Homeownership is an important indicator of immigrant incorporation. Using administrative data from Sweden (1997–2016), we investigated entry into first-time homeownership across immigrant groups and generations. We differentiated between immigrants arriving as adults (1 G) and children (1.5 G) and between descendants of immigrants with two (2 G) and one (2.5 G) foreign-born parent(s). Immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa showed the lowest propensity to move to homeownership, whereas immigrants from Nordic countries, Western-Europe and North America had the highest likelihood. A large proportion of immigrants moved to first-time homeownership already in their first year in Sweden. We observed a clear gradient across migrant generations: the 2.5 G had homeownership levels closer to native Swedes than the other generations, although they still had lower homeownership than the native population. The observed differences in homeownership between the descendants of immigrants from high- and low-income countries suggest the presence of housing segregation due to migration background, preferences, and available resources. These differences, however, are reduced over time and across migrant generations. This study advances the international housing scholarship by highlighting generational convergence of immigrant homeownership in Sweden. Additionally, it offers evidence on the long-term role of homeownership access in shaping social inclusion and incorporation across diverse migrant populations.

The decline in total fertility rates in Western countries, particularly the Nordic countries, has puzzled demographers. Researchers assume that the decline is associated with increasing perceptions of uncertainties about the future. In this study, we explore whether childbearing intentions have also declined and whether individuals have become more uncertain about future childbearing. To do so, we compare childbearing intentions expressed by participants in the 2012 and 2021 Swedish Generations and Gender Surveys. We present multinominal logistic regressions of respondents’ answers to the question whether they definitely or probably intend to have a(nother) child in the next three years and (if not) whether they (ever) intend to have a(nother) child in the future. Our findings indicate that the intentions to definitely have a(nother) child have declined across socio-demographic groups, and that uncertainties about future childbearing have increased. These changes were particularly pronounced among young people and among childless respondents, indicating a growing indecision as well as a growing tendency to remain childfree among groups that are relevant for future fertility development. The decline in intentions and the increase in uncertainties about childbearing indicate that the ongoing fertility decline cannot be classified as a temporary phenomenon. Rather, the results suggest that the decline will continue, because childbearing intentions are rarely fully realized. Our results are a step toward unraveling the puzzle of declining fertility in the Nordic region and beyond. The findings reveal that individuals have become more uncertain about future childbearing and that they have become more likely to retreat from childbearing.

Understanding the housing and residential mobility of migrant populations is crucial to facilitate their integration into host societies. Yet, little is known about their experiences across generations, origin groups, and country contexts. This study investigates residential mobility and housing changes among immigrants and their descendants in five European countries (United Kingdom, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Sweden) with different housing markets and migrant populations. Using longitudinal data from 2010 to 2019, we first compare the risk of a residential move across migrant generations, origins groups, and host countries. We then study the propensity to move to different housing tenure types (i.e., homeownership, private renting, and social renting). We find distinct patterns of residential moves among migrant generations and origin groups. First, immigrants’ residential mobility levels vary across origin groups and country contexts. However, we generally find lower mobility for the second generation compared to the first in all groups. Second, in all countries, immigrants, especially from non-European countries, are less likely to move to homeownership and more likely to move to social or private renting than the native populations. Some of the differences decline across migrant generations, however, we still find lower levels of mobility to homeownership and a higher propensity of moving to social renting among some descendant groups. This study sheds light on persistent differences in residential mobility and housing patterns among immigrants and their descendants in Europe and contributes to a better understanding of the role of the country context in assimilation of housing behaviour and perpetuating housing inequalities.

