Open this publication in new window or tab >>
2023 (English) In: Annals of Operations Research, ISSN 0254-5330, E-ISSN 1572-9338, Vol. 331, p. 581-604Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en] This paper examines a two-period dynamic contracting in a supply chain under information asymmetry, where a supplier sells a product to a retailer via a trade credit contract. It is found that the retailer always prefers to conceal her actual cost information thus signal as a higher-cost type in the first period to pursue a higher information rent, which would decrease the supplier’s profit and thereby the overall profit of the supply chain. To mitigate this ratchet effect, we introduce a reputation compensation mechanism in the two-period trade credit setting. This mechanism could alleviate the information asymmetry to a certain extent as there exists a threshold that incentivizes the retailer to share her true cost information in the earlier period. Moreover, the retailer might claim as a lower-cost type when the supplier offers a relatively higher reputation compensation to take full advantage of her information. Therefore, the supplier should provide trade credit with a reasonable reputation compensation in a two-period setting to enhance his expected profit.
Keywords Supply chain finance, Trade credit, Information asymmetry, Ratchet effect, Reputation compensation
National Category
Business Administration
Identifiers urn:nbn:se:su:diva-220936 (URN) 10.1007/s10479-023-05478-0 (DOI) 001025561600004 () 2-s2.0-85164529095 (Scopus ID)
2023-09-182023-09-182024-01-15 Bibliographically approved