Many affluent societies saw a temporary increase in their fertility rates in 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic. This included a number of countries that had experienced fertility decline during the 2010s, like the Nordic. In the immediate aftermath of the pandemic (2022–2023), fertility rates resumed their previous downward trend. Most research on the pandemic-related fertility trends has relied on aggregate data. Although a few studies have examined group-specific trends, hardly any have covered the post-pandemic years—an important step for revealing whether any uptick in 2021 had a lasting impact on fertility structures. Our study attends to this objective, with a focus on parity and group-specific fertility trends in Sweden before, during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. We apply event-history techniques to Swedish register data to unveil annual trends of birth risks in 2010–2022, for all Swedish-born women of childbearing age. First- and second-birth risks in 2015–2022 are analysed further across socio-demographic factors. Our study reveals that the “pandemic pattern” of fertility increase in 2021 and drop in 2022 was visible among subgroups with better possibilities to prepone already intended births. For example, the fertility increase and subsequent drop was particularly evident for mothers with young children and women with higher education and incomes. The pandemic fertility pattern reflects temporary changes in the timing of childbearing, more specifically a preponement of births that occurred in 2021 with resulting shortfall in 2022. The continued fall in fertility rates in 2023 should be viewed in the light of the long-term fertility decline.

Immigrants and their descendants increasingly shape fertility patterns in European societies. While childbearing among immigrants is well explored, less is known with respect to their descendants. Using Swedish register data, we studied differences in fertility outcomes between first- and second-generation individuals in Sweden and compared with the native Swedish population. We studied men and women separately, distinguished between high- and low-fertility backgrounds, and differentiated whether the descendants of immigrants were offspring from endogamous or exogamous relationships. For most migrants who arrived in Sweden as adults, we found elevated first birth rates shortly after arrival. First birth rates among the second generation were generally close to but lower than the rates observed among native Swedes. Male offspring from exogamous unions with a Swedish-born mother tended to have less depressed rates of first birth than other second-generation individuals. Second birth rates were very similar across population subgroups but generally lower among immigrants and their descendants compared to native Swedes. Third birth rates were often polarized into high- and low-fertility backgrounds, when compared to native Swedes. While fertility patterns among the second generation appeared to drift away from patterns of the first generation, the second generation remained a heterogeneous population subgroup. Nevertheless, and as childbearing patterns of the descendants with one immigrant parent increasingly resembled patterns of native Swedes, exogamous partnerships can likely be considered an important factor behind this gradual family-demographic assimilation process.

Developments over time in the prevalence of marriage and cohabitation formation has long received much interest, but less is known about more recent developments for different population subgroups in European countries. This applies as well to Sweden, a country considered a forerunner in family-demographic change. In contrast, much attention has been paid to the falling birth rates during the 2010s, and explanations that focus on the role of increasing uncertainties. In the Swedish case, the fertility decline has been documented across all main socio-demographic subgroups. The objective of this study is to examine whether the same situation holds for first marriage and cohabitation formation during the 2010s and the exceptional years of the Covid-19 pandemic. Based on Swedish population registers, including with new cohabitation data, we present annual indices of first marriage formation (1991–2022) and cohabitation formation (2012–2022) across a number of socio-demographic strata. We demonstrate a continuous decline in first marriage formation since the early 2010s with an additional sharp dip during the pandemic and a post-pandemic recovery. In contrast, there was a remarkable stability in cohabitation formation during 2012–2022. Although socio-demographic groups differ in their overall levels of marriage and cohabitation formation, the recent trends are strikingly similar across groups. Cohabiting couples, across population subgroups, have become less inclined to transition their union status to a more committed level, as manifested by marriage or parenthood. This occurred in spite of a positive economic climate in the 2010s and stable family policies, indicating that other forces are at play.

