Cosmology and astrophysics provide a unique resource for philosophers of science: due to novel physics, the remoteness of their targets, and the range of relevant spatiotemporal scales, research in these areas pushes the methodology of empirical science to its limits. It should therefore not be surprising that philosophy of cosmology, and, to a lesser degree, philosophy of astrophysics, have seen an explosive growth over the past two decades. This Cambridge Element surveys the existing literature, identifies areas for future research, and highlights how philosophy of cosmology and astrophysics have implications for debates in general philosophy of science.

What is the link between the discovery of the relativistic expanding Universe and British imperialism? A public panel debate in the early days of relativistic cosmology shows how fundamental scientific research, whether there are obvious political stakeholders (like biosecurity and climate) or not, runs real-time risks of being repurposed for political ends.

This volume is the first edited collection of philosophy of astrophysics. In this introductory chapter, we provide a brief history of the rise of philosophy of astrophysics as a distinct subdiscipline in philosophy of science, brief summaries of the chapters in the volume and their interrelated themes, and a few suggestions for further work.

This is an open access book. This book, the first edited collection of its kind, explores the recent emergence of philosophical research in astrophysics. It assembles a variety of original essays from scholars who are currently shaping this field, and it combines insightful overviews of the current state of play with novel, significant contributions. It therefore provides an ideal source for understanding the current debates in philosophy of astrophysics, and it offers new ideas for future cutting-edge research. The selection of essays offered in this book addresses methodological and metaphysical questions that target a wide range of topics, including dark matter, black holes, astrophysical observations and modelling.

The book serves as the first standard resource in philosophy of astrophysics for all scholars who work in the field and want to expand or deepen their knowledge, but it also provides anaccessible guide for all those philosophers and scientists who are interested in getting a first, basic understanding of the main issues in philosophy of astrophysics.

In September 1931, a panel discussion was convened at Central Hall Westminster on the subject of the 'Evolution of the Universe', at the centenary meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. Center stage was what to do about the evolving universe being younger than the stars, evidently a paradox in the relativistic study of the evolving universe, at the time. Here, we discuss two diametrically opposed reactions to the paradox, which were each broadcast at the meeting by Lemaître and de Sitter, respectively. As we argue, that both could be projected to the public as viable reflects an unsettled question at the foundations of the then-nascent discipline: what is the role for considerations of scale in relativistic cosmology?

While ΛCDM has emerged as the standard model of cosmology, a small group of physicists defends modified newtonian dynamics (MOND) as an alternative view on cosmology. Exponents of MOND have employed a broad, at times explicitly philosophical, conceptual perspective in arguing their case. This paper offers reasons why that MONDian defense has been ineffective. First, we argue that the defense is ineffective according to Popperian or Lakatosian views–ostensibly the preferred philosophical views on theory assessment of proponents of MOND. Second, we argue that the defense of MOND can instead best be reconstructed as an instance of meta-empirical theory assessment. The formal employment of meta-empirical assessment by MONDians is unconvincing, however, because it lacks a sufficient epistemic foundation. Specifically, the MONDian No Alternatives Argument relies on falsifiability or explanation conditions that lack epistemic relevance, while the argument from Unexpected Explanatory Success fails since there is a known alternative to MOND. In the last part of the paper, we draw some lessons for applications of meta-empirical assessment more generally.