We examine the relationship between domestic state capacity and the projection of military power abroad during the 19th and 20th centuries. Drawing on recent advances in the conceptualization and measurement of state capacity, we develop a theoretical framework that identifies fiscal, administrative, and informational components as core resources of the state that enable external power projection. We theorize two distinct channels through which domestic state capacity shapes power-projection capabilities: unconditionally, by enhancing the state's ability to pursue an effective foreign policy, and conditionally, by improving its capacity to mobilize material resources within its territory. We further argue that both channels are amplified when states face geopolitical competition from international rivals. We find evidence for both channels, as well as the amplifying effect of rivalries, not only among former and current great powers, but also in a broader sample of countries. These findings contribute a general and flexible framework for analyzing the domestic foundations of international power and have implications for core debates on the sources, conditions, and consequences of power projection.

This article presents an updated and extended version of the widely used Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius (WTH) (2013) dataset on autocratic regime types. While maintaining the original WTH framework, this update introduces a new democracy threshold based on the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) and provides novel regime classifications for the period 1946–2024, providing a reliable tool for analysing long-term autocratic trends, regime transitions, and shifts between autocracy and democracy. We use the updated dataset to shed light on the current wave of autocratization and revival of military autocracy, particularly in Africa.

The building of an efficient fiscal apparatus is crucial in explaining how states in the twentieth century were able to finance increasingly costly infrastructure projects, public-funded education, and welfare provision. Fiscal capacity is commonly explained as the outcome of war or democratization. But in many episodes of state-building both these factors were absent. In order to study the politics of authoritarian state-building, we examine the case of Chile, arguably the most significant example of fiscal modernization in Latin America, utilizing a unique data set comprising financial and personnel information from the Chilean Ministry of Finance, administrative and fiscal reforms in the Ministries of Finance and Internal Affairs, in addition to details of the backgrounds of government ministers. Our preliminary findings suggest that the capacity of modernizing coalitions to monitor the implementation of reform and negate the veto power of traditional elites is critical to understand state building in a context of a non-democratic political system.

This paper is concerned with state capacity and autocrat survival. We argue that state strength in autocracies increases leader tenure but reduces the stability of the regime itself; stronger autocracies run a higher risk of transitioning to democracy. This trade-off arises as a result of how state capacity affects the behavior of elite challengers. A stronger state reduces the likelihood of the ruler being ousted by force, inducing rival elites to switch tactics to peaceful support for democracy. An autocrat may prolong his tenure by investing in state capacity, but this brings on the downfall of the autocratic regime itself. We analyze the implications of our argument using a variety of historical sources providing information on 47 autocracies from 1800 to 2012. Our empirical findings, in part based on original data collection, are in line with the theoretical expectations: in strong states autocrats survive, but autocracies die.

During the past decade, many parliamentary democracies have experienced bargaining delays when forming governments. The previous literature has attributed protracted government formation processes to a high degree of preference uncertainty among the political parties and a high level of bargaining complexity. The article draws on such theories, but also adds a third theoretical mechanism, commitment problems, and highlights two explanatory variables that have not received much attention so far. The first is pre-electoral coalitions, which are declarations by parties stating that they intend to collaborate with each other after the election. The second is familiarity, which is the mutual trust between parties that comes from having worked together in the past. By combining a large-N study of government formation processes in 17 West European parliamentary democracies (1945–2019) with an in-depth case study of the prolonged Swedish government formation process in 2018–2019, it is shown that pre-electoral coalitions that fail to win a majority can sometimes delay, not speed up, government formation. In addition, a lack of familiarity may sometimes lead to a breakdown of negotiations and drawn-out government formation processes. 

This comprehensive and authoritative Encyclopedia, featuring entries written by academic experts in the field, explores the diverse topics within the discipline of political sociology. By looking at both macro- and micro-components, questions relating to nation-states, political institutions and their development, and the sources of social and political change such as social movements and other forms of contentious politics, are raised and critically analysed.

To explore the psychology of voting secrecy, we conducted a field experiment to examine voter sensitivity to arrangements for ballot paper selection under the French ballot system (i.e., multiple ballot papers). Working closely with Swedish election authorities, we randomly assigned participants to vote in a fictional election under low, medium-high and high privacy conditions with a follow up paper-and-pen survey to record perceived voting secrecy. Results show that participants perceived an arrangement for selecting ballot papers behind a closed screen as clearly more secret than one where selection was public, and that a third and even more private arrangement, where voters did not have to walk a few meters with ballot papers in hand, potentially visible to onlookers, provided even higher levels of perceived secrecy. The study demonstrates that voters are sensitive even to small changes in the voting environment. Accordingly, election administrators should be aware that details matter for the experience of voting secretly.