Primary copper production capacity is crucial given future demand and social, environmental, technical, economic, and political constraints, often overlooked in decarbonization pathway models. To address this, we propose a methodology to examine the consistency of the basic drivers of Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) for primary copper requirements using the DyMEMDS stock-flow model. Our approach involves projecting primary copper production capacities to 2050 on a mine-by-mine basis, integrating mining industry dynamics based on commercial data. Results indicate significant concerns regarding the consistency of SSPs' basic drivers for copper requirements, revealing potential gaps exceeding 40 Mt in worst-case scenarios. Such discrepancies could impact technology deployments necessary for socioeconomic and decarbonisation assumptions. We recommend that the decarbonization modeling community align scenarios with mining industry constraints. Considering resource efficiency and circular economy strategies is essential for proposing more consistent scenarios to decision-makers, thereby mitigating risks of copper supply shortages hindering climate action.

The transition away from fossil fuels relies on a range of strategies, including deploying low-carbon, electricity-producing energy sources. To understand how much electricity is needed to substitute fossil fuels, sectors of the economy being electrified must be analysed discretely, as their suitability for electrification varies significantly. Constructing, operating, and maintaining these renewable power plants requires substantial amounts of energy. Here, we propose a model which calculates the electricity required to electrify each major sector, and quantifies the energy required to deploy the renewable power plants producing this electricity. We apply this model to the European Union across scenarios phasing out fossil fuels by 2035, 2050, 2075, and 2100. We find that transition energy requirements increase with transition speed and that they are greater than the current energy spent on obtaining fossil fuels in the more ambitious scenarios. We also reveal the energy requirements of each sector, disaggregated into categories (power plants, grid extensions, and end-use devices) allowing for a comparative analysis of their relative significance. We produce quantitative evidence supporting the emerging conceptual consensus that a rapid energy transition will require reallocating significant amounts of energy from other end uses to transition-related uses. This could lead to societal disruptions, as part of some energy-dependent services (e.g., transport, residential heating, manufacturing etc.) will have to be forgone to carve an energy budget for the transition. Our model can provide a quantitative basis for assessing these disruption risks, and support policy- and decision-making to mitigate them.

The concept of ‘polycrisis’ leapt from Davos into everyday policy talk, yet its meaning remains fluid and sometimes contradictory. To take stock, we asked fifty experts to sort key related statements, and carried out a Q-methodology analysis to reveal four distinct framings. All experts agree that polycrisis spills across sectors and borders and reject the view that polycrisis is a mere buzzword. They diverge, however, on how much faith to place in current knowledge systems and on polycrisis’ drivers. Connecting these insights with Edgar Morin’s crisis theory (crisiology) suggests that polycrisis is best understood as a metamorphic hinge where breakdown and transformation unfold together. We argue that advancing this agenda requires drawing on sustainability science: tracing feedbacks and power, embracing plural knowledges, and situating crises in relational, historical, and reflexive perspectives. Rather than a passing label, polycrisis emerges as a generative lens for navigating the turbulence of planetary upheaval and, as such, a compass for steering pathways of transformation.