This thesis examines the military institutions in late medieval Sweden, the military-political transition during the reign of Gustav Vasa and what consequences the military transformation had for the process of state formation. In previous research, the period after 1560 is often emphasized as the most important phase of military and political change. However, this study also considers the interconnections between warfare and political power during the preceding century, 1450–1550. This period was characterized by recurring military crises and an increasing geopolitical pressure in the Baltic Sea area, which incited military and institutional change.

The primary objects of analysis are the military institutions of late medieval society, which are categorized according to a socio-economic division of nobility, bishops, burghers and peasants. Additionally, the rulers’ own retinues and the new companies of enlisted foot soldiers – and eventually also conscripted units – organized during the reign of Gustav Vasa, are also studied.

The changing character of the state – from a coordinating to an organizing state – is central to the argument. The coordinating state organized the defence of the realm with resources borrowed from established institutions within local society, by reference to legal duties and by offering tax exemption in a continuous bargain process. Gustav Vasa (1521–1560), in contrast, persuaded the subjects to pay a tax in lieu of military service. He organized military units directly through the evolving state administration and dismantled or incorporated the military institutions of local society into one dominant military hierarchy. Thus, this is a study of the transition from one military-political system to another.

The centralization of the military institutions also meant a consolidation of political power. The interconnections between warfare and state building, becomes clear through the argument of synchrony – the consolidation of political power occurred in concert with military institutional change. Furthermore, the process was directly preceded by a period of intensive and near constant defensive warfare. From an international perspective, arguably, the late medieval coordinating state transformed into an organizing state more rapidly in Sweden than in other comparable countries.

Varför anföll inte tyskarna de allierade vid Dunkerque? Den frågan förblir obesvarad i Chrisopher Nolans storfilm Dunkirk. Martin Neuding Skoog har sett en riktig nagelbitare där det historiska skeendet, snarare än individuella människoöden, driver handlingen framåt.

Medeltidens slutskede var en omtumlande tid i Nordens historia. Erik Peterssons bok Furste av Norden. Kristian Tyrann är ett ambitiöst försök att brett skildra denna period och att teckna ett nytt personporträtt av den gåtfulle siste unionskungen.

I Finland blev Okänd soldat snabbt en publiksuccé. Aku Louhimies tolkar Väinö Linnas klassiska roman mästerligt. Den nakna och gripande skildringen av en finsk kulspruteplutons öden i Karelen under Fortsättningskriget lämnar ingen oberörd. Den styvmoderligt behandlade svenska versionen är tyvärr rejält rumphuggen men ändå mycket sevärd.

In this essay I discuss mercenaries as a historical phenomenon and its implications to modern warfare. To a large extent mercenaries were instrumental in creating and consolidating early modern states in Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries. When the role of the military entrepreneurs declined in the 18th century it was not because of declining usefulness but because of an ideological shift. The enlightenment gave birth to nationalism and promoted the concept of citizen armies instead of processional entrepreneurs. But the very negative image of the mercenary figure was by no means a new one. It was in fact established already by the early 16th century generation of humanists – and also by Machiavelli – condemning the whole idea of fighting for profit. During the enlightenment these ideas finally prevailed and for two centuries the common citizen of the European states took to the trenches as a consequence. Many western intellectuals who today promote "democratic" ideals in the third world likewise condemn the use of mercenaries in what could in fact often be described as state-making conflicts in these areas. But why should we deny, for instance, African governments the same tools of political consolidation as were once successfully used in Europe? Could formative steps of state-making just be "skipped" in order to speed up development according to post-modern western ideals?

In the winter of 1464, the Swedish bishop Kettil Karlsson (Vasa) instigated an uprising against King Christian I of Oldenburg who at the time ruled all of Scandinavia. In order to crush the uprising the king quickly responded with a war campaign against the insurgents. In April his army was ambushed in Hälla forest in Västmanland by forces commanded by the bishop. In the battle that followed the king was defeated and fled back to Stockholm. The study of medieval warfare in Sweden has hitherto yielded little interest among scholars. The aim of this article is thus to add to this subject by investigating these events from a military point of view. The article address the question of the actual geographical location of the battle, what elements the two clash-ing armies composed of, further, what really happened during the course of the battle and finally how the battle ended and what the military consequences were.

In this article I show how the tactical concept of light infantry skirmish-line fighting style was introduced into the Swedish line infantry regiments during the reign of Gustav IV Adolf (1792-1809). Up until the end of the 18th century a handful of Jaeger battalions represented the only light infantry units in the Swedish-Finnish army. At this point critical discussions in the general staff identified the demand for a larger proportion of light infantry. The crowns financial strains didn't allow for additional regiments to be organized. The solution chosen was a project to reshape and modernize the existing units to a new flexible standard. Through three sequential infantry reforms ca 1797-1806, skirmish line fighting was introduced as a universal tactical concept in all Swedish infantry regiments. Henceforth the whole infantry was trained to fight as flexible units capable of switching entire battalions (or parts of) from closed order to skirmish lines on the battlefield. This concept even applied to the quickly formed Landwehr battalions of 1808-1809. Success in this respect depended on frequent training and competence both among privates and officers. In this article I both study the discussions leading up to the decisions, the reforms as such reflected in the printed infantry exercise manuals, and to what extent they were applied in the subsequent campaigns, especially in Finland 1808 where they proved decisive in several of David's defensive victories against the Russian Goliath. This reform seem to be the modern threshold of tactical infantry doctrine prevailing up until the introduction of industrial warfare, although additional research on the post-Napoleonic 19th century still needs to be done to secure this claim.