As societies age and late-life divorce becomes more common, older adult divorcees will constitute an increasingly important demographic group. Yet, divorce for older adults differs from mid-life divorce. In this paper, we look at housing tenure transitions around the time of divorce and examine the extent to which housing patterns observed for late-life divorce resemble those among mid-life divorcees. We use Swedish register data to analyze housing shifts during divorce for older adults aged 60–78. Using data on the discontinuation of marriages or civil partnerships between 1995 and 2013, we identify 30,000 late-life divorces. We analyze gender differences in the probability of residential mobility and the likelihood of ownership and rental tenure. We find that women are more likely to move. Our study also highlights gender differences in the effects of late-life divorce on homeownership, showing that women are more likely to be tenant owners, while men are more likely to be owners of single-family housing units.

This article uses Swedish register data to study the labour market experiences of radical right-wing candidates standing in local elections. We look at different measures of economic insecurity (labour market participation trajectories, experience of unemployment in social networks and relative growth in the number of jobs for foreign-born workers vis-a-vis natives) and examine whether they are predictors of candidates running for the Sweden Democrats, the main radical right-wing party in Sweden, as opposed to running for mainstream political parties. We find that the labour market trajectories of such candidates are markedly different from those of mainstream party candidates. Those with turbulent or out-of-labour market trajectories are much more likely to run for the Sweden Democrats, as opposed to other parties. The same is also true for candidates embedded in social networks with higher levels of unemployment, while working in a high-skilled industry markedly lowers the probability of running for the Sweden Democrats, especially for male candidates with low educational attainment. We find mixed results for the ethnic threat hypothesis.

This paper explores the relationship between neighbourhood level density of civil society organisations (CSOs), diversity, and deprivation. We compare the UK and Sweden, two countries with different civil society traditions and welfare state regimes. We use data on formal civil society organisations to examine whether diverse neighbourhoods have lower levels of civil society infrastructure. In the UK, contrary to what could be expected from Putnam's assertion that diversity has a negative effect on trust, thus limiting civil society activities at the neighbourhood level, we observe a positive relationship between the density of CSOs and diversity. In Sweden, we find different patterns. First, we observe a negative correlation between CSO density and diversity. Second, we find lower density of formal CSOs in areas with high diversity and high economic disadvantage and higher density in areas characterised by low diversity and high disadvantage.

Many of the world’s major cities have recently seen large episodes of social unrest. What is the relationship between the changes these cities have experienced, particularly in the form of gentrification, and urban riots? We address this question by examining how local gentrification affected participation in the 2011 London riots. We use an instrumental variable strategy that exploits exogenous variation in the amount of local destruction caused by the Blitz; this is a strong predictor of local gentrification in London in 2001–2011. We find that gentrifying neighborhoods had a lower participation rate than other areas; this was a result of changes in the type of resident (a composition effect) and in the context in which the residents made their participation decisions (a contextual effect). Our findings are consistent with qualitative evidence from the United Kingdom and the United States, and highlight the effect that urban change can have on social order.

We use data from a large-scale and nationally representative survey to examine whether there is in Britain a trade-off between social diversity and social cohesion. Using six separate measures of social cohesion (generalised trust, volunteering, giving to charity, inter-ethnic friendship, and two neighbourhood cohesion scales) and four measures of social diversity (ethnic fractionalisation, religious fractionalisation, percentage Muslim, and percentage foreign-born), we show that, net of individual covariates, there is a negative association between social diversity and most measures of social cohesion. But these associations largely disappear when neighbourhood deprivation is taken into account. These results are robust to alternative definitions of neighbourhood. We also investigate the possibility that the diversity--cohesion trade-off is found in more segregated neighbourhoods. But we find very little evidence to support that claim. Overall, it is material deprivation, not diversity, that undermines social cohesion.

