens was whether they wanted Moldova to remain an independent neutral state, free to pursue political and economic ties with all countries of the world. Out of the 75 percent who turned out, 95.4 percent approved (cf. King, 1994: 357), which, although the referendum question was ambiguously phrased, was interpreted as a clear sign that the people were against union with Romania. On 8 April 1994 the Moldovan parliament ratified the country's 1991 accession to CIS. A gradual reorientation to the east began. Moldova's economic dependency on Russia became obvious, the 14th Army remained in Transnistria, and the west could not offer a strong enough economic and political counterbalance. Moldova by itself, and especially given the outcome of the Transnistrian conflict, could thus not claim its international rights. The same year the Romanian national anthem, in use

since 1991, was replaced by the neutral *Limba noastră* (Our language). Moldovan continued to be the name of the state language in the new constitution, adopted on 27 August 1994, but the previous demand for state employees to be able to speak Moldovan, a law that had been in place since 1989, was removed. It is noteworthy that the PDAM legislature had managed to keep Snegur from having anything to do with designing the new constitution (Way, 2002: 130). This was even more surprising since the PDAM was Snegur's own party.

The reorientation of Moldovan politics towards the east was, however, not without opposition. During the spring of 1995, students demonstrated against the introduction of Moldovan as the state language in the 1994 constitution and demanded the return to Romanian (Kolstø, 1997: 69). An additional reason for the protests was the replacement of "History of the Romanians" with the "History of Moldova" in the curriculum at Chişinău State University (King, 2004: 81, fn. 13). In April of the same year, Snegur proposed that parliament change the name of the state language in the constitution back to Romanian, but this was eventually turned down by the legislature. On the other side of the Dniester, in Tiraspol, the entire debate was regarded as yet more proof of Moldova's imminent union with Romania. In October the conflict over language and history once again reappeared on the agenda as students took to the streets protesting against the introduction of "History of Moldova" and "Moldovan language" in education. Despite of these pro-Romanian manifestations, parliament eventually turned down Snegur's language proposal in 1996.

In the 1996 Presidential elections, Snegur found himself defeated in the second round by PDAM candidate and speaker of parliament Petru Lucinschi. At the time Lucinschi may have been perceived as younger and more energetic than Snegur, but like Snegur, he was from the old Soviet party school, something he applied to his advantage. In addition to being younger, Lucinschi could thus also use his old Communist credentials and a more pro-Russian approach to reach out to the leftist electorate and minority groups (Quinlan, 2000: 6). In his inauguration speech, Lucinschi declared the need to continue with democratic reforms and the difficult negotiations to find a peaceful solution on Transnistria. Internationally, Lucinschi tried, as his predecessor before him, to find a tenable position for Moldova between its much larger neighbors. Additionally, the institutional struggle between parliament and the president, which was a feature of Snegur's term in office, continued. As a former speaker of parliament, Lucinschi may have thought that he would be more successful negotiating with parliament than his predecessor. This was not to be the case.

In 1999 the government started to come apart as the center and right parties could not come to terms with the reform policies to which they had previously agreed. Prime Minister Ciubuc, a defender of continued reforms, resigned, and as he was replaced by previous Minister of Reform Sturza, it

looked likely that the reform process would continue along the same lines. However, it was not long before the Sturza government also fell under joint pressure from the PCRM and the main heir of the Popular Front – the *Fron-tului Popular Creștin Democrat* (Christian Democratic Popular Front, FPCD).

Meanwhile, the conflict between the parliament and president grew more severe. In 1997 President Lucinschi had tried to impose on the parliament a number of measures that would increase his political influence. In 1999 the conflict worsened. By launching an initiative for a referendum, Lucinschi hoped to find a way to change the constitution and increase his powers. The question posed by the referendum was phrased as “Do you support changes in the constitution in order to introduce a presidential form of rule in Moldova, where the president forms the government which is responsible for ruling?” According to official figures, above 50 percent of voters approved Lucinschi’s initiative, but exact results were never released.⁹⁷ Based on the alleged results of the referendum and in order to strengthen his grip on power, Lucinschi proposed a draft law wherein the president would appoint and remove cabinet ministers. Furthermore, the presidential mandate would now run for five years, instead of four, and the number of parliamentarians would be reduced from 101 to 70 (Azi.md, 05/24/99; Roper, 2008: 120). Lucinschi’s proposal on constitutional amendments was, however, met with a counterproposal from the parliament, one which won widespread approval within the legislature and was passed with 90 percent of the votes. This was not surprising considering that it implied increased powers for the parliament by moving the election of the president directly under the jurisdiction of the legislature. The Constitutional Court, moreover, opposed Lucinschi’s attempt to push through a referendum and ruled that it was only the parliament that could propose constitutional amendments. A similar verdict was provided by the Venice Commission, which, while not completely endorsing the parliamentary proposal, did state that it fell within democratic norms (Jowell, et al., 12/20/00). In the end an amendment to the constitution was made, which stipulated that the president should no longer be elected by popular vote but by a two-thirds parliamentary majority, thereby sowing the seeds for the constitutional crisis that left Moldova without an elected president in 2009.

When the time came to elect a new president, the legislature could not reach consensus, even though there had been a general understanding in the parliament to identify a neutral candidate. For this reason Pavel Barbalat, Chairman of the Constitutional Court, had been proposed by all parties in the legislature. However, once the amendment was passed, the PCRM saw the

⁹⁷ However, other sources claim that about 60 percent had voted in support of the referendum question, but the turnout was two percent lower than the stipulated threshold of 60 percent and thus the referendum was declared invalid (Munteanu, 2010: 33).

chance to push through its own candidate, party leader Vladimir Voronin, earlier Minister of the Interior in the MSSR. Despite three attempts, none of the candidates was able to secure the 61 votes needed to be elected president. However, since Voronin received 59 votes in the first round, it was clear that he was the parliament's most popular candidate. By PCRМ forcing their candidate upon parliament and rejecting Speaker Diacov's appeal to nominate a neutral candidate, either parliament would be forced to elect Voronin or Lucinschi would use his mandate as president to dissolve parliament. Lucinschi eventually dissolved parliament, and early elections were called in 2001.

Although the 1990s had been a period when the former Communist party and other leftist forces diminished greatly in importance, they did not leave the political scene. *Blocul electoral "Partidul Socialist și Mișcarea Unitate-Edinstvo"* (Electoral Bloc "Socialist Party and the Unity Movement," BePS-MUE) won 22 percent in the parliamentary elections of 1994, but its supporters consisted mainly of ethnic minorities (cf. Bugajski, 2002: 907). As such it never had the potential to grow beyond a certain level and to compete with the more inclusive Communist Party, which managed to reach out to all ethnic groups, and it soon lost its earlier position among the electorate.

While the Moldovan Communist Party was banned from politics with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, it had numerous offspring. The largest and most successful of these became the reconstituted Communist Party itself, under the slightly changed name of *Partidului Comuniștilor din Republica Moldova* (Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova, PCRМ). Under the leadership of Vladimir Voronin, PCRМ was able to make a political come-back in the local elections of 1995, running on a shared ticket with *Partidul Socialist* (Socialist Party, PS). Soon, however, PCRМ was able to stand on its own and began to win votes from an electorate tired of economic reforms gone awry and longing for what was perceived as the socially and economically secure Soviet times. Because of the ban earlier, PCRМ had the benefit of a fresh start and won over large parts of the PS electorate. This did not have a major impact in the 1995 elections, when PDAM continued to defend its position, but the situation changed with the elections of 1998 and 2001. During the 1998 campaign PCRМ exploited the dire economic situation and declared its intention to improve living conditions, increase salaries and secure work for everyone, appealing to Soviet nostalgic sentiments. This yielded PCRМ slightly above 30 percent of the votes, resulting in 40 of the now 101 seats in the unicameral parliament. During the 2001 parliamentary campaign three years later, PCRМ added possible membership in the Russian-Belarusian union to its list of electoral promises. Voronin's statement, shortly after having been elected president in 2001, that Moldova was to become the "Cuba of Europe" if Communist rule was threatened (March, 2004: 516) was a message for voters who had supported the party that the PCRМ government would not be hindered by anyone. It also indicated, however, that policies might change drastically from then on.

Moldovanism with a Soviet Face: 2001-2003

In the 2001 parliamentary election campaign, PCRM, pursuing a similar strategy as in 1998, appealed to the electorate with promises of social stability and reunification of the country. The reforms of earlier governments would be abandoned, contacts with Russia improved, even to the point of possibly joining the Belarus-Russian union, and the Transnistrian conflict resolved. Pensioners were one of the main target groups for the PCRM's message was, attracted by what could be described as older generational values. This message had an even stronger electoral impact since so many among the younger working age population had migrated.⁹⁸ The campaign paid off, and the PCRM won a landslide victory, capturing 71 out of 101 seats in the parliament. This gave them an overwhelming majority and the power to both form the government and elect the president. Moldova thus became the first of the Post-Soviet states to bring an unreformed communist party back to power by means of popular vote.

While the PCRM's second term in the legislature and executive were relatively stable, the first four years were characterized by the same kind of turmoil and conflict that marked Snegur's and PDAM's attempts to strengthen the Moldovan state and nation. It turned out that not even with a 70 mandate parliamentary majority could the PCRM rule entirely as they saw fit. One conflict unexpectedly evolved over the Russian settlement plan for Transnistria, the so-called Kozak memorandum. While the Kozak memorandum attempted to resolve the Transnistrian conflict, it was in exchange for a politically complicated federative model that would have allowed Tiraspol and Comrat to block the Moldovan parliament (Coppieters and Emerson, 2002; Roper, 2004).

Another major conflict involved the issue of identity. PCRM introduced a forceful brand of national identity politics to support Moldovan statehood combined with a stronger grip over the administration and attempts to control civil society and media. An administrative reform, which revised the 1998 administrative division of the country and aimed at increasing the central government's control over regional matters, went against the strong recommendations of the CoE but was met with popular support (March, 2004: 515). The PCRM's identity policy, involving the introduction of "History of Moldova" and Russian language education, implied a move away from the previously taught Romanian version of history, a return to what some perceived as the Soviet myth of Moldovanism and a political and cultural orientation eastwards. The old conflict from Snegur's time was thus rekindled. Furthermore, by introducing government-sponsored NGOs and labor unions, there was an attempt, albeit not a very successful one, to control civil society

⁹⁸ However, support for the PCRM was also generally strong among the Russian-speaking minority, who, although supportive of democratization, voted for the PCRM to oppose "the resurgence of Romanian nationalism" (Horn, 2006: 207).

(Azi.md, 11/10/03). Finally, state television came directly under the control of the Communist regime, and although print media still reflected a multitude of different opinions (in most cases directly related to the political parties sponsoring them), they lacked the nationwide coverage of national television.

The first conflict, with Russia over Kozak memorandum, came at great economic and political cost to Moldova and was a personal defeat for Voronin. It turned the political orientation of the country towards the West and reintroduced EU integration onto the agenda. Westward, however, there was another brewing conflict with Romania, due specifically to the attempts to strengthen Moldovan identity. Here cultural aspects became intertwined with the political and had serious consequences for relations between the two countries. One serious disagreement involved the respective churches. The Bessarabian Orthodox Church was subordinate to the Romanian Patriarchate in Bucharest, while the Moldovan Orthodox Church was subordinate to the Russian Patriarchate in Moscow. This conflict had been ongoing for almost a decade when the PCRM government came to power in 2001. In 1998 the Bessarabian church had filed a complaint at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), but it now received renewed attention and was framed in terms of Bucharest attempting to move into the parishes of the Moscow metropolitanate. On the one hand, this was a church conflict between Bucharest and Moscow. On the other hand, it was the manifestation of several Moldovan governments' fears that recognition of the Bessarabian church would increase Romania's influence in Moldova (Turcescu and Stan, 2003: 464). In July 2002, one day before the deadline set by the ECHR, the Bessarabian church was finally recognized.

The greatest social unrest during this time however, was caused by the previously mentioned change in history curricula and the introduction of the Russian language in schools. Protests were led by PPCD party leader Iurie Roșca.⁹⁹ Demonstrations began on 9 January 2002 and initially gathered several hundred to a few thousand participants. On 13 February the media reported four to five thousand demonstrators in the central square of Chișinău, *Piața Marii Adunări Naționale*. This increased tenfold towards the end of February when approximately 40 to 50 thousand people gathered in the square in front of the government building – some sources counting 80,000 participants (Waters, 2002: 4). From 31 March demonstrations ran both night and day, and Roșca felt confident enough to raise threats to overthrow the Communist government. An April resolution from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) contained a number of the issues raised by the opposition during the demonstrations, including a moratorium on both the teaching and status of the Russian language and

⁹⁹ According to Skvortova (2003a: 2) these protests against the change of history curricula and language education caused an increase in PPCD financing by Romanian supporters.

changes to history education (PACE, 04/24/02).¹⁰⁰ Roșca felt that the demonstrations had achieved their objectives and called them off, but he declared that the people might once more be brought to the streets if need be (Azi.md, 04/29/02).¹⁰¹

A Softer Form of Moldovanism: 2003-2007

The conflict with Russia over the Kozak memorandum forced the PCRM government to reorientate its priorities. Shifting its previous eastward tilt, the PCRM now started to propose a western EU-orientation in the run up to the 2005 parliamentary elections. Although this was a complete turnaround, the electorate seemed to accept it, and the opposition was deprived one of their main arguments. The PCRM's most serious opponents during the election campaign were the middle-right alliance *Blocul electoral Moldova Democrată* (Democratic Moldova Electoral Bloc, BMD) and the PPCD. The BMD bloc, in turn, consisted of the *Partidul Democrat din Moldova* (Democratic Party of Moldova, PDM), the *Partidul "Alianța 'Moldova Noastră'"* (Alliance 'Our Moldova', AMN), and the *Partidul Social-Liberal* (Social-Liberal Party, PSL). Other smaller, primarily minority, parties such as *Patria-Rodina* (Motherland) and *Ravnopravie* (Equality), were left of the PCRM on the ideological spectrum, disapproved of the PCRM's turn towards the EU and were generally understood as being supported by Moscow.

This type of support for political parties by Moscow could take many forms such as access to Russian media with its strong position in Moldova, official Russian statements in favor of a candidate, high-level visits and financial support. Russian support was also allegedly provided to AMN, one of BMD's constituent parties, and its party leader, Chișinău mayor Serafim Urechean (cf. Socor, 03/13/05). A plausible reason for this was that Russia wanted to weaken the PCRM, because of its westward turn after Voronin rejected the Kozak memorandum, and create a fractioned parliament unable to continue negotiations on Transnistria. No love was lost between the PPCD and the BMD, who both competed to be the main anti-Communist alternative for opposition voters and did their best to discredit each other (Azi.md, 03/09/05; Boțan, 02/17/05).

The 2005 elections received a great deal of attention from the international media at a time when Moldova was expected to be another potential stag-

¹⁰⁰ The same PACE resolution also demanded that the Bessarabian church should be immediately registered.

¹⁰¹ A PACE resolution later in September noted that while most of the issues raised in the April resolution had been addressed by the Moldovan government, there still were shortcomings, and the text thus contained warnings to the Moldovan government not to stray from general democratic procedures (PACE, 9/26/02).

ing ground for a color revolution, of the kind which had earlier swept through Georgia, Ukraine, Serbia and Kyrgyzstan. On election day 500 international observers were present along with another 2,500 local observers, which helped ensure thorough coverage of around 1,400 out of 1,970 polling stations (OSCE/ODIHR, 2005: 3). The elections resulted in the PCRM securing 56 mandates and once again becoming the biggest party in parliament. Almost immediately, the already fragile unity of the opposition was further compromised as PDM declared that it would leave the BMD. PDM, according to its leader Diacov, would be better suited to promoting social democratic values outside the electoral bloc. Hence, BMD was now in practice dissolved.

With 56 mandates PCRM could form a government but needed another five mandates in order to elect the president. After negotiations had taken place between PCRM, PPCD, PSL, and PDM, Vladimir Voronin finally began his second term as President of Moldova. What came as a surprise to many, especially in light of the previous pro-Romanian demonstrations and strong anti-Communist statements, was that the PPCD decided to support Voronin, contrary to previous statements by party leader Roşca that new elections were preferred to electing Voronin as president (Johansson and Westerholm, 2005). This move was initially understood as a necessary measure to ensure continued stability, keep democratic reforms and EU integration on track and deny Russia additional leverage if a weak parliament were to be formed (Socor, 2005). The AMN refused to take part in the election of Voronin as president, in line with what they previously had declared. In the newly elected legislature, PPCD came to function as an informal coalition partner to PCRM. While it is clear that the government and opposition thus struck deals far beyond party ideologies, the move probably saved Moldova from a tumultuous re-election that may have created an even more unstable situation.

The Return of Identity Conflicts: 2007-2009

The 2005 and 2009 elections both took place under PCRM rule. Generally, they were declared as adhering to international standards by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) missions. At the same time, however, it was reported that the ruling party had abused its position by influencing or coercing state media to provide positive media coverage on the PCRM and that PCRM-controlled localities used administrative resources to promote the party (Boţan, 05/19/09). The 2007 local elections, however, were an indication of political changes as the PCRM lost some ground. Out of 34 district councils, the PCRM came to control 11, while the opposition held 14 district councils plus the city of Chişinău. In

another eight district councils no clear majority was observable (Socor, 2009b).

The political landscape had changed quite considerably since the 2005 elections. As the PPCD lost influence, *Partidul Liberal* (Liberal Party, PL), with its party leader Mihai Ghimpu, who had a background in the Popular Front, and his young charismatic nephew Dorin Chirtoacă, moved up among the pro-Romanian electorate (Socor, 2009a). Their anti-Communist and strongly pro-Romanian message was primarily supported by the younger urban electorate and among the diaspora abroad. More to the center stood Vlad Filat's *Partidul Liberal Democrat din Moldova* (Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova, PLDM), with a liberal ideology and clearly against the Communists but with a more moderate stance on the pro-Romanian issue (Socor, 2009a). PLDM was established in 2007 as Filat left the PDM in order to create a new party. It quickly became one of the major opposition parties in Moldova, with strong support throughout the country. The third main opposition party was the AMN, led by Serafim Urechean, which had been one of the main anti-Communist parties in the 2005 elections and had also shown good results in the 2007 local elections. In the 2009 elections, however, it seemed that the AMN had lost its leading anti-Communist position to the more energetic and outspoken PL and PLDM. The AMN decline may also have been caused by the decline of the Moldovanist current, which the party represented, in favor of more pro-Romanian and pro-European messages (Ghinea and Panainte, 2009: 111). PDM, the fourth key opposition party, gained significant support only in the July elections, following Marian Lupu's becoming party leader after leaving the PCRM in the wake of the April 2009 turbulence. In its earlier ideological form, the PDM had been a centrist party with both left and right influences. With Lupu as the driving force, PDM now managed to tap into the electorates of both the PCRM and, most probably, the AMN. Among the minority groups, Lupu was well regarded and generally viewed as a more moderate politician compared to the leaders of the other opposition parties.

In the spring of 2009 many observers and opinion polls predicted a PCRM victory, but one which implied either consultations with other parties or the possibility of new coalitions to form a government and elect a president (cf. IPP, 2009a: 46).¹⁰² Much of the opposition parties' campaigns were based on this assumption and on the belief that the PCRM would do anything to stay in power, even falsify the elections if needed. In the run up to the election, the PCRM campaigned as the party of stability that had overcome numerous crises and as the only true choice for continued develop-

¹⁰² According to the same IPP survey, however, in March more than one-fifth of voters had still not decided for which party they would vote.

ment.¹⁰³ One noticeable feature of the campaign was the increasing polarization of political positions and of the electorate based on identity on a scale not seen in the republic since the 1990s (IMEDIA, 03/10/09).

On 6 April, as the Central Electoral Commission published the nearly final results, it became clear that the PCRM would emerge as the winner, initially even seeming to have received the crucial 61 mandates allowing the party to elect the president unilaterally (Bivol, 04/06/09), but the final tally gave the PCRM 60 mandates.¹⁰⁴ The opposition immediately called for protests in Chişinău's central square *Piaţa Marii Adunări Naţionale* against what it perceived as massive falsification of the electoral results. The demonstrations began peacefully. As the opposition prepared for new demonstrations the following day, appeals to join the protests were also circulated through the Internet social network Twitter (Amnesty International, 09/04/08). The number of people joining the protests in the central square far exceeded what the organizers had predicted. Instead of some 300 protesters, sources estimated the number of participants at 30,000, most of whom were youths. The demonstrations soon split into two parts – a peaceful manifestation held in the central square and a full scale riot raging between the Presidential Palace and the Parliament (Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu, 2009: 138). Eventually, both of these buildings were looted and partially destroyed in what later became known as the *Twitter Revolution*, a possibly misleading moniker as few Moldovans at the time were members of the social network and as the label tends to draw more attention to the communication technology than to the causes for the unrest (Damian, 03/15/11; Parmentier, 2010: 93).

As order was restored, it became evident that a full revolution would not follow. What did follow, however, were massive breaches of human rights as police cracked down hard, often without legitimate grounds, on those suspected of having taken part in the riots. Three deaths were reported as were numerous cases of torture and mistreatment (BBC News, 04/20/09; CoE, 2009). The PCRM government portrayed the riots as an attempted coup d'état by the opposition acting in concert with foreign forces.¹⁰⁵ The

¹⁰³ The televised electoral advertisements for almost all the parties who ran can be found on the webpage for the April 2009 parliamentary elections of e-Democracy (2009a).

¹⁰⁴ According to their procedures the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) published an early statement declaring that the elections had met many international standards but far from all (OSCE/ODIHR, 2009). What this meant in practice was that elections day had been conducted without major disturbances and shortcomings but that the period leading up to it had not. These shortcomings included the unfair use of administrative resources by the ruling party (which to some extent also adhered to the localities where opposition members were in power), a deficient voter register and the manner in which state media, especially TV, was used to promote the PCRM. In Moldovan state media this message was transformed so that the IEOM had concluded that the elections had been conducted according to international standards.

¹⁰⁵ These “foreign forces” accused for what had passed were mainly identified as the Romanian state, Serbian citizens and an American NGO working in Moldova (Bonet, 09/04/13).

opposition blamed the government for having caused the destruction themselves in order to win popular support, claimed that electoral fraud was behind the PCRМ's 60 mandates and pointed to the human rights abuses as the government's way of instilling fear. The end result was that divisions within Moldovan society were further aggravated. Many came to regard the April riots as a planned putsch, while others saw it as a peaceful manifestation with random elements of violence. A July 2009 poll further showed that 26.9 percent of respondents blamed the government for having instigated the riots. The opposition was seen as guilty of the turmoil by 27.2 percent (IPP, 2009c).

For the PCRМ their 60 mandates sufficed to form a government, but they lacked the one crucial mandate to elect the president. This single vote, or the "golden vote" as it came to be called, was initially considered by many politicians and analysts as relatively easy to secure from among one of the opposition parties. In light of the 2005 elections, after which the PCRМ succeeded in securing the five votes it needed in order to elect president, this assumption did not seem too far-fetched. What surprised many was that the opposition held together and walked out during the elections of president in both May and June, leaving the PCRМ without a quorum. Former Prime Minister Zinaida Greceanii, running as the primary candidate in both presidential elections, could thus not be elected.

Because of the parliament's inability to elect a new president, early parliamentary elections were called for 29 July. The April riots cast a shadow over Moldovan society, and the political class became absorbed with laying the blame at the feet of their opponents.¹⁰⁶ The 29 July elections revealed increased support for PLDM and a decline for PCRМ and AMN. With Lupu at the helm of PDM, PCRМ lost one of their strongest candidates, and PDM enjoyed a surge in popularity that could only be related to Lupu. The PL, meanwhile, held on to the same number of mandates as in the April elections. The number of votes cast for parties that did not manage to enter parliament was much smaller than in the April elections, indicating how the electorate had further consolidated their votes in favor of only those parties expected to pass the five percent threshold. Immediately after the elections, the opposition parties PLDM, PL, PDM and AMN formed the *Alianța pentru Integrare Europeană* (Alliance for European Integration, AIE). The AIE's combined 53 mandates allowed them to appoint a government, but once again fell short of the 61 mandates needed to elect president. Two attempts to elect Lupu as President in November and December 2009 failed. Instead PL party leader Ghimpu, by virtue of his role as Speaker of the Moldovan

¹⁰⁶ Both the PCRМ government and the PL produced their own documentaries on the riots and its causes (cf. *Adevărul despre 7 aprilie*, 2009; *Ataka na Moldovy*, 2009), with diametrically opposite claims and allegations against their political opponents. PCRМ blamed the opposition for what had occurred, while PL regarded the riots as instigated by the government.

Parliament, became Acting President. This in and of itself led to numerous conflicts over identity between Romanianist and Moldovanist camps in society and within the AIE government. At the end of the year, PSD party leader and former prime minister Dumitru Braghiș concluded that the April events had created a dangerous inter-ethnic division within Moldovan society that could potentially threaten the integrity of the state (Omega, 04/13/09).

Twenty Years of Identity Politics

Gagauzia and Transnistria were the first direct consequences of pursuing nationalist policies, but even as these conflicts subsided and were partly transformed, the question of language remained. Indeed Gagauz autonomy and the “freezing” of the Transnistrian conflict did not address the roots of the respective problems. Even during times when questions of identity were not prominent, they lingered in the background and provided a potential call to arms for those seeking support for specific political programs. To many Moldovans the right and left bank conflict of the early 1990s remains a mystery. It was regarded as a fight between the same people who did not have much interest in continuing it, although the idea of the future state was different as was the question of who should govern it and how.

Nation-building policies in Moldova, such as language laws, the revision of history and the creation of national symbols, have generally met with little success. This is partly explained by the fact that two nationalisms, Moldovanism and Romanianism, have competed to build the nation. The nation-building tools presented by Norman (2006) are, therefore, only possible to apply within a framework of competition and disparate messages. Language policies were regulated initially, as proficiency in Romanian was first made mandatory, but this policy was never implemented and was later revoked. The granting of citizenship was liberal and included all inhabitants of Moldova at the time of independence. School curricula, on the other hand, has proven to be a battleground for different ideas on history and language. The writing of a national history, as nation-building strategy, in which liberators and oppressors are usually distinguished (cf. van der Veer, 1996), is hardly feasible in the Moldovan context where consensus is lacking.¹⁰⁷ For similar reasons it is doubtful that military service serves manages to reach out to all ethnic groups and instill within individuals any deeper feeling of patriot-

¹⁰⁷ It is thus easy to understand why O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986a: 30) strongly recommend that debates on historical “truths” should not be dealt with when they seem as most pressing. With incompatible claims on how past events should be comprehended, the future may not be shaped. This is not to say that truth commissions and similar arrangements do not have their place in transitional democracies, but a recognition of the complications involved when any, at least majoritarian, consensus on past events is absent.

ism.¹⁰⁸ The civil war likely created more uncertainty for Moldovans regarding their identity than it functioned as the basis for national myth-making. Other historical conflicts are likewise hard to incorporate unambiguously into the psyche of the Moldovan people, since the separation of friend from foe cannot be easily made. National symbols and holidays have been adopted, but they exist side by side with old Soviet holidays such as Victory Day on 9 May.¹⁰⁹ Streets have been renamed, especially in larger communities, but old names remain in many smaller localities as do old Soviet symbols and monuments. While the national media, i.e., television and radio, helps disseminate the government's message, the messages of different successive governments have been contradictory rather than reinforcing. In those moments when Moldovan athletes have achieved international successes, it is likely that these have been instances of national pride, regardless of from which side of the Dniester they hail.

Twenty years after the first large demonstrations took place under the auspices of the Popular Front, Moldova has been transformed in many sectors to a society quite different from the one that emerged from the ashes of the Soviet Union. However, regarding the old conflict over national identity, there has been little movement. It has not necessarily been a struggle between ethnicities as in the Balkan conflicts, but rather a struggle over identity and on the majority population's understanding of whom they are. The pro-Moldovan or pro-Romanian stance has become the main dividing line that separates the different political parties. In this way political ideologies are determined by ideas of identity rather than, for example, issues of economic redistribution. With the burning parliament in the background during the riots of April 2009, one informant concluded "this [referring to the ongoing riot] I have not seen since the independence struggle". The fault lines of national identity had thus re-emerged and with renewed strength.

The Moldovan case demonstrates how difficult it is for a country to democratize when the nation itself is divided and when opposing interests' policies are irreconcilable. At the same time, Moldova does show that democratization is possible. Moldova initially fared well on Beetham's (1992) transition spectrum, but it eventually lost momentum and began to slide back and forth between the poles. After the first wave of Romanianism subsided in the early 1990's, politicians largely seemed to accept the borders of the

¹⁰⁸ Out of the approximately 30,000 men reaching military age annually, 2,605 joined the military in 2010, and 86.3 percent of these were registered as ethnic Moldovans (Ministry of Defense of Republic of Moldova, 08/04/10). This overrepresentation of the core nation within an institution, which does not comprise a great number of citizens, can only marginally foster feelings of a collective "we".

