Much existing empirical research on polycentric climate governance (PCG) systems examines small-N examples. In response, we aim to advance studies of PCG by exploring, and reflecting on, the use of large-N data sets for analyzing PCG. We use Python (a programming language) to create a novel data set from the United Nations’ Global Climate Action Portal. This method allows us to quantify key variables for 12,568 businesses located in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries: the number of businesses’ climate commitments, their progress toward meeting those commitments, and businesses’ memberships in “more polycentric” networks via transnational climate initiatives (TCIs). Our analysis of these data reveals that greater interconnectedness may strengthen climate policy performance, since businesses with memberships in TCIs more commonly achieved their commitments. Additional research using these data, and/or similar methods, could be conducted on climate governance and on other areas of international environmental governance, such as mining and oil production.

While climate change is often understood as a collective action and a market problem, we look at it as a problem of planning and coordination. Long-term planning is necessary to promote structural change, which will be required to keep the Paris Agreement's temperature goals. By encouraging states to develop a long-term climate strategy, the Paris Agreement invites countries to turn anticipatory governance into an international governance instrument. In this paper we explore how these strategies describe countries’ climate plans and what the perceptions of government officials are about the potential for realization of these strategies. Using mixed methods, we explore both 1) planning dimensions (actions, actors and policies described in the strategies) by applying a topic modeling analysis to 50 documents; and 2) perceptions of the content and challenges to their realization among domestic policy professionals of four major emitters. Our results show that the strategies lack a detailed discussion on how decarbonization pathways could be materialized and who has the responsibility for implementation of long-term targets. Moreover, rather than being a steering instrument, the strategies are dominated by scenario planning and there is also a lack of attention to political issues. Taken together, we contend that strategies are limited in the way they present the future possibilities of low emissions development. To make them more effective in steering long-term decarbonization, greater attention needs to be placed on potential conflicts, barriers and stumbling blocks that may arise along the way.

Does INGO climate shaming translate into actual climate laws, or is it ineffective in altering the behavior of governments? This article provides the first systematic assessment of whether and under what conditions INGO climate shaming can influence national climate policymaking. Drawing on social movement and NGO literatures, we argue that INGO climate shaming can incur reputational costs for governments through two main pathways: public opinion and transnational politics. To test our propositions, we generate a unique dataset on INGO climate shaming, utilizing natural language processing (NLP) to extract INGO climate shaming events from media sources, covering the period 1990–2020. We find that climate shaming is generally effective in pushing government to introduce climate laws. Particularly, we find that climate shaming is consequential when governments are trade-dependent and have committed to global climate norms. Our findings provide substantive implications for the global climate governance literature. 

¿Se traducen las vergüenzas climáticas de las ONG internacionales (INGO) en leyes climáticas reales, o son ineficaces para alterar el comportamiento de los gobiernos? Este artículo proporciona la primera evaluación sistemática de si las vergüenzas climáticas de las INGO pueden influir en la formulación de políticas climáticas nacionales y bajo qué condiciones. Basándonos en las literaturas de movimientos sociales y ONG internacionales, argumentamos que las vergüenzas climáticas de las INGO pueden incurrir en costos de reputación para los gobiernos a través de dos vías principales: la opinión pública y la política transnacional. Para probar nuestras propuestas, generamos un conjunto de datos único sobre las vergüenzas climáticas de las INGO, utilizando el procesamiento del lenguaje natural (PLN) para extraer eventos de vergüenzas climáticas de las INGO de fuentes mediáticas, cubriendo el período 1990-2020. Encontramos que las vergüenzas climáticas son generalmente efectivas para impulsar al gobierno a introducir leyes climáticas. En particular, encontramos que las vergüenzas climáticas son significativas cuando los gobiernos dependen del comercio y se han comprometido con las normas climáticas globales. Nuestros hallazgos proporcionan implicaciones sustanciales para la literatura de gobernanza climática global. 

