Non-human animals are a topic of intense philosophical interestin the modern day. It is often supposed that this is a recentdevelopment, but in fact pre-modern philosophers wereintensely interested in animals. Aristotle initiated a long-standingzoological tradition, but it was only part of the vast literatureon animals in antiquity and the middle ages. To do itjustice, this book gathers twenty-five studies of animals inGreek, Arabic, and Latin philosophy. Major themes includethe cognitive capacities of animals, the difference betweenhumans and animals and the question of how humans shouldtreat animals, as well as God’s relationship towards animals,animal diet and mating, language among animals, animalsuffering, animals as ethical exemplars, and reincarnation.

Non-human animals are a topic of intense philosophical interestin the modern day. It is often supposed that this is a recentdevelopment, but in fact pre-modern philosophers wereintensely interested in animals. Aristotle initiated a long-standingzoological tradition, but it was only part of the vast literatureon animals in antiquity and the middle ages. To do itjustice, this book gathers twenty-five studies of animals inGreek, Arabic, and Latin philosophy. Major themes includethe cognitive capacities of animals, the difference betweenhumans and animals and the question of how humans shouldtreat animals, as well as God’s relationship towards animals,animal diet and mating, language among animals, animalsuffering, animals as ethical exemplars, and reincarnation.

The main objective of this book is to show that Porphyry extends moral concern to harmless living beings in his account of justice in On abstinence. It is argued that while Porphyry shares some commonalities with the Platonists, Stoics and Theophrastus on the nature of justice, he develops an original notion of justice also attributing it to external actions. As an attribute of actions, justice consists in refraining from harming harmless animate creatures including animals and plants. Porphyry’s account is entangled with his polemic with opponents of vegetarianism and his quotations from other authors in that polemic. By unravelling these inner complexities of the treatise, this book shows the surprising modernity of his discussions.

In this essay, I argue for a new analysis of Porphyry’s argument for justice in On abstinence. I aim to show that (i) in addition to being an inner order of soul, justice is attributed to external actions and (ii) justice of actions consists in refraining from harming harmless living creatures, including animals and plants. The relevant harm, I argue, consists in taking the lives of living creatures and taking products from them by force or without care. I contend that Porphyry extends moral concern for others to all living creatures, but not merely on the basis of animal suffering. Finally, I argue that that the hierarchy of godlikeness in On abstinence does not support the subordination of moral concern for animals and plants to higher virtues of purity and theory.

In this chapter, I consider the views of happiness (eudaimonia) from the perspective of soul in ancient Greco-Roman philosophical schools. I consider the specific way in which most schools connect happiness to soul: either as Aristotle, identifying happiness with the human good he defines it as soul’s activity in accordance with virtue or as the soul’s virtuous state as the Stoics. The Stoics famously consider a virtuous state of one’s soul to be sufficient for happiness, and it has been argued that Plato and Socrates subscribed to the claim earlier. Aristotle by contrast holds that having virtue is necessary although not sufficient. Virtue of soul is still necessary for happiness for the late ancient Platonist Plotinus but in Plotinus happiness belongs to the intellect not to the soul, since the soul is capable of evil as well. A happy life belongs to the intellect intrinsically and inevitably and we live happily to the extent to which we can live a life of intellect. All of the schools considered in this chapter also hold that becoming morally or ethically good is either a necessary condition for happiness as in Plotinus, or that ethically good action constitutes happiness as in the case of Aristotle.