This article seeks to probe the controversial relationship between seeking asylum and the permission (or obligation) to work. In doing so, we recognise the concurrent claims that can be made for asylum and access to the labour market, problematising the concept of ‘work’ and its relationship to freedom and dignity from the perspective of international refugee law and European human rights norms alongside European Union (EU) law. We examine how British and Swedish legal systems have reflected two starkly opposed policy stances. The UK has long denied asylum seekers the financial and psychological benefits that come with work usually until refugee status is formally granted, but the Swedish system has facilitated a complementary pathway for asylum seekers whose labour can make (what is determined politically to be) a sufficient contribution to the economy. We identify the perceived benefits and failings of each strategy. In this context, we observe that the status quo in both countries is changing and even arguably converging around an illiberal consensus regarding the relationship between asylum and work, which will demand further attention and potentially legal challenges in the years to come.

The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief overview of the legislative framework on EU labour migration, comprising rules covering EU workers exercising their right to free movement, workers who are posted by a company to provide services, and workers coming from outside the EU, referred to as ‘third country nationals’. It presents the development and content of the main instruments of the EU acquis covering these three categories of foreign workers. It then moves on to discuss whether the legislative framework described has responded adequately to challenges identified in relation to the different groups of foreign workers by focusing specifically on the outcomes of the EU acquis on third-country-national workers, the differentiated right to equal treatment depending on the category of foreign workers, and the enforcement problems of the frameworks discussed. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks, including ideas for future research.

Kerstin Hesselgren var under 1900-talets första hälft en av Sveriges mest betydelse-fulla kvinnor. Hon spelade en central roll för Sveriges utveckling till en välfärdsstat och ägnade hela sitt vuxna liv åt att förbättra arbets- och levnadsförhållan-dena för framförallt kvinnor. I Anders Johnsons biografi från 2023 framställs hela hennes gärning med detalj och skärpa. Kerstin Hesselgren är en person att imponeras och inspireras av.

This chapter examines the impact of Directive 2022/2041 on adequate miminum wages (the AMW Directive) in the Scandinavian states. The Norwegian government has concluded that the Directive is not EEA-relevant, based on the European Commission’s publication in the Official Journal of the EU; thus, Norway will probably not implement the AMW Directive. This chapter will focus, then, on Denmark and Sweden.

Denmark and Sweden share some basic common features in their industrial relations models. To begin with, wages are primarily set by collective bargaining agreements in both public and private sector employment. There is no general minimum wage set by statutory law in either country, and there is no model for extending or making certain collective agreements universally applicable (erga omnes). Collective agreements are legally binding for the parties and for those on whose behalf the agreement is entered into. The employer is, however, obliged to apply the collective agreement to all employees performing work within the professional scope of the agreement, regardless of trade union membership. This does not mean that all provisions in a collective agreement necessarily apply in the same way for all employees. Under Swedish law, the so-called general provisions apply for all employees, but it is possible to save part of a pay rise, for example, for the members on local level. Under Danish law, it has also been considered legitimate for an employer to pay members higher wages during sick leave than other employees.

In Sweden there is no minimum wage legislation. Wages for 88% of workers are governed by collective agreement, and for the remainder, they are set by individual employment contracts. The lowest wage levels in collective agreements for adults were about SEK 19,000 in 2022, and the median wage was about SEK 34,200, which corresponds to SEK 119 and SEK 214 per hour, respectively. Wages not set by collective agreement or employment contract are supposed to be ‘reasonable’. A reasonable wage is a wage in line with the level laid down in the sectoral collective agreement. Incarcerated workers earn SEK 13 an hour in Sweden. They are not categorised as workers, however, and therefore are not covered by labour law or collective agreements. But the products of their work – goods and services – are either sold on the open market or used for the benefit of the Swedish Agency for Prisons and the Probation Service, as the services or goods do not have to be bought on the open market. Such low pay would be considered unreasonable for any other work. However, work has been a central aspect of serving time in Swedish prisons for a very long time. Over time, such work has been motivated and governed by different principles and aims, such as the work-first principle, meaning, i.e., that work is both a societal duty and a right, and the aim of disciplining the incarcerated workers for internal and external purposes (resocialisation). The rehabilitative aspect of work has been emphasised. Proposals to raise the pay level have been rejected as being too expensive and counteracting the rehabilitative function of serving time in prison. This article seeks to explain the perceived rationale behind this state of affairs and to bring a human rights perspective into the picture and reflect on its implications.