¹⁰⁹ Such ambiguities can lead to rather awkward situations, such as on May 2010 when Chişinău's liberal mayor Dorin Chirtoacă congratulated veterans who had fought for both the Soviet and the Romanian side during the Second World War (IMEDIA, 05/07/10). Hence, former enemies were thanked for their services to the country over which they had fought each other.

new state, and the parties adjusted their messages accordingly even though the basic conflict over national identity remained unresolved. However, beyond the heated discussions over whether the core nation was Moldovan or Romanian, it is worth recalling the institutional balance that forced both presidents Snegur in 1994 and Lucinschi in 1999 to back down from their attempts to enhance executive power. While democracy during the 1990s was not secure, the balance between the executive and the legislature was such that both institutions could keep each other in check. When this element was removed in the 2000 constitution, the system unraveled and pluralism decreased.

Nevertheless, if we apply the Schumpeterian ([1943] 1992) definition of democracy as a method of reaching political decisions through elected representatives who compete for the electorate's votes, then Moldova had already become a democracy after the first parliamentary elections. Even if Huntington's (1991) two-turnover test is applied, Moldova has done well since political power has changed hands repeatedly. In the next chapter, we will examine what the minimalist and maximalist approaches to the operationalization of democracy in Moldova reveal about its political regime.

6. Democracy from Above

As with most other countries in the region, the history of democracy in Moldova is short. Even if the “golden democratic periods” of interwar Central and Eastern Europe are dubious objectively and more myth than reality (Bunce, 1995a: 89), the memory of a democratic past proved an important factor for future democratization efforts for many of the region’s countries. Other than the Moldavian People’s Republic of 1917, democracy on Moldovan territory had only been briefly organized from Bucharest, and not without its flaws, and in 1991 it did not offer much inspiration beyond the unionist solution.

Democracy can be estimated in different ways, with either maximalist or minimalist approaches to its operationalization that are translated into indices. Most of these, in one way or the other, relate to Dahl’s model of polyarchy. In terms of data, the more inclusive the estimation becomes, the more difficult it is to compare large numbers of countries. While more data offers richer information, it also implies more qualitative judgments, leaving the door open for criticism as to whether estimates in one country are really comparable to those in another. Preferable to a focus on measurements and indices may be the effort to examine specific cases in order to provide a narrative of democracy. Here the aim is to combine information from indices, which allows for the tracking of changes annually, with an overview of polyarchy similar to presentation in Chapter 5 but further expanded. This combination of different approaches, combining a review of process with generalization, mitigates some of the shortcomings of utilizing just one source of data (cf. Denzin, 1970: 301ff; Munck and Verkuilen, 2002: 28).

This chapter begins with a more detailed presentation of how the Moldovan state functions in general. Thereafter, we examine estimates of the level of democracy as measured by the four indices introduced in Chapter 3, namely *Polity IV*, Vanhanen’s *Index of Democracy* and the two Freedom House indices *Freedom in the World* and *Nations in Transit*. The first two indices employ minimalist definitions of operationalized democracy, while the latter two use maximalist. Finally, the main institutions of polyarchy, as defined by Dahl (1971) and operationalized by Coppedge and Reinicke (1990) in their *Polyarchy Scale*, are applied. This allows for a discussion regarding the framework for public opposition and political participation, which are central pillars of democracy. Variables included to measure polyarchy are *free and fair elections*, *freedom of organization*, *freedom of expression*, *alternative*

sources of information and *the right to vote*. For each of these variables, Coppedge and Reinicke created a Guttman scale to allow for differentiation of conditions (see Appendix C). The strength of the Guttman scale, for an exercise such as this, is that it makes it possible to rank phenomena rather than assigning variables with relative weights. In this way the categories function as summaries of polyarchy institutions. If we take *free and fair elections* as an example, this would imply a three-tiered scale which differentiates between i) elections without significant or routine fraud or coercion, ii) elections with some fraud or coercion and iii) no meaningful elections. Similar distinctions are made for the other variables. However, as Coppedge and Reinicke (1990: 57) admit, their scale is crude and is unable to account for all the peculiarities of single countries or even differentiate between countries considered to be on the same level of polyarchy.

In their original application, Coppedge and Reinicke eliminated *the right to run for office* from their list of variables due to data constraints, but they argued that it was similar to the suffrage variable. Later, the suffrage variable was also dropped since it was considered too general.¹¹⁰ In the present study, however, we have included the suffrage variable as it facilitates analysis of the Moldovan diaspora in the context of the country's political process. Another aspect that requires mention is that the variables used here are treated as a summary of approximately twenty years' data. Polyarchy is thus not measured during a specific year but as a composite estimation over a longer period of time. Each section further expands on the elements described in earlier chapters in order to provide the basis for the polyarchy ratings. Coppedge and Reinicke's polyarchy scale has been slightly modified here for the *freedom of organization* and *freedom of expression* variables. Half-points have been included in the measurement scales for these variables in order to add a level of nuance, as it was decided that full points would have resulted in measurements that were either too harsh or too mild. Measurements for other variables were kept in full points. At the end of each variable, Coppedge and Reinicke's summary statements, as found in Appendix C, are provided. Because of the difficulty of developing a scale that still is sensitive to country specific conditions, it was decided here to adjust the *freedom of expression* variable summary to better reflect Moldovan realities. At the end of the chapter, the results from the polyarchy variables are summarized, and the scores are compared to other countries as well as to the results gained from the democracy indices.

¹¹⁰ While it is reasonable to exclude the suffrage variable because of its universal character, it has also been criticized for not taking account of informal ways of restricting the right to vote (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002: 11). Hence, it was decided here to keep the suffrage variable for matters concerning its actual implementation.

Form of Government

Despite the country's lack of political experience, or perhaps as a result of it, the Moldovan political system reveals rather unique characteristics in comparison to other states. One particular characteristic of the political system, as concluded by Mazo (2004: 2), is that Moldova is the only state in the world that has changed from a semi-presidential system to a parliamentarian without first experiencing a serious systemic crisis. When Mircea Snegur was elected president in 1991, a new post-Soviet constitution was not in place. It was the old constitution instead that initially formed the main legal document regulating governance. Since the presidency was not included in the Soviet constitution, the newly installed presidency was superimposed upon the old functioning structures. The fact that the 1994 constitution was drafted exclusively by parliament, without any influence from the sitting president, made it plausible that parliament would seek to reduce the constitutional powers of the president and constitute Moldova as a parliamentary democracy. This assumption, however, did not prove to be correct. Instead of expanding its mandate, parliament vested strong executive powers in the president.¹¹¹ The resulting relationship between the executive and the legislature was not a harmonious one, and parliament continued to survey the actions of the presidential office closely and often suspiciously.


This power struggle between president and parliament thus created a balance of power, which may be argued to have been a guarantee for democracy (Mazo, 2004). Because of power sharing between the executive and legislative institutions, neither could increase its power at the expense of the other. When presidents did try to increase their powers, members of parliament responded by uniting together regardless of where they stood on the political spectrum. This dynamic ensured a certain balance more than it facilitated parliament and president working in accord (Roper, 2008). In 1999, however, this balance was threatened by a struggle over power between president and parliament. The conflict between President Lucinschi and the legislature had reached such levels that either one or the other institution would have to give in. As described in Chapter 5, Lucinschi did his best to increase his control over parliament. In the end, however, parliament secured greater control over the presidency through a constitutional amendment which provided for election of the president by parliament rather than by direct vote. Thus the special institutional framework "patronal presidentialism", suggested by Hale (2005) to explain how other post-Soviet states have oscillated between democracy and autocracy, did not fit the case of Moldova in the 1990s. During the first decade of Moldovan independence, it was the institutionalization of the power balance between legislature and executive that

¹¹¹ However, even if parliament did support the establishment of a strong executive, it was still not the type of presidential powers that it has been argued that Snegur was envisioning. (cf. Cimpoesu, 2010: 62).

ensured democracy, rather than elites succeeding each other at set intervals. Hale also seems to recognize this fact and notes that his framework is applicable to all post-Soviet republics, with the exception of the three Baltic states and Moldova.

In Figure 5 below, the Moldovan form of government from 2000 onward is drawn schematically.¹¹² As shown at the bottom of the figure, the electorate chooses their representatives in parliament by vote. Parliament then elects the head of state (president). The head of state names the government, headed by the prime minister, which is then approved by parliament. Implementation of policies is carried out through the central administration. The six judges of the Constitutional Court should, at least in theory, be independent in its judicial role of passing judgement on presidential decrees and legislation as needed. However, since two judges are each appointed by the president, the parliament and the Supreme Council of Magistrates, this effectively implies that a party which dominates the legislature also controls the executive and therefore also may influence the Constitutional Court.¹¹³ With a strong party holding a two-thirds majority in parliament, Moldova had indeed become more stable than before, but it ran the risk of losing its fragile democratic credentials.

Figure 5. Moldovan form of government



Model by the author

¹¹² On 5 September 2010, in order to break the political deadlock, an AIE-initiated referendum took place on reinstating the direct election of president. The referendum was, however, invalidated as less than the necessary one-third of the electorate participated (see Epilogue in Chapter 8 for further information). Hence, Figure 7 remains accurate.

¹¹³ Moreover, the formation of the Supreme Council of Magistrates, which should be seen as a part of the entire judicial system, raises concerns regarding its neutrality vis-à-vis the governing power (cf. *Judicial Reform Index for Moldova*, 2009).

Grading Moldovan Democracy

One way of quickly getting a sense of a state's democratic credentials is by consulting one of the many applicable indices. Table 6 on next page provides an overview of some of the most applied democracy indices.¹¹⁴ The first column indicates the publication year of the reports, which usually cover the situation in the country the previous year. Each dataset has been color-coded so that no color indicates democracy, dark grey indicates autocracy, and light grey indicates hybrid regimes. This was done in order to make the table easier to read, but there is also a need to briefly explain what the indices measure and what the figures indicate. Each of the indices has its strength and weakness. Polity IV and Vanhanen employ minimalist definitions of democracy, which make data easier to collect and replicate. However, while the former has been criticized for lacking a reliable indicator for participation, the latter does not distinguish whether offices are elected or not. Freedom House employs a maximalist definition of democracy, which provides for rich information but is subject to problems with regard to measurement (cf. Munck and Verkuilen, 2002).

The Polity IV index puts polity and authority patterns at the core of analysis. It employs a composite scale running from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy) (Marshall, et al., 2011; 2002). The index is updated regularly but not on an annual basis. The Polity IV variables that make up the composite scale are mainly oriented towards procedures such as executive recruitment, the regulation of political participation and the competitiveness of political participation. In this sense more substantive indicators, such as rule of law and freedom of speech, are regarded by the Polity Project as manifestations of basic democratic principles (Marshall, et al., 2010: 14). The composite scores, furthermore, may be translated into regime categories, namely autocracies (-10 to -6), incoherent authority regimes or anocracies (-5 to +5) and democracies (+6 to +10).

¹¹⁴ Indices such as these, however well constructed they may be, rely on a reduction of reality according to specific variables in order to provide an indication of the level of democracy in a country (cf. Linde and Ekman, 2006: appendix 1). However, it is important to be aware that these quantitative indices, despite the impression of using strict criteria in their formulation, are the result of subjective ratings. We can observe one such example in the 2010 Freedom House evaluations. The FH report states that "Moldova's political rights rating improved from 4 to 3 due to parliamentary elections that resulted in a rotation of power between the long-ruling Communist Party and a coalition of opposition parties" (FH, 2010). However, the NiT report concludes that "[a]lthough the Alliance introduced democratic principles to the governmental agenda, the system has been affected by the involvement of security forces in political affairs. The independence of the legislative, the executive, and judicial authorities was seriously called into question in 2009; therefore Moldova's rating for national democratic governance worsens from 5.75 to 6.00" (Vițu, 2010). Both reports describe the same reality but draw opposite conclusions.

Table 6. *Estimates of Moldovan democracy*

Year	Minimalist democracy definition		Maximalist democracy definition		
	Polity IV	ID	FH (NiT)	FH (PR)	FH (CL)
2009	8		5.14	3	4
2008	8		5.07	4	4
2007	8		5.00	3	4
2006	8		4.96	3	4
2005	8		4.96	3	4
2004	8		5.07	3	4
2003	8		4.88	3	4
2002	8		4.71	3	4
2001	8		4.50	2	4
2000	7	22.04	4.29	2	4
1999	7	22.04	4.25	2	4
1998	7	22.04		2	4
1997	7	20.65		3	4
1996	7	20.65		3	4
1995	7	12.00		4	4
1994	7	12.00		4	4
1993	7	7.56		5	5
1992	5	7.56		5	5
1991	5	7.56		5	4

Note: Year refer to actual year covered in report.

Source: www.freedomhouse.org (Nations in Transit and Freedom in the World), Vanhanen, 2000b (Index of Democracy), Marshall, 2009 (Polity IV)

Vanhanen’s Index of Democracy (ID) offers yet another procedural measurement for worldwide democracy levels (Vanhanen, 2000a). Last updated in 2000, this index focuses on only two variables: participation and competition. In Vanhanen’s opinion, the other existing indices, such as the Polity IV, Freedom in the World and also Coppedge and Reinicke’s operationalization of Dahl’s polyarchy theory, all suffer from being overly complicated as a result of too many indicators. Hence, collection of data becomes impossible and depends heavily on subjective evaluations and qualitative data. The participation variable applied by Vanhanen is calculated from the total population (since this data is more readily available), while the competition variable is calculated by subtracting the largest party’s share from 100 (*ibid.*: 257). With regard to competition, Vanhanen chose 30 percent as the cut-off point for democracy, i.e., a single party that could hold 70 percent or more of the votes was most likely autocratic. The participation threshold was set to a low 10 percent of the population, a consequence of the entire population of a country being considered – even those that for one or the other reason would or are not allowed to vote. Both thresholds need to be crossed in order for a country to be considered a democracy. The ID value is finally derived by multiplying the competition varia-

ble with the participation and dividing the result by 100. According to Vanhanen a suitable threshold ID for democracy would be 5.0.

The two Freedom House indices, Nations in Transit (NiT) (*Nations in Transit*, 2010) and Freedom in the World (FW) (*Freedom House in the World*, 2010), are published annually. Both of these indices reflect maximalist understandings of democracy. NiT focuses solely on the former Soviet states of Eurasia, while FW provides global coverage. The NiT index contains both an essay of the country covered and numeric ratings for seven focus areas: electoral process, civil society, independent media, national democratic governance, local democratic governance, judicial framework and independence, and corruption. The numeric ratings are numbered from 1 to 7, where 1 is the highest and 7 the lowest level of democratic progress, with the possibility to give quarter-point scores (*NIT Methodology*, 2010). Until 2003 FH applied two aggregate scores to determine overall democratic levels, namely those for *democratization* (using the average of the scores for electoral process, civil society, independent media, and governance) and *rule of law* (using the average of the scores for corruption and constitutional, legislative, and judicial framework). From 2004 onward, a composite *Democracy Score* was introduced, which, according to FH, shows a high correlation to the earlier two aggregate scores. The Democracy Score is divided into five categories: consolidated democracy (1 to 2); semi-consolidated democracy (3); transitional government or hybrid regime (4); semi-consolidated authoritarian regime (5); and consolidated authoritarian regime (6-7).

The FW index measures levels of freedom in fields beyond the control of governments (*FW Methodology*, 2010). These freedoms are condensed into two main categories: political rights and civil liberties. Political rights (PR) are defined as the ability to participate in the political process, including running for office and voting in elections. Civil liberties (CL) include freedom of expression and belief and associational and organizational rights. Hence, the FW index stresses the freedom of individuals and does not rate the performance of governments. Country ratings include an introductory essay and numerical ratings from 1 and 7 for both PR and CL, where a score of 1 equals the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest. An average score for PR and CL is then calculated in order to determine if a country is to be considered “free” (1.0 to 2.5), “partly free” (3.0 to 5.0) or “not free” (5.5 to 7.0).

Taken together, these four indices provide an overview of the general level of democratic development in Moldova from both procedural and substantive perspectives. From the procedural perspective, which emphasizes the institutional context, Moldova can be considered a democracy (Marshall, 2009; Vanhanen, 2000b). Polity IV and ID both indicate the functioning of proper democratic institutions and the improvement of democratic procedures throughout the 1990s, despite the fact that Moldova was

heavily burdened by civil war, a sharp economic downturn and political infighting. However, as noted by Dahl (2000: 198), Polity scores of 8 probably indicate a “marginally democratic” rather than a democratic polity. Meanwhile, Vanhanen’s ID scores, in all years coded for Moldova, show figures above 5.0, which was what Vanhanen considered democratic. However, it is hard to interpret the figures without comparing them to other countries. Hence, for example, in 2000, when Moldova received an ID score of 22.04, Romania’s was 20.66, while established democracies such as the USA and Sweden received scores of 19.08 and 37.69, respectively. All countries passed the democracy threshold of 5.0, but with varying success. Clearly, the relatively low participation rate in US elections resulted in it being passed by both the Romanian and the Moldovan transitional democracies.

While the ID ceases to provide data after 2000, the year that the constitutional changes formally turned Moldova into a parliamentary democracy, the Polity IV index continues to do so, although its scores in no way capture the gradual democratic decline after the 2001 elections. This is clearly a function of the indicators on which Polity IV is based. However, given the developments we highlighted in Chapter 5 and the reports from such institutions as the ODIHR, it is still striking that no deterioration in the level of democratic development has been observed. Moreover, the 2010 Polity IV country report for Moldova, which covers events until early 2010, includes statements which indicate that the analyst did not grasp the significance of the constitutional change in 2000, and the consequences of PCRM’s electoral victory in 2001 (*Polity IV Country Report: Moldova*, 2010).

Freedom House’s NiT and FW indices, which measure the more substantive rather than procedural aspects of democracy, indicate that democracy in Moldova has the character of a transitional or even autocratic regime. Here NiT rates Moldova most negatively relative to all the other indices. While there are reasons for why Moldova fares poorer relative to the Polity IV and ID indices, it is difficult to understand on what grounds Moldova should pass the 5-point mark to rank among group of the semi-consolidated authoritarian states from 2007 onward. It is clear that the 2000s began with a gradual deterioration of democratic standards. To install a parliamentary republic based, at least initially, solely on one party became a severe threat to pluralism. However, according to the NiT methodology, a semi-consolidated authoritarian state is firstly defined as one in which elections, although held at regular intervals, are “marred by irregularities and deemed undemocratic by international observers” (*NIT Methodology*, 2010: 24). Thus far, no such reports with regard to Moldovan elections have been recorded by International Election Observation Missions (IEOMs).

The FW political rights (PR) ratings show progress for the years 1998 to 2001, while the civil liberties (CL) ratings have, on a consistent basis,

fared slightly lower. The PR ratings reveal that towards the end of the 1990s Moldova moved towards increased political rights, which abruptly ended as the constitution was changed. PR and CL taken together provide a measurement of freedom which indicates that, since the turmoil of the first years of independence, Moldova has consistently been “partly free.” There have been downturns, such as when PR fell from 3 to 4 in 2008 (per the 2009 report), but the overall average score of 4 still kept Moldova in the “partly free” category.

Together these indices do provide a rather accurate picture of how Moldovan democracy has developed, even though democracy is still not the only game in town. Which features of democracy are studied depends both on how democracy is operationalized and the policies of the current political regime. If democratic advances are made, then it is also easier to regard a country as undergoing transition even if consolidation remains distant. In the next section, we apply the polyarchy index of Coppedge and Reinicke, adjusted so that the variables reflect two decades of aggregated data. Thereby the focus is kept on the polyarchy institutions, while the Coppedge and Reinicke scale allows us to score and compare results against other states.

Free and Fair Elections

Moldova is a unitary state with special provisions for Gagauz autonomy and, given present political realities, only hypothetical provisions regarding autonomy for the Transnistrian region. The entire country is one constituency, a relic of the separatist tendencies of the early 1990s which resulted in Chişinău acting to ensure that a boycott of elections in the south or east would not invalidate national elections. This setup, intended to lessen the influence of regional minorities, also implies that regional minority representation does not exist (with the exception of the Gagauz governor who is assured a seat in the government). In general, the link between representatives and the electorate is weak, and Moldovan politics revolves around making party leaders the main focus for the electorate.

The Constitution stipulates that “[t]he foundation of State power is the will of the people made known through free elections” (Art. 38). This has guaranteed that elections have been totally free from fraud or coercion. Overall the international monitoring reports have reported that elections in Moldova have been carried out according to international standards, an indication that the shortcomings observed have not determined the outcome of the elections. Nevertheless, numerous examples over the last ten years have shown that the electoral process in Moldova is not as transparent as it should be in a consolidated democracy. Hence, ODIHR reported after the 1998 parliamentary elections that the “election process was as a whole

satisfactory” and “[n]o significant deficiencies were observed during the pre-election period or on election day”(OSCE/ODIHR, 1998: 3). In the 2001 parliamentary elections, ODIHR noted that the elections met international standards, “consolidating a trend already evidenced during the previous elections” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2001: 1). However, in the 2005 parliamentary elections, a worsening of the electoral standards was observed as the elections “generally complied with...international standards for democratic elections, [but] fell short of some that are central to a genuinely competitive election process” (OSCE/ODIHR, 2005: 1). Among these shortcomings were campaign conditions and access to media, confirming trends noted in the 2003 local elections.

Either because of the declining electoral standards that ODIHR started to observe from 2003 onward or due to the general mistrust in the political establishment, only 37.3 percent of respondents in the 2003 survey regarded the 2001 parliamentary elections as “free” or “completely free” while 12.7 percent thought it either “unfree” or “completely unfree” (Johansson and Loftsson, 2003). This indicates that even though the legal and procedural frameworks were in place, people had doubts regarding how they were applied. In the 2009 parliamentary elections, this lack of trust, combined with the PCRM’s use of administrative resources for campaigning, its dominance of state media and deficient voters lists, paved the way for the riots of April and the early elections in July 2009 (OSCE/ODIHR, 2009b).

Hence, although the electoral management bodies have received extensive practical training through three parliamentary elections and one referendum in 2009 and 2010 only and operate at a competent technical level, there are still a number of shortcomings affecting the integrity of the electoral process: Administrative resources are still used in order to ensure effective dissemination of parties’ electoral messages; the parliamentary majority has a tendency to change the electoral rules so that they increase their own prospects in upcoming elections; state media reports are more focused and favourable to the ruling party or parties; electoral commissions below the central level are susceptible to promoting specific political candidates; the management of the voter register leaves room for tampering; and bribes and coercion have been reported. Taken together this paints a bleaker picture of the electoral system than an evaluation of the purely technical procedures would suggest. Thus Moldova would not yet qualify for the highest polyarchy rating of one.

Polyarchy rating: (2) Elections with some fraud or coercion

Freedom of Organization

In between the state and the family lies what is generally referred to as the civil society.¹¹⁵ If well established and functioning, it serves as a bridge linking citizens and state institutions and has, in this capacity, been regarded as crucial to democracy (cf. Putnam, 1996). These links can take many different organizational forms, but taken together they work to create trust between people and government. While the right to freedom of organization is not directly protected in the Moldovan constitution, other complimentary provisions are contained therein, including freedom of conscience (including religious cults) (Art. 31), freedom of assembly (Art. 40), freedom of political associations (Art. 41), and the right to establish and join trade unions (Art. 42). An emerging civil society started to develop in the middle of the 1990s. In 2010 8,000 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were registered at the local and central level together. Out of these it was estimated that approximately 25 percent were active (USAID, 2010: 138).¹¹⁶ Most of the NGOs are located close to larger urban centers, and many of them only consist of a few persons. They depend, to a large extent, on foreign donors, and indeed there is a tendency to establish NGOs in order to attract foreign money. According to one estimate made by the major donors working in Moldova, some 200 NGOs are active (Ciurea, 2011: 213). While the relative weakness of the NGO sector is a matter of concern, active NGOs have produced notable results within many sectors of society.

The environment for NGOs in Moldova has at times not been favorable. Under the PCRM regime, many NGOs and political parties came under increasing pressure on a variety of issues. There were also attempts to control the civil society agenda by establishing parallel organizations such as the new “Nistru” Union of Authors, created in 2003 in order to have an institution, according to president Voronin, less pro-Romanian than the old Union of Writers (Azi.md, 11/10/03). In order to maintain tighter control of the media, an Association of Professional Journalists was created by the PCRM in the early 2000s (IREX, 2002: 123). Other organizations encountered problems registering at the Ministry of Justice or had to endure nu-

¹¹⁵ A more precise definition of the widely discussed civil society concept is offered by Åberg (2008: 32), who argues that civil society may be thought of as “a public sphere consisting of voluntary organizations and associations that are non-governmental and possess some degree of autonomy from other societal spheres such as the political and the economic society. The different spheres are, however, not completely separated – instead they are in more or less constant interaction, albeit to varying degrees.”

¹¹⁶ Bădescu et al (2004: 340) estimates that engagement in civic groups in Moldova only involves 1 to 3 percent of the total population. The corresponding figure for Latvia is 7 percent . The average for post-Communist states such as Hungary, Estonia, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine and Romania is 9 percent (cf. Lindén, 2008: 8). The average for “older democracies” such as Australia, Finland, Sweden, US, Norway and Japan is 24 percent.

merous inspections beyond what was required by law. These shortcomings certainly need to be addressed in order for Moldova to become a more democratic country with a well-established rule of law. However, they do not place the country among the group of autocratic countries like, for example, Belarus, where NGOs and dissident parties must endure far worse conditions. Nevertheless, in order to capture the challenges experienced by some civil society organizations over the years, one half-point to Coppedge and Reinicke's scale was added to better illustrate past shortcomings.

Polyarchy rating: (1.5) Some trade unions or interest groups may be harassed or banned, but there are no restrictions on purely political organizations

Freedom of Expression

Freedom of expression is guaranteed in the constitution (Art. 32). Individuals and organizations, be they political or non-political, are free to protest government actions which they oppose. In the capital Chişinău, this right is exercised quite often to raise issues of a political or social character, with demonstrations frequently taking place in front of public buildings. There have, however, been instances in which the government has moved to quell dissension, including the sudden privatizations by the ruling PCRM-PPCD coalition in the run up to the 2007 local elections of radio station Antena C and television channel EuTV, which had been critical of the regime (Kennedy, 2007a).

The rights of sexual minorities are an issue that still arouses strong feelings in Moldova.¹¹⁷ Until 2010 it had not been possible to stage a full Pride parade as in many other European capitals since political and religious forces worked together to oppose any such attempt. In fact, the opposition to homosexuals is one of the few issues that has brought the Orthodox and much smaller Protestant Churches together. Attempts to put the rights of sexual minorities into a larger human rights context have been met with vague references by the authorities of their obligations to preserve national security or prevent disturbances of public order. In 2008 a bus with Moldovan and international participants of a Pride manifestation in central Chişinău was stopped and temporarily immobilized by an angry mob (Azi.md, 05/12/08; Ilga, 2008). The police, positioned nearby, did not intervene to stop the harassment. The following year a low-key Pride festival was marred by, among

¹¹⁷ It may be discussed whether rights of sexual minorities should be included under a heading of freedom of expression instead of, for example, freedom of organization. It was here decided to, nevertheless, regard the message of sexual minorities as most closely related to a freedom of expression agenda. Not the least since Moldovan governments have viewed the potential impact of the LGBT-community as a direct threat to official ideology.

other incidents, presumed police involvement in the beating of a leading Swedish LGBT representative (Azi.md, 05/05/09; Stiernstedt, 05/12/09).

Given these considerations, a polyarchy rating of 1 seems too high and a rating of 2 too low. The inclusion of “almost” in the formulation of the polyarchy rating below emphasizes that not all topics may be discussed without fear of punishment. Moldovan tolerance, which exists in so many other spheres of society, does not extend to sexual minorities.

Polyarchy rating: (1.5) Citizens express their views on almost all topics without fear of punishment

Alternative Sources of Information

According to Article 34 of the Constitution, both state and private media should relay accurate information, and public media should not be subject to censorship. A variety of media channels are available in Moldova, although internet and print media are more concentrated and available in larger urban centers.¹¹⁸ For most people in the countryside, state television continues to be the main source of information. Despite low circulation, newspapers are readily available in the cities. Rather than functioning as an independent voice, however, newspapers are strongly linked to specific political parties for whom they mainly serve as a mouthpiece. Opposition media outlets have on occasion experienced takeovers or restrictions in doing business. While outright censorship is rare, there is tendency for media outlets to censor themselves on sensitive issues related to economics, politics, or identity in order to avoid potential problems with the authorities (Heintz, 2007: 18).¹¹⁹

Most of the shortcomings related to media freedom occurred during the PCRM's time in power from 2001 and 2009 and especially around electoral periods when it became even more important to control political messages (*Nations in Transit – Moldova*, 2008: 13). This situation has caused Freedom House, Reporters sans frontières (RSF) and IREX all to paint a rather bleak picture of media freedom in Moldova (see Table 7 below).¹²⁰ Years in the table indicate the year the report was published. All indices point towards a down-

¹¹⁸ Furthermore, it has been noted that journalists mainly report on events in the capital and forget to cover other parts of the country, including the bigger cities (Canfir, 6/29/11). This puts a strong focus on national politics, while local conditions are much less known to a wider audience.

