Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>2018 (engelsk)Inngår i: Journal of Political Economy, ISSN 0022-3808, E-ISSN 1537-534X, Vol. 126, s. s116-S139Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
Abstract [en]
We analyze how insurance arrangements, labor supply, moral hazard, and outright cheating are affected by social norms. One question is under what conditions norms may improve social welfare. Another is under what conditions people should be allowed to opt out of social insurance. We introduce an informal production sector to analyze the consequences of alternative assumptions about the information available to norm enforcers. This highlights one important aspect of norms, namely, that they may compensate for the insurer's limited information.
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-161020 (URN)10.1086/698749 (DOI)000445879400005 ()
2018-10-152018-10-152022-02-26bibliografisk kontrollert