In this paper we analyse spatial and temporal variation in the risk of intensive care unit (ICU) admission for COVID-19 in Sweden. The analysis is based on geocoded and time-stamped data from the Swedish Intensive Care Registry (SIR). We merge this data with a classification of Swedish neighbourhood cluster types constructed from multi-scalar measures of socio-economic and country of birth segregation (Kawalerowicz and Malmberg in Multiscalar typology of residential areas in Sweden, 2021 available from https://doi.org/10.17045/sthlmuni.14753826.v1). We examine 1) if residence in more socio-economically deprived or diverse neighbourhood cluster types was associated with a higher risk of ICU admission for COVID-19, 2) if residence in more affluent neighbourhoods was associated with a lower risk of ICU admission for COVID-19, and 3) how these patterns changed over time during the three first waves of the pandemic. While the highest overall risk was associated with residence in urban disadvantage coupled with diversity, models where neighbourhood cluster types were interacted with waves reveal that the highest risk was associated with living in a neighbourhood cluster type characterised by rural town disadvantage coupled with diversity under the 3rd wave (February 2021–June 2021). Residence in such a neighbourhood cluster type was associated with a four times higher risk of ICU admission, compared to the reference category of living in a homogeneous rural neighbourhood cluster type with average levels of deprivation under wave 1. Looking at disparities within each wave we found that residence in most affluent urban areas was at first associated with a slightly higher risk of ICU admission for COVID-19 as compared with the reference category of living in a homogeneous rural neighbourhood cluster type, but under waves 2 and 3 this risk was no longer statistically significant. The largest inequalities between different neighbourhood cluster types could be seen during the 1st wave. Over time, the risks converged between different neighbourhood cluster types.

This article analyses challenges for civil society research in superdiverse areas and proposes ways to overcome them. Key components of previous studies are problematised, such as the lack of attention to demographic complexity, the focus on formally registered organisations at the expense of informal ‘below the radar’ initiatives, the over-reliance on analyses using administrative data and building on dichotomous categorisations of social capital. The article calls for scholars to develop methodologies and theory that enable research across the full range of civil society activity. We argue for a holistic approach to researching civil society through comparative and mixed-methods designs that facilitate research about the nature of civil society action, its forms, patterns and experiences. The concept of ‘superdiversity’ is useful to reflect evolving demographic complexity, given age, gender, nationality, religion and immigration status, and divergent experiences of rights and the labour market.

We use data from Understanding Society to evaluate several claims advanced by David Goodhart in The Road to Somewhere. We show that geographically mobile individuals are indeed more likely to support Remain in the EU referendum, as Goodhart suggests. But Remainers are no different to Leavers in how attached they are to their local community. And people reporting higher level of civic participation or those who are more trusting are actually less supportive of Brexit. Our findings suggest that the dichotomy between cosmopolitan Anywheres and communitarian Somewheres is a misleading one. Cosmopolitan Anywheres are just as communitarian as Somewheres, if not more so. 

After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the media abounded with stories of people ‘fleeing city-centres’ and ‘finding refuge in the countryside’. A recurrent argument is that the shift towards remote work has prompted individuals to reconsider their living situation and envisage the possibility of relocating further away from their workplace. The aim of this study is to examine the patterns of out-migration from the Stockholm inner city during the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the characteristics of out-migrants. We use Swedish register data to compare the trends for the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic (2020) and the 5 years preceding it (2015–2019). Our study shows that, similar to other large cities across the world, individuals moved out of the inner city of Stockholm to a higher degree in 2020 than during the years preceding the pandemic. The majority of movers relocated to the Stockholm suburbs, which experienced a substantial increase in inflows from the Stockholm inner city. Yet a number of smaller municipalities, including traditional tourist destinations, also received more residents from the Stockholm inner city in 2020. Although it remains to be seen whether the increase in out-migration from the Stockholm inner city observed in 2020 will be a long-term trend, the paper discusses the policy implications of inner city out-migration, from the perspective of both the sending and the receiving locations.

In many European countries, a growing share of population with immigrant background coincides with the surge in support for radical right parties. In this paper we show how such increases affect radical right candidacy. We use Swedish register data which identifies political candidates. With geocoded data, we match individuals running for the Sweden Democrats to their local neighbourhood contexts, and measure changes in the share of visible minority residents at scales ranging from 100 meters to 2 kilometres. For those who stayed in the same neighbourhood between 2006 and 2010, the change in the share of visible minorities generally does not affect the decision to join the pool of party candidates. This result is robust when we introduce additional tests and select on the scale of the neighbourhood, unemployment terciles, change in share of visible minority groups terciles, and entry threshold into the pool of candidates. For those who stayed in the same neighbourhood, the only significant finding is a small mobilisation effect for a subsample of individuals who live in densely populated metropolitan neighbourhoods - here we also observe a halo effect, with negative association for small-scale changes and positive association for changes in the larger halo zone.