This study investigates partnership changes and childbearing among immigrants and their descendants in the UK, France, and Germany. Our analysis of longitudinal data shows, first, significant diversity in family trajectories among immigrants and their descendants in Europe. Immigrants from other European countries and their descendants tend to cohabit prior to marriage, and their fertility in unions is often similar to that of the native population. In contrast, South Asians and Turkish populations exhibit marriage-centred family behaviour with elevated third-birth rates. Individuals of sub-Saharan African or Caribbean origin display higher rates of non-marital family transitions. Second, we observe some changes in partnership and childbearing patterns across migrant generations; these are stronger for fertility than for partnership patterns. Third, migration background is particularly associated with partnership patterns, whereas the destination country context influences childbearing patterns. We expect some patterns to persist across future migrant generations (e.g. preference for marriage vs cohabitation), whereas others are likely to vanish (e.g. large families).

Following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, many countries faced short-term fertility declines in 2020–2021, a development which did not materialize in the majority of German-speaking and Nordic countries. However, more recent birth statistics show a steep fertility decline in 2022. We aim to provide empirical evidence on the unexpected birth decline in 2022 in Germany and Sweden. We rely on monthly birth statistics and present seasonally adjusted monthly Total Fertility Rates (TFR) for Germany and Sweden. We relate the nine-month lagged fertility rates to contextual developments regarding COVID-19. The seasonally adjusted monthly TFR of Germany dropped from 1.5–1.6 in 2021 to 1.4 in early 2022 and again in autumn 2022, a decline of about 10% in several months. In Sweden, the corresponding TFR dropped from about 1.7 in 2021 to 1.5–1.6 in 2022, a decline of almost 10%. There is no association of the fertility trends with changes in unemployment, infection rates, or COVID-19 deaths, but a strong association with the onset of vaccination programmes and the weakening of pandemic-related restrictions. The fertility decline in 2022 in Germany and Sweden is remarkable. Common explanations of fertility change during the pandemic do not apply. The association between the onset of mass vaccinations and subsequent fertility decline indicates that women adjusted their behaviour to get vaccinated before becoming pregnant. Fertility decreased as societies were opening up with more normalized life conditions. We provide novel information on fertility declines and the COVID-19-fertility nexus during and in the immediate aftermath of the pandemic. 

Background: The number of confirmed COVID-19 deaths differed across countries and across waves of the pandemic. Patterns also differed between groups within a country.

Objective: We combine data on excess mortality with data on cause-of-death-specific mortality in the case of Sweden to identify which groups had excess mortality beyond what can be captured by analyses of COVID-19-specific deaths. We also explore the possibility that some groups may have benefited in terms of reduced all-cause mortality, potentially due to home-centered living conditions during the pandemic.

Methods: We produced and compared three sets of group-specific incidence rates: deaths from (1) any cause in 2020, (2) any cause in 2019, (3) any cause excluding COVID-19 in 2020. We compared rates across different socioeconomic profiles based on combinations of sex, age, marital status, education, and country of birth.

Contribution: We show that many of those who died during 2020 would not have done so in the absence of the pandemic. We find some evidence of COVID-19 mortality underestimation, mainly among individuals with a migration background. We also found groups for which mortality decreased during the pandemic, even when including COVID-19 mortality. Progression across the first and second waves of the pandemic shows that more groups appeared to become protected over time and that there was less underestimation of COVID-19 mortality in the second part of 2020.

Objectives This is the first population-level study to examine inequalities in COVID-19 mortality according to working-age individuals' occupations and the indirect occupational effects on COVID-19 mortality of older individuals who live with them.

Methods We used early-release data for the entire population of Sweden of all recorded COVID-19 deaths from 12 March 2020 to 23 February 2021, which we linked to administrative registers and occupational measures. Cox proportional hazard models assessed relative risks of COVID-19 mortality for the working-aged population registered in an occupation in December 2018 and the older population who lived with them.

