Recently, Martin Smith defended a view he called the “normic de minimis expected utility theory”. The basic idea is to integrate a ‘normic’ version of the de minimis principle into an expected utility-based decision theoretical framework. According to the de minimis principle some risks are so small (falling below a threshold) that they can be ignored. While this threshold standardly is defined in terms of some probability, the normic conception of de minimis defines this threshold in terms of abnormality. In this article, we present three independent arguments against the normic de minimis expected utility theory, focusing on its reliance on the de minimis principle. 

In their Unfit for the Future, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argued that there is no moral right to privacy, which resulted in a string of papers. This paper addresses their most recent contribution, arguing that—contrary to their claims—there is no conflict between God and a moral right to privacy.

Recent simulations by Scanlon et al. showed seemingly spectacular results for the Waymo self-driving vehicle in simulations of real accident situations. In this paper, it is argued that the selection criteria for accident situations must be modified in accordance with the relevant policy alternatives. While Scanlon et al. compare Waymo with old human-driven vehicles, it is argued here that the relevant policy question is whether we ought to use self-driven vehicles or human-driven vehicles in the future, which means that we need to consider whether other technological solutions, which are available but not broadly used in human-driven vehicles, could result in human-driven vehicles managing to avoid the same accidents. In this article, a proposal for a new standard of selection criteria is made.

Although philosophy cites less than most other academic subjects, many scholars still take a lack of reference to and engagement with the relevant literature as a reason to reject a paper in philosophy. Here I argue against that idea. Literature requests should only in rare circumstances be an absolute requirement, and a lack of (engagement with) references is not a good reason to reject a paper. Lastly, I briefly discuss whether an author has reasons to provide references, and I argue that although there are special circumstances in which we ought to avoid referencing papers, there are strong reasons in favor of engaging with the literature. Hence there is an asymmetry between what the author has a reason to do in writing a paper and how reviewers and editors ought to evaluate it.

This paper critically examines the conceptual, normative, and practical challenges to strong longtermism—the view that the far future is the key priority in moral decision-making. The main challenge is that if we take strong longtermism seriously, it follows that harming present and near-future people is permissible, if not obligatory. Given that this conclusion is repugnant to most, we argue that strong longtermism must be substantially weakened. Furthermore, even if strong longtermists bite the bullet on the challenge of what we owe to the present, we raise a set of related concerns that demand attention. Specifically, we argue that it is questionable whether the far future can be a difference-maker in moral decision-making. Even if it could, our inability to predict or understand how the far future will unfold, or what values future generations will hold, severely limits our capacity to account for it. Finally, the implementation of strong longtermism requires a level of progressive moral reasoning that far exceeds our current cognitive and ethical capabilities. While these objections do not necessarily debunk strong longtermism, they seriously challenge its plausibility—as it currently stands.

In their “Così fan tutte: A better approach than the right to be forgotten”, Martha Garcia-Murillo and Ian MacInnes (2018) present an alternative to the right to be forgotten. It mainly consists of changing social norms to a more open and transparent society and improving anti-discrimination laws. In this reply, I challenge their suggestions both empirically and normatively, arguing that they cannot achieve what they set-out; that their analysis of privacy and the right to be forgotten misses important aspects that go beyond discrimination; and that we have a shared interest in allowing individuals to live a partly opaque life.

Most analyses of can and abilities accept what is known as the poss-ability principle (i.e. that an agent S is able to Φ only if it is possible for S to Φ). In this paper, I devise a new route to rejecting the poss-ability principle. I argue that the poss-ability principle is incompatible with some kind of agent, such as God; that the poss-ability principle has normatively unacceptable consequences (granted the existence of a certain kind of evil agent); and that analyses of abilities or ‘can’ based on the poss-ability principle are conceptually flawed.

Recently, John Danaher defended a research agenda he calls Axiological Futurism. In this commentary, I propose two revisions for how that research agenda is defined. I argue that it ought to focus on disagreements and comparison of different axiologies.

The de minimis principle states that some risks are so trivial that they can be ignored or treated categorically differently from non-trivial risks. Lundgren and Stefánsson criticize the de minimis principle, arguing that it either has to be applied locally or globally and that problems arise whichever application is chosen. Aven and Seif respond to Lundgren and Stefánsson's argument and defend the de minimis principle as a meaningful and useful perspective for handling risk in practice. The response highlights some aspects of the argument in Lundgren and Stefánsson that needs clarification, which is what we do in this note.

This article is about the role of factual uncertainty for moral decision-making as it concerns the ethics of machine decision-making (i.e., decisions by AI systems, such as autonomous vehicles, autonomous robots, or decision support systems). The view that is defended here is that factual uncertainties require a normative evaluation and that ethics of machine decision faces a triple-edged problem, which concerns what a machine ought to do, given its technical constraints, what decisional uncertainty is acceptable, and what trade-offs are acceptable to decrease the decisional uncertainty.