This brief examines how the global rise of autocracies is reshaping international cooperation. Itidentifies three major developments that challenge the foreign policies of democratic governmentsand offers guidance for democratic policymakers who seek to defend liberal norms, shape globalgovernance, and sustain public support for international engagement.The first development is institutional drift in international organisations. Autocratic and backslidinggovernments are gradually reshaping how these organisations work. They prioritise sovereigntyover transparency, constrain civil society participation, and use procedural mechanisms to weakenoversight. These changes alter the practice of cooperation without formally changing institutionalmandates.The second development is the growing role of informal governance. International cooperation isincreasingly carried out through informal platforms, networks, and flexible arrangements. Whilethese can be useful for pragmatic coordination, their weak rules and limited accountability makethem vulnerable to authoritarian influence. Autocratic states use informal governance to promoteilliberal norms such as absolute non-interference and sovereignty absolutism.The third development is potential domestic backlash in democracies. Public support forinternational cooperation in democracies depends heavily on who the partner states are. Citizens indemocracies prefer cooperation with democracies and are more skeptical of cooperation withautocratic governments. As autocratic states become more central to global governance, this canreduce the political space for democratic governments to sustain cooperation, even when it isnecessary to address global challenges like climate change, conflict, and displacement.Jointly, these developments show that the transformation of global governance is not limited toformal institutional changes. It also involves shifts in norms, procedures, and public attitudes thatcumulatively weaken the foundations of democratic cooperation. Democratic policymakers cannotassume that liberal norms will hold automatically. They must be actively defended both insideinternational institutions and in public discourse at home.To address these challenges, democratic policymakers should pursue three priorities. First,democratic governments in international organisations should coordinate more systematicallyamong each other to defend transparency, accountability, and civil society involvement. Second,they should engage strategically with informal governance by working to embed accountabilitymechanisms—such as transparency policies and civil society access—into informal institutions,while avoiding uncritical participation that risks legitimising illiberal norms. Third, they shouldstrengthen domestic communication about the necessity and benefits of cooperation with bothdemocratic and autocratic partners, explaining the costs of non-cooperation and framingengagement in terms of tangible national interests.

This article presents an updated and extended version of the widely used Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius (WTH) (2013) dataset on autocratic regime types. While maintaining the original WTH framework, this update introduces a new democracy threshold based on the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) and provides novel regime classifications for the period 1946–2024, providing a reliable tool for analysing long-term autocratic trends, regime transitions, and shifts between autocracy and democracy. We use the updated dataset to shed light on the current wave of autocratization and revival of military autocracy, particularly in Africa.

Multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs) have been advocated as new global governance mechanisms that could address implementation and emission gaps. Yet, there is limited knowledge of how citizens evaluate MSPs as means to policy implementation, especially in comparison with governance arrangements led by traditional actors like governments and corporations. This study examines how citizens evaluate climate policy proposals involving MSPs. Does it matter for citizens who are implementing policies? If so, do citizens prefer policies implemented by MSPs or other actors, such as governments or private companies? We argue that citizens are more likely to show support for climate policies that are implemented by MSPs than for policies implemented by single actors such as governments and business. To test our expectations, we conduct a population-based conjoint survey experiment fielded to over 6000 respondents in Brazil, the UK, and the US. Our main findings are three-fold. First, in line with our expectation, we find that citizens have greater support for global climate policies if they are implemented by MSPs rather than by governments or the private sector. Second, we find that support for MSPs in the implementation of climate policies is stronger among citizens who support collaboration between different societal actors. Third, we find that citizens – regardless of their political ideology, attitudes to the environment, and confidence in their government – prefer climate policies implemented by MSPs. In addition to these results, we also find that citizens generally prefer highly ambitious and cost-effective climate policy proposals. We conclude by providing some substantial implications for our understanding of MSPs.

