As private companies assume a growing role in climate adaptation, their strategies may harm society and ecosystems unless grounded in responsible business conduct. This Element offers a new perspective on responsible business conduct in climate adaptation, presenting a theoretical framework that explains how regulatory and political factors external to firms influence their consideration of societal needs when adapting to climate change. Using a novel quantitative and qualitative dataset, the Element shows that the world's largest mining companies have primarily addressed climate risks through conventional corporate social responsibility strategies rather than procedural components of responsible business conduct, such as risk assessments, participation, and transparency. The results suggest this outcome is best explained by a combination of weak governance, lax voluntary standards, and civil society advocacy.

The influence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on international organizations is a perennial question in global governance research. We examine whether and why horizontal venue-shopping strengthens NGO influence on international organizations in the area of biodiversity protection. We argue that horizontal venue-shopping facilitates NGO influence, building on previous studies on institutional complexity and NGO influence in global governance. The argument is examined through process tracing based on extensive fieldwork material in the context of the governance of sharks in the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas during 1994–2021. We find NGO preference attainment in a majority of the studied policy processes, and indicative evidence of increased NGO influence over time. The results suggest that horizontal venue-shopping strengthened the influence of NGOs in several of the examined processes. These findings have broader implications for research on NGO influence in an increasingly complex global governance landscape.

The United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) is central to peacebuilding and disaster relief, yet we know little about its capacity to fulfil one of its core functions, mobilizing donor countries to give bilateral aid in the event of rapid-onset and underfunded humanitarian emergencies. This article argues that the aid given bilaterally by individual donor countries follows the choices made by the CERF to provide humanitarian aid, as bilateral donors seek enhanced aid coordination and delivery. The argument yields two hypotheses, which are examined by using a dataset for aid flows from the CERF, 29 Development Assistance Committee donors, and 147 aid recipients between 2006 and 2021. The main findings are twofold. First, they suggest that bilateral humanitarian aid follows CERF aid. Second, the crowding-in effect of CERF aid does not appear to depend on donor country size. These results are robust even when addressing endogeneity, controlling for several other multilateral aid flows, and including various fixed effects. The article concludes by discussing broader implications for the literature about aid catalyzation, aid coordination through international organizations, and the determinants of humanitarian aid flows more broadly.

El fondo central para la acción en casos de emergencia de las Naciones Unidas (CERF, por sus siglas en inglés) resulta fundamental para la consolidación de la paz y para prestar socorro en casos de desastre. Sin embargo, tenemos poca información sobre su capacidad para cumplir una de sus funciones principales: movilizar a los países donantes para que presten ayuda bilateral en caso de emergencias humanitarias de aparición repentina y con financiación insuficiente. Este artículo argumenta que la ayuda prestada bilateralmente por los países donantes individuales se ajusta a las decisiones tomadas por el CERF para proporcionar ayuda humanitaria, ya que los donantes bilaterales buscan una mayor coordinación y entrega de la ayuda. Este argumento plantea dos hipótesis, que se analizan utilizando un conjunto de datos sobre los flujos de ayuda procedentes del CERF, de 29 donantes del Comité de Asistencia para el Desarrollo (CAD) y de 147 receptores de ayuda entre 2006 y 2021. De esto, obtenemos dos conclusiones principales: En primer lugar, nuestras conclusiones sugieren que la ayuda humanitaria bilateral sigue a la ayuda del CERF. En segundo lugar, el efecto de atracción de la ayuda que ejerce el CERF no parece depender del tamaño del país donante. Estos resultados son sólidos incluso cuando se aborda la endogeneidad, se controlan otros flujos variados de ayuda multilateral y se incluyen diversos efectos fijos. El artículo concluye analizando las implicaciones más amplias que tiene todo esto para la literatura en materia de catalización de la ayuda y de coordinación de la ayuda a través de OOII, así como para la literatura relativa a los determinantes de los flujos de ayuda humanitaria en general.

Le Fonds central d’intervention d’urgence (CERF) des Nations Unies est essentiel dans la consolidation de la paix et les secours en cas de catastrophe. Pourtant, nous en savons peu quant à sa capacité à remplir l’une de ses fonctions centrales, la mobilisation des pays donateurs en vue d’apporter une aide bilatérale dans le cas d’un événement au déclenchement rapide et d’urgences humanitaires sous-financées. Cet article affirme que l’aide apportée de façon bilatérale par des pays donateurs suit les décisions prises par le CERF de fournir une aide humanitaire, car les donateurs bilatéraux recherchent une accentuation de la coordination de l’aide et de sa fourniture. L’argument débouche sur deux hypothèses, que l’on examine à l’aide d’un ensemble de données sur les flux d’aides du CERF, 29 donateurs du Comité d’aide au développement (CAD) et 147 bénéficiaires de l’aide entre 2006 et 2021. Les conclusions principales se découpent en deux parties. D’abord, elles suggèrent que l’aide humanitaire bilatérale suit l’aide du CERF, puis que l’effet d’accumulation de l’aide du CERF ne dépend pas de la taille du pays donateur. Ces résultats résistent même lorsque l’on traite l’endogénéité, que l’on neutralise plusieurs autres flux d’aide multilatérale et que l’on inclut divers effets fixes. L’article se conclut sur une discussion portant sur les implications plus larges pour les littératures relatives à l’accélération de l’aide, la coordination de l’aide par les OI et les déterminants des flux d’aide humanitaire au sens large.