Le dénigrement climatique des ONG internationales (INGO) se traduit-il en lois climatiques réelles ou est-il inefficace pour modifier le comportement des gouvernements? Cet article fournit la première évaluation systématique de la capacité du dénigrement climatique des INGO à influencer l‘élaboration des politiques climatiques nationales et les conditions sous lesquelles cela peut se produire. En nous appuyant sur les littératures des mouvements sociaux et des ONG internationales, nous soutenons que le dénigrement climatique des INGO peut entraîner des coûts de réputation pour les gouvernements par deux principaux canaux : l‘opinion publique et la politique transnationale. Pour tester nos propositions, nous générons un ensemble de données unique sur le dénigrement climatique des INGO, en utilisant le traitement automatique du langage naturel (TALN) pour extraire des événements de dénigrement climatique des INGO à partir de sources médiatiques, couvrant la période 1990-2020. Nous trouvons que le dénigrement climatique est généralement efficace pour pousser les gouvernements à introduire des lois climatiques. En particulier, nous constatons que le dénigrement climatique est significatif lorsque les gouvernements dépendent du commerce et se sont engagés à respecter les normes climatiques mondiales. Nos résultats offrent des implications substantielles pour la littérature sur la gouvernance climatique mondiale. 

How do non-governmental organizations (NGOs) target governments for climate shaming? NGOs increasingly function as monitors of states climate performance and compliance with international climate treaties such as the Paris Agreement. Lacking formal sanctioning capacities, NGOs primarily rely on 'naming and shaming' to hold states accountable to their commitments in climate treaties and to ramp up their climate mitigation efforts. However, we know little about how and why NGOs engage in climate shaming. This article advances two arguments. First, we argue that NGO climate shaming is likely to be shaped by the international and national climate records of governments. Second, governments' climate actions can create contradicting expectations by both inviting and repelling NGO climate shaming. To test our arguments, we complied an original global data set on climate shaming events carried out by environmental NGOs. Our empirical analysis suggests that while NGOs are generally more likely to shame climate laggards, climate frontrunners may also be shamed if they engage in non-binding climate commitments. Key policy insights Climate laws and international climate treaties are central for our understanding of how NGOs target governments for climate shaming. NGOs are generally more likely to target climate laggards than frontrunners. Climate shaming is not only about whether but also how governments participate in global climate governance. Membership in climate institutions with non-binding commitments attracts NGO climate shaming. There is a risk that governments sign international climate treaties, without the intention to comply, in order to escape climate shaming.

For several decades, national environmental framework laws have come into existence to define its citizens’ environmental rights and duties, as well as express how the government will manage and protect the environment. However, previous research has not considered how a nation’s highest form of law promising environmental protection and management conveys its role or supports relevant parties. To fill this gap, we do a narrative analysis to see what themes emerged in 44 national environmental framework laws across the world. The main themes are (1) Rights and responsibilities of citizens and corporations, (2) Rights of the natural environment, (3) Environmental knowledge, (4) Governing the natural environment, and (5) External influences. Overall, we argue that the narratives we observed in the national environmental framework laws helps shape and reify the existing human domination of the natural environment for our own benefit and survival under the guise of protection.

The author summarizes and reviews the available scholarly literature on the environmental state. He describes the main research issues, gives an overview of different conceptualizations and definitions of the environmental state, and synthesizes the main findings on the patterns, causes, and consequences of state interventions on environmental issues. Based on the review a set of outstanding research issues are identified. In conclusion, the main argument is that these key issues in environmental state research can only be resolved with further empirical studies, with the overall goal of providing a better model of the political economy of the environmental state.

The limitations and possibilities of the state in solving societal problems are perennial issues in the political and policy sciences and increasingly so in studies of environmental politics. With the aim of better understanding the role of the state in addressing environmental degradation through policy making, this article investigates the nexus between the environmental policy outputs and the environmental performance. Drawing on three theoretical perspectives on the state and market nexus in the environmental dilemma, we identify five distinct pathways. We then examine the extent to which these pathways are manifested in the real world. Our empirical investigation covers up to 37 countries for the period 1970-2010. While we see no global pattern of linkages between policy outputs and performance, our exploratory analysis finds evidence of policy effects, which suggest that the state can, under certain circumstances, improve the environment through policy making.