This chapter focuses on the International Labour Organization's (ILO) efforts to promote decent work, examining its successes, failures, and the factors that influence outcomes. It explores which instruments and strategies hold the most promise for the ILO's future endeavors. Offering a novel perspective, the chapter delves into the ILO's enforcement mechanisms, extending beyond previous studies to include potential strategies and tools for labor rights promotion, such as declarations, the convention adoption process, ratification campaigns, the role of monitoring bodies, and technical assistance. It argues that, in general, the ILO's instruments function as intended. However, the chapter also highlights significant challenges the ILO faces in promoting decent work globally, especially in the context of global supply chains. It concludes by emphasizing the necessity of adopting new governance models to ensure decent work worldwide.

This review examines the promises and pitfalls of multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs) for sustainable development. We take stock of the literature on the creation, effectiveness, and legitimacy of MSPs and focus on recent research on MSPs committed to achieving the 2030 Agenda and United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The 2030 Agenda conceives of MSPs as vehicles to achieve large-scale sustainability transformations. Yet, research on MSPs under earlier sustainable development initiatives found that they had limited effectiveness and significant legitimacy deficits. We show that recent research on SDG partnerships suggests they reproduce many of the shortcomings of their predecessors and so are unlikely to foster synergies and minimize trade-offs between areas of sustainable development to deliver transformations on a global scale. We also examine recent research on the prospects of governing MSPs to enhance accountability and ensure better institutional designs for achieving transformations, highlighting challenges arising from international political contestation.

Does INGO climate shaming translate into actual climate laws, or is it ineffective in altering the behavior of governments? This article provides the first systematic assessment of whether and under what conditions INGO climate shaming can influence national climate policymaking. Drawing on social movement and NGO literatures, we argue that INGO climate shaming can incur reputational costs for governments through two main pathways: public opinion and transnational politics. To test our propositions, we generate a unique dataset on INGO climate shaming, utilizing natural language processing (NLP) to extract INGO climate shaming events from media sources, covering the period 1990–2020. We find that climate shaming is generally effective in pushing government to introduce climate laws. Particularly, we find that climate shaming is consequential when governments are trade-dependent and have committed to global climate norms. Our findings provide substantive implications for the global climate governance literature. 

¿Se traducen las vergüenzas climáticas de las ONG internacionales (INGO) en leyes climáticas reales, o son ineficaces para alterar el comportamiento de los gobiernos? Este artículo proporciona la primera evaluación sistemática de si las vergüenzas climáticas de las INGO pueden influir en la formulación de políticas climáticas nacionales y bajo qué condiciones. Basándonos en las literaturas de movimientos sociales y ONG internacionales, argumentamos que las vergüenzas climáticas de las INGO pueden incurrir en costos de reputación para los gobiernos a través de dos vías principales: la opinión pública y la política transnacional. Para probar nuestras propuestas, generamos un conjunto de datos único sobre las vergüenzas climáticas de las INGO, utilizando el procesamiento del lenguaje natural (PLN) para extraer eventos de vergüenzas climáticas de las INGO de fuentes mediáticas, cubriendo el período 1990-2020. Encontramos que las vergüenzas climáticas son generalmente efectivas para impulsar al gobierno a introducir leyes climáticas. En particular, encontramos que las vergüenzas climáticas son significativas cuando los gobiernos dependen del comercio y se han comprometido con las normas climáticas globales. Nuestros hallazgos proporcionan implicaciones sustanciales para la literatura de gobernanza climática global. 

Le dénigrement climatique des ONG internationales (INGO) se traduit-il en lois climatiques réelles ou est-il inefficace pour modifier le comportement des gouvernements? Cet article fournit la première évaluation systématique de la capacité du dénigrement climatique des INGO à influencer l‘élaboration des politiques climatiques nationales et les conditions sous lesquelles cela peut se produire. En nous appuyant sur les littératures des mouvements sociaux et des ONG internationales, nous soutenons que le dénigrement climatique des INGO peut entraîner des coûts de réputation pour les gouvernements par deux principaux canaux : l‘opinion publique et la politique transnationale. Pour tester nos propositions, nous générons un ensemble de données unique sur le dénigrement climatique des INGO, en utilisant le traitement automatique du langage naturel (TALN) pour extraire des événements de dénigrement climatique des INGO à partir de sources médiatiques, couvrant la période 1990-2020. Nous trouvons que le dénigrement climatique est généralement efficace pour pousser les gouvernements à introduire des lois climatiques. En particulier, nous constatons que le dénigrement climatique est significatif lorsque les gouvernements dépendent du commerce et se sont engagés à respecter les normes climatiques mondiales. Nos résultats offrent des implications substantielles pour la littérature sur la gouvernance climatique mondiale. 

