In this article, I consider Georg Henrik von Wright’s proposal that we can account for normative consistency and normative entailment in terms of what is a rational course of action from the point of the norm-giver. I argue that von Wright’s accounts of normative consistency and normative entailment make a logic of norms possible; that while I am not convinced that there can be a logic of norm-propositions without a logic of norms, the possibility of a logic of norms on the basis of von Wright’s accounts indicates that there can be a logic of norm-propositions; that there seem to be significant logical differences between a logic of norms and a logic of norm-propositions; and that as a result of these differences, one may have reason to make use of a logic of norm-propositions when dealing with certain types of questions and a logic of norms when dealing with other types of questions. In addition, I argue that we have reason to avoid invoking either non-monotonic or many-valued logic in the analysis of normative consistency and inconsistency, or norm-conflicts more loosely conceived, because even if such a logic were to turn out helpful in some respect(s), adopting it would complicate legal thinking so much that the gains would very likely be outweighed.

This chapter focuses on whether any of four carefully selected contemporary theories of law—Michael Moore's theory, Joseph Raz's theory, Robert Alexy's theory, and Alf Ross's theory—have interesting implications for legal argumentation. I argue (1) that Moore's and Alexy's theories of law have interesting implications for the interpretation and application of the law; (2) that Raz's thesis has interesting implications both for the interpretation and application of the law and for legal argumentation more broadly conceived, namely, for the legitimacy of judicial decision-making; (3) that Ross's theory, interesting though it is, lacks interesting implications for legal argumentation more broadly conceived and thus for the interpretation and application of the law, too; and (4) that claims (1)–(3) suggest that other theories of law, too, may have interesting implications for legal argumentation.

In this chapter, I discuss Robert Alexy's dual-nature theory of law conceived as a version of legal constitutivism. Alexy argues (i) that legal acts necessarily raise a claim to correctness; (ii) that it follows from law's raising a claim to correctness that law has a dual nature; (iii) that the dual nature of law implies that legal acts that do not raise a claim to correctness, or raise one but fail to satisfy it, will lack legal character or else will be legally defective; (iv) that the dual nature of law is incompatible with the separation thesis of legal positivism; and (v) that it follows from law's dual nature that legal argumentation is a special case of general practical argumentation. Spaak argues, however, (A) that even if in some sense legal acts necessarily raise a claim to correctness, it does not follow that law has a dual nature; (B) that even if it did follow that law has a dual nature, it would not follow (i) that the separation thesis of legal positivism was false, or (ii) that legal argumentation was a special case of general practical argumentation; and (C) that this in turn suggests that constitutivists about practical reason are fighting an uphill battle.

This chapter focuses on the uses of the notion of ‘sources of law’ in continental analytical jurisprudence. It aims to illuminate the way legal theorists in the civil law world have grappled with the various aspects and meanings of this notion. In the first section, it shows that four different concepts of sources of law can be found in the literature: sources (1) as law-creating (f)acts, (2) as norms, (3) as authoritative texts or materials, and (4) as causal factors; it then goes on to show that the first concept is more fundamental than the three others and should have priority over them. In the second section, the chapter reviews the classical controversies regarding the various types of sources of law, such as the respective status of legislation, precedent, custom, legal doctrine, etc. It raises the puzzle of how various (f)acts (such as precedent) can be law-creating without being recognised as ‘formal’ sources of law and aims to explain how legal theorists can cope with it.

By the term ‘legal power’, we refer to a range of practices common to all modern legal systems in which persons are intentionally empowered by the legal system to bring about changes in it by affecting their own legal position or that of others. The fourteen essays included in this volume explore this fundamental concept through an approach to five major themes. The chapters of the first part deal with still open questions about the meaning of legal power and legal competence. The second part offers an analysis of the normativity of legal power. The third part is devoted specifically to exploring the relationship between legal power and constitutive norms. The fourth part is composed of chapters dealing with the analysis of legal offices and legal officers. Finally, the last part of this volume groups together chapters analysing various theories of legal power and legal competence.

Although the Common Law model of precedent and the Civil Law model of precedent differ in certain respects, they are also similar in important respects. In this chapter, I discuss the question of whether the common core of these models, which I call the shared view, can be squared with a theory called reasons holism. I argue (1) that if the usual reasons for following precedent are genuine, then any of these reasons may favor following precedent in some situations, but not in others, and that this threatens the shared view. I also argue, however,  (2) that we may coherently conceive of these reasons as conventional reasons, and that therefore the shared view will not be threatened. Moreover, I argue (3) that if ordinary legal reasons are genuine, the ratio decidendi of a precedent cannot be a genuine general norm, that following precedent can therefore not be understood as action in keeping with such a norm, and (4) that no alternative analysis of the ratio in terms of legal rules of thumb, or supervenience likeness, can solve these problems. I also argue, however, (5) that the shared view can nevertheless be defended, because the theory of reasons holism is actually rather problematic, and because even if this were not so, legal positivists could still defend the shared view, on the grounds that legal reasons are merely conventional reasons.      

Joseph Raz defends the authoritative intention thesis, which has it that to the extent that law derives from deliberate law-making, its interpretation should reflect the intention of the law-maker. The idea is that as a matter of conceptual necessity, if one follows legislation, then one interprets the relevant piece of legislation in such a way that it reflects the intention of the law-maker. Raz’s position, then, is that legal content (as well as form) that is the result of deliberate law-making is necessarily communicated content. While I find the authoritative intention thesis appealing, I do not find the arguments that Raz adduces in support of the thesis persuasive. Raz adduces two main arguments in support of the thesis, which I shall refer to as the no-prediction argument and the argument from authority, as well as a third, highly condensed argument, which he mentions in passing in a discussion of another question; and all three arguments involve the assumption that as a matter of conceptual necessity, law aims to function as an authority, and the claims that legal directives that are not interpreted in accordance with the law-maker’s intention, will, strictly speaking, not be the law-maker’s directives, and that this in turn means that the law-maker cannot be in control of the process of legislation and can consequently not function as an authority. As I try to show, all three arguments fail, though in different ways.