Non-state actors play an increasingly important role in environmental policy. Lobbying by interest groups has been associated with policy stagnation and environmental degradation as well as with sustainable governance. However, little is known about how competition between economic and environmental interests influences the ability of governance systems to avoid undesirable outcomes. We investigate how competing interest group behaviour affects sustainable resource management by tracing the policy change process in a case study of the European Union fisheries policy and analysing its dynamics with an agent-based model. We find that formation of interest group coalitions in response to a perceived crisis can delay or prevent collapses, even when the competing interests have unequal resources. We attribute such outcomes to the emergence and timing of a 'tug of war' mechanism between competing interest group coalitions. We argue that attempts to improve sustainable resource management must account for feedbacks from environmental change to behaviours of political actors. What role do interest groups play in environmental policy? Orach et al. find that coalition-building among interest groups in response to a perceived crisis can delay or prevent resource collapses, even when competing interest coalitions have unequal resources.

The continuous submission and scaling-up of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) constitutes a key feature of the Paris Agreement. In their NDCs, states propose governance mechanisms for implementation of climate action, in turn distinguishing appropriate roles for the state in climate governance. Clarity on Parties' suggested roles for the state makes explicit assumptions on the premise of climate policy, in turn contributing to enhanced transparency in negotiations on the scaling-up of NDCs. This also speaks to ongoing debates on roles for the state in climate governance literature. This article identifies the governance mechanisms proposed by states in their NDCs and the roles for the state envisioned by those governance mechanisms, and also examines how cross-national patterns of roles for the state break or converge with conventional patterns of international politics. The analysis shows that states propose a plurality of roles, which to different extents may be complementary or conflictual. We conclude that income, region, and the Annexes under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) are important for understanding suggested roles for the state, but that there are nuances to be further explored. We argue that this paper has three key findings: i) a majority of states rely on market mechanisms to implement their NDCs while rules on implementation and assessment of market mechanisms are still an outstanding issue in the negotiations, meaning that resolving this issue will be essential; ii) the process for evaluating and assessing qualitative governance mechanisms needs to be specified; and iii) increased awareness of differing views on the state's roles makes explicit different perspectives on what constitutes an ambitious and legitimate contribution to combating climate change. Key policy insights A majority of states (> 75%) envision the state as regulator (creating and strengthening legislation), market facilitator (creating and maintaining market structures), or facilitator (creating more favourable material conditions for climate-friendly behaviour). Greater awareness of differing views on roles for the state can increase understanding of different perspectives on ambition and legitimacy of contributions, in turn facilitating trust in negotiations. A distinction between substantive and procedural qualitative governance mechanisms and their function and interaction would facilitate the stocktaking dialogues.

The aim of this paper is to investigate if stakeholder participation increases the legitimacy of nature reserves in the surrounding community. Most previous studies of the effects of stakeholder participation in natural resource management have relied on case studies, but in this paper we use a combination of panel data from a two-wave survey (2008 and 2013) of 92 Biosphere Reserves (BRs) in 36 countries and semi-structured interview data from 65 stakeholder respondents in a sub-sample of 10 BRs to systematically investigate the effects of stakeholder participation on the legitimacy of the natural reserve in the local community. The data cover four levels of stakeholder participation: (1) Information, (2) Implementation, (3) Involvement and (4) Representation. These levels roughly correspond to rungs on Arnstein's ladder of participation, and the expected outcome is that the legitimacy of the nature reserve will increase in the surrounding local community as the degree of participation increases. However, findings suggest that there is no linear relationship between participation and legitimacy: climbing upwards on Arnstein's ladder of participation does not uniformly enhance the level of legitimacy of the nature reserve in the local community. Instead, a practice-based form of participation is what seems to increase legitimacy.