Immigrants and their descendants increasingly shape fertility patterns in European societies. While childbearing among immigrants is well explored, less is known with respect to their descendants. Using Swedish register data, we studied differences in fertility outcomes between first- and second-generation individuals in Sweden and compared with the native Swedish population. We studied men and women separately, distinguished between high- and low-fertility backgrounds, and differentiated whether the descendants of immigrants were offspring from endogamous or exogamous relationships. For most migrants who arrived in Sweden as adults, we found elevated first birth rates shortly after arrival. First birth rates among the second generation were generally close to but lower than the rates observed among native Swedes. Male offspring from exogamous unions with a Swedish-born mother tended to have less depressed rates of first birth than other second-generation individuals. Second birth rates were very similar across population subgroups but generally lower among immigrants and their descendants compared to native Swedes. Third birth rates were often polarized into high- and low-fertility backgrounds, when compared to native Swedes. While fertility patterns among the second generation appeared to drift away from patterns of the first generation, the second generation remained a heterogeneous population subgroup. Nevertheless, and as childbearing patterns of the descendants with one immigrant parent increasingly resembled patterns of native Swedes, exogamous partnerships can likely be considered an important factor behind this gradual family-demographic assimilation process.

This study examines COVID-19 mortality across long-term care settings comparing migrants and Swedish-born during the first 2 years of the pandemic. Previous research shows that migrants faced higher risks of severe COVID-19 outcomes, contrasting with the observed Migrant Mortality Advantage. Using Swedish total population data (2019–22), we stratified participants aged 70+ by care setting and migration status. We analysed the first pandemic year (March 2020–February 2021) and the second year (March 2021–February 2022), alongside pre-pandemic mortality data for context. Outcome measures included all deaths from COVID-19 and other causes. Cox proportional hazards models were employed adjusting for sociodemographic and health variables. Our findings highlight the significant impact of care settings on COVID-19 mortality in the first pandemic year, exceeding that for other causes of death. Migrants born in low- or middle-income countries in institutional care had higher mortality rates (HR = 42.88, 95% CI = 36.69–50.13) than Swedish-born individuals in institutional care (HR = 25.83, 95% CI = 24.12–27.65) relative to Swedish-born with no care. This contrasts with mortality patterns for non-COVID causes before and during the pandemic, indicating a specific migrant disadvantage during the first year. In the second year, the excess COVID-19 mortality in care settings decreased yet continued to be higher for migrants than for Swedish-born, likely influenced by the equalizing effect of vaccinations. Despite mitigation efforts, a clear migrant mortality disadvantage persisted among those receiving home care or living in care homes.

International migration has historically been an urban phenomenon. Despite the increasing presence of immigrants in non-urban areas and political initiatives aimed at regionalization, research in Europe continues to exhibit a pronounced urban analytical bias. This paper examines the geographies of immigrant and refugee settlement along the urban–rural continuum in Sweden, Germany, and Switzerland. Using (multistate) event history models, we first examine changes in migration stocks in urban, suburban, and rural municipalities, emphasizing the role of immigrant subgroups in regional population changes. Second, we analyze internal origin–destination flux to enhance our understanding of the spatial adjustment processes of immigrants in the context of new immigrant destinations in Europe. Results suggest that immigrants contribute little to suburbanization and ruralization processes, with both initial settlement and secondary moves predominantly directed toward urban areas. EU and non-EU immigrants exhibit stable trajectories post-arrival; in contrast, refugees subjected to a dispersal policy tend to relocate in significant proportions to urban areas once mobility restrictions are lifted. In the three countries, secondary moves by refugees have resulted in an increased concentration of this population in urban areas, reaching proportions comparable to those of the non-European immigrant group not subjected to this policy. The consistency of this finding across the three countries raises significant questions regarding the effectiveness of the dispersal policy from a demographic perspective. Furthermore, transitions from urban to suburban or rural municipalities remain uncommon and do not demonstrate clear associations with the duration of residence or socioeconomic status, as predicted by the spatial assimilation model.

