The Nam Theun 2 dam is an influential case of applying safeguards to mitigate social and environmental impacts from hydropower, being used as a model for large dams globally. However, these safeguards have produced mixed results. We examine the role of safeguards in hydropower, and how stakeholders have discussed its use. Based on a literature review and stakeholder interviews, we conduct a discourse analysis of narratives used to frame hydropower. We find four discourses being used for different purposes: Green Neoliberalism to legitimize, Ecological Modernization to operationalize, Green Radicalism to criticize, and Radical Incrementalism to repurpose hydropower. Whereas green radicalism in high-income countries challenges over-consumption, we find that green radicalism in low-income countries highlights environmental justice and shortcomings of conventional development models. We argue for a broader understanding of discourses to include Radical Incrementalism as one strategy for change of careful and considered actions over time.

Recent decades have shown the increased popularity of market-based instruments (MBIs) for conservation despite mixed social and ecological outcomes. This paper explores the extent to which two crucial MBIs, namely, ecotourism and sport hunting, are compatible with 'convivial conservation', a novel, integrated approach that explores conservation beyond capitalism. We developed an analytical framework of five key features for transformative change that can potentially contribute to conviviality: access and property rights, benefit-sharing, value operationalisation, institutional arrangements, and decision-making processes. We analysed the use of ecotourism and sport hunting in southern and eastern Africa in relation to the five features. Based on 'radical incremental transformation', we applied these features to analyse if, and if so how, incremental changes to these MBIs can be supportive in transitioning conservation towards (further) conviviality. With insights from our extensive research experiences in eastern and southern Africa, we highlight that the institutional design and contextual factors determining power relations are often more important than the choice of instrument in influencing its social and ecological outcomes. In conclusion, we propose a shift in the dialogue on conservation beyond its infatuation with commodification by integrating convivial elements into the design of conservation policies.

Humanity is at a crossroads inaddressingbiodiversity loss. Several assessments have reported on the weak compliance with the Aichi Biodiversity Targets by the parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). To address this lack of compliance, the challenges in implementing and enforcingCBDobligations must be understood. Key implementation challenges of the CBD are identified through a content analysis of policy documents, multi-stakeholder interviews, and participant observation at the recent CBD Conference of the Parties. Building on this analysis, the article explores the extent to which the review mechanisms of international human rights law, with their various strategies for eliciting compliance, can help to improve CBDmechanisms. The findings of this article reveal insights that the CBD can draw from international human rights law to address these compliance challenges, such as facilitating the participation of civil society organizations to provide specific input, and engaging independent biodiversity experts to assess implementation. The article concludes that insights fromhuman rights review mechanisms are useful for improving the emerging peer reviewmechanismof the CBD, which is important for strengthening accountability within the post-2020 global biodiversity framework.

Biodiversity offsets and no net loss (NNL) are important tools for the international policy focus on ecological restoration. In this issue of One Earth, Kajula et al. call for national, public offset registers to enable evaluations of biodiversity offset programs. Here, we argue that we also need to control the main drivers of biodiversity loss.

None of the world’s biodiversity goals from the last decade were fully met, as biodiversity losses are occurring at an unprecedented rate. Policies are not always effective; their use may have adverse effects on people and nature. Biodiversity offsets are an example of a policy that can be used to protect and restore biodiversity loss from economic development. Yet, offsets have been criticized for poor ecological outcomes, commodifying nature, and creating social inequality. To address this challenge, we need to learn from the shortcomings of biodiversity policies and governance as new goals are being drafted under the Post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework.

This thesis examines how biodiversity policies can be designed and implemented for effective and equitable outcomes for people and biodiversity. I focus on the design (Paper I) and implementation (Paper II) by examining economic instruments in conservation. I then broaden to the governance landscape by analysing the implementation of policies in national (Paper III) and international regulatory contexts (Paper IV).