¹¹⁹ A further complicating fact is that media, which ideally should function as a watchdog against corrupt behavior in society, often feel forced to adopt to corrupt behavior themselves and therefore become less inclined on reporting on the issue (Hinnemo, 2010: 106).

¹²⁰ For a comparison of press freedom indicators, including Freedom House, IREX and RSF, see Becker et al (2007), *An Evaluation of Press Freedom Indicators*. Although the indices are constructed on sometimes diverging indicators, Becker shows that the final results are similar.

Table 7. *Freedom of media in Moldova*

Year	Freedom House	IREX*	RSF
2009	67	1.81	33.75
2008	66	1.75	21.38
2007	65	1.48	24.75
2006	65	1.48	19.17
2005	65	1.51	17.50
2004	63	1.56	20.50
2003	59	1.65	27.00
2002	59	1.57	
2001		1.72	

Source: www.freedomhouse.org; www.rsf.org; www.irex.org

Note: Due to differences in reporting periods, years indicate when the report was published

* In 2006 and 2007 IREX issued a total score covering both years

ward trend between 2001 and 2010. From 2001 to 2003 FH's Freedom of the Press Index media ratings translated to "partly free." From 2004 onward, however, the media climate deteriorated and was characterized as "not free." Similar trends are reflected in the IREX data, where a higher score on the scale indicates that the country meets more of the criteria for media freedom. While there are some fluctuations in the scores, the general situation is what IREX describes as an "unsustainable mixed system", that just barely meets the minimal objectives of free media. The RSF index is slightly more difficult to interpret, related as it is to a global ranking of all countries in the world than to factual scores, and it does not pass judgment on specific time periods. Higher scores in the index indicate less press freedom. Hence, the general trend of the RSF data indicates that media freedom in Moldova has deteriorated, with a slight improvement registered in 2004 and 2005 that is discernible also in the IREX data but not in the FH index. This improvement in the media landscape captured by the RSF index is most likely related to the PCRM's choice to orientate towards the EU and thus initially show greater concern for media freedom.

Taken together these indices imply that media freedom is not guaranteed in Moldova. There is a plethora of different media, but the main channels have thus far been under the control of the governing power and have reported favourably on the government and less favourably on the opposition.

Polyarchy rating: (2)Alternative sources of information are widely available but government versions are presented in preferential fashion. This may be the result of partiality in and greater availability of government-controlled media: selective closure, punishment, harassment, or censorship of dissident reporters, publishers, or broadcasters: or mild censorship resulting from any of these

Right to Vote

The Constitution gives all Moldovan citizens the right to vote (Art. 38). The 1991 Law on Citizenship was formulated liberally and stipulates that every person living on the territory of the country at the time of independence would become a citizen and thus also have the right to vote (Gasca, 2009: 5f). Even though language tests were proposed for state employees initially, these were never applied to the process of gaining citizenship.¹²¹ The only restrictions regarding voting rights that have been imposed upon the Moldovan electorate, fraud and information shortcomings aside, are the direct and indirect limitations placed on the diaspora. While this does not lower the polyarchy rating, it should be noted that successive governments have formulated approaches towards the diaspora depending how this dispersed group's political orientation has been interpreted by the ruling party at the time. Generally, young and mobile migrants are considered more likely to vote for center and right parties. This holds true, at the very least, for those who migrate to Western countries (cf. e-Democracy, 2005; 2009b; 2009c). In the 2003 survey (Johansson and Loftsson, 2003: q. 35b), respondents were asked whether they believed the outcome of the previous parliamentary elections would have been different (i.e., greater support for the opposition to the PCRM) if Moldovans living abroad would have been able to vote to the same extent as other citizens. 43.6 percent believed that it would have been different or totally different, while only 24.8 percent believed that the result would have reflected little to no difference. These results mirror a widespread perception that the voting preferences of the diaspora led the PCRM government to adopt a rather cool stance towards them. Conversely, the AIE government tried to improve possibilities for the electorate abroad to vote.

Polyarchy rating: (1)Universal adult suffrage

State of Polyarchy

The above summary of the state of Moldova's institutions of polyarchy provides a better basis to determine the exact stage of more procedural forms of democracy. Although the country should not be placed within the authoritarian group of countries, it is nonetheless clear that democracy is still not "the only game in town." The respective polyarchy ratings reveal the following sequence for the variables *free and fair elections*, *freedom of*

¹²¹ This is a clear difference from countries such as Estonia and Latvia, which, after the break-up of the Soviet Union, granted citizenship only to persons residing in those states before the 1940 occupation and their descendants or through naturalization.

organization, freedom of expression, alternative sources of information, and right to vote:

2 1.5 1.5 2 (1)

The score for *right to vote* has been placed in parentheses since this category is excluded from Coppedge and Reinicke's index. Adding the first four variables, therefore, results in an aggregate rating of 7, from which 4 should be subtracted, per coding instructions, to arrive at a final score of 3 on the scale (Coppedge, 1998). This indicates a country close to but not yet a full polyarchy on Coppedge and Reinicke's index. However, none of their scale types fully fit the specific rating series of Moldova. If the 1.5 ratings for both freedom of organization and freedom of expression are rounded down to 1.0, this would place Moldova on a par with 1985 Greece and Jamaica, where "[m]eaningful fair elections are held and there is full freedom for political organization, but some public dissent is suppressed and there is preferential presentation of official views in the media" (Coppedge and Reinicke, 1990: 64). If the ratings are rounded up to 2.0, Moldova comes in closer to Egypt, South Korea or Mexico where "[e]lections are marred by fraud or coercion, some independent political organizations are banned, some public dissent is suppressed, and there is preferential presentation of official views in the media" (ibid.). The 1.5 freedom of organization and freedom of expression ratings then place Moldova somewhere in between these two characterizations. However, the former characterization is more in line with Moldovan realities, with the addition that elections do take place "with some fraud or coercion".

An Unfinished Transition


This chapter has provided an overview of Moldovan democracy from 1991 to 2009 by combining annual democracy indices with a summary of the main polyarchy variables. The advantage of this approach is that it combines minimalist and maximalist quantifications with qualitative assessments. This allows us to see that the Polity IV index and Vanhanen's Index of Democracy capture the mere structure of democracy. While these indices account for the fact that all the institutions are in place and that participation and contestation is secured, they are not able to track political changes that actually decrease the democratic space. Here the Freedom House indices are more useful, and although the NiT index is perhaps overly pessimistic, it does highlight important trends. According to Coppedge and Reinicke's polyarchy index, we can observe that a more substantive approach to democracy reveals a number of shortcomings in Moldova's political environment, which are largely applicable to the institutions of polyarchy. It may be too

early, however, to pass judgment on Moldova's efforts at democratization as much can happen in the years to come. Moldova does not seem to be exhibiting a gradual and continuous deterioration of democratic standards moving it gradually further and further from consolidation (Diamond, 1997: xix). Indeed the picture that is painted is rather one of "pending polyarchy" (Dahl, 1999: 269), a regime moving from authoritarianism and democracy. In Moldova's case, it would seem that the country, to a large extent, already enjoys a place on the democratic side of the spectrum. Based on what we have examined in previous chapters, we know that these developments are greatly influenced by the political conflicts between Moldovanists and Romanianists. What we do not know, however, is how citizens position themselves vis-à-vis these national identity dividing lines and how they express attitudes towards democracy in the country.

7. The View from Below

We now turn to the survey data collected in 2003 to determine how these may shed further light on the link between nation and democracy in Moldova. In order to estimate the level of political support, the framework by Norris (1999), previously discussed in Chapter 4, was applied. This enables us to divide political support into five levels, where *political community* is considered the most diffuse object of support, followed by *regime principles*, *regime performance*, *regime institutions* and, finally, *political actors* as the most specific object of support. To facilitate analysis of the survey data, we have linked these five levels of political support directly to survey questions asked (see Table 8).

Table 8. *Political support and survey questions applied*

	Object of Support	Survey Questions Applied
Diffuse support 	Political Community	How proud are you to be a Moldovan citizen? How proud are you to belong to your specific ethnic/national group? How proud are you to live in Moldova?
	Regime Principles	Looking at what you personally think, how important is it to...1) vote in elections; 2) obey laws and regulations; 3) treat minorities as other inhabitants?
	Regime Performance	What is your overall judgment of our present governing system? Where on this scale would you put our governing system in five years?
	Regime Institutions	Tell me how great is your personal trust in [name of institution]? How close is political party x to your own orientation? To what extent do you think politicians can be trusted?
	Political Actors	How close is [name of party] to your own political orientation?
Specific Support		

Source: Norris (1999: 10); Johansson and Loftsson (2003)

Below each objective is addressed separately, starting with the most diffuse object of support, political community, and moving to the most specific object, political actors. The analysis of the data is supported by percentage tables and simplified correspondence analysis (CA) tables which indicate possible relationships between variables. The percentage tables provide an overview of how respondents have replied to survey questions and often function as a first step preparing for the more complicated correspondence analysis. The simplified CA tables are based on the results of scatter plots and analysis. The CA tables summarize the results of the scatter plots, but in a clearer and more concise way while preserving most of the information from the plots. The simplified CA tables thus aim to facilitate interpretation of the results and include axes inertia (variance), significant column and row variables and the positive or negative loadings of these variables.¹²² Variable loadings refer to where on the axes the variables are situated in relation to zero. Hence, there are no qualitative interpretations to be made if the loadings are positive or negative. Instead focus has been placed on how row and column variables group together. Complete CA tables and scatter plots can be found in Appendix D.

The background variables which were applied have already been introduced in Chapter 1, namely gender, age, location, ethnicity and education. These can also be found broken down into subcategories in Appendix B together with their abbreviations. Of these variables, it should be noted that those identifying as “primarily Ukrainian, secondarily Moldovan” and those who did not indicate a reply to the question of educational level have been removed from the analysis. The reason for their removal is that for all questions under study these two variables had profiles far from the average, while they simultaneously had the lowest weights due to the limited number of cases they represented. As outliers in the analysis, such variables should be discarded lest they skew the axes and lead to serious misinterpretations (cf. Greenacre, 2007: 91f).

Political Community

As argued by Dalton (1999: 72), the identification with a political community, i.e., a nation, constitutes the most fundamental political identity. The nation combines the cultural content of a people with a political program, while the nation-state bridges the distance between the state’s political institutions and the people. Hence, an established political community functions to get people to

¹²² As a rule, axes affecting inertia more than 10 percent are represented in the tables. Regarding variables, these were included if they influenced inertia more than the average loading. This means that if there were, for example, 12 variables, a single variable would have to have a value higher than 8.33 to be included ($100/12=8.33$).

cooperate politically. Historically, a national identity has preceded other types of identities, making the process of democratization easier. For transitional democracies undergoing multiple transitions at the same time, democracy had to be built at the same time as the nation was. If identification with a political community did not already exist, there was a need to construct one, ideally in congruence with the newly established state. However, in transitional states previous political identities were already in place and, as in the case of Moldova, it was not just a matter of exchanging one identity for another. Although identities are constructed and communities imagined, as Anderson (1991) has articulated, there are limits to how this can be achieved. People need to view identity as corresponding and relevant to their reality. If not, the construction of identity will fail, implying a failed political community and, referring back to the discussion in Chapter 3, serious implications for democratization.

It has been already mentioned that ethnicity, the group identity that often constitutes the foundation of a nation, was a well established identity category in the Soviet Union and readily applied as a matter of identification. While all citizens of the Soviet Union were expected to become members of a larger Soviet nation, nationality was kept as an identity marker mostly intended to describe an ethnic group. This created a potential focal point around which dissent could be built, and rivaling claims of national sovereignty made. The trajectory of political developments in Moldova since independence has shown that national identity remains an important factor in understanding politics in the country. These developments have largely been influenced by the positions which the parties and the electorate have taken regarding the national question.

Responses from the survey indicate that a majority Moldovans subscribe to a rather relaxed view of ethnic identity and tend not to regard it in primordial terms, but rather as a form of identity that may be altered, albeit with some difficulties. On the question “do you think that it is possible for an individual to change his/her national identity during his/her lifetime?” 13.2 percent of respondents replied that it could be done without any problems, 31.0 percent that it would be possible but not come easily, and 21.9 percent that they did not think it possible. Only 10.4 percent thought change of national identity was completely impossible, while 23.5 percent were undecided.

If we were to take the Constitution as a point of departure, we would include all Moldovan citizens as members of the political community.¹²³ In Table 9 below, however, we can see that this is not the case. Only 38.6 percent of respondents agree to the statement that all Moldovan citizens are to be regarded as Moldovans. Moldovan language proficiency (supported by 27.4 percent), residence in Moldova (18.0 percent) and being born in the country (31.3 percent) do not seem to be recognized as strong markers of Moldovan nationality. Rather

¹²³ As noted by Neukirch (1999: 53), the way the Constitution is framed, together with legal practices and politics, points more toward a understanding of Moldova as a classic nation-state with a majority population, or core nation, and minority groups.

respondents find “moldovaness” in lineage, i.e., Moldovans are those who have Moldovan parents (supported by 62.3 percent) and speak Moldovan as their first language (supported by 46.5 percent). While this is in line with the nationality definition of Soviet times, when the republic was defined in congruence with its titular population, it consequently makes it more difficult for those without Moldovan ethnicity to become part of the nation.

Table 9. *Which of the following groups would you say are Moldovans?*

	Yes	No	DK/NA
All Moldovan citizens	38.6%	51.5%	9.8%
All Moldovan-speaking people living in the country	27.4	60.0	12.6
All residents in Moldova	18.0	68.1	13.9
All people born within Moldovan territory	31.3	55.7	13.0
All people with Moldovan parents	62.3	26.7	11.0
All people with Moldovan as their first language	46.5	38.7	14.7

Source: Johansson and Loftsson (2003: q.75)

Support to the political community was investigated by combining three survey questions: (A) how proud are you to be a Moldovan citizen? (B) how proud are you to belong to your specific ethnic/national group? (C) how proud are you to live in Moldova? While questions A and C can be said to measure different aspects of the same phenomenon, question B makes it possible to see if there is a difference between being proud to be part of the political community (being a citizen) and to belong to an ethnic/national group.¹²⁴ As we can see from Table 10, many of the respondents are quite proud or very proud to be Moldovan citizens, to belong to their ethnic group and to live in Moldova.

Table 10. *How proud are you...*

	Very proud	Quite proud	Not very proud	Not proud at all	DK/NA
A. To be a Moldovan citizen?	27.7%	45.1%	20.7%	4.3%	2.2%
B. To belong to your specific ethnic/national group?	27.2	46.0	15.4	3.5	7.9
C. To live in Moldova?	26.9	43.1	22.8	4.7	2.5

Source: Johansson and Loftsson (2003: q. 74 B)

¹²⁴ The reason why the question was formulated using “ethnic/national group” goes back to the way nationality was understood in the USSR and still is in Moldova in that an ethnic group is often conceptualized as a nation. Hence, it is better to ask if a respondent is proud to be a Moldovan citizen than a member of the Moldovan nation as the latter would almost certainly be misunderstood. This is also observable in how respondents replied to the questions regarding who are to be considered Moldovans in Table 9.

Running correspondence analysis on the contingency table shows that almost 80 percent of the variance in the table can be explained by the three first axes. Table 11 below captures all significant row and column variables and places them according to their positive or negative loadings. The first axis is built around the extremes of “very proud” and “not very proud.” Those not very proud to be Moldovan citizens, belong to their specific ethnic group or to live in Moldova are the younger generation, i.e., people between 18 to 29 years of age, those living in larger urban settlements excluding Chişinău and persons identifying as Russians or Russian Moldovans.

On the other end of the spectrum, those expressing pride in being part of the Moldovan polity and nation, are people above 60 years of age, those coming from smaller communities and persons with incomplete secondary education. Controlling for gender, there does seem to be a difference between women and men, which is manifested on the second axis. Men are generally prouder to belong to their specific ethnic group, although they showed a higher degree of uncertainty on this issue. Women, meanwhile, are prouder to be Moldovan citizens and to live in Moldova although they expressed more uncertainty on these particular issues.

A certain ethnic dimension is found on the third axis. Ukrainians, ethnic groups listed as “other” and those with incomplete primary education are found in the upper positive side, while Moldovans and Romanians are in the lower negative. However, only Ukrainians and “other” ethnic groups have a closer correlation to axis three, with the interpretation being that it is primarily these groups who are proud to belong to their specific ethnic group or to live in Moldova.

While it might have been assumed that those identifying as Moldovans would be prouder to be Moldovan citizens or to live in Moldova, it is clear that being part of the political community is far from merely an ethnic question. Instead there seems to be a much more complicated partition, running along generational, educational and urban-rural divides. This may also be an indication that the understanding of what constitutes the political community is a function of one’s social and political context and dynamics surrounding the sharing and communication of information (cf. Deutsch, 1966). Due to the political changes, it is natural that there were great generational differences regarding the type and manner in which information was shared and values promoted. Regarding how Moldovans view the nation, these differences remain in rural areas and among people with lower levels of education.

Table 11. *Support of political community*

Inertia	Axis 1 [48.4]		Axis 2 [18.7]		Axis 3 [10.6]	
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
Column variables	<u>Moldovan citizen:</u> not very proud <u>Ethnic group:</u> not very proud <u>Live in Moldova:</u> not very proud	<u>Moldovan citizen:</u> very proud <u>Ethnic group:</u> very proud <u>Live in Moldova:</u> very proud	<u>Ethnic group:</u> quite proud <u>Ethnic group:</u> DK/NA	<u>Moldovan citizen:</u> quite proud DK/NA <u>Live in Moldova:</u> quite proud	<u>Ethnic group:</u> quite proud DK/NA <u>Live in Moldova:</u> quite proud <u>Moldovan citizen:</u> quite proud <u>Moldovan citizen:</u> DK/NA	<u>Moldovan citizen:</u> very proud <u>Live in Moldova:</u> very proud
Row variables	Age group 18-29 Location 1 Location 2 First Russian, second Moldovan Russian	Age group 60+ Location 3 Moldovan Secondary educa- tion incomplete	Male	Female	Ukrainian Ethnicity "other" Primary education incomplete	Moldovan First Romanian, second Moldovan

Source: table by the author

Regime Principles

Support for regime principles, which in this case refers to democratic principles, is admittedly a rather abstract matter. In the present study, we measured this support by looking at some of the basic concepts underpinning democracy such as participation, rule of law and tolerance. In this manner we avoided confusing support for regime principles with support for regime performance, which would otherwise lead to a measurement problem raised in the literature (Fuchs, et al., 1995: 330f). However, there are both strengths and weaknesses to such an approach. On the one hand, participation, rule of law and tolerance are concepts essential to a functioning democracy and should be well-known among the Moldovan population, even if democracy itself is a contested concept. While the measurement problem is not eliminated by focusing on constituent values, it does move the level of abstraction down a level. On the other hand, there is a risk that the more specific concepts enjoy such universal approval that almost anyone would be in support of them, although this would also be true for the more general concept of democracy.

In Table 12 below percentages are given for the respondents' views on how important it is to vote in elections (as a measure of participation), obey laws and regulation (as a measure of rule of law), and treat minorities as other inhabitants (as a measure of tolerance). It should be noted that the last indicator of tolerance may be slightly ambiguous since the minority groups are not specified. We generally assume that respondents have interpreted the question of tolerance as relating mainly to *ethnic* minorities. With regard to the negative views concerning *sexual* minorities raised in previous chapter, it is plausible that the number of respondents considering it important to treat these minorities as they do other inhabitants would have been much lower had this minority group indeed been specified.

Table 12 shows that respondents consider all three areas to be of importance, although relatively fewer believe it is important to treat minorities as other inhabitants are treated, and relatively more provide no answer on this question of minorities.

Table 12. *Participation, rule of law, and tolerance*

Looking at what you personally think, how important is it to...	Not at all important (1)	2	3	4	Very important (5)	DK/NA
...vote in elections?	2.4%	2.3%	10.0%	21.0%	62.5%	1.9%
...obey laws and regulations?	1.0	1.3	7.4	16.5	72.5	1.5
...treat minorities as other inhabitants?	5.9	5.6	13.0	21.8	41.7	11.9

Source: Johansson and Loftsson (2003: q.30_b; q.30_d; q.30_j; q.30_k)

A closer analysis of the contingency table, as summarized in CA Table 13, reveals that almost 62 percent of the variance can be described in two dimensions. The observed tendency in Table 12 to treat all three variables as important or very important means that most replies get clustered around the average in the CA. The main difference concerns the variable on tolerance, for which both the highest and lowest levels of support, together with the “don’t know/no answer” are significant. On the first axis, inhabitants of the capital and people from smaller communities exhibit the highest levels of support for tolerance.¹²⁵ Women, Moldovans and those with incomplete primary and secondary education show lower levels of support for the tolerance variable on the first axis, with incomplete primary education and Moldovans showing the strongest contribution.

Variance was also registered on the second axis, but it should be remembered that this axis only explains slightly above 13 percent of the total level of variance in the table. The main findings are that lower levels of support for the rule of law and tolerance are registered among males, persons between 18 to 29 years of age, those identifying as Moldovans first and Romanians second, those identifying as Romanians and, finally, those people with a university education. Although it is surprising that university education would correlate to lower levels of support for rule of law and tolerance, it is probably the case that university education is related to the ethnic variables, which tend to determine the structure of the second axis. Any further conclusions are difficult to draw, not least because the second axis, as mentioned, only represents a small fraction of the total variance found. Regardless of the findings on the second axis, it is fair to conclude that support for central democratic regime principles in Moldova is high.

¹²⁵ Conversely, respondents from Bălți exhibit a slightly lower level support for the tolerance variable.

Table 13. *Support of regime principles*

		Axis 1 [48.6]	Axis 2 [13.3]		
Inertia		Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
Column variables	Tolerance 5	Tolerance 1	Tolerance DK/NA	Tolerance DK/NA	Rule of Law 2
					Rule of Law 3
Row variables	Capital	Female	Age group 60+		Tolerance 1
	Location 2	Moldovan	Location 2		Tolerance 2
	Location 3	Primary education incomplete	Primary education incomplete		Tolerance 3
		Secondary education incomplete	Ethnicity "other"		Male
					Age group 18-29
					First Moldovan, second Romanian
					Romanian
					University education
	Not at all important (1)	2	3	4	Very important (5)

Source: table by the author

Regime Performance

Questions concerning support for regime performance aim to capture how democracy works in a specific country. However, rather than understanding these questions in the context of how democracy functions in practice or even their own generalized views on democratic governments, respondents tend to associate these types of questions directly with the incumbent government. To avoid such misunderstandings, the questions below were formulated specifically with respect to the present governing system and where it would be in five years. Yet another potential problem is, as noted by Linde and Ekman (2003: 406), that replies to questions on regime performance become very sensitive to the political preferences of respondents.¹²⁶ Hence, the performance of the respondent's preferred political party in the last elections affects how s/he evaluates the performance of the regime. Thus while researchers readily apply these questions to tap into respondents' views on regime performance (cf. Klingemann, 1999: 48), we need to be aware that other variables may determine how people respond.

Table 14. *Judgment of present governing system and situation in five years*

	Very bad (1)	2	3	4	Very good (5)	DK/NA
1. What is your overall judgment of our present governing system?	10.6%	15.5%	39.3%	24.1%	5.8%	4.7%
2. Where on this scale would you put our governing system in five years?	6.6	10.5	23.9	26.8	11.9	20.2

Source: Johansson and Loftsson (2003: q.23_1 and 2)

From the percentages in Table 14, we can observe that slightly more respondents consider the present government system to be “good” or “very good” (30 percent) compared to those who believe it to be either “bad” or “very bad” (26 percent). There is, furthermore, a belief that the government system will improve over the next five years, with an increasing share of percentages in the “good” or “very good” categories (39 percent). However, large shares of respondents were neutral, unsure or even negative on this question. In a study of 37 countries, Klingemann (1999: 46), applying somewhat different questions than those included here, noted that the evaluation of regime performance in all countries was rather low and that the average was not

¹²⁶ It may also be helpful to bear in mind that in 2003, when the survey data was collected, the PCRM government had ruled for two years. Despite receiving widespread support in the 2001 elections and presiding over relative stability in 2003, the anti-incumbent demonstrations of 2002 may still have affected survey answers one year later.

higher than 26 percent, which closely mirrors the results presented here. However, as Klingemann argues, many of those replying negatively to the questions regarding regime performance may be “dissatisfied democrats”, i.e., they approve of having a democratic regime but are not happy with how the particular regime has fared. Such views could be interpreted as revealing strong respondent support for a more democratic regime rather than as a negative verdict for democracy. The results for regime principles and regime performance indicate that the Moldovan population expects a regime that is more democratic than what has so far been delivered. The output produced by the political system has not met the expectations of citizens represented on the input side (cf. Easton, 1965: 29ff).

Most of the variance found through the CA analysis, summarized in Table 15 below, can be explained by the first axis, which accounts for almost 61 percent of total inertia, and to some extent by the second axis, which accounts for almost 11 percent. The axis serves as a continuum, moving from a positive to a negative evaluation of the governing system’s performance. Among those respondents who were most satisfied with the present government system and who exhibited the most optimism as to how it would be in five years were persons over 60 years of age, Moldovans and those with incomplete primary and secondary educations. Those over 60 and with incomplete primary education accounted for the strongest contribution to the variance in the axis. Among those who displayed the most negative feelings towards present and future government systems were respondents within age groups 18 to 29 and 30 to 44, inhabitants of the capital, those who identify as Romanians first and Moldovans second, Romanians and persons with university educations.

The second axis provides greater clarity as to how the ethnic factor is linked to dissatisfaction with the present and future governing system, albeit to a limited degree. Those identifying as Moldovans first and Romanians second, Romanians first and Moldovans second, Russians first and Moldovans second and, finally, people whose ethnicities are undeclared or listed as “other” all indicate their dissatisfaction with the government system. Additionally, these feelings of dissatisfaction are also shared by people living in smaller communities and those with incomplete secondary education.

Correspondence analysis reveals that it is not solely the “dissatisfied democrats” who are responsible for lowering the overall evaluation of Moldova’s governing system. Instead it seems that the outcome may be the result of respondents understanding the questions as concerning the incumbent PCRM regime rather than as a general question of democratic regime performance. The results thus indicate that those with the most positive views of the governing system, namely the older generation and those without higher education, are among the main supporters of the PCRM. Those with negative views of the governing system, made up of the younger generation, persons with higher education and inhabitants of the capital, were thus not so much “dissatisfied democrats” as they were dissatisfied with the PCRM government.

Table 15. *Support of regime performance*

	Axis 1 [60.83]		Axis 2 [10.9]		
	Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative	
Column variables	Present governing system: 1 Governing system in five years: 1 Governing system in five years: 3	Present governing system: 4 Governing system in five years: DK/NA	Present governing system: 2	Present governing system: 1 Governing system in five years: 1 Governing system in five years: DK/NA	
Row variables	Age group 18-29 Age group 30-44 Capital First Romanian, second Moldovan Romanian University education	Age group 60+ Moldovan Primary education incomplete Secondary education incomplete	First Moldovan, second Romanian First Russian, Second Moldovan Ethnicity "other"	Location 2 First Romanian, second Moldovan Ethnicity N/A Secondary education incomplete	
	Not at all important (1)	2	3	4	Very important (5)

Source: table by the author

Regime Institutions

Institutions play an important role in every society. If institutions are part of the government and public services of a democratic regime, then they function as the highest representative structures, providing rules and affecting the behavior of citizens. Citizens, therefore, will have opinions on how these institutions are fulfilling their tasks and if they are meeting expectations. However, citizens' perceptions of or relations with these institutions, should be separated from interactions with individual politicians or parties. Inappropriate or corrupt behavior on the part of a parliamentarian, for example, should not call into question the integrity of the entire legislature. "But if citizens begin to distrust the institutions of government or the political system as a whole, there are theoretical and political reasons to expect that this might erode compliance with government actions." (Dalton, 2004: 166).