Results Among working aged-adults, taxi/bus drivers had the highest relative risk of COVID-19 mortality: over four times that of skilled workers in IT, economics, or administration when adjusted only for basic demographic characteristics. After adjusting for socioeconomic factors (education, income and country of birth), there are no occupational groups with clearly elevated (statistically significant) COVID-19 mortality. Neither a measure of exposure within occupations nor the share that generally can work from home were related to working-aged adults' risk of COVID-19 mortality. Instead of occupational factors, traditional socioeconomic risk factors best explained variation in COVID-19 mortality. Elderly individuals, however, faced higher COVID-19 mortality risk both when living with a delivery or postal worker or worker(s) in occupations that generally work from home less, even when their socioeconomic factors are taken into account.

Conclusions Inequalities in COVID-19 mortality of working-aged adults were mostly based on traditional risk factors and not on occupational divisions or characteristics in Sweden. However, older individuals living with those who likely cannot work from home or work in delivery or postal services were a vulnerable group.

BACKGROUND

The downward fertility trend in Western countries during the 2010s is puzzling, not least in the Nordic region.

OBJECTIVE

In order to better understand its driving forces, we examine whether the decline is driven by differential behavior or compositional changes across sociodemographic population subgroups, for the empirical case of Sweden.

METHODS

Event-history techniques are applied to register data of the Swedish-born population to provide an in-depth analysis of the sociodemographic profile of the fertility decline.

RESULTS

The decline is confined to first births, with no apparent difference between individuals living in different types of municipalities or between those with fully Swedish and non-Swedish backgrounds. The first-birth decline is notable across labor market activity groups, but is somewhat more pronounced among those with weaker labor market positions. However, the shares of men and women who were active in the labor market and who had high earnings increased. The findings are strikingly similar for men and women.

CONCLUSIONS

For the most part the factors driving the Swedish fertility decline do not appear to be structural. Other forces, perhaps global, may underlie the general tendency to increasingly forego or postpone having children. The polarization in childbearing across labor market positions is an area for future research.

CONTRIBUTION

The study provides new insights into the conundrum of Nordic fertility decline during the 2010s.

In this study, we provide an account of mortality levels in Sweden in 2020, focusing on both excess mortality and mortality due to COVID-19 deaths.We present various measures of life expectancy for women and men based on age-specific death rates in 2020. Our measures of excess mortality are based on comparisons with benchmarks derived from a previous mortality forecast for 2020 by Statistics Sweden and observed average mortality rates during 2017–2019. We present data on regional and seasonal variation in excess mortality, as well as estimates of Years of Potential Life Lost due to COVID-19. We decompose excess mortality in 2020 into excess mortality due to COVID-19 and excess mortality attributable to other causes. We also provide some estimates on the impact of excess mortality in 2020 on the remaining life expectancy for different cohorts of women and men in Sweden. We demonstrate that the impact of COVID-19 mortality was concentrated at higher ages, and among men in particular. Conversely, some younger age groups experienced negative excess mortality. The mortality changes during 2020 caused life expectancy levels to revert back to those observed in 2018 for women and in 2017 for men.

During the 2010s, fertility rates fell across the Nordic region. The onset of these declines seems linked to the Great Recession of 2008–2009, but their continuation cannot easily be linked to subsequent economic change. The 1990s, too, brought episodes of economic crises to the Nordic region that were followed by different degrees of fertility decline. In this study, we provide an empirical overview of parity-, age- and education-specific fertility developments in the five Nordic countries in the wake of the economic recessions in 2008 and the early 1990s, respectively. We demonstrate a high degree of heterogeneity in fertility developments across countries after 1990, whereas after 2008, the trends are much more similar across the five countries. Likewise, the educational differences in birth hazards that characterized the developments after 1990 were much smaller in the initial years after 2008–2009. This reversal from heterogeneity to homogeneity in the fertility response to recessions calls for an expansion of theories on the cyclicality of fertility in relation to uncertainty and economic and social change. In our discussion, we consider the role of a set of factors that also incorporates the state, crisis management, and perceptions of economic and welfare uncertainty.