The 4 papers cover a diversity of cases across the globe at different governance levels. Paper I conducted a policy analysis of offsets from six countries (Australia, England, Germany, Madagascar, South Africa, and the US), through an economic framing of biodiversity trading and institutional arrangements. Paper II reviewed market instruments for conservation, ecotourism and sport hunting in eastern and southern Africa, to analyse whether these instruments can be compatible with new ideas for conservation such as conviviality. Paper III investigated the politics around Mekong hydropower development, through multi-stakeholder interviews and a discourse analysis of the social and environmental impacts of a dam in Laos. Paper IV examined the implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and how review mechanisms of human rights law can improve compliance.

This thesis highlights that a human rights-based approach provides important conceptual and political support for biodiversity governance. It contributes to the science-policy interface with these insights. First, the institutional design and implementation are as important for the outcomes as the type of policy. In economic policies such as offsets, a high involvement of the market does not influence the level of commensurability, but increases the degree of commodification. Second, the contextual factors (politics and power relations) of policies should be acknowledged to address inequality. An institutional design and implementation that ensures meaningful participation and a balance of power is crucial for effective and equitable outcomes. Review mechanisms used in human rights help to navigate power inequities, by ensuring that all rights-holders have a substantial voice.

Third, offsets can be designed with different institutional arrangements (state, market, voluntary). If a market approach is chosen with biodiversity trading, effective monitoring and regulation is needed to safeguard biodiversity. Lastly, to foster compliance with policies, management and enforcement approaches can be used in a complementary manner through positive incentives, sunshine methods, and negative incentives. Overall, this thesis provides insights of how to meet our global goals for protecting and restoring biodiversity, while safeguarding people and nature.

Biodiversity losses are occurring at an unprecedented rate, with ongoing environmental degradation at the expense of expanding economic activities. A transformative change is needed away from business-as-usual development and towards prioritizing the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. For the effective governance of biodiversity, a well-designed mix of policy instruments are needed that are suited to the local context. This PhD project examines the social-ecological implications of policy instruments for biodiversity governance, with an emphasis on biodiversity offsets. Offsets are a policy instrument where actions are taken to compensate for negative impacts to biodiversity caused by developments. I discuss how such policy instruments must be carefully designed and implemented to ensure positive outcomes for people and biodiversity.

In Paper I, I examined how biodiversity offset policies, which have been commonly misunderstood as a market-based mechanism, can be designed with various levels of involvement from market and state. I presented an ideal-typical typology based on the institutions from which biodiversity offsets are organised: Public Agency, Mandatory Market and Voluntary Offset. I identified the institutional arrangements of six offset policies using cross-case comparison and stakeholder mapping to analyse how the biodiversity losses and conservation measures are decided. Based on these results, I determined how the six policies relate to the ideal types. The results found that the government plays a key role not just in enforcing mandatory policies but also in controlling the supply and demand of biodiversity units, supervising the matching of biodiversity values or granting legitimacy to the offset. The paper concluded that commensurability of natural capital is restricted in offsets (biodiversity is always exchanged with biodiversity), while different degrees of commodification are possible depending on the policy design and role of price signals when trading credits.

In Paper II, I examined the implementation gap of the Convention on Biological Diversity’s (CBD) objectives and global biodiversity targets at a (sub)national level. I identified obstacles to achieving the Aichi Biodiversity Targets and challenges faced in interpreting the CBD guidelines through a content analysis of biodiversity policy documents, participant observation as well as semi-structured interviews with experts at the 14th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the CBD. As compliance was found as a key challenge in the CBD, I presented insights for fostering the implementation and enforcement of biodiversity policies by drawing from concepts in international human rights law. In particular, I examined review mechanisms of human rights law and biodiversity agreements to determine the strategies used for compliance. The paper concluded that recognising the synergies between human rights and biodiversity can help strengthen review mechanisms for implementing the objectives of the CBD.The findings from Paper I provided a foundation for understanding the institutional design of national and local offset policies. In Paper II, I then broadened out to discuss the challenges faced in interpreting and implementing global biodiversity targets into national regulatory frameworks. Together, both papers analysed the institutional design and implementation of policy instruments, and examined their contributions to a transformation for the sustainable use of biodiversity.

