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Hartman, Robert J.
Publikasjoner (4 av 4) Visa alla publikasjoner
Hartman, R. J. (2021). Concomitant ignorance excuses from moral responsibility. Thought: a journal of philosophy, 10(1), 58-65
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Concomitant ignorance excuses from moral responsibility
2021 (engelsk)Inngår i: Thought: a journal of philosophy, ISSN 0340-6245, E-ISSN 2161-2234, Vol. 10, nr 1, s. 58-65Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
Abstract [en]

Some philosophers contend that concomitant ignorance preserves moral responsibility for wrongdoing. An agent is concomitantly ignorant with respect to wrongdoing if and only if her ignorance is non-culpable, but she would freely have performed the same action if she were not ignorant. I, however, argue that concomitant ignorance excuses. I show that leading accounts of moral responsibility imply that concomitant ignorance excuses, and I debunk the view that concomitant ignorance preserves moral responsibility. 

Emneord
compatibilism, excuse, free will, ignorance, libertarianism, moral responsibility
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-216115 (URN)10.1002/tht3.481 (DOI)000611406500001 ()2-s2.0-85099839669 (Scopus ID)
Tilgjengelig fra: 2023-04-04 Laget: 2023-04-04 Sist oppdatert: 2023-04-04bibliografisk kontrollert
Hartman, R. J. (2021). Heavenly Freedom and Two Models of Character Perfection. Faith and Philosophy, 38(1), 45-64
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Heavenly Freedom and Two Models of Character Perfection
2021 (engelsk)Inngår i: Faith and Philosophy, ISSN 0739-7046, E-ISSN 2153-3393, Vol. 38, nr 1, s. 45-64Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
Abstract [en]

Human persons can act with libertarian freedom in heaven according to one prominent view, because they have freely acquired perfect virtue in their pre-heavenly lives such that acting rightly in heaven is volitionally necessary. But since the character of human persons is not perfect at death, how is their character perfected? On the unilateral model, God alone completes the perfection of their character, and, on the cooperative model, God continues to work with them in purgatory to perfect their own character. I argue that although both models can make sense of all human persons enjoying free will in heaven on various assumptions, the cooperative model allows all human persons in heaven to enjoy a greater degree of freedom. This consideration about the degree of heavenly freedom provides a reason for God to implement the cooperative model.

HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-196803 (URN)10.37977/faithphil.2021.38.1.4 (DOI)000683158700004 ()
Tilgjengelig fra: 2021-09-27 Laget: 2021-09-27 Sist oppdatert: 2022-02-25bibliografisk kontrollert
Hartman, R. J. (2020). Against the Character Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 98(1), 105-118
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Against the Character Solution to the Problem of Moral Luck
2020 (engelsk)Inngår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 98, nr 1, s. 105-118Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
Abstract [en]

One way to frame the problem of moral luck is as a contradiction in our ordinary ideas about moral responsibility. In the case of two identical reckless drivers where one kills a pedestrian and the other does not, we tend to intuit that they are and are not equally blameworthy. The Character Response sorts these intuitions in part by providing an account of moral responsibility: the drivers must be equally blameworthy, because they have identical character traits and people are originally praiseworthy and blameworthy in virtue of, and only in virtue of, their character traits. After explicating two versions of the Character Response, I argue that they both involve implausible accounts of moral responsibility and fail to provide a good solution to the problem of moral luck. I close by noting how proponents of moral luck can preserve a kernel of truth from the Character Response to explain away the intuition that the drivers are equally blameworthy.

Emneord
moral luck, character, moral responsibility
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-170861 (URN)10.1080/00048402.2019.1617755 (DOI)000474072400001 ()
Tilgjengelig fra: 2019-07-23 Laget: 2019-07-23 Sist oppdatert: 2022-03-23bibliografisk kontrollert
Hartman, R. J. (2019). Kant Does Not Deny Resultant Moral Luck. Midwest studies in philosophy, 43(1), 136-150
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Kant Does Not Deny Resultant Moral Luck
2019 (engelsk)Inngår i: Midwest studies in philosophy, ISSN 0363-6550, E-ISSN 1475-4975, Vol. 43, nr 1, s. 136-150Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:su:diva-177828 (URN)10.1111/misp.12109 (DOI)000500321100009 ()
Tilgjengelig fra: 2020-01-08 Laget: 2020-01-08 Sist oppdatert: 2022-02-26bibliografisk kontrollert
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