One of the questions posed asks respondents to indicate trust in regime institutions on a scale between 1 (have no trust at all) to 5 (have greatest trust). Table 16 shows respondents' answers regarding trust in the regime institutions mentioned by Norris (cf. 1999: 11) along with other types of institutions which are included for purposes of comparison and because they are relevant to the total functioning of a polyarchy. The institutions included by Norris have been placed above the dotted line, while the additional institutions have been placed below. Approximately one-third of the respondents' answers concerning their level of institutional trust fell within the neutral category in the middle, which likely indicates a lack of experience in dealing with these institutions.

Because of the relatively high number of institutional variables, responses were divided into two overarching categories – trust and distrust, with trust represented by categories 4 and 5 combined and distrust by categories of 1 and 2 combined. We can observe that the church is by far the most trusted institution supported by 71 percent of respondents, followed by schools, hospitals, television and radio. The military ranks among first amongst regime institutions, enjoying a trust of 44 percent, followed by the head of state who is trusted by more than 42.8 percent.¹²⁷ Political parties are the most distrusted institution as indicated by 51.7 percent of respondents, followed by police, banks, courts and the parliament. The general trend observed in Table 16 is of low levels of trust in regime institutions but relatively higher levels of trust in non-regime institutions. For a democracy, where

¹²⁷ As a point of reference it may be noted that when asked for which alternatives that mostly represented Moldova (q.73), 30 percent of respondents chose the president as their first alternative. The production of wine, otherwise regarded as the main national symbol, came in on a second place with 14.4 percent. Trust and symbolism are, however, two very different things.

Table 16. *Levels of trust in institutions*

Institution	Have no trust at all (1)	2	3	4	Have greatest trust (5)	DK/NA
A. President	12,1%	13,2%	29,7%	23,9%	17,9%	3,2%
B. Government	13,6	16,3	34,1	20,7	11,7	3,5
C. Parliament	17,0	17,0	32,9	20,3	9,0	3,8
D. Political parties	27,5	24,2	28,4	7,7	3,5	8,7
E. Election administrating authorities	15,3	14,0	30,0	20,4	6,3	14,1
F. Courts	17,7	16,1	31,1	19,0	7,9	8,2
G. Police	23,3	17,9	27,3	19,2	7,6	4,7
H. National military	14,0	9,6	25,1	28,5	15,5	7,3
I. Trade unions	18,8	13,7	27,9	17,4	6,9	15,3
J. Television, Radio	7,5	10,0	31,4	32,4	13,6	5,1
K. Press (newspapers)	6,9	11,1	34,5	28,7	12,0	6,8
L. Banks	19,0	15,6	22,9	18,2	7,7	16,5
M. Universities	6,0	7,7	24,2	27,9	13,4	20,8
N. Town (village) halls	10,5	10,5	39,5	24,7	10,9	3,9
O. Private enterprises	16,8	15,3	31,1	15,2	6,2	15,5
P. The church	5,5	3,8	16,4	24,9	46,1	3,4
Q. Hospitals	7,0	13,4	27,8	30,3	19,2	2,4
R. Schools	4,3	4,6	21,8	34,6	26,7	7,9

Source: Johansson and Loftsson (2003: q.32)

representatives are elected and institutions installed to represent the interests of the people, it certainly poses a problem if these very institutions elicit low levels of trust within society.

Since it is only the institutions of the regime that are of primary interest here, the analysis focuses only on institutions A-H listed in Table 16, with trust and distrust collapsed into two overarching categories. CA Table 17 includes significant variables, their contribution to variance on the axis and their positive or negative loading. As most of the inertia is found in the first axis (82.8 percent), we can thus focus our analysis on this axis, which provides a trust-distrust continuum for the data. With regard to background variables, we can observe that persons aged 18 to 29 and 30 to 44, inhabitants of Chişinău and Bălţi and those with university education display higher levels of distrust in regime institutions on the continuum. Conversely, persons 60 years of age and older, those with incomplete primary or secondary education and people living in small communities display higher levels of trust in these institutions.

Table 17. *Support of regime institutions*

Background variable	Contribution	+/-	Institution trust/distrust	Contribution	+/-
Age group 18-29	12.2	-	President (trust)	12.0	+
Age group 30-44	4.9	-	President (distrust)	10.0	-
Age group 60+	18.5	+	Government (trust)	10.8	+
Capital	10.2	-	Government (distrust)	9.5	-
Location 1	6.1	-	Parliament (trust)	13.2	+
Location 3	4.9	+			
Primary education incomplete	4.1	+	Parliament (distrust)	11.1	-
Secondary education incomplete	9.4	+	Military (distrust)	8.4	-
University education	4.8	-			

Source: Johansson and Loftsson (2003: q.32)

Hence, levels of trust in regime institutions are primarily related to generational and educational differences and the urban-rural divide. Distrust in regime institutions is prevalent among younger respondents and those with higher education. Even the national army, which otherwise enjoys generally high levels of trust, elicits distrust among some respondents. The older generation and those with lower levels of education express a higher degree of trust in regime institutions. Additionally, the period during which the survey was conducted should be taken into account. Given the general perception that the PCRM government found its main supporters among older voters in the countryside, it is not surprising that respondents within exactly these categories express the highest level of trust in regime institutions whose representatives they are likely to have supported in the elections two years earlier in 2001.

Given the high levels of distrust in political parties found in Table 17 above, where age was among the factors affecting support most, it was further investigated if respondents exhibited similar levels of distrust in politicians by analyzing their responses to a direct question regarding this particular regime institution and sorted frequencies according to age groups (Table 18). Table 18 reveals no significant differences between the age groups along the trust and distrust continuum for politicians, although persons 60 years of age or older account for a greater percentage of non-answers. A

Table 18. *To what extent can politicians be trusted?*

Age group	Not at all (1)	2	3	4	Very much (5)	DK/NA
18-29	26.0%	27.6%	27.3%	7.3%	0.9%	11.0%
30-44	28.6	28.9	28.0	7.6	1.1	5.9
45-59	27.3	30.9	27.7	5.5	1.2	7.4
60+	21.2	22.7	26.0	8.6	0.4	21.2

Source: Johansson and Loftsson (2003: q.26e_4)

comparison to Table 16 above, reveals a correlation between the distrust registered for political parties and that for politicians. Having established this picture of general distrust in politicians, we turn toward to the last and most specific form object of political support, namely political actors.

Political Actors

Moldovan politics has thus far avoided reflecting purely ethnic divisions in the party system, and individual parties represent a spectrum of ethnic groups (Protsyk and Osoian, 2010: 19).¹²⁸ Instead politics is divided along identity fault lines of either pro-Romanian or pro-Moldovan orientation. This led Heintz (2007: 20) to conclude that Romanian-speakers tend to vote for democrats, Moldovan-speakers for communists. These preferences, however, are related less to ideology and more to the parties' stance on the national issue. Indeed political ideologies in Moldova, although often of a different character than their Western counterparts, appear to be of less importance for many voters than the question of how the parties view Moldovan nation- and statehood. Thus the choice of what one calls the language implies a range of other political preferences and, ultimately, becomes the lens through which politics and thus one's own place in society is perceived.


For these reasons, it is not surprising to find that the survey question which elicits the strongest positioning along ethnic lines is one regarding political preferences. Most of the nine parties in the survey have already been introduced in Chapter 5, namely the Party of Communists (PCRM), the Christian Democratic People's Party (PPCD), the Democratic Party (PDM), the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Agrarian Democratic Party (PDAM), and the Social-Liberal Party (PSL). The parties not mentioned earlier but included in the survey are the *Alianța Social-Democrată din Moldova* (Social Democratic Alliance of Moldova, ASDM), the *Alianței Independenților din Republica Moldova* (Alliance of Independents of Moldova, AIRM), and the *Partidul Liberal* (Liberal Party, PL).¹²⁹ The ASDM, AIRM and PL all ceased to exist as independent parties in 2003 as they merged into the *Alianța "Moldova Noastră"* (the "Our Moldova" Alliance, AMN). An overview of Moldova's identitarian politics, which looks at the PCRM, PDM, PSD, PSDL, and

¹²⁸ There have, however, been some attempts to form ethnic parties which specifically target Moldova's ethnic minorities. Examples include the *Mișcarea social-politică "Ravnopravie"* (Social-political Movement "Equality"), primarily finding its electorate among the Slavic minorities, and the *Mișcarea social-politică a Romilor din Republica Moldova* (Roma Social-political Movement of the Republic of Moldova). "Ravnopravie," which participated in the 2001 and 2005 elections, garnered 0.1 percent of the votes in the November 2010 parliamentary elections, while the Roma Social-political Movement, running for the first time, garnered 0.14 percent of the votes in the 2010 elections.

¹²⁹ The Liberal Party of 2003 was, however, a different party to the *Partidul Liberal* that managed to win several mandates in the parliamentary elections of 2009 and 2010.

PPCD, is offered by Protsyk (2007: 15). In the present study, we have expanded this further to include all nine parties and have placed them on a simplified Moldovanist-Romanianist continuum (Table 19).¹³⁰ Protsyk’s original data comes from a 2006 ECMI expert survey conducted in Chişinău.

Table 19. *Political Parties according to identitarian positions*



Source: Protsyk (2007: 15) modified by the author

Since Moldovan political parties are generally recognized by their party leader, each party was listed together with their respective head. Respondents were then asked to position themselves on a scale between one to five for each party, where one (1) implied the party was very far from the respondent’s political orientation and five (5) implied that the party was very close to the respondent’s political orientation. In Table 20 below we can see that the PCRM emerged as the most popular party, followed by the AIRM and the ASDM. Some of the parties were largely unknown to the respondents as indicated by the high percentages in the don’t know/no answer column.

Table 20. *Distance to Political Parties*

Political Party	Very far from own political orientation (1)	2	3	4	Very close to own political orientation (5)	DK/NA
PCRM (V. Voronin)	16.5%	6.6%	14.2%	16.7%	28.1%	17.8%
PPCD (I. Roşca)	39.7	12.4	8.7	5.5	4.7	29.0
AIRM (S. Urechean)	25.8	11.7	14.4	6.9	4.9	36.3
PL (V. Untilă)	28.6	9.8	7.0	2.2	2.1	50.3
PDM (D. Diacov)	29.9	10.4	10.8	4.1	2.4	42.5
PSD (O. Nantoi)	27.3	8.9	7.7	5.5	3.5	47.1
ASDM (D. Braghiş)	26.9	11.6	12.2	6.9	3.9	38.5
PDAM (A. Pupoşoi)	27.6	9.9	7.7	3.8	1.5	49.4
PSD (O. Serebrian)	26.7	6.4	7.5	2.6	2.5	54.3

Source: Johansson and Loftsson (2003: q.16_1-16_9)

To enable further understanding of support for political actors, we focused only on positive levels of support, i.e., answers corresponding to categories four and five on the scale. In addition to the previously mentioned problematic outliers, “primarily Ukrainian, secondarily Moldovan” and those who did not indicate a reply to the question of educational level, persons identify-

¹³⁰ While the Moldovanist and Romanianist extremes on the endpoints of the continuum are represented by the PCRM and PPCD with some degree of certainty, the order of the parties in between may not be so clear-cut.

ing as Moldovans first and Ukrainians second appear as an outlier and have been removed to avoid distortion of the CA results.¹³¹ The first and second axes combined account for more than 80 percent of the variance found in the contingency table (see Table 21). On the first axis only the PCRМ has a contribution that makes it stand out from the average, but in the CA scatter plot, found in Annex D-5, it is possible to see how the parties which constituted the opposition in 2003 are grouped together. On the second axis, a division of the opposition into two clusters is discernible, one comprised of the AIRM and the ASDM and the other of PSL, PPCD, and PL.

With regard to background variables, those who find the PCRМ close to their own political orientation include residents of Bălți; persons identifying as Russians; as Ukrainians; as Moldovans first and Russians second; people with undefined ethnicity; and people with incomplete secondary education. Although none of the opposition parties has a contribution of significance to account for the variance in the first axis, background variables concerning these parties do, and particularly those identifying as Romanians and those having a university education. This indicates the influence of identity on opposition supporters. The second axis, which mainly breaks down and clusters the opposition, reflects that AIRM and ASDM find supporters among people residing in the capital, those identifying as Romanians first and Moldovans second and those with incomplete secondary education, while PSL and PPCD find support among people identifying as Romanians followed by residents of Bălți and smaller communities.

Hence, there is a clear ethnic diversification of political preferences, which is arguably linked to how parties position themselves on the Moldovanist-Romanianist continuum. Finally, given the findings earlier in the chapter, the variable of age was expected to have a greater degree of impact on a respondent's support for a specific party. Surprisingly, this did not prove to be the case, and age had very little impact on party preferences.

Summary of Main Divides Found

Correspondence analysis results regarding the different objects of support revealed a number of links between objects of support and background variables. This does not lead us to necessarily assume that one background variable influences all objects of support. Instead, since clusters of variables often occur together, this hints that individuals with specific combinations of background variables may harbor specific attitudes. Even if the analysis

¹³¹ However, the tendency of those identifying as Moldovans first and Ukrainians second and those identifying as Ukrainians first and Moldovans second were in the same direction as those identifying just as Ukrainians, only much more extreme and carrying minimal weight, i.e., numbering only a small number of respondents.

Table 21. *Support of political actors*

		Axis 1 [68.2]		Axis 2 [12.4]	
Inertia		Positive	Negative	Positive	Negative
Column variables	PCRM			AIRM ASDM	PSL PPCD PL
	Row variables	Location 1 First Moldovan, second Russian Russian Ukrainian Ethnicity "other" Secondary education in- complete	Romanian University	Capital First Romanian, second Moldovan Secondary education in- complete	Location 1 Location 2 Romanian

Source: table by the author

here does not allow compiling profiles of individuals, which would require stacking of variables. Some of the background variables are, however, more present in the CA plots than others, which makes it possible to draw several conclusions regarding the relationship between objects of support and particular groups as summarized below.

The notion of a *political community* mainly found adherents among the older generation, i.e., above 60 years of age, people from smaller communities and, not surprisingly, those identifying as Moldovans. On the other hand, the younger generation, some minorities and inhabitants of Chişinău and Bălţi were not as proud to be either members of the Moldovan political community or of their own ethnic groups. This indicates a generational rift within the political community between older people, who remember the relatively greater socio-economic stability of Soviet times, and younger people, who have experienced post-Soviet economic downturns firsthand.¹³² A similar trend of disaffection towards the nation, was spotted among some of the ethnic minority groups.

Support of *regime principles* was largely dependent upon the particular principle. No major differences were observed among the different respondent groups with respect to the importance of participation. However, those who were less inclined to see tolerance as important included men, those between 18 to 29 years of age, persons regarding themselves as Romanians, persons regarding themselves as Moldovans first and Romanians second and those with university educations. Meanwhile, those who did consider it less important to obey laws included Romanians and those identifying as Moldovans first and Romanians second.

Support of regime performance only required interpretation along the first axis. Those who most approved of the PCRM regime's performance in 2003 and where it would stand in five years were persons with lower levels of education, those identifying as Moldovans and the older generation above 60 years of age. These characteristics indeed capture a large part of the PCRM electorate. Thus we might conclude that these groups probably approved of the regime change in 2001 and remained optimistic that things would improve in the coming years. Among those who did not approve of the regime's performance and did not believe that it would change for the better in the coming years were younger people, inhabitants of Chişinău, those regarding themselves as Romanians to any extent and those with university education.


Trust in *regime institutions* was exhibited by the older generation above 60 years of age, those residing in smaller communities, and persons with

¹³² The research by Abbott et al (2010) has, however, shown that the feelings of Moldovan youths towards the nation is more complex and that they are often torn between their allegiance to the country and their disapproval of how the political, economic, and social systems have deteriorated over the past twenty years of transition.

incomplete primary or secondary educations. Distrust was expressed by the combined age group of 18 to 44 years of age and by people living in the capital and Bălți. It is thus likely that the part of the population who displayed trust in institutions is probably the same group who approved of the PCRM. It is important to note, however, that overall trust in regime institutions was low and is a worrying sign for any regime.

Finally, the issue of ethnicity became the main background variable in determining support to specific *political actors*. The political landscape was clearly divided between the PCRM, on one side of the spectrum, and the opposition, on the other, with Slavic groups, “other” minority groups and people with lower education clustering around the PCRM. The opposition parties found their support among those identifying as Romanian or some combination of Romanian and Moldovan. This explains the tendency of political parties in Moldova, as noted earlier, to formulate their political platforms around issues of national identity.

Table 22. *Divided political support*

	Object of Support	Summary of divides identified	
Diffuse support 	Political Community	Older generation, smaller localities, Moldovans	Younger generation, urban centers
	Regime Principles		Younger generations, Romanians, university-educated
	Regime Performance	Lower education, Moldovans, older generation	Younger generation, inhabitants of Chişinău, Romanian first Moldovan second, Russians, university-educated
	Regime Institutions	Older generation, smaller communities, lower education	Younger generation, urban centers
Specific Support	Political Actors	Ethnic minorities, lower education	Romanians, university-educated

Source: table by the author

Hence, political support in Moldova with respect to the different objects of support is highly divided. Table 22 above captures the main divisions identified according to relational clusters of background variables derived from the correspondence analysis.¹³³ The pattern that is created shows a genera-

¹³³ There were some indications that the sex of respondents may have influenced their positions on political community and regime principles, but these variables were not of considera-

tional, educational, urban-rural and ethnic divide. The ethnic divide, which is based on the assumption that ethnicity influences attitudes towards the nation and, consequently, towards the nation-state is meaningful, but it is not one of the main background variables found to affect dependent variables. Instead the generational, educational, and urban-rural variables that most impact the objects of support. Generational differences may be caused by having internalized different value systems, those either promoted by the MSSR prior to independence or fostered, albeit ambiguously, by the contemporary Republic of Moldova.¹³⁴ Educational differences are related to the level of schooling completed, with the increased probability that higher education may have exposed the individual to discussions on Soviet nation-building and Romanian history. Finally, the urban-rural divide reinforces such differences as urban areas provide better access to all public services, including educational. Taken together, these differences expose a major rift in the way political support is expressed, which, based on the presentation in earlier chapters, could be described in terms of a Moldovanist-Romanianist split. It is important to bear in mind, however, that while extreme forms of old Soviet Moldovanism and Romanianism still linger, there are also nuances to each of these positions.

However, there are other factors at play here. As mentioned earlier, two decades of economic downfall, massive migration and deteriorating social conditions deprived many Moldovans, regardless of ethnic group, of a sense of pride in their nation. If recognized at all, Moldova became known internationally only for its economic problems and poverty. Among citizens this probably helped foster thinking of the nation in less than appreciative terms, and it so happened that Moldovans venturing abroad, for whatever reasons, at times claimed that they were citizens of other states. This development was detrimental as not only was the country deprived of many of its young and most productive people, but feelings toward the political community were severely weakened. Both Acton (1949) and Connor (1972) took note of the hegemonic form that the nation craves. A well-functioning nation implies a monopoly of the definition of who the people are, their past and their future. There is a need for an identity to facilitate the consolidation of a common space, one which can overcome the particularities of context and background to be able to “do business” (Taylor, 1999). Even if the foundation of the nation are not important and change when values do, there must be

ble strength. To be able to answer whether there is a gender dimension, closer analysis would be needed.

¹³⁴ Reiterating this generational divide, some years after the survey data analyzed here was collected, PDM party leader Marian Lupu, during a campaign meeting in Bălți in October 2010, stated that “there are currently two Moldovas: one belonging to communists, and the other is anti-communist, one belongs to youth, the other one – to old people” (Azi.md, 10/18/10).

something that holds people together. As argued by Rustow (1970), national unity is an acute prerequisite to representative democracy.

Moldova is a manifestation of the opposite case. Instead of one nation's monopoly, two major nationalisms are competing for hegemony. According to Way (2002), this situation has been beneficial for democratization, even if not for democratic consolidation, and has functioned as a guarantor for pluralism. These nationalisms, however, are not based directly on ethnicity, at least not according to our conventional understanding of the term. The people to whom Moldovanist and Romanianist calls are directed belong to the same collective. This calls our attention to the commonality of values, and indeed the schisms do not seem as dramatic compared to other countries (cf. Inglehart, 1997). The generational, educational, and urban-rural differences observed through the correspondence analysis in this chapter are a threat to neither nation nor democracy. They are the kind political cleavages expected to find in most societies. For most objects of political support, the ethnic background of respondents did not seem to play an important role, but when this variable did impact variance, it did so with respect to the most specific object of support, namely political actors. Here Moldovanism and Romanianism, mixed with more conventional political ideologies, run strong in the programs and declarations of a number of parties, demonstrating that Moldovan political parties perceive the need to address the national question in one way or another. Could the Moldovanist-Romanianist split then also be the explanation for Moldova's relative democratic success?

8. A House Divided

In Chapter 1 three questions were posed. These were formulated such that looking into two sub-questions, namely *What are the effects of Moldova being a nation divided on political developments in general and democratization in particular?* and *How does national identity influence the nature of the Moldovan political support?* would provide the basis for answering the main question of the study, namely *How and why has Moldova, despite being a nation divided, been able to achieve relatively high democratic standards?* The two sub-questions are first addressed below, and thereafter we turn our attention to the key question of how Moldova has been able to democratize despite not having a coherent political community.

Nation, Political Developments and Democratization

The politics of the MSSR and the Republic of Moldova have largely been affected by how the nation has been understood. Specific strands of national identity have influenced policies in either one direction or the other or have made them impossible to even formulate given outright opposition from the other party. These identities have been painted in either Moldovan or Romanian colors, but none of them has yet gained enough strength to impose its own particular vision of the nation and end the identity debates once and for all.

To politicians, national identity remains a source from which they can draw to win the electorate's support. While this may yield parliamentary mandates, it implies the continued polarization of society on the basis of identity, a cleavage much more complicated to negotiate than one of a socio-economic dimension (Elster, et al., 1998: 249f). This observation, which was supported by and based on previous research, formed the basis for the present study, which ultimately aims to explore how conflicts surrounding nation and identity have served to frame politics in Moldova and, more specifically, how Moldova, despite its identity-based national divisions, has still managed to pursue democratization.

Moldovan political elites have been able to use the identity schisms of Moldovanism and Romanianism for their own political ends. On the one hand, this has provided a platform for pluralism. On the other, it has locked politics to non-negotiable identity positions. Some political parties have

done this to a greater degree than others, as the Moldovanist PDAM and PCRM and the Romanianist PPCD and PL examples show. Attempts to change the status quo have been met with stark opposition, which, for example, led to the end of the PCRM's attempt to change the school curriculum in 2002 and replace the existing Romanian version of history with an integrated Moldovan version. During the PCRM's early second term in office, identity conflicts were at their lowest, and issues related to the identity of Moldovans were touched upon more in passing than as a matter of political debate. This happened after the cooptation of the PPCD, which silenced the strongest pro-Romanian voice of the time. This period of relative calm ended with the parliamentary elections of 2009 when the dormant issues of national identity appeared again on the political agenda. For the Moldovans the basic question of *Who are we?* have lingered more or less since independence.

Although political party positions are defined according to identity fault lines, inter-personal and inter-group ethnic relations are more harmonious. This is supported by the findings in Chapter 7 which show that ethnicity is not the main factor in the country's division. This is also corroborated if we consider how Moldovan society functions as a whole. While much has changed in the country since independence, including the situation of minorities, the relative lack of inter-ethnic conflicts would suggest that ethnicity in daily life has little to do with how people conduct their affairs. This is likely the result of Moldova being a border country historically, causing a fluidity of ethnic and national identities and greater tolerance. While not universal in nature, this tolerance has become a strong component in holding together a multicultural society.

We can observe then that national divisions in Moldova are manifest differently on different levels. On higher political levels, national identity may serve as a source of conflict, while on lower individual or group levels it is not a topic of greater concern. This leaves room for hope that the problem of national identity can be solved from below by people fed up with the constant and inconclusive quarrelling regarding identity among political elites. In such a case, the tolerance which exists among Moldova's different ethnic groups will be a great asset in finding viable solutions and finally charting a course for the country. It remains to be seen whether this course will steer Moldova towards the west or the east, some combination of both or in another direction entirely.

Other border-states of the former Soviet Union, notably Ukraine and Belarus, have had similar historical experiences of being border states without strong national identities. Törnquist-Plewa (1999: 41) has argued that ethnic mobilization and ethno-national conflicts in these states in the early 1990s were never realized precisely because of their weak national identities. Without strong national identities in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, massive support for ethno-national nation-building projects were impossible. If one's identity is flexible, there is a greater chance to negotiate around it. Neverthe-

less, Moldova did experience a short civil war, and Ukraine had to tackle separatism in Crimea among other things (while Belarus weak nation rather opened up for a return to the political identity of the Soviet past) but neither of these conflicts turned as brutally violent or as drawn out as the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s. Moldova's weak or ambiguous national identity thus served to lessen the risk of inter-ethnic violence. It also provided a platform for pluralism, although this has been a mixed blessing with regard to prospects for democratic consolidation.

Table 6, Chapter 6, brings together some of the main democracy indices available and reveals how Moldova's democracy scores have varied over the years. Although there are differences in how democracy has been measured, the Freedom in the World and Nations in Transit indices indicate that levels of democracy during the 1990s gradually improved. However, there was a clear break in 2001, the year the PCRM won an overwhelming victory in the parliamentary elections enabling it to elect president by itself based on the constitutional revisions made just before. Way (2002: 136) took note of the PCRM's strong position early in its first mandate period and suggested that its cohesion would threaten democracy in Moldova. Without a strong opposition in the early 2000s and given the quashing of the institutionalized power struggle between legislature and executive, political competition was severely weakened. While the dominance of one party would not necessarily endanger a consolidated democracy, such a situation in a transitional state could indeed derail democratization efforts.

However, while Way pointed out the dangers of the first year of PCRM rule, he could not foresee its outcome eight years later. Not even the cohesion of the PCRM, its strong party discipline and regional presence, influence over media and control over the police and military allowed it to rule unhindered. The party's reorientation from east to west and its recreated political vision also indicate that the assumption of Moldovan politicians' general preference for autocracy is more complex than it would appear. After all, the same divided Moldovan nation, which has split the political elite into fractions, allowed the country to quickly re-orientate westward following the failure of the Kozak-memorandum and subsequent conflict with Russia. In this manner it was not comparable to Belarus' short flirtation with the West from 2006 to 2010, when a conflict with Russia on gas tariffs paved the way for some liberalization but was mainly was a strategy of the dictatorial regime to secure credits and win time (cf. Potocki, 2011). Pluralism in Moldova proved sturdier than Way probably would have predicted.

National Identity and Political Support

Although it is a nation divided the Moldovan population has often taken an indifferent or pragmatic position with regard to its national identity. In the

2005-2006 World Values Survey (WVS), currently the largest international social science survey, 38.3 percent of Romanians and 33 percent of Ukrainians expressed that they were very proud of belonging to their specific political communities, while only 18.8 percent of Moldovans replied that they were proud. Moldovans have instead often sought other non-national labels for their identity, and 27.2 percent of Moldovan respondents queried in the WVS survey agreed strongly to the statement that they are world citizens. Kennedy (2007b: 2) likewise observed the Moldovans' tendency to describe themselves as Europeans. Both the "world citizen" and "European" labels imply that individual identity belongs in a larger context, which is understandable, especially with regard to the Moldovan diaspora, but this may also be a way of avoiding a much more problematic discussion on one's national identity.

Given the strong focus of political elites on identity-related issues, we would expect a corresponding impact of respondents' ethnicity on expressions of political support in the 2003 survey data. To some extent this is realized, and indeed members of different ethnic groups are proud to belong to the Moldovan political community to varying degrees. Those identifying as Moldovans are also more positive towards a state that bears a name with which they can identify. With regard to the last and most specific of Norris' objects of support, namely political actors, we can observe that ethnicity contributes strongly to how closely respondents associate themselves with particular political parties. For the three remaining objects of political support, namely regime principles, regime performance, and regime institutions, another picture materializes. Generational and urban-rural differences, rather than ethnic, influence expressions of support. For the overall level of political support, with all objects of support included, ethnicity cannot be said to be the main determinant.

The generational difference observed supports the assumption that there likely are important variations in cultural learning. Discussing the differences in Post-materialist values between older and younger generations in Western societies, Inglehart concludes that there are strong reasons to believe that these "reflect the persisting impact of distinctive formative experiences that (in the case of the oldest cohort) took place as much as fifty years ago" (Inglehart, 1990: 128). Even if it is plausible to argue that the difficult socio-economic transition of Moldova has affected the values of younger generations and rendered them not only more materialistically-oriented but less tolerant, as hinted by the lower levels of support for tolerance among the age group 18 to 29, than older generations, more research would be needed to approach such a question satisfactorily.