Public opinion has become an increasingly important issue for international organizations (IOs) in the wake of growing politicization and contestation of global governance. This special issue aims to advance the research field on this topic by examining the ways in which public opinion and IOs are interconnected. In this introduction, we contribute to this aim by identifying three core areas of research: the drivers of public opinion toward IOs, the effects of public opinion on IOs, and the influence of IOs on public opinion. For each area, we introduce key theoretical typologies, review the state of knowledge, and outline how the articles in this special issue advance the field. We conclude by outlining an agenda for future research, calling for scholarship to further explore the interplay between public opinion and IOs, unpack public opinion and global governance, and expand the comparative scope beyond the western context.

Geopolitical tensions between states can undermine the perceived legitimacy of international environmental institutions (IEIs), making it more difficult to find ambitious policy solutions, diffuse norms and rules, and enforce compliance to address joint environmental challenges. Despite heightened geopolitical tensions in the past two decades, however, citizens’ perceptions of IEI legitimacy worldwide have remained reasonably stable at moderate levels. We argue that IEIs may gain legitimacy by helping states navigate geopolitical tensions through plurilateral cooperation within IEIs. The argument is supported by analysis of the patterns of legitimacy perceptions of the United Nations based on data from 88 countries from the European Values Study 5 and the World Values Survey 7 (2017–2022), and case-based analysis of how plurilateralism may strengthen IEI legitimacy. Finally, the chapter sketches broader implications for the study of legitimacy and geopolitics in global environmental governance.

As climate change is becoming an ever more pressing global policy challenge, the linkages of climate change to other issue areas are diversifying. This article seeks to explain why some climate linkages are more likely to spread across international organizations (IOs) than others. Drawing on organizational and framing theories, we argue that the framing of climate linkages affects how such linkages disseminate across IOs. Distinguishing between three framings of climate change––technical, emotional and emergency––we develop and test novel hypotheses about the effects of framing climate linkages on their spread on social media. We use an original dataset on the dissemination of climate linkages on the social media platform Twitter (currently X) among eight IOs with a global mandate during the period 2008–2019. The results suggest that both the characteristics and the framing of climate linkages influence their spread across the studied IOs, as we find, in the context of the climate-development and climate-disaster risks linkages, that technical and emotional framings affect how linkages spread across several United Nations agencies. In all, we show the importance of the interplay between climate change linkages and the framings of these linkages for their spread across IOs.

Throughout the history of European integration, economic wealth has increased to the benefit of citizens in the European Union (EU). However, inequalities in well-being persist within and between Europe’s regions, undermining the legitimacy of the EU in the eyes of citizens. This book investigates how the EU can use its regional funding programmes in ways that increase citizen well-being. The book shows that while EU social investments improve labour market performance in rich regions, they exacerbate income inequality in poor regions. Based on this insight, the book presents a theory on the conditions under which EU funding will enhance well-being. Crucially, it argues the case for enhancing the inclusivity of EU growth, which yields the promise of a more legitimate and stronger union.

There is a lively debate about the legitimacy of the international climate regime, as represented by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the quality of non-state actor participation in the regime. This commentary examines perceptions of involved non-state actors from 2021–2022 regarding their participation and regime legitimacy. The findings reveal no legitimacy crisis for the adaptation and mitigation regimes, but the surveyed NSAs are divided in their legitimacy beliefs. NSAs also express significant disappointment about their opportunities for participation.

Adaptation to the risks and threats posed by climate change is the process of adjusting to both the climate and its effects in order to moderate harm and build resilience. It is therefore an urgent priority for societies and ecosystems, as shown not only by the two million deaths worldwide caused by extreme weather events over the past three decades, but also by the climate-related hunger, food insecurity, and malnutrition of millions more. This entry shows the importance of policy in enhancing understanding the barriers and opportunities to successful adaptation.

Climate change, health pandemics, structural decline, and more - the challenges of solving political problems are daunting, particularly when the political institutions addressing them are not trusted. This article tests the economic theory that residents of high-income regions are more likely to trust political institutions, given their positive experiences with services and opportunities, against the rival argument that predicts a negative effect of regional disadvantage within a country on political trust. Using European Values Study and World Values Survey (2017-2020) data, combined with socioeconomic data for 606 regions in 42 countries, this paper analyses samples of regions both in and outside the EU. The results suggest that people living in wealthy EU regions - both in absolute and relative terms - trust national government more and the EU less. In the global sample, the evidence is more variegated and corroborates economic theory only in democracies. The article sketches implications for regional inequality, political trust, and legitimacy research.