In the mid-1990s, the Nordic countries witnessed a number of spectacular shootings and deaths linked to motorcycle (mc) clubs, which at the time resulted in extensive attention in the media and to intensive debates in the parliament. This chapter analyzes how these events were described and discussed in the Swedish Parliament (Riksdagen) during the period 1993-1997. The data have been collected from the Swedish Parliament's database, Rixlex, and all publications from the Swedish Parliament concerning mc clubs have been examined. The data show that even though the majority of the bills of private members of parliament concerning mc-related crime did not make any reference to organized crime, the further treatment in parliament in the end anyway led to that mc-related crimes came to be regarded as organized crime. This was the case despite the fact that there was no evidence to support such a categorization. The linking of outlaw bikers to organized crime came to be an important argument in the debate to justify the introduction of new coercive measures. Powers that once they have been established in the legal system gradually have spread to less serious offenses. The classification of mc-bikers as organized crime has in that way contributed to a normalization of expanded police powers and practices and stricter legislation.

Since the law on universal conscription was passed 1901, there has been a

debate in Sweden concerning how to deal with those who refuse military

service. The state faces a dilemma: on the one hand maintaining the law on

conscription, while on the other allowing the right to conscientious objection.

The objective of this article is to scrutinize how the Swedish state has tried to

solve this dilemma. At the beginning of the 20th century, those who refused to

fulfill the fundamental duty of military service were not regarded as deserving

any kind of legal protection. Their actions questioned the consensus on

the need for a military defense, and therefore had to be punished. But it did

not take long until this view was modified, and a law was established that

opened up the option of community service for conscientious objectors. In that

way, the legislators created a buffer in the conflict between pro-militarists and

anti-militarists. As long as the objectors stayed in the buffer construction, they

did not represent any threat towards military defense. On the contrary, they

even served as proof that the state respected human rights. The opposition was

in that manner divided into two parts; those who accepted community service

and those who did not. The latter, who did not accept the state’s offer of community

service, were sentenced to prison. Since 1901, the legislator’s main

strategy to tackle opposition towards military defense has been a combination

of co-optation via community service and repression via prison for those who

do not accept that service. It has been of great concern for the lawmakers to

keep the number of the latter, the total resisters, sentenced to prison as low as

possible. If the number becomes too high, it will cause debate and criticism,

both in public and in the parliament. The lawmakers have responded by

modifying the prison sentence and changing the construction of the buffer.

Ungdomsbrottslighet framstår som ett av de centrala problem­områdena i såväl kriminologisk forskning som i svensk samhällsdebatt. I den här antologin medverkar flera av landets främsta experter på ungdomsbrottslighet. Utifrån sin forskning belyser de centrala frågor kring ungdomars brottslighet. Denna femte upplaga innehåller fem helt nyskrivna kapitel som behandlar skjutningar i gängmiljöer, skolan och brottsligheten, ungas utsatthet för brott, ungdomsbrottslighet ur ett livsförloppsperspektiv samt social förändring och ungdomsbrottslighet. Övriga kapitel har genomgått omfattande uppdateringar och omarbetningar. Sammantaget ger boken utifrån skilda perspektiv och metoder en mångfacetterad kunskap om ungdomsbrottslighetens karaktär, omfattning och utveckling, dess orsaker och förklaringar samt om samhällets åtgärder och reaktioner.

This article presents a study of the theatrical performance in court in a high-profile transnational corporate bribery case. Data gathered from observations in court were supplemented with interviews with the defense teams and the presiding judge. The paper’s objective is to demonstrate how the defendants performed unbelonging in court via the interactions between the different ‘teams’ in the courtroom; the defense, the prosecutors, the judges, and the company Telia. The analysis draws on Goffman’s theater analogy and his understandings of performance and self-presentation. The authors introduce the concept of ‘performing unbelonging in court’ and show how the defendants performed unbelonging via an indirect expression of status and standing. The authors further analyze the defense teams’ framing of the case, including the framing of the defendants as being scapegoated by the corporation, and of the prosecution as being unfair and illegitimate, which also contributes to the performance of unbelonging in court. The complexity and ambiguity of a transnational corporate bribery case permeated the interactions during the trial; however, at the end of the article, the authors discuss how knowledge from this case is transferable to other crime types or legal cultures.

The telecommunication company Telia’s dealings in Uzbekistan have resulted in bribery accusations both in Sweden and in abroad. The article analyzes the defense mechanisms produced by both the corporation and the prosecuted former executives of the company. Telia’s initially denial eventually changed into a partial acknowledgment in combination with a scapegoating discourse. While Telia hardly defended itself at all in the Swedish court, the company’s former executives employed a defense of legality, denial of knowledge, of deviance, and of responsibility as well as a claim of being scapegoated. We discuss these developments in the light of the transformation of the Telia case from a mediated corporate scandal to a criminal court case and from a focus on organizational to individual responsibility. 

In recent years two Swedish companies, Telia and Lundin Petroleum, have had to work hard to legitimate their actions as a result of allegations of criminal activity. In this paper, the corporate framings employed to deal with allegations of crime will be analysed on the basis of Stanley Cohen's (2009) theoretical work on processes of denial and neutralization techniques. More specifically, the paper focuses on the temporalization of neutralizations of corporate crime and aims to answer the following questions: How have the corporations' defence mechanisms changed over time? How might the types of crime of which they have been accused, and their corporate structures, affect the ways in which particular defence mechanisms are employed? The analysis demonstrates that although there are similarities, such as both companies framing their businesses as contributing to the development of democracy, human rights, prosperity and peace, the companies follow two different lines of development in their defences. While Telia moves from literal denial to confession, Lundin Petroleum stays with its literal denial in parallel with a strong condemnation of the condemners. These differences seem to be grounded both in the crimes of which the companies have been accused and their respective corporate structures.

When corporations are faced with accusations of crime, they usually find it necessary to justify their actions to the public, the media and their shareholders. Corporate self-defense, aimed at protecting a corporation’s image and legitimacy, belongs to a broader category of offenders’ denials and neutralizations. The objective of this article is to compile and discuss literature that is of value for an understanding of neutralizations of corporate crime and, by means of this literature and our own empirical studies on corporate denials, to outline a typology of corporate neutralizations. The typology distinguishes between a wide variety of corporate responses to allegations of crime and exemplifies how these techniques have been used. We also discuss the function of corporate neutralization techniques and argue that corporate accounts mediate action; they influence both other actors and future corporate actions.

In recent years, several Swedish companies have been accused in the media, by NGOs, and via legal proceedings of engaging in criminal activities. Two of these companies, TeliaSonera and Lundin Petroleum have been the focus of substantial public attention. During the years following the revelations that TeliaSonera, a partly state owned telecommunications company, had committed bribery offences in Central Asia, the affair went from a public scandal in Sweden to a legal process in Sweden and abroad. Lundin Petroleum, a family owned oil company accused of participating in crimes against humanity in Sudan, has continuously denied the accusation by using a variety of denials and neutralizations. The current paper analyzes the strategies employed by these two businesses when defending themselves against allegations of criminal acts. Drawing on Stanley Cohen’s (2009) theoretical work on processes of denial and neutralization techniques, we have identified four main techniques used by the two companies to deflect allegations of criminal wrongdoing: literal denial; denial of knowledge; condemning the condemners; and appealing to a higher loyalty. In addition, we identify how the corporations emphasise their “Nordic values” by linking into a post-colonial discourse and justify their behaviour by relativising it. The article contributes to the discussion of neutralization strategies by pointing out the importance of the context in which a defence takes place.