Participants judged the risk of an infection during a face to face conversation at different interpersonal distances from a SARS-CoV-2 infected person who wore a face mask or not, and in the same questionnaire answered questions about Corona related issues. Keeping a distance to an infected person serves as a protective measure against an infection. When an infected person moves closer, risk of infection increases. Participants were aware of this fact, but underestimated the rate at which the risk of infection increases when getting closer to an infected person, e.g., from 1.5 to 0.5 m (perceived risk increase = 3.33 times higher, objective = 9.00 times higher). This is alarming because it means that people can take risks of infection that they are not aware of or want to take, when they approach another possibly virus infected person. Correspondingly, when an infected person moves away the speed of risk decrease was underestimated, meaning that people are not aware of how much safer they will be if they move away from an infected person. The perceived risk reducing effects of a face mask were approximately correct. Judgments of infection risk at different interpersonal distances (with or without a mask) were unrelated to how often a person used a mask, avoided others or canceled meetings during the COVID-19 pandemic. Greater worry in general and in particular over COVID-19, correlated positively with more protective behavior during the pandemic, but not with judgments of infection risk at different interpersonal distances. Participants with higher scores on a cognitive numeracy test judged mask efficiency more correctly, and women were more worried and risk avoiding than men. The results have implications for understanding behavior in a pandemic, and are relevant for risk communications about the steep increase in risk when approaching a person who may be infected with an airborne virus.

Concerns have been raised regarding misconceptions about attachment theory in child protection settings, but the application of attachment concepts in judicial child protection decisions has not been systematically explored. This study therefore examined the perception and application of attachment concepts in Swedish judicial decision protocols concerning involuntary removals of children (aged 0–2 years) where emotional neglect was a notable concern (n=28). Attachment concepts were frequently misunderstood, and imprecisely articulated. Unsystematic observations of child behavior were used to infer attachment insecurity and, by extrapolation, caregiving deficiencies. Attachment concepts were primarily used to support child removal, and insecure attachment seemed to be viewed as meeting the legally required level of risk to warrant involuntary child out–of–home placement. Our results indicate that misconceptions about attachment theory may be prevalent in judicial decision protocols. We emphasize the need to elaborate on risks in legally relevant ways without incorrect appeals to attachment theory.

People display motivational biases when interpreting numerical information on politically polarized topics. We investigated how disambiguating informationof a numerical problem affected biased reasoning. Results showed that participants’ initial conclusions were biased in line with their ideology, but that biases dropped significantly with the simplified version of the problem.

Abstract for the symposium "Psychological drivers of misinformation and misperception"

We have increasingly sophisticated ways of acquiring and communicating knowledge, but at the same time, efforts to communicate this knowledge often encounter resistance. The aim of the symposium is to understand and characterize the role of drivers such as trust, conformity, ideology and information complexity in motivated reasoning and knowledge resistance.

The resource saving bias is a cognitive bias describing how resource savings from improvements of high-productivity units are overestimated compared to improvements of less productive units. Motivational reasoning describes how attitudes, here towards private/public health care, distort decisions based on numerical facts. Participants made a choice between two productivity increase options with the goal of saving doctor resources. The options described productivity increases in low-/high-productivity private/public emergency rooms. Jointly, the biases produced 78% incorrect decisions. The cognitive bias was stronger than the motivational bias. Verbal justifications of the decisions revealed elaborations of the problem beyond the information provided, biased integration of quantitative information, change of goal of decision, and motivational attitude biases. Most (83%) of the incorrect decisions were based on (incorrect) mathematical justifications illustrating the resource saving bias. Participants who had better scores on a cognitive test made poorer decisions. Women who gave qualitative justifications to a greater extent than men made more correct decision. After a first decision, participants were informed about the correct decision with a mathematical explanation. Only 6.3% of the participants corrected their decisions after information illustrating facts resistance. This could be explained by psychological sunk cost and coherence theories. Those who made the wrong choice remembered the facts of the problem better than those who made a correct choice.