The concept of power is central to the humanities and the social sciences, including the fields of social ontology and cultural evolution. This chapter contributes to the conceptual analysis of power by clarifying and applying three notions of social power – telic, artisanal, and deontic – to the peer review process. More specifically, it offers a theoretical and methodological discussion of social power and clarifies some of its varieties. Furthermore, it offers a new empirical case study of external reviewer statements for academic positions through the lens of these different types of social power. This empirical contribution is situated within the debate on academic excellence and gender bias. The chapter ends with the observation that both social ontology and cultural evolution have overly emphasized transparent forms of social power (i.e., power that must be represented to exist) and often neglected opaque forms of social power (power that must not be represented to exist). Still, opaque forms of social power are central to understanding society and its evolution, and their existence poses a new challenge to cultural evolutionary theory that we develop and refer to as “the opaque forms of social power objection”.

The central claim of this book is that a paradigm shift from ideal to nonideal social ontology is currently underway, and that this shift ought to be fully followed through. I present a summary of three central ideas to argue for this claim. First, to develop and criticize the standard model of ideal social ontology. Second, to argue that social power, rather than collective intentionality, ought to play a key role in our general theories of the social world. Third, that my own nonideal account—the power view—can incorporate opaque kinds of social facts, such as economic classes.

There are three prevalent themes among the critics. First, a call to advance the concept of social power by expanding on structural power and demonstrating how telic power can be operationalized. Second, the critics want a stronger objection to the collective intentionality claim (assumed by the standard model). Third, there is a need to clarify the concept of opaque kinds of social facts, especially in relation to economic class. I integrate Khalidi’s clarification of opaqueness, elaborate on the concept of economic class, and introduce a new development of the power view by operationalizing telic power through an empirical case study.

In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, Laura Valentini poses and answers this overall question: When and why, if at all, are socially constructed norms morally binding? Valentini develops an original account, the agency-respect view, that offers an answer to this general question by offering a moral criterion in terms of agency respect. I agree with the criterion proposed by the agency-respect view, given the account of socially constructed norms that it assumes. However, its account of socially constructed norms seems too narrow to answer the general question. More specifically, I argue that the account of social norms is too narrow, even according to Valentini’s own standard, since it does not account for teleological social norms, which are about standards of excellence rather than standards of behavior. Taking teleological social norms into account calls the moral criterion proposed by the agency-respect view into question: it is plausible concerning the type of social norm assumed by the agency-respect view, but not for teleological social norms. Hence, the general question has not been fully answered.

Contemporary social ontology is a rapidly growing but divided area of study. In Nonideal Social Ontology, Åsa Burman provides a systematic overview and synthesis of core ideas in the field by showing that its key questions and central dividing lines can be fruitfully reconstructed as a clash between ideal and nonideal social ontology.

Burman argues for the use of nonideal theory in social ontology, claiming that a paradigm shift from ideal to nonideal social ontology is underway, and that this shift should be fully followed through.

Burman offers a new theory, called the Power View, of nonideal social ontology. It uses social power as the central building block, showing how this can partly bridge the divide between ideal and nonideal social ontology. The Power View replaces the flat and narrow conception of social power in ideal social ontology with a richer and more extensive conception. In addition, it rectifies a shortcoming in other theories of nonideal social ontology by attending to class, which has been notably overlooked in that literature.

I introduce a newly identified form of power: telic power. While deontic power is a key concept in social ontology, it is too narrow to capture a central dimension of the social world. I introduce and define the previously overlooked concept of telic power, offering two justifications for this new concept. First, it captures a distinct and central dimension of the social world that has previously been neglected due to the one-sided use of examples and a consequent emphasis on deontic power. Second, it is theoretically useful because telic power can both conflict with and reinforce our deontic powers.

This contradiction ”1. The universal right to free speech did not exist before the European Enlightenment, at which time it came into existence. 2. The universal right to free speech has always existed, but this right was recognized only at the time of the European Enlightenment.” (Searle) draws on two common and conflicting intuitions: The human right to free speech exists because institutions, or the law, says so. In contrast, the human right to free speech can exist independently of institutions—these institutions simply recognize a right we already have. John Searle argues that his status function account of human rights can preserve both intuitions by showing that the inconsistency between (1) and (2) is merely apparent. I argue that this solution works for tokens of human rights but not for types, while the contradiction concerns types. Hence, the status function account of human rights fails to preserve both intuitions.