A main theme of the present study has, nevertheless, been to explore how national division, based on findings of existing literature, serves to frame politics in Moldova. While there is some danger here of circular reasoning, i.e., deciding to produce a narrative based on specific assumptions, which, in

the end, validates those assumptions, the intention was to create a better understanding of the effect of being a divided nation on political developments in Moldova and to control for other potential explanations. Thus could a large body of literature be synthesized and narrowed in a manner which otherwise would not have been feasible. While it was shown above that Moldova's national division is indeed an important determinant in political developments, the correspondence analysis indicates that other factors may better describe this division than national identity. This suggests that there may be a conceptual problem in how Moldova's national division is understood. At the same time, perceiving Moldova as a nation divided may also be problematic, when it just as well could be described as a nation still forming.

A Divided or Forming Nation?

The Moldovan political community is not only divided according to ethnic lines.¹³⁵ The division is more complex and is probably related to the shaping of cognitive frameworks, i.e., interpretive systems, over many generations as a result of the nation-building efforts and influences of the Soviet Union, Romania and the Republic of Moldova. Succeeding generations have internalized different cultural values. Although Moldova as a nation is indeed divided, it must be recognized that a historical Moldovan nation never truly existed before the current republic was brought into being in 1991. What did exist in terms of a Moldovan nation was largely the result of conscious nineteenth and twentieth century Russian and Soviet nation-building projects (cf. van Meurs, 1994), which competed with a Romanian alternative. Upon independence, there was no ready vision of nation and identity around which to rally. There was only the immediate sense of an initially unpleasant past which no longer existed, and the option to embrace Romanian nationalism. Not before the strength of Romanianism had eventually subsided could the process of independent Moldovan nation-building actually begin.¹³⁶ Hence, even if we have focused largely on Moldova's *divisions*, it may be equally valid to view Moldova as a nation in *formation* and one which is still in the process of consolidation.

Although nationalism in Western Europe became a means to ensure greater cohesion within the state, which would later function as a basis for democratization efforts, this was not the case in many other regions of the world. Following the demise of the European Great Powers after the Second World War, the former colonies in Africa and Asia initiated state- and na-

¹³⁵ Parts of this section were inspired by a seminar held to discuss the present study at the Institute for Public Policy, Chişinău, 12/11/11.

¹³⁶ This draws again attention to the advice by O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986a: 30) who argue that historical "truths" should not be addressed during a transition because they tend to become infected and endless while there are so many other urgent needs to address during a process of democratization (see Ch. 5, fn. 107).

tion-building projects within their prescribed colonial borders. Often these were beset with many of the same problems that the Post-Soviet states would encounter decades later, i.e., weak state structures with divided political communities leading to similar problems regarding the legitimacy of political regimes and the protection of state borders (cf. Beissinger and Young, 2002: 30ff). Adding democratization into the mix only serves to increase considerably the level complexity. The time required for a step-by-step transition was not an option available in the same way that it had been historically for many of the Western states. “A slow political development may foster a civic culture, but what the new nations of the world lack is the time for this gradual development” (Almond and Verba, [1963] 1989: 369f). Transition came suddenly to the Post-Soviet states, and with it came the necessity to conduct the type of difficult fourfold transitions mentioned earlier in this study (Kuzio, 2001b). Thus from a comparative perspective, the Moldovan situation, with a state preceding the nation, is not novel. It is too early to predict if the Moldovan nation will exist in the future. At the same time, there are no reasons to believe that the current divisions will last indefinitely. Provided that Moldova does not experience any major disruptions, it is possible that the nation will over time take on a more stable and concrete form.¹³⁷

Another possibility would be for the current situation to stabilize in a manner such that the Moldovan and Romanian national identities are allowed to co-exist. This is contrary to the aims of essentialists, who seek to render the other group defunct or reduce them to mere minority status as was the case with the PCRM’s 2004 *Nationality Concept*, which defined Romanians as one of the smallest ethnic groups, or the 2009 pursued the pro-Romanian rhetoric of acting President Ghimpu. It would mean a situation in which both parties accept and respect that history may be perceived from different perspectives, and no one national narrative is more true than the other. Hence, the core nation would have two constituent parts of the same status if not size. Since both Moldovanist and Romanianist proponents make state-bearing claims, this is not a scenario likely to play out in the near future. It is, however, an option that offers some hope in case the nation remains divided.

For the time being both these scenarios may seem like illusions or wishful thinking, but there are a few things to consider before dismissing them too quickly. First, no nation has existed since the dawn of time. At a certain point it had to be imagined, given form and internalized as a cultural and political identity in the minds of people. Since there are precedents, then it is also possible for young states like Moldova to establish a nation in time.

¹³⁷ An alternative would be the formation of a completely different type of political community, perhaps in the vein of Habermas’ (2001) constitutional patriotism, or something else entirely. Although this is possible theoretically, it is less than plausible given the global hold the nation-state paradigm still enjoys and considering that a large share of Moldovan political discourse continues to promote the idea of a Moldovan nation and nation-state.

Second, nations are real in the sense that collectives treat and act upon them as real, but they are not real in the sense of race, blood ties, “objective” historical past and other such constructions. Nations are instead about bundles of values that evolve over time as society and people change. Some values may seem like they have existed forever, but are, in reality, subject to change. Nations thus define who does and does not belong to the community. In an age of increasing globalization, when migration is increasing and borders, at least regionally, are being removed, it is necessary that the concept of the nation be understood for exactly this, a set of values, rather than what it is not, a tribal community based on imagined blood.¹³⁸ It is a challenge to get modern representative democracy to work. However, it is also a challenge for a nation to confront the ideas upon which it is based upon and for the individual to more actively consider the values which bind the nation (cf. Johansson Heinö, 2009: Ch. 7). If this is taken seriously, it will likely mean the end of the nation as we know it, as borders between political communities will blur when the universal character of values are recognized. This does not necessarily imply a threat to democracy, but it means that we need to reconsider the foundation of the political community.

In divided societies like Moldova, or, for that matter, a country such as Belgium, the promotion of common values becomes an important instrument in keeping the national communities together. Although national divisions between Flemings and Walloons in Belgium run deep, they constitute, unlike Moldova, two distinct communities joined within the framework of a federative Belgian state. Nevertheless, the politico-cultural rifts between the two communities shape Belgian politics in ways that are reminiscent of the Moldovan case. What works in Belgium’s favor, despite the cultural divisions, is the existence of a basic feeling of solidarity between Fleming and Walloon citizens and political and economic elites that seeks to maintain the unity of the country (Billiet, et al., 2005: 931f). Without such a feeling of shared solidarity, Moldova’s political community will not be able to reach the level of stability needed to consolidate democracy.

¹³⁸ In the wake of the terrible terrorist acts in Norway which occurred in July 2011, the Swedish discourse revealed how there was a qualitative difference in analysis with regard to the ethnic background of the perpetrator. It was duly noted that if she or he was to be right-wing extremist, which turned out to be the case here, it would be considered almost a “train accident” or the actions of a “single lunatic” (Guillou, 23/7/11). The enemy was “one of us” and “came from within”. These labels would not have been applied had the terrorist been born outside of Norway and had had Islamist connections. If this were the case, the debate would have taken quite another turns and focused on the outsider, the one who does not belong to the nation (cf. Andersson, 13/8/11).

National Division and Democratization

In a more general context, the Moldovan case raises questions as to how nations are built and on what grounds democracy is achieved. Democracy rests on the assumption of a delimited polity, but it does not, by definition, prescribe how the political community should be defined (cf. Smilov and Jileva, 2009: 211). As pointed out by Connor (1972), nation-building involves as much the destruction of rivaling nationalisms as it does the promotion of a common identity. For states undergoing triple or quadruple transitions, it would, therefore, be rational for the core nation to ascertain dominance throughout its jurisdiction in order to ensure the success of further democratization efforts. Democracy is thus won by application of undemocratic means, a contradictory and unnerving proposition for most democrats. The case of Estonia presents an example of such hegemonic democratization. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Estonia managed to successfully chart a democratic course, although it initially faced considerable resistance towards the core nation's attempts to turn state and nation into an Estonian one (Pettai and Hallik, 2002). Estonia thus pursued democratization amidst allegations of discrimination against its Russian-speaking minority (cf. CoE, 10/29/96; Everly, 1997), which, on the one hand, undermined democratization efforts by breaching human rights, but, on the other hand, kept democratization on track. The same methods that further homogeneity in small states, however, often drive minorities towards autonomy or secession (Hobsbawm, 1992: 242f).

Moldovan democratization was never threatened in this way by hegemonic attempts (except, it could be argued, in the very early 1990s), but as national divisions suddenly emerged, policy directions splintered into numerous divergent paths. The effort to keep the country on track and maintain momentum was imperiled by a growing battle of wills, which were based on different and conflicting visions of the nation. These wills were not necessarily authoritarian and may well have been formulated based on the self-interests of political actors rather than for the common good. Despite these political challenges, Moldova has managed to maintain certain democratic standards even if, as observed in Chapter 6, many shortcomings have been registered. Democracy is yet to become the "only game in town," and it sometimes does come under attack. In the context of Beetham's spectrum (see Figure 4, Chapter 3), Moldovan democracy may be viewed as oscillating back and forth mainly on the democratic part of the scale but without yet having reached consolidation. In Dahl's (1999: 269) words this illustrates a "pending polyarchy".

Way, Rustow or Institutionalized Democratization?

The unusual nature of Moldova's democratization led Way (2003c) to consider how relatively high standards of democracy can be sustained even when classical democracy theory suggests otherwise. His conclusion was that Moldova constitutes a case of *pluralism by default*, and is based upon the premise that Moldova would become autocratic if the divisions between competing elites and individuals were removed.¹³⁹ Way also includes ethno-political conflict and competing nationalisms as two major causes undermining incumbent power and thus promoting pluralism. Indeed we have observed numerous examples of how national identity divisions have pushed Moldova in one direction or pushed it toward the other and, following Way's reasoning, promoted pluralism as a result. The most massive demonstrations against the government have indeed been based on the question of nationality. This was true during the independence struggle, during the conflict in 2002 over how history should be taught in schools and during the electoral campaigns of 2009. However, the divisions in Moldova are more complex and go beyond national identity to include, for example, the generational divides discussed above.¹⁴⁰

Pluralism by default is a valuable concept in that it illuminates other ways and reasons by which democratization can be pursued, even in settings where the classic requisites of national unity, economic progress and a democratic legacy are lacking. National identities may offer convenient dividing lines in politics that facilitate the creation of a pluralistic party landscape, but, at the same time, they can be exploited to assert political positions which are exclusionary and non-negotiable. In the long run, democracy would fare better if politics were focused less on insoluble essentialist issues and more on cleavages which are negotiable. As Way (2002) argues, pluralism by default may indeed promote pluralism, but it can also threaten the consolidation of democracy.

If it is the case that national unity is required in order to consolidate democracy, what then is the difference between what Way and Rustow each propose? If we remove Way's assumption regarding the autocratic intentions of Moldova's politicians (and it should be removed because of its teleological claims), then their general approaches are no longer so different. Way argues

¹³⁹ As mentioned in Chapter 1, Way (2003b: fn. 33) does, however, acknowledge the risk of promoting authoritarian teleology, which is no better than democratic teleology, but he does not address the issue much further. The problem with such an approach is that it relies on an assumption of the future that we will never know. We may study the actions of political elites in different countries and conclude whether their behavior is democratic or autocratic, but to separate their true intentions from their actual behavior is a questionable approach.

¹⁴⁰ The same generational impact was also noted by Cașu (2007: 242) who, referring to Way's conclusions, drew attention to the fact that one of the main reasons for the PCRM's electoral victory in 2001 was the strong support the party enjoyed among the older electorate, while a large share of the younger electorate who supported other parties was working abroad.

that the lack of national unity provides some space for pluralism but hampers democratic consolidation. Rustow posits that national unity is a crucial condition for democracy. Contrary to Rustow then, Way believes that national unity does not have to precede democratization and that divisions can actually create the basis for pluralism. Interpreted positively, it is an argument that democratic transitions can take place even in severely divided societies. Regarded more negatively, and this is where both Way and Rustow agree, it implies that democratization without national unity is either incomplete or impossible and therefore makes democratic consolidation a lost cause in the long run. Neither of them raises the possibility of a precarious national unity evolving and growing stronger over time. Both base their assumptions on a snapshot of the political community at the time transition is initiated.

There are also problems regarding the notion that national unity is a necessary prerequisite to achieve democratic consolidation. First, it threatens to disqualify any democratization effort that begins without national unity in place. Thus if national divisions are present, it is pointless to attempt democratization that only threatens to open up a Pandora's box of potential political conflicts. Second, it is arguable that national unity is absolutely necessary *before* the start of transition or instead can be instilled *after* the inception of transition. Estonia democratized rapidly despite their political communities exhibiting dividing lines similar to Moldova's. Likewise, Belgium stirs occasionally because of internal divisions but survives these, and the United States has managed to build a nation around diversity (even though it too has numerous examples of inequality between ethnic groups). Moreover, if the idea of a national unity prerequisite for democracy is transferred to post-colonial Africa and Asia, democratization in most of these places should never have stood a chance. Nevertheless, democratic states such as South Africa and India do exist, regardless of the challenges brought by national divisions. Furthermore, it is rare to hear leaders of Western democratic states argue against the spread of democracy or for the cessation of aid to support democratization because of potential obstacles such as internal divisions. Diversity does not necessarily imply that democracy is doomed before it even begins.

For new states, especially those undergoing difficult and multiple transitions, it is important to recognize that if a strong sense of community does not already exist, then nation-building will take time beyond the establishment of basic political institutions (which will themselves be affected by divisions in the political community). This conclusion is also supported by Elkins and Sides (2007), who found that federalism and the proportional electoral system, two of the main solutions to ethnic division, do little to improve the national unity of a state. Wider distribution of power does not seem to correlate directly with higher levels of attachment to the state, and minority allegiance is not automatically created by democracy and consociational democratic institutions. In Moldova the functioning balance of power

arrangement between the executive and legislative branches of government prior to the 2000 constitutional revision reveals that pluralistic institutions, which may or may not be endorsed by the people, do not necessarily imply that the people automatically express a greater affinity for the political community. This hints once more to the requirement for a *demos* that shares an (imagined) sense of belonging. While political institutions may help in promoting a national identity, they have to be combined with a cultural content that can help define the collective they are set to administer and serve. Nevertheless, the positive influence the balance between parliament and president had generally on Moldovan democracy is clearly one of the reasons to Moldova's relatively high democratic standards during the 1990s. It is doubtful whether this arrangement could be argued to be a mere consequence of national division.

Are there then any signs from the correspondence analysis of political support in Chapter 7 that a Moldovan nation may be evolving? We have observed that political developments and democratization efforts have been greatly affected by the utilization of national division by political elites. However, the results of the correspondence analysis indicate that there is more to the issue of division than purely national identity. National identity divisions do not seem to determine levels of support for objects of political support, with the notable exception of support for political actors, i.e., political parties. Instead generational and urban-rural divides strongly influence how respondents are grouped in the correspondence analysis. With the passing of generations then, a Moldovan nation may emerge, indicating that it is not implausible for a sense of national identity to be instilled over time and that political unity can be realized while democratization is already underway. Hence, focus can be directed towards the end point of both political consolidation (democracy) and cultural consolidation (nation), rather than at their inception. Democracy, even though at times chaotic and unruly, does offer an arena for many opinions to be heard and for consensus to be reached.

...democracy has institutional features which offer the hope that every part of the population will feel part of the whole – its concerns addressed, its prosperity enabled, its security protected. Thanks to free political parties, a free press, contested elections, and an accepted supreme arbiter in the courts, democracy promises to address deep divisions more successfully than any alternative (Glazer, 2010: 19).

Whether the Moldovan nation-building project will, in the end, achieve enough consensus to be considered consolidated remains to be seen. Nevertheless, if there is no major disruption of the political system, if democratization efforts continue and democracy is further entrenched within an institutional setting that does not threaten to concentrate power into the hands of one group, it is likely that the Moldovan political system will become stable

enough so that disruptions will be improbable. It is a slow and sometimes painful process to undertake a debate on identity, but that such a discourse can occur within a democratic context is commendable and provides hope that, at the very least, some of the more brutal and destructive qualities of nation-building may be averted.

Another more direct, and perhaps more important, factor for democracy in Moldova has been its institutional arrangements. We have already noted the beneficial balance of power between legislature and executive, described by Mazo (2004) and Roper (2008), which were in place until PCRM's victory in the 2001 parliamentary elections following the constitutional changes the previous year. This institutional setup did not reap any direct nation-building benefits, but it did preserve overall levels of democracy. It is likely that this feature, rather than national divisions, was the key factor in sustaining the relatively high levels of democracy throughout the 1990s.¹⁴¹

Therefore, if seeking an solution to Moldova's pluralistic shortcomings, it is not national divisions which should primarily be addressed but rather the institutional arrangements in place to channel the interests of different groups. Well-designed institutions would bring more stability to society, which, in turn, would create the conditions for the emergence of a viable political community. Whereas democratization can be a process that brings divisions to the surface, democracy remains the best tool at our disposal to address, mitigate, and turn difference into an asset for the political system and for the good of people.

Concluding Remarks and Future Research

That a state consists of a divided nation is not entirely unusual in a global context. Considering the myriad of cultures that exist, it is not surprising that some groups would contest the notion of a state established by and for the core nation. What has made Moldova different from many other states with contested nations were the strong ties to a neighboring state, i.e. Romania. Any nation-building strategy initiated in Moldova has had to define itself in relation to the Romanian nation in some way, which in turn has affected foreign relations not only with Romania but also with Russia.

This dissertation has raised a number of important issues pertaining to the relationship between nation and democracy. Some of these relate to conditions specific to Moldova, while others are of general nature. To begin with, it was established that both Rustow and Way make valid points with regard to the link between nation and democracy. On the one hand, a basic national

¹⁴¹ Way (2002: 138) has, however, provided the example that President Snegur's attempts to strengthen his office during the crafting of the 1994 Constitution failed due to the Romanianist camp's failure to support this initiative.

unity seems to be required for democracy to consolidate, but there is nothing to indicate what constitutes this unity. On the other, democratization is possible to pursue even if the nation is divided. Conflicts surrounding national identities do offer grounds for pluralism, and as long as these do not become violent, they can work to the benefit of democracy even though consolidation will likely not be reached. This observation raises an important question for policymakers and practitioners alike: should the lack of national unity be reason enough to discourage democratization efforts? The answer to this is no. If there were an attempt to consolidate the nation before democratization begins, chances are indeed great that any movement towards democracy would never begin. As Way argues, it could very well prove that authoritarian leaders, backed by a united nation, find their own positions all too secure and comfortable to start gambling with democracy.

The institutional setup in Moldovan during the 1990s created a balance of power between the executive and the legislature that was highly beneficial for democracy. This arrangement was not an outcome of the conflicts defined by national divisions. The view of the nation did not, for example, determine whether the parliament would draft the new constitution without the involvement of the president, who, in this case, happened to come from their own party ranks. Other dynamics were involved here, and further research could shed light on both how this functioned during the first decade of Moldovan independence and if it would be advisable to reinstate direct presidential elections.

With regard to the institutions, it is also important to explore exactly how minorities are represented within the political parties. Representation is one of the main characteristics of modern democracy, and in order to make citizens feel part of the nation and heard by the regime, it is paramount that minorities feel their views being furthered. Although it has already been noted that Moldova lacks ethnic parties and that minorities are represented through parliamentary parties, it would be helpful to see where they are placed on party lists and to what extent they can influence party politics.

The patterns observed from the correspondence analysis demonstrate that there are benefits to combining an examination of the attitudes and behavior of political elites with closer scrutiny of how political support is expressed by the masses. The main finding of the correspondence analysis was that the ethnicity of the respondents did not play a significant role in respondents' answers regarding particular objects of political support. There are entire spheres of politics that have other determinants. However, exactly how the generational, urban-rural and educational factors are interconnected was beyond the scope of this study. A suggestion for future research would, therefore, be to stack the variables into profiles which can give a fuller picture of the respondents' backgrounds.

* * *

In 1858, Abraham Lincoln, later to become the 16th President of the United States, commented on the growing rift between the north and south states in an oft-quoted speech that “[a] house divided against itself cannot stand” (Lincoln, 1858: 462). But divided the US was, and it took the American Civil War and the addressing of tremendous grievances before the country was once again reunited. Despite the substantial challenge of healing a severely broken country after the war, democracy was over time installed throughout the territory.

When considering the challenges faced by Moldova and other divided states, it is all too easy to forget the other states which have confronted even greater challenges and have emerged from them all the stronger. The Moldovan case exposes for us the challenges of democratization in a post-Soviet setting where the preconditions for democracy are, by all standards, less than ideal. Nevertheless, the consolidation of democracy and nation in Moldova has a universal bearing. The story of Moldova is a narrative of how this consolidation has been attempted on a shallow foundation. Only time can bridge the internal divides, and this is ultimately necessary for the nation to coalesce. It is undoubtedly possible to be Moldovan and Romanian at the same time within the same state. Identities are not set in stone, and they vary according to the context of their communities. Only collective human imagination decides when an imagined community becomes an imaginary one. There are, hence, possibilities even for such a joint nation to evolve. Meanwhile, democratization efforts in Moldova should not only continue, but expand in strength and scope. It is only within a democratic context and discourse that divides can be overcome without creating new animosity between people who have lived together on a borderland of Europe for centuries.

Epilogue: Referendum and New Elections

The 2009 electoral year ended in political deadlock, one in which neither the PCRM nor the AIE governments managed to elect a president and thereby bring an end to the constitutional crisis. Meanwhile, issues related to identity and the country's past continued to define politics as politics was pushed in a pro-Romanian direction largely by the PL. This was exemplified by the condemnation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the commemoration of 28 June as the Day of Soviet Occupation and the evaluation of the communist legacy (PACE, 01/24/11). Linked to the change of government, the activities of extreme religious groups, protesting against anything perceived as anti-Orthodox, and of the Orthodox church itself, which had held a privileged position during PCRM's eight years in power, created some concerns of religion becoming a new political dividing line (IMEDIA, 06/20/10). Although some political actors did try to make Orthodoxy a theme of their electoral campaigns, the message did not seem to win any greater appeal among the electorate.

During the course of 2009 and 2010, various measures were discussed to resolve the political deadlock. Eventually, it was decided to put to popular vote the question regarding whether the president should be elected directly or by parliament. Initially, the idea of a referendum to change the constitution was embraced by neither the EU nor the Venice Commission, but they did not oppose the initiative in the end. The PCRM, wanting to keep parliamentary control over the executive, decided to boycott the entire exercise together with some of the smaller parties and was probably further distanced by parliament's decision to lower the election validity threshold to one-third of the electorate. However, the protests of the opposition were not heeded, and a republican constitutional referendum was called for 5 September 2010. The question posed to Moldovan citizens was "would you agree with the constitutional amendment, which would allow the election of the president of the Republic of Moldova by the entire population?" (e-Democracy, 2010). Although supported by 87.83 percent of voters, the referendum only managed to bring 30.07 percent of the electorate to the ballot boxes. Hence, it failed to pass the one-third threshold and was declared invalid.¹⁴² Shortly

¹⁴² Related to the referendum, the phenomenon of an "ethnic vote" was discussed in media. Although a concept still rejected by some, available data point in another direction. As con-

thereafter, parliament was dissolved, and early elections were called for November 28.

The campaign period preceding the November elections was mostly conducted in an orderly manner. There were allegations that administrative resources were used for electoral campaign purposes and that some individuals resorted to threats against political opponents, but these seem to have been isolated events rather than signs of a larger trend. The IEOM did express concern, however that the electoral code had been revised only four months prior to the elections.¹⁴³ While some of the changes did remove ambiguities, the amendment to allocate “remainder seats” equally to all parties that passed the four percent threshold to enter parliament, instead of on a proportional basis according to the d’Hondt method applied previously, was regarded by the Venice Commission and other international organizations as a way to favor smaller parties, i.e., the members of the AIE (OSCE/ODIHR, 2010: 4).¹⁴⁴

Although the 28 November 2010 elections were the fourth national elections held in 20 months, the referendum counted, and, despite fears of voter fatigue, turnout reached 63.37 percent, which was five percent higher compared to previous year.¹⁴⁵ The out-of-country voting alone increased by more than three times and provided the highest level for this category of voters ever recorded. Turnout was high, and the elections were carried out in a generally satisfactory manner (OSCE/ODIHR, 01/26/11). The outcome, however, still did not change the distribution of parliamentary mandates enough to secure the two-thirds majority needed to elect a president without the creation a coalition of party blocs. The PCRM remained the biggest party with 42 mandates, followed by the PLDM with 32 mandates, the PDM with 15 and the PL with 12 mandates. Thus, the PCRM continued a downward trend begun in the 2009 and 2010 elections, while the PLDM greatly increased its electoral base. The third and fourth biggest parties, the PDM and

cluded by the political analyst Igor Boțan, the ethnic factor seems to keep a continued hold on Moldovan politics (Boțan in Cushevici, 2010).

¹⁴³ By changing the electoral code just before elections and in a manner that would be to the benefit of the AIE, the negative trend of previous regimes trying to adjust the electoral framework to their advantage was once again confirmed.

¹⁴⁴ Examples of the actual effect the d’Hondt versus the reformed voter allocation methods would have had in parliamentary elections during the 2000s may be found in Lipcean (2011: 96).

¹⁴⁵ In order to fully understand the significance of these results, the turnout should be compared to the number of voters on the voter lists across a number of election years. In 2010 the number of voters was 2.65 million given a turnout of, as mentioned, 63.37 percent. In July 2009 the number of voters was 2.6 million given a turnout of 58.77 percent. In April 2009, the number of voters was 2.59 million given a turnout of 57.55 percent. While the 2005 elections had a higher turnout than the 2010 elections, with 64.84 percent, the voter list at that point included only 2.3 million voters. This is likely an indication of the poor quality of the voter lists and of fluctuations that cannot be explained by demographics alone (cf. www.e-democracy.com).

the PL respectively, largely changed places compared to the previous year. The PDM most likely managed to increase its share of votes by tapping into the PCRM's electorate, while the PL lost voters to the PLDM. An additional difference from the previous year was, as many had predicted prior to the November elections, AMN's failure to cross the four percent threshold to enter parliament.

Moldova's constant political campaign mode continued yet again as the country began preparations for planned local elections on 3 June 2011. The country's inability to elect a president meant that the already short periods between planned and potential elections decreased even further. Instead of a reasonable period in between electoral events, the time to pursue policies and conduct more far-reaching reforms was growing slimmer. Another consequence of the AIE's inability to elect president after the November elections was the constituent parties' positioning in the run up to anticipated new elections. Initially united by their opposition to the PCRM, their unity started to wane, and they began competing for the votes of the same electorate. At one point each of the AIE parties, including the PL, held closed talks with the PCRM, probably to assess the prospects of remaining within the existing coalition or forming new coalitions straight across the party landscape. In October new presidential elections were finally called for 18 November. A few weeks later, it became known that three PCRM parliamentarians, among them Igor Dodon and Zinaida Greceanîi, two of the leading figures of the Communist party and both potential successors to Voronin, had left the party (Jurnal.md, 11/04/11). Hence, at the time of writing, a majority to elect a president has potentially been created. These developments indicate that, at the very least, the political turbulence set in motion in 2009 has opened up Moldovan politics to diverging opinions and generated the seeds for a better, more constructive balance between government and the opposition.

Uncertainties remain, however. It is not yet clear whether a president will, in the end, be elected, a new coalition created or new parliamentary elections called. To varying degrees all of these scenarios involve political positioning on the issue of national identity. This author believes that it is plausible for the rhetoric of Moldovanism and Romanianism to subside in the coming years as politicians and people grow increasingly tired of the constitutional deadlock, the constant positioning on identitarian issues and the tug-of-war concerning the framing of the past. How this will play out in the end and if a relapse into conflicts surrounding national identity will again occur remains to be seen.

Sammanfattning

Republiken Moldavien var en av de femton stater som uppstod i och med Sovjetunionens sammanbrott. Dock var det en ung statsbildning som utropades i augusti 1991, utan egentliga historiska föregångare och med splittrad nationell identitet. Genom sin geografiska placering kom området som utgör nuvarande Moldavien att bli en bricka i spelet mellan det Ottomanska riket, Ryssland, Rumänien och Sovjetunionen. Ett område som förvisso var föremål för olika maktens nationsbyggande ambitioner, men där de nationella identiteter som dessa valde att framhäva samtidigt blev ömsesidigt exkluderande. Den sovjetiska tanken om att befolkningen utgjorde en särskild moldavisk nation, bestående av en blandning av rumänska och slaviska element, var exempelvis svår att kombinera med de rumänska mellankrigstida anspråken på att den befolkning som delade den rumänska statens officiella språk också var just inget annat än rumäner. Vid Moldaviens självständighet var frågan om nationell identitet fortfarande olöst och kom på olika sätt att inverka på upprättandet av den nya staten och, inte minst, på dess demokratiseringssträvanden.