Many affluent societies saw a temporary increase in their fertility rates in 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic. This included a number of countries that had experienced fertility decline during the 2010s, like the Nordic. In the immediate aftermath of the pandemic (2022–2023), fertility rates resumed their previous downward trend. Most research on the pandemic-related fertility trends has relied on aggregate data. Although a few studies have examined group-specific trends, hardly any have covered the post-pandemic years—an important step for revealing whether any uptick in 2021 had a lasting impact on fertility structures. Our study attends to this objective, with a focus on parity and group-specific fertility trends in Sweden before, during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. We apply event-history techniques to Swedish register data to unveil annual trends of birth risks in 2010–2022, for all Swedish-born women of childbearing age. First- and second-birth risks in 2015–2022 are analysed further across socio-demographic factors. Our study reveals that the “pandemic pattern” of fertility increase in 2021 and drop in 2022 was visible among subgroups with better possibilities to prepone already intended births. For example, the fertility increase and subsequent drop was particularly evident for mothers with young children and women with higher education and incomes. The pandemic fertility pattern reflects temporary changes in the timing of childbearing, more specifically a preponement of births that occurred in 2021 with resulting shortfall in 2022. The continued fall in fertility rates in 2023 should be viewed in the light of the long-term fertility decline.

Previous research on fertility by field of education has revealed stronger fertility variation than by the more frequently studied metric of educational level. However, this line of research has not focused on both men and women and changes across cohorts. Our study is the first to analyze cohort trends in fertility by field of education for both sexes and includes the cohorts of educational expansion and the development towards the dual-earner–dual carer family model. We focus on native Swedes born 1946–1975. Swedish register data are used to depict educational orientation, educational level, and the number of children at age 45. The ranking of educational fields by childlessness and completed fertility is remarkably similar for men and women and stable across cohorts. Distinguishing the fields by level gives a largely analogous picture, but detailing educational fields reveals some different developments by sex and cohort. The similarity in patterns between men and women suggests that field-based attributes and conditions in resulting occupations may matter more than gender conformity for fertility outcomes.

Developments over time in the prevalence of marriage and cohabitation formation has long received much interest, but less is known about more recent developments for different population subgroups in European countries. This applies as well to Sweden, a country considered a forerunner in family-demographic change. In contrast, much attention has been paid to the falling birth rates during the 2010s, and explanations that focus on the role of increasing uncertainties. In the Swedish case, the fertility decline has been documented across all main socio-demographic subgroups. The objective of this study is to examine whether the same situation holds for first marriage and cohabitation formation during the 2010s and the exceptional years of the Covid-19 pandemic. Based on Swedish population registers, including with new cohabitation data, we present annual indices of first marriage formation (1991–2022) and cohabitation formation (2012–2022) across a number of socio-demographic strata. We demonstrate a continuous decline in first marriage formation since the early 2010s with an additional sharp dip during the pandemic and a post-pandemic recovery. In contrast, there was a remarkable stability in cohabitation formation during 2012–2022. Although socio-demographic groups differ in their overall levels of marriage and cohabitation formation, the recent trends are strikingly similar across groups. Cohabiting couples, across population subgroups, have become less inclined to transition their union status to a more committed level, as manifested by marriage or parenthood. This occurred in spite of a positive economic climate in the 2010s and stable family policies, indicating that other forces are at play.

This study investigates partnership changes and childbearing among immigrants and their descendants in the UK, France, and Germany. Our analysis of longitudinal data shows, first, significant diversity in family trajectories among immigrants and their descendants in Europe. Immigrants from other European countries and their descendants tend to cohabit prior to marriage, and their fertility in unions is often similar to that of the native population. In contrast, South Asians and Turkish populations exhibit marriage-centred family behaviour with elevated third-birth rates. Individuals of sub-Saharan African or Caribbean origin display higher rates of non-marital family transitions. Second, we observe some changes in partnership and childbearing patterns across migrant generations; these are stronger for fertility than for partnership patterns. Third, migration background is particularly associated with partnership patterns, whereas the destination country context influences childbearing patterns. We expect some patterns to persist across future migrant generations (e.g. preference for marriage vs cohabitation), whereas others are likely to vanish (e.g. large families).