Multistakeholder partnerships (MSPs) in global environmental governance are either praised for their problem-solving capacities and inclusion of various societal actors or criticized for their limited accountability and corporate dominance. Despite the lively scholarly debate and the continued promotion of MSPs by international organizations and governments, knowledge about how environmental MSPs are perceived by the public is very limited. Understanding the sources of public support for MSPs is important, given its crucial role in MSPs’ abilities to secure resources and achieve their goals. In this article, we evaluate whether and how institutional features of MSPs influence citizens’ legitimacy beliefs. Building on previous studies, we theorize which institutional dimensions of MSPs matter for citizens’ level of support. We conduct population-based survey experiments in Brazil, the United Kingdom, and the United States, encompassing more than 6,000 respondents. The results from the survey experiments have substantive implications for our understanding of the role of MSPs.

How do non-governmental organizations (NGOs) target governments for climate shaming? NGOs increasingly function as monitors of states climate performance and compliance with international climate treaties such as the Paris Agreement. Lacking formal sanctioning capacities, NGOs primarily rely on 'naming and shaming' to hold states accountable to their commitments in climate treaties and to ramp up their climate mitigation efforts. However, we know little about how and why NGOs engage in climate shaming. This article advances two arguments. First, we argue that NGO climate shaming is likely to be shaped by the international and national climate records of governments. Second, governments' climate actions can create contradicting expectations by both inviting and repelling NGO climate shaming. To test our arguments, we complied an original global data set on climate shaming events carried out by environmental NGOs. Our empirical analysis suggests that while NGOs are generally more likely to shame climate laggards, climate frontrunners may also be shamed if they engage in non-binding climate commitments. Key policy insights Climate laws and international climate treaties are central for our understanding of how NGOs target governments for climate shaming. NGOs are generally more likely to target climate laggards than frontrunners. Climate shaming is not only about whether but also how governments participate in global climate governance. Membership in climate institutions with non-binding commitments attracts NGO climate shaming. There is a risk that governments sign international climate treaties, without the intention to comply, in order to escape climate shaming.

The 2030 Agenda highlights the crucial role of multi-stakeholder partnerships in global governance for the achievement of seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Partnerships, it is argued, could potentially solve implementation gaps and address democratic deficits in sustainability governance, particularly by including various stakeholders. Previous research demonstrates that successful and legitimate partnerships depend on a set of factors, such as organizational resources, transparency, and inclusion of stakeholders. What type of partnerships have been developed and implemented in the context of the SDGs? What are the conditions for success? We address these questions by using a unique and novel dataset on partnerships related to seven environmental SDGs. We map and compare over 1600 multi-stakeholder partnerships and their specific characteristics to examine how they fare on institutional capacity, inclusion, and transparency, which have been highlighted as important factors of partnership performance. The findings have important implications for the success of SDG partnerships in fulfilling their promise to be transformative, effective, and inclusive in implementing the 2030 Agenda.

How and when do intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) promote incorporation of international norms in domestic politics? In this article, I assess the impact of the International Labour Organization (ILO) on national labour regulations. I advance a new argument regarding how and when labour regulations are shaped by the ILO. More specifically, I argue that the ILO can shape labour regulations during the preparatory process of international labour standards. I theorize that the preparatory period of international labour conventions constitutes a propitious condition for mechanisms of elite socialisation, learning and domestic mobilisation. To test our argument, we focus on national dismissal regulations covering the period 1970-2013. The findings provide evidence in line with my argument that states improve their regulations during the adoption process. However, I find no evidence that states improve their regulations after formal adoption. The results have substantive implications for our understanding of IGOs and labor standards in particular.