Föreliggande avhandling fokuserar på relationen mellan nation och demokrati i Moldavien mellan åren 1989 och 2009. I mycket av den statsvetenskapliga demokratiforskningen anges nationell enighet som det mest betydelsefulla kriteriet för en framgångsrik demokratisering, med Rustow (1970) som en av de tydligaste förespråkarna. Den nationella enigheten kan ta sig många olika uttryck, men utgår från att det måste finnas en uppsättning värderingar som delas av en befolkningsmajoritet. Grundantagandet lyder, enligt Rustow, att den moderna demokratin kräver ett folk som uppfattar sig utgöra ett nationellt kollektivt och väljer att låta sig styras av valda representanter. Ett ifrågasättande av den nationella enigheten borde därför, enligt detta antagande, leda till att en stats demokratiseringssträvanden omöjliggörs.

Fallet Moldavien visar dock något annat. Trots nationell splittring samt andra försvårande demokratiseringsfaktorer, så som en mycket svag ekonomisk utveckling och oförmåga att upprätthålla den territoriella integriteten, har en relativt framgångsrik demokratisering genomförts. Moldavien brukar vid sidan av de tre baltiska staterna ofta framhållas som den mest demokratiska av de post-sovjetiska staterna. Lucan Way (2002; 2003b; 2003c) har därför, argumenterande utifrån det moldaviska fallet, föreslagit att Moldavien inte är så mycket ett exempel på lyckad demokratisering som det är en

misslyckad autokrativering – delvis förklarad av den nationella splittringen. Denna *pluralism genom oförmåga (pluralism by default)*, som Way valt att beteckna de moldaviska politikernas misslyckande att enas kring en autokratisk struktur, erbjuder en förklaringsmodell till Moldaviens demokratisering, men baseras på ett antagande om autokratisk teleologi och observationer på elitnivå. Med Moldaviens demokratiseringsframgångar, uppnådda trots en splittrad nation, som utgångspunkt och Rustows och Ways motsatta teoretiska antaganden formulerades tre frågor för att precisera studiens fokus.

Den övergripande forskningsfrågan tar fasta på den nationella enighetens roll vid demokratisering och söker därför beskriva och förklara *hur och varför Moldavien, trots dess nationella splittring, lyckats uppnå förhållandevis goda demokratinivåer?* Frågeställningen inkluderar därmed både Rustows och Ways antagande om att nationell enighet, vare sig den existerar eller ej, utgör grunden för demokratisering och demokratisk konsolidering. Frågan om relationen mellan nationell enighet och demokrati är dock mångfacetterad och därför introducerades två underordnande frågor för att underlätta besvarandet av huvudfrågan.

Den första underfrågan baseras på antagandet att moldavisk politik i hög grad har påverkats av den nationella splittringen och fokuserar därför på hur denna splittring har påverkat politiska elitors beteende och institutionella ramverks funktion. *Hur påverkar Moldaviens nationella splittring landets politiska utveckling i allmänhet och demokratisering i synnerhet?* För att kunna besvara den här frågan krävs en beskrivning av politiska elitors agerande på grundval av den nationella splittringen samt en bedömning av tillståndet för den demokratiska utvecklingen i landet.

Den andra underfrågan tar sin utgångspunkt i den nuvarande bristen på studier som i det moldaviska fallet undersöker uttryck för politiskt stöd på massnivå och formuleras *hur påverkar nationell identitet formen av politiskt stöd i Moldavien?* Även om detta stipulerar premisserna för frågan, så har metodologiska steg vidtagits för att hålla analysen så öppen som möjligt. Därigenom bereds möjlighet att fastställa om andra faktorer än den strikt nationella påverkar politiskt stöd i Moldavien och är också ett sätt att undersöka om antagandet om Moldaviens splittrade nation är giltigt.

För att besvara huvud- och underfrågorna ovan används första- och andrahandskällor, statistik samt en enkätundersökning. Metodtriangulering sker genom att blanda deskriptiva skildringar med statistisk analys av enkätdata. De deskriptiva skildringarna utgår från antagandet om att splittringen i nationell identitet påverkat Moldaviens politiska utveckling, men gör detta mer sammanhållet och i ett längre perspektiv än vad som gjorts i tidigare studier. Bedömningen av politiskt stöd bygger på en enkätundersökning, inkluderande 1 100 respondenter, insamlad våren 2003 inom ramen för avhandlingsarbetet. Dataunderlaget från enkäterna samkördes senare statistiskt med hjälp av korrespondensanalys. Korrespondensanalys möjliggör visualisering och analys av kvalitativa data i korstabeller och tillåter därmed även data på no-

minal skalnivå (jfr. Greenacre, 2007). Metoden är därmed framför allt ett sätt att klarlägga eventuella samband mellan olika variabler.

I avhandlingens andra kapitel ges en historisk och socio-ekonomisk bakgrund till det nutida Moldavien. Här beskrivs Moldaviens grundande och senare uppgående i andra riken och imperier. Den senare delen beskriver hur Moldavien, vilket utgjorde en välmående del av Sovjetunionen, snart efter självständigheten såg början på en lång och svår ekonomisk nedgång. Detta medförde att en stor del av den unga arbetsföra befolkningen lämnade landet för att söka sin utkomst annorstädes. Syftet med kapitel 2 är därmed dels att introducera landet för läsaren och dels att underbygga den teoretiska argumentation som följer.

I kapitel 3 diskuteras transitionsbegreppet och i synnerhet då i relation till förändring av nation och politiskt system. Detta medför å ena sidan en diskussion av nation, etnisk grupp, nationell identitet och nationsbyggande och å andra sidan av demokrati och demokratisering. Detta görs för att skapa en plattform utifrån vilken empirin i efterföljande kapitel kan struktureras och analyseras. För nationsbyggande tas fasta på Normans (2006) uppräknande av nationsbyggande ”verktyg” till vilka bland annat räknas skolans läroplan, officiell språkpolicy och antagande av nationella symboler. För att uppskatta demokratinivåer appliceras Dahls (1999) polyarkibegrepp i Coppedge och Reinickes (1990) operationaliserade form, vilket innebär fokus på demokratis institutioner, exempelvis fria och rättvisa val och yttrande- och tryckfrihet. För medborgarnas stöd för det politiska systemet används Norris (1999) vidareutveckling av Eastons (1965) modell som är ordnad från den mest abstrakta formen av stöd (den nationella gemenskapen) till den mest konkreta (politiska aktörer).

Kapitel 4 presenterar de etniska minoriteterna i Moldavien, men också de moldaviska och rumänska nationalismerna, vilka båda gör anspråk på att inkludera ungefär samma befolkningsgrupp inom den nation de förespråkar. Mot slutet av kapitlet diskuteras denna motsättning och får även bestämma dispositionen för kapitel 5 efter perioder då antingen den moldavisk eller rumänska nationalismen bestämt landets politiska utveckling.

Med utgångspunkt i konflikten rörande nationell identitet, är kapitel 5 indelat i fem perioder: *Nationalism och reaktiv nationalism*, 1989-1993, *Casa noastră* (Vårt hus), 1994-2000; *Moldovanism i sovjetisk tappning*, 2001-2003, *En mjukare form av moldovanism*, 2003-2007, och slutligen *Identitetskonflikternas återvändande*, 2007-2009. Kapitlet visar hur Normans nationsbyggande ”verktyg” överlag haft föga framgång i Moldavien, vilket beror på den oenighet som finns kring hur nationen ska beskrivas. Med pro-moldaviska och -rumänska politiker som konkurrerar om delvis samma väljarkår, men med ömsesidigt exkluderande logiker, har nationen i Moldavien fortfarande att finna sina former. I kapitlet visas också hur den moldaviska demokratiseringen inte kan beskrivas i termer av linjär progression. Snarare

har genom åren framgångar mötts av motgångar, men där miniminivån av fria val kvarstår.

Kapitel 6 lyfter analysen av de politiska skeendena till institutionell nivå och inleds med en översikt av Moldaviens styrelseskick samt en uppskattning av moldaviska demokratinivåer över tid genom presentation av några av de vanligaste demokratiindexen. Därefter sker en generell genomgång av tillståndet i den moldaviska demokratin på aggregerad nivå genom användning av Coppedge och Reinickes operationalisering av Dahls polyarkikriterier enligt fria och opartiska val, församlingsfrihet, yttrandefrihet och allmän rösträtt. Det sammanlagda resultatet av demokratiindex och polyarkikriterierna förtydligar bilden av Moldaviens demokratisering som över en period av två decennier genomlevt både demokratiska med- och motgångar. En fullständig demokratisk konsolidering är fortfarande avlägsen trots att de formella institutionerna etablerats.

I det sjunde kapitlet analyseras data insamlat i enkätundersökningen från 2003 med hjälp av korrespondensanalys. Var och en av komponenterna för politiskt stöd (den nationella gemenskapen, regimprinciper, regimeffektivitet, regiminstitutioner och politiska aktörer) kopplas till en eller flera frågor ur enkäten. I den löpande texten används förenklade tabeller över korrespondensanalysens resultat för respektive komponent, medan fullständiga data och diagram återfinns i appendix D. Resultaten av analysen visar att frågan om medborgarnas stöd för olika komponenter i det politiska systemet är uppbyggd av många olika faktorer och låter sig inte härledas endast till den nationella identiteten. I stället växer en bild fram av skiljelinjer som löper längs generationer, stad-landsbygd, utbildning och etnicitet. Även om etniciteten spelar in, så har de andra faktorerna generellt ett större genomslag. Detta tyder på att olika generationer påverkats av sin tids värdesystem; den sovjetiska, moldaviska eller kanske till och med den mellankrigstida rumänska. Resultaten visar också att högre utbildning och urban bakgrund förmodligen exponerat respondenterna mer för diskussioner kring sovjetisk nationsbyggnad och den rumänska historien och kulturen.

Kapitel 8 är avhandlingens avslutande kapitel i vilket svar på studiens huvudfråga och de två underfrågorna redovisas. Den *första* underfrågan fokuserade på effekterna av den delade moldaviska nationen på demokratiseringen. Här kan konstateras att den politiska utvecklingen till stor del har påverkats av den splittrade nationella gemenskapen och politiska partier har kommit att formulera sina budskap efter frågor kretsande kring nationell identitet snarare än klassiska politiska ideologier. Samtidigt kännetecknas det moldaviska samhället i stort av tolerans mellan de olika etniska grupperna. En persons etnicitet spelar inte en framträdande roll i individers vardag, men kvarstår som en möjlig politisk mobiliseringskälla.

Den *andra* underfrågan sökte svara på hur den nationella identiteten kom till uttryck i medborgarnas politiska stöd för olika komponenter av det politiska systemet. Som beskrevs ovan, så visade analysen av enkätdata att de

uttryck för politiskt stöd som registrerats inte låter sig reduceras till enbart en fråga om nationell identitet. I stället är det andra faktorer som kommer in, vilka kan relateras till värderingar sprungna ur ålder, utbildning, och grad av urbanitet. Vidare forskning, där de olika bakgrundsfaktorerna tillåts kombineras i olika konstellationer vid korrespondensanalys, har potential att ytterligare kasta ljus över hur de faktiska förhållandena kan se ut.

På grundval av de båda underfrågorna är det nu möjligt att närma sig avhandlingens huvudfråga, det vill säga *hur och varför Moldavien, trots dess nationella splittring, lyckats uppnå förhållandevis goda demokratinivåer?* För att återvända till Rustows och Ways respektive antagande om den nationella enighetens roll vid demokratisering kan konstateras att båda författarna på sitt vis har rätt. För att tala med Rustow, så har Moldavien haft svårt att konsolidera demokratin. Transitionen pendlar någonstans mellan konsolidering och stundvis lägre nivåer av demokrati (och alltså närmre den autokratiska skalan). Ways perspektiv är att den splittrade nationella identiteten var vad som ursprungligen till stor del tillät demokratisering. I detta har han också empiriskt stöd. Politiseringen av nationell identitet erbjöd en plattform, om än en problematisk sådan, runt vilken politiska partier kunde formuleras och positionera sig.

Däremot bygger Way sin vidare argumentation på ett antagande om politiska eliters autokratiska intentioner, vilket är betydligt svårare att leda i bevis. Med nationell enighet, menar Way, skulle pluralismen ha förhindrats och diktatur ha följt. Vad han säger skiljer sig dels i sak inte från Rustow: utan nationell enighet är demokratisk konsolidering svår att uppnå. Vad som särskiljer Ways argument är således de autokratiska ambitioner som han tillskriver den moldaviska politiska eliten. Om denna avlägsnas blir skillnaden mellan författarna inte särskilt stor. Den pessimistiska slutsats man riskerar dra av detta är att demokratisering utan nationell enighet redan från början är dömt att misslyckas. Detta leder dock fel och demokratiska stater som Sydafrika och Indien existerar trots avsevärd mångfald. Det är inte mångfalden i sig som är problemet, utan att utforma den kollektiva nationella identiteten på så sätt att den kan inkludera hela befolkningen.

Det moldaviska fallet visar tydligt vikten av att institutioner i framväxande demokratier utformas på ett sådant sätt att de kan balansera varandra (jfr. Mazo, 2004; Roper, 2008). Fram till år 2000 stipulerade konstitutionen att presidenten valdes direkt av folket. Efter en uppsplitande konflikt mellan president och parlament ändrades dock detta och presidenten kom därefter att väljas av parlamentet, vilket visade sig innebära en försämring för demokratin då balansen mellan den lagstiftande och den verkställande makten i praktiken avlägsnades. I det här fallet är det inte troligt att det var den nationella splittringen som i sig drev fram 1990-talets institutionella lösning. Den moldaviska demokratiseringen har dels fått stöd av en politisk pluralism, vilken än så länge varit nära knuten till frågor om nationen, men kunde också under

loppet av tio år dra fördel av den ovan nämnda institutionella balansen mellan parlament och president.

Medan nationell enighet underlättar demokratins konsolidering, så finns inget som bestämmer i exakt vilka termer som denna enighet ska definieras. En avslutande fråga som den här studien också ger upphov till är om Moldavien bör ses som en delad nation eller en nation som håller på att ta form? Nationsbildning tar tid och har i Moldavien, när detta skrivs, inte pågått mycket mer än 20 år. Det är därför möjligt att Moldavien, givet att nuvarande statsbildning består, med tiden kommer etablera en nation med fastare former eller, alternativt, att en nation bildas där både de rumänska och de moldaviska anspråken kan sammanjämkas och deras exkluderande anspråk upphöra. Då analysen av politiskt stöd framför allt påvisar att de skiljelinjer som identifierats har med helt andra faktorer än etnicitet att göra, finns anledning att tro att den nationella splittringen med tiden kommer att avlägsnas i samband med generationsväxlingar. Med en sammanhållen nationell identitet torde också möjligheterna för demokratiserings-strävandena att bära frukt underlättas väsentligt. Demokratien har en inneboende motsättning i det att demokratiseringsprocesser riskerar att öppna upp för konflikter som en ung transitionsstat kan vara oförmögen att hantera institutionellt. Samtidigt är det så att ett demokratiskt system har möjlighet att ta sig an motsättningar, lösa och vända dem till ett uttryck för gemensamt kollektivt handlande. På längre sikt bär detta hopp om både demokratins och nationens konsolidering.

Rezumat

Republica Moldova a fost una dintre cele cincisprezece state care au fost stabilite după căderea Uniunii Sovietice în anul 1991. La momentul independenței, Moldova avea doar o slabă moștenire istorică medievală de statalitate pe care se putea baza, precum și identitatea națională a populației care a fost subiectul unor dezbateri îndelungate (cf. King, 2000). Republica Moldova actuală este situată în partea de sud-est a Europei, o regiune care de multe ori s-a aflat la intersecția conflictelor între puterile străine, cum ar fi Imperiul Otoman, Rusia Țaristă, România și Uniunea Sovietică. Acesta a fost un teritoriu cărui nu i-au lipsit ambițiile naționale, dar trăsăturile de identitate pronunțate de către o putere deveneau reciproc exclusive pentru cele care o înlocuiau. Problema de identitate a populației Moldovei a fost, prin urmare, strâns legată de necesitatea puterilor externe de a-și justifica pretențiile teritoriale. Ideea sovietică a unei națiuni moldovenești unice, constând dintr-un amestec de elemente slave și românești, a fost, conform definiției, incompatibilă cu afirmația românească că oamenii care vorbesc limba oficială a statului român nu sunt altcineva decât români. Problema identității naționale a fost complicată și mai mult de minoritățile slave și găgăuze considerabile, care în unele momente au invocat propriile revendicări politice legate de identitatea națională (Chinn și Roper, 1995; Webster, 2007). La momentul independenței Republicii Moldova, problema identității naționale a populației majoritare era încă nerezolvată și a ajuns să aibă un impact considerabil asupra tranziției țării în general și a democratizării în mod specific.

Acest studiu se concentrează pe relația dintre națiune și democrație în Republica Moldova între anii 1989 și 2009. În cadrul științei politice, în general, este recunoscut faptul că unitatea națională este o cerință fundamentală necesară pentru instaurarea democrației (Rustow, 1970). Unitatea națională poate lua multe forme diferite, dar se bazează pe înțelegerea că trebuie să existe un anumit set de valori împărtășite de către o majoritate a populației. Democrația modernă se bazează pe ideea că un anumit popor acceptă faptul că acesta constituie un colectiv național, un *noi*, și că acest popor este de acord să fie guvernat de către reprezentanții pe care și-i alege. O problemă a existenței unității naționale, astfel, amenință să deraieze eforturile de democratizare.

Cazul Republicii Moldova arată că lipsa unității naționale nu implică în mod automat imposibilitatea democratizării. Democratizarea a avut loc în

ciuda existenței unei națiuni divizate, în asociere cu alte condiții, care de obicei sunt considerate a fi în detrimentul democrației, cum ar fi dezvoltarea economică proastă și incapacitatea de a controla teritoriul statului. Pe lângă cele trei state baltice, Republica Moldova este adesea considerată cel mai democratic dintre statele post-sovietice. Lucan Way (2002; 2003b; 2003c), pe baza cazului Moldovei, a sugerat că Republica Moldova nu este atât un exemplu de democratizare de succes, cât o încercare nereușită de a transforma statul autoritar. Un eșec, cel puțin parțial, alimentat de diviziunea națională, a privat elita politică de a crea o platformă comună. Acest *pluralism prin incapacitate (pluralism by default)*, care este conceptul pe care l-a ales Way pentru a descrie incapacitatea politicianilor moldoveni de a se concentra în jurul unui proiect comun autocratic, oferă o explicație pentru democratizarea Republicii Moldova, dar se bazează pe presupunția unei teleologii autoritare.

În ceea ce privește cele menționate mai sus, există atât o contradicție teoretică care privește modul în care democrația se raportează la unitatea națională, cât și un caz empiric care arată cum democratizarea și lipsa unei unități naționale pot fi combinate. Cu succesul relativ de democratizare a Moldovei ca punct de plecare și ipotezele teoretice opuse ale lui Rustow și Way cu privire la modul în care națiunea și democrația se raportează una față de cealaltă, a fost formulată o întrebare principală și două întrebări secundare pentru a diviza punctul central al acestui studiu. Întrebarea principală de cercetare a fost în consecință creată pentru a descrie și explica cum și de ce Republica Moldova, în ciuda faptului că este o națiune divizată, a fost în măsură să atingă standarde democratice relativ ridicate? Această întrebare conține ipotezele naționale ale lui Rustow și Way, fie aceasta unită sau divizată, ca condiție esențială pentru democrație și democratizare. Pentru a găsi răspunsul la întrebarea principală, două întrebări secundare de sprijin au fost introduse.

Prima întrebare secundară se bazează pe presupunerea că politica din Moldova a fost intens afectată de diviziunea națională a țării (cf. Chinn și Roper, 1992; Dungaciu, 2009; King, 1994) și se axează asupra faptului cum această diviziune a afectat acțiunile elitelor și funcționalitatea structurilor instituționale. Aceasta a fost formulată după cum urmează: care sunt efectele diviziunii naționale ale Republicii Moldova cu privire la evoluțiile politice în general, și democratizare în mod particular? Acest lucru implică atât descrierea activităților elitelor politice cât și estimarea nivelului democratic din Moldova. Deși contribuții similare se mai găsesc în literatura de specialitate, acest studiu oferă un aspect mai comprehensiv, cuprinzând o perspectivă temporală mai îndelungată.

A doua întrebare secundară are drept punct de plecare lipsa abordărilor anterioare care ar combina elita și nivelul instituțional cu atitudinile maselor în ceea ce privește sprijinul politic. Prin urmare, a doua întrebare secundară a fost formulată în felul următor: cum influențează identitatea națională natura

suportului politic moldovenesc? Astfel, centrul este axat pe diviziunea națională, dar anumite măsuri/etape metodologice au fost luate pentru a menține analiza pe cât de deschisă posibil, și anume dacă există alți factori care influențează sprijinul politic într-o măsură mai mare decât identitatea națională? Aceasta este o modalitate de a controla dacă afirmația că Republica Moldova constituie o comunitate divizată la nivel național de asemenea afectează sprijinul politic la nivel de mase.

Pentru a răspunde la întrebările de mai sus au fost aplicate surse primare și secundare, statistici, și un sondaj specific elaborat pentru acest studiu. Metoda triangulație (folosirea mai multor metode) a fost realizată prin combinarea prezentărilor descriptive și analizelor statistice. Partea descriptivă provine de la una dintre principalele ipoteze din literatura de specialitate privind Republica Moldova, și anume faptul că diviziunea națională a afectat dezvoltarea politică a țării. Această abordare este urmărită mai coerent în acest studiu, într-o perspectivă temporală mai îndelungată decât ceea ce a fost făcut mai devreme. Datele unice a 1100 respondenți, colectate în cadrul proiectului de disertație în anul 2003, sunt aplicate și apoi prelucrate statistic, prin intermediul mijloacelor de analiza de corespondență, pentru estimarea sprijinului politic. Analiza de corespondență este un instrument statistic care furnizează vizualizarea datelor calitative într-un model tabelar, ceea ce permite manipularea variabilelor la nivel de scară nominală și care nu ar putea fi obținute, de exemplu, prin analiza de regresie (cf. Greenacre, 2007).

În al doilea capitol al tezei este prezentat cadrul istoric și socio-economic al Republicii Moldova. Pasajele istorice se concentrează în principal asupra evoluțiilor secolului al douăzecilea, dar, de asemenea, oferă cadrul fondării feudei moldovenești. Partea de final a capitolului descrie modul în care Republica Moldova, care a constituit o parte economică prosperă a Uniunii Sovietice, la scurt timp după declararea independenței a avut de experimentat o deteriorare rapidă a economiei, care a cauzat grave probleme sociale și a forțat sute de mii de moldoveni să-și părăsească țara pentru a căuta venit în altă parte. Scopul capitolului 2 este, așadar, de a prezenta contextul actual în care urma să fie instaurată democrația.

Capitolul 3 este principalul capitol teoretic și abordează națiunea și democrația în raport cu tranziția. Acest lucru implică pe de o parte o discuție despre conceptele de națiune, grup etnic, identitatea națională și constituirea națiunilor, și pe de altă parte democrația și democratizarea. Acest lucru se face cu scopul de a crea o bază după care poate fi structurată analiza datelor empirice în capitolele următoare. Discuțiile ulterioare despre etnie și națiune se bazează pe presupunerile lui Brubaker (1999) despre minoritățile și națiunea de bază (*core nation*) pentru a descrie diviziunea în cadrul unei populații. Prezentarea unui set de instrumente de constituire a națiunii, după Norman (2006), care include aspecte cum ar fi curriculum-ul școlar, politica oficială de limbă și simbolurile naționale, de asemenea formează baza pentru

analize ulterioare în ceea ce privește constituirea națiunilor. În scopul de a stabili nivelurile de democrație, conceptul poliарhiei lui Dahl (1971, 1999) este utilizat în forma operaționalizată a lui Coppedge și Reinicke (1990), axându-se pe instituțiile democratice, de exemplu, alegerile libere și corecte, libertatea de exprimare și sursele alternative de informare. Pentru a investiga gradul suportului politic al cetățenilor este aplicat modelul de cinci nivele sugerat de Norris (1999), bazându-se pe rezultatele anterioare ale lui Easton (1965), care grupează suportul politic de la forma cea mai abstractă (comunitatea politică, adică națiunea) la forma cea mai concretă (actorii politici).

Capitolul 4 prezintă minoritățile: ucraineană, rusă, găgăuză, bulgară, romă, evreiască, dar și revendicările concurente de constituire a națiunii de bază de Moldovenism și Româanism, care abordează aproximativ aceleași grupuri țintă, adică populația vorbitoare de limbă moldovenească sau română. Această tensiune este utilizată, de asemenea, pentru a structura capitolul 5 în funcție de perioadele în care, fie curentul Moldovenismul sau Româanismul au influențat evoluțiile politice.

Având ca punct de reper conflictul în jurul identității naționale, capitolul 5 a fost împărțit în cinci perioade: *Naționalism și naționalismul reactive*, 1989-1993; *Casa noastră*, 1994-2000; *Moldovenismul cu o față sovietică*, 2001-2003; *Forma mai ușoară a moldovenismului*, 2003-2007; și *Returnarea conflictelor de identitate*, 2007-2009. Acest capitol prezintă modul în care au fost aplicate instrumentele de constituire a națiunii amintite de Norman, dar utilizate de către naționalisme concurente, care nu au fost capabile să formeze o națiune consolidată. Cu politicieni pro-moldovenism și pro-români, apelând către același electorat, cu mesaje de identitate națională reciproc exclusive, unitatea națională nu a fost atinsă. În plus, capitolul demonstrează cum democratizarea Republicii Moldova nu poate fi descrisă ca o progresie liniară. Pe parcursul anilor succesele democratice au fost confruntate de eșecuri, dar nu au amenințat temelia unor alegeri libere și corecte.

Capitolul 6 abordează analiza dezvoltării politice la nivel instituțional și începe cu o introducere despre forma de guvernământ a Republicii Moldova și o estimare a nivelurilor democratice, văzute prin prisma unora dintre cei mai des aplicați indici ai democrației. După aceea, urmează o imagine de ansamblu a stării democrației în Republica Moldova după operaționalizarea lui Coppedge și Reinicke a criteriilor poliарhiei lui Dahl, în conformitate cu alegeri libere și corecte, libertatea de organizare, libertatea de exprimare, surse alternative de informare și dreptul la vot. Împreună, rezultatele de la compararea estimărilor democrației din indicii și criteriile poliарhiei sprijină descrierea anterioară a democratizării Republicii Moldova ca un șir de succese și regrese. Instituțiile există, dar consolidarea democratică este încă îndepărtată.

În capitolul al șaptelea sunt prezentate și analizate datele sondajului efectuat în 2003 cu ajutorul rezultatelor obținute din analiza de corespondență. Fiecare obiect de sprijin (comunitatea politică, principiile de regim, regimul de performanță, instituțiile de regim și actorii politici) sunt legate de unul sau mai multe întrebări din sondaj. Pentru cercetarea rezultatelor analizei de corespondență, au fost utilizate tabele simplificate cu privire la rezultate, în timp ce datele complete și tabelele de contingență pot fi găsite în Anexa D. Rezultatele analizei arată că problema modului în care moldovenii își exprimă sprijinul politic conține mai mulți factori diferiți și nu poate fi redus doar la identitatea națională. În schimb, din date se conturează un model mai complex de diferențe dintre liniile de generații, urban-rural și de nivelul de educație. Chiar dacă identitatea națională are o anumită importanță, mai ales atunci când vine vorba de forma cea mai specifică de sprijin, și anume alegerea actorilor politici, de obicei alți factori au un impact mai puternic asupra modului în care se poziționează respondenții vis-à-vis de diferite obiecte de sprijin. Aceasta este probabil o reflectare a unui sistem de valori diferit pe care generații de moldoveni l-au încorporat, și anume cea a Uniunii Sovietice, Moldovei, sau poate chiar a României interbelice. În cele din urmă, este important să se sublinieze că analiza de corespondență poate arăta tendințele grupurilor de factori, dar în forma în care a fost aplicată aici, acesta nu poate fi utilizată pentru variabilele care se află în legătură directă una față de cealaltă. Pentru a putea realiza acest lucru, sunt necesare analize suplimentare, care ar include, de asemenea, aranjarea (și anume combinațiile) variabilelor pentru a crea baza pentru noi analize.

