This paper discusses how incidences of unit taxes and ad valorem taxes are related to various market characteristics under imperfect competition. Incidence is higher the more competitive markets are. More specifically, it is higher the wider the firms' product ranges, the lower the degree of market concentration and the lower the degree of product differentiation, and higher in Bertrand markets compared to Cournot markets. Furthermore, the incidence is higher for unit taxes than for ad valorem taxes. The relative difference between unit and ad valorem tax incidence is larger the lower marginal costs and taxes are.

We present a model of the interaction between firms agreeing on a degree of collusion and a competition authority that simultaneously determines the allocation of resources to enforcement of anti-trust legislation. An increase in demand is associated with tougher enforcement and a lower degree of collusion. A stronger competitive pressure first decreases the degree of collusion and increases the level of enforcement, then increases both the degree of collusion and the level of enforcement, and eventually increases the degree of collusion and decreases the level of enforcement. Simulation results indicate that a move from the EU penalty regime to the tougher US standard with treble damages would mainly impact on the enforcement intensity and to a much lesser extent affect the degree of collusion.

This study develops a framework for the strategic interaction of firms that have to decide between adhering to and violating legislation. Depending on how deterring enforcement is various degrees of compliance with the law will arise in equilibrium. For an agency that targets a certain compliance rate more resources per firm should be allocated to industries with strong demand and high costs for adhering to legislation. Whenever some degree of non-compliance among competing firms can be expected, more inspection resources are needed in markets where products are highly differentiated and/or the number of firms is small.

This study focuses on the consequences of inducing compliance with environmental legislation through inspections in oligopolistic markets. Adherence to the law is associated with environmental gains, but also with losses in surpluses as firms incur abatement costs. By relating the net social benefit of deterring breaches of legislation to inspection costs, the impact of various market characteristics on the effectiveness of inspections can be assessed, thus providing guidance for environmental inspection agencies that have to prioritize among sectors given a fixed budget.

This paper discusses how marginal costs of public funds are related to various market characteristics under imperfect competition. Under a quite general tax scheme, these costs turn out to be lower the wider the firms' product ranges, the lower the degree of market concentration and the lower the degree of product differentiation. Moreover, marginal costs of taxation are lower in Bertrand markets compared to Cournot markets. In cases when marginal costs of public funds cannot easily be assessed we ask if pass-through rates can provide useful information for policy makers. The market characteristics that we analyze are shown to have opposite effects on pass-through and marginal costs of public funds. It is also demonstrated that the marginal cost of public funds is generally lower for ad valorem taxes than for unit taxes. The main results are based on a linear demand system, but a number of extensions confirm that our main results are reasonably robust.

We extend the work of Grossman and Shapiro (J Econ 103:79–100, 1988) on consumption externalities in prestige goods markets, and model a general aversion towards large levels of output interacting with an aversion towards copies in particular. These externalities play the role of protecting the market share of the producer of originals. We show that the well-established result under positive network externalities, that piracy is an equilibrium, extends to the case of negative consumption externalities. When externalities are pronounced enforcement should be strict, while in markets subject to moderate externalities there are no strong arguments in favor of a strict policy.

Målsättningen har varit att ta fram ny kunskap inom miljötillsynen och därigenom uppnå en effektivare miljötillsyn samt att få in nya vetenskapliga perspektiv på miljötillsyn.

I rapporten studeras metoder för inspektioner och det kommunikativa samspelet mellan inspektören och företrädare för den verksamhet som inspekteras, hur den institutionella ramen för inspektionsprocessen fungerar samt visar på möjligheter att mäta effekterna av inspektioner och tillsyn.

Naturvårdsverket kommer att ha resultatet som ett kunskapsunderlag i fortsatt arbete med tillsynsvägledning och utveckling av hur tillsyn och tillsynsvägledning kan följas upp och utvärderas.

The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (Naturvårdsverket) has financed the interdisciplinary research program “Efficient Environmental Inspections and Enforcement” (“Effektiv miljötillsyn”). The researchers are affiliated to Stockholm University, which is the responsible research institution, the Royal Institute of Technology (Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan), the Karolinska Institutet, and the Swedish Defense Research Agency (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut). The goal has been to develop new knowledge, thereby achieving more efficient environmental inspections and enforcement and obtaining new scientific perspectives on environmental inspections and enforcement.

The report studies methods for inspections and the communication between the inspector and the representative of the inspected facility, how the institutional framework for the inspection process works, and demonstrates the possibilities of measuring the effects of inspections and enforcement. The researchers involved in the program are fully responsible for the content of this report.

The Swedish Environmental Protection Agency will use the results as a base for its continuing efforts to improve inspection and enforcement guidance and to develop the following up and evaluation of inspections and enforcement and guidance.

The authors analyzed the implications of targeted advertising on the equilibrium level of channel profile differentiation (e.g., in terms of political positioning), in free-to-air broadcasting industries. When consumers have no preferences over program content (e.g., entertainment vs. news) standard Hotelling type results apply. Market forces minimize differentiation while the optimal degree is at an intermediate level. As preferences over program content get somewhat stronger, the difference between optimal and market outcomes is initially reduced. However, when preferences over program content get more pronounced, minimal differentiation suddenly becomes optimal while market forces lead to excessive differentiation. Hence, policies aimed at increasing diversity are beneficial only when viewers care little about differences in program content.

This paper first presents stylized evidence showing how the date of the adoption of competition policy is correlated with country size. Smaller countries tend to adopt competition policy later. We then present a theoretical model with countries of different size, trade costs, and firms competing à la Cournot. In the model we show that reduced trade costs following from increasing globalization affect countries differently depending on their size. This has implications for the incentives to introduce competition policy. The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical regularity presented.

Ce mémoire présente certains résultats qui suggèrent comment le moment choisi pour adopter une politique de concurrence est co-reliéà la taille du pays. Les petits pays tendent à adopter des politiques de concurrence plus tard. On présente un modèle théorique avec des pays de tailles différentes, qui ont aussi des coûts de commerce différents, et où les firmes se concurrencent à la Cournot. On montre que la réduction des coûts de commerce qui suit une mondialisation croissante affecte les pays d'une manière différente selon leur taille. Cela a des implications pour les incitations à mettre en place une politique de concurrence. Les prédictions du modèle sont consistantes avec les régularités empiriques observées.