We investigate the propagation of environmental performance among competitors and in customer–supplier relationships. We find a significant causal effect among competitors, while the propagation from customers to suppliers and vice versa appears insignificant or does not survive identification tests. The effect is stronger among firms in highly concentrated competitor networks and toward firms with less market and bargaining power than their competitors. We also find significantly stronger propagation of environmental performance among competitors engaged in joint research and development activity. These results show that the propagation stems from both competitive pressure and technological spillover. Importantly, we find that propagation is strong when the competitor improves its environmental performance and when the firm’s own environmental performance is poor initially, alleviating concerns that improvements in performance are concentrated among firms, which are already green. Overall, network effects among competing firms are a significant force shaping environmental performance, and a force mostly for good. 

The reasons for the 1929 Wall Street crash and why it occurred at the particular time that it did are still debated among economic historians. We contribute to this debate by building on a new model, which provides a measure of the financial system's potential for financial crises. The evidence suggests that a tightening of margin requirements in the first nine months of 1929 combined with price declines in September and early October caused enough investors to become constrained that the market was tipped into instability, triggering the sudden crash of October and November. 

Analyzing a large sample of U.S. firms, we show that the asymmetry of stock return volatility is positively related to investor attention and differences of opinion. Using the number of analysts following a given firm to capture attention and the dispersion in analyst forecasts as a common proxy for differences of opinion, we show that the two effects are complementary. Furthermore, the effect of attention is strongest among stocks with low institutional ownership and high idiosyncratic volatility. Our results are robust to the traditional “leverage effect” explanation of volatility asymmetry. The findings relate to the previously documented relationship between attention and volatility and suggest that volatility asymmetry is driven by asymmetric attention.

This paper uses a unique quasi-natural experiment to study the market quality effects of market fragmentation across stock exchanges. In July 2019, following the breakdown of EU-Swiss equivalence rules, the Swiss stock markets transitioned from being fragmented to being centralized. As the event was non-gradual (fragmentation went from 31% to zero overnight), widely anticipated, and unrelated to technological developments, strong identification was possible. The main result is that greater market fragmentation leads to greater market tightness and depth without affecting market efficiency. The results confirm theoretical predictions that market fragmentation boosts liquidity through quote competition across exchanges.