Capitolul 8 este ultimul capitol al tezei și revine la întrebarea principală și cele două întrebări secundare de sprijin. O lecție inițială din cazul Republicii Moldova este importanța instituțiilor (cf. Mazo, 2004; Roper, 2008). Până în 2000, Constituția prevedea că președintele era ales direct de către popor. După un conflict serios între parlament și președinte, constituția a fost schimbată și președintele urma ulterior să fie ales de către parlament. La prima vedere acest lucru poate părea ca un pas spre o mai mare democrație, mai ales într-o perioadă în care alte state post-sovietice au introdus puteri executive mai mari. Consecința, totuși, a fost că o majoritate covârșitoare în parlament putea controla atât legislativul cât și executivul sau, în cazul în care nu a existat o asemenea majoritate, parlamentul a intrat în impas. Echilibrul de putere, care a lucrat atât de favorabil pentru Republica Moldova pe parcursul anilor 1990 a fost astfel eliminat.

Revenind la întrebările de cercetare, prima întrebare secundară s-a axat pe efectele națiunii moldovenești divizate în ceea ce privește democratizarea. Aici s-a constatat că dezvoltarea politică, într-adevăr, a fost afectată de unitatea națională divizată și că partidele politice au ajuns să formuleze mesaje lor întemeiate mai degrabă pe bază națională decât ideologie. În același timp, este important de menționat faptul că societatea

moldovenească, în ansamblu, este caracterizată prin toleranță mai degrabă decât conflict între diferitele grupuri etnice. Etnia nu joacă un rol proeminent în viața de zi cu zi a cetățenilor Republicii Moldova, dar rămâne, totuși, o sursă potențială de mobilizare politică.

A doua întrebare secundară s-a axat pe modul în care identitatea națională a fost exprimată în sprijinul politic al cetățenilor pentru diferite obiecte din sistemul politic. După cum a fost menționat mai sus, analiza datelor sondajului au arătat că diferențele de sprijin politic înregistrate nu pot fi reduse doar la o problemă a identității naționale. În schimb, alți factori influențează rezultatul analizei statistice mai mult, care mai degrabă ar putea fi legate de vârstă, educație și gradul de urbanitate. Cercetarea ulterioară, în cazul în care diferitele variabile de fundal sunt combinate în diferite grupări de funcționare înainte de a conduce analiza de corespondență, ar putea arăta care sunt factorii care interacționează și pentru care obiecte de sprijin.

Pe baza rezultatelor obținute din cele două întrebări secundare, a fost posibil să se găsească un răspuns pentru problema principală a studiului, și anume: Cum și de ce Republica Moldova, în ciuda faptului că este o națiune divizată, a fost în măsură să atingă standarde democratice relativ ridicate? Revenind la ipoteza respectivă a lui Rustow și Way în ceea ce privește rolul națiunii în timpul democratizării, se poate concluziona că observațiile celor doi autori au relevanță în cazul Moldovei. Rustow ar fi remarcat aici faptul că Republica Moldova a avut dificultăți în atingerea consolidării democratice din cauza națiunii sale divizate. Tranziția a ajuns să fluctueze undeva între consolidare și niveluri mici de democratizare (și, prin urmare mai aproape de autoritarism). Perspectiva lui Way este că diviziunea privind identitatea națională a fost anume acel factor care a permis, în cele din urmă, acest proces de democratizare. Dacă ar fi existat unitate națională, după Way, pluralismul ar fi fost imposibil și un tip de regim autoritar s-ar fi instaurat. Aici argumentarea lui Way devine problematică. Ceea ce spune el nu diferă în esență de Rustow: consolidarea democratică este puțin probabilă fără unitatea națională. Ceea ce face argumentul lui Way diferit de cel al lui Rustow este faptul că el aplică o teleologie autocratică la aspirațiile elitei politice moldovenești. În cazul în care teleologia este eliminată, și care de fapt ar trebui să fie eliminată, deoarece acestea sunt doar speculații, diferența dintre cei doi autori dispare. Cu toate acestea, Way atrage atenția asupra faptului că democratizarea poate fi realizată în circumstanțe dificile, chiar dacă lasă perspectivele pentru democrație pe termen îndelungat. Concluzia pesimistă care riscă a fi extrasă din cele expuse mai sus, este faptul că democratizarea fără unitatea națională de la bun început este predestinată să eșueze. În comparație la nivel mondial astfel de verdict nu este universal valabil. Statele democratice, cum ar fi Africa de Sud, India și Belgia există în pofida pluralismului considerabil din cadrul lor cultural. Pluralismul cultural în sine nu este problemă, dar există necesitatea de a forma o identitate colectivă în jurul unui set de valori inclusive. În pofida tuturor

defectelor sale, democrației are șanse mai bune decât orice alt sistem pentru a ne ajuta să trecem peste astfel de diferențe (Glazer, 2010: 19).

O ultimă întrebare pe care a provocat-o acest studiu, este, dacă Republica Moldova ar trebui să fie privită ca o națiune divizată sau ca o națiune în formare? Constituirea națiunii are nevoie de timp, iar acest proces în Republica Moldova, în momentul scrierii acestui studiu, durează doar un pic mai mult de 20 de ani. Este posibil ca Republica Moldova, având în vedere că acesta rămâne în starea sa actuală, în timp util, se va consolida ca o națiune. În mod alternativ, va deveni o națiune unde atât revendicările naționale ale românilor cât și moldovenilor pot fi reconciliate și logica excluderii eliminată. Odată cu unitatea națională perspectivele consolidării democratice ar trebui să se îmbunătățească considerabil. Indiferent de obiectivele pe care un colectiv și le alege, trebuie să existe un consens în ceea ce privește care sunt aceste obiective și modul în care acestea ar trebui să fie atinse. Până acum, Republica Moldova a demonstrat că, chiar și în timpuri dificile cauzate de diviziunea națională, anumite obiective pot fi atinse. O soluție la interminabilele conflicte privind identitatea națională ar elibera cu siguranță resurse atât de necesare acum, în loc să fie epuizate pentru dezbaterile privind cine sunt moldovenii.

Резюме

Республика Молдова – одно из пятнадцати государств, которые были основаны при распаде Советского Союза в 1991 году. Во время обретения независимости Молдова располагала лишь скромным наследием средневековой государственности и национальная идентичность населения страны долго была дискуссионной темой (ср. King, 2000). Современная Республика Молдова расположена в юго-восточной части Европы, в регионе, который часто лежал на пересечении интересов внешних сил, таких как Османская империя, царская Россия, Румыния и Советский Союз. При этом на данной территории наблюдалось явное стремление к созданию государства, но всегда черты идентичности, провозглашенные одной властью, становились взаимоисключающими при власти новой, пришедшей ей на смену. Проблема идентичности молдавского населения, таким образом, была прочно связана с необходимостью внешней силы обосновать свои территориальные притязания. Советское представление об уникальной молдавской нации, состоящей из смеси румынских и славянских компонентов, было, соответственно, по определению несовместимо с румынскими заявлениями, что народ, говорящий на официальном языке Румынского государства, является ни чем иным как румынами. Вопрос национальной идентичности еще более усложнялся наличием значительного славянского и гагаузского меньшинств, которые иногда и сами предъявляли политические требования, связанные с идентичностью (Chinn and Roper, 1995; Webster, 2007). К моменту обретения Молдовой независимости проблема национальной идентичности большинства молдавского населения по-прежнему не была разрешена и, как следствие, имела сильное воздействие на развитие страны в целом и на ее демократизацию в частности.

Данное исследование фокусирует внимание на взаимоотношении между нацией и демократией в Республике Молдова в период между 1989 и 2009 годами. В политологии считается общепризнанным, что национальное единство является фундаментальным необходимым условием для создания демократии (Rustow, 1970). Национальное единство может принимать разнообразные формы, но оно основывается на условии, что должен существовать определенный набор ценностей, которые разделяет большинство населения. Современная демократия

строится на идее существования определенного народа, проживающего на определенной территории и признающего, что он составляет национальный коллектив, некое *мы*, и что этот народ соглашается быть управляем представителями, которых он выбирает. Таким образом, сомнение в существовании национального единства угрожает свести на нет все демократические усилия.

Случай с Молдовой, однако, показывает, что отсутствие национального единства вовсе не обязательно предполагает, что демократизация становится невозможной. Несмотря на разобщенность нации в сочетании с другими условиями, которые принято считать губительными для демократии, как например, плохое экономическое развитие и неспособность контролировать территорию государства, демократизация Молдовы была достигнута. Кроме трех балтийских стран, Молдову часто рассматривают как наиболее демократичную из постсоветских государств. Вследствие этого Люкан Вэй (Lucan Way, 2002; 2003b; 2003c) предположил, что Молдова скорее не пример успешной демократизации, а неудачная попытка склонить страну к авторитаризму. Этот провал авторитаризма, был обусловлен – по меньшей мере, отчасти – национальной разобщенностью, которая лишала политическую элиту возможности создать единую платформу. Л. Вэй подобрал особый концепт – *плюрализм по необходимости/по умолчанию (pluralism by default)* – для описания неспособности молдавских политиков объединиться вокруг общего автократического проекта. Данный концепт предлагает ясное объяснение демократизации Молдовы, но основывается на предположении об авторитарной телеологии.

Таким образом, в связи с вышесказанным, существуют и теоретическое противоречие в том, как демократия связана с национальным единством, и эмпирический случай, который показывает на практике, что демократизация может сочетаться с отсутствием национального единства. Принимая за отправную точку относительно успешную демократизацию Молдовы, а также учитывая противоположные теории Вэя и Рустова о соотношении нации и демократии, были сформулированы один основной вопрос (цель работы) и два вспомогательных (задачи работы) с целью сузить предмет данного исследования. Итак, цель диссертации формулируется следующим образом: описать и объяснить, *как и почему Молдова, с ее разобщенной нацией, смогла достичь относительно высоких стандартов демократии?* Этот вопрос подразумевает теории как Рустова, так и Вэя о нации, единой или разобщенной, как основном предусловии демократии и демократизации. Для достижения цели исследования, были поставлены следующие две задачи.

Первая из задач основывается на предположении, что национальная разобщенность в значительной степени повлияла на политическое

развитие Молдовы (ср. Chinn and Roper, 1992; Dungaciu, 2009; King, 1994). Но каково именно влияние разрозненности общества на поступки элит и функционирование институциональных структур? Так, первая задача сводится к ответу на вопрос: *каково влияние разобщенной молдавской нации на политическое развитие в целом и демократизацию в частности?* Для выполнения данной задачи требуется и описать деятельность политических элит, и оценить уровень демократии в Молдове. Хотя схожие научные достижения можно найти и в другой научной литературе, в данной работе рассматривается более продолжительный период времени, и в целом подход к вопросу более разносторонний и всеобъемлющий.

Вторая задача отталкивается от отсутствия предыдущих подходов, которые сочетали бы политические предпочтения на разных уровнях: институциональном, уровне элит и уровне масс. Так, вторая задача исследования – ответить на вопрос, *как национальная идентичность влияет на природу политических предпочтений в Молдове?* Внимание, таким образом, сосредоточено на национальной разобщенности. Но при этом были предприняты определенные методологические шаги с целью сделать анализ как можно более открытым, то есть позволяющим установить, существуют ли другие факторы, влияющие на политические предпочтения в большей степени, чем национальная идентичность? Это позволит проверить два предположения: составляет ли Молдова разрозненное национальное сообщество, и влияет ли разобщенность на политические предпочтения масс.

Для выполнения поставленных задач были использованы первичные и вторичные источники, статистические данные, а также опрос, составленный специально для данного исследования. Метод триангуляции был произведен посредством объединения описательного изложения и статистического анализа. Описательные части работы происходят от одного из основных предположений в литературе о Республике Молдова, а именно, что национальная разрозненность повлияла на политическое развитие страны. Однако этот метод используется здесь более логически последовательно и в большей временной перспективе, чем это делалось ранее. Для измерения политических предпочтений были использованы данные специально составленного опроса, который был проведен в ходе диссертационного исследования в 2003 году, и в котором приняли участие 1100 респондентов. Полученные данные были статистически обработаны посредством анализа соответствий. Данный анализ является статистическим инструментом, позволяющим визуализировать представленные обычно в виде таблиц качественные данные, и таким образом, дает возможность проработать переменные на уровне классификационной шкалы, чего не позволяет, например, регрессионный анализ (ср. Greenacre, 2007).

Во второй главе диссертации представлены исторические и социально-экономические истоки Республики Молдова. Историческая часть в основном фокусируется на развитии страны в XX веке, но также освещает период основания молдавских княжеств. Далее в главе описывается, как Республика Молдова, которая составляла экономически процветающую часть Советского Союза, вскоре после его распада перенесла быстрое разрушение экономики, повлекшее тяжелые социальные проблемы, которые, в свою очередь, вынудили сотни тысяч молдаван покинуть свою страну в поисках дохода за границей. Итак, замысел второй главы сводится к вводу фактического контекста, в котором предстояло установиться демократии.

Третья глава является основной теоретической главой, в ней речь идет о нации и демократии, и их отношении к развитию страны. Она включает, с одной стороны, рассмотрение понятий нации, этнической группы, национальной идентичности и национально-государственного строительства и, с другой – понятий демократии и демократизации. Всестороннее рассмотрение терминов проведено с целью создать основание, на котором можно будет структурировать анализ эмпирических данных в следующих главах. Последующее обсуждение этнической принадлежности и нации опирается на систему Брубэйкера (1999) о меньшинствах и титульной нации (*core nation*), которая описывает внутреннее разделение народа. Что касается национально-государственного строительства, то здесь берется за основу для дальнейшего анализа теория Нормана (2006) об инструментарии национального строительства, который включает такие аспекты, как школьная программа, политика официального языка и национальных символов. Для того чтобы оценить уровень демократии используется понятие Дая (1971, 1999) о полиархии (многовластии) в форме, введенной в оборот Коппэджом и Райнике (1990), которая фокусируется на демократических институтах, таких как, например, честные выборы, свобода выражения и альтернативные источники информации. Для изучения уровней политических предпочтений граждан применяется пятислойная модель, предложенная Норрисом (1999), и опирающаяся на более ранние сведения Истона (1965), в которых политические предпочтения группируются от наиболее абстрактных (политическое сообщество, то есть, нация) до самых конкретных (политические деятели).

В главе 4 представлены меньшинства: украинское, русское, гагаузское, болгарское, цыганское и еврейское. Здесь также рассматривается противостояние молдовинистских и румынистских притязаний на титульную нацию, которые вовлекают в спор по сути одну целевую группу, точнее молдоязычное или румыноязычное население. Это противостояние также используется для того, чтобы структурировать пятую главу в соответствии с периодами, когда на

политическое развитие влияли молдовинистские течения, и когда их сменяли румынистские.

Приняв за отправную точку конфликт, связанный с национальной идентичностью, пятая глава была разделена на 5 периодов: *Национализм и реактивный национализм, 1989-1993, Casa noastră* (Наш дом), 1994-2000, *Молдавизм с советским лицом, 2001-2003, Умеренный молдовинизм, 2003-2007, Возвращение конфликтов идентичностей, 2007-2009*. Данная глава показывает, как в Республике Молдова был использован инструментарий национально-государственного строительства (по Норману) в условиях противоборствующих националистских движений и при том, что создание консолидированной нации не было достигнуто. При том, что про-молдавские и про-румынские политики апеллировали к одной и той же части электората, при взаимоисключающих основаниях национальной идентичности, к которым они зывали, невозможно было достичь национального единства. Кроме того, в данной главе показано, что демократизация Молдовы не может быть описана как линейное движение. По прошествии лет демократические успехи сменялись провалами, но все же не в такой степени, чтобы угрожать созданию системы свободных и честных выборов.

Шестая глава поднимает анализ политического развития страны на институциональный уровень. Глава начинается с описания формы правления в Молдове, а также оценки уровня демократии, рассмотренного сквозь линзу одних из наиболее часто применяемых демократических показателей. Затем следует общий обзор состояния демократии в Республике Молдова, основанный на критериях полиархии Даля (введенных в оборот Коппэджем и Райнике): свободные и честные выборы, свобода вступать в организации, свобода выражения, альтернативные источники информации и право голоса. Взятые вместе, результаты сравнения критериев полиархии и оценки демократии по показателям подтверждают данное ранее описание демократизации Молдовы как процесс чередующихся успехов и неудач. На данный момент институты уже созданы, но до развитой демократии все еще далеко.

В седьмой главе данные опроса 2003 года приводятся и анализируются с помощью результатов выведенных из анализа соответствий. Каждый объект политических предпочтений (политическое сообщество, принципы власти, действия властей, институты власти и политические фигуры) связаны с одним или несколькими вопросами из опросника. Для изучения результатов анализа соответствий были использованы упрощенные таблицы, в то время как полные данные и графики рассеяния приводятся в приложении D. Результаты анализа показывают, что вопрос о том, как жители Молдовы выражают свои политические предпочтения,

содержит множество различных факторов, таким образом, данную проблему нельзя сводить только к национальной идентичности. Вместо этого из полученных данных собирается более комплексный набор различий, связанных с поколениями, уровнем образования, городским и сельским населением. Даже если национальная идентичность и играет роль, особенно когда речь идет о наиболее специфических формах предпочтений (то есть о политических фигурах), другие факторы обычно имеют более сильное влияние на то, как респонденты позиционируют себя по отношению к другому объекту предпочтений. Возможно, это отражение различных систем ценностей, которые усвоили жители Молдовы разных поколений, а именно поколения независимой Молдовы, Советского Союза и возможно даже межвоенного румынского периода. В итоге, важно подчеркнуть, что анализ соответствий может показать общие тенденции в материале и кластерах признаков, но в той форме, в какой он был применен в данной работе, он не может применяться к напрямую связанным друг с другом фоновым переменным. Чтобы сделать это возможным, необходим дальнейший анализ, который также будет включать пакетирование (то есть комбинации) переменных для создания новой основы для анализа.

Восьмая глава является заключительной главой диссертации и, таким образом, возвращается к цели (ответу на главный вопрос) и задачам исследования. Однако, прежде есть один первоначальный урок, который стоит извлечь из молдавского случая, – это важность институтов (ср. Mazo, 2004; Roper, 2008). Вплоть до 2002 года конституция Молдовы предусматривала, что президент избирается народом напрямую. После серьезного конфликта между парламентом и президентом конституция была изменена, и после этого президент стал назначаться парламентом. На первый взгляд, это может показаться шагом к лучшей демократии, особенно в то время когда в других постсоветских странах производится увеличение полномочий исполнительной власти. Однако последствия были иными: или сильное большинство в парламенте получало возможность контролировать одновременно и законодательную и исполнительную власть, или же, в случае если такого большинства не набиралось, парламент оставался в тупиковой ситуации. Баланс власти, который так хорошо служил Молдове на протяжении 1990-х годов, был таким образом устранен.

Возвращаясь к цели и задачам исследования, напомним, что первая цель фокусировалась на влиянии разобщенности молдавской нации на процесс демократизации. В ходе исследования было подтверждено, что политическое развитие действительно было затронуто отсутствием национального единства, а также и то, что политические партии вынуждены формулировать свои послания на национальной основе больше чем на идеологической. В то же время важно заметить, что

молдавское общество в целом характеризуется скорее толерантностью между различными этническими группами, чем конфликтом. Этничность в этом смысле не играет заметной роли в повседневной жизни граждан Молдовы, но остается, тем не менее, потенциальным источником политической мобилизации.

Вторая задача сводится к ответу на вопрос, как национальная идентичность была проявлена гражданами в политической поддержке различных объектов в политической системе. Как было описано выше, анализ данных опроса показал, что зарегистрированные различия в политических предпочтениях невозможно свести только к вопросу национальной идентичности. Вместо этого, другие факторы влияют на итог статистического анализа в большей степени, что может быть связано с возрастом, образованием и уровнем урбанизации. Дальнейшее исследование, в ходе которого переменные с различными основаниями совмещаются в различных комбинациях перед проведением анализа соответствий, показывает, какие факторы взаимодействуют с какими объектами предпочтений.

Выполнение поставленных задач сделало возможным достижение цели исследования, а именно ответить на вопрос, как и почему Молдова с ее разобщенной нацией смогла достичь относительно высокого уровня демократии? Возвращаясь к предположениям Рустова и Вэя соответственно о роли нации в процессе демократизации, можно сделать вывод, что наблюдения обоих авторов имеют подтверждение в Молдове. Рустов отмечает здесь, что Молдова столкнулась с трудностями на пути к утверждению демократии из-за национальной разобщенности. Развитие страны колеблется где-то между развитой демократией и начальными ее этапами, и таким образом Молдова все еще близка к авторитаризму. С точки зрения Вэя, именно национальная разобщенность молдавского общества сделала в принципе возможным развитие демократии в стране. В случае, если бы нация была единой, по мнению Вэя, плюрализм был бы невозможен, и вместо него установился бы некий авторитарный режим. И вот здесь аргументация Вэя встречает противоречия. Его заявления по сути не отличаются от мнения Рустова: без национального единства маловероятно достижение развитой демократии. Один момент отличает доводы Вэя от аргументации Рустова: Вэй приписывает устремлениям молдавской политической элиты авторитарную телеологию, то есть изначальное безусловное стремление к авторитарному правлению. Если же от телеологии отказаться (что было бы правильно, поскольку это всего лишь предположение) различия между теориями двух авторов попросту исчезают. Однако Вэй привлекает внимание к тому факту, что демократизация может происходить и в трудных обстоятельствах, пусть они и делают перспективу демократического развития довольно безрадостной. Из вышесказанного можно было бы сделать

пессимистический вывод, что демократизация без национального единства с самого начала обречена на неудачу. В мировой перспективе такой вывод вовсе не всегда оказывается верным. Некоторые демократические страны, такие как ЮАР, Индия и Бельгия существуют, несмотря на существенное разнообразие культур среди их населения. Не само по себе культурное разнообразие является проблемой, но при таком разнообразии существует необходимость создать коллективную идентичность, основанную на суммарном наборе ценностей. В этом и заключается трудность, и, несмотря на все недостатки, у демократического строя наилучшие шансы помочь нам преодолеть различия, чем у всех других систем (Glazer, 2010: 19).

Финальный вопрос, который поднимается в данном исследовании: стоит ли рассматривать Молдову как страну с разобщенной нацией или как страну с нацией формирующейся. Национально-государственное строительство – процесс длительный, а у Молдовы для этого было в распоряжении всего чуть более 20 лет (на момент написания работы). Возможно, что Молдова при условии, что она и далее останется в современном ее положении, со временем сможет прийти к объединенной нации или же наоборот, что нация, в которой существуют одновременно и молдавские и румынские притязания на государственность, сможет примириться, а взаимоисключающая идеология будет устранена. В случае если национальное единство будет достигнуто, перспектива демократического развития значительно улучшится. Не так важно, какие именно цели изберет для себя сплоченная нация, важнее само достижение консенсуса относительно этих целей и пути их достижения. На данный момент Молдова доказала, что некоторые цели могут быть достигнуты даже при серьезных ограничениях, вызванных отсутствием единства нации. И все же разрешение бесконечных конфликтов на почве национальной идентичности, несомненно прекратит дебаты по поводу того, кто же такие молдаване, и высвободит востребованные для развития страны ресурсы.

Appendix A

[CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS CONT. FROM CH. 1] In this section a more technical introduction to how CA is applied in practice is provided. It is primarily intended for the reader who wants to gain a better understanding of how to read the CA appendices relating to Chapter 7, thereby making it easier to follow the grounds on which interpretation of scatter plots and outputs have been conducted.

If the Chi-2 value of a contingency table is divided by n , providing for total *inertia*, we get a measure of variance in a table or, in other words, the total amount of departure from the average (Alberti, 2009: 6). Hence, what we are interested in when interpreting CA outputs is how much an axis, i.e., a set of variables in either column or row, contributes to total inertia. This will allow us to understand which axis contributes most to total inertia found, and we can more easily determine which variables are of interest to our study. "It is at the root of the practice of CA that taking only a few axes often clarifies the relationship among objects, separating, in some sense, interesting 'signal' from the uninteresting 'noise'" (Ciampi, et al., 2005: 30). Exactly how high the axis contribution to total inertia should be in order to be deemed significant varies. One rule of thumb suggests 80 percent, but this should naturally be interpreted within the analytical context. By such a reduction of axes, it is obvious that information may also be lost, as the "noise" may carry valuable informa-

tion. Through the application of CA, this reduction may be done as much as possible while simultaneously easing interpretation. Results may then be illustrated by letting the axis containing most of the inertia, usually ranging from one to three, form a map where column and row variables either can be plotted together or separately.

The second step is to determine whether the variables affect the respective axis more than their average share would yield. Since contribution levels are measured in percentages, this is simply done by dividing 100 percent with the number of variables included in rows or columns. Any variable with a result higher than the average contribution should thus be closer scrutinized.

Thirdly, the coordinates show if a variable has a negative or positive value, i.e., left or right of zero on either of the axes, which lets us group variables more easily. The coordinates are directly related to where on the axis the variables are plotted. We may see this both through the coordinates of the CA tables and in the scatter plots of rows and columns. Variables close to the intersection of the axes affect axis inertia to a low degree and thus show a low level of contribution. Consequently, variables far from the intersection of the axes affect inertia to a high degree and will therefore manifest a high level of contribution.

Finally, it is important to realize that row and column variables,

among themselves are dealt with as completely individual categories. CA scatter plots may either be mapped asymmetrically or symmetrically (Greenacre, 2007: 68-72). An asymmetric map scales row and columns differently (one in principal coordinates and the other in standard coordinates) and allows for comparison between rows and columns. A symmetric map, which probably is the most popular method to display CA data, has both row and column variables scaled in principal coordinates. This means that two maps, in fact, are placed upon each other, and it is not possible to directly interpret relations between row and column variables.¹⁴⁶ However, it would seem that the distortion between row and column variables caused by the symmetrical map is not too great, and this would then imply cautious interpretations of row-column relationships while maintaining better visualization of data than the asymmetric

¹⁴⁶ Hence, if there is a cluster of row variables around, e.g., a specific party, it is only possible to see these as individual variables. It could therefore be that males *and* rural localities are close to a specific party within a graphical subspace, but it does not necessarily mean that males *from* rural localities are close to said party (although it would seem plausible). In order to carry out such an analysis the contingency table under analysis first has to be recoded and then stacked, e.g., gender and locality would be combined into new variables. In such a case, we would e.g., have males from rural localities, males from urban localities, females from rural localities and females from urban localities. The technique of stacking variables is not applied here, since it would also mean that it would not be possible to see the contribution of individual variables but rather profiles.

map may provide (ibid., 2007: 267f). This was also the main reason to use symmetric maps for the analysis in Chapter 7.

Appendix B

Full name	Abbreviation	Comment
Male	m	
Female	f	
Age group 18 to 29	18-29	
Age group 30 to 44	30-44	
Age group 45 to 59	45-59	
Age group above 60	60+	
Capital resident	LocCap	Chişinău
Location 1 resident	Loc1	50.000-130.000 inhabitants (Bălţi)
Location 2 resident	Loc2	20.000-50.000 inhabitants
Location 3 resident	Loc3	0-20.000 inhabitants
Moldova	M	
Moldova first, Romanian secondarily	MRo	
Romanian first, Moldovan secondarily	RoM	
Romanian	Ro	
Moldovan first, Russian secondarily	MRu	
Russian first, Moldovan secondarily	RuM	
Russian	Ru	
Moldovan first, Ukrainian secondarily	MUa	
Ukrainian first, Moldovan secondarily	UaM	
Ukrainian	Ua	
Other ethnic group	Other	
Ethnicity N/A	Etn N/A	
Primary education incomplete	1incmpl	
Secondary education incomplete	2incmpl	
Secondary education complete	2cmpl	
University education	Uni	
Education N/A	EdN/A	

Appendix C

Variable	Category
<i>Free and fair elections</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Elections without significant or routine fraud or coercion 2. Elections with some fraud or coercion 3. No meaningful elections: elections without choice of candidates or parties, or no elections at all.
<i>Freedom of organization</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Some trade unions or interest groups may be harassed or banned but there are no restrictions on purely political organizations. 2. Some political parties are banned and trade unions or interest groups are harassed or banned, but membership in some alternatives to official organizations is permitted. 3. The only relatively independent organizations that are allowed to exist are nonpolitical. 4. No independent organizations are allowed. All organizations are banned or controlled by the government.
<i>Freedom of expression</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Citizens express their views on all topics without fear of punishment. 2. Dissent is discouraged, whether by informal pressure or by systematic censorship, but control is incomplete. The extent of control may range from selective punishment of dissidents to a situation in which only determined critics manage to make themselves heard. There is some freedom of private discussion. 3. All dissent is forbidden and effectively suppressed. Citizens are wary of criticizing the government even privately.
<i>Alternative sources of information</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law. If there is significant government ownership of the media, they are effectively controlled by truly independent or multi-party bodies. 2. Alternative sources of information are widely available but government versions are presented in preferential fashion. This may be the result of partiality in and greater availability of government-controlled media: selective closure, punishment, harassment, or censorship of dissident reporters, publishers, or broadcasters; or mild self-censorship resulting from any of these. 3. The government or ruling party dominates the diffusion of information to such a degree that alternative sources exist only for nonpolitical issues, for short periods of time, or for small segments of the population. The media are either mostly controlled directly by the government or party or restricted by routine prior censorship. Foreign media may be available to a small segment of the population. 4. There is no public alternative to official information. All sources of information are official organs or completely subservient private sources. The media are considered instruments of indoctrination. Foreign publications are usually unavailable or censored, and foreign broadcasts may be jammed.
<i>Right to vote</i>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Universal adult suffrage. 2. Suffrage with partial restrictions. 3. Suffrage denied to large segments of the population. 4. No suffrage.