Biodiversity offsets (BO) are increasingly promoted and adopted by governments and companies worldwide as a policy instrument to compensate for biodiversity losses from infrastructure development projects. BO are often classified as 'market-based instruments' both by proponents and critics, but this representation fails to capture the varieties of how BO policies actually operate. To provide a framing for understanding the empirical diversity of BO policy designs, we present an ideal-typical typology based on the institutions from which BO is organised: Public Agency, Mandatory Market and Voluntary Offset. With cross-case comparison and stakeholder mapping, we identified the institutional arrangements of six BO policies to analyse how the biodiversity losses and gains are decided. Based on these results, we examined how these six policies relate to the BO ideal types. Our results suggested that the government, contrary to received wisdom, plays a key role not just in enforcing mandatory policies but also in determining the supply and demand of biodiversity units, supervising the transaction or granting legitimacy to the compensation site. Mandatory BO policies can be anything from pure government regulations defining industry liabilities to liability-driven markets where choice sets for trading credits are constrained and biodiversity credit prices are negotiated under state supervision. It is important to distinguish between two processes in BO: the matching of biodiversity losses and gains (commensurability) and the trading of biodiversity credits (commodification). We conclude that the commensurability of natural capital is restricted in BO policies; biodiversity is always exchanged with biodiversity. However, different degrees of commodification are possible, depending on the policy design and role of price signals in trading credits. Like payments for ecosystem services, the price of a biodiversity credit is most commonly based on the cost of management measures rather than the 'value' of biodiversity; which corresponds to a low degree of commodification.

Ecological compensation (EC) is being explored as a policy instrument for the European Union's 'No Net Loss of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services' initiative. EC is commonly associated with the Polluter-Pays Principle, but we propose the Developer-Pays Principle as a more comprehensive principle. Safeguards that are relevant to local and national contexts are needed when addressing social-ecological resilience in the face of risks associated with EC. The operationalisation of EC in Sweden is assessed through two case studies: the E12 highway and Mertainen mine. The institutional design and implementation procedures are investigated through semi-structured interviews as well as an analysis of legal and other written documents. Using a multi-level governance framework, we examine four key disputed issues within compensation. Our results suggest that (i) Risk of a license-to-trash can be minimised; (ii) Complementary quantitative and qualitative ecological valuation methods are needed to achieve additionality and No Net Loss; (iii) Compensation pools may be a promising strategy to secure land availability; and (iv) Social safeguards are vital for EC in high-income countries as well, where they are currently understudied. We conclude that EC cannot be the main instrument for nature conservation, but rather complementary to a strong legal framework that protects biodiversity and ecosystems in addition to the sustained and equitable benefits of ecosystem services.

Hydropower development is booming along the Mekong river, with Lao PDR producing and exporting electricity to its neighbouring countries. The Nam Theun 2 dam in Laos is an influential case of applying safeguards, being used to justify support for other large dams. We unpack the narratives used by various stakeholders to frame hydropower development and their social-environmental impacts. We explore how different stakeholders perceive the role of safeguards in mitigating social and environmental impacts from development projects. Based on a review of policy documents and grey literature, as well as interviews from key stakeholders, we conduct a discourse analysis of the narratives around hydropower and safeguards. Our findings suggested four main narratives were used by various constellations of stakeholders: Green Neoliberalism and Green Governmentality to legitimize, Ecological Modernization to operationalize, and Green Radicalism to criticize hydropower policies. Whereas green radicalism is often associated with over-consumption, this study suggests that green radicalism in lower-income countries highlights the marginalisation of local communities and inadequacy of conventional development models. We also demonstrated the influence of dominant discourses such as ecological modernization and green neoliberalism on shaping societal perspectives on hydropower in Laos.