Variables of polyarchy according to Coppedge and Reinicke (1990)

Appendix D

Note: Tables and diagrams were compiled using Minitab 16 and Past 1.96 and 2.02.
Scatterplots are in the form of symmetrical maps.

D-1 Political Community

Analysis of Contingency Table

Axis	Inertia	Proportion	Cumulative	Histogram
1	0,0238	0,4835	0,4835	*****
2	0,0092	0,1874	0,6709	*****
3	0,0052	0,1057	0,7766	*****
4	0,0039	0,0800	0,8566	****
5	0,0024	0,0478	0,9045	**
6	0,0013	0,0255	0,9299	*
7	0,0008	0,0163	0,9463	*
8	0,0007	0,0147	0,9609	
9	0,0006	0,0129	0,9738	
10	0,0005	0,0109	0,9847	
11	0,0003	0,0071	0,9917	
12	0,0003	0,0052	0,9969	
13	0,0002	0,0031	1,0000	
Total	0,0493			

Row Contributions

ID	Name	Qual	Mass	Inert	Component 1			Component 2		
					Coord	Corr	Contr	Coord	Corr	Contr
1	m	0,998	0,093	0,097	-0,002	0,000	0,000	-0,223	0,973	0,502
2	f	0,998	0,107	0,084	0,001	0,000	0,000	0,195	0,975	0,439
3	18-29	0,907	0,040	0,067	-0,273	0,900	0,124	-0,003	0,000	0,000
4	30-44	0,647	0,065	0,024	-0,106	0,621	0,031	-0,004	0,001	0,000
5	45-59	0,866	0,047	0,019	0,131	0,861	0,033	-0,008	0,003	0,000
6	60+	0,926	0,049	0,062	0,237	0,891	0,115	0,016	0,004	0,001
7	LocCap	0,750	0,038	0,020	-0,139	0,741	0,031	-0,005	0,001	0,000
8	Loc1	0,762	0,008	0,050	-0,481	0,755	0,078	0,048	0,008	0,002
9	Loc2	0,934	0,014	0,072	-0,481	0,930	0,138	-0,021	0,002	0,001
10	Loc3	0,945	0,140	0,039	0,113	0,944	0,076	0,001	0,000	0,000
11	M	0,947	0,120	0,047	0,115	0,687	0,066	-0,024	0,030	0,007
12	MRo	0,452	0,011	0,017	-0,181	0,443	0,015	-0,026	0,009	0,001
13	RoM	0,631	0,004	0,015	-0,321	0,629	0,019	0,015	0,001	0,000
14	Ro	0,540	0,007	0,014	-0,144	0,212	0,006	-0,007	0,001	0,000
15	MRu	0,304	0,006	0,007	0,048	0,042	0,001	-0,002	0,000	0,000
16	RuM	0,757	0,007	0,038	-0,422	0,719	0,056	0,050	0,010	0,002
17	Ru	0,831	0,012	0,053	-0,399	0,754	0,083	0,007	0,000	0,000
18	MUa	0,452	0,002	0,021	-0,398	0,278	0,012	0,081	0,012	0,001
19	Ua	0,768	0,011	0,034	-0,088	0,049	0,004	0,073	0,034	0,006
20	Other	0,757	0,011	0,047	0,076	0,026	0,003	0,159	0,116	0,029
21	Etn N/A	0,162	0,007	0,024	-0,083	0,041	0,002	-0,028	0,005	0,001
22	1Incpml	0,358	0,018	0,052	0,166	0,197	0,021	0,039	0,011	0,003
23	2incmpl	0,810	0,032	0,034	0,204	0,792	0,055	-0,006	0,001	0,000
24	2cimpl	0,204	0,044	0,026	-0,057	0,110	0,006	-0,000	0,000	0,000
25	2prof	0,459	0,066	0,010	-0,034	0,147	0,003	0,009	0,010	0,001
26	Uni	0,517	0,040	0,028	-0,116	0,392	0,023	-0,025	0,019	0,003

Component 3


ID	Name	Coord	Corr	Contr
1	m	-0,036	0,025	0,023
2	f	0,030	0,023	0,018
3	18-29	0,023	0,007	0,004
4	30-44	0,021	0,025	0,006
5	45-59	-0,006	0,002	0,000
6	60+	-0,044	0,031	0,018
7	LocCap	0,015	0,008	0,002
8	Loc1	0,005	0,000	0,000
9	Loc2	-0,023	0,002	0,001
10	Loc3	-0,003	0,001	0,000
11	M	0,066	0,230	0,101
12	MRo	-0,003	0,000	0,000
13	RoM	-0,007	0,000	0,000
14	Ro	0,179	0,328	0,045
15	MRu	0,119	0,262	0,016
16	RuM	-0,083	0,028	0,010
17	Ru	-0,127	0,076	0,038
18	MUa	-0,303	0,162	0,032
19	Ua	-0,326	0,685	0,223
20	Other	-0,365	0,614	0,274
21	Etn N/A	0,138	0,116	0,027
22	1Incpml	-0,145	0,150	0,074
23	2incmpl	-0,030	0,017	0,005
24	2cimpl	-0,052	0,094	0,023
25	2prof	0,048	0,302	0,030
26	Uni	0,060	0,106	0,028

Column Contributions

ID	Name	Component 1						Component 2		
		Qual	Mass	Inert	Coord	Corr	Contr	Coord	Corr	Contr
1	Avp	0,935	0,092	0,075	0,157	0,616	0,095	0,010	0,003	0,001
2	Aqp	0,784	0,150	0,042	0,041	0,121	0,011	0,083	0,495	0,112
3	Anvp	0,895	0,069	0,103	-0,250	0,851	0,182	0,027	0,010	0,006
4	Anp	0,517	0,014	0,059	-0,264	0,342	0,041	0,181	0,161	0,050
5	A?	0,447	0,007	0,048	0,074	0,016	0,002	0,304	0,282	0,073
6	Bvp	0,786	0,091	0,058	0,137	0,592	0,071	-0,071	0,159	0,049
7	Bqp	0,929	0,153	0,087	0,005	0,001	0,000	-0,147	0,776	0,359
8	Bnvp	0,853	0,051	0,078	-0,236	0,739	0,120	-0,086	0,099	0,042
9	Bnp	0,395	0,012	0,040	-0,198	0,235	0,019	-0,163	0,160	0,034
10	B?	0,495	0,026	0,052	0,038	0,015	0,002	-0,181	0,334	0,094
11	Cvp	0,924	0,090	0,076	0,163	0,638	0,100	0,016	0,006	0,002
12	Cqp	0,938	0,144	0,056	0,079	0,325	0,038	0,090	0,415	0,125
13	Cnvp	0,915	0,076	0,121	-0,259	0,859	0,215	0,047	0,028	0,018
14	Cnp	0,740	0,016	0,070	-0,398	0,719	0,104	0,041	0,008	0,003
15	C?	0,263	0,008	0,034	0,012	0,001	0,000	0,194	0,183	0,033

ID	Name	Component 3		
		Coord	Corr	Contr
1	Avp	0,112	0,317	0,224
2	Aqp	-0,048	0,168	0,067
3	Anvp	0,049	0,033	0,032
4	Anp	-0,055	0,015	0,008
5	A?	-0,221	0,149	0,068
6	Bvp	0,034	0,036	0,020
7	Bqp	-0,065	0,152	0,125
8	Bnvp	0,033	0,014	0,010
9	Bnp	0,003	0,000	0,000
10	B?	-0,120	0,146	0,072
11	Cvp	0,108	0,279	0,200
12	Cqp	-0,062	0,198	0,105
13	Cnvp	0,047	0,028	0,032
14	Cnp	0,054	0,013	0,009
15	C?	-0,128	0,080	0,026

Support of political community



D-2 Regime Principles

Analysis of Contingency Table


Axis	Inertia	Proportion	Cumulative	Histogram
1	0,0213	0,4855	0,4855	*****
2	0,0058	0,1328	0,6182	*****
3	0,0033	0,0751	0,6934	****
4	0,0032	0,0726	0,7660	****
5	0,0026	0,0604	0,8264	***
6	0,0017	0,0393	0,8657	**
7	0,0016	0,0362	0,9019	**
8	0,0013	0,0285	0,9305	*
9	0,0009	0,0201	0,9506	*
10	0,0006	0,0133	0,9639	
11	0,0005	0,0111	0,9750	
12	0,0004	0,0090	0,9841	
13	0,0004	0,0087	0,9928	
14	0,0002	0,0053	0,9981	
15	0,0001	0,0019	1,0000	
Total	0,0439			

Row Contributions

ID	Name	Qual	Mass	Inert	Component 1			Component 2		
					Coord	Corr	Contr	Coord	Corr	Contr
1	m	0,665	0,079	0,020	-0,002	0,000	0,000	-0,079	0,565	0,084
2	f	0,883	0,121	0,036	0,100	0,763	0,056	0,040	0,120	0,033
3	18-29	0,485	0,040	0,023	0,043	0,074	0,003	-0,100	0,399	0,069
4	30-44	0,222	0,065	0,011	0,040	0,210	0,005	-0,009	0,010	0,001
5	45-59	0,153	0,047	0,017	0,040	0,100	0,004	-0,007	0,003	0,000
6	60+	0,765	0,049	0,030	0,116	0,510	0,031	0,070	0,184	0,041
7	LocCap	0,794	0,038	0,054	-0,221	0,775	0,087	-0,033	0,017	0,007
8	Loc1	0,531	0,008	0,042	-0,302	0,401	0,034	0,025	0,003	0,001
9	Loc2	0,844	0,014	0,100	-0,469	0,708	0,147	0,182	0,107	0,081
10	Loc3	0,971	0,140	0,179	-0,215	0,823	0,303	0,032	0,018	0,025
11	M	0,865	0,120	0,035	0,102	0,819	0,059	0,024	0,044	0,012
12	MRo	0,848	0,011	0,039	0,182	0,215	0,017	-0,284	0,522	0,154
13	RoM	0,270	0,004	0,018	-0,025	0,004	0,000	-0,197	0,219	0,029
14	Ro	0,648	0,007	0,037	0,126	0,072	0,005	-0,355	0,567	0,158
15	MRu	0,367	0,006	0,020	-0,186	0,239	0,010	-0,132	0,121	0,018
16	RuM	0,549	0,007	0,012	-0,107	0,163	0,004	-0,004	0,000	0,000
17	Ru	0,562	0,012	0,030	-0,095	0,085	0,005	0,018	0,003	0,001
18	MUa	0,072	0,002	0,010	0,077	0,024	0,001	-0,015	0,001	0,000
19	Ua	0,418	0,011	0,031	0,192	0,295	0,019	0,118	0,111	0,026
20	Other	0,409	0,011	0,029	-0,118	0,118	0,007	0,182	0,283	0,061
21	Etn N/A	0,074	0,007	0,026	-0,076	0,036	0,002	-0,048	0,015	0,003
22	1Incpml	0,772	0,018	0,086	0,354	0,609	0,108	0,181	0,160	0,104
23	2incmpl	0,817	0,032	0,031	0,181	0,764	0,049	-0,020	0,009	0,002
24	2cmpl	0,403	0,044	0,039	0,112	0,317	0,026	0,050	0,063	0,019
25	2prof	0,470	0,066	0,014	-0,035	0,129	0,004	-0,051	0,273	0,029
26	Uni	0,700	0,040	0,030	-0,087	0,225	0,014	-0,080	0,190	0,043

Column Contributions

ID	Name	Qual	Mass	Inert	Component 1			Component 2		
					Coord	Corr	Contr	Coord	Corr	Contr
1	P1	0,359	0,008	0,047	-0,141	0,075	0,007	-0,065	0,016	0,006
2	P2	0,112	0,008	0,021	-0,055	0,025	0,001	-0,076	0,048	0,008
3	P3	0,198	0,033	0,036	0,010	0,002	0,000	-0,079	0,133	0,036
4	P4	0,136	0,070	0,020	0,025	0,049	0,002	0,032	0,079	0,012
5	P5	0,015	0,208	0,013	-0,005	0,009	0,000	0,004	0,005	0,001
6	P?	0,336	0,006	0,022	0,072	0,034	0,002	0,111	0,080	0,013
7	L1	0,055	0,003	0,018	0,095	0,038	0,001	0,062	0,016	0,002
8	L2	0,613	0,004	0,037	-0,001	0,000	0,000	-0,445	0,524	0,144
9	L3	0,800	0,025	0,052	0,047	0,024	0,003	-0,196	0,411	0,161
10	L4	0,299	0,055	0,035	0,062	0,138	0,010	0,017	0,010	0,003
11	L5	0,769	0,241	0,019	-0,023	0,149	0,006	0,019	0,105	0,015
12	L?	0,461	0,005	0,027	0,115	0,055	0,003	0,206	0,175	0,035
13	T1	0,663	0,017	0,095	0,362	0,530	0,103	-0,156	0,099	0,070
14	T2	0,705	0,016	0,048	0,244	0,464	0,046	-0,153	0,182	0,066
15	T3	0,525	0,041	0,051	0,075	0,104	0,011	-0,144	0,377	0,146
16	T4	0,368	0,071	0,030	0,078	0,320	0,020	-0,023	0,029	0,007
17	T5	0,982	0,155	0,196	-0,230	0,950	0,384	0,038	0,026	0,038
18	T?	0,977	0,034	0,232	0,504	0,839	0,401	0,203	0,136	0,238



Support of regime principles

D-3 Regime Performance

Analysis of Contingency Table


Axis	Inertia	Proportion	Cumulative	Histogram
1	0,0284	0,6083	0,6083	*****
2	0,0051	0,1094	0,7177	*****
3	0,0041	0,0878	0,8055	*****
4	0,0032	0,0683	0,8738	***
5	0,0021	0,0456	0,9194	**
6	0,0017	0,0356	0,9550	*
7	0,0008	0,0181	0,9732	
8	0,0005	0,0105	0,9837	
9	0,0005	0,0102	0,9939	
10	0,0003	0,0061	1,0000	
Total	0,0467			

Row Contributions

ID	Name	Qual	Mass	Inert	Component 1			Component 2		
					Coord	Corr	Contr	Coord	Corr	Contr
1	m	0,916	0,079	0,052	0,115	0,433	0,037	-0,020	0,013	0,006
2	f	0,915	0,121	0,034	-0,075	0,422	0,024	0,013	0,012	0,004
3	18-29	0,743	0,040	0,046	0,197	0,717	0,054	-0,030	0,017	0,007
4	30-44	0,777	0,065	0,041	0,148	0,752	0,050	-0,020	0,014	0,005
5	45-59	0,159	0,047	0,014	-0,020	0,029	0,001	-0,005	0,002	0,000
6	60+	0,977	0,049	0,130	-0,335	0,903	0,194	0,055	0,024	0,029
7	LocCap	0,825	0,038	0,069	0,254	0,755	0,086	0,071	0,059	0,038
8	Loc1	0,519	0,008	0,018	0,231	0,495	0,015	-0,044	0,018	0,003
9	Loc2	0,677	0,014	0,024	0,029	0,010	0,000	-0,230	0,665	0,147
10	Loc3	0,946	0,140	0,023	-0,084	0,934	0,035	0,006	0,005	0,001
11	M	0,953	0,120	0,032	-0,105	0,885	0,047	-0,021	0,037	0,011
12	MRO	0,616	0,011	0,033	0,116	0,097	0,005	0,244	0,427	0,129
13	RoM	0,931	0,004	0,063	0,646	0,617	0,064	-0,453	0,304	0,176
14	Ro	0,850	0,007	0,056	0,518	0,743	0,069	-0,110	0,034	0,017
15	MRu	0,168	0,006	0,008	-0,006	0,001	0,000	-0,098	0,157	0,011
16	RuM	0,712	0,007	0,024	-0,008	0,000	0,000	0,293	0,583	0,125
17	Ru	0,545	0,012	0,017	0,156	0,388	0,011	0,046	0,033	0,005
18	MUa	0,348	0,002	0,025	0,333	0,176	0,007	0,323	0,165	0,037
19	Ua	0,274	0,011	0,012	-0,112	0,249	0,005	-0,020	0,008	0,001
20	Other	0,629	0,011	0,021	0,160	0,278	0,010	0,173	0,327	0,063
21	Etn N/A	0,797	0,007	0,028	0,249	0,345	0,016	-0,195	0,211	0,054
22	1Incpml	0,894	0,018	0,105	-0,470	0,825	0,143	-0,080	0,024	0,023
23	2incmpl	0,825	0,032	0,043	-0,204	0,656	0,047	-0,104	0,169	0,067
24	2cml	0,304	0,044	0,014	0,009	0,005	0,000	0,008	0,004	0,000
25	2prof	0,768	0,066	0,021	0,092	0,581	0,020	0,024	0,040	0,007
26	Uni	0,941	0,040	0,048	0,211	0,795	0,062	0,065	0,075	0,033

Column Contributions

ID	Name	Qual	Mass	Inert	Component 1			Component 2		
					Coord	Corr	Contr	Coord	Corr	Contr
1	Gov1	0,968	0,053	0,105	0,241	0,630	0,109	-0,176	0,335	0,322
2	Gov2	0,648	0,077	0,096	0,168	0,489	0,077	0,096	0,158	0,138
3	Gov3	0,469	0,196	0,046	0,062	0,350	0,026	0,014	0,018	0,008
4	Gov4	0,927	0,121	0,122	-0,201	0,860	0,172	-0,006	0,001	0,001
5	Gov5	0,670	0,029	0,065	-0,241	0,560	0,060	0,030	0,009	0,005
6	GovDK/NA	0,824	0,024	0,073	-0,283	0,555	0,066	-0,040	0,011	0,007
7	5yGov1	0,955	0,033	0,103	0,292	0,588	0,099	-0,197	0,269	0,252
8	5yGov2	0,782	0,053	0,076	0,199	0,588	0,074	0,073	0,079	0,055
9	5yGov3	0,759	0,119	0,080	0,149	0,716	0,094	0,036	0,042	0,030
10	5yGov4	0,382	0,134	0,039	-0,063	0,297	0,019	0,020	0,030	0,011
11	5yGov5	0,759	0,060	0,050	-0,124	0,388	0,032	0,062	0,098	0,045
12	5yGovDK/NA	0,909	0,101	0,145	-0,219	0,715	0,171	-0,079	0,094	0,125



Support of regime performance

D-4 Regime Institutions


Axis	Inertia	Proportion	Cumulative	Histogram
1	0,0321	0,8194	0,8194	*****
2	0,0018	0,0463	0,8657	*
3	0,0017	0,0430	0,9087	*
4	0,0010	0,0245	0,9332	
5	0,0007	0,0167	0,9498	
6	0,0005	0,0121	0,9620	
7	0,0005	0,0117	0,9737	
8	0,0003	0,0085	0,9822	
9	0,0003	0,0067	0,9889	
10	0,0001	0,0033	0,9922	
11	0,0001	0,0028	0,9950	
12	0,0001	0,0022	0,9972	
13	0,0001	0,0017	0,9988	
14	0,0000	0,0008	0,9996	
15	0,0000	0,0004	1,0000	
Total	0,0392			

Row Contributions

ID	Name	Qual	Mass	Inert	Component 1			Component 2		
					Coord	Corr	Contr	Coord	Corr	Contr
1	m	0,900	0,081	0,020	0,083	0,746	0,018	-0,037	0,149	0,063
2	f	0,625	0,120	0,018	-0,031	0,159	0,004	0,052	0,466	0,184
3	18-29	0,951	0,039	0,109	0,316	0,924	0,122	0,023	0,005	0,012
4	30-44	0,944	0,065	0,044	0,155	0,933	0,049	0,014	0,007	0,007
5	45-59	0,940	0,049	0,023	-0,131	0,930	0,026	0,013	0,010	0,005
6	60+	0,989	0,048	0,165	-0,349	0,931	0,185	-0,067	0,035	0,123
7	LocCap	0,974	0,038	0,094	0,291	0,904	0,102	-0,004	0,000	0,000
8	Loc1	0,958	0,008	0,063	0,496	0,802	0,061	-0,219	0,156	0,212
9	Loc2	0,586	0,014	0,009	-0,089	0,327	0,003	0,049	0,100	0,019
10	Loc3	0,968	0,140	0,045	-0,105	0,903	0,049	0,003	0,001	0,001
11	M	0,932	0,121	0,012	-0,049	0,625	0,009	-0,003	0,003	0,001
12	MRo	0,881	0,012	0,029	0,281	0,842	0,030	-0,018	0,003	0,002
13	RoM	0,811	0,005	0,021	0,354	0,723	0,018	-0,110	0,070	0,031
14	Ro	0,712	0,007	0,031	0,330	0,678	0,026	0,073	0,034	0,023
15	MRu	0,511	0,006	0,006	0,076	0,159	0,001	0,020	0,011	0,001
16	RuM	0,749	0,008	0,014	0,173	0,431	0,007	-0,069	0,069	0,020
17	Ru	0,344	0,011	0,009	0,076	0,188	0,002	-0,025	0,020	0,004
18	MUa	0,494	0,002	0,005	0,221	0,488	0,003	0,021	0,004	0,000
19	Ua	0,902	0,010	0,038	-0,359	0,887	0,040	-0,042	0,012	0,010
20	Other	0,932	0,011	0,027	-0,211	0,484	0,016	0,099	0,106	0,062
21	Etn N/A	0,613	0,007	0,010	0,175	0,540	0,007	-0,060	0,064	0,014
22	1Incpml	0,932	0,017	0,046	-0,276	0,737	0,041	-0,136	0,179	0,179
23	2incmpl	0,978	0,032	0,081	-0,302	0,957	0,094	0,037	0,015	0,025
24	2cempl	0,599	0,043	0,009	-0,064	0,535	0,006	0,010	0,013	0,002
25	2prof	0,935	0,067	0,029	0,124	0,929	0,033	-0,002	0,000	0,000
26	Uni	0,942	0,040	0,044	0,196	0,911	0,048	0,004	0,000	0,000

Column Contributions

ID	Name	Qual	Mass	Inert	Component 1			Component 2		
					Coord	Corr	Contr	Coord	Corr	Contr
1	presT	0,965	0,082	0,105	-0,215	0,941	0,120	-0,034	0,024	0,055
2	presDT	0,938	0,050	0,089	0,252	0,923	0,100	0,032	0,015	0,029
3	govT	0,960	0,062	0,099	-0,234	0,906	0,108	-0,057	0,054	0,114
4	govDT	0,931	0,060	0,090	0,224	0,878	0,095	0,054	0,051	0,098
5	parlT	0,953	0,058	0,115	-0,269	0,951	0,132	-0,011	0,002	0,004
6	parlDT	0,962	0,067	0,097	0,229	0,950	0,111	0,020	0,008	0,016
7	partT	0,826	0,022	0,032	-0,136	0,327	0,013	0,061	0,067	0,046
8	partDT	0,707	0,102	0,021	0,062	0,492	0,012	-0,008	0,008	0,003
9	elecT	0,843	0,052	0,034	-0,101	0,417	0,017	0,039	0,062	0,045
10	elecDT	0,798	0,058	0,050	0,155	0,725	0,043	-0,049	0,073	0,077
11	courT	0,865	0,053	0,023	-0,080	0,396	0,011	0,085	0,447	0,216
12	courDT	0,674	0,067	0,013	0,066	0,576	0,009	-0,027	0,093	0,027
13	polT	0,890	0,053	0,050	-0,169	0,778	0,047	0,056	0,085	0,093
14	polDT	0,857	0,081	0,042	0,121	0,736	0,038	-0,049	0,121	0,110
15	milT	0,929	0,087	0,057	-0,148	0,867	0,060	0,017	0,011	0,013
16	milDT	0,934	0,047	0,083	0,239	0,836	0,084	-0,045	0,030	0,054



Support of regime institutions

D-5 Political Actors

Analysis of Contingency Table

Axis	Inertia	Proportion	Cumulative	Histogram
1	0,0381	0,6823	0,6823	*****
2	0,0069	0,1243	0,8066	****
3	0,0051	0,0911	0,8977	***
4	0,0026	0,0464	0,9441	**
5	0,0015	0,0261	0,9702	*
6	0,0009	0,0155	0,9857	
7	0,0006	0,0113	0,9970	
8	0,0002	0,0030	1,0000	
Total	0,0558			


Row Contributions

ID	Name	Qual	Mass	Inert	Component 1			Component 2		
					Coord	Corr	Contr	Coord	Corr	Contr
1	m	0,853	0,085	0,008	0,054	0,544	0,006	0,036	0,245	0,016
2	f	0,844	0,116	0,006	-0,041	0,568	0,005	-0,026	0,224	0,011
3	18-29	0,739	0,041	0,029	0,153	0,591	0,025	-0,076	0,146	0,034
4	30-44	0,339	0,057	0,007	0,033	0,168	0,002	0,026	0,107	0,006
5	45-59	0,209	0,050	0,007	-0,005	0,003	0,000	0,008	0,009	0,000
6	60+	0,903	0,052	0,025	-0,153	0,875	0,032	0,025	0,024	0,005
7	LocCap	0,979	0,040	0,056	0,164	0,340	0,028	-0,155	0,304	0,138
8	Loc1	0,911	0,005	0,048	-0,584	0,605	0,042	0,250	0,111	0,043
9	Loc2	0,766	0,012	0,012	-0,092	0,152	0,003	0,172	0,535	0,053
10	Loc3	0,931	0,144	0,009	-0,018	0,098	0,001	0,019	0,112	0,008
11	M	0,822	0,129	0,016	0,044	0,287	0,007	-0,042	0,263	0,033
12	MRo	0,780	0,012	0,016	0,204	0,574	0,013	0,082	0,094	0,012
13	RoM	0,935	0,005	0,035	0,485	0,591	0,030	-0,348	0,304	0,085
14	Ro	0,971	0,011	0,190	0,843	0,738	0,205	0,452	0,212	0,323
15	MRu	0,955	0,004	0,043	-0,684	0,720	0,046	-0,017	0,000	0,000
16	RuM	0,698	0,007	0,015	-0,288	0,678	0,015	-0,044	0,016	0,002
17	Ru	0,952	0,009	0,045	-0,455	0,704	0,047	-0,010	0,000	0,000
18	Ua	0,950	0,008	0,080	-0,722	0,935	0,109	0,093	0,015	0,010
19	Other	0,971	0,007	0,097	-0,864	0,958	0,136	0,074	0,007	0,005
20	Ethn N/A	0,709	0,008	0,010	0,177	0,446	0,006	0,008	0,001	0,000
21	1Incpml	0,899	0,016	0,035	-0,278	0,632	0,032	0,098	0,079	0,022
22	2incmpl	0,890	0,029	0,078	-0,333	0,736	0,085	-0,145	0,139	0,088
23	2cmpl	0,936	0,040	0,030	-0,156	0,578	0,026	0,098	0,228	0,055
24	2prof	0,700	0,071	0,034	0,120	0,543	0,027	0,033	0,042	0,011
25	Uni	0,785	0,044	0,071	0,251	0,693	0,072	-0,079	0,069	0,039

Column Contributions

ID	Name	Qual	Mass	Inert	Component 1			Component 2		
					Coord	Corr	Contr	Coord	Corr	Contr
1	PCRM	0,999	0,415	0,369	-0,222	0,990	0,536	0,016	0,005	0,015
2	PPCD	0,889	0,095	0,105	0,201	0,658	0,101	0,093	0,139	0,117
3	AIRM	0,976	0,110	0,128	0,183	0,519	0,097	-0,098	0,147	0,151
4	PL	0,621	0,040	0,072	0,170	0,285	0,030	0,169	0,284	0,163
5	PDM	0,663	0,060	0,029	0,106	0,414	0,018	-0,069	0,173	0,041
6	PSD	0,855	0,083	0,098	0,225	0,777	0,111	-0,047	0,034	0,026
7	ASDM	0,835	0,100	0,056	0,082	0,218	0,018	-0,101	0,330	0,149
8	PDAM	0,557	0,050	0,029	0,002	0,000	0,000	-0,064	0,123	0,029
9	PSL	0,881	0,047	0,115	0,268	0,530	0,089	0,213	0,335	0,308

Support of political actors



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